IR 05000338/2017004
| ML18032A512 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/2018 |
| From: | Steven Rose NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Stoddard D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR 2017004 | |
| Download: ML18032A512 (21) | |
Text
UNITED STATES February 1, 2018
SUBJECT:
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2017004 AND 05000339/2017004
Dear Mr. Stoddard:
On December 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On January 17, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. L. Lane and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Steven D. Rose, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 05000338, 05000339 License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7
Enclosure:
IR 05000338/2017004 and 05000339/2017004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos.: NFP-4, NFP-7 Report No.: 05000338/2017004 and 05000339/2017004 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Mineral, VA Dates: October 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017 Inspectors: G. Croon, Senior Resident Inspector G. Eatmon, Resident Inspector J. Dodson, Senior Project Engineer (Sections 1R20.2, 4OA2)
P. Capehart, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.3)
Approved by: Steven D. Rose, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
Integrated Inspection Report 05000338/2017004; and 05000339/2017004, October 1, 2017, through December 31, 2017; North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and one regional inspector. No findings were identified during this inspection period. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operations of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) and remained so for the remainder of the quarter.
Unit 2 began the inspection period in a refuel outage. On October 7, 2017, the reactor was taken critical and placed back online. On October 18, 2017, the unit was returned to essentially full power operation and remained there until December 8, 2017, when the unit was taken offline for a forced outage. On December 10, 2017, the reactor was taken critical and placed back online and reached essentially full power operation on December 12, 2017. Unit 2 remained at 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the quarter.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Partial Walkdown
The inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a redundant or backup system or train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
The inspectors selected the following systems or trains to inspect:
- Unit 1, Auxiliary Feedwater Train B
- Unit 2, Residual Heat Removal Train A and B in Mode 5
- Unit 2, Primary Grade Water System Isolation Train A and B in Mode 6
.2 Complete Walkdown
The inspectors verified the alignment of the Unit 1 quench spray system outside containment, and the Unit 1 instrument air system inside the auxiliary building. The inspectors selected these systems for assessment because the quench spray is a risk-significant mitigating system and the instrument air system is important to various mitigating systems and served as a vertical slice review of a maintenance activity to assess whether different parts of the maintenance process work together effectively.
The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures, drawings, the updated final safety analysis report, and other documents. The inspectors reviewed records related to the systems outstanding design issues, maintenance work requests, and deficiencies. The inspectors verified that the selected system was correctly aligned by performing a complete walkdown of accessible components. The inspectors observed whether there was indication of degradation, To verify the licensee was identifying and resolving equipment alignment discrepancies, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, including condition reports (CRs)and outstanding work orders (WOs). The inspectors also reviewed periodic reports containing information on the status of risk-significant systems, including maintenance rule reports and system health reports. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05A/Q - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Quarterly Inspection
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program. In evaluating the fire plans, the inspectors assessed the following items:
- control of transient combustibles and ignition sources
- fire detection systems
- water-based fire suppression systems
- gaseous fire suppression systems
- manual firefighting equipment and capability
- passive fire protection features
- compensatory measures and fire watches
- issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees corrective action program The inspectors toured the following four fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Unit 1, Cable Vault and Tunnel and 280 Rod Drive, fire zone 3-1
- Unit 2, Cable Vault and Tunnel and 280 Rod Drive, fire zone 3-2
- Unit 1, Emergency Switchgear Instrument Rack and Air Conditioning Rooms with Battery Rooms 1-2 and 1-4, fire zones 6-1, 7B-1, 7D-1
- Unit 2, Emergency Switchgear Instrument Rack and Air Conditioning Rooms with Battery Rooms 2-2 and 2-4, fire zones 6-2, 7B-2, 7D-2
.2 Annual Inspection
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire brigade performance during a drill on December 29, 2017, and assessed the brigades capability to meet fire protection licensing basis requirements. The inspectors observed the following aspects of fire brigade performance:
- capability of fire brigade members
- leadership ability of the brigade leader
- use of turnout gear and fire-fighting equipment
- team effectiveness
- compliance with site procedures The inspectors also assessed the ability of control room operators to combat potential fires, including identifying the location of the fire, dispatching the fire brigade, and sounding alarms. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to declare the appropriate emergency action level and make required notifications in accordance with NUREG 0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (FEMA-REP-1)and Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Internal Flooding
The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and walked down the two areas listed below containing risk-significant structures, systems, and components susceptible to flooding. The inspectors verified that plant design features and plant procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal flooding analysis assumptions. The inspectors also assessed the condition of flood protection barriers and drain systems. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee was identifying and properly addressing issues using the corrective action program.
Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Unit 1, Cable vault and tunnel
- Unit 2, Cable vault and tunnel
.2 Underground Cables
The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and inspected the two areas listed below containing cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment.
The inspectors directly observed the condition of cables and cable support structures and, as applicable, verified that dewatering devices and drainage systems were functioning properly. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee was identifying and properly addressing issues using the corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Unit 1, Cable trench at manhole 01-EP-MH-25
- Unit 1, Cable trench at manholes 1-BLD-MBAR-5MH03 and 1-BLD-MBAR-5MH04
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
On December 21, 2017, the inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario administered to an operating crew as part of the annual requalification operating test required by 10 CFR 55.59, Requalification. The scenario involved a main feedwater impeller degradation, followed by a main condenser vacuum degradation, a PZR Level control channel failing high, a feedwater check valve failing to return to AUTO, and ending with a seismic event with loss of offsite power and ruptured steam generator.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- licensed operator performance
- the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators
- the quality of the post-scenario critique
- simulator performance Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual
Plant/Main Control Room On October 7, 2017, the inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during the Unit 2 startup from the outage. On November 8, 2017, the inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during the Unit 2 troubleshooting of Unit 2, B Control Rod Bank Lo/Lo-Lo Limit alarm. On December 10, 2017, the inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during the Unit 2 shutdown due to excessive RCS leakage. On December 12, 2017, the inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during the Unit 2 startup.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- use of plant procedures
- control board manipulations
- communications between crew members
- use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities
- management and supervision Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
.3 Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results
On February 17, 2017, the licensee completed the comprehensive biennial requalification written examinations and the annual requalification operating examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), Requalification Requirements, of the NRCs Operators Licenses. The inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations and the crew simulator operating examinations in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.02, Requalification Examination Results, of IP 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the issues listed below to verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory condition. In addition, the inspectors performed a review of quality control to ensure licensee was in compliance with their Quality Assurance Program requirements.
Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluations for the effluent radiation monitoring system (RM007) and the fire protection system (FP002)
- QC Sample - WO 59103118225, Replacement of 3/4-inch VOGT Check Valve
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities.
Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Unit 2, October 18, 2017, repair breaker for 2-FW-P-1A for pump status indication in Control Room and on breaker
- Unit 1, October 10. 2017, Main Generator AVR (1-ED-SW-1) oscillations in AUTO
- Unit 1, October 23, 2017, Perform relay testing (1-EP-BKR-15610)
- Unit 2, November 1, 2017, Channel calibration for station black out (2-PT-36.17B)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the operability determinations or functionality evaluations listed below for review based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the determinations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the components or systems remained capable of performing their design functions. To verify whether components or systems were operable, the inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specification and updated final safety analysis report to the licensees evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.
Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. In addition, a review of the control room operator workaround log was performed.
- Unit 2, 2-FW-94, B Main Feed check valve failed PT, CR 1077517
- Unit 2, Suspect 2-SW-MOV-205C is Leaking By, CR 1080579
- Unit 2, Personnel hatch malfunction, CR 1080718
- Unit 2, High oil level on 1C charging pump (2-CH-P-1C), CR 1081731
- SBO diesel expansion tank level is low, CR 1066776
- Unit 1, 1-SI-P-1B leaking oil, CR 1086669
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that the plant modifications listed below did not affect the safety functions of important safety systems. The inspectors confirmed the modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components. The inspectors also verified modifications performed during plant configurations involving increased risk did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated whether system operability and availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, and changes to documents, such as drawings, procedures, and operator training materials, complied with licensee standards and NRC requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with modifications. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- DC1519C, U2 turbine controls upgrade
- DC64767, U2 thimble tube and seal fittings replacement
- 0-GP-4.2, Extreme weather operations, Install space heaters in SBO diesel room
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.
- WO 59102428409, Valve In-service Inspection Associated with 2-EG-TK-2H for 2-EG-260, October 31, 2017
- WO 59103109220, Instrument air dryer inlet drain valve repair, October 16, 2017
- WO 59102448803, 1C main feedwater pump replacement, October 18, 2017 The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:
- Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness
- Effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed
- Test instrumentation was appropriate
- Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures
- Equipment was returned to its operational status following testing
- Test documentation was properly evaluated Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with post-maintenance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Refuel Outage
For the Unit 2 refueling outage from September 9, 2017, through October 7, 2017, the inspectors evaluated the following outage activities:
- outage planning
- shutdown, cooldown, refueling, heatup, and startup
- initial containment entry
- reactor coolant system instrumentation and electrical power configuration
- reactivity and inventory control
- decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling system operation
- containment closure The inspectors verified that the licensee:
- considered risk in developing the outage schedule
- controlled plant configuration in accordance with administrative risk reduction methodologies
- developed work schedules to manage fatigue
- developed mitigation strategies for loss of key safety functions
- adhered to operating license and technical specification requirements Inspectors verified that safety-related and risk-significant structures, systems, and components not accessible during power operations were maintained in an operable condition. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with outage activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
.2 Forced Outage
On December 10, 2017, at 2334, Unit 2 entered TS 3.3.3 for two trains of the reactor vessel level indication system (RVLIS) inoperable. The unit was shut down and repairs were made. Inspectors reviewed the repair plan for the RVLIS bellows and followed the implementation of the repair plan. On December 12, 2017, inspectors observed the startup of Unit 2, which followed repairs of the RVLIS bellows. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance tests listed below and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing activities adequately demonstrated that the affected SSCs remained capable of performing the intended safety functions (under conditions as close as practical to design bases conditions or as required by technical specifications) and maintained their operational readiness.
The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with surveillance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Routine Surveillance Tests
- 1-PT-34.3, Turbine Valve Freedom Test
- 2-PT-14.1, 1A Charging Pump Test
- 1-PT-71.1Q, Terry Turbine (1-FW-P-2) Pump Test Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection
- 2 GOP-52,2A, Increased RCS Leak
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the emergency preparedness drill conducted on October 12, 2017. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator to evaluate implementation of the emergency plan, including event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations. The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance against criteria established in the licensees procedures.
Additionally, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying emergency preparedness weaknesses and verified the identified weaknesses were entered in the corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PIs listed below. The inspectors reviewed plant records compiled between January 1, 2017 and December 31, 2017, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station. The inspectors verified that the PI data complied with guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures.
The inspectors verified the accuracy of reported data that were used to calculate the value of each PI. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- residual heat removal system
- emergency AC power system
- heat removal system
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
The inspectors screened items entered into the licensees corrective action program to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up.
The inspectors reviewed condition reports, attended screening meetings, or accessed the licensees computerized corrective action database.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed issues entered in the licensees corrective action program and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on all reports of seal leakage on plant valves and pumps on both the primary and secondary side of plant for both units. The purpose was to identify any common issues or trends for seals and seal leakage at North Anna. The sampling was performed during the current cycle as a representation of repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of inspector daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the 6-month period of July 2017 through December 2017, although some examples extended beyond those dates since the scope of the trend warranted such. The inspectors compared their results with the licensees analysis of trends. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents that were processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in the condition of structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing non-conforming or degraded conditions. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified. The inspectors discussed the results of their sampling with the licensee. The licensee had previously identified seal leakage trends several years prior to this sampling and have seen a reduction of seal leak occurrence over the past five years. The licensee continues to monitor and submitted a trend CR 1088383, Boric Acid on Various Components.
.3 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the following five nuclear condition reports:
- CR 1074806, Reduced Margin due to Temperature Derating of SWPH MCC Bucket Transformers/Fuses
- CR 1084540, U2 Reactor Vessel Flange Leak off High Temp Alarming
- CR 1085649, U-2 C Steam Generator Loose Parts Alarm The inspectors chose these samples because they were considered as high priority and were listed as conditions adverse to quality.
The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the licensees actions:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- classification and prioritization of the problem
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem
- identification of any additional condition reports
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On January 17, 2018, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Larry Lane and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- M. Becker, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning
- R. Evans, Manager, Nuclear Training
- R. Galbraith, ISI/NDE Supervisor
- E. Hendrixson, Director, Nuclear Site Engineering
- D. Hicks, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
- L. Hilbert, Plant Manager
- J. Jenkins, Manager, Nuclear Site Services
- L. Lane, Site Vice President
- D. McGinnis, Technical Specialist II
- B. Nevius, Supervisor, Nuclear Station Procedures
- R. Page, Licensing Engineer
- B. Raven, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
- J. Schleser, Manager, Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness
- R. Simmons, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry
- R. Simpson, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering
- J. Slattery, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- W. Standley, Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing
- D. Taylor, Manager, Station Licensing
- M. Whalen, Technical Advisor, Licensing
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
None