IR 05000338/2013007
| ML13135A406 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/2013 |
| From: | Curtis Rapp NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Heacock D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR-13-007 Errata | |
| Download: ML13135A406 (12) | |
Text
May 15, 2013
SUBJECT:
ERRATA - NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2013007 AND 05000339/2013007
Dear Mr. Heacock:
May 9, 2013
SUBJECT:
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2013007 AND 05000339/2013007
Dear Mr. Heacock:
On March 28, 2013, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on March 28, 2013, with Mr. G. Bischof and other members of your staff.
The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of plant equipment and activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team concluded that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems at North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 was adequate. Licensee identified problems were entered into the corrective action program at a low threshold.
Problems were generally prioritized and evaluated commensurate with the safety significance of the problems. Corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and addressed the identified causes of problems.
Lessons learned from the industry operating experience were generally reviewed and applied when appropriate. Audits and self-assessments were effectively used to identify problems and appropriate actions. One self-revealing finding was identified which did not involve a violation of NRC requirements. Enclosure In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). Adams is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Curtis W. Rapp, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7
Enclosure:
INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2013007 AND 05000339/2013007
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.:
05000338, 05000339
License Nos.:
Report Nos.:
05000338/2013007 and 05000339/2013007
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Facility:
North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Mineral, VA
Dates:
March 11 - 15, 2013 March 25 - 29, 2013
Inspectors:
R. Taylor, Senior Project Inspector, Team Leader R. Clagg, Resident Inspector, North Anna S. Ninh, Senior Project Engineer J. Quinones, Project Engineer C. Scott, Resident Inspector, Robinson
Approved by:
C. Rapp, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000338/2013-007 and 05000339/2013-007; March 11, 2013 - March 25, 2013; North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution Program.
The inspection was conducted by a senior project inspector, senior project engineer, project engineer, and two resident inspectors. One Green Finding was identified. The significance of inspection findings are identified by their color i.e. (greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, or Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP) dated June 2, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated June 7, 2012. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few number of deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors determined that overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensees processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.
Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
Green: A self-revealing finding was identified for failure to establish and implement appropriate periodic preventive maintenance for replacement frequency of the C4 capacitor on the Speed Error Amplifier card B (1A08D) in accordance with VPAP-803, Preventive Maintenance Program. Consequently, the C4 capacitor failed due to age related degradation and caused an automatic reactor trip from 100 percent reactor power.
The licensees failure to establish and implement appropriate periodic preventive maintenance for replacement frequency of the C4 was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the associated cornerstone in that a reactor trip occurred
Enclosure corrective action to prevent recurrence was to revise VPAP-803 to ensure that component level replacement recommendations are obtained from component manufacturer guidance.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to establish and implement appropriate periodic preventive maintenance for replacement frequency of the C4 capacitor on the Speed Error Amplifier card B (1A08D) in accordance with the vendors recommendations was a performance deficiency. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective in that age-related failure of the C4 capacitor resulted in a reactor trip. Using NRC Manual Chapter 0609.04, SDP - Phase 1 screening dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a transient initiator, but did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency was not indicative of current plant performance.
Enforcement: This finding did not involve enforcement action. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) and was entered into the licensees CAP as CR493091. This finding is identified as FIN 05000339/2013007-01, Failure to Implement Vendor Recommendations Causes an Automatic Reactor Trip.
4OA6 Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On March 28, 2013, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Bischof and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information examined during the inspection had been returned to the licensee.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Attachment KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel:
G. Bischof, Site Vice President F. Mladen, Plant Manager B. Anhold, Component Engineer J. Daugherty, Manager Maintenance F. Errico, CAP Supervisor P. Harper, CAP Coordinator E. Hendrixson, Site Engineering Director P. Kemp, Licensing Supervisor J. Leberstien, Licensing S. Morris, Engineering Programs Manager J. Schleser, Organizational Effectiveness Manager
NRC personnel:
G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector G. Hopper, Chief, Branch 7, Division of Reactor Projects
LIST OF REPORT ITEMS
Opened and Closed 05000339/2013-007-01 FIN 05000339/2013007-01 Failure to Implement Vendor Recommendations Causes an Automatic Reactor Trip
Closed 05000339/2012-001-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip Resulting From A Card Failure (Section 4OA3)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 4 ER-AA-PRS-1002, Equipment Reliability Health Report, Revision 7 ER-AA-SYS-1002, System Engineering Walkdowns, Revision 4 ER-AA-SYS-1001, System Health Report, Revision 6 ER-AA-SYS-1003, System Performance Monitoring, Revision 3 OP-AA-101, Operational Decision Making, Revision 10 PI-AA-10, Performance Improvement Process, Revision 0 PI-AA-100-1007, Operating Experience Program, Revision 3 PI-AA-200-2001, Trending, Revision 3 PI-AA-300-3004, Cause Evaluation Methods, Revision 2 PI-AA-300-3003, Common Cause Evaluation, Revision 0 PI-AA-200-2002, Effectiveness Reviews, Revision 5 PI-AA-300-3001, Root Cause Evaluation, Revision 3 OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Revision 9 PI-AA-100, Performance Monitoring, Revision 4 PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Revision 20