IR 05000338/1980030
| ML19290G621 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1980 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Tattersall A, Webster E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17150A124 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-80-30, 50-339-80-29, NUDOCS 8012180149 | |
| Download: ML19290G621 (17) | |
Text
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'o UNITED STATES l'
, mf[ n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o, i f[// E 3a REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST.. N.W., SUITE 310o
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AT LANT A, G EORGI A 30303 As
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Report Nos. 503-38/80-30 and 50-339/80-29 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company P.
..,x 26666 Rich...ad, VA 23261 Facility Name: North Anna Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7 Inspection at North Anna Site near Mineral, Virvinia Inspectors:
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E. 'If. Web s te r
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Ifate Signed
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fl38 fN tA t A. P. Tattersall
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'Date Signed Approved by:
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P. 'J.~Kellogg, Acting S(ction Chief, RONS
/ bate Signed Branch SUM'iART Inspection on July 12 - August 20. 1980 Unit 1 Areas Inspected This routine inspection by the resident inspectors involved 88 hours0.00102 days <br />0.0244 hours <br />1.455026e-4 weeks <br />3.3484e-5 months <br /> on site in the areas of surveillance activities, IE Bulletins, operational safety and licensee event reports.
Unit 1 Findings:
Of the four areas inspected, no items of n".icompliance or deviations were identified.
Unit 2 Areas Inspected This routine inspection by the resident inspectors involved 186 hours0.00215 days <br />0.0517 hours <br />3.075397e-4 weeks <br />7.0773e-5 months <br /> on site in the areas of near term operating license followup, emergency planning, low power physics testing, IE Bulletins, fire drill conduct, and operational safety.
Unit 2 Findings:
Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in five areas. One apparent dcviation was identified in one area (failure to maintain portable radios for fire brigade ure as committed to in the Fire Protec-tion System Review paragraph 16).
s o j u so/W
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employe-s
- W. R. Cartwright, Stati,n Manager kE. W. Harrell, Assistant Station Manager
- D. L. Benson, Superintendent, Technical Services
- J.
W. Orgen, Supervisor, Administrative Services
- G.
M. Stokes, Fire Marshall AD. L. Smith, Resident QC Engineer
- G. A. Kann, Supervisor, Engineering Services
- R. A. Bergquist, Instrumentation Supervisor
- D. M. Hopper, Health Physics Supervisor
- A. H. Stafford, Assistant Supervisor, Health Physics
'A.
K. White, Ergineer
- C.
E. Arrit t, Administrative Assistant Other licensee employees contacted included two technicians, five operators, and office personnel.
Other Organizations Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation
- A. W. Rychalsky, Advisory Engineer
- Attended one or more exit interviews 2.
Exit Interview The inspectior, scope and findings wer e summarized on July 18, 22, August 8, and 19,1980 with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The apparent deviation was discussed and acknowledoed by station management on August 8, 1980.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved items (338/79-45-04 and 339/79-54 c') Safeguards Area a.
Ventilation System Seismic Design.
The licensee completed the seismic support uodifications and procedural changes required to ensure operability to the SAVS exhaust ducting in a seismic event.
Paragraph 14.c discusses this item further and identifies further items to be tracked by IE.
This item remains unresolved pending resolution of FSAR section 9.4.6 and NPSQAM section 2 ambiguities.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved iten (338/78-30-03 and 339/78-28-02) Service Water Spray Pond Fiberglass Piping and Supports. Item 7.4(1) in the Technical Specifications of facility license NPF-7 dated April 11, 1980 required
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that VEPCO develop a surveillance test program for the fiberglass service water spray piping and piping supports that was in conformance
..ith the regulatory position in Reg. Guide 1.72 Revision 2 November 1978. Periodic Test 1-PT-75.10 " Visual Inspection of Service Water Spray Pipe Supports" and 1-PT-75.11 " Surveillance of Service Water System Reservoir Spray Grids" were reviewed. The inspector had no comments and this item is considered closed.
Unresolved Items Unreselved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 17.
5.
LHSI Discharge Lines Not Analyze d for Temperatures Below 70 F (339/80-17-10)
This problem has been previously discussed in IE Repert Nos. 339/80-17, 339/80-28 and 339/6v-27. During this period the inspector reviewed Stone and Webster let ter NAS ' 2, 530 dated July 28, 1980.
This letter confirmed that the calculations for the pipe penetration through Containment and Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump nozzles had been completed and that the calculated nozzles were within allowable valves.
The allowed LHSI pump nozzle loads were as specified in Westinghouse letter NAW-3591 dated July 9, 1980. This letter was also reviewed. This item is considered closed with regard to the issuance of a full power license, however the item will remain open to administrative 1y follow the revision of Unit 2 LER 80-1..
6.
Integrity of Systems outside Containment Likely to Contain Radioactive Materials NUREG 0578 "T!!I-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short Term Recommendations" Section 2.1.6a required that applicants and licensees develop a program to reduce leakage from systems outside containment that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to as low as practical levels. This program was to be imple-mented immediately and the actual measured leak rates were to be reported to the NRC. AdJitionally, a preventative maintenance pregram was to be implemented to mi:ntain the leak rates at the lowest practicable levels and to provide for periodic integrated leak tests at least every refueling.
VEPCO letters number 015 of January 10, 1980 and 490 of June 9, 1980 reported the results of the initial leak rate determinations.
The preventative maintenance program and periodic leak rate measurements are implementad in the form of geriodic tests.
These leters and the following periodic tests were reviewed:
2-PT-57.5A (A Safety Injection Pump); 2-PT-57.5B (B Safety Injection Pump); "-PT-57.6 Boron Injection Tank; 2-PT-64.5A (Outside Recirculation Spray Pump A); and 2-PT-64.5B Qutside Recirculation Spray Pump B).
The inspector had no questions and this item is considered close.
NSS Review of Emergency Procedures NUREG 06t J "NRC Actior. Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident",
Task I.C.7 requires that the NSSS vendor re'iew the Emetgency Procedures.
The results of the review by Westing'ause are provided in the Westinghouse letter to Mr. R. B. Bradbury. This letter and the comments were reviewed.
The inspector had no questions concerning this issue ar.. it is considered closed.
8.
NSSS Review of Power Ascension Test Procedures NUREG 0660 "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of tF-TMI-2 Accident",
Task I.C.7 requires that the NSSS vendor review the power-ascension test procedures.
The results of this review by Westinghouse are outlined in Westinghouse letter NAW 3585 dated July 14, 1980.
This letter and the applicable test procedures were reviewed and it was noted that the pertinent comments provided by WestingL use were incorpc< ate into the test procedures by " Procedure Deviation" forms in accordance with Section 5 of the Nuclear Power Station Quality Assurance Manual (NPS QAM).
The inspector had no questions concerning this item and this item is considered closed.
9.
Pressurizer Relief and Safety Valve Position Accoustica1 Monitoring System (339/80-17-02)
As was discussed in IE Report 50-339/80-20 the initial calibration of
" Valve Monitoring System" had been completed.
During this report the readjustment of the alarm setpoints in accordance with the vendors guidelines based on furtiier analysis of the installation at this site was reviewed.
ICP-2-VMS-01 completed on July 11, 1980 was reviewed and the inspector had no questions concerning these adjustments.
Based on this review license NPF-7 Technical Specification 7.3 (19) and open item 339/80-17-02 are closed.
10.
Post Accident t;ampling Procedures NUREG 0660 task II.B.3 requires the inst.allation of systems and development of procedures required for sampling tbs Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and Containment Atmosphere under pcst accident conditions.
IE raport 339/80-17 discussed the RCS sampling system. During this report period the inspector observed a walk thru of OP 12.2 " Post Accident Contain-ment Atmospheric Sampling System".
It was observed that the sample could be taken and analyzed as described in the procedure.
It was noted that the re 'iired 7" needle for sampling was not available but was on order. This item is considered closed for the purpose of issuance of a full power license, but the item remains open until all required equipment is on hand.
(339/80-29-01)
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11.
Low Power Testing (339/8C-17-05)
On July 16, 1980, the inspector observed por tions of 2-ST-8 " Natural Circula-tion Verification" and 2-ST-9 " Natural Circulation with Simulated Loss of Power Conditions." These test were performed in order to allow licensed persc.nel to participate and observe during natural circulation.
During the period of observation the inspector
. ted that: the test was conduct <.d
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in accordance with approved procedures; tu n.anning in the control room was in compliance with the Technical Specifications; all Technical Spccificati n requirements were complied with or exceptions had been granted by Amendment I to licanse NPP-7.
It was observed that each of the licensed operators was a:tivel" participating in the conduct of the tests and that they w-re afforded the opportmnity to observe different aspects of plant behavior during the tests.
At the completion of these tests all licensed operators.ad participated in at least one test and observed two others. This is in accordance with the com.. itment made by VEPCO and this item (339/80-17-05) is considered c1' sed.
12.
Control Room Design Review Prior to the issuance of license NPR-7 a review teara conducted an inspection of the North Anna Unit 2 Control Room. During this inspection deficiencies were identified which were required to be corrected prior to achieving variou_ milestones during the Startup and Test Program.
The following comments address the items required to be corrected prior to operation above 5% power. These items are specified in the Safety Evaluation Report horth Anna Power Station Unit 2 (NUREG 0553) Supplement 10, page IV-6.
a.
Control Room Noise This item was closed during the reinspection by the Human Factvcs Engineering Branch of the Division of Human Factors Safety, b.
Core Cooling Monitor Accessibility At the time of the initial inspection accessibility to the Core Cooling Monitcrs was restricted due to their location at the top of anoti er panel.
Subsequently, Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) 2727 was initiated to relocate the monitors to Main Control Benchboard Section 2-III.
This item is adminf stratively closed, but the item remains open pending review of E&DCR 2727. (339/80-29-02)
c.
Strip u.iart Recorder Deficiemcies Six questions were brought up concerning Strip Chart Recorders. The following areas were corrected and inspected, and are considered closed:
(1) The third scale on 3 pen recoreders obscures pee position and trend len (2) The trend recorders lack system labeling.
(3) The scaling increments on the recorder do not match the is.crements on the paper. After further review and discussion the following item is closed based on analysis of the individual recorder in question.
(a) Strip Chart recorder mounting location.
(4) The following two areas are closed concerning this review but remain open pending further investiga tion concerning alternative measures. These items are identified as open item 339/80-25-03).
(a) Computer Controlled Analog Trend recorders (b) Multipoint impact recorders d.
Review of tue Lamp Test Capability is discussed in paragraph 14b of this report.
e.
Design Convention Violations The noted discrepancies involvirig violation of stereot "ical design convention were corrected. This area is considered closed.
f.
Computer Outputs Three areas of concern were identified during this review.
(1) Sensor Point Addresses All computer point addresses are now indexed by two methods in the unit specific Computer Point Pecord.
They are listed by computer address and ystem. If it is desired to locate the oint by instrument number then the Instrument Manual is used. This document is controlled and is available adjacent to the Main Control Benchboard. Therefore, this item is considered closed.
(2) Computer Alarm Limits The Computer Point Limit Log has been initiated since the design review and was reviewed by the inspector. This log will be used ta record compater points removed f rom scan or where the alarm limit has been changed.
The inspector noted that this log had not been incorporated into the Station Administ rative Frc,cedures, and this point was discussed with Static > Management. This ifem is closed wit!> respect to the issuance of a full power licenm, but remains opt a p nding rev5sion of the Statior; Administrative procedures. Open item (339/80-29-a4).
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-6-(3) Computer Paper Takeup This item is not considered an issue for issuance of full I wer license and is considered closed.
g.
Hagan Process Contzollers Two areas were ocidered concerning Hagan precess : aut rollers.
(1) Positive Valve Indication Those valves which are required to serve a safety function, e.g.
the Pressurizer PORVs, have valve position indication separate from the controller. Therefore, this item is considered closed.
(2) Hagan Inverse Controllers Various controllers were identified as requiring an increase in power signal to decrease the contolled parameter.
This inverse relationship could lead to operator eror. The identified controllers were modified to provide a direct relationship between the process control and the contolled parameter.
This item is considered closed.
h.
Control Emergency Air Breathing Supplies During the design review it appeared that there were not a sufficient number of Emergency Air Breathing Apparatus in the Control Room.
Since that time eight (8) apparatus have been placed in the Control Room. This number is sufficient to provide for the operations personnel required by Technical Specifications for tw units in opeations. The inspector also reviewed the station " Respiratory Protection Manual" and records of completed training for the station. Eight operators were identified as not having completed the required retraining within the specified time period.
Six of those operators completed the retraining on July 25, 1980, and the other two on July 29, 1980.
Therefore, this item is considered closed.
i.
Switti Handle Protective Guards Protective rails were installed on all benchboards and protection was provided to switches on the two safeguards panels. Further inspection indicated that these areas requiring protective quards had been ade-quately protected. This item is considered closed.
j.
General Control Room Maintenance The items identified in this category are generally classified as housekeeping items.
Since the issuance of the Design Review report, there has been a general improvement in these items. For the past few weeks the inspectors have paid particular attention to these housekeeping
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items and have noted no further concerns of this nature. Therefore this item is closed with respect to this inspection, but this item will be continued to be reviewed during periodic inspections of _ne housekeeping areas.
13.
Visual Verification of Hydraulic Snubber Operability at Operating Temperature (339/79-26-02)
As discussed in IE Report 339/80-20 all snubbers on lines that have reached normal operating temperature and pressure, those that had deficiencies during ttf Hot Functional Testing (HFT) and those that were installed after (HFT) have been inspected and had the hot piston stroke setting measured and recorded. The snubbers on the feedwater lines will be inspected during the power ascension testing program when these lines reach their normal operat ing temperat ure.
This item is considered closed for operation above 5% power, but item 339/79-26-02 remains open pending completion of the required inspect ions prior to attaining 90% power.
14.
The following five items were identified as milestone items to be verified complete by IE in a North Anna 2 status letter dated July 28, 1980. Upon completion of these verifications, as indicated in the paragraphs below, IE endorsed licensing the North Anna Unit 2 facility for a full power operating license on August 20, 1980 at an open meeting of the NRC Ccmmissioners.
The license was authorized by the Commissioners and a full power operating license NPF-7, was issued on August 21, 1980.
' t aining Program for Mitigating Core Damge i
a.
NUREG 0660 Volume 1 Task II.B.4 and License NPF-7 condition 2.D.5.i outline requirements for training in Degraded Core operations. VEPC0 letter no. 576 dated June 27, 1980, describes the specific program, its content, attendance and examination requirements in detail. These documents form the basis against which t he program was reviewed.
The referenced VEPCO letter stated that all licensed individuals, potential Emergency Directors, Shift Technical Advisors and Nuclear Training Coordinators would complete this program at;d be required to achieve a minimum of 80% of the examination. A sampling of individuals in each of these categories was selected and documentaion was reviewed to determine attendance and completion of the required examination.
In addition, the examinations were reviewed against the answer key provided to access grading requirements.
The documents showed that attendance was in conformance with the commitment, the program conducted was as described in the VEPC0 letter and that personnel required to achieve a minumum grade did so.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
b.
Lamp Test Modification for Safeguards Panels The Human Factors Engineering review of the North Anna Power Station Unit 2 (NAS2) control room identified as one of its findings the inability of an operator to verify that position or status indicating
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lights were operable. \\TPC0 lett er no. 526 dated June 10, 1980 stated that VEPC0 would modify the two safeguards panels (2-3A,2-3B) prior to exceeding 5% power and would complete all remaining modifications for this testing capability as time permitted but in no case later than the end of the first refueling outage.
The portions of Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E&DCR)
P-2723-2 that modified existing hardware so as to allow lamptesting of circuits on the two safeguards panels were verified by reviewing the series of tests conducted to determine operability of the test circuit as well as the control circuit. The results of the checks performed on the lamp test switches, the relay tests, and the relay and component operability checks were reviewed. In addition the inspector verified at the control board that all lamps not normally energized could be checked using the Lamp Test switch.
The inspector had no further comments concerning this portion of the E&DCR and this item is considered closed for the purposes of issuance of a full power license.
Open items 339/80-29-05 and 338/80-30-01 will track completion of the remainder of this item for Unit 2 and Unit 1.
c.
Safeguards Building Exhaust System (79-54-06)
This. tem was discussed in IE Report 339/80-20 paragraph 5b (10). At the concluison of the inspection period the Central Area Exhaust Ventilation System (Vent Stack A) had been modified by DC-79-S87 and 1-AP-36 " Seismic Event" had been appropriately revised to provide instruction to the operator. During this report period a VEPC0 letter dated June 19, 1980 provided further information concerning the scismic qualification of this duct work.
DC-80-S39 provides the changes required to upgrade the supports on the Sa fegua rds Area Ventilation Exhaust to Seismic Category I.
This design change was reviewed with respect to the changes made to supports on the Unit 2 Safeguard Exhaust Systems and the installation of the new exhaust port.
This inspector also conducted a walk down of the system af t r completion of the design change modifying the hangers and installing the exhaust port.
During the walk down it appeared that the supports SH-442, 443, 444 and the exhaust port had been installed as modified, however locking devices had not been installed on all threaded fasteners as required in the design. Also, there appeared to have been no Quality Control inspection activities during the installa-tion of the concrete anchors.
Both of these items were immediately corrected by installing locking devices and retorquing the concrete anchors.
Both of these activities were witnessed by Station Quality Control personnel.
The area of Quality Control inspection activities after completion of construction, will be inspected further and is designated as open items 338/80-30-02 and 339/80-29-06.
In addition, 1-AP-36 " Seismic Event" was reviewed to determine that the procedure had been modified to include the recommendations of the design change. The inspector determined that the required information
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had not been incorporated into the procedure but upon disucssions with station management the appropriate revisions to the procedure were made and included in a new revision to 1-AP-36. Also, 2-PT-77.1A/77.1B was identified as requiring a change in order to incorporate the new exhaust port in the operability requirements.
The completion of the mcdification of the Safeguards Area Exhaust System hangers and the addition of the new exhaust port are sufficient to close this item for issuance of a full power license. Open item 338/79-45-04 and 339/79-54-06 will remain open to track the installation of remote capability to operate this exhaust port.
d.
CDA/SI Reset Function Errors (339/79-55-01)
This subject was discussed in IE Report 50-339/80-20 and open item 339/79-55-01 which remained open pending the completion of remaining hardware changes to TV-MS-201A, B, C, and 2-TV-102-l and 103, these changes are now complete.
Design Change (DC) 80-S20 was initiated to complete hardware modifica-tions to TV-MS-201 A, B, C.
DC 80-S20 was reviewed.
In addition 2-ST-23, a special test was written to test this modification as well as the reset features of MS-TV-213 A, B, C which had not been tested during the Preoperational Test Program, was reviewed. The inspector had no questions c:.ncerning this subject.
Design Change DC-80-S11 was initiated to complete modifications to 2-TV-102-1 and 103. The Design Change, the Implementation and Testing procedures, and applicable documentation were reviewed. The inspector had no questions concerning this item.
Completion of these two Design Chauges completes the changes to Unit 2 required to rectify the Reset Function Errors. Therefore, item (339/
79-55-01) is closed.
e.
Emergency Exercise on August 16, 1980 NUREG 0660, Task Action Plan - task item III.A.1 requires the perfor-mance of an emergency response exercise by the licensee to verify the capability of the state, licensee, and locai emergency staffs to respond to an emergency using the recently revised Emergency Plans.
At the NRC meeting on July 31, the Commissioners ruled that the emergency exercise must be held and the response evaluated prior to licensing Unit 2 for full power operation.
The emergency exercise was developed by the licensee and presented to the NRC on August 12 in a meeting at Bethesda, MD. The scope of the drill was considered somewhat limited by the NRC staff, in that in plant decision making was not expected. The licensee modified the drill
-10-simulation plan to recuire plant personnel to evaluate parameters and decide, using the emergency plan directions, what action was required by the plant.
The exercise was then conducted on August 16 starting at 6:30 a.m.
The exercise scenario and evaluation of the conduct-is discussed in detail in IE report 50-339/80-30. The seven deficiencies noted from this exercise were addressed in a Confirmation of Action letter dated August 19,1980 from NRC Region TI con fi rming the completion dates committed to by tl.e licensee.
The results of the exercise and the commitment to correct the seven deficient items an tha near future complete the requirements of task item III.A.1 for issuance of a full power license. Correction of the seven deficiencies shall be followed up in f ature iaspections.
15.
Auxiliary Feedwater System Reliability (Unit 2)
The Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for North Anna Power Station - Unit 2 Supplement No. 11, dated July 28, 1980, item II.E.1.1 paragraphs II A.1 and II A.2 require IE verification of procedure implementation regarding AFW system operation.
Specifically, the following items were commit ted to be covered by the licensee in their letter 825/092879 of November 2,1979:
Emergency action steps to be taken to insure an adequate water supply a.
to the AFW pumps if the Emergency Condensate Storage Tank (ECST) is initially unavailable, or, during operation of the AFW system, becomes inoperable.
b.
Procedures for plant startup or AFW system maintenance or testing require two independent ope ra t o rs checx AFW valve lineup to assure operability of the system is restored.
c.
Surveillance requirements of the AFW system include procedures for a flow test to verify the normal flow path from the ECST to the steam generators.
The inspector reviewed the following procedures to verify the above procedural steps were in place.
(1)
2-AP-22.6 " Loss of Emergency Condensate Storage Tank" (2)
2-AP-21 " Loss of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow" (3)
2-AP-22.1 " Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater System Alternate Lineups" (4)
2-EP-3 " Loss of Secondary Coolant"
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(5)
2-0P-31.2A " Valve Checkof f-Auxiliary Feedwater" (6)
2-0P-1.4 " Unit Startup Hot Shutdost to Hot Standby" (7)
2-0P-1 A " Pre-Startup Checkof f Test" (8) 2-mop-31.01 " Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2-FW-P-3A" (9)
2-M0P-31.02 " Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2-FW-P-3B" (10) 2-MOP-31.03 " Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2-FW-P-2" (11) 2-PT-71.1 "AI%' Pumps - Val. s and Turbine Driven Pump" (12) 2-PT-71.2 "AFW Pump 2-FW-P-3A Test" (13) 2-PT-71. 3 "AFW Pump 2-FW-P-3B Tes t" (14) 2-PT-71.4 "AFW Pump Logic Test" On August 14, the inspector informed licensee staff of the following deficiencies in the above listed procedures:
(a) Procedure 2-AP-21 had no direction for loss of AFW suction pressure or loss of ECST level.
(b) Procedures 2-MOP.31.01, 2-MOP.31.02, and 2-MOP-31.03 did not indicate two operator verification of valse lineup following maintenance on any of the AFW pumps, althocri two blanks were provided for ti:ese steps.
(c; Procedures 2-PT.71.1, 2-PT.71.2, and 2-PT-71.5 and 2-PT.71.4 did not require second operator verification of valve lineup follouing surveillance testing of the AFW pumps.
On August 19, the inspector verified procedure changes to correct these deficiencies had been uade and approved by the safety committee.
The irunector had no further questions in this area and closed this item, through IE Region II, as a limit on power operation below St.
16.
Fire Drill on August 1,1980 The inspector observed a fire drill rua by the plant Fire Marshall at 12:55 p.m.
on August I and participated in the critique held af terward. The drill simualted an explosion and fire in the 2-III battery room with an injured man in the Unit 2 cable spreading room. The inspector utilized the following references in assessing drill response adequacy in regards to personne) response, emergency equipment availability and use, communications, and training:
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Fire Protectian Sy.tems Review dated April 1, 1977, and Sup;,lements I through 3 b.
Fire Protection Program SER dated February,1979 Technical Specifica tions section 6.2. 2. f, 3. 7.14.1, 3. 7.14.2, 3. 7.14.5, c.
and 3. 7.15.
d.
Engineering judgement The inspector had several comments on areas which were covered by licensee observers of the drill.
The followup actions to the licensees critique comments will be reviewed in future inspections (339/80-29-07).
During the course of the drill fire team members attempted t'o get a portable radio from the control room to use at the scene. No portable radios were in the control room, although another radio was later located and used.
In the Fire Protection Systems Review, Supplement I dated December 15, 1977, response 15 b., the licensee committed to having four portable radios available for fire team use in the control room.
The lack of portable radios for fire team use deviates from this commitment and was presented to licensee management as an apparent deviation (339/
80-29-08).
17.
Control of Manufacturers Manuals During tours through the plant the inspector noted that there were a number of Manuf acturers Manuals left in various areas of the plant that did not appear to be under controlled distribution and were utilized by technicians during periodic and corrective maintenance.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion VI " Document Control" states in part that " Measures shall be established to control the issuance of documents, such as instruction, procedures, and drawings, including changes thereto, which prescribe all activities affecting quality".
VEPC0 Topical Report " Quality Assurance Program Operations Phase" VEP-3-A and the Nuclear Power Station Quality Assurance Manual (NPSQAM) section 6 implement this requirement.
The NPSQAM requires that Manuafacturers Manual be distributed through Station Records and that a complete and up to date distribution list be kept. At the present this distribution list does not exist. This item was identified in a Quality Assurance audit (N-79-12) completed April 19, 1979 and a reaudit (N-79-12A)
completed October 19, 1979.
In addition, the manuals do not indicate whether they are controlled. The inspector has not had sufficient time to pursue this matter to completion, as such this it em is considered unresolved (338/80-30-03 and 339/80-29-09) pending review of the licensee use of these manuals in safety-related maintenance, surveillance and troubleshooting, and further review of the corrective actions taken by the licensee on the quality assurance audit finding.
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Observation of the Conduct of Periodic Testing The conduct of 1-PT-31.1.2 "T/Tavg Protection Channel II (T-422) Functional Test" was observed by the inspector. The procedure and the conduct of the periodic test ?were reviewed in the following areas:
(1) conformance to Technical Specification requirements, (2) proper licensee review and approval, (3) calibration of test instrumentation, (4) removal and restoration of equipment to service (5) review and approval of test results and resolution of discrepancies (6) qualifications of test personnel and (7) conformance to schedule requirements.
During the observation of the test the inspector noted that where a specific input is required there is no tolerance provided for the input.
In one instatace during the periodic test the technician was unable to set the specififed input as stated in the procedure. During discussions with the Instrument Supervisor, after completion of the test, it was demonstrated to the inspectors satisfaction that although the exact input was not achieved, the acceptance criteria for the test was still met.
However, due to the fact that some inputs may af fect the acceptance criteria, VEPC0 committed to review all Periodic Tests and, where required, stipulate a tolerance on an input.
This same item is applicable to Unit 2 and these items are identified as (338/80-30-04) and 339/80-29-10).
While reviewing the qualifications of the Instrument Technician conducting the periodic test, the inspector determined there was no compilation of prior technical training, and certifications maintained to assure job assignments were properly made.
After discussions with the Instrument Supervisor it became apparent that this was the case for all technicians when employed through an outside agency, although individual training records were kept in the records vault. The Instrument Supervisor acknowledged this problem area and agreed to develop training records for these personnel. This item is designated as open item (338/80-30-05) and (339/8t.-29-11).
19.
IE Bulletins (Units 1 and 2)
The following IE Bulletins were reviewed and found to be not applicable a.
to the North Anna power station and were not transmitted to the licensee for response.
Licensee management was informed of this existence and subject matter and that they are closed for both units.
(1)
IEB 79-08 " Events Relevant to BWR Reactors Identified During Three Mile Island Incident" (2)
IEB 79-13 "Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities" (3)
IEB 79-26 " Boron Loss from BWR Control Blades" b.
The following IE Bulletins are closed following receipt of correspondence from NRC technical review groups of the technical adequacy of the licensees response, and inspector verification of the respons.
-14-(1) IEB 79-06,79-06A, 79-06A Revision 1 and 79-06C " Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island." The NRC safety evaluation dated March 25, 1980, combined with the emery y procedure reviews documented in IE Reports 50-338/80-10, 50 as/80-08, and on completion of the NRR emergency procedure review conducted June 20 - July 7,1980.
Upon completion of these on site reviews, simualtor exercires and in plant walk-throughs, all facets of the licensees responses had been verified as well as completring NUREG 0660 task items I.C.1 and I.C.8, and closing items 338/80-20-02, 33S/80-10-03, 339/80-08-01, 339/80-08-02, and 339/80-08-03.
(2) IEB 79-07 " Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-related Py.ing." ihe licensees response indicated that the seismic analyses methodologics found to be in error were net used at the North Anna plants. IE Review of calculation models that were used substantiated this.
(3) IEB 79-13, 79-13 Revision 1,
and 79-13 Revision 2 " Cracking in Feedwater System Piping" (Unit 1 only). IE has completed verifica-tion of the licensees inspection program and corrective actions as discussed in IE Report 338/79-42, and review of subsequent licensee responses, and finds them adequate.
ILB 79-13 remains open for Unit 2 pending completion of inspection requirements during the first refueling outage.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area.
20.
Licensee Event Reports The following events or problems were reported as prompt (14 day) LERs per the applicable units technical specifications during this report period:
Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Analysis Error (LER 80-61) Unit 1 a.
On July 8, 1980, the licensee reported that reanalysis of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow rates in certain accident conditions based on observed AFW pump head curves, indiceted that AFW pump 1-FW-P-3B may not supply the design limit of 340 gpm.
The analysis was conducted assuming worst case parameters nd trictional losses in the AFW system to derive flow f rom the given AFW pumps pressure vs.
flow rate perfor-mance curves. The result indicated that pump 1-FW-P-3B could develop only 335 gpm in this case.
The licensee promulgated Standing Order 56, which locked shut valve 1-FW-186, the recirculation (about 20 gpm)
was secured, increasing pump discharge flow.
On August 4, an NRC analysis of this event report recommended that the recirculation isolation valve be left open to protect pump 1-FW-P-3B from possible damage until the flow test was conducted. This recsmmenda-tion was based on known inaccuracies resulting from friction-loss analyses and the desire to maintain the pump operable. On August 7, 1980, upon being in fo rmed of the NRC recommendation, the licensee cancelled Standing Order 50.56 and reopened valve 1-FW-186.
Followup
_ _ _
.
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-15-on conduct of the AFW flow verification test (Test 1-ST-31), analysis of its results, and any necessary modifications to assure 340 gpm flow shall be conducted in future inspections. (338/80-30-06)
b.
Feedwater Flow Indication Error (LER 80-63) Unit 1 On August 8,1980, the licensee reported an observed error in feedwater flow indication of 3%. The error appears to be caused by fouling of the feedwater flow ventures which increases during continued plant operation, and causes the indicated flow to read high. This error is nonconservative in its ef fect on the steam flow-feedwater flow coincedent with low steam generator level trip function. As a result, the licensee changed the mismatch setpoints the solid state protection system by 5%
and changed the calormetric calibration procedure (1-PT-24) to use steam flow indication to calculate reactor power instead of feedwater flow.
The inspector reviewed tite licensees tren ! data which clearly showed feedwater flow indicati< a increasing with t ime while primary calorimetric data decreased.
The steem flow indication system, already used to provide safety signals to reactor t rip and safety injection systems, was also reviewed, as was Westinghouse letter VPU(JLV)-7 of August 7, 1930 which confirred a 3-5% feedwater flow indication error could occur due to feedwater venture fouling.
The inspector verified the steam flow /feedwater flow setpoint change made on August 9, 1980, and shall followup on permanent procedure changes and monitoring of feedwater flow error in future inspections (338/80-30-07).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area.
21.
I'lant Tours Touts of various plant areas were conducted during the inspection period in conjunction with other inspection activities.
The following items, as available, were observed:
a.
Fire Equipment Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppres; ion equipment.
b.
Houseiceping Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanliness levels in systems under of following testing. Observations regarding certain areas were given to station management who acknowledged the inspector's comment.
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c.
Equipment Preservation Maintenance of specialpreservative measures for installed equipment as applicable, d.
Component Tagging Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety or equipment [rotection.
e.
Communication Effectiveness of public system in all areas toured.
f.
Equipment Controls Effectiveness of jurisdictional controls in precluding unauthorized work or cystems tut led over for ini ial operations or preoperational testing, g.
Foreign Material Exclusion Maintenance of controls to ssure systems which have been cleaned and flushed are not reopened to admint foreign material.
h.
Security Implementation of security provisions for both Units.
Within the above areas, no items of noncompliance or deviations were observed when compared to the applicable station program and procedures.
,