IR 05000338/1980027
| ML19331B691 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1980 |
| From: | Burnett P, Quick D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19331B687 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-80-27, 50-339-80-25, NUDOCS 8008120598 | |
| Download: ML19331B691 (3) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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o 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 I
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Report Nos. 50-338/80-27 and 50-339/80-25 Licensee: Virginia Electric Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name: North Annc 1 & 2 Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7 Inspection at North Anna Site near Mineral, Virginia Inspector:
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Date Signed Approved by:
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D. R. Quick, SVction Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection Date: June 12-14, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 23 inspector-hours on site. This inspection was addressed to initial criticality of Unit 2 and witnessing of some of the zero power physics tests on that unit. Unit 1 operation was also observed and discussed.
Results No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
8008120508
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. R. Cartwright, Station Manager S. Harvey, Superintendent of Operations
- R.
Starr, Shift Supervisor
- J. P. Smith, Startup Supervisor C. T. Snow, Senior Engineer T. J. Kunsitis, Associate Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included four engineers and four operators.
Other Organizations D. G. McLain, Yankee Atomic Corporation B. Palowich, Westinghouse Electric Corporation NRC Resident Inspector
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M.S. Kidd A. Tattersall
- Attended exit interview 2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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Unresolved items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
4.
Unit 2 Initial Critical Test Part of the approach to critical by dilution of the reactor coolant system (RCS) Boron Concentration was observed. The initial critical configuration was bank D at 156 steps (all other rods out), 1330 ppm Boron in the RCS and RCS temperature at 546.6F. This result was acceptably close to the predicted
configuration.
Subsequently the tests to determine the overlar between source range and intermediate range nuclear instruments, to determine the power level for onset of nuclear heating and to calibrate the reactivity computer were witnessed. These were all parts of procedure 2-SU-17, " Initial Critical-ity".
Review of the completed procedure and the test engineer's log and procedure deviations that are a part of it engendered no questions.
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e-2-5.
Zero-Power Physics Tests (Unit 2.
The all-rods-out critical boron concentration was determined to be 1331 ppmB, which was close to the predicted value of 1322 124 ppm. The all-rods-out temperature coefficient was measured to be -0.69 pcm/ F.
Correspondingly the moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) is +1.43 pcm/ F.
A positive MTC is contrary to technical specification 3.1.1.4.
The licensee was in the process of complying with action statement (a) of that specifica-tion at the close of the inspection. That is, control rod withdrawal limits were being established to ensure that the critical boron concentration at any power level is less than that concentration which would yield a positive MTC.
In the interim the licensee was operating within the limits of special test exception 3.10.3 of the technical specifications.
Calibration of control rod bank D by boron dilution was in progress at the close of this inspection.
The associated reactor manipulation and data logging were observed on several occassions.
No problems were noted or questions raised.
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Unit 1 Operations Units 1 and 2 share a common control room. Observations on several occasions indicated that the activities on one unit were not distracting to the operators of the other unit. It should be noted, however, that the dilution of Unit 2 to initial criticality was halted when Unit 1 tripped. The Unit 2 test was not restarted until separation of activities between the units could be assured.
Monitoring of the reactor power distribution to detect dropped control rod rodlets was discussed with members of the plant staff and the corporate nuclear fuels organization. Their interest in searching out dropped rodlets from examination of the core power distribution stems from a quadrant power tilt that occurred late in cycle one contemporaneous with the discovery of dropped rodlets at Salem 1.
No dropped rodlets were found and control rod integrity was later confirmed by physical examination. Nevertheless they believe that by comparing observed and predicted power distributions that one dropped rodlet in an interior fuel bundle would be detectable. Two dropped rodlets would be detectable in exterior bundles.
The fuel vendors guidance on this problem has been limited to a general recommendation to look at the power distribution. The vendor made only nonspecific reference to experience with dropped rodlets prior to the Salem 1 events.
The licensee has not changed the frequency or method of power distribution monitoring to facilitate searching for dropped rodlets.
(However, the frequency has been increased to monitor the persisting, but decreasing, quadrant power tilt).
Contingency procedures have not been developed or planned for operation with dropped rodlets. The licensee has no spare control rods on hand.
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