IR 05000338/1980010
| ML19305E519 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1980 |
| From: | Burke D, Kellogg P, Webster E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19305E515 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-80-10, 50-339-80-08, 50-339-80-8, NUDOCS 8005200014 | |
| Download: ML19305E519 (6) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SulTE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report Nos. 50-338/80-10 and 50-339/80-08 Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Company P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name: North Anna Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4 and CPPR-78 Inspection at North a ite ne Mineral, Virginia Inspectors:
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d' M - RONS Branch Date~Sitned SUMMARY II Inspection on February 19-22, 1980 Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection invelved 56 inspector-hours on site in the areas of small break loss of coolant procedures and training, and the reactor trip of February 20.
Results Of the three areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie _......
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. R. Cartwright, Station Manager
- J. D. Kellams, Superintendent - Operations
- S. L. Harvey, Operations Supervisor
- S. D. Dodds, Nuclear Training Supervisor
- E. R. Smith, Superintendent - Technical Services
- W. R. Madison, NRC Coordinator Other licensee employees contacted included 7 operators, and 4 office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector M. S. Kidd
- A.
P. Tattersall
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 22, 1960 with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above.
Inspection 1:ndings were presented at that time, however, the licensee commitments were discussed
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subsequent to the inspection. Due to the use of identical procedures in
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Units 1 and 2 and the NRC requirement for vendor review of Unit 2 emergency procedures prior to an unrestricted operating licensee being issued, the commitments for several issues have been identified for resolution upon receipt of the vendor review comments.
It is anticipated that the comments in paragraphs 5 and 6 which are so identified shall be factored into both the Unit I and Unit 2 procedures, with any vendor recommendations, or be justified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Small Break Loss of Coolant Procedure Review j
The inspectors reviewed the emergency procedures invclved with a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure and discussed them with licensee management. The procedures listed below were compared to the Westinghouse guidelines of November 2, 1979 and reviewed for clarity, completeness in
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direction of operator actions, and correctness in regard to actions speciiied
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and approved in the Westinghouse guidelines. As indicated in the November 5, 1977 NRC letter to the Westinghouse Owners Group, implementation of emergency procedures developed in accordance witu the approved vendor guidelines and associated training was to be completed by all Westinghouse design plant licensees by December 31, 1979.
EP-1 Reactor Trip EP-2 Loss of Reactor Coolant Accident
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EP-3 Loss of Secondary Coolant EP-4 Steam Generator Tube Rupture EP-5 Safety Injection In comparison of these procedures to the Westinghouse guidelines and the guidelines of Westinghouse letter OG-17, the inspectors had the following significant comments:
The RCS pressures at which reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) are to be a.
manually tripped in procedures EP-4 and EP-5 appear to be below the Westinghouse guidelines as prescribed in letter 0G-17.
This pressure is to be established by each licensee in accordance with a formula which, according to a North Anna Engineering Study, number 79-71 dated December 27, 1979, would establish 1485 psig as the RCS pressure at which RCP's should be secured. Procedures EP-4 and EP-5 direct the RCP's be secured at an RCS pressure of 1250 psig.
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Procedure EP-2, Loss of Coolant Accident, step 4.10 directs the operator l
to restart RCP's if RCS pressure is greater than 1485 psig and all of the starting precautions and limitations are met. Due to the consequences of continued RCP operation in an LOCA scenario resulting in core uncovery upon loss of RCP's (RCP's are not powered from an emergency
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electrical bus and therefore, may lose power at any time during an accident), this action appears to be contrary to the Westinghouse guidelines
Subsequent to the inspection, the licensee committed to reanalyze both j
of the above concerns and either demonstrate their safety or change
the subject y edures by March 14, 1980. This item shall be followed f
up (338/80-l' - 1 and 339/80-08-01) prior to licensing action on Unit
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2.
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Otner concerns, as listed below, were also discussed with licensee l
management for inclusion in any procedure changes which are made as a j
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result of the vendor procedure review now in progress.
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All 5 procedures have the note to trip RCP's at a certain pressure
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i under "Long Tern Operator Action", whereas the Westinghouse l
guidelines specify this action as Immediate Operator Action.
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l EP-5 Safety Injection step 4.4 lists 4 criteria which must be met
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j to terminate safety injection. _Three other criteria, listed in I
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t the Westinghouse guideline E-0, step D.7 as a.
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are not included in EP-5 step 4.4.
EP-1 Reactor Trip, attachment 1, Diagnostic Checklist, appears to
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assume a small main steam line rupture inside containment in the indications expected. The containment recirculation sump level does not indicate it may read high on a main steam line break, and the steam generator level indications are indicated to be
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increasing, which does not appear to be a meaningful item to note for diagnostic use.
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Several other more minor administrative changes were discussed with licensee management. These comments involved relocating notes, additions to notes and typ> graphical errors. The philosophy
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of maintaining these procedures clear and non-cumbersome also generated several comments which the licensee agreed to consider.
The above listed items shall be followed up once the vendor review comments are finalized (338/80-10-02 and 339/80-08-02).
6.
Small Break Loss of Coolant Operator Interviews The inspectors interviewed six licensed operators, including two senior reactor opreators and four reactor operators, and the station manager. The interviews were performed to determine the adequacy of the subject procedures from a functional standpoint and the effectiveness of the training program.
The following areas were covered:
a.
Understanding of small break LOCA.
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b.
Differentiation between loss of coolant accidents (LOCA's) and other depressurization events.
Familiarity with the SBLOCA procedures.
c.
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Operator knowledge of appropriate related procedures and their bases.
Knowledge of transient response characteristics necessary to guide the
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licensed operator to the correct procedure.
f.
Evaluation of any individual or generic deficiencies.
g.
Walk-throughs of the procedures including system-related aspects of
the procedures to ensure that the licensed operator actions could be
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performed.
h.
Confirmation that the appropriate procedures immediate actions were memorized.
i.
Understanding of the procedures subsequent actions and precautions
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that ensure plant safety.
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Recognition of the importance of the primary and backup heat sinks.
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Ability to recognize adequate subcooling and core voiding, importance of subcooled versus saturated conditions, indications of inadequate core cooling and implementation of natural circulation.
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Recognition of possible instrumentation abnormalities including those encountered during the TMI transient and and environmental considera-tions.
Supervisory techniques in assisting and directing accident recovery m.
actions.
Based on the operator interviews in the above areas, the inspectors deter-mined that the licensee's SBLOCA procedure and training on it were adequate.
However, based on the responses from these interviews and walk-throughs, the inspectors recommended the following items for inclusion in the training program and possibly in the procedures.
Personnel did not appear aware of the affect of loss of auxiliary a.
feedwater (AFW) pump supply on continued AFW system operation.
Training and/or procedure modification to make the operators aware of the potential to damage AFW pumps due to loss of suction pressure / water supply appears necessary.
b.
Personnel did not appear aware of the reasons why RCP's are secured on a low pressure transient or how the pressure at which RCP's are secured was determined. Marginal knowledge on LOCA transient conditions (pressure vs. break flow vs. SI flow during the transient) was displayed.
It appears that training on SBLOCA transient analyses is necessary.
Personnel were not familiar with some of the new equipment installed c.
as a result of NUREG 0578. Lack of knowledge of these systems design and indication reliability directly affects their ability to respond to depressurization transients Many of these instruments were installed within a month of the inspection. Use of the required reading file to train the operators does not appear to be sufficient to transmit the required level of knowledge to the operators, therefore, more formal
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training on recent design changes appears to be necessary.
d.
Management personnel who are designated to be directing plant operations in emergency conditions are not receiving the appropriate level of training of plant transient theory, changing industry standards, and details of emergency procedures. A program to ensure this training occurs on a continuing basis appears necessary. A similar item was identified in IE Report 339/80-10 and is identified for followup as (339/80-10-06) for Unit 2 only.
The above items will be followed up in subsequent inspections (338/80-10-03 and 339/80-08-03).
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7.
Small Break Loss of Coolant Training The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records of training given to licensed operators on the topics of transient analyses, Three Mile Island (TMI)
lessons learned, emergency procedure revisions, and any practical workup in these areas. The following training was documented as completed.
THI Lessons Learned lectures given by NRC: April 21, 1979 a.
b.
TMI Lessons Learned plant implementation seminars: May 4 through 20, 1979.
TMI accident simulator training: May 2 through June 6, 1979.
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d.
Accident control '- 'ures and quizes: June 13 through July 3, 1979.
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Average quiz graos 1 with 2 operators scoring less than 80% and receiving adequate retraining.
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TMI Self-study using handouts: September, 1979.
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TMI internal audit exam: October, 1979, average grade 92% with 7 operators scoring less than 93% and receiving adequate retraining.
g.
Accident simulator training: November 26 through December 21, 1979.
With the exception of those items noted in paragraph 6 above, this training program appeared to be adequate.
8.
Small Break Loss of Coolant-System Considerations
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The inspectors reviewed system-related aspects of procedures to ensure that operator actions required subsequent to an SBLOCA could be perforned.
System considerations in the following areas were reviewed:
Instrumentation to carry out operator actions in the SBLOCA procedure.
a.
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Power opereted relief valve position indication.
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Equipment response to safety injection reset.
c.
d.
Safety injection effects ca containment isolation.
Real-time consideration of SBLOCA procedure actions, including adequate e.
time to switch over from injection to recirculation modes,
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Protection of high head safety injection pump against deadheading in the recirculation modes.
j No problems were identified with system considerations reviewed.
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