IR 05000339/1980010
| ML19309G898 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1980 |
| From: | Allenspach F, Ewald S, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309G894 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-339-80-10, NUDOCS 8005070748 | |
| Download: ML19309G898 (11) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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<r REGION 11
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 D00 070 (
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Report No. 50-339/80-10 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261 Facility Name: North Anna Unit 2 Docket No. 50-339 License N,.
CPPR-78 Inspection at North site near Mineral, Virginia and Corporate Offices, Richmond, Virginia Inspectors:
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Da'te Signed Accompanying Pers e:
A. Dromerick, B. Clayton, J. Snell and A. Tattersall Approved by:
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C / f / en Chief, RONS Branch Da'te $igned s
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SUMMARY Inspection o'n February 20-22, 1980 Areas Inspected l
This special, announced inspection involved 96 inspector-hours on site in the areas of shift technical advisor, augmentation of plant staff for startup test program, independent safety review function, on site and off site managment l
organization and technical capability, the on site operations support and l
technical support centers, and health physics organization and management.
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Results Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were i
identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted License Employees
- J. Ahladas, Director, Production Operations and Maintenance Support
- E. Ashby Baum, Executive Manager Licensing and QA
- J. Benton, Director, Production Technical Support W. Cameron, Superintendent, Technical Services
- W. Cartwright, Station Manager W. Daley, Manager Production Operations S. Dodds, Training Supervisor
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- J. Ferguson, Executive Vice President, Power
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L. Goodrich, Mechanical Supervisor
- J. Hanson, Jr., Supervisor Production Program Division J. Harper, Instrument Supervisor E. Harrell, Superintendent Maintenance S. Harvey, Operating Supervisor J. Hopper, Supervisor Health Physics J. Horton, Supervisor Chemistry G. Kann, Engineering Supervisor J. Kellams, Superintendent Operations D. Roth, Engineering Supervisor S. Sarver, System Health Physicist E. Smith, Superintendent Technical Services
- C. Stallings, Vice President Power Supply and Production Operations
- B. Sylvia, Director Nuclear Operations D. Thomas, Electrical Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included two operators, two assistant HP supervisors and three office personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 22, 1980 with
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those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items
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Unresolved' items were not identified during this inspection.
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Shift Technical Advisor The objective of this portion of the inspection was to determine whether the licensee was prepared to implement the shift technical advisor (STA)
staffing requirement / commitment by time of issuance of an operating license for Unit 2.
a.
Documents Reviewed The following reference and licensee documents were reviewed and
discussed:
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(1) NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 lessons learned Task Force Status Report and Short Tern Recommendations" dated July 1979.
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(2) Clarifying documents for NUREG-0578 dated October 30 and November 9, 1979.
(3) American National Standards (ANS) draft revision 3.1 of December 6,
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1979 entitled " Standard for Qualification and Training of Personnel l
for Nuclear Power Plants"
(4) Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) North Anna Power Station Administrative Procedure ADM-29.3, " Conduct of Operations" December 12, 1979.
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l (5) VEPCO North Anna Power Station Administrative Procedure ADM-1.0,
" Station Organization and Responsibility" dated January 28, 1980.
(6) VEPCO responses to NUREG-0578 dated August 8, August 24, October 31 i
i and November 26, 1979 and January 10, 1980.
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Findings (1) No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area.
(2) Pursuant to commitments made relative to the operating unit (Unit 1) Shift Technical Advisers (STA) are in place and on shift. As
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further detailed in the applicant's responses listed above, assigned STA's are licensed Senior Reactor Operators without degrees.
(3) Vepco has committed to a comprehensiv$ training program for STA's which will be completed by January 1, 1981. The program had not been developed or initated at the time of this inspection, accordingly, assigned STA's do not conform to the qualification and training requirements of ANS 3.1(December 1979 draft).
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-3-V (4) Shift Technical Advisor duties and responsbilities are detailed in station administrative procedures and appear to be.un.derstood by STA personnel interviewed.
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(5) The applicant has sufficient senior operator licensed personnel to man four shifts with a Shift Supervisor, an Assistant Shift Supervisor and a Shift Technical Advisor. Following a review by corporate management, the applicant has elected not to provide a shift clerk or administrative aide. Some shift administrative duties are assumed by the STA.
6.
On Site Organization and Technical Capability The objective of this part of the inspection was to review the management and technical capabilty of the North Anna, Unit 2 nuclear plant staff.
In performing this task we reviewed the plant staff organizationa arrangement, responsibility, authority, and qualifications of plant staff principal l
persone-1, shift crew composition and interfacing of principal personnel with off site groups supporting the operation of the North Anna nuclear plant, a.
Documents Reviewed The following reference and licensee documents were reviewed and discussed:
(1) North Anna Nuclear Plant FSAR Section 13 (2) Regulatory Guide 1.8 (3) Draft ANS 3.1 dated 12/6/79 (4) Site Emergency Plan (5) Revised Site Emergency Plan dated December 10, 1979.
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Findings
l (1) No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area.
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L (2) The Operating Supervisor, as shown in Figure 13.1.2-2 of the North Anna FSAR, will not have Senior Reactor Operator license on
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Unit 2 at the time of operating license issuance. This item will
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remain open pending further review by the NRC (50-339/80-10-01).
(3) Procedures for the evaluation and dissemination of operating experiences have not been formalized and implemented. This item j
will remain open pending review and verification of implementation l
of the procedures during a subsequent inspection (50-339/80-10-02).
(4) The procedures for " restrictions on use of.gvertime" are not formalized or implemented. This item will Remain open pending review and verification of implementation of the procedures during a subsequent inspection (50-339/80-10-03).
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-4-(5) TheSiteEmergencyPlandoesnotestablishspecifihlinesof i
authority and responsibility for those persons reporting to the site to provide technical support to the plant staff i'n the event
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of an emergency. This item will remain open pending review of
procedures which define the responsibility of persons reporting to the site during a subsequent inspection (50-339/80-10-04).
(6) The Site Emergency Plan does not clearly delineate the members or responsbility of the Emergency Committee. This item will remain open pending review of procedures which delineate the authority and responsibility of the Emergency Committee during a subsequent inspection (50-339/80-10-05).
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Independent Safety Review Function The objection of this portion of the inspection was to determine that the licensee has established or plans to establish an on site safety review group to perform reviews of plant operational activities and engineering evaluation of the operating history of the plant and plants of similar design a.
Documents Reviewed i
(1) ADM-1.0 Station Organization and Responsibilities dated 1-28-80.
(2) ADM-29-1 Conduct of Operations dated 2-12-79.
(3) ADM-29-3 Conduct of Operations dated 12-12-79.
(4) Letters from VEPCO to Mr. H. R. Denton dated 10-25-79, 8-24-79, 11-26-79 and 1-10-80.
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b.
Findings The following findings include information about the licensee's current program for independent reviews and evaluations.
(1) No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified in this
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(2) The licensee's Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNSOC) provides on site reviews of plant operations. The review
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responsibilities of the SNSOC are contained in the plant Technical Specifications.
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(3) An Operations Assessment Coordinator (OAC) is stationed at the site with responsibilities for reviewing North Anna and industry
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operating experiences. He will insure that any information which t
is pertinent to improving station operation ( is disseminated to
the appropriate departments within the stati6n. He will be a h
member of the Station Safety Assessment Staff.
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(4) The licensee is in the process of establishing a Safety Assessment Staff (SAS). The SAS will be comprised of a system level staff of 4-5 persons and a staff of 2-3 persons at each station. The functis.s of the staff include activities previously performed by the exist.ing organization and new activities to improve operational assessment and upgrading capabilities.
The system SAS will provide direct communication between corporate management and the safety assessment function. The Station SAS will provide the station specific review of operations, site applicability review of generic information, followup of improvements and reporting on operational information.
The licensee is currently developing implementing procedures for the Safety Assessment Function. The licensee stated the SAS function will be in place by fuel load. This item will remain open pending review and verification of implementation of these procedures during a subsequent inspection (50-339/80-10-06).
(5) Assessment of Industry Operating Experience will be provided by the Safety Assessment Staff.
8.
On Site Technical Support Center (TSC)
The objective of this portion of the inspection was to determine that the licensee has established an on site technical support center that has the
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capability to display and transmit plant status to those individuals who are knowledgeable of and responsible for engineering and management support of reactor operations in the event of an accident.
a.
Documents Reviewed (1) Response to letter from Division of Operating Reactors dated September 13, 1979 (2) Response to letter from Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated October 30, 1979 (3) EPIPI Emergency Classification and Organization Formation, Notification and Communication dated December 28, 1979
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(4) Draft VEPCO North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan (5) Draf t Acceptance Criteria - Utility Management and Technical Competence
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Findings The following findings include the inspectors sarification of actions taken by the licensee with regard to committents made in the above documents.
(1) No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area.
(2) As stated in the licensee's reponses, the licensee has established a TSC in the Records Building (3) Activation and manning requirements for the TSC are contained in the licensees emergency procedures (EPIPI and draft Emergency Plan)
(4) The following Draft Acceptance Criterin items had not been addressed by the licensee (a) Time frame for full manning of the TSC (b) Provision that QA be included in manning of the TSC.
9.
On site Operational Support Center (OSC)
The objective of this portion of the inspection was to determine that the licensee has established a primary operational support area to be designated as the on site operational support center for shift personnel to be in direct communication with the control room and other operaticas managers for assignment to duties in support of emergency operations.
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Documents Reviewed (1) Response to Letter from Division of Operating Reactors dated September 13, 1979 (2) Responses to Letter from Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated October 30, 1979
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(3) EPIP 1 Emergency Clasification and Organization Formation, Notification and Communication l
(4) Draft VEPCO North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan (5) Draft Acceptance Criteria - Ability Management and Technical
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Findings The following findings include the inspector's verification of action taken by the licensee with regard to commitments made in the above responses.
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(1) No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area.
(2) The OSC has been established as stated in the licensee's responses.
(3) Activation and manning requirements for the OSC are contained in the licensee's emergency procedures (EP1P1 and draft Emergency Plan)
(4) The following Draf t Acceptance Criteria items had not been addressed by the licensee
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(a) Time frame for full manning of OSC (b) Provision to include the following personnel in manning of the OSC; instrumentation and control, plant chemistry, electrical and mechanical systems, one additional full shift complement of licensed and non-license operations, three two-health physics monitoring teams, sufficient security man force personnel to man one additional shift 10.
Offsite Organizationand Resource The inspection team reviewed licensee's off-site organizations, both the management and technical support staffs, to access their capability to support the safety operation of North Anna Unit 2 facility during normal operation and under emergency conditions, a.
Documents Reviewed The following references and licensee documents were reviewed and discussed:
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(1) North Anna Nuclear Plant FSAR Section 13
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(2) Draft ANS 3.1 dated December 6, 1979
(3) Site Emergency Plan (4) Revised Site Emergency Plan dated December 10, 1979 l
(5) Draft Criteria for Management Organization and Technical Competence
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This review was performed by a combination of ~ interview ~s with licensee
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management and technical support personnel (including a number of
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y working level engineers); detailed reviews of selected management controls procedures, position descriptions, and personnel r.esumes; formal presentations by licensee's management representatives' on the organizational structure; authorities, responsibilities of the various groups; and informal question and answer discussions with representatives of the various groups. The review was concentrated on licensee's Division of Power Supply and Production Operations. Specific areas considered in the conduct of the review included:
(1) The competence of management and technical staffs.
(2) The size of the management and technical staffs.
(3) The degree of involvement of the off-site organizations in normal
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and abnormal plant operations.
(4) The areas of expertise available to support the plant staff.
(5) Organizational arrangements for both normal and accident situations.
(6) The training provided to management and technical personnel.
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(7) Provisions for implementation of preestablished plans for supporting the plant staff in abnormal operations.
(8) Provisions for the identification and independent technical review of safety significant items and unresolved safety issues b.
Findings (1) No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
(2) No training program exists for the management and technical support personnel who would report to the site to provide support in the event of an emergency.
This item will remain open pending the implementation of a training
program which covers the areas of system operations, system
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interaction and transients (50-339/80-10-07).
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c.
Observations (1) The offsite safety review committee as currently structured utilizes consultants to provide expertise in several areas such as reactor operations and health physics.
Corporate members of
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the committee have no nuclear operations or health physics experience.
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(2) The two top corporate management officials' concerned with nuclear plant operation do not have nuclear plant op'eration experience or formal training in nuclear engineering.
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(3) The corporate emergency plan is in a dr,ft form. No implementing procedures have been prepared.
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These three observations are made only as observations taking into account a proposed reorganization which will eliminate these items.
11.
Health Physics Organization A review of the corporate and station organization and management with respect to the area of health physics was conducted.
Corporate health physics functions are performed under the supervision of the Superintendent of Technical Services by a System Health Physicist and two Support staff with health physics expertise. A review of staff qualifications and job descriptions revealed the corporate staff has a strong technical background in health physics but with the exception of the Superintendent of Technical Services, appears to be lacking "in plant" applied health physics experience.
Relating to this observationis the lack of a specific training and retraining program for the corporate health physics staff.
Similar concerns about plant specific experience and training programs are discussed generically for corporate staff in paragraph 9.
One other concern relating to the corporate health physics function was discussed.
This concern involves the failure of the corporate organization to assure the health physics staff is made aware of various problems in a timely manner to allow for preparation and planning or health physics input to decision and review processes.
Specifically, the health physics staff is seldom requested to provide input to SNSOC reviews. Also, decisions as to what information is routed to the health physics group are made by individuals with little or no health physics expertise. This results in items with potential health physics
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impact not being brought to the attention of the health physics. staff
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for review and action. For example, actions recommended,by NRC Bulletins have been.. planned without health physics input, even though resulting man-rem exposure ~s a-were-significant.
A similar problem exists in the station organization. The Health Physics Supervisor does not routinely participate in SNSOC meetings and decisions as to what information is routed to health physics are mady by individuals
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with limited health physics expertise. This limits health physics input to decision and planning functions at the station.
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The Station Health Physics staffing, qualifications, and training programs were reviewed and no problers were identified. The step training program for technicians appears to be comprehensive and management support of staff pursuing associate and bachelor degrees in health physics should also be recognized as providing for continued improvement of the technical expertise of station health physics staff.
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