IR 05000335/2007004
| ML072960575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/2007 |
| From: | Vias S NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3 |
| To: | Stall J Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-07-004 | |
| Download: ML072960575 (23) | |
Text
ber 23, 2007
SUBJECT:
ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000335/2007004, 05000389/2007004
Dear Mr. Stall:
On September 30, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your St. Lucie Plant Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 2, 2007, with Mr. Johnston and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, one licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this report. NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it is entered into your corrective action program. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the St. Lucie facility.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARs) component of NRC's document
FP&L 2 system ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Steven J. Vias, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-335, 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-67, NPF-16
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000335/2007004, 05000389/2007004 w/Attachment - Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-335, 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-67, NPF-16 Report Nos.: 05000335/2007004, 05000389/2007004 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company (FPL)
Facility: St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 Dates: July 1 - September 30, 2007 Inspectors: T. Hoeg, Senior Resident Inspector S. Sanchez, Resident Inspector G. Laska, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2)
C. Kontz, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2)
Approved by: Steven J. Vias, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000335/2007-004, 05000389/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; St. Lucie Nuclear Plant,
Units 1 & 2; Event Followup.
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by region based inspectors. One Green licensee-identified violation was identified.
The significance of most findings is identified by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
One violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. The violation is discussed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Both units started the inspection report period at full Rated Thermal Power (RTP). Unit 1 reduced RTP to 90 percent and 75 percent during the week of August 6 due to micro-fouling of their circulating water pump backwash system from large amounts of algae. Unit 1 also reduced RTP on August 13, to repair a leaking shaft seal injection line on the 1C condensate pump. Unit 1 returned to full RTP on August 14 where it remained throughout this inspection period. Unit 2 was forced to shutdown on August 18, due to a leak on the 2B1 seal injection line and returned to full RTP on September 1 where it operated through the remainder of this inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
During the weeks of August 6, August 13, and September 3, the inspectors reviewed and verified the status of licensee actions taken in accordance with their procedural requirements during the height of the 2007 hurricane season. The inspectors reviewed lessons learned and corrective actions taken from the 2006 hurricane season. The inspectors reviewed Administrative Procedure ADM-04.01, Hurricane Season Preparation, and performed site walkdowns to verify the licensee had made the required preparations. The inspectors performed reviews of plant exterior areas and risk significant systems vulnerable to high winds and hurricane conditions including the following:
- Unit 1 and 2 Turbine Buildings
- Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Auxiliary Building Exteriors
- Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Pump and Heat Exchanger Area
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted four partial equipment alignment verifications of the systems important to safety listed below to review the operability of required redundant trains or backup systems while the other trains were inoperable or out of service (OOS). The inspectors looked to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system, and therefore, potentially increase risk. These inspections included reviews of applicable Technical Specifications (TS), plant lineup procedures, operating procedures, and piping and instrumentation drawings, which were compared with observed equipment configurations. The inspectors also reviewed applicable reactor control operator logs; equipment out of service and operator workaround lists; active temporary system alterations; and outstanding condition reports (CRs) regarding system alignment and operability.
- 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) during 2A EDG maintenance
- 1B and 1C charging pumps during 1A charging pump maintenance
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Fire Protection - Tours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the nine areas listed below to verify they conformed with licensee procedure AP-1800022, Fire Protection Plan. The inspectors specifically examined any transient combustibles in the areas and any ongoing hot work or other potential ignition sources to assure compliance with the licensees procedure that assured defense-in-depth. The inspectors also assessed whether the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of portions of the fire protection systems, equipment and features were in accordance with the Fire Protection Plan.
Furthermore, the inspectors evaluated the use of any compensatory measures being performed in accordance with the licensees procedures and Fire Protection Plan.
- Unit 1 Charging Pump Area
- Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room
- Unit 1 Piping Penetration Room
- Unit 1 and 2 Big Mud Creek Ultimate Heat Sink Valve Rooms
- Unit 2 CCW Heat Exchanger Building
- Unit 1 A Vital Switchgear Room
- Unit 1 B Vital Switchgear Room
- Unit 2 Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System Room
- Unit 1 Engineered Safety Features Pump Room
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review
a. Inspection Scope
On September 5, 2007, the inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator actions during a simulated station loss of offsite power followed by a loss of coolant accident event to verify that operator performance was adequate and that evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems. The inspectors also reviewed simulator physical fidelity and specifically evaluated the following attributes related to the operating crews performance:
- Clarity and formality of communication
- Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms
- Control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions
- Oversight and direction provided by operations supervision, including ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions, regulatory reporting requirements, and emergency plan actions and notifications
- Effectiveness of the post-evaluation critique
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Biennial Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history and associated documents in preparation for this inspection. During the periods of August 21-23 (in office) and August 27-30 (on site), 2007, the inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the administration of simulator operating tests and Job Performance Measures (JPMs) associated with the licensees operator requalification program. Each of the activities performed by the inspectors was done to assess the effectiveness of the licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in 10 CFR 55, Operators Licenses. The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines as established by their Systems Approach to Training (SAT) based INPO approved program. The inspectors also reviewed and evaluated the licensees simulation facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations. The inspectors observed two crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation reviewed included written examinations, JPMs, simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, simulator modification request records and performance test records, the feedback process, licensed operator qualification records, remediation plans, watchstanding, and medical records. The records were inspected against the criteria listed in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
Quarterly Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the reliability and deficiencies associated with the two systems listed below, including associated CRs shown in the list of documents reviewed. The inspectors verified the licensees maintenance effectiveness efforts met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 and licensee Administrative Procedure ADM-17.08, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.65, Maintenance Rule. The inspectors focused on the licensees system functional failure determination, a(1) and a(2) classification determination, corrective actions, and the appropriateness of established performance goals and monitoring criteria. The inspectors also attended applicable expert panel meetings, and interviewed responsible engineers. The inspectors reviewed associated system health reports, and the licensees goal setting and monitoring requirements.
- Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System
- Unit 1 Reactor Protection System
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the risk assessments for the following six systems, structures, and components (SSCs), or a combination thereof, that were non-functional due to planned and/or emergent work. The inspectors also walked down and/or reviewed the scope of work to evaluate the effectiveness of licensee scheduling, configuration control, and management of online risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and applicable licensee program procedure ADM-17.16, Implementation of the Configuration Risk Management Program. The inspectors interviewed responsible senior reactor operators on-shift, verified actual system configurations, and specifically evaluated results from the online risk monitor for the combinations of OOS risk significant SSCs listed below:
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following nine CR interim dispositions and operability determinations to ensure that operability was properly supported and the affected SSCs remained available to perform its safety function with no increase in risk. The inspectors reviewed the applicable UFSAR, and associated supporting documents and procedures, and interviewed plant personnel to assess the adequacy of the interim disposition.
- CR 2007-21387, Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head O-ring Leakage
- CR 2007-21237, 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Radiator Expansion Tank Level
- CR 2007-20789, Unit 1 and 2 Ultimate Heat Sink Barrier Valve Test
- CR 2007-23569, Robotic Camera Left in Unit 2 Containment Building
- CR 2007-24457, 2A EDG Test
- CR 2007-27487, 1A Charging Pump Discharge Valve Stem Damage
- CR 2007-27095, Unit 2 Control Element Drive Motor Disconnect Breaker Wiring
- CR 2007-27862, 2A Charging Pump Valve Block Leakage
- CR 2007-15684, 1A Containment Spray Pump Seal Cooler Fouling
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed and reviewed Work Order (WO) post maintenance test (PMT)activities of the six risk significant SSCs listed below. The following aspects were inspected:
- (1) effect of testing on the plant recognized and addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;
- (2) testing consistent with maintenance performed;
- (3) acceptance criteria demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents such as TS, UFSAR, and others;
- (4) range, accuracy and calibration of test equipment;
- (5) step by step compliance with test procedures and/or work orders (WO), and applicable prerequisites satisfied;
- (6) control of installed jumpers or lifted leads;
- (7) removal of test equipment; and,
- (8) restoration of SSCs to operable status. The inspectors also reviewed problems associated with PMTs that were identified and entered into the licensees CAP.
- WO 36015923, 2B Battery Charger 18 Month Maintenance
- WO 37001810, Ultimate Heat Sink Valve TSA
- WO 33003752, LPSI Valve HCV-3625 Maintenance
- WO 36033250, High Pressure Safety Injection Valve HCV-3625 Maintenance
- WO 37014000, Unit 1 Feedwater Valve FCV-9011 Positioner Replacement
- WO 36018474, Unit 1 Control Element Drive Mechanism Power Switch Replacement
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Forced Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
Forced Outage Entry, Control and Risk Assessment On August 18, 2007, Unit 2 was shutdown due to exceeding unidentified reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage inside of the containment building. The leakage was determined to be from a cracked pipe joint on the 2B1 reactor coolant pump shaft seal injection line.
As a result, a reactor plant cooldown and depressurization took place to repair the leak.
The cracked pipe was sent off-site to determine the cause of the failure. The inspectors examined the licensees implementation of shutdown safety assessments as outlined in licensee procedure 0-AP-010526, Outage Risk Assessment and Control, to verify whether a defense in depth concept was in place to ensure safe operations and avoid unnecessary risk when shutdown. Furthermore, the inspectors regularly monitored outage planning and control activities in the Outage Control Center (OCC), and interviewed responsible OCC management, during the outage to ensure SSC configurations and work scope were consistent with TS requirements, site procedures, and outage risk controls.
Monitoring of Shutdown Activities The inspectors observed portions of the reactor plant shutdown and cooldown of Unit 2 beginning on August 18, 2007. The inspectors also monitored plant parameters and verified that shutdown activities were conducted in accordance with TS and applicable licensee operating procedures, such as: 1-GOP-123, Turbine Shutdown - Full Load to Zero Load; 1-GOP-203, Reactor Shutdown; 1-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldown -
Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown; and 1-NOP-03.05, Shutdown Cooling.
Outage Activities The inspectors examined outage activities to verify that they were conducted in accordance with TS, licensee procedures, and the licensees outage risk control plan.
Some of the more significant inspection activities accomplished by the inspectors were as follows:
- Walked down selected safety-related equipment clearance orders
- Verified operability of RCS pressure, level, flow, and temperature instruments during various modes of operation
- Verified electrical systems availability and alignment
- Verified shutdown cooling system operation
- Reviewed control of containment penetrations
- Examined FME controls put in place inside containment
- Verified near reduced reactor coolant system inventory controls
- Verified boric acid deposited from the seal line leak were cleaned, inspected, and evaluated by the licensee Heatup, Mode Transition, and Reactor Startup Activities The inspectors examined selected TS, license conditions, license commitments and verified administrative prerequisites were being met prior to mode changes. The inspectors also reviewed measured RCS leakage rates, and verified containment integrity was properly established. On August 29, the inspector performed a containment walkdown inspection while the RCS was at normal operating pressure and temperature. The results of low power physics testing were discussed with reactor engineering and operations personnel to ensure that the core operating limit parameters were consistent with the design. The inspectors witnessed portions of the RCS heatup, reactor startup and power ascension in accordance with the following plant procedures:
- Pre-operational Test Procedure (POP) 1-3200088
- Unit 2 Initial Criticality Following Refueling
- POP 0-3200092, Reactor Engineering Power Ascension Program
- 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 to Mode 1
- 2-GOP-302, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 3 to Mode 2
- 2-GOP-303, Reactor Plant Heatup - Mode 3 <1750 to Mode 3 >1750
- 2-GOP-403, Reactor Plant Heatup - Mode 4 to Mode 3
- 2-GOP-504, Reactor Plant Heatup - Mode 5 to Mode 4
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed portions of the following six surveillance tests and monitored personnel conducting the tests as well as equipment performance, to verify that testing was being accomplished in accordance with applicable operating procedures. The test data was reviewed to verify it met TS requirements, UFSAR commitments, and/or licensee procedure requirements. The inspectors also verified that the testing effectively demonstrated the systems were operationally ready, capable of performing their intended safety functions, and that identified problems were entered into the licensees CAP for resolution. The tests included one inservice test.
- 3200051, Unit 2 Moderator Temperature Coefficient Testing
- 2-OSP-03.06A, 2A LPSI Pump Code Run
- 2-OSP-03.05A, 2A HPSI Pump Code Run
- 2-OSP-25.07C, 2C Control Room Ventilation Monthly Test
- 2-OSP-01B, 2B Charging Pump Code Run
- OP-2-0010125A, Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System Isolation Valve Testing
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors continued to periodically screen active Temporary System Alterations (TSA) for risk significant systems. The inspectors examined TSA 1-07-007, Unit 1 control room air conditioning system HVA-3A,3B,3C, including a review of the technical evaluation and its associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening. The TSA was compared to the system design basis documentation to ensure that:
- (1) the modification did not adversely affect operability or availability of other systems;
- (2) the installation was consistent with applicable modification documents; and,
- (3) did not affect TS or require prior NRC approval. The inspectors also observed accessible equipment related to the TSA to verify configuration control was maintained.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
On August 8, 2007, the inspectors observed a quarterly EP drill of the licensees Emergency Response Organization (ERO) for personnel in the Technical Support Center (TSC). During this drill the inspectors assessed licensee performance to determine if proper emergency classification, notification, and protective action recommendations were made in accordance with EP procedures. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the post drill critique conducted in the TSC.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the following PIs reported to the NRC. The inspectors reviewed the PI data of both Units 1 and 2 for the previous four quarters (i.e.,
Second Quarter 2006 through First Quarter 2007). Monthly Operating Reports, LERs, RCO Chronological Logs, and CRs were reviewed to verify the reported PI data was complete and accurate.
- Unit 1 Safety System Functional Failures
- Unit 2 Safety System Functional Failures The inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, Performance Indicator Verification. The applicable planning standard, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Revision 4, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines, was used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This was accomplished by reviewing the CR summaries from daily printed reports and periodically attending CR oversight group meetings. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
.2 Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends
a. Inspection Scope
As required by inspection procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on condition reports associated with human performance errors. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-month period of April through September 2007, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the condition reports were reviewed for adequacy.
b. Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors reviewed several condition reports associated with human errors and determined that there were two examples where the wrong revision to a procedure was used in the field to perform maintenance without any consequence noted. The inspectors also found that several condition reports were written by the licensee to identify a number of human error traps and precursors existing in some licensee processes which could if left uncorrected result in adverse conditions. No trends were identified by the inspectors. The inspectors determined the licensee actions taken to be appropriate and timely.
.3 Annual Sample: Review of 1B Containment Spray Seal Cooler Flow Blockage
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected CR 2007-15684, Flow Blockage to 1B Containment Spray Seal Cooler, for a detailed review to understand how and why this blockage occurred. The inspectors reviewed the apparent cause evaluation and interviewed engineering personnel. The inspectors evaluated the CR in accordance with the licensees corrective action process as specified in licensee procedure NAP-204, Condition Reporting.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified
4OA3 Event Followup
.1 (Closed) LER 05000335/2007-001-00, Mispositioned Containment Isolation Valves
On June 6, 2007, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power when two service air containment isolation valves were found locked opened vice locked closed. The licensee was performing a monthly valve lineup surveillance procedure when valves V18794 and V18796 were discovered to be locked open. The licensees Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1 requires that containment vessel integrity be maintained with containment isolation valves. The licensee determined the cause of the valves being out of their TS required position to be from human error in which implementation of configuration control processes were not exercised. This licensee-identified finding involved a violation of TS 3.6.1, Containment Vessel Integrity. The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in section 4OA7. This LER is closed.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On October 2, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.
Gordon Johnston and other members of your staff, who acknowledged the findings.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a NCV.
Technical Specification 3.6.1 requires that containment vessel integrity be maintained with prescribed manual valves being locked closed prior to plant entering Mode 4.
Contrary to this, on June 6, 2007, two Unit 1 service air manual containment isolation valves were found locked open while performing a TS surveillance at Mode 1. The valves were left locked open for approximately 3 weeks from the time when Unit 1 entered into Mode 4 until time of discovery. The finding was greater than minor because it degraded the containment and shielding building integrity. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it only affected the containment barriers cornerstone and did not present an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the containment vessel. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2007-17363.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- D. Albritton, Assistant Operations Manger
- E. Armando, Site Quality Manager
- D. Calabrese, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
- D. Cecchett, Licensing Engineer
- T. Cosgrove, Site Engineering Manager
- C. Costanzo, Plant General Manager
- M. Danford, Performance Improvement Department Supervisor
- K. Frehafer, Licensing Engineer
- B. Jacques, Security Manager
- G. Johnston, Site Vice President
- B. Kelly, System Engineer
- R. McDaniel, Fire Protection Supervisor
- R. Merle, Projects Manager
- L. Neely, Work Control Manager
- B. Neff, System Engineer
- W. Parks, Operations Manager
- M. Navin, Assistant Operations Manager
- M. Page, Assistant Operations Manager
- T. Patterson, Licensing Manager
- W. Raasch, System Engineer
- G. Swider, Systems Engineering Manager
- J. Tucker, Maintenance Manager
- D. Cecchett, Licensing
- S. Wisla, Project Manager
- B. Dunn, Engineering
- M. Horrell, Engineering
- J. Judans, Engineering
- M. Moore, Radiation Protection Manager
- D. Lauterbur, Turkey Point Operations Training Recovery Manager
- E. Roberts, Turkey Point Project Manager of Training Material Recovery Project
- W. Smith, Operations Training Supervisor
- L. Porro, Simulator Engineering Group Supervisor
- D. Carpenter, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Instructor
- S. Duston, Training Manager
NRC Personnel
- B. Mozafari, NRR Senior Project Manager
- S. Ninh, Region II Senior Project Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000335/2007001-00 LER Mispositioned Containment Isolation Valves (4OA3)