IR 05000327/1981019
| ML19350E899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 06/03/1981 |
| From: | Butler S, Ford E, Quick D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350E892 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-81-19, 50-328-81-23, NUDOCS 8106230632 | |
| Download: ML19350E899 (10) | |
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Report Nos. 50-327/81-19 and 50-328/81-23 Licensee: Tenna>see Valley Authority 500 Chestnut Street Chattanooga. TN' 37401 Facil j Name: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos. OPR-77 and CPPR-73 Inspection at Sequoyah s7te r. ear Chattanooga, Tennessee Inspectar2:
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Approved by:
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0. R. Quick, Sect 1(on Cnief, Resident and Reactor Da'te Signed Preject Inspection Division
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SUMMARY Inspection in April 6, - Hay 5,1981
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Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 129 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Unit 2 Preoperational testing, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin Review, Independent Inspection Effort, Office of Inpsection and Enforcement open items, and Construction Deficiencies, followup on plant incidents and witnessing of Unit 1 startup testing.
Results O
Of the seven areas' inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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.0ETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent C. E. Cantroll, Assistant Plant Superintendent W. T. Cattle, Assistant Plant Superintendent J..M. McGriff, Assistant Plant Superintendent B. M. Patterson, Maintenance Supervisor (M)
W. A. Watson, Maintenance Supervisor (I)
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D. J. Record, Operations Supervisor (E)
W. H. Kinsey, Results Supervisor R. J. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor R. S. Kaplan, Public Safety Service Supervisor D. O. McCloud, Quality Assuranca Supervisor M. R. Harding, Compliance Supervisor
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W. M. Halley, Preoperational Test Supervisor
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C. R. Brimer, Outage Director Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
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technicians, operators, shift engineers, security force members, engineers,
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maintenance personnel, contractor personnel and corporate office personnel.
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Other Organizations Four members of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II. Four members of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
2.
Exit Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Super-intendent and/or members of his staff on May 1, 1981. The three unresolved items were discussed and the licensee acknowledged them.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved item 327/81-16-03: This item involves untimely 10 CFR 2'
reporting.
The inspector reviewed a revision to Division Procedure Manual DPM N77A14, dated March 30, 1981, which has been changed to implement additional steps to exaedite handling of 10 CFR 21 reports once they are relayed.from the plars to the corporate office. The changes were considered i
l necessary to ensure prompt notification of the Manager of Power of report-able defects once they are evaluated.
This matter was discussed with members of Region II office and it was determined that the licensee met the requirements of 10 CFR 21 reporting in that once their " responsible officer" was informed of the defect, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was properly notified. The lack of definitive criteria in 10 CFR 21 for what is
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an acceptable evaluation period for defects is presently under review by the NRC. The inspector considers this matter resolved.
Unresolved Items U.1 resolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. New unrecolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragrapas 5 and 10.
5.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector toured various areas of Unit 1 on a routine basis throughout the reporting period. The following activities were reviewed / verified:
a.
Adherence to limiting conditions for operation which were directly observable from the control room panels.
b.
Control board instrumentatien and recorder traces.
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Proper control room and shift manning.
d.
The use of approved operating procedures.
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Unit operator and shift engineer logs.
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General shift operating practices.
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Housekeeping practices.
h.
Fire protection measures for hot work.
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Posting of hold tags, caution tags and temporary alteration tags.
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Measures to exclude foreign materials from entry inte Clean systems.
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Personnel, package, and vehicle access control for the Unit 1 protected area.
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General shift ' security practices on oost manning, vital area access
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control and security force response to alarms.
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Surveillance testing and startup testing in progress.
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Maintenance activities in progress.
The inspector noted during a review of operator logs that on April 24, 1981,
the Unit 1 control room had indications that they were losing water and resin from the inservice mixed bed letdown demineralizer. At about the same
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time some workers exiting the Unit 1 690 pipe chase had indications of high radiation levels in the pipe chase. The workers quickly left the area and u
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Lnotified Health Physics personnel. Further investigation by the inspector
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revealed that during valve ~ alignment of the common resin discharge header in support of flushing werk1taking place'on the Unit 2 letdown _ domineralizer
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pressure was apparently relieved on-the. Unit 1,- B mixed bed domineralizer
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resin discharge line. - ThisLallowed some contaminated resin to leak through
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the~ resin' discharge valve of the IB mixed bed'demineralizer and: flow through piping. in the ~690 pipe chase to the Spent Resin Collection Tank 1 causing a
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'significant increase in local radiation levels. ~ Discussion with the:Hoalth
' Physics Supervisor indicated that his people responded quickly to the report of. increasing rauiation levels and performed the necessary surveys to. post
' the' areas involved and restrict access to personnel-. -A check of personnel in the' area. of the resin discharge piping and collection tank revealed no:
indication'that anyone had received any significant exposure. The inspector
- went to the Auxiliary Building to enture that _the areas involved were
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. properly. posted and controlled.- Independent radiation surveys were made to
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verify - radiation ~ levels in accessible areas were acceptable.
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'occurrance was discussed with operations personnel who indicated. they.
~ promptly checked the suspected valve and found it-tagged. shut as required by.
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procedure. After the domineralizer. was valved out of service the valve was cycled and indications were that the ~ leakage had stopped. The domineralizer will remain out of service until the resin bed can be replentished and the
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valve checked.
The potential problem of excessiva> exposure due to the movement of spent resin through unshielded piping in the 690 pipe chase was initially
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-identif tsd in IE report ' 327/79-27, 328/79-14. The licensee responded to this concern by committing to administrative 1y controlling resin discharging to ensure accers was controlled to'the pipe chases during movement of resin.
The problem of excessive exposure due to an inadvertent discharge of resin
through theiline or a future accumulation of hotspots-in the line have not been addressed by the licensee and will be followed up by the inspector as
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F items 317/81-19-01 and 328/81-23-01.
Further discussion with the Health Physics Supervisor indicated that he is pursuing the need for permanent shielding for the resin ' discharge line with the licensee's Engineering
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Design group.
During a tour of the refueling area rallroad bay the inspector found the
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outer bay door open with no plant personnel in the area. The control switch
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had a. caution tag that required an operator to be in attendance when the i
door was open. The refueling deck hatches to the railroad bay were shut.
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This portion ~ of the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment E, closure (ABSCE) is designed to be functional with either the outer door shut or the refueling deck hatches shut and is interlocked to prevent opening of both
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sets of doors at the same time, however, testing of the Auxiliary Building
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Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) (see LER SQRO-50-327/80184) has shown that the
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' system' can only. maintain the required negative pressure in the refueling l<
area with both sets of doors shut. The licensee posted the caution order on the door to ensure operability of the AGBTS until modifications to the door
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seals could be made.
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The inspector notified the Shift Engineer after finding the door open, an
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operator was dispatched to shut the door. The licensee was notified by the inspector that this was considered a potential violation of ABGTS oper-ability and ABSCE requirements. This matter will remain unresolved until it can be further reviewed by the inspector. (327/81-19-02).
On April. 3C', 1981, the inspector was notified of a licensee identified violation. On April 4,1981, a Public Safety Officer was securing his post on the -690 lower containment airlock.
He installed the locking device an the airlock handwheel but it was apparently not installed properly to prevent opening the door. This was discovered approximately seven hours later when another Public Safety Officer was preparing for a containment entry. Action was immediately taken to tssure that.no one had entered the containment and corrective action was implemented. The occurrance had been documented in an internal memorandum to the Plant Superintendent dated April 8, 1981. This matter was discussed witn a Region II Safeguards and Health P;1ysics specialist.
It was determined that it did not require a formal report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The inspector informed the licensee that this constituted a potential violation of access restriction requirements to high radiation areas and will require further review t;y the inspector.
This matter is unresolved (327/81-19-03).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Unit P. Preoperational Testing a.
Reactor Protection System procedure review The inspector reviewed test procedure W-8.18, " Reactor Protection System Operational Time Response Test", approved on 10/29/80.
the review consisted of an examination of adherence to FSAR and $ER requirements; Regulatory Guide 1.68, Rev 0; and a review of the same procedure previously used for unit 1.
Based on the aforegoing criteria and noting the procedural changes since its last run, the inspector has completed this review.
No violations or deviations were.loted.
b.
Preoperational Test Witnessing The inspector witnessed the conduct of preoperational testing at various times throughout the reporting period. Seiected portions of the following tests were observed by the inspector:
1.
W-1.28, Rev. O, dtd 12/1/78, " Reactor Coolant System Heatup".
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W-1.3, Rev. O, dtd 6/4/80, Reactor Coolant System at Tempera-ture".
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W-3.2, Rev. O, dtd 8/1/79, " Boric Acid System".
W-3.38, Rev. O, dtd 3/7/80, "CVCS Functional Test'!.
5.
TVA-22, Rev. O, dtd 4/24/80 " Auxiliary Feedwater Functional Test".
Various pieces of test equipment utilized such as dead weight testers, chart recorders, stroke tachometers, and multimeters were examined for test hook up in accordance with procedure and valid calibration dates.
The inspector verified the adecuacy of communications between the test director-and test personnel. The inspector observed the exchange of information and test director authority at shift changes and that proper administrative controls were exercised to handle test deficiencies and exceptions as they occured.
No violations or deviations were noted.
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7.
Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) Review IEB 78-12,.78-12A and 78-12B: Atypical Weld Material in Reactor _ Pressure Vessel Welds. This item was previously inspected and closed for Unit 1 in IE report 327/80-29. No further inspection is required for Unit 2 and this Bulletin is closed for Unit 2.
IEB 80-03: Loss of Charcoal from Standard Type II, 2 inch, Tray Absorber Cells. This item was previously inspected in response to the licensee's construction deficiency report NCR 17P and IEB 80-03. All related systems containing these defective charcoal trays were covered and reported in IE
reports 327/80-16 and 327/80-29. The inspector reviewed this problem for the only remaining system, Unit 2 cuntainment purge system. The inspector discussed this matter with cognizant licensee personnel and reviewed reports from Nuclear Consulting Services which documented the inspection loading and leak t3 sting of repaired Flanders enarcoal trays.
The report indicated there were 86 acceptable trays and 24 trays that were still defective and returned empty to the licensee for disposition. The licensee indicated 84 trays would be necessary for successful loading of the Unit 2 containment purge system. This Bulletin is closed for Unit 2.
IEB 80-21:
Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.
The inspector was notified by the lead insoector for this bulletin in Region II that the licensee's response for Unit i has been reviewed and was satis-factory. A supplemental response was reviewed and discussed with the Region II lead inspector and also considered satisfactory. The licensee indicated that they had completed the review required by this bulletin and determined that no valve parts supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company were in use or planned for use in safety-related systems.
This Bulletin is closed for Units 1 and 2.
No violations or deviations were identified,
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Independent Inspection Effort
!The inspector. routinely attended the morning scheduling and. staff meetings
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.during the reporting period..These meetings provide a daily status-report
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discussion of significant problems or incidents associated with the start-up
' testing and ' operations effort.
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'h 10n April 22-24, 1981, the inspector attended'a Resiaent Inspector's meeting-t
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in Lthe ' Region II' office. The inspector routinely attended the1 daily pre-operational test planning meetings held by tthe test group _ supervisors-and
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their-test directors.
This allowed the inspector to, maintain a timely:
knowledge of. ongoing testing-' proble:u and their~ resolution.
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provided an additional means to. assess management < control of the testing
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No violations or d'eviations were identified.
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Office of' Inspection and Enforcement. Open Items and Construction'
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Deficiencies
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(Closed) 327/79-46-02, 79-46-03, The inspector reviewed the licensee's final report' for NCR 12P. and 13P Reactor Coolant System Exceeding Heatup and.
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i Cooldown Rate. dated December 12, 1979. In addition the~ inspector-reviewed
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General Operating Instr 0ctions GOI-1 and GOI-3, which have. incorporated
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precautions to prevent recurrence of this problem when establishing or
collapsing' a steam bubble in the pressurizer. These licensee identified j
ttens are closed for Units 1 and 2.
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(Closed) 327/80-29-02, Sequoyah's licensee event re' ports 80-01 thru 80-100
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were subsequently reviewed in detail by a regional based inspector which
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resulted in a violation involving improper and/or late reporting of licensce
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events. This open f tem is closed for Unit 1.
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(Closed)'327/78-38-07, NCR MEB 78-2, Maldistribution ' of ERCW Flow to CCS l_
- Heat Exchangers, wu reviewed by a regional based inspector and closed for Unit 2 in report 328/81-01. This open item is also closed for Unit 1.
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(Closed) 328/80-09-06, NEB 8006, Upper Internals Guide Tube Pins. T:.e
_ inspector reviewed the licensee's final report dated February 23, 1981,
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which described their corrective action of replacing the defective guide
l tube pins with redesig'id pins which had received a modified heat treatment
to prevent cracking. 1.tese pins were supplied by Westinghouse. This item
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ihad been ' reviewed earlier prior to fuel load of Unit 1 and the. pin eplacement was observed at that time. Discunions with the licensee and
- the onsite Westinghouse. representative indicated that the pins replacement
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on Unit 2 has been satisfactorily accomplished and documented. This item is closed for Unit 1 and 2.
.(Closed) 328/79-35-03, NCR.17P, Defective Charcoal Absorber Trays. This item
- was previously inspected and closed for Unit 1 in IE Report 327/80-16. This
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inspection involved all systems except Unit 2 containment purge _ system. The inspector has discussed this matter with the licensee and reviewed docu-mentation that indicates that sufficient acceptable trays are available to load into the Unit 2 containment purge system and all defective trays have been identified. This item is closed for Unit 2.
(Closed) 327/79-72-04, 328/79-35-04, NEB 79-6, Control Rod Drop Event. The inspector has reviewed the licensee' * interim and final reports on this
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item.
In addition the inspector,
reviewed the licensce's General Operating Instruction G01-5 to ensu:e that Westingnouse recommended pre-cautions had been incorporated to prevent the predicted power overshoat that could result-from' a rod drop event while ope.*ating in the automatic mode.
This item is closed for Unit 1 and 2.
(Closed) 328/79-35-05, NEB 79-4, Undetectable Failure in the Solid State Protection System P-4 Signal. This item was previously inspected for Unit I and closed in IE report 327/80-16. The inspector verified that the licensee procedures which were reviewed previously were also applicable to Unit 2.
This item is closed for Unit 2.
(Closed) 328/79-14-01, Discriminator Setting on Monitor 0-RM-90-118. This~
item was previously inspected and closed for Unit 1 in IE report 327/79-48.
This.ts a common system monitor therefore the item is also closed for Unit 2.
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(Closed) 328/79-27-04,- This item was inadvertently identified as a Unit 2 open item. This item-was closed for Unit 1 in IE report 327/79-48.
The item does not apply to Unit 2 and is.therefore closed for administrative
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purposes.
(Closed) 328/79-27-01, SWP 79-S-3, Excessive Output Fluctuations of Foxboro Instrumentation. This item was previously inspected and closed for Unit 1 in IE report 328/80-16.
The vital inverters supplying Unit 2 Foxboro instrumentation have been similarly replaced and discussion with the Instrument Supervisor indicates that the operation of the Foxboro instru-mentation has been acceptable.
The licensee intends to install field modification kits which have been developed and tested by Westinghouse when approved by their Engineering Design Group to further improve their per-formance. This item is closed for Unit 2.
(Closed) 328/79-31-03, The inspector reviewed IE report 328/79-31 and found no open item designated 79-31-03.
This item is closed for administrative purposes.
(Closed) 328/80-28-07, 60-28-08, These open items were inadvertently charged to ' Unit 2.
They do not apply to Sequoyah and are therefore closed fr-administrative purposes.
(Closed) 328/81-08-03,-EEB 8022, ERCW Pump Motor Relays. This open item was already being tracked as item 3'_8/81-02-14.
This item is closed for administrative purposes.
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a (Closed) 328/77-23-18, 77-23-19, 77-23-20, These open items for Unit 2 were S
previously inspected and closed in IE report 328/79-05. These items are
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-(Closed) 327/79-14-02, This item number was inadvertently charged to Unit 1.
It is_a-Unit-2 item that was closed in IE repnet 328/79-26. This item is closed for administrative purposcs.
(Closed) 328/79-26-01, 79-26-02, These items, related to the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS), were previously closed in IE reports 327/80-25 and 327/80-16 respectively. ABGTS is a common system to both Units and no furer inspection is r": quired for Unit 2.
These items are closed for Unit 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Followup on Plant Incidents On April 19, 1981, five outage steamfitters, received first and second degree
burns when trapped steam escaped from a valve on which they were working.
Three of the workers were admitted to a local hospital for treatment and two were treated and released.
The inspector reviewed the incident and discussed it with some of the
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personnel involved.
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The valve was a. steam supply isolation valve for the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The bonnet of the valve was found to be leaking during hot functional testing and required repair. A tagout had been initiated on April 18 to perform the work, however, the work was not commenced until April 19. At the time of tb tagout it was suspected that one of the upstream steam header isolation valves was leaking throcjh (2-FCV-1-15 or 16). Some precautionary measures were taken by the operations personnel to mitigate the steam laakage and the outage personnel performing were cautioned of the leakage prior to performing the work.
However, the licensee's clearance procedure contains no definitive requirements to ensure isolated systems remain vented to prevent th, build up of fluid or gas pressure due to boundary valve leakage. In additiot, there is no definitive guidance on the operation of equipment by maintenance personnel within the boundary of a clearance. This appears to have aggravated the problem in that valves 2-FCV-1-17 and 2-FCV-1-18 were being manipulated as part of the maintenance work being done and consequently isolated any vent path that nad besn intended by operations to prevent the buildup of steam pressure in the line.
These potential problem areas will be reviewed again once the licensee has finalized and completed their permanent corrective action in regard to this incident.
Until such time, this matter will remain unresolved.
(327/81-19-04,328/81-23-02)
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Witnessing of Unit 1 Startup Testing
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The inspector witnessed the conduct of the following test procedures for
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Unit-1 during this reporting period:
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5U-9.1,'"10*; Load Swing Test", Rev. 6, dated 3/26/81 - Conducted on 4/23/81.
b.
SU-9.3, "Large Load Reduction Test", Rev. 5, dated 3/26/81 - Condcuted on 4/23/81.
c.
SV-9.4A, " Plant Trip from 100". Power", Rev. 6 dated 3/26/81 -
Conducted'on 4/30/81.
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SV-9.4B, "100". Net Lead Trip", Rev 6. cated 3/31/81 - Conducted on S/1/81.
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The inspector reviewed the procedures in use to assure they had received proper review and approval, and the appropriate revisions were in use.
Communications between the test director, test crew and operating personnel were observed to be adequate and coordinated.
A sampling of test pre-requisites by control room observations and questioning of involved personnel showed them to be satisfied prior to test commencement.
A sampling of test equipment showed them to be within calibration limits. The test was conducted in accordance with the procedure directions, data was collected for analysis, and acceptance criteria was met or excepted as appropriate.
All test results are in the process of evaluation; however, items a, c, and d are ten'tatively considered to be successfully run by the licensee. Item b resulted in a reactor trip and will probably be run again pendin'g licensee final evaluation. Item b is an inspectcr follow-up item and is designated 50-327/81-19-05.
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