IR 05000327/1981033
| ML20039A246 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1981 |
| From: | Fiedler R, Jape F, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039A233 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-81-33, 50-328-81-43, NUDOCS 8112160411 | |
| Download: ML20039A246 (6) | |
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'o UNITE 3 STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA ST N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report Nos'. 50-327/S1-33 and 50-323/81-43 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:
Sequoyah Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos. OPR-77 and DPR-79 Inspection at Sequoyah site near Chattanooga, Tennessee Inspectors:
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R. Fiedle'r
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D te 3 g Approved by:
H b$LG O DYW F. Jape, Section Chief
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Dr te 'S'igned a
Engineering Inspection Branch Engineering and Technical Inspection Division SUMMARY Inspection on September 9-14, and November 3-6, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 92 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, preoperational test results review, initial criticality procedure review, 10 CFR 50.55(e) item, tour of Unit I and witnessing initial criticality of Unit 2.
Forty-eight inspector hours in the Region II Office were involved reviewing low power physics test procedures.
Results-Of the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT-DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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C. C. Mason, Plant Superintendent W. T. Cottle, Assistant Plant Superintendent
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- J. M. McGriff, Assistant Plant Superintendent
L. Nobles, Operations Supervisor B. Patterson, Instrumentation Supervisor
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- D. L. McCloud, Chief, Field QA Staff
- R. L. Hamilton, Site QA Supervisor
- K. Parr, Nuclear Engineer
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- 0. Romine, Compliance Engineer W. H. Kinsey, Results Supervisor R. Fortenberry, Nuclear Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included two technicians, six operators, and start-up test personnel.
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NRC Resident Inspectors
- E. J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector
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.S. D. Butler, Resident Inspector
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- Attended exit interview i
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Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 6, 1981 with
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those persons indicated in paragraph I above.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) - Violation 50-327/81-22-01 - Failure to provide applicable quantitative and qualitative -acceptance criteria in safety-related
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' surveillance instruction. The corrective actions taken by the licensee
as reported to RII on August 10, 1981, were reviewed by the inspector.
SI-2 was revised to include quantitative acceptance criteria.
The i
inspector has no further questions.
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-b.
(Closed) ' Violation 50-327/81-22-02 - Inadequate safety evaluation because a special requirement of the safety evaluation was not veri-fied. The corrective actions taken by the licensee as reported to RII-
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Lon: August-10, 1981, were reviewed by the inspectors. ' AI-19 was revised to require'-that all appropriate unresolved safety questions determina-i tion (USQD) ~ special requirements be delineated in the work plan and raviewed by PORC. The inspector has no further questions.
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Unresolved Items l
. Unresolved. items were r.ot identified during this inspection.
5.
Preoperational Test Results Review The following completed test data packages were reviewed:
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W-6.-1C, SIS, Centrifugal Charging W-6.10, SIS, Safety Injection W-6.1F, Integrated Engineering Safeguards The inspectors reviewed the above completed test data packages to verify the following:
a.
.That the cognizant engineering function has evaluated the test results
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l and has signified. that the testing demonstrated that the system met
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l design requirements.
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That the licensee specifically compared test results with established
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acceptance criteria.
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Test data packages W-6.1C and W-6.1D had recevied engineering design (EN DES) final approval and appeared satisfactory. Test data package W-6.1F had received interim ENDES approval. The results appeared satisfactory with the.following exception. During the performance of W-6.1F when both trains-of safety injection were required to operate on on-site power the_ safety injection pump motors were observed to be drawing less current.than
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expected. An investigation by the test group discovered that the discharge I
valves in both trains of safety injection were closed..This item was
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recorded as deficiency 29. The ENDES resolution to deficiency 29 stated the deficiency was acceptable because the system operated as designed. This appears to differ from the system description in the FSAR.
This is an inspector followup item (IFI 3.?8/81-43-1).
6.
Initial Criticality Procedure Review
Startup test procedure SU-7.2 " Initial Criticality" was reviewed to verify the following:
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That the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved b.
That the procedure contained adequate prerequisites c.
That special test instrumentation was identified
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That the minimum-acceptable. count rate was specified for source range channels
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. That the-procedure contained. adequate acceptance criteria inclu' ding E prediction of the Boron concentration at criticality with the definea control rod pattern
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That the pro'cedure contained requirements for maintaining Inverse Multiplication plots during dilution until criticality is achieved.
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That ' the procedure contained limiting rates of nuclear flux: level.
l increase following attainment of criticality h.
-That the. procedure specified the frequency of Boron concentration determination and Boron dilution rates
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That the procedure contained. adequate step-by-step detailed instruc-tions such that initial' criticality will be approached in an orderly
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and safe manner.
The procedure appeared adequate.
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7.
Low Power Test Procedure Review
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The following low power test procedures were reviewed.
-SU-7.3.1
" Nuclear Design Check Tests:
Boron Endpo' int Determination and.
Isothermal Temperature Cuefficient Measurement" SU-7.3.2 " Nuclear Design Check iests: Low Power Flux Mapping"
SU-7.4
" Rod and Boron Worth Measurement During Boron Dilution" SU-7.5
" Rod and Boron Worth Measurements During Boron Addition"
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SU-7.7
" Minimum Shutdown Verification"
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i The procedures were reviewed to verify the following:
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a.
That the procedures had been properly reviewed and approved
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.b.
That all FSAR commitnents were included
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That test' objectives were clearly stated i-d.
That pertinent prerequisites were identified e.
. Acceptance criteria against which the test will be Judged were clearly
identified
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That the initial test conditions were spedified
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.That step-by-step instructions for the performance of the procedure were adequate to the extent necessary tn assure that test objectives are met h.
That' provision is made for the test director to indicate the accepta-bility of the data
.The test procedures appeared adequate.
8.
Licensee Identified Item (LII) 10 CFR 50.55(e)
(Closed) LII-328/81-43-02 (SQRD-50-328/81-42)(NEB 8129) " Revised ERCW Preop -
erational Test Instructions Inadequate." The licensee reported this item to
- RII on May 4,1981, and submitted a final report on August 10, 1981. The inspector reviewed the corrective action including a verification that the associated valves had been tagged as required by the corrective action. The corrective action appeared adequate.
9.
Tour of the Unit 1 Control Room and Auxiliary Building A tour of the accessible areas was conducted to determine by observation that plant conditions and activities were in accordance with applicable requirements.
Within the areas inspected there were no violations or deviations identified with the following exception: During a tour of'the auxiliary instrument room on November 4, 1981 with the senior resident inspector it was observed that temporary test leads were connected _from. test points in two different and redundant reactor protection channels to a common strip chart recorder. This appeared to be a violation of the separa-bility requirements for redundant protective channels. This condition was brought to the attention of the licensee management that same afternoon.
During a subsequent inspection of the auxiliary instrument room that same evening it was observed, that all' temporary connections between the protec-tion channels and strip chart recorders were removed. This item will be a subject of the resident inspector's monthly report.
10. Witnessing Initial Criticality The inspector observed the preparation for initial criticality and witnessed initial criticality in order to verify the following:
a.
That the. licensee was meeting the license commitments.
b.
That startup and intermediate range nuclear-instruments were calibrated-and the startup range instruments were operating with the required count rate.
c.
.That crew requirements were met as defined in the procedures, and that staffing satisfied the requirements of technical specifications and licensee conditions regarding licensed operators.
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That the proper. version of the procedure was being used and that the
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That on-site technical support was adequate.
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The approach to initial criticality began at approximately 6:40 a.m. (CST)
November 4,1981. with the withdrawal. of control bank A control rods. At 7:20 a.m. (CST) with control bank A at 103 steps withdrawn the reactor experienced a low pressure reactor trip and "B" Train safety injection. The reactor trip and safety injection was caused by a failure of a-logic card in the solid state protection system, coincident with one pressurizer pressure channel in the. tripped state due to an instrument mechanic performing _ a -
surveillance. test. The approach to initial criticality was initiated.again at 3:55 p.m. (CST) November 4,1981 with the withdrawal of control bank A.
When the desired control-rod configuration of control bank D at 160 steps withdraw and.all other control and shutdown banks fully withdrawn was
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achieved, a boron dilution of the reactor coolant system (RCS) was ini-tlated. The RCS boron dilution was stopped at 4:35 a.m. (CST)'on November 5,1981 with the RCS boron concentration at 1491 ppm, in order that the requirement for entry into Mode 2 operation could be completed. The RCS dilution by injection of demineralized water at a rate of 70 gpm was ini-tiated at 8:10 p.m.
(CST) on - November 5, 1981.
At 1010 p.m.
(CST) on November 5,1981 the dilution rate was reduced to 35 gpm. At 10:20_p.m.
(CST) on November 5,1981 the RCS dilution was st)pped.
The reactor was
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declared critical at 10:25 p.m. (CST) on November 5,1981 with approximately 2 X 103 counts per second (CPS) on the source rante. The reactor operator inserted control bank D as required in order to maintain the neutron. flux level at a constant valve of 10 * amps as indicated by the intermediate L
range.
The operator actions during initial criticality were timely and correct.
- At 00:05 a.m. (CST) on November 6,1981, after allowing adequate time for mixing of the RCS was allowed, the following conditions existed:
a.
RCS boron concentration of 1269 ppm
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Control bank D at 107 steps and all other control rod banks fully withdrawn c.
Neutron flux level constant at approximately 10 * amps as indicated by the intermediate range The corrected critical boron concentration for a neutron flux level-of 10 '
amps as indicated by the intermediate range, and control bank _ D at 160 steps and all other control rod banks fully withdrawn was 1309 ppm.
Thus the actual critical boron concentration was 146 ppm (3.6%) greater than the predicted concentration of 1263 ppm.
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