IR 05000327/1981022

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IE Insp Repts 50-327/81-22 & 50-328/81-22 on 810519-22. Noncompliance Noted:Safety Evaluation Inadequate.Assumed W/O Confirmation That Quantified Surveillance Instructions Existed
ML20010F304
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  
Issue date: 06/19/1981
From: Burnett P, Fiedler R, Hunt M, Matt Thomas
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20010F300 List:
References
50-327-81-22, 50-328-81-22, NUDOCS 8109100023
Download: ML20010F304 (5)


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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y'

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101 MARIETTA ST N.W., SulTE 3100

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ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30303

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Report Nos. 50-327/81-22 and 50-328/81-22 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority E00A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos. OPR-77 and CPPR-73 Inspection at Segeayah site near Chattanooga, Tennessa4 Inspectors: M/)4

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M. D.rHunt Dite Signed *

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Approved by:

//endY 8'/f-M P. T. Burnelt, Acting Chief, Test Program Section, Date Signed Engineering Inspection Branch, ETI Division SUMMARY Inspection on May 19-22, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 72 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee action on previcus inspection findings, preoperational test procedure review and test results evaluation, and 10 CFR 50.55(e) items.

Results

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Of the three areas inspected, no violations or aeviations were identified in two areas; two violations were found in one area (see Paragraph 3.b).

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • M. R. Harding, Compliance Supervisor
  • W. M. Halley, Preoperation Supervisor
  • J. M. Munns, Construction QA Supe visor

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  • D. W. Kelly, QCRU Supervisar
  • S. B. Miller, QCRU
  • D. P. Roberts, Compliance Engineer E. A. Condon, Preoperational Test Staff M. Skarzinski, Assistant Preoperation Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included two technicians and preopera-tional test personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

  • E. J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector S. D. Butler, Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarirn.' on May 22, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The upgrading of unresolved item 327/81-11-01 to two violations was discussed in detail.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.

(Clo sed) Unresolved item (UNR) 328/81-20-03, Setting of valve openings following maintenance.

The valves which were set at 79 open to increase SIS train B flow have been tagged with temporary alteration order tags which instructs maintenance personnel to reset the valve openings to 79* following maintenance.

The inspector reviewed docu-

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mentation indicating a f1?ld change notice had been issued to have the drawing revised to show the new valve opening of 79*.

The tags will remain on the valves until the drawing has been ravised. This item is closed, b.

(Closed) Unresolved item (UNR 327/81-11-01) Pressurizer level indi-cator deviation.

During the entrance meeting on May 19, 1981, the lice.,see representatives were notificd of the inspector's intention to

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change the unresolved item into two violations. Since no information was provided by the licensee, this item is being changed into two J

violations.

(VIO 327/81-22-01) Failure to provide quantitative and

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qualitative acceptance criteria in surveillance instruction SI-2.

(VIO 327/81-22-02) Failure to implement the instructions specified in work

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plan 9117 which required that the-relationship between the pressurizer level channels remaining unchanged be confirmed once per shif t.

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4.

Unresolved Items Unr2 solved items were not identified during this inspection.

5, Licensee Identified Items (LII) 10 CRF 50.55(e)

a.

(Closed) LII 328/81-02-02 (MEB 8002) Main steam safety valve setpoint.

This item was reported to RII April 25, 1980. The inspector reviewed completed work plans S1280 and S1617 which. covered the installation of additional dampens and temperature controls.

The work has been completed as reported in TVA's final report dated June 11, 1980.

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b.

(Closed) LII 328/78-06-04 (NRC 700 and 714): Valve position indicator

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transformer failure. This i'.em was reported to RII February 16, 1978.

The corrective action tat - as reported by TVA's final report dated June 20, 1979 was reviewed. Work plans S1584 and S1702 which covered

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the installation of approximately 400 RC networks was reviewed. The drawings necessary for the work plan completion have been revised.

c.

(Closed) LII 328/81-20-10 (EEB 8109):

Non-IE containment airlock electrical penetrations.

This ' item was reported to RII February 27, 1981. The inspector reviewed the completed work packaga S1761 which covered the work required for the corrective action taken as stated in TVA's final report dated March 30, 1981.

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d.

(Closed) LII 328/81-02-04 (SQN NEB 8012): Spent fuel pool gates. The subject deficiency was reported to Region II on May 1,1980.

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licensee stated in the revised final report dated October 15, 1980 that the problem at. Sequoyah would be corrected by administrative 1y requiring the gate to remain in its storage location until modifica-tions are made which will qualify the gate.

The inspector reviewed Sequoyah fuel handling instruction (FHI-9, Rev. 2) which was revised to include the precaution to have the isolation gate between the spent fuel pit and cask loading pit in place any time the cask is lowered into or raised out of the spent fuel pit cask loading area. At all other times the isolation gate will be placed in its storage rack on the spent fuel pit wall.

e.

(Closed) LII 328/81-02-11 (NEB 8025):

SIS train S flow deficiency.

This item was reported to Region II on May 1,1980, and the licensee

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submitted a revised final report on November 26, 1980. The inspector discussed this item with site personnel. The inspector verified the valve setting of 79* open.

The valve has been tagged to instruct maintenance personnel to rest the vsive to 79 open after maintenance is performed on it. The tag will remain on the valve until the revised drawing has been issued to show the valve opening of 79*.

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f.

(Closed) LII 328/81-02-26 (CEB 8037): Discrepancy in as-built versus as-analyzed piping anchor location..The licensee reported this item to Region II on December 3,1980. The inspector reviewed the licensee's final report dated February 20, 1981.

The licensee performed a reanalysh. on the run of piping and determined that no hardware changes were required because the anchor and associated run of piping are still qualified to the appropriate design loads.

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(Closed) LII 328/81-02-16 (SN-M-80-17): Failure to come'./ with proc.e-dures.

The licensee reported this item to Region II on January 2, 1981. A final report was submitted on April 8,1981. The inspector reviewed the final report and the resolution to the auo.t deficiency.

A memorandum from the construction engineer (Janauary 12, 1981) was issued t7 management supervisory personnel responsible for conducting

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construction tests, clarifying commitments made to NRC.

In addition, interdivisional quality assurance prucedure (ID-QAP) 11.2, Ccnstruction

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Test Control, was issued March 9, 1981. This procedure def'.nes organi-zational functions and responsibilities and establishes divisional l

l it.terface in support of the construction test program.

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(Closed) LII 328/81-22-03 (EEB 8016): Hydrogen detection system. The

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licensee reported this item to Region II on July 14, 1980. A final report was submitted August 13, 1980.

The vendor (COMSIP) provided field modification kits which were to be used for modification of the pumps.

The pumps were modified by instclling a bypass line from the pump discha*ge to the pump suction.

The inspector reviewed the documentation indicating the work had been performed, and inspected the pumps to verify the modifications had been performed in accordance with the vendor specifications.

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(Closed)

LII 328/81-22-04 (CEB 8106):

Error in TPIPE computer l

program. The subject deficiency was reported to Region II on liarch 27, 1981. The licensee stated in the final report submitted April 23, 1981 that a new corrected version of the TPIPE program had been verified and put into use in place of the vers'on in error.

It was determined by questioning the users who were using or had used the erroneous TPIPE versions that no incorrect design information had been issued.

6.

Loss of Offsite Power - Test Procedure and Test Results Evaluation The procedures for the loss of offsite power testing (TVA 1381 and TVA 13B2)

were reviewed in conjunction with the test results because the test had been

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performed earlier. It was noted that' equipment, identified as miscellaneous loads, were not identified in the procedures or the test results. Miscel-laneous loads are those loads which are not stripped off the bus on loss of offsite power and are applied to the diesel generators immediately. It has been determined that the miscellaneous loads will be incorporated and accounted for during Pre-op Test No. W6.1F, Integrated ESF System Test.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System Testing

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During the entrance meeting on May 19, 1981, with the licensee representa-tives, the inspector requested that the licensee review testing of the ESF System for Unit 1 since 6he operability of this system was based upon preoperational testing prior to initial plant operation. This request was initiattu because of a recent review of the preoperational testing of the ESF system on Unit 2 (inspection on May 5-8, 1981, Report No. 50-328/81-20).

That review led to the NRC-0IE Region II and NRR position that the preopera-tional testing performed on the ESF system does not fulfill the commitment for an integrated safety injection (SI) system test as stated in Table 14.1-1 of the FSAL During the exit interview, the licensee respresentative stated that no additional testing was conducted on Unit 1.

However there have been four unscheduled SI actuations since initial operation commenced, and that during these unscheduled SI actuations there were no apparent equipment malfunctions.

The status of NCR 27P - Safety Injection Pump Breaker Lockout, for which corrective action was to be completed by Novewmber 3, 1980 was also discussed during the exit interview with licensee representatives. As of May 22, 1981 no corrective action had been taken on NCR 27P:

It is the under'.tanding of the inspector that this problem is associated with all Safety Related 6900V breakers. Followup of NCR 27P will be addressed in the resident inspectors report.

t This information was relayed to Region II management on May 22, 1981 following the exit interview. Region II is currently reviewing the Unit 1 ESF testing.

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