IR 05000327/1981026
| ML20010F025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1981 |
| From: | Andrews D, Crlenjak R, Jenkins G, Marston R, Mcfarland C, Roemmich R, Stansberry W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010F021 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-81-26, 50-328-81-33, NUDOCS 8109090277 | |
| Download: ML20010F025 (11) | |
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o, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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E 11EGION 11 Q
101 MARIETTA ST., NY!., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, G EoRGiA 30303 g*****
g Report Nos. 50-327/81-26 and EP -328/81-33 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 Inspection at Sequoyah Site, Cha tanooga, TN and Muscle Shoals, AL Inspectors:
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Date Signed 5~/2.-SY R. V. Crlerjak Date Signed Accompanying Personn
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. R. Jenk ns, M. J. Gaitanis, T. H. Essig, K.
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Approved by:
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SUMMARY
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Inspection on Ju'y 6-9, 1981
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l Areas Inspected
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This routine, announced inspection involved 228 inspector-hours onsite in the area of a radiological emergency exercise.
Results There were no violations or deviations identified in the areas inspected.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted l
l-Licensee Employees
- J.' W; Hufham,' Assistant to the Director, Division of Nuclear. Power L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety H. J. Green, Director of Nuclear Power
- J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent W. T. Cottle, Assistant Plant Superintendent l
- E. K. Sliger, Supervisor Radiclogical Emergency Preparedness (REP) Staff
- J. L. Ingwersen,-Supervisor, Radiological Emergency Planning and Freparedness (REPP) Group -
- M.' R. Harding, Compliance Supervisor
- R. J. Kitt,' Health Physics Supervisor
- W. E. Webb, Project Engineer, REP Staff
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- K. Marks, Project Engineer, REP Staff
- E'.~ A. Belvin, Jr., Director, Office of Health and Safety C. Crowell, Director of Information
- C. Cra4,1 ford, Manager of Power Information
- J. Schlatter, Nuclear Information Officer
- S. B. Goldman, System Nuclear Engineer for Information-T. Knight, Reactor Engineering Branch Chief G. Jones, Outage Management Branch Chief (Acting)
R. Doty, Occupational Health % Safety C. Kent, Occupational Health 2 Safety P. Knapp, Occupational Health & Safety R. Smith, Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS)
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NRC Resident Inspectors
- E. J. Ford, Senior RI
- S. L. Butler, RI Other licensee employees contacted included six operations personnel and six HP staff.
- Attended exit meeting.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 9,1981 withithose l
persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
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The need for an integ
.ed radiological emergency exercise of.onsite func-
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- tions was discussed at the exit meeting. During a telephone conversation on August 6,1981, TVA management stated 'that an exercise of Sequoyah onsite ~
functions would.be conducted in November,:1981.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not. inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items
l Unresolved items were not identified d'uring this. inspection.
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5.
Exercise: Scenario The emergency exercise scenario, developed by the licensee, met the require-
i ments of 10CFR50.47(b)(14),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F and specific '
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criteria of NUREG 0654, Section N.3 and provided for a sequence of simulated
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events which required activation of the licensee's emergency response organization beginning with an unusual Ev-t and progressing through sequentially escalating classes to a Generai Emergency.
At a meeting
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between the inspectors and TVA representatives on July 6, 1981, held to discuss the real and simulated events scheduled for the exercise, TVA stated that due to the fuel loading of Unit 2 the participation of the Sequoyah onsite staff would t;e limited.
Prior to this meeting, during telephone conversations between the inspector and TVA representatives, TVA had indicated that there would be full onsite and offsite participation in the exercise. Some time compression was written into the scenario to accelerate-the overall involvement of licensee, State and local organizations partici-
.pation on July 7, 1981 and July 8, 1981. The sequence of simula' ed events was coordinated in advance with State representatives to prt/ide an~
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opportunity for exercising the State and local emergency re;oonse eganizations.
The exercise scenario included the following postulated emergency condi-tions:
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a.
A reactor coolant pump failure becomes a source of loose parts which are assumed to cause damage to reactor fuel element cladding and steam generator tubes. These events result in a radiation release into the secondary system and to the environment via the condenser and vacuum pump exhaust.
b.
A small line break in the subsystem of a reactor coolant loop results in leakage of primary coolant into containment.
The small loss of l
coolant accident (LOCA) causes leakage to the atmosphere through the j
shield building vent.
The release of radioactive gases necessitates
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i evacuation and sheltering of persons in the nearby counties in the path l.
of the plume.
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6.
Assignment of Responsibility L
This' area was observed to determine that ' primary responsibilities for
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emergency response by the licensee have' been specifically established and l
that adequate staff is available to respond to an emergency as required by
"10CFR50.47(b)(1),10CFR50, Appendf x C, paragraph IV. A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,.Section II.A.
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'The' inspectors verified that specific assignments have been made" for the-l licensee's offsite emergency organization groups, as described in.Section 4,
9, and 11 and Appendices A, B, and D of the TVA Radiological Emergency Plan-for the Sequoyah duelear Station.
The conduct of the exercise did not
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provide for an adequate demonstration of these functions for the onsite activities in the Operational Support Center (OSC) nor the nearby Interim Emergency Operation Facility (IEOF). The inspectors did verify that there were adequate staff available te fulfill the emergency functions required by
- the plan for the functions at the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC),
the Division of Nuclear Power Emergency Center (DNPEC) and the Muse.le Shoals Emergency Control Center (MSECC). Onsite responsibilities will be observed during a subsequent exercise (50-327/81-26-01; 50-328/81-33-01).
7.
-Onsite Emergency Organization The licensee's onsite'edergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities 'for emergency response are unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing is provided to insure initial facility :ccic it response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support activities are specified as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(2), 10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV. A, and specific criteria in NUREG CC54,Section II.B.
As stated above in paragraph 6 'the limited effort by the onsite staff prohibited the' inspectors from evaluating the onsite emergency organization and from observing work related to verifying the above responsibilities.
Specifically there was no res,..se in the following areas: post accident sampling; dosimetry and exposure control; assembly, accountability and evacuation of personnel; repair and corrective actions; contamination control and persontol monitoring; and protective actions. ihese areas will
- be observed during a subsequent exercise (50-327/81-26-02; 50-328/81-33-02).
8.
Emergency Response Support and Resources This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and
. effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to i
accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other that organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(3),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragrapo IV.A, and specific criteria l
in NUREG 0654,Section II.C.
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The IEOF, established at the power Operations Training Center near the Sequoyah site, was not activated for this exercise.
Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources and arrangements to accommodate State and local staff were made at the CECC and DNPEC in Chattanooga.
9.
Emergency Classification System
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This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme is in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(4), 10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.D.
The inspectors observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in Section 5 o the Radiological Emergency Flan and in
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Implementing Procedures SQN-IP-1 through 5.
The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulaud accident and provided initial and continuing mitigating actions taken during the simulated emergency. The inspectors had no further qu< ;tions in this area.
10.
Notification Methods and Procedures This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification bv the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response orcani' ' 'ons has been established as required by 10CFR-50.47(b)(5),10CFR60, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.E.
The inspectors observed that notification methods and procedures have been established and were used to pr. vide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
The inspectors noted that early in the exercise the Operations Duty Specialist had trouble keeping up with the incoming information and notifying all required contacts within the TVA emergency response organization.
TVA recognizes the need to improve on the timeliness and the clarity of communications, especially during the early phases of an emergency.
The inspectors' concerns are further developed in paragraph 11.
11.
Emergency Commu11 cations The area was observed to determine that provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(6),
paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I.
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During'the course of the exercise the inspectors noted several problems in the area of comr.anications as follows:
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The-CECC aied DNPEC directors were not informed of the declaration of a Site Emergency until about thirty minutes after it was declared by the Site Emerger
. Director (SED).
The MSECC knew of the Site Emergency s
and questioned the CECC's continued use of the Alert status during this thirty minute time period.
b.
The inspector at the MSECC noted that the close proximity of the two most frequently used telephones caused noise problems that impeded the i
effectiveness of the MSECC communications.
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The inspectors noted that there was a lack of information flow from the State Emergency Operations Center to the licensee's CECC concerning i
actions that had been taken by the offsite agencies.
A licensee
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representative stated that the area of information feedback would be discussed with State of Tennessee representatives.
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The inspectors noted that there were several instances when ct,.nmuni-
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cators reported plant status and field data relative to local time, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), rather than TVA system time, Central-Daylight Time (CDT).
The inspectors stated that all facilities should routinely verify the messages received and should periodically veri fy the time of the i
information. The potential for significant errors was recognized by TVA and I
corrective actions will be initiated. The area of emergency communications will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(50-327/81-26-03,.
50-328/81-33-03)
12.
Public Education and Information
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This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergeacy was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10CFR50.47(B)(7), 10CFR50, Appendix E, paragrapa IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.G.
TVA did not_use the primary, nor the alternate, news center designated in
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the Radiological Emergency Plan. A temporary news center was set up in Chattanooga. The CECC Director, or his alternate, were the principal TVA
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spokesmen.
Electronic services for radio and television reporters in the news center were excellent.
However there were no telephones, copying machin's or telex facilities, nor large scale maps or visual.airis at the newr center.
Press releases were issued in a timely manner, however there. was no meeting with area media representatives until about seven l
hours af ter -the exercise started.
The Emergency News Service (ENS) was activeted and the local media informed the public of the exercise.
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Arrangements E for ' a t%aly exchange of I information : among designated spokespersons did not wrk properly throughout the progress of the exercise.
TVA. information personnel in ' Chattanooga - the people making initial preparation of news relecses
,were: unable to obtain copies of news releases
. issued by the: State..of Tennessee. It was not determined until the next day that Ten,essee was simulating sending its news releases-to TVA.
When
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Tennessee's announcements: were not received.. TVA's - information personnel
- should have moved aggressively to determine the cause of the problem.
i The above areas ~ will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-327/
81-26-04,50-328/81-33-04).
13.
Emergency. Facilities and Equipment This area _was observed to determine-that adequate emergency facilities and.
equipment to support an emergency response are provided a-d maintained as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(8), 10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.H.
a.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC did not fully participate in the exercise. It was staffed for the initial phase of the exarcise but was deactivated after about two.
hours.
There was no data display of control room instrumerts; the closed circuit TV' supplied for that purpose - was not usei.
Radiation monitoring equipment was not used within the TSC.
There was-insufficient working space for other than the TSC staff. TVA has committed to NRR to uograde the TSC by December 31, 1981. This upgrade is proposed to include additional work space and will incorporate the Emergency Control Center (ECC) into the TSC.
This area will be reviewed during a
subsequent inspection.
(50-327/81-26-05, 50-328/81-33-05).
b.
Operatic::: Support Center (OSC)
The OS, was not acti"ated for this exercise.
c.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The Interim EOF was not activated for this exercise. The scenario
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l information was provided by the ECC to the Operations Duty Specialisz i
in Chattanooga who transmitted the information to the CECC and DNPEC.
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d.
Offsite Monitoring Teams l
Provisions for offsite monitoring smaport and facilities have been made through the MSECC. The field actis..ies were directec by MSECC by t
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providing health physics (HP) personnel and equipment from Sequoyah and Watts Bar Nuclear Stations, and from a TVA environmental lab et Vonore, TN. MSECC directed the offsite monitoring for TVA in the vicinity of the Sequoyah facility through the TVA coordinator located at the State Field Control Center (FCC) located at the Air National Guard at Lovell Field Municipal Airport, Chattanooga, TN.
The inspectors observed that the Watts Bar team, using a van and equipment from the Watts Bar Plant, and the Muscle Shoals team, using a van from the Vonore laboratory, had the required equipment, but there were no health physics or EP implementing procedures in the field kits.
The " cutie pie" radiation survey instruments in both vans had expired calibration -dates.
These apparent deficiencies were discussed with licensee representatives and corrective actions will be initiated.
This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(50-327/81-26-06, 50-328/81-33-06)
e.
Decid aal/ Visual Aids TVA status boards at the MSECC and FCC appeared to be adequate, but were not effectively used. In both cases information on the displays concerning the status of the plant and offsite monitoring data was incomplete and not kept up-to-date, except for meteorological data at the MSECC which was kept current throughout the exercise.
At the TSC no displays, visual or decisional aids were used.
In the CECC/DNPEC the status board that was used was not adequate to provide trending displays and accident historical data. Entries on the status board lacked identification and it was not clear what informa-ticn was current.
The status board was located in the DNPEC and was very difficult to read from the CECC. Most information was passed to key personnel in the two centers by individual data sheets, which were distributed frequently. This method does not insure that all personnel are kept informed of the current plant status and does not provide for trending data nor historical accident information. TVA representatives agreed that improvements are needed in this area.
The area of decisional / visual aids will be observed during a subsequent inspection.
(50-327/81-26-07, 50-328/81-33-07).
14. Accident Assessment This area was observed to ' determine that adequate methods, systems and equipment.or assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
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corsequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(9),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I.
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l The. accident assessment program includes in plant radiological monitoring, out-of plant radiological mon'toring and offsite dose calculations.
The onsite organizatioe was not involved in determining the release rates nor the initial dose projections. All onsite information was passed to the MSECC in " final" form for assessment actions. The dose calculations at MSECC went smoothly; however, certain inconsistencies were noted in the source terms used.
The source term would sometimes consist of ali noble
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gases and no radioiodines and sometimes of no noble gases and all radiciodines. The reason for this inconsistency was not apparent, with the exception of a few situations (i.e., the initial calculation when only ecble-gases were thought to be present, and later for radiolodine during the investigation of discrepancies in field data).
Several source terms appeared to be generated by back calculation of environmental data.
Requests for process monitor data (particularly for the shield building vent
monitor folk ing the puff release) by MSECC personnel appeared to be lacking; such data (assuming it was available) could have been used to substaniate other estimates of source terms and offsite doses.
Dose calculations (noble gas plume exposure, iodine inhalation, and iodine ingestion via milk) were expressed in units of mrem /hr.
This practice
appeared to yield equivalent dose projections in a satisfactory and straightforward manner for the noble gas plume exposure pathway.
For the i
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ingestion and inhalation pathways (such as infant thyroid via ingestion of milk), however, it appeared that a dose rate was being reported rather than an integrated dose committment for a one hour time period. In addition, it was not clear which time should be used - release duration, duration of ingestion, etc.
It was not clear the extent to which the two day milk i
pathway delay time was considered (or if instantaneous equilibrium was
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assumed) An integrated dose (mrem) wccid be more responsive to the EPA Protective Action Guides.
In subsequer t discussions with personnel at Muscle Shoals, TVA representatives agreed that a more clear reporting format for dose committments should be developed.
TSis area will be reviewed
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l during a subsequent inspection. '(50-327/81-26-08, 50-328/81-33-08).
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15.
Protective Responses
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l This areas was observed r.o determine that guidelines for protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, are implemented promptly as required by 10CFR-50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.J.
a.
Accountability An accountability of ons:te personnel was not
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conducted during this exercise.
b.
Evacuation of Owner Controlled Areas - Thue was no atte..p+ to insure that persons who may be present within the owner controlled area, but outside the plant exclusion area, were informed of the simulated potential radiation hazard.
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-controlled areas will be~ reviewed during a subsequent : exercise.
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-(50-327/81-26-09, 50-328/81-33-09)
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' 16. Radiological Exposure Control-This area was observed to determine thtt means for controlling rediological-exposures, in an emergency, are established 1and implemented for emergency
. workers ~ and that' they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA
- Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action. Guides as required by -10CFR50.47(b)(11) and.speci fic criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.K.
The licensee did not demonstrate this area during the exercise.
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. 17... Medical and Public Health Support
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This area was observed to determine that arrangements are made for medical l
services for - contaminated injured individuals as required by 10CFR-E 50.47(b)(12),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.L.
The licensee did not demonstrate this area during this exercise.
18.
Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post-accident Operations This area was observed to determine that general plans for recovery and reentry are provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(13),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.H, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.M.
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The inspectors reviewed with the recovery organization's outage management staff the short term recovery plan, the preliminary list of-post-incident l
recovery procedures and the scope of the radiation dose management program.
The recovery team developed a sequence assessment of the emergency L
incidents, an evaluation of the incidents, and an evaluation of the measures required to stabilize tre plant systems. The recovery team identified the condition of -the affected equipment and plar.t structures and developed programs for the repairs and for the retesting of the affected components and systems. Subsequently the inspectors have reviewed the final issuance of the plan for recovery. The inspectors have no further questions in this area.
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19. Radiological Emergency Response Training This area was observed to determine that radiological emergency response
~1 training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency
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as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(15), 10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654, Sectici 11.0.
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- Exercise Controllers - There were no controllers assigned - to the
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loffsite monitoring teams. The.-offsite teams had the controllers input.
I data and participated as controllers and players / workers.
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b.
Offsite Monitoring-Teams - The teams did not appear to be knowledgeable in ' vegetation sampling _ techniques in that they.did not sample a
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i measured or patterned area and seemed to.be unsure of ~ the' types :of vegetation to.be sampled in a particular area.
No procedures were available for _the team to use.
This area will' be reveiwed during a j :
subsequent inspection. (50-327/81-26-10,50-328/81-33-10)
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l 20.. Exercise Critique The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine
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that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally-
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presented to = licensee management for. corrective ' actions as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(14), 19CFR50, Appendix E,
paragraph-IV.F, and s>ecific
criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.N.
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A formal TVA critique of the emerger.cy exercise was held on. July 9,1981
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with all controllers,' key exercise participants, licensee management and NRC
personnel attending.
Deficiencies and ' weaknesses in ~ the emergency preparedness program, identified as a result of this exercise were presented
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by licensee personnel during the critique. Followup of corrective actions for the TVA identified deficiencies and weaknesses will' be accomplished
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i though subsequent NRC inspections.
21.
Exercise Evaluation
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The inspectors concluded that the emergency exercise demonstrated the licensee's' ability to respond to an emergency and provide support to the a
onsite emergency organizatim through activation and effective use of n
of fsite TVA facilities and agencies of the counties and the State.
The onsite emergency a gar.ization-participated only to a limited extent and an
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overall evaluation of the effectiveness of onsite emergency preparedness
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could not be made on the basis of this exercise.
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