IR 05000327/1981040
| ML20041C769 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1982 |
| From: | Andrews D, Jenkins G, Marston R, Stansberry W, Taylor P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041C752 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-81-40, 50-328-81-49, NUDOCS 8203020547 | |
| Download: ML20041C769 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
E REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 o
Report flos. 50-327/81-40 and 50-328/81-49 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 Inspection at the Sequoyah Site, near Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee Inspector:
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&clual J/S/84 D. L. Andrews Date Signed d la i c{mJ afr/Jz
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R. R. tiarston Date Signed G.l cl<cw J L/5}h.
W. W. Stansberry Date Signed N47 d/
J/3/P:L P. A. Taylor Dat6 Signed Approved y:
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G. R. Jenkins, Section Chief, EPOS Division Date Signed SUfEARY Inspection on December 17, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 126 inspector-hours on site in the area of a radiological emergency exercise.
Resul ts There were no violations or deviations identified in the area inspected.
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8203020547 820205 PDR ADOCK 05000327 O
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i REPORT DETAILS i
1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees J
- C, C. Mason, Plant Superintendent
- W. T. Cottle, Assistant Plant Superintendent (0perations)
- J. W. Doty, Assistant Plant Superintendent (Maintenance)
J. McGriff, Assistant Plant Superintendent (Health and Safety)
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J. T. Crittenden, Chief, Public Safety Service L. Noble, Operations Supervisor
- W. W. Kinsey, Engineering Supervisor
- R. J. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor i
- C. E. Kent, Jr., OCH&S Health Physicist
- B. Marks, Project Engineer i
- W. J. Milsap, OCH&S Health Physicist J. A. Thomas, Lt., Public Safety Service
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Other licensee employees contacted included several craftsmen, technicians,
operators and security force members..
NRC Resident Inspector
- E. J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector S. L. Butler, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 17, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
I 3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved itens were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Exercise Scenario The scenario for the radiological emergency exercise was reviewed in advance
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of the scheduled exercise to veri fy that the requirements of 10CFR-
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50.47(b)(14),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria of NUREG 0654, Section N.3 were met, l
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The exercise scenario was developed primarily to cover those functions of the onsite emergency ' organization which were not demonstrated during the exercise conducted July 7 and 8, 1981.
The exercise started with the discovery and activation of an explosive device which caused equipment damage and personnel injury.
This was the basis for the activation of the
accountability and evacuation procedures.
A leak of reactor coolant in Unit 1 caused a liquid and gaseous release in the containment building, and a subsequent airborne release through the shield building vent.
This exercise escalated to no higher than an ALERT condition.
The scenario for this radiological emergency exercise when combined with the exercise conducted July 7 and 8,1981, appears to meet the above requirements.
6.
Assignment of Responsibility This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff is available to respond to an emergency as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(1),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.A.
The inspectors verified that specific assignments had been made for the licensee's onsite emergency organization as specified in the TVA Radio-logical Emergency Plan for the Sequoyah Nuclear Station.
The inspectors verified that there were adequate staff available to fulfill the emergency functions required by the plan.
i Based on the above findings, items 50-327/81-26-01 and 50-328/81-33-01 are closed.
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7.
Onsite Energency Organization
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The licensee's onsite emergency organi at.fon was observed to detennine that z
the responsibilities for emergency responsa are unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing is provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces among various
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onsite response activities and offsite support activities are specified as l
required by 10CFR50.47(b)(2), 10CFR50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.B.
The inspectors noted that the initial and augmented onsite emergency organization was well defined and that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions as described by Section 4 of the Sequoyah Radiological Emergency Plan.
Offsite participation was limited to communications involving the Operations Duty Specialist at the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) in Chattanooga.
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Based on the above findings, items 50-327/81-26-02 and 50-328/81-33-02. are i
closed.
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8.
Emergency Classification System This area was observed to detemine that a standard emergency classification
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and action level scheme is in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(4), 10CFR50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.D.
The inspectors observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in Section 5 of the Radiological Emergency Plan and in Implementing Procedures SQN-IP-1 through 5.
The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency
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procedures provided initial and continuing mitigating actions taken during the simulated emergency.
The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
9.
Notification Methods and Procedures
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This area was observed to detemine that procedures had been established for
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notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages
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to response organizations has been established as required by 10CFR-
50.47(b)(5),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.E.
The inspectors observed that notification methods and procedures have been i
established and were used to provide information to the Operations Duty Special ist.
Since only the onsite organization was being exercised, the Operations Duty Specialist was not actually required to make the notifi-l cations. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
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10.
Emergency Communications i
The area was observed to determine that provisions exist for prompt j
communications among principal response organizations and emergency
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personnel as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(6),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph
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IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.F.
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Onsite communications were observed and were considered adequate.
Offsite
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communications to the Operations Duty Specialist at the CECC in Chattanooga l
appeared to be adequate.
The communications link between the CECC and
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offsite agencies was not activated during the exercise.
Under the TVA concept of operations all communications from the Sequoyah Site are directed
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i to the CECC, which in turn maintains offsite communications links with the
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appropriate State, local and Federal agencies. These offsite communications l
links were observed during the previous exercise.
The inspectors had no
further questions in this area.
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11. Emergency Facilities and Equipment This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response are provided and maintained as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(8), 10CFR50, Appendix E,
paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.H.
a.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TV camera in the Control Room was not effective in providing information to the TSC.
A licensee representative stated that an alternate method of providing Control Room parameters to the TSC would be implemented.
The status boards used in the TSC were inadequate.
The licensee identified this problem during the exercise critique and stated that
the boards would be upgraded.
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An NRC representative discussed NRC workspace and equipment with a licensee representative.
The licensee stated that a private room with a speaker phone and status boards will be provided for NRC personnel.
The above items will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
The open item concerning upgrading the TSC from a previous inspection (50-327/81-26-05; 50-328/81-33-05) remains open.
Some improvement in the TSC has been accomplished; however, the arrangements for NRC space and equipment noted above have not been completed.
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b.
Operations Support Center (OSC)
The individual designated to be in charge of the OSC operated in the ECC during the exercise. As a result, OSC accountability was difficult to determine and maintain.
Three different persons were apparently dispatching teams without coordinating with each other. One individual
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in the OSC needs to be in charge (50-327/81-40-01; 50-328/81-49-01).
Teams being dispatched were not briefed on radiological and other plant conditions before dispatch (50-327/81-40-02; 50-328/81-49-02).
Bomb search teams did not appear to be familiar with bomb search techniques.
The licensee identified this problem during the critique and stated that local police and military expertise would be used in this area.
The inspector noted that the Plant procedures need to be revised to identify assistance available in this area. These above areas will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
c.
Emergency Control Center (ECC)
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There were no status boards or trend displays available in the ECC.
The licensee identified this problem in the critique.
A licensee represeritative stated that because of the location of the ECC, in the
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Control Room area, large status boards could not be used. The licensee is considering the use of small status and trend displays.
This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
12. Accident Assessment This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems and equipment -for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(9),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.I.
Initial dose assessment by Control Room personnel appeared to be adequate to classify the emergency.
Long tenn dose assessment was not observed since the Muscle Shoals Emergency Control Center (MSECC) was not activated.
Dose assessment at MSECC was observed during the previous exercise (0IE Report No. 50-327/81-26; 50-328/81-33).
Post-accident samples were obtained within a reasonable time;.however, the technicians appeared to be unfamiliar with the Sampling and Analysis Procedure (TI-66). The Health Physics Technicians accompanying the Sampling Team did not appear to be familiar with their responsibilities under the procedure (TI-66)
in providing advice on radiation levels and dose commitments.
There also did not appear to be any one individual in charge to make decisions for the team.
In the lab, the shielding of the hood did not seem to be adequate for the radiation levels of the simulated sample.
The above problems were identified by the licensee during the critique. A licensee representative stated that training and familiarization with the procedure would be provided for applicable personnel.
In-plant radiation monitoring was performed in a satisfactory manner.
The inspectors had no futher questions in this area.
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The Offsite Monitoring Team was directed to monitor various locations on plant property outside the Protected Area.
A ten minute delay was encountered at the security gate due to the need for a radiological clearance and material pass for the team's equipment.
The licensee identified this problem during the critique and stated that it will be corrected.
Sampling was done in accordance with procedure MSECC IP-9.
Analysis of airborne particulate was also done in accordance with this procedure. Analysis of airborne iodine concentration was done in accordance with instructions printed on a worksheet.
The iodine analysis should be made part of a procedure (50-327/81-40-03; 50-328/81-49-03).
The weather was rainy and the monitoring team did not have any means of protecting the air sampler filters and cartridges from the rain.
This could have caused considerable error in the evaluation of airborne radioactivity concentra-tions.
A licensee representative stated that this matter would be looked into for possible methods of resolution (50-327/81-40-04; 50-328/
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81-49-04).
The filter cutter used to cut a 2-inch circle out of the 4-inch particulate filters was unwieldy and difficult to handle.
Techniques used
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by team personnel to handle and cut the filters could result in contamina-tion spread (50-327/81-40-05; 50-328/81-49-05).
These areas will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
It was noted that instruments used by the monitoring team were in current calibration.
Based on this finding, items 50-327/81-26-06 and 50-328/
81-33-06 are closed.
13. Protective Responses This area was observed to detennine that guidelines for protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, are implemented promptly as required by 10CFR-50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.J.
The accountability measures used in emergencies are specified in the Emergency Plan, paragraph 6.4.1, and Procedure IP-8.
Provisions are made for a full accounting of all individuals onsite or identification of missing individuals within 30 minutes from declaration of an emergency. During the exercise, it took approximately one hour and forty-five minutes to account for all onsite personnel.
The first total was done in 29 minutes with six persons unaccounted for.
The discrepancy appeared to be due to the inability of the assembly area supervisors to provide an accurate and timely accountability.
This problem was identified by the licensee during,the critique.
The licensee's corrective actions will be evaluated during a subsequent inspection.
The Central Alarm Station (CAS) is designated to coordinate the accounta-bility and report the results to the Chief - Public Safety in the Control Center.
Search and Rescue teams are used to locate individuals reported as missing. Personnel at assembly areas remained there until the all-clear was sounded, providing a means for maintaining continuing accountability.
The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
Radiological Exposure Control This area was observed to detennine that means for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency are established and implemented for emergency workers and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(11) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.K.
Radiological surveys were conducted and dosimetry was provided throughout the exercise.
It was noted that teams dispatched from the OSC were not briefed on radiological conditions in the plant (paragraph 11.b), and the post-accident sampling team could have been overexposed due to a lack of guidance from the HP escort (paragraph 12).
The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
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15. Medical and Public Health Support This area was observed to determine that arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals as required by 10CFR-50.47(b)(12),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.L.
The medical measures used in emergencies are specified in the Emergency Plan, paragraphs 6.5 and 7.1.7, and in Procedure IP-10. There appears to be no procedural guidance provided or actions to be taken by Public Safety, EMT, and Heal th Physics personnel to expedite the onsite evacuation of injured personnel.
However, even without this guidance, the ambulance was able to leave the protected area without delay.
The medical team appeared to be well-trained and effective at their job.
The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
16.
Radiological Emergency Response Training This area was observed to determine that radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an energency as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(15),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.0.
As discussed in the above paragraphs, there were several instances in which personnel of the emergency response organization did not appear to have a good understanding of their functional responsibilities within the organization.
This appeared to be the result of inadequate training and some procedural deficiencies, primarily in the area of post accident sampl ing. These problems are discussed in paragraph 12.
17.
Followup on IE Bulletin 79-18 During the exercise, it was noted by the inspectors that the emergency alarm could not be heard in at least one area of the plant.
Audibility of emergency alarms was discussed with licensee personnel.
A licensee representative stated that since neither Unit was licensed at the time the Bulletin was issued, it was sent for information only.
A survey had been perfomed within the plant and some areas were identified where the alarm could not be heard; however, the survey was conducted prior to full operation of both units.
The licensee committed to perfom another survey to identify and correct any identified problems (50-327/81-40-06; 50-328/81-49-06).
This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspec-tion.
18.
Exercise Critique The licensee's critique of the emergency exer :ise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally
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presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(14),
paragraph IV.F.
and specific
criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.N.
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A fonnal TVA critique of the emergency exercise was held on-December 17, 1981 with controllers, key exercise participants, licensee management and HRC personnel attending.
Deficiencies and weaknesses in the emergency preparedness program, identified as a result of this exercise, were presented by licensee personnel during the critique.
Followup of corrective
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actions for the TVA identified deficiencies and weaknesses will be accomplished through subsequent NRC inspections.
19.
Report of Federal Evaluation Team The report of deficiencies noted by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional i
Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV j
staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise held July 7-8, 1981, is included as an attachment to this report.
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JUL 2 4 19El
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Colonel Lut.cnc P. Tanner State Direcccr Tennessee uter 9ency.bneye.:ent A;ency l
3941 Staco Drive j
hishville. lennessee 37204 I
Dear Lolonel Tanner.
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ine f ollo. gin, oeficiencies were nottd during i:AC IV/FE;iA staf f particination
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in ano evaluation or the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant exercisc July 7-6, 1951.
General Cm.r.ents:
1.
Tin:t (CDT vs. EDT) caused probleas throughout the exercise.
2.
There vas confusion on wind direction as it affects plam.e travel.
A firo, decision should t e raade on using wind direction "from" or "to" in future exercises.
Specific Cor. tents.
1.
l'utir~ication and Alerting of Staff Auequate.
2.
riotification and Alerting of the Public
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The warnin; systoa utilizea in this exercise did not meet the requirencnts of D654.
3.
External Coanunications Capability Between Sites Coi.n.anications break-dov:us with Bradley County curing the exercise caused delays in uessage transraission.
There were several instances where messages were garbled in transmission
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causing figures to be reported in error and unit terms to be confused.
L Trainin shoulc t,e conductec to familiarize both operations and contr.unica-a tions personnel with the appropriate terminologies used in these operations.
4.
EOC Facility The tradley County EOC needs improver.ents in space, ventilation, and coc:.. uni ca ti ons.
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Lv0 Inte n.al tra anications and Displ.us
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1,..per.ve..ents in plotting procedures, messoe handling an6 locir_ are n m ed.
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i.cIls cn so.c phones were disccr.nected in the FCC causing calls to L+ r..issr.
uhen fleshir., licots ucre nat noticed,
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The FCC status boards were not updatcd to reflect the current sitaation as
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7/6 when the exercise resu.:ca.
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Tbc pla.m was not olotted on the FCC.,;aps.
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6.
Accqu cy ei 5taffire f
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.Acc a.:,eno a revieu of staf fing over a sustained period.
7.
Facility i ccess/ Control The functions of security and dosimetry should be separated.
3.
Support by hesponsible Elected or Appoir,ted Officials Aceqaatc.
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Direction and Control
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Tua i:.er..Ltrs at the tripartite 0; eratcd iror the CECC which lic.iteo their
- j ability to function by reuoving them frc.a iim.ediate and airect contact with
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their support staff and thus harpered the Direction and Control function of
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the State LOC.
There was a lack of infonnation exchan'Je between11amilton and Bradley County EOC's and the State EOC in Nashville.
Coordination between the State E0C and the FCC was lacking at times.
Delays were experienced in implementing
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decisions because of limited information.
i Direction and control of monitoring tearas needs improvenent in these areas:
d.
Pre-dssiSRMent briefin9s were not COnplete in that expcCted exposure rates, types of release, plant conditions, aission exposure limits and i
recommended protective rneasures were not discussed.
l b.
Monitors did not refer to nor follow SOP's.
c.
Eackup raonitoring teams were not assigned to assist teams following the
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plume.
d.
Assigned monitoring team identification nunbers did not follow the 50P.
10. Coordination l
The State LOC /TCC relationship and functions should be better defined. At tir.ics infonr,ation by-passed the FCC as it went froa State to lo.al goverm.ients.
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Auequate.
12.
PuLlic Int er;.atiar.
The ICC die not rcctive prcss releases trc the CECC or the State ECC.
Therc ::ert nu arrangents NJe for cress briefings at the FCC.
13. i,ccident. !,ssess;.ent Radiological teaus were not instructed nor did any teams concuct monitoring en route tu prc-ecsionated tonitorin; points.
leam meabers were not asked for personal exposures durinj r.;issions.
TVA and Rao liedith used different population dose projection raodels which createo a significent oifference in projected exposures offsite.
Field monitoring data was not used for verification of projections.
Use of Public tervice Co=ission personnc1 as meubers of iacnitoring teams was 300a. ibis ce;chility anu trained resource can be immediately utilized when needed anu snovic be further explored.
14.
Protective Actiers
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Reasons for evucuatian ano sheltering cecisions were not rcade clear to fielo locations.
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Shelter personnel should be aware of decontamination procedures.
Plans should be developed for in.plementation of decontamination as a protective action for shelterces.
Evacuation was ordered for sone areas where monitoring teams were reporting background readings only.
15. Exposure Ccntrol The decision to adainister potassiun iodide was not explained satisfactorily at all field locations.
Decontamination stations and procedures to be followed for personnel and eaersency vehicle decontamination were not established during the exercise.
16. Recovery and Re-entry Much work and planning remains to be done in the areas of recovery and re-entry.
17. Adequacy of the Scenario to Test the Plan Deviation from the senario caused much confusion for exercise observers and staff alike.
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16.
Lcncfits ot' the :.xercise to I articip4nts self critic,ae trcadi. out benerits of exercise 1.0 the pcrtir.1; ants.
19.
Capability of vi;strved Jurisdiction to Execute Plans Aacquetc.
Sincerely, g, o, b,. 9.
0 Jack D.
!(.hardson Chairman, RAC IV cc:
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CF RD Gantt ActingExecuht'
(fssistant7 ?W h ffj
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PP/RJGAMT/np/x363/7/23/81 READING FILE FEMA IV