IR 05000327/1981011
| ML19350D945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1981 |
| From: | Burnett P, Fiedler R, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350D944 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-81-11, 50-328-81-12, NUDOCS 8105270303 | |
| Download: ML19350D945 (4) | |
Text
pn arouq'o, UNITED STATES r
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA ST N.W SulTE 3100
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V Report Nos. 50-327/81-11 and 50-328/81-12 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:
Sequoyah Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77 and CPPR-73 Inspection at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant near Chattanooga, Tennessee Inspectors: k f-//~8/
R. L. Fiedler Date Signed W. b 3-//- g/
M. Thoinas Date Signed Approved by:/
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i P. T. BuFneTt, Acting Section Chief Date Signed Engineering Inspection Branch Engineering and Technical Inspection Division SUMMARY Inspection on March 30 - April 101981 -
Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 57 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of hot functional test procedure review and witnessing of hot functional testing of Unit 2 and a tour of the Unit 1 control room and auxiliary building.
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Of the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. T. Cottle, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- J. M. McGriff, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- W. H. Kinsey, Jr., Results Supervi sor
- M. R. Harding, Compliance Supervisor
"R. W. Fortenberry, Reactor Unit Supervisor M. Halley, Pre-op Supervisor M. A. Skarginski, Pre-op Engineer E. Saputa, Test Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included several operators.
NRC Resident Inspector E. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. D. Butler, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 2,1981 with l
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings l
Not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items l
l Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
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determine whether they are acceptable or may-involve violations or devia-tions. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 7.
5.
Unit 2 Hot Functional Test Procedure Review The inspector examined hot functional test procedure W-1,3 to verify the following:
a.
Management review and approval b.
That test objectives were clearly stated l
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c.
Prerequisites were identified d.
Acceptance criteria were specified e.
Initial test conditions were specified f.
Step-by-step instructions for the performance of the procedure were complete to the extent necessary to assure that test objectives are met.
The procedure appeared adequate with the following exception.
There was no planned testing to verify the operation of each of the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) motor operated block valve during a blow down of pressurizer pressure using the PORV at normal operating temperature and pressure. This would verify the ability of the motor operated block valves to isolate a stuck open PORV during. normal operating conditions. This concern was brought to the attention of the licensee by the inspector. The licensee agreed to consider testing of the PORV motor operated block valves. This item will be inspected during a subsequent inspection. (IFI 328/81-12-01)
6.
Inspector witnessing of the reactor coolant system heatup for hot functional testing W-1.2B.
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The inspector observed portions of the reactor coolant system heatup to
540 F to verify the following:
a.
That an approved master copy of the heatup procedure W-1.2B was available and in use by testing personnel and control room operators.
b.
That the test was being performed as required by the procedure.
c.
That special test equipment required by the procedure was calibrated and in service.
d.
That operator actions appeared to be correct and timely during the performance of the reactor coolant system heatup.
e.
That a test log was being maintained by test personnel which recorded problems encountered during reactor coolant system heatup and testing.
Within the areas inspected there were no violations or deviations identi-fied.
7.
Tour of the Unit 1 Control Room and Auxiliary Building A tour of the accessible areas was conducted to determine by observacion that plant conditions and activities were in accordance with applicable requirements.
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During a tour of the Unit 1 control room on April 2,1981 the inspector
,oted that pressurizer level as indicated by LI-68-339A was 7% higher than the other two pressurizer level channels LI-68-335A and LI-68-320. When questioned about the difference in pressurizer level indication, the Unit 1 operator and shift engineer were unaware of any criteria to be used to determine when differing indications of the same parameter should be declared inoperable. Pressurizer level channel LI-68-339A was subsequently declared inoperable by the shift engineer.
A review of surveillance instruction SI-2 performed on April 1, and April 2,1981 clearly show that pressurizer level as indicated by LI-68-339A was diverging from the pressurizer level as indicated by the other two pressurizer level channels.
Surveillance instruction SI-2 requires that the indication of specified instrumentation be recorded once per shift and is used to meet the CHANNEL CHECK requirement to Technical Specification 4.3.1.1.1, however SI-2 also lacks any criteria as to when a diverging instrument channel should be declared inoperable.
The above findings were brought to the attention of the Assistant Plant Superintendent (operations) on April 2,1981 and repeated during the exit interview on April 2,1981 Further investigation of the pressurizer level indication difference revealed that a safety evaluation performed as a requirement for a temporary change to recalibrate channel LI-68-339A had as a basis for determining that
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the recalibration did not constitute an unreviewed safety quastion require-ment (2) that "The level indication of channel 68-339 shall be compared once per shift to the other two level channels (335&320) to confirm that the relationship is unchanged." The failure to take action when the relation-ship between level indications changed invalidated the safety review. This is an unresolved item. (UNR 327/81-11-01)
8.
Inspector Followup Item (Closed) IFI 327/81-02-03. This item related to equipment identification number and/or its calibration dates not being recorded for all test i
equipment used in the performance of W-10.2.
This item is closed based upon the inspectors review of an internal TVA memo.
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