IR 05000327/1981042
| ML20042B722 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1982 |
| From: | Butler S, Ford E, Quick D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042B702 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.3.09, TASK-TM 50-327-81-42, 50-328-81-52, NUDOCS 8203250582 | |
| Download: ML20042B722 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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o 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report flos. 50-327/81-42 and 50-328/81-52 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Til 37401 Facility Name: Sequoyah fluclear Plant Docket flos. 50-327 and 50-328 License flos. DPR-77 ar,d DPR-79 Inspection at Sequ a site near Soddy Daisy, Tennessee
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Date Figned Approved by:
2-D. R. Quick, S@tfon Chief, Division of Resident Ddte ' Signed and Reactor Project Inspection SUlt!!ARY Inspection on December 6,1981 - January 5,1982 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 163 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, witnessing of Plant Radiological Emergency Drill, following of flVREG 0737 item, General Employee Training, independent inspection effort, following of plant incidents, Unit 2 license conditions and radiation shield survey.
Resul ts Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in six areas; two violations were found in two areas, (328/81-52-01) failure to implement 501 55-0-!1-12 for 2-Rf1-90-112 instrument malfunction annunciator and (327/81-42-02,328/81-52-03) failure to adequately demonstrate proficiency during general employee training).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees C.11. flason, Plant Superintendent J. W. Doty, Assistant Plant Superintendent (Acting)
W. T. Cottle, Assistant Plant Superintendent J.11. ficGriff, Assistant Plant Superintendent D. H. Tullis, liaintenance Supervisor (H) (Acting)
B.11. Patterson, Maintenance Supervisor (I)
W. A. Watson, Maintenance Supervisor (E)
L. H. Nobles, Operations Supervisor W. H. Kinsey, Results Supervisor R. J. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor J. T. Crittenden, Public Safety Service Supervisor R. L. Hamilton, Quality Assurance Supervisor it. R. Harding, Compliance Supervisor W. M. Halley, Preoperational Test Supervisor J. Robinson, Outage Director Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, shift engineers, security force members, engineers, maintenance personnel, contractor personnel and corporate office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Superintendent and/or members of his staff on December 21, 1981 and January 6, 1982.
The violations and unresolved items were discussed and the licensee acknowledged.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about whi::h more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.
5.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector toured various areas of the plant on a routine basis throughout the reporting period.
The following activities were
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2 reviewed / verified:
a.
Adherence to limiting conditions for operation which were directly observable from the control room panels.
b.
Control board instrumentation and recorder traces.
c.
Proper control room and shift manning.
d.
The use of approved operating procedures, e.
Unit operator and shift engineer logs.
f.
General shift operating practices.
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Housekeeping practices.
h.
Posting of hold tags, caution tags and temporary alteration tags.
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Personnel, package, and vehicle access control for the plant protected area.
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General shif t security practices on post manning, vital area access control and security force response to alarms.
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Surveillance, start-up and preoperational testing in progress, 1.
fiaintenance activities in progress.
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Health Physics Practices.
During a tour of the Auxiliary Building on December 15, 1981 the inspector noted that radiation monitor 2-Rfi-90-112 for the Unit 2 upper containment was inoperable.
Both sample pump breakers indicated tripped at the monitor.
The monitor indicates upper containment activity levels for particulate, noble gas and iodine and alarms on high level and provides a redundant containment ventilation isolation signal.
The inspector proceeded to the main control room to determine why the sample pumps were not operating and noted that the containment ventilation isolation signal from Unit 2 lower containment monitor 2-Rf-t-90-106 was blocked to allow chemistry personnel to change the detector filters.
Monitor 2-Rti-90-106 indicates particulate, noble gas, and iodine activity levels for the lower containment as well as providing another redundant containment ventilation isolation signal. The inspector questioned the auxiliary unit operator who had blocked the 2-Rfi-90-106 monitor signals and he stated that he had checked the annunciator panel prior to blocking the monitor and there was not a malfunction annunciator for 2-Rfi-90-112 and he considered it operable. Technical Specifications, section 3.3.3.1 (table 3.3-6, 2.b.i.a and ii.a) requires a minimum of one channel of containment gaseous activity and particulate activity ventilation isolation operable in
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all modes. The inspector reviewed the technical specification requirements to determine compliance since radiation monitors 2-RM-90-112 and 106 both provide gaseous and particulate activity ventilation isolation signals. The inspector concluded that there was no violation of technical specification requirements since the required action for less than the minimum required channels of containment ventilation isolation references Technical Specification 3.9.9, which states that, with the containment ventilation isolation systen inoperable, close each of the ventilation penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere (ie the containment purge isolation valves).
The inspector verified that the containment purge fans were locked out and the purge isolation valves were shut.
Technical Specification 3.0.2 states that nonconpliance with a specification shall exist when the requirements of the Limiting Conditicn for Operation and associated action requirements are not met within the specified time interval.
The action requirements were met.
However, the inspector determined from discussion with operators that they were not aware that there was an instrument malfunction annunciator on 2-RM-90-112 and there was no action taken to investigate the problem or correct it until the inspector brought it to their attention.
System Operating Instruction, S0I 55-0-N-12 (XA-55-12D), " Annunciator Response",
requires that the immediate actions for the " Instrument Malfunction" annunciator for 2-RM-90-112 include checking the instrument on panel 0-N-12, checking the normal valve lineup to the instrumerat and dispatching an operator to the monitor at elevation 714 to evaluate the problem.
Failure to take these innediate actions is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a which requires annunciators response procedurer for safety-related annunciators to be implemented (327/81-52-01) and a Notice of Violation will be issued.
The Unit 2 operator dispatched an auxiliary unit operator to the monitor on elevation 714 to start a sample pump and the malfunction annunciator was cleared and 2-RM-90-112 was determined to be operable.
On December 18, 1981, the inspector noted during a tour of the main control room that a purge of Unit I lower containment was in progress.
The inspector reviewed valve lineups, system operating instructions in use, and sampling data sheets to verify they were being properly implemented.
Required radiation monitors were verified to be in service.
The inspector had no further questions on this evaluatian.
On Decenber 21,1981, Unit 2 was restarted af ter an outage that began November 14, 1981 for main generator exciter repairs.
On Decenber 22, 1981, during a review of control room logs, the inspector noted that Unit 2 had been started up and operated for approximately eight hours with control rods above the rod withdrawal limits established during zero power physics testing.
The limits were established as required by technical specifications to ensure the moderator temperature coefficient was maintained negative during reactor operation.
See IE Report 50-328/81-51 for details of the inspector and subsequent actions.
On December 24,1981, Unit 2 was cooled down to Mode 5 following an inadvertent reactor trip.
The cooldown was to facilitate draining and
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refilling the steam generator to correct out of specification water chemistry. The Unit had not been restarted as of the end of the reporting period.
During the reporting period the inspector became aware of numerous reports
of safety-related. instrumentation, primarily on Unit 2, that had become inoperable due to freezing.
In each case it appeared as if the licensee was complying with the applicable action requirements of technical specifi-
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i Cations and was restoring the instrumentation to service within the required j
time limitations.
However the licensee experienced the same problem with instrument freezing on Unit I last winter and should have implemented the
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necessary corrective action to prevent the loss of safety-related instru-mentation on either unit due to freezing.
This issue will be carried as an unresolved item (327/81-42-01, 328/81-52-02) until the inspector can review the scope and sffectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions for the instrument freezing problem.
No other violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Witnessing of Plant Radiological Emergency Drill
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On December 11, 1981, the inspectors witnessed the licensee's evacuation and accountability drill. The drill was held by the licensee to test changes made to their accountability procedure, Implementing Procedure IP-8 of the Sequoyah Radiological Emergency Plan.
The drill lasted approximately one hour with only minor difficulties encountered while accounting for plant personnel.
During the drill, the inspector noted several areas of the plant which were either isolated or had high background noise where the evacuation siren given could not be heard.
This problem was identified to plant management who acknowledged.
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On December 17, 1981, the inspectors assisted Region II emergency planning
specialists in witnessing a general site drill of the Radiological Emergency i
Plan (REP). The drill was held at the request of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission because of the limited involvement of plant personnel during the annual REP drill held in July 1981.
Details of the drill are covered in IE
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report 327/81-40 and 328/81-49. The inspectors concerns-regarding inability
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to hear the evacuation siren in certain parts of the plant were covered with i
plant management during the exit interview following the drill and will be the subject of a followup item in the above report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Followup on NUREG 0737 Item II.K.3.9
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The inspector verified that the licensee had received Westinghouse Technical
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Bulletin NSD-TB-81-12 entitled " Inadvertent Power Operated Relief Valve
(PORV) Opening". The inspector had previously verified the implementation of an acceptable modification to the pressurizer PORV controller to satisfy NUREG 0737 item II.K.3.9 and documented this in IE report 50-327/81-23,
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The modification method used by the licensee for their
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pressurizer PORV controller, to defeat the derivative function, involved raising the interlock setpoint as well as turning the time constant off.
This in effect defeated the derivative function and will prevent the type of problem described in the Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-81-12.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
General Employee Training On January 4,1982, the inspector monitored portions t f the general employee training (GET) program.
Specificalij, the inspector observed the conduct of the presentation of course material and the practoring of the examination given at the conclusion of the lesson.
This exam is used to evaluate the employee's comprehension of the material presented and demonstrate satis-factory proficiency.
The inspector observed unauthorized discussions, copying of answers and other evidence of violation of exam material during the testing phase.
There was, in general, a casual attitude on the part of the tested groups and the instructors regarding exam integrity.
This was the case for two seperate lessons, GET-8 " Clearance Procedures" and GET-9 " Adverse conditions and Corrective Actions", conducted by different instructors. The problem was discussed with the training officer who, in conjunction with plant management, took immediate corrective action. This consisted of individual instructor counseling and a memorandum to all employees emphasizing managements concern for a quality program and measures for increased examination integrity such as spaced seating, management proctoring, and disciplinary action.
After consulting with regional personnel and management the inspector met with the plant manager who reiterated the committment to a quality program for general employee training and will take the following corrective actions:
those classes held on January 4 will be given again.
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an investigation into the conduct of lessons designated GET-4, 5, and 6
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will be conducted and they will be repeated if necessary, and management will evaluate the present general employee training
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organization to determine if further corrective action can be taken.
Plant management was responsive and took prompt corrective action and is evaluating for further action. The inspector has not observed further breaches of exam integrity and continuing to monitor the program.
It was noted that those portions of the program (GET-1, 2 and 3) needed as a prerequisite to employee badging (i.e. plant security, emergency plans, and HP orientation) were not observed to have the above problems.
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This is a severity level VI violation and will be identified in Appendix A -
tiotice of Violation (327/81-42-02, 328/81-52-03).
flo other violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspector routinely attended the morning scheduling and staff meetings during the reporting period. These meetings provide a daily status report on the operational and testing activities in progress as _well as a discussion of significant problems or incidents associated with the start-up testing and operations effort.
The inspector traveled to the Region II office on January 5,1982, to prepare special inspection report 50-328/81-51 and participate in an enforcement conference with licensee personnel concerning the violation of the rod withdrawal limits referenced in paragraph 5.
tio violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Followup on Plant Incidents On December 23, 1981, Unit 2 tripped from approximately 25% power. The unit operators were in the process of reducing turbine load for a turbine overspeed trip test while maintaining reactor power at 25% by dumping steam to the main condenser.
During this evaluation, the main feedwater regu-lating valve (!!FRV) for the #4 steam generator failed open and overfed the steam generator. The high level in #4 steam generator tripped the main turbine and isolated main feedwater. The auxiliary feedwater pumps started as required but could not provide enough flow to maintain the reactor power level.
The operator attempted to reduce reactor power when the main feedwater isolated but the reactor tripped on low steam generator level.
All safety systems appeared to have operated properly and operators were observed recovering the unit in accordance with approved procedures.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
The inspector discussed the #4 f1FRV problem with the Instrument Supervisor who reported that the problem was traced to a malfuncticning manual / auto-matic switch in the 11FRV controller.
The controller was replaced and the valve tested satisfactorily. The valve subsequently displayed a similar problem with the Unit shutdown and the licensee found a malfunctioning transformer in the controller amplifier.
The transformer was replaced and the valve tested satisfactorily. tio further problems have been reported with the valve.
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On December 24, 1981, the inspector was informed that the licensee had declared a security alert at the site. The alert was declared at 2314 (CST)
on December 23. The fluclear Regulatory Commission was notified per 10 CFR 50.72.
The alert was declared when security personnel making routine rounds i
reported that there had been apparent tampering with a portion of the protected area fence.
The licensee proceeded to rule out the possibility of an unauthorized entry into the protected area.
Searches were conducted and
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alarm systems tested.
No alarms had been received in the area of the apparent tampering.
The inspector e'isured that Region 11 security
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specialists were informed of the situation. The licensee secured from the
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security alert when they were assured there had been no unauthorized entry
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into the protected area.
Subsequent discussitn with the licensee revealed that the apparent tanoring with the fence was the result of the wind on a loose fence bracket and not from vandalism or an attempted intrusion.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Unit 2 Licensee Conditions Unit 2 licensee DPR-79, paragraph 2.c.(16)s, " Primary Coolant Outside Containment" requires that the licensee perfom leakage tests on systems that carry radioactive fluid outside containment prior to Unit 2 operating above 5% power.
In addition the licensee condition requires that the licensee submit a report of the test results to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) within thirty days of comoleting them. The licensee completed the leak testing on November 10, 1981 and prepared a test results report at the plant to the forwarded to the NRC by the corporate regulatory staff. The report was received at the corporate office but was apparently lost and not forwarded to the NRC. The failure to forward the report was discovered by the licensee on December 31, 1981 and the Region II office was notified immediately in accordance with license condition 2.h.
The report was mailed to *a Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on the same day.
In that the licensee identified this violation of license condition 2.c.(16)s. and acted promtply to submit the report and the violation is of minor safety significance, it will remain as a licensee identified violation in accordance with the Interim Enforcement Policy, 45 FR 66754 (October 7,1980).
No notice of violation will be issued.
No other violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Radiation Shield Survey On December 22, Unit 2 reached 10% power and plant health physics (HP)
personnel implemented paragraph 5.2 of SV-1.0 " Plant lieasurements -
Operational and Baseline Data." This test requires radiation surveys to be performed at various steps during the power escalation program to determine radiation dose-levels at preselected locations throughout the plant to evaluate the adequacy of plant shielding.
This test is used to evaluate, determine the adequacy of, and locate any faults in the radiation shielding.
The inspector accompanied a two-man HP team into the following areas: upper containment, lower containment raceway, fan rooms, accumulator rooms, and inside the crane wall.
The inspector observed the proper use of procedures for control of survey and data recording, the techniques utilized to obtain radiation data, including ALARA considerations, the proper calibration requirements for survey equipment, and the evaluaton of data from reporting teams.
It was noted during the survey in lower containment that a neutron meter was accidentally dropped and failed a field check. This would
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invalidate any data taken prior to this time by this instrument. The team notified HP control of the problem.
Control dispatched another team to resurvey the upper containment and a messenger, with an in-calibration i
replacement instrument, to the lower containment team whereupon they resurveyed the necessary points.
J No violations or deviations were identified.
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