IR 05000327/1981003
| ML19343D211 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1981 |
| From: | Butler S, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19343D209 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-81-03, 50-327-81-3, NUDOCS 8104090935 | |
| Download: ML19343D211 (6) | |
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101 MARIETTA ST.. N.W.. SulTE 3100
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f ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report No. 50-327/81-03 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority.
500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Docket No. 50-327 '
License No. OPR-77 h Nuclear Plant Inspection at Se
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Inspector:
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H. C. Dance,[Section Chief, RONS Branch Bate' Signed SUMMARY Inspection on January 5-31,1981 Areas Insoected This routine inspection involved 75 inspector-hours on site in the areas of operational safety verification, power ascension test review, independent inspection effort, followup on plant incidents, inspection and enforcement bulletin review and status of three mile island action plan items.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent C. E. Cantrell, Assistant Plant Superintendent W. T. Cottle, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. M. McGriff, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. M. Doty, Maintenance Supervisor (M)
B. M. Patterson, Maintenance Supervisor (I)
W. A. Watson, Maintenance Supervisor (E)
O. J. Record, Operations Supervisor W. H. Kinsey, Results Supervisor R. J. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor C. R. Brimer, Outage Director R. S. Kaplan, Supervisor, Public Safety Services W. M. Halley, Preoperational Test Supervisor D. O. McCloud, Quality Assurance Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included three technicians, eight operators, five shift engineers, six security force members, seven engineers, three contractor personnel, and two corporate office personnel.
Other Organizations Six NRC Inspectors Region II 2.
Exit Interv'ews The inspection scope cnd findings were summarized with the Plant Superintendent and members of his staff on J wuary 26, 1981 and February 3, 1981'.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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Operational Safety Verification The inspector toured various areas of Unit 1 on a routine basis throughout the reporting period. The following activities were reviewed / verified:
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Adherence to 1.imiting conditions for operation which were direct'ly observable f om the control room panels, t
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Control board instrumentation and recorder traces.
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Proper control room and shift manning.
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The use of approved operating procedures, e.
Unit operator and shift engineer logs.
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General shift operating practices.
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Housekeeping practices.
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Fire protection measures for hot work.
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Posting of hold tags, caution tags and temporary alteration tags.
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Measures to exclude foreign materials from entry into clean systems.
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Personnel, package, and vehicle access control for the Unit 1 protected area.
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General shift security practices on post manning, vital area access control and security force response to alarms.
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Surveillance testing and start up testing in progress.
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Maintenance activities in progress.
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Annunicator status on main and auxiliary control boards.
On January 14, 1981 prior to implementation of Phase II of Physical Security at Sequoyah, the inspector walked down the new protected area fence and access portal to ensure its adequacy. The inspector was accompanied by the
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In " addition, th'e licensee's plans for
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transition to the new access portal and protected area were discussed.
Subsequent to the transition the expanded protected area was reviewed by Safeguards Specialists from Region II.
During the reporting period the inspector reviewed the licensee shutdown margin procedure and calculations for adequacy and to determine if technical specification requirements were being satisfied concerning frequency of determination and consideration of all sources of positive and negative reactivity.
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During the reporting period, the inspector reviewed Emergency Operating Instruction E0I-14 to ensure that the operators have sufficient guidance on how to deal with an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) event.
In addition it was determined that the operators had the necessary authority to operate the emergency boration system if in their judgement it was neces sary. The procedure was considered adequate and the inspectors (
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findings were forwarded to Region II to be included in a report to be submitted to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Headquarters.
On January 26, 1981 during a routine plant tour the inspector determined that the licensee was not properly controlling access to a vital area. The problem was identified to the Public Safety Service Supervisor who took immediate steps to ensure proper access control. A Region.II safeguards inspector who was onsite was briefed on the event and will handle the matter in Inspection and Enforcement report number 50-327/81-04.
On January 29, 1981 the inspector verified by review of computer printouts that during the startup and power ascension on January 28, 1981, the licensee had complied with the Auxial Flux Difference requirements of Technical Specification 3.2.1.
In addition, the inspector verified that the latest axial flux difference parameters had been properly entered into the computer program used for axial flux difference penalty calculations and the plants curve book TI-28 was updated to reflect the latest auxial flux target bands.
No other violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Power Ascension Test Review During the reporting period the inspector reviewed S/U 10.2, Steam Generator Moisture Carryover Measurement, which had been performed at 90% power. The test is to ensure that the moisture content of the steam produced in the steam generators does not exceed design values. The inspector determined that the procedure was properly approved for performance, that appropriate steps had been signed off by the test director and that data had been properly recorded and results calculated. The inspector performed independent calculations using the data provided and consistent results were -
obtained. The acceptance criteria of the test had been met.
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The ' inspector rev'iewed S/U'8.4' Incore ~-- Excore' Detector calibration and S/U 8.68 Axial Xenon Oscillation.
The tests were perfcraed at 75% power to obtain the necessary incore and excore instrumeat data and use this data to calibrate the excore power range channels, tne delta flux penalt" to the -
overtemperature delta temperature protectior channels, the delta flux meters on the main control board and the axial flJx difference monitor program in the P-250 process computer. The inspector reviewed the procedure to ensure that the test was approved for performanco, that appropriate steps had been signed off by the test director and that data had been properly recorded.
The inspector performed various calculaticns manadily tu verify the accuracy of the Itcensee's computer program. The inspector verified by record review that the calibration data had been transmitted to the instrument department and calibrations performed. The test had no acceptance criteria.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Independent Inspection Effort The inspector routinely attended the morning scheduling and staff meetings during the reporting period. These meetings provide a daily status report.
on the operational and testing activities.in progress as well as a discussion of significant problems or incidents associated with the start-up testing and operations effort.
On January 6,1981 the inspector attended a sub-committe meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in Wasnington, D.C. to answer questions concerning the startup and power ascension test program at Sequoyah. The meeting dealt mainly with the hydrogen ignitor system in the Sequoyah containment.
On January 21-23, 1981 the inspector attended a resident inspectors meeting in the Region II office.
On January 27, 1981 the inspector attended a meeting of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 'in Washington, D.C. held to approve the use of the hydrogen ignitor system in the Sequoyah containment.
On January 19, 1981 the inspector was informed by the licensee that they had discovered that their explosive detectors each had 10 millicurie nickel 63 sources installed which is larger than the exempt quantities of nickel 63 specified in 10 CFR 30. The licensee had not received these detectors under a 10 CFR 30 byprcduct material license. This information was discussed with Region II management and Nuclear Materials specialists and it was subse-quently determined that these detectors had been manufactured and distri-buted by a vendor under a materials license which classified the sources as exempt.
The licensee was informed of this determination.
The inspector later determined that the licensee has posted these sources as radioactive material requiring health physics precautions for maintenance and installed particulate filters on the exhaurt of the nine machines to preclude the possible spread'of contamination. ' Region IV is persuing the matter with the vendor of the machines.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Followup on Plant Incidents During the reporting period the licensee experienced severai plant trips.
In each instance the inspector reviewed the circumstances concerning each occurrence to dete rmine proper reporting to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, proper use of procedures subsequent to the trip for plant recovery, proper operation of safety re,'ted equipment and systems involved and proper plant and operator response.
- n addition the inspector followed the licensee's determination of cause of plant shutdown and corrective action.
On January 26, 1981 the licensee experienced momentary loss of Unit 1 and
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common system accunicator power due to a component failure in the
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annunicator inverter. The annunciators were restored as soon as an operator reached the inverter adjacent to the control room and transferred to the backup power supply.
There was no apparent affect on plant control or indication.
The Nuclear R( julatory Commission was notified per 10 CFR 50.72. The inverter was sub3equently repaired. The inspector is continuing to. review the event.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin Review During the reporting period the inspector began a review of the licen.ee's reponse to Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 80-24 concerning Preve1 tion of Damage due to Water Leakage inside Containment. A preliminary summary of the licensee's response was forwarded to Region II on January 7, 1981 to be included in a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners.
Ne violations or deviations were idu tified.
10.
Status of Three Mile Island Action Plan Items On January 9,1981 the inspector completed a review of the status of various Three Mile Island Action Plan items that were to be accomplished by January 1, 1981. The status of these items was ascertained by records and correspondence review and will be verified by personal observation at a later date.
The status of these items was forwarded to Region II to be
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included a report to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Headquarters.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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