IR 05000328/1981051

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IE Insp Rept 50-328/81-51 on 811222-29.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Comply W/Moderator Temp Coefficient Tech Specs, to Maintain Procedures Re Surveillance of safety-related Equipment & to Comply W/Retraining Program Tech Specs
ML20054K649
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 03/29/1982
From: Butler S, Cantrell F, Fiedler R, Ford E, Quick D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054K644 List:
References
50-328-81-51, NUDOCS 8207060017
Download: ML20054K649 (4)


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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 o

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Report No. 50-328/81-51 Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:

Sequoyah 2 Docket No. 50-328 License No. DPR-79 Inspection at Sequ h site near Chattanooga, Tennessee h

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Date Sig'ned F. S. Caiitrell, Acting fXnf Reactor Projects Brandi 1 Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on December 22 and 29,1981 Areas Inspected This special inspection involved 22 inspector-hours on site in the area of technical specification compliance for reactivity control systems (moderator temperature coef ficient).

Results In the area inspected, three violations were identified (failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.1.1.3.a, moderator temperature coefficient - para-graph 5; failure to comply with Technical Specification 6.8.1.c, establish, implement and maintain written procedures concerning surveillance of safety related equipment; and failure to comply with Technical Specification 6.4.1, that a retraining program for the unit staff shall be maintained and shall meet or exceed the requirements of Section 5.5 of ANSI N18.1-1971).

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • C. C. Mason, Plant Superintendent
  • W. T. Cottle, Assistant Plant Superintendent L. M. Nobles, Operations Supervisor M. R. Harding, Compliance Supervisor M. J. Lorek, Shif t Technical Advisor R. E. Yorborough, Shif t Engineer L. E. Guinn, Reactor Operator W. Muirhead, Reactor Operator R. W. Fortenberry, Supervisor Nuclear Engineering W. O. Lovelace, Assistant Shift Engineer
  • Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 29, 1981 with the Plant Superintendent and members of his staff. This event was discussed by Region II management via telephone with Messrs. J. A. Coffey, Assistant Director of Nuclear Power and C. C. Mason, Sequoyah Plant Superintendent on December 23, 1981.

The violation regarding failure to comply with the technical specification for moderator temperature coefficient was discussed.

The licensee agreed to the action discussed in the Confirmation of Action letter also dated December 23. A management meeting was held in Region II offices with Mr. Green and others of his staff on January 6,1982 to discuss NRC concerns and the licnesee's investigation and corrective actions.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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Not inspected.

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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Technical Specification Compliance During a review of Unit 2 operating logs on December 22, 1981, the inspector observed from a co-trol room log book entry that shortly after 3:30 a.m.

(CST) the operator had commenced a reactor coolant system (RCS) dilution

"due to moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) considerations".

The unit had been operating since December 21, 1981, at approximately 3% reactor power. Further review revealed that the Unit 2 reactor had been taken

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critical at 6:57 p.m.,

(CST) on December 21 with RCS boron concentra-tion at 1262 parts per million (ppm) and control bank D at 125 steps.

On November 13, 1981, the licensee had submitted Special Report 81-8 in accordance with Technical Specification 3.1.1.3, which stated that they had determined that the Unit 2 MTC was positive during low power physics testing.

The report also described control rod withdrawal limits as required by Technical Specification 3.1.1.3 which would permit continued operation until core burnup restored the MTC to within the required limits.

The critical rod position of 125 steps on control bank D exceeded the withdrawal limits established to ensure that the MTC remained negative and the control bank remained beyond the limits until approximately 3:30 a.m.

(CST) on December 22 when the reactor operator compared the rod position with the rod withdrawal limitation curve and discovered that the rods were beyond the limit.

The licensee immediately commenced a RCS dilution to establish control rod position within the limit. The inspector discussed the matter with the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) who was also on duty the previous day and who had calculated the estimated critical condition (ECC)

for the startup. The STA calculated an ECC of 1262 ppm boron and 87 steps on control bank D.

The ECC was also above the withdrawal limit and the STA stated that the withdrawal limits had not been added to the procedure used to calculate ECC for startup and he had failed to consider it.

The inspector verified that control rod position and RCS boron concentration following the dilution complied with the MTC control rod withdrawal limits and Region II management was notified of the problem. Failure to maintain the control rod withdrawal limits required to ensure that MTC is less positive than 0 delta k/k/ F is a violation of Technical Specification 3.1.1.3 (328/81-51-01).

The inspectors discussed the matter with the Assistant Shift Engineer (ASE)

l on shift when criticality was achieved.

The inspectors also reviewed the ASE log. The ASE stated that he was aware of the positive MTC and that the control rod withdrawal limits established by the action statement of Tech-l nical Specification 3.1.1.3 were required. Entries were made in the ASE log prior to criticality and at the shift change following criticality, to the effect that the action requirements of Technical Specification 3.1.1.3 were required. The ASE stated that he forgot to verify that the action require-ments of Technical Specification 3.1.1.3 were met.

The inspectors discussed the matter with the Reactor Operator (RO) on shift when criticality was achieved.

The inspectors also reviewed the R0 log.

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The RO stated that he was not aware that a positive MTC existed at the all rods out condition, or of the existence of the rod withdrawal limits. There were no entries in the R0 log, during the shift in which criticality was

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I achieved, relating to Technical Specification 3.1.1.3.

This was the first shift that this R0 had stood on Unit 2 in approximately eight months. This individual had been conducting training since February 1981 and had stood several shifts on Onit 1 prior to assuming the shift on Unit 2.

He had not received any training on the results of the special physics program con-ducted on Unit 2 prior to ass),ing the shift on Unit 2.

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Plant management had considered and decided not to make a change to existing startup procedures regarding the control rod wi*hdrawal limits requirements.

This appears to be a violation of Technical Sepcification 6.8.1.c which requires that the licensee shall establish, implement and maintain written procedures concerning surveillance of safety related equipment (328/81-51-02).

There had been no training for the licensed operators regarding the results of special physics testing conducted during plant startup.

This appears to be a violation of Technical Specification 6.4.1 which requires that a retraining program for the unit staff shall be maintained and shall meet or exceed the requirements of Section 5.5 of ANSI N18.1-1971 (328/81-51-03).

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