IR 05000302/1980042
| ML20003E662 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 03/06/1981 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Beverly Smith, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003E661 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-80-42, NUDOCS 8104080022 | |
| Download: ML20003E662 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES
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- "j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.. SulTE 3100 q
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ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30003
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Report No. 50-302/80-42-Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 320134th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Facility Name: Crystal River Do:Let No. 50-302
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License No. DPR-72 Iespection at Crystal River site near Crystal River, FL.
Japectors: [/-
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VStetka, Senior / Resident Inspector Date 61gned T. F:UMLLL ih/r/
B~. W.(pmith, Resident Inf pector Ode. S i gn'ed Approved by:
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P. J. Kellogg, Section/ Chief, RRPI Division D' ate' Si gned
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SUMMARY
Inspection on December 1,1980 through January 5,1981.
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Areas Inspected
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This routine inspection involved 128 resident inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant.. operations,; security, radiological controls, Licen.see. Event Reports (LER's)' and - Non-Conforniing Op'erations ' Reports (NCOR's), non-routine events,
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licensee action on IE Bulletins and Circulars, and licensee action on previous inspection items, Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations
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. observed. Some of these tours and observations were conducted on back shif ts.
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'Results I-Of the.five. areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. Buckner, Officer of the Guard
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- J. Bufe, Compliance ' Auditor M. Collins, Reactor Specialist
- J. Cooper, QA/QC Compliance Manager
- W. Cross, Operations Engineer
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- V. Hernandez, Compliance Auditor
- K. 'Lancaster, Compliance Supervisor
- J. Lander, Maintenance Superintendent
- S. Lashbrook, Health Physics Supervisor
- T. Lutkehaus, Technical Services Superintendent
- P. McKee, Operations Superintendent
- 0. Poole, Nuclear Plant Manager
- G. Ruszala, Chemistry / Radiation Protection Manager H. Sassard, Fossil Shift Supervisor, Units 1 and 2 D. Smith, Technical Support Engineering Supervisor L. Tittle, Performance Engineering Supervisor G. Williams, QA/QC Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included maintenance engineering, operators, chem / rad,- corporate, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2..
Exit Intervi.ew.
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The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion. of the inspection on January 5,1981. During this meeting the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailedsin this recort. During the meeting, the unresolved items and inspector followup items were discussed.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items (0 pen) Unresolved Item'(302/80-39-07):
The licensee revised Short Term Instruction (STI) 80-81 - on December-3, to ' require the Shift Supervisor to verify -that adequate retesting has been performed following maintenance.
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The licensee is'also revising compliance procedure'CP-113 to include these new re-test-review requirements. 'The effectiveness of the licensee's new program will be examined during. subsequent inspections.
_ 0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-39-01): Due to additional auxiliary (building evacuations caused by tank draining operations,- the licensee-has
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the new procedures under development.
It is expected that the procedure revisions and operator training will be completed by January 31, 1981.
(0 pen)- Unresolved Item (302/80-33-01):
The licensee continues to have interpretation problems with Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3.1 as identified in paragraph 5.b.(1) of this report. This item remains open.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (302/80-33-06):
The licensee has correctly revised procedure SP-161 to include calibration of 0-3000 psig gauges and has
. initiated modification 80-9-76 to install a new 0-3000 psig gauge.
This modification is expected to be completed by May 1, 1981. this item remains open pending completion of this modification.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (302/80-28-02):
The licensee has changed their Equipment Out of Service (00S) system and now utiliz3s 00S stickers and a new logging method. The resident inspectors have obsereed implementation of this system and the system now appears adequate to monitor 00S equipment.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may result in violations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5.a.(3)
and 5.b.(5)(a).
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5.
Review of Plant 0perations The plant continu'ed' wit 5 power ope ~ rations (Mode 1) for the majority of this
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inspection period. On December 8, a brief shutdown was performed in order ato add oil to the Reactor Coolant Pump Motors and to replace a failed Position Jn
.The; plant returned,to po.wer.
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operation's on December 8 and,dicat.io_n _ Coil.
. Control. Ro.d;Srive :
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continued operation in this' mode for the remainder of the inspection period.
The inspector was. present in the l
control room to observe the return to criticality on December 8.
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- Shift Logs and Facility Records
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The inspectors reviewed the_ records listed below and discussed various
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specifications and the-licensee's administrative procedures.
Shift Supervisor's Log;
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Operator's Log;
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Equipment Out-of-Service Log;
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Shift Relief Checklist;
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Control Center Status Snard; Short Term Instruction;
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Auxiliary Bui41 ding Operator's Log; and
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Operating Daily Surveillance Log.
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In addition to these record reviews, the inspectors independently
verified selected clearance order tagouts.
These record reviews identified the follewing:
(1) On December 12, the inspector noted from the Shif,t Supervisor's 109 entries that fire service valve FSV-107 was closed to isolate a leaking hydrant. Approximately one hour and 55 minutes later the oparators re-opened the valve after realizing that they had isolated the auxiliary building fire suppr ession system and had not established a continuous fire watch as required by Technical Specification 3.7.11.2.a.
The licensee promptly reported this event in LER 80-51. (see paragraph 5.a.(3))
The licensee's corrective actions for this event includes a critique of the event by all personnel involved and a presentation of the lessons learned to all operational-shifts by January 15, 1981.
' Inspector Followup Item: Verify training to the FSV-107 event is l
given to all operational shifts. (302/80-42-01).
(2) During review of the operator work schedules on December 29, the inspector noted that two operators had worked an eight hour shift
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(1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> to 2400 hours0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br />) on December 24 and then returned to work another eight hour shift (0800. hours to 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />). This schedule only provides eight hours between each work period and is not consistent with NRC_ guidelines for operator working hours. as
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discussed in NUREG 0737.
This item was' discussed with licensee aanagement personnel and it wa.s: re-emphasized,that the. NUREG 0737 guidelines should be
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' fo llowed.
The ' inspectors:will continue to follow this item as delineated.in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/80-28, paragraph 7.c.
(3) On December 10, the inspector requested c'ompleted equipment clearance orders dated November 16 and November 23, for review.
.The licensee has been unable to locate these records and has also
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determined that-all the c'ompleted equipment clearance orders for October and. November 1980, appear to be missing. The licensee is continuing the search for these records.
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Unresolved : Item:
Locate completed equipment clearance order heets -for. the months of October -aad November 1980.
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b.' ". Facility Tours and Observations
~ he' inspection L period, facility tours were conducted to-Throughout t
observe operations and mair.tenance. activities in progress.
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operations and maintenance activities were observed during back shifts.
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e Also'during this inspection period, numerous licensee meetings were
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i attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
Security perimeter fence;
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Turbine Building;
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Control Room;
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Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms;
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Auxiliary Building;
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Intermediate Building;
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Battery Rooms;
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Reactor Building; and
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Electrical Switchgear Rooms.
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During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation was observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the Technical Specifications for the current operational mode:
Equipment operating status;
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. Area, atmospheric-and liquid radiation monitors;
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. Electrical system lineups;
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-Reactor operating parameters; and
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Auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
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As a result of these observations, the following was identified:
_ _0n; December. 9,,. upon failure.of_ conta.inment 1. solation valve CAV-3
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to close', the licensee ' entered the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.
Soon after entering the action statement, the inspector noted that containment isolation valve CAV-2 ~ was closed.and red tagged to remain in thit position, however, the valve was not de-energized to meet the de-activate statement of
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Technical Speci fication. 3.6.-3.1.
The inspector questioned the operator to determine why the valve was not-de-energized.~
The operator responded that they could not de-energize this valve by opening the breaker. because it supplied power to other valves that are necessary.for plant operation. The inspector stated that the intent.of the TS action statement was that an automatic valve will be disconnected from its actuating supply'.(i.e., either an electrical supply, air supply, etc.) and that red tagging of the valve control switch did not meet this intent.
The operator. acknowledged the. inspector's comments and had personnel lift the'. leads supplying power - to CAV-2 thus de-energizing the valve.. The inspector verified that this action-was accomplished within.the four hour time limit provided by the TS.
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This issue was discussed with licensee management representatives.
Interpretation o' Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 is the subject of unresolved item 302/80-33-01. While the licensee's actions in this instance are different than that which occurred before, the action indicates continued confusion over the interpretation of this TS.
The licensee wrote and issued Short Term Instruction (STI) 80-04 on December 11 to insure that all operators understand what de-activation of a valve means. The inspectors will continue to observe the licensee's implementation of TS 3.6.3.1 as identi-fied in unresolved item 320/80-33-01.
(2) Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified by numerous checks that the operating shift staffing was in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
In addition, the inspectors observed shift turnovers on different occasions to verify that continuity status, overational problems and other pertinent plant information was being accomp 'ished.
(3) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether sdafety and/or fire hazards exist.
The general housekeeping conditions are accept-able.
(4)
Fire Protection - Fire extinguishers and fire fighting equipment were observed to be unobstructed and inspected for operability.
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No ~ evidence. of smoking was observed in. designated "No Smoking" areas.
(5) Radiation Areas - Radiation control zones were observed to verify
.propero iden.ti.fication. _and. implementation.. These. observation.s.
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~ included'~rev~iew' of step-off' liadJ donditions, disposal'~of contaminated clothing,. and area posting.
Area postings were
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verified for accuracy through - the use of the inspector's own radiation monitoring-instrument. _ As a result of the inspector's verification of adequate postings and observations of radiation control zones, the following items were identified:
(a) On December _30, while touring the plant berm inside - the protected area and outside of the radiation control area (RCA),.the inspector measured dose rates of 3 to 4 mr/hr near
. trailers containing refueling support equipment.
These trailers, located on the west side of the plant, were enclosed within a posted radiation barrier. 'The inspector noted that the 3 to 4 mr/hr dose rate could be received while standing just outside the radiation control barrier and that this area of the barm could be. frequented by non-TLD badged personnel.
The. inspector's : concern of possible dose rates to non-TLD badged personnel while within the protected area was
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previously discussed on December 17 with licensee management representatives.
The inspector was informed that a modification evaluation is underway to build a wall around the trailers and the RCA fence located on the berm to assure that unmonitored dose rates would not.be received.
Inspector Followup Item:
Review progress of the licensee modification to install a wall around the RCA fence and trailers (302/80-42-03).
While this modification is being developed, the licensee has extended the barriers further from the trailers and verified correct posting.
Unresolved Item:
Insure that posting and barriers for the
' RCA's are adequate and correct (302/80-42-04).
(b) On December 30, while touring the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) floor in the auxiliary building, the inspector measured high radiation readings near drums containing debris vacuumed from the SFP. The inspector noted that the posting around this area did not agree with the inspector's measurements and that a portion of the barrier was down. The inspector alerted a
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Chem / Rad Technician about these conditions and they were immediately corrected. This. issue was also discussed with.
licensee management 'and follow'up on the licensee's actions is inicuded in unresolved item (302/80-42-04).
_(c),0n December-16,.while observing, maintenance.on a Reactor.
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Building ' Spray pump, the inspector rioted that some personnel
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were not dressed in specific anti-contamination clothing as stated on ' the Radiation Work Permit (RWP) in that the personnel were wearing a surgeon's cap in lieu of a hood.
This issue was discussed with licensee management and further observations of work and maintenance activities indicate that personnel are properly dressing out.
Inspector. Followup Item:
Observe' for proper dress-out of personnel working within contaminated areas. (302/80-42-05)
(6) Fluid Leaks - Various plant' systems were observed to detect the presence of leaks. No problems were identified in this area.
(7) Piping Vibration - On December 29, the inspector noted a banging sound emanating ' from -the check valve on the. discharge side of Nuclear Serv. ices Closed Cycle Cooling (NSCCC) pump (SWP-Ic).
Discussions with operators.and licensee management indicate that this has been a problem with this pump since pre-operational testing and that subsequent engineering evaluations have been
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unable to identi fy the cause.
The licensee is considering reorientation of the check valve as a possible solution.
Inspector Followup Item:
Review licensee actions to stop check valve slamming on SWF-Ic. (302/80-42-06)
(8) Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were observed. No problems were identified in this area.
(9) Secuirty Controls - Security controls were observed to verify that security barriers are intact, guard forces are on duty and access to the protected area is controlled in accordance with the facility security plan. During these observations, the inspector discovered the automatic closure mechanism on a v!tal area access door damaged such that the door had to be closed manually. The door was found in its normal closed position.
The inspector notified the licensee of the broken automatic closure mechanism on the vital area access door ard maintenance activities were initiated to repair the door.
Inspector Followup Item:
Verify the automatic closure mechanism on the vital area access dcor is in working order (302/80-42-07).
(10) Surveillance Testing - Surveillance testing was obwrved to verity that:
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Aphioved procedures were being used; Qualified personnel were conducting the tests;
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Testing was adequate to verify equipment operability; and,
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-9 Calibrated. equipment, as. required, were utilized.
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The following tests were observed:
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Surveillance Procedure (SP)-333, Control Rod Exercises; SP-401, Control Rod Programming Verification-(tests SP-333
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and Sp-401 were observad as part of post maintenance testing following completion af the position indication (PI) coil
. replacement on December 8);
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. Reactivity Galance Calcula_tions (including independent _calcul_ation by the inspector of control rod ECP and shutdown margin);
SP-322, Cable Tunnel Sump Pumps Operability Verification;-
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SP-340, ECCS Pump Operability (for Building. Spray Pump
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post-maintenance operability test);
SP-510,- Weekly Battery Check (Units 1 and 2);
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SP-187, Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust System Testing-(portioqs of this test); and,
. SP-179, Containment Leakage Test - Types
"B".and "C" (only.
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for type C testing of AHV 1A and 18).
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As a result of these reviews the following items were identified:
(a) The inspector observed the performance of a pressure decay test conducted in accordance with SP-179.
The inspector noted that while procedure SP-179 discussed such a test, the directions for test performance do not exist.
In addition, during the performance of the test, the inspector identified to the engineer conducting the test that the results were
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invalid due to the failure of the engineer to remove the air supply hose from the test rig.
Failure to remove the air
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supply from the test rig caused air to leak past the air supply isolation valve thus providing invalid pressure decay readings.
The air hose was removed and the test was completed.
This item was discussed with licensee management.
The licensee will revise SP-179 thus providing instructions for conducting a pressure decay test.
Inspector Followup Item:
Review status of revision to procedure SP-179 to include pressure decay test.
(302/80-42-11)
(b). Crystal River Units 1 and 2 (Coal Fired Plants) contain batteries that are used to operate switchgear that provide offsite power to Unit 3.
The matetenance of these batteries is under the cognizance of the fossil plant operating staff.
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Procedure. AI-1300,. Crystal River Units 1 and 2 Interface with
' Crystal River Unit 3, discusses.how such activities are interfaced between the three' units, however, the inspector
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questioned whether the fossil plant staff is sufficiently
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notify "the' CR-3 Shift Supervisor 'of any maintenance on safety-related equipment which will in any way render it out of service as defined by Technical Specificatoins", (the quoted passage is from procedure AI-1300). '
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments and will re-examine - the fossil nuclear plant interface to assure
' adequate maintenance controls exist.
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Inspector Followup-Item: Review licensee actionsL to assure that the' fossil / nuclear olant interface contains adequate maintenance controls (302/80-42-12).
(11) Maintenance _ Activities - The inspector observed maintenance activities to verify _ that:
Approved procedures were being utilized;
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' Correct equipment clearances were in effect;
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Work Requests (W/R's), Radiation Work Permits (RWP's) and Fire Prevention Work Permits, as required, were issued and being followed; and, Quality Control personnel were available for inspection
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activities as required.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
Replacement of a control rod position indication (PI) coil in
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accordance with maintenance procedure (MP)-108, Control Rod Drive Handling;
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Replacement of a mechanical seal in Building Spray Pump 1A in accordance with procedure MP-131, Disassembly And Reassembly Of BSP-1A And 18 And DHP-IA And 1B; and Activities on the spent fuel pool floor associated with the
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installation of high density spent fuel racks including review of procedure MP-135, Fuel Rack Removal Procedure, and review of modification M-79-3-18-0 (Modification of Hardstop on Fuel Carriage)-.
With the exception of the RCA posting / barrier item and anti-contamination clothing dressing item discussed in paragraph 5.b.(5) of this report, no inadequacies were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee' Event Reports, and Non-Conforming Operations Reports (NCOR)
a.
The inspector rev.iewed Licensee Event Reports (LER's) to verify that:
The re. ports accurately describe the events;
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The safety. significance is as reported; The -report -satisfies requirements. wi.th. respect.to information
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provided and tidiing oV submittal;
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Corrective action is appropriate; and,
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. Action has been taken.
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LER's 80-44, 80-42, 80-48, 80-49, 80-50 and 80-51 were reviewed. This review' identified the following items.
(1)
LER's 80-48 and 80-49 reported failures of containment isolation
. valves (CIV's) CAV-3 and CAV-12. Failure of;CIV's is a continuous problem and has been identified as Inspector Followup Item The licensee's activities to - minimize these (302/80-39-06).
failures will be followed under this item.
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(2)
LER 80-50 reported a-failure of-the level instrumentation for the sodium hydroxide tanks. The'cause of the instrument failure was found to be water in the level transmitter dry sensing line. The instrument was returned-to service and.the ' licensee is investigating the reason for water formation in the line.
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Inspector Followup Item:
Review results of licensee's investi-gation of water in soduim hydroxide tank level instrument sensing
-a 102/80-42-08)
(3) LER v.
or reported the disabling of the Auxiliary Building fire suppression system due to operator error. This event is described in detail in paragraph 5.a.(1) of this report.
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The inspector reviewed NCOR's to verify the following:
Compliance with Technical Specifications;
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Corrective actions as identified in the reports or during
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subsequent reviews have been accomplished or are being pursued for completion; Generic items are identified and reported as required by 10 CFR
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Part 21; and, Items are reported as required by the Technical Specifications.
The following NCOR's were reitewed:
80-72, 80-79, 80-80,80-107, 80-112,80-123, 80-124,80-145, 80-166,80-167, 80-178,80-183, 80-190,80-202, 80-210,80-222, 80-228,80-229, 80-237,80-239, 80-251,80-262, 60-270,80-281, 80-282,80-289, 80-303,80-307, 80-309,80-311, 80-312,80-313,-80-314,80-315, 80-316,80-318, 80-324,80-328 J As a result of ' Sis review, the following items were identified:
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(1) NCOR 80-289 reported a high radiation alarm and subsequent evacuation of the Auxiliary Building on November 4,1980. This
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_ event.was reviewed as. reported in NRC Report 80-39 and is being
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be'ing f'ollowed'by' Inspector Fol'lowup' Item (302/80-39-01) ' '
(2). NCOR 80-324 reported the use of non quality "0"-rings (BUNA-N) in approximately 13 hydraulic snubbers. As a result of this use, the licensee. entered the 72 hour-action statement of Technical Speci-fication' 3.7.9.1(b) and applied to Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for approval of the BUNA-N material used. This approval was granted within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement time period and the
. licensee is allowed-to utilize this material until the next scheduled refueling outage (estimated to' be_ approximately September / October 1981).
-The ' inspector's review of this event. indicates that 15 hydraulic snubbers may be utilizing the BUNA-N material and that -14 of these snubbers are considered to. 1-inaccessible due to their locations within the containment building. One. snubber (MSH-248), located in the Intermediate Building, is accessible and the licensee is i
conducting a monthly' visual. surveillance of this snubber to detect
'if any' leakage is occurrin.
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1 The inspector reviewed a letter compiled by the licensee that compares the BUNA-N material with the acceptable ethylene propylene (EP) material.
Based upon this review, the inspector consideres the licensee's surveillance program to be necessary and adequate to detect seal failures.
In addition, the inspector has questioned the. licensee to determine the mechanism that caused the incorrect seals to be installed. The licensee is still reviewing this matter.
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Inspector Followup Item:
Review the monthly surveillance conducted on snubber MSH-248 and the licensee's investigation into
- he reason for use of the incorrect seal material. (302/80-42-09)
(3) NCOR 80-328 reported a high radiation alarm and subsequent evacuation of the Auxiliary Building on December 21, 1980. The inspector was present when this event occurred and the event is detailed in paragraph 7 of this report.
7.
Nonroutine Events Auxiliary Building (AB) Evacuations (NCOR's80-314 and 80-328)
a.
At 2215 hours0.0256 days <br />0.615 hours <br />0.00366 weeks <br />8.428075e-4 months <br /> on December 9, an AB evacuation was initiated due to alarms on AB gaseous radiation monitors RM-AZ and RM-A3. The tripping of these RMA channels resulted in the automatic securing and isolation of.,various AB. fans,and. ventilation _ dampers.. The licensee began an immediate search of the AB to determine the source of the high gaseous activity.,This action included isolation of selected waste gas headers and waste gas equipment that could cause waste gas leakage into the AB atmosphere.,,,,
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At 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> on December 10, gaseous levels decreased sufficiently to clear the alarms on RM-A2 and RM-A3 and access to the AB was resumed.
By approximately 1015 hours0.0117 days <br />0.282 hours <br />0.00168 weeks <br />3.862075e-4 months <br />, the source of the leakage was identified (a fitting leak on a pressure switch monitoring. the waste gas compressor suction lines and a seal leak on the Reactor Coolant (RC)
Evaporator vacuum pump) and these leaks were isolated for repair.
The event -resulted in a gaseous' release from the plant. The release amounted to 0.437%-gamma and 0.242% beta of the Technical Specification instantaneous release limit which consisted primarily of Xe-133 and Xe-135 gas.
The inspector was onsite when this event occurred and observed the
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The inspector has no further questions at this
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time.
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At 0932_ hours on December 21, an LAB evacuation was initiated due to alarms. on AB gaseous radiation monitor RM-A2. The licensee began'a
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1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />, a second radiation monitor (RM-A3) alarmed and the licensee continued their search witn personnel in protective clothing.
The source of the activity was traced to an open drain line on the reactor coolant evaporator feed tank. The valve was closed and AB radiation levels returned to normal. Building access was restored at 1055 hours0.0122 days <br />0.293 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />4.014275e-4 months <br />.
This event caused by failure of the level indicator on the feed tank which, in turn, caused an operator draining the tank to not realize the tank had gone completely empty. Complete emptying of the tank caused
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waste gas to vent from the tanks to the AB atmosphere.
The event resulted in a gaseous release from the plant.
The release amounted to.0.991% gamma and 0.57% beta of the Technical Specification instaneous release limit. The inspector verified that this event taken cumulatively with.the December 9 event did not approach nor exceed the quarterly and annual release limits.
The licensee has-had similar problems with tank draining evolutions resulting in gaseous releases (Reference NRC Report 80-39). As the result of an event that occurred-on November 4, the licensee wrote a short term instruction _ (SIT 80-75) and is revising procedures that direct tank draining operations. Followup on these revisions are being carried as inspector followup item (302/80-39-01).
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The. licensee is also planning _ modifications to the rad-waste tank level
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' instrumentation to ' improve the reliability and accuracy of this equipment.
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Inspector ; Followup Itemi : Review licensee's progress in modifying rad-waste tank level instrumentation (302/80-42-10).
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