IR 05000302/1980020
| ML19318B378 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1980 |
| From: | Martin R, Quick D, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19318B370 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-80-20, NUDOCS 8006260023 | |
| Download: ML19318B378 (6) | |
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'o't UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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t REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 o
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report No.- 50-302/80-20 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Facility Name:
Crystal River Docket,No.
50-302 I'icense No.
DPR-72 Inspection at corporate offices and Cry tal River 3 site
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[O Inspectors:
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D. Quic Date Signed g
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M.Graamy Date Signed
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Approved by:
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/M[O R. Martin,Clitief,RONSBrpch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on April 14, 1980 through April 19, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 83 inspector-hours on site in the areas of refueling, followup on licensee identified items, and touring the plant.
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Results l
Of the three areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were j
identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
'B. L. Griffin, Senior Vice President, Engineering and Construction
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G. C. Moore, Vice President, Power Production J. A. Hancock, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Operations
'Q.'B. DuBois, Director, Quality Programs Department
P. Y. Baynard, Man'ager, Nuclear Support Services B. Simpson, Manager. Nuclear Engineering
- D. Poole, Plant Manager
- T. Lutkehouse, Technical Services Superintendent
- P. McKee,. Operations Superintendent
- G. Westafer, Maintenance Superintendent
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- J. Cooper,-QA/QC Compliance Manager G. Perkins, Health Physics Supervisor
- K. Lancaster, Compliance Auditor W. Cross, Operations Engineer J. Kraiker, Operations Shift Supervisor H. Reeder, Operations Shift Supervisor
- J. Bufe, Compliance Auditor L. Hill, Engineer, Nuclear Support Services Other Organizations P. Childers, Babcock and Wilcox, Fuels
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NRC Resident Inspector
- B'. Smith,. Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
'2.
Exit Interview The' inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 18, 1980 with thosefpersons indicated in Paragraph I above. Mr.
Stetka stated that the
- purpose of his inspection had been familiarization with corporate and plant
. personnel and facilities. 'The inspector discussed findings based on obser -
vations of licensee activities made during his tours, and on licensee-identified items which occurred while he was on site.
Ms,.
Graham confirmed withthelicenseehisplannedresponsestolicenseeidentifjeditems,and stated her intent to remain on-site to witness-portions of*their implemen-tation.
Prior to leaving the site on April 19,.the inspector discussed her
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review of the licensee's actions, and of refueling with W.' Cross, Shift Outage Coordinator. Her findings were formally stated -in-an exit interview.
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~ by phone with D. Poole, Plant Manager, on April 22.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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Resident Inspector Familiarization Tour D.' Quick, Project Inspector for Crystal River 3, and T.'Stetka, Senior
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Resident Inspector designee,. toured the Florida Power Corporate offices and Crystal River plant. The trip was to provide the new inspector familiari-zation with licensee personnel and-facilities. The new Senior Resident Inspector was introduced to management and staff at both locations, and discussed current regulatory issues with cognizant individuals.
Mr.
Stetka will begin his duty as the Crystal River Senior Resident Inspector the week of May 5, 1980.
6.
Followup on Licensee Identified Items The following items were identified to the NRC Regional Office or the inspector on site by the licensee. Although they do not represent items of noncompliance, they are items of safety significance. As such, the licensees evaluation and response to.the items were reviewed by the inspectors.
a.
Vent valve dropped on core
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On April 12,_1980, during removal of a vent valve from the reactor vessel, either the valve itself_or the handling tool caught on the lip of the valve housing, preventing further movement. A weld on the handling tool broke under the increased tension, and the vent valve dropped five to six feet onto the core. The reactor building was evacuated until it was evident there had been no fission product-release.
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To prevent recurrence of this event, the licensee will complete the
.following items' prior to commencing re-installation of the vent valves:
(1) Procedure NP-112, Reactor Internals Vent Valve Removal and Replace-ment, will be revised to require that the vent valve and removal-tool be centered in'the reactor vessel prior to applying a lifting force to the tool with the reactor building crane. The procedure will also be revised to require personnel to observe the-load cell while the_ vent valve is being inserted into place or removed from place and during the beginning of the lifti46 operation to assure the tool and/or valve are free of vessel or core internals.
(2) The tool will be repaired.and visually examined to assur.e structu-ral integrity.
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The; inspector will review the ' changes in procedure MP-112 during a future inspection.
(. Inspector Followup Item 80-20-01).
The inspector also~ reviewed the licensees' evaluation of core damage caused by the dropped valve.
The vendor, Babcock and Wilcox, made several videotapes of the affected area of the core, both before and
'after the vent valve had been removed. The tapes showed superficial scratching-of several-fuel. elements, and a somewhat ' deep'er scrape across the top of one control rod assembly.
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Tests of the effected fuel elements and control rods were performed.by
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the licensee and observed by the inspector. A tool the shape of the control rod drive locking mechanism was tested for fit in the upper portion of the damaged control' rod and. rotated to verify operability of the spider assembly's locking device. All of the elements showing any damage, four fuel assemblies and two control rods, were then demonstrated to be free moving by grappling and pulling one inch.
After the element containing the more damaged control rod was moved to the spent fuel pool, a drag test was done on the control rod. The results were reviewed by inspectors and found to be within Babcock and Wilcox's acceptance criteria.
The inspector has no further questions at this time on the licensee's evaluation of core damage.
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b.
Testing fuel transfer mechanism with spent fuel On April 17, 1980, the operator of the spent. fuel pool bridge mis-indexed and seltated a spent fuel element rather than the dummy to use in functional testing of the fuel transfer mechanisms. The indexing system on the spent fuel pool bridge has two parallel sets of letters, one red ~and one black;ffor the A and B spent fuel pools. The operator's error'was in reading the wrong colored letter. Testing of the Y fuel transfer mechanism was completed prior to discovery of the selection This ites was identified by the licensee as movement of fuel error.
without.the required procedures and documentation.
- A potential consequence of the error was overexposure of indviduals working in the' area'of the fuel transfer canal. The~ licensee reviewed
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all dosimetery records for the effected shift and found:no unusual'
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exposures. The' functional test was then repeated using the same spent-fuel' element so. Red-Chem personnel:could measure dose' rates. Supple-
. mental' shielding had been placed prior to the. unintentional fuel'
movement for protection during use of the canal ~ to defuel, so there-was.no; severe streaming. The maximum localized doseeggte was 400
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Asia-short term preventionLof: erroneous indexing, the licensee changed his fuel ~movementLprocedure tto require the operator monitoring refueling
'from;the control room to inquire'" Red Scale or Black Scale?" of the-
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soent fuel bridge operator' each time the bridge was inde rd. The color indicated was then recorded on the move sheets. As a long tere q
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- remedy, the. licensee indicated that better human engineering would be
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exercised in the development of the indexing system for the new high density racks to-be placed this cycle.
The inspector has no further questions on the licensees response to this item.
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c.,
'DecayLHeat Removal pump shaft crack
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On April 19, 1980, the liceusee informed the inspector of the discovery of a crack in the shaft of the Decay Heat Removal System "A" Pump.
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This is.the third cracked DHR pump shaft to be found at Crystal River
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The inspector ' observed the crack, which radiated from the side of the: keyway, and discussed with the licensee his plans to perform
. radiographic testing.
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i In subsequent telephone conversations with the inspector, the licensee indicated that the crack was shown to be-surface, not volumetric.
It appears to be a chip in the~ side of the keyway. As such, the licensee I
felt that the crack was unrelated to the two previous cracking problems.
Review of the licensee's evaluation of the cracked shaft will be performed by'the inspector at a later date.
(Inspector Followup Item 80-20-02).
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7.
Refueling The-inspector reviewed changes to the refueling procedures made since the previous fuel shuffle. Procedures reviewed were:
FP 302-New Fuel Assembly Unloading, Inspection, Storage, and Container
.Reclosing FP 304, Receiving New Fuel
. FP 601'
Refueling Equipment Portions of the. completed data packages for FP 302 and FP 304 were also reviewed.
The~ inspector observed movement of new fuel from the new fuel storage area to the spent. fuel pool on-April 16, 1980. At-that time the auxiliary. hook e
- of the auxiliary building overhead crane was being used ta ' remove new fuel from the'back row of the new fuel storage pit. The mainhqgk was used for
other -fuel l assemblies,- but architectural:- restraints prevented use of a
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hook that size?in'the back row. The minimum hoist speed of the auxiliary _
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. hook isl18Lfeet/ minute,.three times the Babcock and Wilcox recommended:
maximum of six feet / minute for movement of new fuel.
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The licensee had previously identified this problem and developed a modifi-cation package, MAR-78-12-02. This had not, however, been implemented.
The issue and proposed licensee commitments were referred to a regional specialist for followup (Inspector Followup Item 80-20-03).
The inspectcr reviewed the refueling log, reactor operators' log, and shift supervisors log for completion of required surveillance procedures prior to core alterations. Fuel movement was observed by inspectors on site subse-quent to the inspection.
Th' inspector has no further questions in this area.
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e 8.
Health Physics Practices During his plant tour, the inspector observed the implementation of the licensees radiation protection program. Areas reviewed included identifi-cation of radiation and contaiminated area, step-off pad conditions, disposal of anti-contamination clothing, and area posting. The inspector also observed personnel leaving the controlled area, and packaging and removing contaminated materials.
The inspector noted several cases of poor health physics practices and discussed them with licensee personnel.
Careless contamination control was observed in the drumming of a.
contaminated clothing in the auxiliary building. Subsequent surveys of the area showed no spread of contamination.
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b.
An incorrect entry had been made on the radiation work permit (RWP)
posted in the spent fuel area. Respiratory protection was erroneously required. The licensee stated that the error had been caught and corrected on the original RWP, but correction of carbon copies had been forgotten. Workers in the area were using all protective clothing and equipment required by the corrected RWP.
Individuals were observed leaving the auxiliary building without using c.
the hand held "frisker" prior to using the portal monitor. The inspector felt that this may have been due in part to the fact that only one frisker was available. The licensee indicated that this was an unusual condition; the second frisker normally available had been temporarily removed for maintenance and would be returned to service very shortly.
The licensee also agreed to post signs at the exit point stating the requirements to use the frisker.
In an effort to improve his overall health physics practices, the licensee instituted a 24-hour health physics watch.
One ro'ving Rid,Shem technician with no other duties is to monitor radiation protection conditions through-
-out the plant. This watch will remain in effect for the entire outage.
The effectiveness of the licensee's actions in the health physics area will be reviewed in future inspe,ctions (Inspector Followup Item 80-20-04).
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Licensee Training Tapes During this inspection the inspector received licensee site familiarization training. This training is required prior to issuance of a site photo identification badge and consists of a review of video tapes. During this training session the inspector noted that there was no ttnining related to the site emergency and evacuation alarms (i.e., the sound of these alarms, action to be taken, and required assembly areas).
s The licensee will review t>eir training tape inventory and change the tapes as'necessary to assure this information is included. This item will be reviewed at a subsequent inspection.
(Inspector Followup Item 80-20-05).
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