IR 05000302/1980038
| ML19350A820 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1981 |
| From: | Martin R, Beverly Smith, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350A814 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-80-38, NUDOCS 8103160911 | |
| Download: ML19350A820 (13) | |
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arcq q'o UNITED STATES
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[ ' ^,,,, ' g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
s REGION 11
e 101 MARIETTA ST N.W.. SUIT E 3100 ATLANTA. G EoRGIA 3olo3 o
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v Report No. 50-302/80-38 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 320134th Street, South St. Petersberg, FL 33733 Facility.Name: Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection at Crystal River Unit 3 near Crystal River, FL (1-D'I:-
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Inspectors:
T. F. Stetka W L[/
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Date Signed C-
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B. W. Smith V U
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Approved by:
R. D. Martin, Section" Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on October 4 through November 3,1980 Areas Inspected
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This routine inspection by the resident inspectors of plant operations, security, radiological controls, license event report (LER's), Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCOR's), non-routine events, and licensee action on previous inspection items involved 106 hours0.00123 days <br />0.0294 hours <br />1.752645e-4 weeks <br />4.0333e-5 months <br /> onsite by two resident inspectors. Facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed. Some of these tours and observations were conducted on a backshift. This report also documents inspector attendence
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at the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) meeting conducting at FPC corporate headquarters.
Results Four items of noncompliance were identified (Failure to secure reactor building purge while recctor building purge exhaust moritor was inoperable paragraph 4.a.(1); failure to deactivate reactor building purge valves after they were closed, paragraph 4.a.(1); failure to escort individual that was required to be escorted at all times when wichin the protected area paragraph 4.b.(9); failure to report entry into a degraded mode, paragraph 5.b.(1).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employee e
Florida Power Corporation Personnel
- J. Bufe, Compliance Auditor
- J. Cooper, QA/QC Compliance Manager W. Cross, Operations Engineer J. Edwards, Training Specialist S. Johnson, Maintenance Staff Engineer
- K. Lancaster, Compliance Supervisor
- T. Lutkehaus, Technical Services Superintendent
- P. McKee, Operations Superintendent D. Mardis, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer G. Perkins, Health Physics Supervisor
- D. Poole, Nuclear Plant Manager
- G. Ruszala, Chemistry / Radiation Protection Manager
- G. Westafer, Maintenance Superintendent K. Wilson, Licensing Specialist, NSSD Babcock and Wilcox Personnel T. Hagen, Acting Technical Spe:cification Coordinator
!uclear Regulatory Commission Personnel Pete Erickson, Licensing Project Manager (NRR)
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Other licensee personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering, chem / rad and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview
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The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
during and at the conclusion of the inspection period.
During these meetings, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the insp;ction as detailed in this report. During these meetings the items of noncompliance and inspector followup items were discussed.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items (Open):
Unresolved Item (302/80-33-01): The licensee issued Short Term Instruction 80-71 on October 3 to insure that both licensed and non-?icensed operators understood the intent of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.
This item remains open pending the inspectors' continuing review of the licensee's i:nplementation of this Technical Specification.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-28-04):
Procedure AI-500 was s
i revised as revision 37 on September 25, 1980 to require log reading by the oncoming shift prior to shift turnover. Shift turnover observations made by the resident inspectors indicate that this practice, implemented in August by issuance of a Short Term Instruction, is being accomplished.
4.
Review of Plant Operations The plant continued with power operations (Mode 1) for the majority of this inspection period. On October 8, at 0003 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, a turbine trip and reactor trip occurred (see paragraph 6.a for details). The plant was returned to power operations by 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> on October 8 and continued operation in this mode for the remainder of the inspection period.
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Shift Logs and Facility Records i
The inspectors reviewed the records listed below and discussed various entries with operation's personnel to verify compliance with technical specifications and the licensee's administrative procedures.
Shift Supervisor's logs;
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Operator's log;
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Equipment Out-of-Service log;
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Equipment Clearance Order log;
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Shift Relief Checklist; Control Center Status Board;
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Short Tern Instructions; and,
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Operating Daily Surveillance log.
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In addition to _these record reviews, the inspectors independently verified selected clearance order tagouts.
These record reviews identified the following:
(1) During routine operator log review on Ocotber 29, 1980, the inspector noted that the reactor building purge had been secured and the purge supply and exhaust isolation valves (AHV-1A, 1B, 1C and 1D) had been closed due to the fact that the particulate detector was not installed.in the Reactor Building Purge Exhaust Radiation Monitor (Rha-1). The inspectors performed an invest-igation into this issue to determine the reason for the missing particulate detector and to verify licensee actions.
This investigation identified the following:
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On October 26, 1980, at approximately 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br />, maintenance was
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performed on RMA-1 which involved replacing the particulate detector. This maintenance activity placed the gaseous detector
of RMA-1 in an inoperable status due to the fact that removal of the particulate detector results in an opening into the system that allows auxiliary building air to be drawn into and mix with the flow of air coming from the reactor building purge exhaust resulting in a dilution of the air passing through the gaseous detector of RMA-1. This dilution of air prevents the gaseous detector from monitoring a representative sample of the air being released via the reactor building purge.
No declaration of inoperability was made on the gaseous detector; therefore, the surveillance procedures to verify operability of RMA-1, subsequent to the replacement of the particulate detector, were not performed.
On October 28, 1980, at 1540 hours0.0178 days <br />0.428 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.8597e-4 months <br />, RiA-1 particulate detector
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was again removed for maintenance. An oncoming midnight shift chemistry / radiation protection technician noticed an abnormally low count rate on the gaseous channel of RMA-1 while t& king log readings.
His investigation as to the cause of the low count rata revealed the missing particulate detector and he immediately notified tu, Aift supervisor. The shift supervisor recegnized that the missing particulate detector made the gaseous detector inoperable and ordered the reactor building purge secured and the purge supply and exhaust valves closed at 2323 hours0.0269 days <br />0.645 hours <br />0.00384 weeks <br />8.839015e-4 months <br /> on October 28, 1980. This action was in accordance with Technical Specification i
3.6.3.1 but did not meet full compliance with Technical Speci-
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fication 3.6.3.1 for continued operation in that the controls for
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the purge supply and exhaust isolation valves were not deactivated.
This technical specification requirement was brought to the licensee's attention by the inspectors at the same time that
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RMA-1 was being surveillanced for operability. RMA-1 operability
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surveillance was completed satisfactorily on October 29, 1980, at l
1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br /> and the reactor building purge was restarted at 1040 l
hours.
I The inspectors reviewed the liceasee's calculations for the estimated radioactive release to verify no radioactive release limits were exceeded.
Conservatism was used in these calcula-tions and the results indicated no radioactive release limits were exceeded.
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l As a result of the above investigation, the following noncompliances l
were identified:
l (a) During the period of October 26, 1980, at approximately 0400
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hours through October 28, 1980, at 2323 hours0.0269 days <br />0.645 hours <br />0.00384 weeks <br />8.839015e-4 months <br />, the licensee did not close and maintain closed the reactor building purge
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supply and exhaust isolation valves, i
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i j-4-q Item of Noncompliance: Failure to close and muntain closed
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the reactor building purge supply an exhaust isolation valves while RMA-1 gaseous detector was inoperable is i
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contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.2.1 (302/80-38-01)
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(b) During the period of October 26, 1980, at approximately 0400
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hours through October 28, 1980, at 2323 hours0.0269 days <br />0.645 hours <br />0.00384 weeks <br />8.839015e-4 months <br />, the licensee did not close and maintain closed the reactor building purge supply and exhaust valves; and during the period of October
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26, 1980,.at approximately 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> through October 29, 1980, at 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br />, the licensee did not deactivate the
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reactor building purge supply and exhaust valves.
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Item of Noncompliance: Failure to close and maintain closed i
i and deactivate the reactor building purge supply and exhaust valves while RMA-1 gaseous detector was inoperable is contrary to Standard Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.
This non-compliance will be treated collectively with the additional noncuapliance against Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 identi-
i fled in paragraph 5.4.(1) following. (302/80-38-02)
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As a result of the above issue, the licensee immediate1 ' initiated a formal training program on this issue to be given to all opera-tions, maintenance and chemistry / radiation protection personnel.
The inspectors reviewed and had no questions on the training
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syllabus.
At this time all personnel, with the exception of
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several chemistry / radiation protection technicians and personnel away fras the power station on leave or other duties, have
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i received this training.
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I (2) Subsequent to the above events, another event concerning RMA-1 occurred at 2325 hours0.0269 days <br />0.646 hours <br />0.00384 weeks <br />8.846625e-4 months <br /> on October 29, 1980.
It was discovered
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that the inlet flow isolation valve to RMA-1 was shut but the measured flow rate through the detectors was within allowable limits. The shift supervisor directed the reactor building purge to be secured and the purge supply and exhaust isolation valves closed and deactivated. The plant manager immediately formed a task force at approximately 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> to investigate the cause of the event, determine the lessons learned and to initiate immediate and long term corrective actions to prevent this and
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other related problems from occurring in the future. The licensee's investigation revealed that subsequent to obtaining a sample of the reactor building purge exhaust at RMA-1 the flow inlet isolation valve was not opened as required by the sampling procedure.
Following this sampling activity, the operability surveillance was performed on RMA-1 and appeared to be satisfactory (even though the inlet flow isolation. valve was left shut) and the reactor building purge was initiated at 1040 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.9572e-4 months <br />, on October 29, 1980, and remained in operation until discovery of the shut inlet.
flow isolation valve at 2325 hours0.0269 days <br />0.646 hours <br />0.00384 weeks <br />8.846625e-4 months <br /> on October 29, 1980.
The inves-
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-5-tigation, of the flowrate being within surveillance procedure acceptance criteria with the inlet flow isolation valve shut led to the discovery of a leaking seal on the particulate detector which allowed sufficient air to be drawn into the system thus preventing the low flow alarm from activating.
The seal was tightened to stop the inleakage of air.
The licensee initiated the following corrective actions as a result of this event:
(a) Revise Surveillance Procedure (SP)-335, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Functional Testing, to include cycling of radiation monitor inlet flow isolation valves in order to verify proper system integrity and low flow alarms. This action has been completed.
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Initiate controlling procedures to integrate all activities required for maintenance of radiation monitors with regard to removal from service, major maintenance steps, restoration, and testing.
Inspector Followup Item (302/80-38-03). Verify controlling procedures are issued to integrate maintenance activities on radiation monitors.
(c) Require chemistry / radiation protection personnel to have the procedure "in hand" for those chemistry / radiation protection procedures that require system manipulation. This action has bnn completed.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's calculations for the ostimated radioactive release to the environment to verify that
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no radioactive release limits were exceeded.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed this event with the licensee and have no further questions on this issue at this time with the exception of the inspector followup item noted above.
(3) The inspectors noted several log entries concerning periodic weeping problems with pressurizer code safety valve (RCV-8). The inspectors verified that the Reactor Coolant System leakrate technical specification limit was not exceeded. Discussions with licensee personnel revealed that RCV-8 has had a history of weepage problems and that the valve has been replaced three times in an attempt to correct the problem.
Past engineering studies on the valve, piping and hangers have failed to identify the problem. A new engineering review of the RCV-8 installation is to be performed.
Inspector Followup Ites: (302/80-38-04) Review licensee's actions with regards to RCV-8 weepage problems.
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Facility Tours and Observations Throughout this inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. On Saturday, October 4, a facility tour was conducted to observe the security controls in effect during the continuous concrete pour being performed f,e construction of the Technical Support Center (TSC).
Also on October 4, and on Sunday, October 5, at 0000 to 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />, facility tours were conducted to observe security and plant operations. On October 29, at 2230 to 2400 hours0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br />, a facility tour was conducted to verify that operator training, required as a result of the events that occurred during the period of October 26 through October 29 (see paragraph 4.a.(1)), was bei% conducted.
Alao during the inspection period, several licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
Security perimeter fence;
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Turbine building;
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Control room; Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) rooms)
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Auxiliary building;
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Intermediate building;
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Battery rooms; and,
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Electrical switchgear rooms.
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During these tours the following observations were made:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation:
The following instrumentation was observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the Technical Specifications for the current operational
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mode:
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Equipment operating status; Area, atmospheric, and liquii ~ radiation monitors;
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Electrical system lineups;
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Reactor operating parameters; and,
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Auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
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(2) Shift Staffing:
The inspectors verified on several occasions that the operating shift was manned in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
In addition the inspectors observed shift turnovers on different occasions to verify that continuity of information regarding plant operating status, operational problems, etc., was being accomplished.
(3) Plant Housekeeping Conditions: Storage of material and components and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards
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-7-exist. The licensee appears to be maintaining an improved house-keeping status and general housekeeping is acceptable.
(4) Fire Protection:- Fire extinguishers and fire fighting equipment were observed to be unobstructed and inspected for operability.
No evidence of smoking was observed in designated "No Smoking" areas.
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(5) Radiation Areas: Radiation control zones were observed to verify proper identification and implementation.
These observations included review of step-off pad conditions, disposal of contam-inated clothing, and area posting.
The licensee is installing
"bar-door" type swing gate barriers that will be used to post and barricade high radiation areas (Reference IE Report 80-23 and Inspector Followup Item 302/80-23-03).
The use of these gates should minimize previously identified barricading problems. Area j
postings were verified for accuracy through the use ot the inspector's own radiation monitoring instrument.
i (6) Fluid Leaks-Various plant systems were observed to detect the presence of leaks.
On October 21, while touring Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) B room, the inspector observed an air leak on the EDG air start system. The air was leaking from the drain petcocks off the filters downstream of the solenoid operated air control valves.
The inspector notified the licensee of this finding and questioned the effect of this air leak on EDG opera-bility. The licensee, who was already aware of this air leak, responded that in the remote possibly where complete failure of these filters did occur, the failure would result in a loss of air pressure to the air start valves and subsequent starting of the EDG. The licensee has already ordered parts to repair the damaged petcocks. The inspector is satisfied with the licensee's
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explanation and the corrective actions being taken. The inspector will followup on the licensee's procurement of parts and repair of these filters.
Inspector Followup Item: Review licensee's progress in repairing EDG B control air filter housing petcocks. (302/80-38-05).
(7) Piping Vibration: No excessive piping vibration was noted.
(8) Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints: Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety related systems were observed.
No inadequacies were identified.
(9) Security Controls:- Security controls were observed to verify that security barriers are intact, guard forces are on duty and access to the protected area is controlled in accordance with the facility Security Plan.
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On October 21 at approximately 1115 hours0.0129 days <br />0.31 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.242575e-4 months <br />, the inspector observed a contractor employee with an escort badge in the protected area.
The inspector did not observe any escort with this employee and upon questioning the employee determined that his escort had left the employee to perform work in an adjoining room that placed the escort out of sicht of the escorted individual.
The inspector immediately notifu " licensee personnel of this event and these personnel took over the escorting responsibilities.
Failure to provide an escort at all times while in the protected area for individuals not authorized to enter this area without an escort is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(6) and the Crystal River Nuclear Plant Security Plan.
Item of Noncompliance: Failure to provide an escort at all times I
of individuals not authorized to enter the protected area without an escort. (302/80-38-06).
5.
Review of Licensee Event Reports and Non-Conforming Operations Reports The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LER's) to verify that:
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--the Reports accurately described the events;
--the safety significance is as reported;
--the report is accurate as to cause;
--the report satisfies requirer.ents with respect to information provided and timing of submittal;
--corrective action is appropriate; and,
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--action.has been taken.
LERs 80-33, 80-35, 80-36, 80-37, 80-38, 80-40, and 80-41 were reviewed.
This review identified the following items.
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(1) LER 80-33 reported that automatic containment isolation valve CFV-11 failed to close. Failure of CFV-11 to close rendered the valve inoperable and the licensee is required by Technical Specifi-cation (TS) 3.6.3.1 to either return the valve to an operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or to take certain actions to isolate the open containment penetration. One of these actions included isolating the penetration with a deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position. The inspector's investigation o'
this event indicates that while CFV-11 was manually closed at approximately 1119 hours0.013 days <br />0.311 hours <br />0.00185 weeks <br />4.257795e-4 months <br /> on October 3 thus isolating the open penetration the valve was not deactivated until approximately 0715 hours0.00828 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00118 weeks <br />2.720575e-4 months <br /> on August 5.
During this time period no additional actions (e.g., closing a manual isolation valve in the same line)
were taken to comply with TS 3.6.3.1. Failure to deactivate CFV-11 is contrary to TS 3.6.3.1 and is an item of noncompliance.
This noncompliance will be treated collectively with the additional noncompliance against TS 3.6.3.1 identified in paragraph 4.a.(1)
preceding.
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-9-(2) LERs 80-36, 80-37, and 80-38 reported various failures with the Decay Heat Removal (DHR)/ Low Pressure Injection (LPI) flow control valves DHV-110 and DHV-111. These valves have been a continuing problem fu the licensee and are the subject of an engineering review to modify and improve the reliability of this system.
Progress on this engineering review will be followed by the inspectors..
Inspector Followup Item:
Review licensee's progress on the engineering review to improve reliability of DHV-110 and DHV-111.
(302/80-38-07).
(3) LER 80-40 reported a failure to sample Test Well #4 as required by the Environmental Technical Specifications (ETS). The original report was incorrect with respect to report date, event date, and event coding and a revised report (Rev. 1) was issued. Review of the revised report indicates that the re@ re date is still incorrect and that an additional report is required.
I Inspector Followup Item: Review revised LER 80-40 for corrected information. (302/80-38-08).
b.
The inspector reviewed Non-Conforming Operations Report (NCOR's) that were not reported as LERs to verify the following:
--compliance with the Technical Specifications;
--items that appear. to be generic in nature are identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21; and,
--corrective actions as identified in the reports or as identified during subsequent reviews have been accomplished or are being pursued for completion.
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NCOR's80-184, 80-185,80-186, 80-189,80-192, 80-193,80-194, 80-217, and 80-219 were reviewed. As the result of this review the following
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items were identified:
(1) NCOR 80-192 reported the failure of dt cay heat removal / low pressure injection (LPI) flow control valve DHV-110 on August 6.
Failure of this valve placed the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) LPI subsystem into a degraded mode. Technical Specification 6.9.1.9 i
requires reporting of conditions leading to operation in a degraded
mode to the Director of.the Regional NRC Office within 30 days of the occurrence of the event. As of October 29, 1980 this event
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had not been reported.
l Item of Noncompliance: Failure to provide a 30 day report as required by, TS 6.9.1.9 describing entry into a degraded mode-of operation. (302/80-38-09).
l (2) NCOR 80-194 reported a reactor trip that occurred on August 8,
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. during' physics testing while performing procedure PT-110, Control-l
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-10-ling Procedure for Zero Power Physics Testing. The cause of this trip was the failure of PT-110 to caution technicians to install i
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a jumper while removing or installing Reactor Protection System (RPS) linear amplifiers.
Procedure PT-110 must be revised to include a caution and jumper installation instructions thus preventing a reactor trip.
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Inspector Followup Item:
Review licensee's progress in revising PT-110 to prevent a reactor trip while adjusting the RPS linear amplifiers. (302/80-38-10).
6.
Nonroutine Events a.
Reactor Trip Due to Grid System Voltage Oscillation i
On October 8 at 0003 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> the reactor tripped from 100% power. The trip was an anticipatory reactor trip caused by a main turbine trip which occurred as a result of overexcitation of the main generator.
The generator overexcitation was caused when grid system switching operations caused voltage oscillations on the grid. A normal reactor shutdown occurred with all safety systems responding as designed. The plant was placed in a stable hot shutdown condition. At 0419 hours0.00485 days <br />0.116 hours <br />6.92791e-4 weeks <br />1.594295e-4 months <br /> on October 8, the reactor was made critical and the plant was returned to power operations by 0500 hoars.
The licensee has established a " Lessons Learned" task force that reviews each plant trip; to review the cause of the trip and plant response, and to determine what corrective actions could be initiated to mitigate a recurrence.
As a result of this task force review, the licensee has determined that certain non-safety system items need to be reviewed including additional licensed operator training on the generator exciter circuit and adjustment of main steam safety valve blowdown settings.
Inspector Followup Item:
Review licensee progress with respect to task force recommendations from the October 8 reactor trip event.
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'(302/80-38-11).
b.
Auxiliary Building (AB) Evacuation At 1025 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.900125e-4 months <br /> on October 26 an AB evacuation was initiated as the result of an alarm on the auxiliary building atmospheric monitor RMA-2. By 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br /> on October 26 the alarm had cleared, the evacua-tion was terminated, and building access restored. The ca'
- 4 this event was waste gas ente-ing the auxiliary building foll' at. '.21sture draining operations on the Waste Gas Surge Tank (WGST) drar_ pt This event resulted in a gaseous release from the plant.
The gas released consisted primarily of Xe 133 and Xe 135 gas 0.19%
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-11-(gamma) and 0.11% beta of the Technical.cpecification instantaneous release limit.
i To prevent recurrence of this event the licensee has installed a level I
indicating sight glass on the WGST drain pot to enable monitoring of the water level in the pot and thus ensure securing of the draining operation prior to allowing a release of waste gases.
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The inspe tors have reviewed the licensee's actions and have no further
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questions on this item at this time.
c.
Inadvertant Engineered Safeguards Actuation At 0947 hours0.011 days <br />0.263 hours <br />0.00157 weeks <br />3.603335e-4 months <br /> on October 16, 1980, an inadvertant actuation of High
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Pressure Injection (HPI) and Low Pressure Injection (LPI) on Engineered Safeguards (ES) train "B" occurred. The ES actuation occurred due to
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surveillance testing being performed on channel I with a concurrent fuse failure in channel 2.
Plant conditions at the time of the actua-tions were: Mode 1 operations at 96% power, plant pressure 2145 psig,
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pressurizer level 200 inches, and plant temperature 579 F.
The operators
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observed plant parameters to verify that the ES actuation was inadvertant,
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that the 20*F subcooling margin was met and then proceeded to secure i
from HPI and LPI. Approximately 240 gallons of HPI water was charged
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into the Reactor Coolant System causing plant pressure to increase to i
2185 psig and pressurizer level to increase to 212 inches. The plant
continued in Mode 1 operations during and subsequent to the ES actuation.
Surveillance testing was secured and troubleshooting was initiated on the ES system in order to determine the cause of the blown fuse. The cause was traced to a relay coil drawing excessive current in ES
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l channel 2. The relay was replaced and ES channel 2 was returned to service. The inspectors have reviewed this event and have no further questions on this event.
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7.
Systematic Assessment of Licencee Performance (SALP) Meeting On October 30, 1980 the resident inspectors attended a SALP meeting at the Florida Power Corporation (FPC) corporation headquarters located in St.
Petersburg, Florida. Also in attendance at this meeting were IE Region II management personnel, the Nuclear Reactor Regulations (NRR) licensing l
project manager, and FPC corporate management personnel and Crystal River site personnel.
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The purpose of this meeting was to:
-Improve licensee performance;
-Identify exceptional or unacceptable licensee performance;
-Improve the IE Inspection Program;
-Provide a basis for allocation of NRC resources; and,
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4-Achieve national uniformity by evaluating licensee performance from a national perspective.
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I Additional details of this meeting are provided in IE Report 50-302/80-37.
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It is felt that all participants benefitted from this meeting and that the purpose of the meeting was accomplished.
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