IR 05000280/1986038

Insp Repts 50-280/86-38 & 50-281/86-38 on 861102-1206.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maint & Surveillance,Outages,Followup on Region Identified Items & Insp of Dry Spent Nuclear Fuel Facility

ML20207L165
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	12/29/1986
From:	Cantrell F, Holland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207L159	List: IR 05000280/1986038 ML20207L154
References
50-280-86-38, 50-281-86-38, NUDOCS 8701090665
Download: ML20207L165 (11)

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UNITED STATES

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Report Nos.: 50-280/86-38 and 50-281/86-38 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conduct : Novpmber 2 - December 6, 1986 Inspector: '

8 3 4R W. E. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector

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Accompanying Inspectors: G. Schnebli Approved by: 4 /A/,2 9/fd F. S. Cantrell, 2B SepQon Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted in the areas of plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, outages, followup on region identified items, IE Bulletin followup, and inspection of the dry storage spent nuclear fuel facilit Results: No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection repor PDR ADOCK 05000280 Q PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted R. F. Saunders, Station Manager D. L. Benson, Assistant Station Manager

• H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager

• D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Operations

• E. S. Grecheck, Superintendent of Technical Services J. W. Patrick, Superintendent of Maintenance S. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics R. Johnson, Operations Supervisor N. Clark, Site Quality Assurance Manager

• W. D. Craft, Licensing Coordinator J. B. Logan, Supervisor, Safety and Licensing

• L. L. Morris, Supervisor, Health Physics

• M. F. Haduck, Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance

• W. D. Grady, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne * Attended Exit Intervie . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 9,1986, with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph The following new items were identified by the inspector during this exi (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 280, 281/86-38-01, Followup on completion of work requests for freeze protection per PT-52. (paragraph 3)

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 280, 281/86-38-02, Followup on long term corrective action for recirculation spray heat exchanger tube degradation issu (paragraph 4)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 280, 281/86-38-03, Followup on GE SIL 445 relating to nuclear instrument fuse failure (paragraph 7)

The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings with no dissenting comment The license did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Plant Operations Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspector conducted daily inspections in the following areas: control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved

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procedures, technical specifications, and limiting conditions for operations;

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examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure The inspector conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:

verification of operability breaker positions, conditionof of selected ESFor equipment systems by ) (s component valve alignment,

, and operability of instrumentation and support systems essential to system actuation or performance; and plant tours which included observation of general plant /

equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazard The inspector conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:

verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineup (s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 1 Certain tours were conducted on backshifts. Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, Steam Safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, Unit 2 containment, auxiliary building, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level intake structure, and Safeguards Valve Pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated and that appropriate actions were taken, if require On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security progran. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory post Unit 1 began the reporting period operating at power. The unit operated at power throughout the reporting period with no reactor trips or shutdown Unit 2 began the reporting peric.i in the middle of a scheduled refueling outage with new fuel onload in progress. During the period the unit new fuel onload was completed, the reactor vessel was reassembled, a type "A" containment test was ccmpleted, the reactor was restarted and required physics testing was completed. The unit was connected to the grid and returned to power operation on December 2,1986. Paragraphs 4 and 6 of this report address additional areas inspected during the refueling outag .

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Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)

The inspector perfomed a walkdown of the ace ;ible portions of the Residual Heat Removal System for Unit 2 to verify its operability. This verification included the following: confirmation that the licensee's system lineup procedure matches plant drawings and actual plant configuration; hangers and supports are operable; housekeeping is adequate; valves and/or breakers in the system are installed correctly and appear to be operable; fire protection / prevention is adequate; major system components are properly labeled and appear to be operable; instrumentation is properly installed, calibrated and functioning; and valves and/or breakers are in correct position as required by plant procedure and unit statu Cold Weather Preparations (71714)

During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's program for implementation of protective measures for extreme cold weather. The program is implemented by performance of monthly periodic test (PT) 52 " Cold Weather Protection". The PT is required to be performed during each calendar month of the year except the months of April, May, June, July, August, September, and October. However, the PT had been accomplished in late October 1986, in preparation for cold weather. The PT identified numerous discrepancies which were documented by maintenance requests. The inspector verified that the PT inspected systems susceptible to freezing to insure the presence of heat tracing, space heaters, and/or insulation. The requirement to perform the PT once a month insures that proper freeze protection is maintained during the cold weather period. The inspector was in the process of verifying that the work requests identifying discrepancies had been accomplished when the inspection period ende This item is identified as an inspector followup item (280, 281/86-38-01) for both unit Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Inspections (62703)

During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures. Inspections areas included the following:

Repair of Unit 2 Feedwater Regulating Valve (2-FW-FCV-2488)

During last month's inspection effort, the inspector witnessed repair activities associated with corrective maintenance of the main feedwater regulating valve for the B steam generator on Unit 2. The valve was being repaired due to a body to bonnet leak; however, when the valve was disassembled it was determined that no seat repairs would be require The maintenance activity was being accomplished by one of the licensee's quality maintenance teams. The inspector discussed the job with the team foreman and then observed the reassembly activity being accomplished in the #2 machinery space. After completion of all work and post maintenance testing, the inspector reviewed the completed work package. The work was accomplished using corrective mechanical maintenance procedure MMP-C-FW-145,

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" Secondary Corrective Maintenance Procedure for Feedwater Regulating Valves".

The procedure properly documented all repair work accomplished and also documented all post maintenance testing. No discrepancies were identified by the inspector in this work packag Inspection of Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers *

During last months inspection period, the licensee conducted inspections of the internals of the four recirculation spray heat exchangers located in containment for Unit 2. These inspections were being accomplished due to tube degradation of the B recirculation spray heat exchanger which required the unit to shut down and make repairs in July 1986 (See LER 86-011-00 for Unit 2). The licensee conducted inspections of all four of the heat exchangers on the service water side of the system and determined that tube degradation in the form of pitting was occurring. The licensee conducted a hydrostatic test on each heat exchanger to 150% of the design pressure of the component in order to verify tube integrit During this inspection period, the inspector was provided with a copy of a preliminary repor The report provided an integrity evaluation of the Surry Unit 2 recirculation spray heat exchangers. The report concluded that the recirculation spray heat exchanger tube integrity was adequate for operation for the next fuel cycl The conclusion is based on laboratory analysis of the corrosion products and water samples taken from two of the four heat exchangers, eddy current inspection of a combined total of 828 tubes in all heat exchangers, selected visual examinations of the remaining defects, and the hydrostatic testing of the heat exchanger The inspector reviewed the preliminary report and considers that the evaluation and testing accomplished during this refueling outage, in addition to repairs made to the heat exchanger service water inlet valves which will help to limit inleakage of service water was adequate for continued operation for one additional fuel cycle. However, the inspector considers that a long term solution to the issue is still required and this item will be identified as an inspector followup item (280, 281/86-38-02)

for both unit Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Inspections (61726)

During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures. Inspection areas included the following:

- On November 26, 1986, the inspector reviewed periodic test (PT)

2-PT-17.2, " Containment Inside Recirculation Spray Pumps". This test verified the operability on the pumps prior to unit restar No discrepancies were note On November 26, 1986, the inspector reviewed PT 2-PT-18.1, " Low Head Safety Injection Test" for the Unit 2 safety injection pump The test indicated that the recirculation flow was lower than anticipated and indicated that the recirculation flow path may be blocke No

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other discrepancies were noted. The PT was rerun on November 27, 1986, l after system pressure was above the shutoff head of the pump. The test indicated that all parameters were norma .

- On December 1,1986, the inspector reviewed completed PT 2-PT-15.1C,

" Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2-FW-P-2". The test had been conducted to verify operability of the pump in accordance with technical specification requirement The pump had been completely rebuilt during the refueling outage. No discrepancies were identifie Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Outages Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37700)

The inspector selected four design changes that were being accomplished during the present Unit 2 refueling outage for review. These changes were:

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Inadequate Core - Cooling System Upgrade, DC-85-11- This change completes the installation of systems that satisfies the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, for the monitoring of core cooling parameters. The work included the installation of a new core exit thermocouple system and a new inadequate core cooling syste Completion of this work will satisfy the requirements of NUREG-0737, paragraph II. Charging Pump Service Water Piping Replacement, DC-84-67- This change provides for replacement of plastic pipe installed in the charging pumps service water system which provides cooling water to charging pump intermediate seal coolers and lubricating oil cooler The piping replacement is required to satisfy the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2(e), of 10 CFR 5 RCP Thermal Barrier CCW System Modification /Surry/2, DC-85-22- This change installs check valves, trip valves, and relief valves in the portion of the component cooling water system that provides cooling to the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier. This change was required to prevent overpressurization of this portion of the CCW system in the event of a thermal barrier ruptur Vital Bus Expansion /Surry/ Unit 2, DC-85-34- This change installs new station vital batteries for the 125 volt DC power supply for both safety trains of powe The 2B battery and its associated invertor and charger is being replaced during this outage. The 2A battery, inverter, and charger is scheduled to be replaced during the 1988 outag During last month's inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's engineering review and safety analysis for each change to assure that the changes had been reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that the reviews were adequat .

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During this months inspection period, the inspector continued his review of the design changes by review of the test requirements which were identified as applicable to the above listed design changes. The inspector reviewed the following test procedures as part of his revie Test Electrical Procedure (TEP) - 1, " Insulation Resistance Measurements - Electrical Equipment" dated July 10, 1984

- Test Electrical Procedure (TEP) - 2, " Control Circuitry Checkout" dated July 31, 1984.

- Test Instrument Procedure (TIP) - 3, " Instrument and Controls Functional Loop Checkout" dated September 18, 198 Test Instrument Procedure (TIP) - 4, " Checkout Procedure for Air-Operated Valves and Dampers" dated October 11, 198 Test Mechanical Procedure (TMP) - 7, " System Hydrostatic / Pneumatic Testing" dated May 1, 198 The inspector determined that all appropriate steps required to properly test the components or systems were controlled by procedure and that configuration control was maintained when required by temporary alterations or jumper logs as appropriate. No discrepancies were identifie Plant Startup from Refueling (71711)

During this inspection period, the inspector witnessed selected portions of the Unit 2 restart after the refueling outage was complete. The inspector

conducted a walkthrough of the Unit 2 containment prior to restart to independently ascertain that appropriate portions of the Reactor Coolant

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System and Recirculation Spray System had been properly returned to service; and that general containment cleanliness was adequate. During the startup, the inspector verified that evolutions were being accomplished in accordance

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with approved procedures and technical specification requirements. Additional i physics testing was witnessed by a regional inspector and will be addressed in inspection report No. 281/86-40,

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

4 Followup on Region Identified Items (92701)

l (Closed) IFI 280; 281/86-38-03, Review of applicability of General Electric Service Information Letter (SIL) 445 entitled " Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) Fuse Failure". The subject SIL was received by the resident inspector in late October, 198 The SIL addressed a problem that occurred at an operating GE/BWR in which all positive and negative IRM 3/4 amp fuses connected to the 24 Vdc bus were blown. After the positive 3/4 amp fuses were replaced, all inoperative IRM channels appeared to be operating normall However, because of continued loss of the negative power supply, of which there was no indication on the control room panels, the IRM channels were

inoperable. Although Surry units are Westinghouse units, the SIL recommended

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The inspector brought this issue to the attention of the licensee and was informed that nuclear instruments (NI) at Surry did have fuses installed in the NI drawers; however, any maintenance performed inside one of the drawers including fuse replacement would require a functional test to be conducted to verify operability of the NI. This test is what was recommended in the GE SIL as corrective action for the identified concern. The inspector considers that the licensee is presently taking appropriate action to prevent the concern identified by the SIL from occurring at Surry. This item is close . IE Bulletin Followup (0 pen) 280; 281/85-BU-03 IE Bulletin 85-03, " Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings."

The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee personnel concerning their progress in the actions required b The licensee indicated approximately half of the IEB MOVs (22)y IEB 85-0 for Surry Unit 1 were tested using the M0 VATS system for valve / actuator signature analysis -- actual valve stem thrust was measured during valve operation with a calibrated load cell. In addition, three of the twenty-two valves were stroke tested at their maximum expected differential pressure. The M0 VATS testing included signatures of the torque and limit switch actions Belleville spring pack deflection with a thrust measuring device, analysis of motor power and current, and the use of a calibrated load cell on rising stem valves to measure actual operator thrust for specific torque switch setting M0V testing was in progress during this inspection for Unit 2 MOVs as the unit was in a refueling outage. The licensee stated they planned to M0 VATS test 25 of the bulletin valves on Unit 2 during the current outage. Of the 25 valves, 7 were already completed (2FW-251A, B, C, D, E, F and 2CH-2115B).

The inspector witnessed the initial inspection and setup of the M0 VATS equipment on 2CH-2289A, the charging pump to normal charging isolation valv The inspector interviewed MOVATS and licensee test personnel present at this valve. When questionei as to the various problems they have encountered during testing, they indicated there were no major problems -

just the usual problems associated with limitorque operators. These include: limit switches needing replacement due to sticking rotors; torque switch imbalance; spring pack preload set too high; and torque limiter plates not allowing the actuator to develop required thrust (this will be discussed later in this report).

l The inspector reviewed the completed work / test packages for the following valves that had been M0 VATS tested: 2FW-2510, 2FW-251F, and 2CH-2115 The packages were reviewed to ensure the work was accomplished using the latest approved procedures; the required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; the data required to be taken was documented in the procedure; and problems encountered during testing were documented and properly corrected. The M0 VATS test data sheets were reviewed to ensure: all actuator, motor and valve information were recorded; torque switch balancing valves were documented; spring pack "as left" calibration was accomplished; the "as found" and thrust valves were recorded and the "as l left" valves fell within the range of the target thrust valve; total valve L

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stroke time and torque switch bypass times were recorded; and a licensee engineering review of the contractors work was conducted and documented in the work package In addition to reviewing the work packages, the following procedures that were used to performed work on these M0Vs were reviewed:

- EMP-C-MCC-152, Corrective Maintenance Procedure for Replacement of Thermal Overload Devices in Safety Related Motor Control Center FW-MOV-E/R1, Preventative Maintenance Procedure For the Feedwater System Motor Operated Valve EMP-C-M0V-151, Test M0Vs Using the M0 VATS Syste EMP-C-MOV-11, Disconnect and Reconnect Safety Related MOV CH-M0V-E/R1, PitP Chemical and Volume Motor Operated Valve The following Engineering Work Requests associated with the M0V Work packages were also reviewed:

- EWR 86-436, Evaluate Removal of GDC-17 Torque Switch Limiter Plate This EWR was generated to request engineering to evaluate removing the torque switch limiter plates which were installed as part of the GDC-17 progra The limiter plates were installed to ensure that the motor operator would operate at 80 percent voltage by limiting the amount of torque developed at 100 percent voltage. The limiter plate setpoints were based on torque switch settings, recommended by limitorque needed to operate the valve at 100 percent voltage. However, through the use of M0 VATS testing, it was learned that a particular torque switch setting was not as meaningful as the actual thrust or torque developed by the operator, which is measured during MOVATS testin The licensee's response to IE Bulletin required documentation of the actual setpoints at which the torque switch operate They decided that the M0 VATS system would be used to document these setting An evaluation was made of the thrust / torque required to operate specific valves against their maximum differential pressure. Similarly, the torque switch settings of safety-related valves wero changed to identify the setting in terms of thrust or torque instead of a specific torque switch number. In each case, the GDC-17 Limitations were taken into consideration for the evaluation and engineering provided an administratively controlled torque switch adjustment band, in terms of thrust / torque, which does not exceed any of the applicable limitation During implementation of the adjustment in terms of thrust / torque, it was discovered that in some cases the desired band could not be achieved due to the limiter plates. It was concluded, in thosa cases where the desired thrust / torque valves could not be achieved due to the limiter plates, that the plates be removed, as the GDC-17 limitations were already taken into account in the evaluation for the thrust / torque band desired. The licensee performed a Safety Analysis as part of the engineering evaluatio ._ .

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EWR 86-2248, Evaluate Change to Torque Switch Bypass Switch Setting In this EWR the licensee performed a Safety Analysis for setting the i torque switch bypass setpoints to the following:

The adjustment of the torque switch bypass limit switch to 85 percent (for M0Vs with four train limit switches), of travel in the safety direction, will help to ensure that the operation of the subject valves is not hindered during an emergency. In order to preclude the adjustment of the bypass switch from interfering with the adjustment of the other limit switches, the bypass limit switch will be relocated to an 1 independent spare rotor. The non-safety related direction torque bypass limit switch will be adjusted to 5-10 percent of travel. This will ensure that the valve has the maximum torque protection in the non-safety related directio For valves with two train limit switches the safety direction torque switch will be jumpered out. This will ensure that the operation of i these valves is not hindered during an emergenc This will be done as an interim measure until such time as the two train limit switches can be replaced with four train limit switches. The non-safety related direction bypass switch will be adjusted the same as previously noted for the valves with four tra:n limit switche The open position indication limit switch (for valves with two or four train limit switches) will be adjusted to the same setting as the open-limit limit switc This will ensure that an open indication in the Control Room will accurately reflect' the open position of the valve The closed position indication limit switch (for valves with two or four train limit switches) will be adjusted to the same setting as the closed limit switch, for limit closed valve For torqued closed valves, the closed position indication limit switch will be adjusted to 95-100 percent of travel. This will ensure that a closed indication in the Control Room will accurately reflect the closed position of the valve For M0Vs 2289B, 2867C, and D changing the control circuitry to permit limit opening and closing will not change the requirements of Tech Spec 3.8 for containment isolation. Tech Spec 3.8 does not specify if the containment Isolation valves should be torqued or limit close No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte . Inspection of Dry Storage Spent Nuclear Fuel Facility (TI 0110/2)

VEPC0 received a license from the NRC issued on July 2, 1986, to package and store spent fuel assemblies at the Surry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Location (ISFSI) located on the Surry Power Station site. The license contained specific PREOPERATIONAL LICENSE CONDITIONS which had to be satisfied prior to the loading of spent nuclear fue During the previous two inspection periods, the inspector verified that all of these conditions had been accomplished. The inspector also witnessed the loading of the

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first cask with spent fuel and the last inspection period ended with the fully loaded cask in the spent fuel pool while an engineering analysis was conducted to determine why the inner lid would not properly seal on the cas During this inspection period, the licensee resolved the lid sealing problem and removed the cask (No. 500-11-005) from the spent fuel pool to the decon area. The lid sealing problem was due to the "0" ring seal coming out of its groove during the initial lowering of the lid onto the cask. A new "0" ring was installed and lid was lowered at a slower rate onto the cask and a proper seal was obtained. In the decon area the cask was vacuum dried, backfilled with helium, and pressure and leak rate teste The secondary lid was then installed and the pressure alarm system was tested and installe The cask was decontaminated in the decon area; however, due to the long period that the cask remained in the spent fuel pool (over two weeks)

leaking of contaminants continued to recontaminate surface area The licensee then decided to move the first cask (No. 500-11-005) out of the decon area into a control surface contamination area in the crane ba They then moved cask No. 500-11-003 into the spent fuel pool, loaded this cask with spent fuel, and moved this second cask into the decon area for final drying, backfilling and closur Since this cask only remained in the spent fuel pool for approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, the licensee concluded that decontamination of the surface area of the cask would take less tim However, the licensee still continued in a slow and methodical manner to ,

decontaminate the second cask. After completion of decontamination and final closure operations, the second cask (No. 500-11-003) was moved to the ISFSI and placed at the proper location on the storage pad. The pressure alarm system was connected, activated, and functionally teste During this inspection period, the inspector witnessed portions of the following operations:

- Dewatering of the first cas Final assembly of the primary lid cover on the first cas Vacuum drying and helium backfill of the first cas Installation of the secondary cover switch and pressure alarm switch

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on the first cas Decontamination of the second cas The inspector also verified that radiation levels at the ISFSI pad were within technical specification limits and that the pressure alarm system

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was installed and operational. The inspector intends to review the completed procedures during the next inspection period for Cask No. 500-11-003.

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l Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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