IR 05000280/1986034

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Insp Repts 50-280/86-34 & 50-281/86-34 on 861020-23 & 27-31. Violation Noted:Failure to Provide Appropriate Inservice Insp Drawings
ML20212F920
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 11/28/1986
From: Blake J, Coley J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212F888 List:
References
50-280-86-34, 50-281-86-34, NUDOCS 8701120214
Download: ML20212F920 (10)


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pa ne'eg UNITE 3 STATES

  • p NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y #

, REGION il 3 j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * 2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-280/86-34 and 50-281/86-34 q

Licensee: Virdini_aElectricandPowerCompany Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32.and DPR-37 Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2

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Inspection Conducted: . October 20-23 and October 27-31, 1986 Inspector: k.k, au // ,2 4-3b J. L. Co% Q Date Signed Approved : '

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J. J. Blake Chief T Date Signed Materials and Processes Section .

l Division of Reactor Safety i

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l SUMMARY l.

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Scope: This routine, announced inspection was in the areas of inservice inspection (ISI) - observation of work and work activities and review of previous I j open item Results: One violation was identified - Failure to Provide Appropriate ISI Drawings - paragraph t R

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees R. F. Saunders, Station Manager

  • L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
  • L. Benson, Assistant Station Manager
  • L. Hardwick, Manager, Nuclear Programs and Licensing
  • E. Clark, Manager, Quality Assurance
  • T. Shaub, Licensing Engineer
  • H. Blount, Supervisor, Surveillance and Test D. L. Sponner, Corporate Nondestructive Test Examiner - Level III J. Paul, Nondestructive Test Examiner - Level III A. McNeil, ISI Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, members and office personne Other Organizations Westinghouse Electric Corporation R. R. Hilterman, ISI Supervisor R. H. Ingraham, level III Examiner, Eddy Current Examination D. Kurek, Level III Examiner, Ultrasonic Examination NRC Resident Inspector
  • E. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 31, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the license (0 pen) Violation 280, 281/86-34-01, Failure to Provide Appropriate ISI Drawings, paragraph (0 pen) Unresolved Item 281/86-34-02, QA Records Do Not Agree with Visual Examination Conclusiors on Loop Outlet Nozzle Dissimilar Metal Weld,

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l paragraph 5.c.(1).

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(0 pen) Unresolved Item 281/86-34-03, Reactor Nozzle Indications,. paragraph 5.c.(2).

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 281/86-34-04, Review Video Tape to Determine

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Effectiveness of Licensee Alternate Examination of the OD Surface on the Reactor Vessel Nozzle to Safe-end Butt Weld, paragraph 5.c.(3).

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Unresolved Item 280, 281/85-15-02, Adequacy of Transducer for Examination of Cast Stainless Steel Piping. On September 4, 1986, Virginia Electric and Power Company's (VEPCO's) Corporate Level III and the Surry Authorized Nuclear Inspector visited NRC's Region II Office to demonstrate the capability of their ultrasonic examination procedure to detect, locate and size actual cracks in the Region II centrifugally cast stainless steel (CCSS) test specimen At the conclusion of the performance demonstration, a meeting was held with the licensee representative to discuss what changes would be made to procedure ISI-206, Rev. 1 to ensure that the equipment and techniques used to examine the reactor coolant loop piping welds represented the best examination effort possible. The licensee representative stated that the following changes would be initiated prior to the October outage of Unit 2: A 10% notch would be added to the ID surface of the calibration in bloc A field change would be issued to procedure ISI-206, Rev. I to provide for the following:

(1) Notch calibration (2) Require that notch sensitivity be used as the test sensitivity (3) Require that a refracted longitudinal (RL) wave dual element transducer of the type demonstrated during the performance demonstration be used to supplement the RL water column transducer on axial scan where joint geometry will allow 25% or more of the required examination volume to be examined with the RL dual transduce On October 29, 1986, the inspector reviewed the implementation of the licensee's actions described above and this item is considered close '

3 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. Two new unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5.c.(1) and 5.c.(2). Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities (73753)

(Unit 2)

The inspector observed ISI work and work activities to determine whether these activities were performed in accordance with licensee commitments and NRC requirements. The applicable code is the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code,Section XI,1980 Edition with Addenda through winter 1980. For pipe only, the ASME Code Section XI,1974 Edition thru summer 1975 Addenda is used to define the extent of examinations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a. The inspector observed work and evaluated data for the following different methods of examination of components: Volumetric Examination of Pressure Vessel Welds Using the Manual A-Scan Ultrasonic Technique On October 21, 1986, Westinghouse ultrasonic examiner's accompanied by the inspector attempted to examine 96 inches of circumferential weld #4 (bottom head to shell weld) and 4 inches of longitudinal weld #3 on the Unit 2 Pressurize The inspection effort was cancelled because the ISI program required that circumferential weld #4 be examined in a clockwise direction from longitudinal weld #3; however, the area cleaned for examination was in a counter clockwise direction from weld #3. In addition to the above, it was brought to the attention of the inspector that the ISI drawing (VIR-1-2100, Rev. 1, dated June 18, 1985) did not depict an apparent weld that could be observed visually at approximately 27 inches above support shirt weld #8. This apparent drawing error disturbed the inspector particularly when the welds at the drawing locations could not be visually confirmed and examinations of safety-related welds were being conducted based totally on a drawing dimension. The inspector expressed his concern over this apparent drawing error to the licensee and requested that the apparent weld be acid etched to determine if in fact the drawing was in erro On the morning of October 22, 1986, the inspector was informed by the licensee that VEPC0 had reviewed fabrication drawings and had determined that no full penetration weld existed in the area identified by the inspector. Therefore, Westinghouse ultrasonic examiners had been sent to examine the weld location depicted on Virginia Power Drawing (VIR-1-2100 Rev. 1, dated June 18,1985). The inspector went imediately to the Unit 2 containment to observe the ultrasonic

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examinations and to better examine the area that had been determined as not being a weld by the licensee. After performing a close visual j inspection of the suspected weld, the inspector was convinced that the l licensee's drawing was in error. On October 23, 1986, the inspector j expressed his concern to plant management and requested an acid etch be performed so that no question would exist as to the adequacy of the drawing. On October 24, 1986, upon returning to the Surry facility, the inspector was informed by the ISI engineer that the area reported by the inspector as being a weld was weld #4 and that the May 11, 1975 preservice inspection edition, the ISI 1979 Edition and the ISI 1984 Edition of drawing VIR-1-2100 all depicted weld #4 as being where the inspector. had reported an apparent weld. This information indicated the following:

(1) The drawing was wrong and it had been revised without proper control (2) Ultrasonic examinations performed on October 22, 1986, were performed on base materia (3) The inspector had been given incorrect information by the licensee concerning their review of fabrication drawing The inspector also reviewed the ISI drawing used for the pressurizer during the June 1986 outage of Unit 1 and found that the drawing (VPA-1-2100, Rev. 1, dated June 18, 1985) had been revised and contained the same dimension errors as the Unit 2 drawing. This item was identified to the licensee as Violation 50-280, 281/86-34-01, Failure to Provide Appropriate ISI Drawings, b. Volumetric Examination of Steam Generator Tubes Using Eddy. Current Technique The inspector observed Westinghouse examiner's evaluate eddy current indications for Unit 2, B and C steam generators. The inspector

was interested in how Westinghouse was resolving the evaluation

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difficulties they had experienced during the June 1986 outage of Unit 1. As a result of indications detected in Unit 1, all tubes in A and C steam generators had to be eddy current examined and one tube had to be removed in order that netallography could determine the source of the eddy current indications. The results of the investi-gation conducted on the Unit 1 steam generator revealed that oxides were the apparent source of the proble The inspector was interested in how the eddy current examiners were distinguishing tubes with oxides from defective tubes on Unit 2. The inspector found, however, that Unit 2 was not experiencing the problems observed on Unit 1 in that oxides were not creating unacceptable eddy current indications. The Westinghouse level III examiner, however, demonstrated to the inspector the technique for distinguishing the difference between an eddy current indication caused by oxides and an

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eddy current indication caused by a discontinuity in the tub The inspector continued to conduct a surveillance inspection of the eddy current evaluation process from October 20-22, 1986. Approximately  !

720 tubes were examined both in the B-steam generator and the C-steam l generator and no tubes were required to be plugged in either generator as a result of the eddy current examination Volumetric Examination of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Outlet Nozzles Dissimilar Metal Welds Using an Automatic Ultrasonic Technique VEPC0 letter, dated June 23, 1986, requested relief from certain inservice examination requirements of the 1980 Edition thr ugh winter 1980 Addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code at Surry Po' + Station, Units 1 & 2 for the second ten-year inspection interval. Specifically, the request was for relief from the outside diameter (0D) surface examination of the reactor vessel nozzle-to-safe end butt welds. NRC granted this relief for Surry Units 1 & 2 for the first ten-year inspection interva However, NRC requested that the licensee demonstrate the effectiveness of the alternative examination if the same relief was to be requested for subsequent inspection intervals. On June 24, 1986, NRC staff members attended a meeting at the Westinghouse Waltz Mill Site in Pennsylvania to observe a demonstration of the licensee's ultrasonic examination procedure Westinghouse demonstrated defect detection capabilities on calibration blocks with side drill holes and notches and on blocks with artificially induced mechanical fatigue cracks. The NRC staff considered that VEPC0 had complied with the staff's request to demonstrate the detection of a 5%

wall thickness notch on the OD surface and that the licensee also demonstrated the possibility of detecting flaws exceeding the code allowable on the OD surface using the licensee's ultrasonic examination procedure from the pipe 1 On October 27, 1986, the inspector arrived at the Surry site to observe the ultrasonic examinations of the reactor vessel nozzle dissimilar

! metal welds or to observe the video tape recordings of the examinations if the examination work activities had been completed over the weekend L as scheduled. The inspector found Westinghouse examiners performing an augmented, focused, 60-degree refracted longitudinal (RL) wave ultrasonic examination that had not been demonstrated during the meeting held at Waltz Mil The inspector was aware that the transducer being used by the Westinghouse examiners is normally used to discern cracks from ID geometry since this particular transducer angle and wave mode does not reflect well on many typical pipe geometrical condition The inspector held discussions with the Westinghouse Level III examiner and found that the normal ultrasonic examination procedure transducers and techniques that had been demonstrated to NRC for relief of the ASME Code required OD surface examination had detected so many indications on the inside surface of the pipe that the 60 degree RL transducer was being used to try to characterize the indication The 60 degree RL

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transducer was displaying indications at the ID surface that ranged

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- from 40% to 250% of DAC. The most serious indication was reported in loop A. - The indication was reported to be 360' of the pipe ID surface and exhibiting in one area a throughwall depth of .275 inc An indication of these dimensions :would not be code acceptabl However, subsequent discussions with the Westinghouse Level III examiner and the VEPC0 Level III examiner indicated that they were accepting-the indications based on a limited remote visual examination as

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geometr Construction QA records reviewed by the inspector for the three outlet nozzles indicated that the ID surface had been welded even with the counter bore and ground flush, and the inspector's review of construction radiographs did not indicate an ID problem. In addition, the 1979 ISI ultrasonic examinations did not reveal any recordable indications, and discussions with ISI engineer for VEPC0 indicated that the ISI-examination performed on the nozzles ID surface approximately 16 months ago did not produce any recordable indication Limited remote visual inspection, however, revealed loops B and C outlet nozzles to be ground smooth and at least the top portion (visual

. examination performed through a bubble at the top of the pipe) of loop A was in the as welded condition. Although the inspector does not disagree that at least the upper portion of loop A does appear to be in the as welded condition with a surface condition that appears as if it could cause geometric reflectors, the inspector could not dismiss the indications as geometric reflectors without more investigation for the following reasons:

- Construction QA records indicate all three welds have been ground smooth (so this would indicate that at least some portion of loop A had been ground smooth; however the indication is 360' of the pipediameter)

- Construction radiographs of loop A do not exhibit any root conditions '

- Previous ISI ultrasonic records have never recorded indications in this area

- The 60 transducer did not reduce the detectability of the indications as expected for geometry but greatly enhanced their detection

- Indications were also recorded on loops B and C nozzles that the limited remote visual examination indicate were ground smooth

- Visual inspection was limited (performed through an air bubble without the benefit of visual comparison block)

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As a result of the above reactor vessel nozzle dissimilar metal weld examination, the inspector opened the following concerns:

(1) Unresolved Item 281/86-34-02 was opened for the licensee to address why quality assurance records for the fabrication of the loop A nozzle weld do not agree with present visual examination conclusion for this wel (2) Unresolved Item 281/86-34-03 was opened for the licensee to address why the nozzle indications, if geometrical, were not reported in previous ISI examinations. (In addition, if a fracture mechanics analysis is to be used as a conservative approach for dispositioning the reported indications (as indicated by the licensee) the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations (NRR) should be contacted by the licensee as soon as possible so any questions NRR may have concerning the reported indications, the method of examination, or the conclusion reached in performing the fracture mechanics analysis can be resolved).

l (3) The inspector also requested that the licensee obtain the video

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tapes of the loop A, B and C 41-degree examinations from Westinghouse so that the inspector can review these tapes and determine the effectiveness of the licensee's alternate examination for the OD surface of the reactor vessel nozzle dissimilar metal welds. This item was identified to the licensee as Inspector Followup Item 281/86-34-04.

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For each selected method of examination described in paragraph a through c above, the inspector verified that the following requirements were met:

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Approved procedures were available, were being followed, and specified nondestructive examination equipment was being use Examination personnel were knowledgeable of examination method and operation of test equipmen Examination personnel with proper level of qualification and certification were performing the various examination activities, including designation of examination method / technique to be used, equipment calibration, examination, and interpretation /evalu-ation/ acceptance of test result Examination results, evaluation of results, and any corrective actions / repairs / replacements were being recorded as specified in the ISI program and NDE procedure .,

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8 Review of Examiner Qualification and Certification Records The inspector reviewed the Qualifications and Certification records for the following examiners:

Method - Manual UT Examination Examiner Level of Certification H. M. Ackerman UT-Trainee K. H. Behanna UT-Trainee R. S. Cassut UT-Trainee R. H. Cline UT-Level II J. D. Funyak UT-Level I W. G. Halley UT-Level I R. R. Hilterman UT-Level II K. N. Kortokray UT-Level II K. Mical UT-Trainee Method - Eddy Current Examination Examiner Level of Certification R. H. Ingraham ET-Level III H. McClintock ET-Trainee W. A. Burgess ET-Level II K. A. Ingraham ET-Level II R. S. Burkholder ET-Level II M. D. Coradi ET-Level II & ET Level II A J. J. Chapla ET-Level II A N. J. Gianaris ET-Level II & ET Level II A E. P. Lopez ET-Level II & ET Level II A P. L. Waite ET-Level II F. Idzik ET-Level I Method - Automated Ultrasonic Examination Examiner Level of Certification W. E. Hazlett Ut-Level II G. Pushnit UT-Level II A. Jusino UT-Level III D. Kurek UT-Level III Within the areas examined, no violations except as noted in paragraph Sa or deviations were identifie ..

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9 Inspector Followup Item (IFI) (92701B)

(Closed) IFI 280, 281/86-13-01, Programmatic Change for Eddy Current Examination The inspector reviewed the -licensee's investigation and proposed change, dated October 21, 1986, to the ISI program for eddy current examination using the MIZ-18 digital acquisition system. The licensee's actions in resolving this matter were satisfactory and this item is considered close I

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