IR 05000280/1982017

IE Insp Repts 50-280/82-17 & 50-281/82-17 on 820503-31.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Operating Records,Maint & Testing,Ler Followup & Plant Security

ML20055A097
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	06/16/1982
From:	Burke D, Marlone Davis, Julian C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055A087	List: IR 05000280/1982017 ML20055A086
References
50-280-82-17, 50-281-82-17, NUDOCS 8207150473
Download: ML20055A097 (6)

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%, UNITED STATES 8(# n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (

g a REGION 11 o * 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 o ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

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Report Nos. 50-280/82-17 and 50-281/82-17 Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection at Surry site near Surry, Virginia Inspectors: [,[ /7,.e br~ k/d /6, /FL D. J. Burke / Date Signed

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M. J. Davis v Date S'igned Approved by: [ hr Ci Julian, Section Chief, Division of hw /t. MJ '

/ Date Signed

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Project and Resident Programs SUMMARY Inspection on May 3-31, 1982 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 230 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of i plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance and testing, followup on licensee events and event reports and plant securit '

Results No violations were identified in the areas inspected.

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. L. Wilson, Station Manager

• R. F. Saunders, Assistant Station Manager

• G. E. Kane, Operations Superintendent

• D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Technical Services

• D. Rickeard, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff S. Sarver, Health ohysics Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift supervisors, chemistry, health physics, plant maintenance, security engineering, administrative, records and contractor personne * Attended exit interview Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a biweekly basis with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation 281/81-33-02: Failure to follow Abnormal Procedure 5.18 during containment purgin Retraining has been conducted and AP labels placed on the various radiation monitor panels to assure use of the proper procedure (Closed) Violation 281/82-01-01: Failure to take prompt and adequate corrective action when leakage was detected on a Type B electrical penetration into containment. Periodic Test 34 has been revised and the SKV electrical penetrations have been replaced in the Unit 2 containment (see paragraph 6.f). Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio . Unit 1 Operations Unit 1 operations were inspected and reviewed during the inspection perio During this time, the inspectors routinely toured the Unit 1 control room

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and other plant areas to verify that the plant operations, testing, and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications and procedures. Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie Specific areas of inspection and review included the following: Review of annunciated alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the plan Unit 1 operation at full power during the reporting period; no reactor trips or shutdowns occurred during the month, Inspection and review of maintenance and testing during the reporting perio . Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 operations were inspected and reviewed during the inspection perio During this time, the inspectors routinely toured the Unit 2 control room and other plant areas to verify that~ plant operations, testing and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications and procedures. Within the areas inspected, no violations 1 were identified. Specific areas of inspection and review included the following:

' Review of alarms in the control room and inspection of safety-related valve and pump alignments on the consoles and in the plan Unit 2 began ramping down in the preparation for a scheduled maintenance outage at 2232 on May 14, 1982. On May 15, at 0406 the unit tripped from 20 percent power due to a turbine trip on 'B' Steam Generator high high leve Level control was in manual at the time of the tri During heatup af ter the outage on May 24, 1982, a pinhole leak was found in a 3/4 inch channel head drain line on the 'A' Steam Generato The leak was in a socket weld just upstream of the manual isolation valve 2-RC-159. Startup was delayed and the plant cooled to cold shutdown conditions; the ' A' loop was drained for weld inspection and repair Examination of the split pass weld identified a 3/8 inch linear indication on the socket weld. The weld was ground out and repaired. The original weld records indicated no defects on the final pass weld, the defect was determined to exist in the initial pass, and had propagated into the final weld. All welds on the drain line from the SG were reinspected and no defects were noted. While inspecting the drain line and repair work, the inspector noted that the 2.5 foot

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long (approximately) drain line was unsupported. The design change / ETA 10046 documentation package, Field Change 13, described ~the elimination of the channel head drain pipe support due to reanalysis during the i

"show cause" pipe support review. In addition, the piping weld to the SG which has the greatest moment arm, was intact and not degraded, d. Following repairs to the channel head drain line the unit was taken critical at 1446 on May 2'/, 1982. At 0005 on May 28, the unit experienced a turbine trip / reactor trip from'C' Steam Generator high

high level while operating at 28 percent power. Level control was in manual at the time of this trip. The feedwater regulating valve was found to be sluggish in operation and was repaire e. Following mechanical adjustments and cycling of the feedwater regulating valves, the unit was taken critical at 1246 and went on line '

at 1429 on May 28, 198 f. The inspectors observed and reviewed the installation of 8 new conex type electriccl containment penetrations into Unit 2 during the outage; the modifications were performed under Design Change 82-16B. The SKV electrical penetrations were installed in accordance with the procedures and were successfully Type B tested following installatio Certain containment flange faces were polished with a grinding device to remove minor pitting or irregularities (eg - dirt, rust) before the new penetraction assemblies and seals were installed. The polishing operation was not prescribed in the design change or procedures, but was considered to be within the skill of the workers and acceptabl The polishing was subsequently documented in the design change packag Radiological air samples and smears during the penetration chargeout and polishing verified no presence of radioactivity. The environ-mentally qualified Conax penetration assemblies were observed to be quite substantial (approx. 700 lbs) when compared to the previously installed Amphenol penetration assemblies or flanges (approx. 50 lbs),

however, no modifications were made to the existing 8 inch diameter penetration pipe flange in the containment wall. The inspector requected seismic qualification data to ensure system integrity during seismic events. The licensee and its contractors stated, in a May 21, 1982 letter, that the Conax electrical penetration had been seismically qualified and that the existing 8 inch flange and holts were adequate to support the additional size and weight of the new penetrations. The inspector requested specific data to ensure that f.he existing flange ~

and bolts would support the new penetrations during seismic events; this item will remain open (281/82-17-01) pending NRC receipt and review of the dat g. During the Unit 2 outage, the inspectors observed maintenance work in

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containment and in outside areas to verify that qualified personnel were utilizing the proper maintenance and testing procedures. No l

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deficiencies were identified in the areas inspected. The containment ,

sump was cleaned and the sump screens and trash racks properly reinstalled. A number of hydraulic snubbers were inspected; no leaks

or problems were observed. The inspectors observed work in progress to i repair steam leakage through the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump isolation valves PCV-MS-202 A and B; the maintenance was performed

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with procedures by qualified personnel. When the AFW pump was tested following maintenance, low oil level in the turbine governor valve resulted in low pump discharge pressure and periodic test (PT 15.lc)

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failure, although the oil level in the sight glass appeared adequat The oil apparently bound up in the sight glass and did not indicate the

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actual low level or an oil film on the sight glass was mistaken for the oil level. The sight glass was vented and wiped, and oil was added to the reservoir; the PT was satisfactorily performed. The sight glasses are being inspected to assure accurate display of oil level ' , The inspector reviewed the LER's listed below tn ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness ofscorrective action taken and planned. Certain LER's were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine compliance with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements. The review

-included examination of log books, internal correspondence and records, review of SNS0C meeting minutes, and discussions with various staff member Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified, (Closed)LER 280/82-43 concerned M0V-1862A, the RWST to LHSI pump suction isolation valve, which failed to close during testin The hand wheel was engaged and its release mechanism was bindin Upon starting the motor could not engage the gear train. The hand wheel release mechanism was cleaned and lubricated and cycled satisfactorily during subsequent testing.

l (Closed)LER 280/82-44 concerned the failure of the component cooling system radiation monitor RM-CC-105 to alarm at the alarm setpoint due to a faulty alarm card. The card was replaced and the alarm setpoint was adjuste (Closed) LERs 280/82-50 and 82-51 concerned high I-131 dose equivalent ,

activity following reactor trips due to known fuel element defects in the reactor core. In each case the coolant specific activity was monitored every four hours until the level returned to less than microcuries/c (Closed) LERs 280/82-52 and 281/82-11 concerned heat tracing failure in which the redundant circuits remained operable. In each case the defective heat tracing was replaced within the time span specified by Technical Specifications. A design change is in progress to correct l- the heat tracing systems.

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5 (Closed) LER 280/82-54 concerned radiation monitors RM-CC-105 and 106 setpoint greater than twice background due to decreasing background activity in the CC system. The setpoints were adjusted and more frequent monitoring of setpoints instituted, (Closed)LER 281/82-22 concerned the loss of Nuclear Instrument channel N-44 when a voltage surge on Vital Bus 4 caused the protection circuit of N-44 to de-energize the power supply to the detector. The surge was a result of the Differential Lockout of #2 Auto-Tie Transformer from a failed lightning arrestor on the transformer. N-44 was returned to service af ter restoration of its power supply. The #2 Auto-Tie Trans-former was returned to service af ter replacement of the failed lightning arresto . Plant Physical Protection The inspector verified the following by observations: Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructed, Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access contro No violations were identified.

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