IR 05000280/1987004

Insp Repts 50-280/87-04 & 50-281/87-04 on 870201-28.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maint,Surveillance,Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters & TMI Action Item Closeout

ML20207T633
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	03/06/1987
From:	Cantrell F, Holland W, Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T622	List: IR 05000280/1987004 ML20207T621
References
TASK-2.F.2, TASK-TM 50-280-87-04, 50-280-87-4, 50-281-87-04, 50-281-87-4, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8703240196
Download: ML20207T633 (10)

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REGION 11

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Report Nos.: '50-280/87-04 and 50-281/87-04 Licensee: Virginia-Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: -50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducte - ebrua'ry 1-28, 1987 .

. Inspectors: 88 8!d W. E. H and,SeyiorResidentInspecto Date Signed

/. I h IW L. E. Nicholson, Resident Inspector ^

b Date Signed Accompanying Personnel: R.<P. Crdteau

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. Approved by: N F. S. Cantrell, 2B; IMction Chief '

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Dhte Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY

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Scope: This routine inspection was conducted in the areas of licensee action

, on previous enforcement matters, -plant operations, plant maintenance, plant T- surveillance, followup 'on inspector identified items, TMI. action item closecut, licensee event report review, and followup on IE bulletin Results: No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection repo ,

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• F. Saunders, Station Manager

• L. Benson, Assistant Station Manager

• L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager

• A. Christian, Superintendent of Operations

• E. S. Grecheck, Superintendent of Technical Services J. W. Patrick, Superintendent of Maintenance S. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics R. Johnson, Operations Supervisor N. Clark, Site Quality Assurance Manager

• W. D. Craft, Licensing Coordinator J. B. Logan, Supervisor, Safety and Licensing

• Attended exit meetin Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel. Exit Interview

.The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on March 3,1987, with those individucls identified by an asterisk in paragraph The following new items were identified by the inspectors during this exi One inspector followup item (280; 281/87-04-01) was identified (paragraph 6) with regards to licensee consideration of additional inspection / testing of the Unit 1 turbine building service water flow path during future system outage The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings with no desenting comment The license did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 280/85-19-01, Inadequate Procedure and Failure to Follow Procedure during Installation of Conax Connectors per Design Change Procedure DC-81-10 The violation involved the stations failure to follow procedure for the installation of environmentally qualified electrical components inside Units 1 and 2 containment In addition, the procedure did not provide appropriate instructions for the proper installation of transmitters and seal assemblie _ _ _ _ ,_ _ _

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Immediate corrective actions included review of open design changes to insure discrepancies were corrected, and a detailed inspection program was developed and conducted for both Units 1 and 2 equipment inside containment to identify and correct existing discrepancie Long term corrective actions included review and modification (as required) of station repair and replacement procedures, additional training of craft and inspection personnel in the areas of new or special application products, and upgrading reference material by obtaining the latest revisions to technical information. Also, a course in " Quality Assurance Awareness" was implemented for non-QA supervisors to improve quality. The inspector confirmed that this training had been given to 75 station and 45 construction supervisors. This item is closed. Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection. Plant Operations Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspector conducted daily inspections in the following areas: Control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, technical specifications, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure The inspector conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:

Verification of operability breaker positions, conditionof of selected ESForsystems equipment component by ) (s valve

, andalignment, operability of instrumentation and support stems essential to system actuation or performanc Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazard The inspector conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:

Verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation cf control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineup (s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 1 Certain tours were conducted on backshifts. Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room,

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Unit 1 containment, auxiliary building, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level intake structure, and safeguards valve pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were-reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakaga from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated and that appropriate actions were taken, if require On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs)

were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWPs. Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory post Unit 1 began the reporting period in cold shutdown. Repairs to the feed and condensate system resulting from the unit 2 feed pump suction break event. inspection program were completed and the unit commenced heatup on February 11, 1987. The unit reached approximately 300 degrees F on February 13, 1987. However, a leak was discovered in a service water system which was required to be operable prior to the unit exceeding 350 degrees The service water line was buried under the turbine building floor requiring extensive cutting of reinforced concrete to make repair The licensee decided to cool the unit back down to less that 200 degrees F while repairs were being made. Repairs to the service water line were completed and the unit commenced heatup on February 21, 1987. The unit went critical and recommenced power operation on February 23, 1987. At the end of the inspection period the unit was operating at full powe Unit 2 began the reporting period in cold shutdown. The unit remained in cold shutdown at the end of the inspection period while repairs to the feed and condensate system were being complete Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)

The inspector performed a walkdown of the accessible areas of the component cooling water system for both units to verify its operabilit This verification included the following: confirmation that the licensee's

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system lineup procedure matches plant drawings and actual plant l configuration; hangers and supports are operable; housekeeping is adequate; valves and/or breakers in the system are installed correctly and appear to be operable; fira protection / prevention is adequate; major system components are properly labled and appear to be operable; instrumentation is properly installed, calibrated and functioning; and valves and/or breakers are in correct position as required by plant procedure and unit statu Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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4 Maintenance Inspections (62703)

During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure Inspections areas included the following:

Inspection of Unit 1 Steam Generator Main Steam Trip Valves (MSTV)

The inspectors witnessed portions of the maintenance and testing of MSTV 101A,B&C. Inspection reports 280;281/86-41 and 280;281/86-42 address in detail the improper assembly and testing of the MSTV that resulted in a reactor trip on December 9,1986. The inspectors witnessed post maintenance testing of the above unit 1 valves that assured full opening of the MST After completion of all work and testing, the inspectors reviewed the completed work package. This work was accomplished using procedure MMP-C-MS-002, " Corrective Maintenance Procedure For Inspection Of Main Steam Trip Valve TV-MS ". The procedure properly described and documented all repair work and testing accomplished. No discrepancies were identified by the inspectors in this work packag Repair of Service Water Pipe Leak The inspectors witnessed the repair of a 6" service water line that provides one of two service water flow paths to the control room and relay room air conditioning chillers and the charging pump lube oil coolers. The problem was first noted when water was observed leaking through the floor of the unit 2 tubine building basement south of feedwater pump 2-FW-P-1 When line 6"-WS-151-136 was isolated, the water leakage stopped. This

- piping is Bondstrand Series 2000 fiberglass piping that is buried in selected granular backfill under the unit 2 turbine building floor. The concrete floor over the pipe was removed and the pipe replaced. Visual inspection of the removed pipe internals revealed numerous localized cuts or tears of the fiberglass strands with complete through-wall failure in several locations. The licensee is still evaluating the failure mechanism, but indicated that a recent water lancing of the pipe could have caused

, and/or contributed to the failur A pressure drop test was performed on the second service water flow path per Engineering Work Request 87-104. This line, buried under the Unit 1 turbine building floor, is of similar material and provides the second required flow path to the shared chillers and lube oil coolers. The inspectors reviewed the test method and results that indicated no leakage from the unit 1 pipin No discrepancies were noted. However, the inspectors requested that the licensee consider additional inspection / testing of the Unit 1 turbine building service water flow path during future system outages. This item is identified as an inspector followup item (280; 281/87-04-01) for both unit Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie ._ _ . ___

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.> Surveillance Inspections (61726)

During the reporting period, the-inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with - the appropriate procedure Inspections areas included the following:

On February 20, 1987, the inspector witnessed portions of the performance of periodic test 1-PT-18.6B, " Quarterly Testing of Misc. Containment Trip Valves". The inspector verified that valves did operate as required by the test and that test data was properly measured and recorded. Periodic test 1-PT-18.10A was performed in conjunction with the above test to verify proper local and remote valve position indication. No discrepancies were identifie On February 20, 1987, the inspector reviewed the completed results of periodic test 2-PT-18.6H, " Reactor Coolant and Pressurizer Head Vent Valve Test". This test verified that the subject valves full stroke within 30 seconds as measured from actuation of switch to final light. No discrepancies were identified in this test packag Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Inspector Identified Items (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 280/81-17-03, Followup on repair of underground fuel oil tank level manometers. The inspector verified during this inspection period that the subject manometers were operable. This item is close (Closed) IFI 281/84-36-02, Daily Oil Level Inspections of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG). A leak on a fuel injector tube fitting had caused fuel oil to drain into the oil crankcase and subsequently ignite. The inspector verified during this inspection period that the licensee is monitoring the '

crankcase oil level on a per shift basis to detect abnormal level change This item is close (Closed) IFI 280; 281/85-01-03, Review and Correction of Main Steam

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Prints, Operating and Calibration Procedures. This issue involved

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incorrect prints, inadequate valve lineup procedure, and inadequate calibration procedure. Licensee corrective action included revision of the main steam drawings, addition of the anti-motoring transmitters to the refueling calibration books, and revision of valve lineups and prints including a better description of transmitter root valve isolations. This item is close (Closed) IFI 280/85-01-05, Review of Implementation of ADM-24. The issue involved weakness in the administrative control procedure ADM-24 (Adherence to Technical Specifications). The licensee rewrote the entire procedure to strengthen administrative controls for the review of

technical specifications and their amendments. This item is closed.

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(Closed) IFI 280; 281/85-07-02, Programatic Review of Safety-Related Motor Operated Valves. The issue was identified when several MOVs failed to operate properly. The licensee conducted an. inspection of the safety-related MOVs for both unit Specific inspections performed included torque switch as found verification, circuit breaker thermal overload devices verification, limit switch operability, and torque switch / limit switch adjustment as required. This item is close (Closed) IFI 281/85-07-03, Redirection of Service Water Spray Vents. The issue involved spray of service water into the safeguards room when testing of M0Vs. The licensee revised the applicable periodic test procedures to require that isolation valves on the standpipes be closed when conducting these tests. This revision eliminated spray of service water into the safeguards rooms. This item is close (Closed) IFI 280; 281/85-09-02, Followup on Suitability of Wood Spacers for Vital Batterie The issue involved the fact that the licensee was using wood spacers between battery cells. The licensee confirmed with the vendor that wooden spacers did meet all requirements; however the station did install styrofoam-type sheets at the ends of each battery. This ite:n is close (Closed) IFI 280; 281/85-09-03, Followup on Operator Training for Kaman Displays and Alarms. The issue involved operator unfamiliarity with Kaman process and ventilation-vent radiation monitors in the control room. The licensee upgraded procedures and training to ensure that operators are familiar with readout on this type of instrumentation. This item is close (Closed) IFI 280; 281/85-09-04, Followup on Capacity Test for Vital Batteries. The issue involved performance of suitable capacity testing on vital batteries as recommended in IEEE 450-1975. The licensee has

< ins,talled new batteries for the three emergency diesel generators and two of the four vital batteries. Also, periodic test procedures for station safety-related batteries are being upgraded using the guidance from IEEE 45;-1980. This item is close (Closed) IFI 280/85-19-02, Followup on review of fire in post accident monitoring (PAM) panel which occurred on May 11, 1985. The issue involved licensee review of PAM fire and evaluation of cause. The licensee conducted a review of the fire. The review was documented in engineering work request (EWR) report 85-580. The inspector considers that the report I adequately addressed the event. This item is close I

• i (Closed) IFI 280/85-32-02, Followup on revision of ADM 89.8. The issue involved increased testing of pumps in the ALERT range as required by ADM

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89.8. The licensee revised ADM 89.8 to remove this requirement since the

.' additional testing was not required by ASME,Section X This item is

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close (Closed) IFI 280/85-34-01, Followup on licensee action to correct deficiencies noted on safety equipment in low level intake structure. The issue involved packing adjustment on emergency service water pumps (ESWP),

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start button relay inspection, and missing anchor bolts for diesel exhaust manifold piping supports. The licensee corrected all discrepancies ,

identified and conducted appropriate testing to verify operability. This item is close (Closed) IFI . 281/85-34-01, Followup on Solid plug installation in Limitorque MOVs. The issue involved solid plugs installed in M0Vs instead of T-drain plugs. The licensee evaluated the installation and concluded that no damage was done with the solid drain plugs installed. However, they removed the solid plugs and installed T-drain plugs. This item is close (Closed) IFI 280/85-38-01, Followup on cleaning of charging pump service water flow instruments. The issue involved flow sight glasses on the service water lines which were difficult to read due to internal deposits on the sight gaug The licensee cleaned the sight glasses for flow instruments FI-SW- 101A, B, C and 201A, B, The inspector verified that the work orders were completed to clean the sight gauges. This item is closed. TMI Action Item Closecut (25544)

(Closed) TMI ITEM II.F.2.3.b, Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling. The subject item was previously addressed in inspection report 280; 281/85-32. The outstanding issue involved upgrading the core exit thermocouple system to meet the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.97. The licensee completed the upgrade for both units during their respective refueling outages in 1986. The inspector verified that these upgrades were completed and operable. This item is closed for both units.

10. Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)

The inspector reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of the corrective action (s). The inspector's review also included followup on implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation that all required corrective action (s) were complet (Closed) LER 280/85-21, Inadvertent ESF Actuation. With the reactor protection system logic test for normal operation in progress, an auxiliary feed pump start occurred due to an open coil in a BFD rela Several BFD relay failures have been experienced at Surry and the licensee safety engineering staff is evaluating the failures to determine root caus This issue is discussed in inspection report 280; 281/86-29 and licensee corrective action is being tracked as an inspector followup item (280,281/86-29-01). This item is close (Closed) LER 280/85-22, Spurious Auto Start of Auxiliary Vent Emergency Fan Due to a momentary decrease of instrument air pressure several components on the auxiliary vent system realigned to the safety mode and other components affected by the instrument air realigned. The decrease in air pressure was due to ice formation in the instrument air dryer due

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b to improper: adjustment.of a hot _ gas bypass valve. The valve was adjusted and : the turbine ibuilding , operations - personnel logs were changed to

. incorporate . instrument- air dryer condenser temperature readings. The

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inspector verified that the turbine building operator logs require these

[ readings. This item is closed.

I '(Closed) LER 280/86-01, Reactor Trip Due to. Loss of Instrument Air. This

event was similar to the event described in LER .280/85-22. The ice j

formation in this case was more severe and resulted in a reactor trip on

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. low steam generator level coincident with a feed flow less that steam flow ~

l signal due .to inadvertent closure of feedwater regulating valves due to loss of air pressur The decrease in air pressure was due to ice formation in the instrument air dryer.due to improper adjustment of a hot gas bypass valve. .The valve was adjusted and the turbine building operations personnel. logs were changed to incorporate instrument air dryer condenser . temperature-readings. The inspector verified that the turbine  ;

building operator logs require these readings. This item is close '

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(Closed) LER 280/86-10, Reactor Trip caused by Turbine Trip due_to High

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Steam Generator Level. During unit startup, control of the C feedwater -

regulating valve was difficult resulting in a-high water level trip of the

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turbine. The turbine trip resulted in a reactor trip. The event was l caused -by failure to adjust the valve controller following maintenance.

] The maintenance procedure was changed to include a step for instrument l technicians to check for proper control settin The procedure was reviewed by the inspector. This item is close <

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(Closed) LER 281/84-18, Reactor Trip on Voltage Spike. The trip occurred on a false high pressurizer trip signa One channel was already in the trip condition due to being unreliable. The reactor trip occurred when a maintenance activity caused a voltage transient on one of the other channels when a screw was dropped in the area. Additional administrative

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controls for work on energized components were initiated to prevent j- recurrence. This item is close '-

(Closed) LER 281/86-01, Auto Start of Number 2 EDG from Loss of E Transfer Bu This -event occurred due to a failed stress cene connection on a feeder breaker. A piece of tape under the stress relief tube created an

,. air void and led to the failur Failure to follow procedure was

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identified as the cause of this even The licensee re-emphasized the requirement to follow procedure to personnel performing this work. Also,

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during the event a rod control urgent failure alarm was received preventing rod motio A check of the rod control rod logic cabinet i identified a control pulser card malfunctio The deficiency was  ;

corrected and the rod control system was returned to normal operatio ,

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This item is close i (Closed) LER 281/86-02, High RCS Leak Rate. The high leak rate was due to several leaking components including the C loop stop valve packing, the C loop stop valve packing gland drain isolation valve diaphragm, and the l

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number 2 seal on the C RCP. This event was reported to the NRC late as

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discussed'in' inspection report 280; 281/86-02. The C loop stop valve was backseated, reducing RCS leakage to an acceptable value. The valve was later repacked and the isolation diaphragm replaced. This. item is close . Followup'on IE Bulletins (92701)

(Closed) 280;281/86-B0-02,' IE Bulletin 86-02. This bulletin concerned the installation of Static "0"-Ring model 102 or 103 differential pressure switches as electrical equipment important to safety. The licensee responded to the NRC in a letter dated July 25, 1986 that they have not purchased or installed the subject switches at Surry. This item is close ,

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