IR 05000280/1986014

Insp Repts 50-280/86-14 & 50-281/86-14 on 860603-0707.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations & Operating Records,Maint & Surveillance,Security & LER Review

ML20205A045
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	08/05/1986
From:	Marlone Davis, Ignatonis A, Igratonis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205A042	List: IR 05000280/1986014 ML20205A038
References
50-280-86-14, 50-281-86-14, NUDOCS 8608110292
Download: ML20205A045 (6)

Text

an #t2; UNITE 3 STATES

/ o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ p REGION 88 g j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * * ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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AUG 0 51986 Report Nos.: 50-280/86-14 and 50-281/86-14

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Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company P. O. Box 26666'

Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: June 3 - July 7, 1986 Inspector: N[. wcII 8h//P/

Date Signed M.J. Davis,UtesidegInspector Approved by: d$ 9, e- ,w e t$ 8[// d

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A. J. Ignaffnis, Sefftiori Chief Da(e S'igned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This inspection involved inspections in the areas of plant operations and operating records, plant maintenance and surveillance, plant security, and LER revie Results: No violations or deviations were identifie .

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REPORT DETAILS 1. Licensee Employees Contacted -

R. F. Saunders, Station Manager D. L. Benson, Assistant Station Manager H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Operations E. S. Grecheck, Superintendent of Technical Services J. W. Patrick, Superintendent of Maintenance J. Logan, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff S. Sarver, Superintendent of health Physics R. Johnson, Operations Supervisor N. Clark, Site Quality Assurance Manager Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors, chemistry, health physics, plant maintenance, security, engineering, administrative, records, contractor personnel and their supervisor . Exit Interview The inspections scope and findings were summarized on a weekly basis with certain individuals identified in paragraph The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This item was not inspected during this reporting perio . Operations (61726) (71707) Units 1 and 2 operations were inspected and reviewed during the inspection period. The inspector kept informed, on a daily basis, of the overall status of both units and of any significant safety matters related to plant operation Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed dail The inspector observed control room staffing during the inspection period to verify that control room manning requirements were being me In addition, the inspector observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintaine The inspector periodically questioned shift personnel

- relative to their awareness of plant condition Through log review and plant tours, the inspectors verified compliance with selected TSs and LCO The inspector conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included the following: witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of operating and

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standby safety systems and equipment; and, confirming valve and breaker positions, instrument and recorder readings, and annuicator alarm The inspector verified that equipment was properly tagged, that plant housekeeping efforts were adequate, that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, that clean areas were being controlled in

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accordance with procedures, that excess material or equipment was stored properly,'and that combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours, the inspector monitored the plant for unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, piping hanger and seismic restraint setting, instrument calibration dates, and adequacy of fire fighting equipmen Certain tours were conducted on backshifts. Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, fire pump house, Units 1 and 2 Steam Safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, cable penetration areas, low level intake structure, Unit 1 Circulating Water Discharge Tunnel, spent fuel pool, and Units 1 and 2 Containment Building On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWPs. Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie b. Unit I remained in a cold shutdown condition for the duration of the reporting period, continuing with the refueling and maintenance outage that began May 10, 198 c. Unit 2 began the reporting period operating at power. On June 7, 1986, air ejector radiation monitors began showing slight activity indi-cation Steam generator blowdown samples were taken which indicated tube leakage in the A Steam Generator. Operation continued with frequent generator sampling to closely monitor the leakage. On June 16, a service water leak inside containment of approximately one gallon per minute was found in an expansion joint on the service water return line from the ' A' Recirculation Spray heat exchange Service water was isolated to the heat exchanger. Unit 2 was subsequently shutdown on June 17 and an unusual event declared when it was determined that repairs to the expansion joint would take longer than the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed by the TS limiting condition for operatio The leak in the expansion joint was caused by galvanic corrosion. Although

- the expansion joint had an Inconel 600 sleeve insert, the edge of the flange was carbon steel. The carbon steel experienced galvanic corrosion when exposed to brackish service water, and a through wall leak developed between the flanged section and the expanding ribbed section of the expansion join The leaking expansion joint and another of the same design were subsequently replaced. Carbon steel in the replacement joints exposed to service water was coated to prevent corrosio . _ _ . _ .- . .

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During the maintenance outage to replace the service water expan: ton

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joints, tube plugging and eddy current testing was also conducted on the 'A' Steam-Generator to repair tube leakage. The tube damage was apparently caused by a foreign object, a conical grinding wheel, found

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at the base of the leaking tube. Three other foreign objects (bo;ts)

were also removed from the generato Unit 2 was taken critical on July 2 and went on line early on July At the end of the reporting period, Unit 2 was opereting at full powe . Survey of Licensee's Response To Selected Safety Issucs (TI 2512/77)

The inspection required by Temporary Instruction 2512/77 was performed to determine the licensee's response to selected safety i ssue The first j issue dealt with reliability of high pressure coolant injection / ret.ctor core

< isolation cooling (HPIC/RCIC) systems in Boiling Water Reactors and did not apply to the Surry facility. The inspection was applied to the High Head

, Safety Injection (HHSI) system in which the licensee's procedures were found to be adequate, ensuring HHSI system reliability.

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The second issue dealt with biofouling of cooling water heat exchanger Significant Operating Event Report (50ER) 84-1 outlined recommendations in this area and the licensee response to this SOER stated the plant's methods for dealing with this problem. The licensee was found to have provided

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adequate measures to detect and prevent biofouling problems. These findings were based on a review of periodic tests, maintenance procedures, SOER responses, and discussion with site personne . Surveillance and Maintenance Inspection (62703) (7171G)

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During the reporting period the inspector reviewed various surveillance and

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maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures and TS. Inspection areas included the following:

) The inspector. observed portions PT 23.5c " Refueling Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator No. 3. Batteries." The inspector obse-ved refueling operations in the Unit I containment and the Spent Fuel Pool Area.

, The inspector toured the Unit 1 Circulating Water Discharge Tunnel, which was drained for inspection during the Unit I cutage. Readings were taken of radiation lovels on the hose Laing used to pump down the

- temporary liquid waste catch tanks constructed in the CW discharge.

1 They were approximately 0.1 mrem /hr. Tha tunnel appeared to be in good

condition with little noticeable deterioratio The inspector observed work in progress to resolve EQ concerns with the t location of the main steamline flow transmitters in the main steam valve house. The transmitters were relocated to the basement of the i

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Steam Safeguards Building where elevated temperatures would not be expected in the event of a steam line brea The inspector observed performance of PT 5.2, " Analog Rod Position

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Instrumentation," for calibration of IRPI signal conditioning modules L-5, 6-7, and 6-9 on Unit .

The inspector observad portions of the #1 cylinder assembly replacement on the #3 Emergen-y Diesel Generator which was damaged by water leakag The inspector observed portions of PT 8.2 " Reactor Protection Logic" prior to the Unit 2 startup, On July 6, the inspector observed performance of Unit 1 PT 8.5A

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" Consequence Limiting Safeguards Functional Test Hi-Hi System" for trains A and B.

' The inspector performed an ESF system walkdown to verify operability of the Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. No discrepancies were note Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated and that appropriate actions were taken, if require In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

l Licensee Event Reports (LER) Review (92700)

The inspector reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective actions taken and planne Certain LERs were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine compliance with the TS and other regulatory requirements. The review included examination of the logbooks, internal correspondence and review of Station Nuclear Safety Operating Committee meeting minutes and discussion with various staf f member (Closed) LER 280/86-13 concerned a dose equipment Iodine-131 activity spike following Unit 1 shutdown for a refueling outage. The iodine spike was l caused by known fuel element defects. Activity levels were monitored every

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4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> until the level returned to less than 1 microcuries/cc. The maximum activity noted was 1.25 microcuries/cc. Leaking fuel elements were replaced during refueling outag '

(Closed) LER 280/86-15 concerned the inside and outside containment sump trip valves (1-DA-TV-100 A & B) which would not hold a(r pressure during

.' Type C cor.tainment leakage testing. The globe type valves were replaced during the outage with ball type valves.

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(Closed) LER 281/86-05 concerned Unit 2 reactor trip. The reactor tripped on overpower delta T following a turbine runback on spurious dropped rod signals caused by a degraded voltage condition on the IH and 2J emergency buses. The degraded voltage condition was caused by a malfunctioning auto

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load tap changer on the 'C' reserve station service transformer that had drifted to its lowest setpoint. The tap changer was subsequently replace (Closed) LER 281/86-06 concerned a leaking service water expansion joint inside containment. (For details see operations paragraph 4.c. of this report). The leaking expansion joint and another of the same design were replace (Closed) LER 281/84-02 concerned Unit 2 reactor trip from 2 percent power during replacement of reactor trip relay coils. The electrical maintenance procedure used for replacement of reactor trip relay coils has a precaution to close the reactor trip bypass breaker and a step to install a jumper to prevent de-energizing other relays in the train. The cause of the trip was failure to follow procedures in that the electricians performing the coil changeout did not have the bypass breaker closed and incorrectly installed the jumper. When the first coil lead was lif ted, the ' A' reactor trip breaker was de-energized resulting in the trip. Personnel were reinstructed in the requirements to follow procedures. The procedure was modified to provide more definitive instructions for safe replacement of relay (Closed) LER 281/84-14 concerned an unexpected start of auxiliary feedwater pump 2-FW-P-38 during relay replacement due to an incorrectly positioned jumper. Additional precautionary measures were added to the relay replace-ment procedure to ensure jumpers are correctly specified and place (Closed) LER 281/84-16 concerned a reactor trip from 21 percent power during startup due to the main feedwater manual isolation valves being closed. The values were closed during Periodic Test 15.3 " Main and Auxiliary feedwater Cold Shutdown Check Valve Test." The valves were not reopened to minimize the possibility of overfilling the steam generato Plant startup procedures were subsequently modified to included checking feedwater valve positions and stroke testing of the feedwater valve Personnel were reinstructed in how to maintain administrative control of off ndrmal plant condition . Resident Inspector Safeguards Inspection (71707)

In the course of monthly activities, the inspector included review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of-the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities which included: protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vechicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts.