IR 05000263/2017011

NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs): Inspection Report 05000263/2017011 (DRS-B.Jose)

ML17306B195
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	11/01/2017
From:	Jeffers M NRC/RGN-III/DRS/EB2
To:	Church C Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
References
IR 2017011
Download: ML17306B195 (11)

Text

UNITED STATES mber 1, 2017

SUBJECT:

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANTNRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS): INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2017011

Dear Mr. Church:

On October 6, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial baseline Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The inspection reviewed the implementation of the Environmental Qualification Program for electrical equipment. The enclosed report documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed on October 6, 2017, with Mr. Kent Scott and other members of your staff.

Based on the results of this inspection, no violations of significance were identified.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mark T. Jeffers, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

Enclosure:

IR 05000263/2017011

REGION III==

Docket No: 50-263 License No: DPR-22 Report No: 05000263/2017011 Licensee: Northern States Power Company Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Location: Monticello, MN Dates: September 18, 2017, through October 6, 2017 Inspectors: B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead)

I. Khan, Reactor Inspector I. Hafeez, Reactor Inspector Observers: N. Khan, NRR Inspector Trainee Approved by: M. Jeffers, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000263/2017011; 09/18/201710/06/2017; Monticello Nuclear Generating

Plant; Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs).

The inspection was a 2-week onsite baseline inspection that focused on the implementation of the Environmental Qualification Program. The inspection was conducted by three regional engineering inspectors. No findings were identified by the inspectors. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow,

Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated October 8, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated November 1, 2016. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, dated July 201

NRC-Identified

and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

No findings were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

1R21 Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs)

.1 Introduction

This is a baseline inspection of a licensees program conducted per U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Procedure 71111.21N, Attachment 1. The objective of the Design Bases Assurance Inspection is to gain reasonable assurance that structures, systems, and components can adequately perform their design basis function. This includes reasonable assurance that electrical equipment important-to-safety for which a qualified life has been established can perform its safety functions without experiencing common cause failures before, during, and after applicable design basis events. This inspection will review the licensees implementation of the electrical equipment Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program, as required by their license, for maintaining the qualified status of equipment during the life of the plant. The inspection is intended to assess the programs effectiveness by sampling a limited number of components. This inspectable area verifies aspects of the Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measure performance.

The inspectors assessed the implementation of the EQ Program, established to meet the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants. The scope of this rule included safety-related equipment relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events, nonsafety-related equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent safety-related equipment from performing design functions, and certain post-accident monitoring equipment. The NRC originally verified plants EQ Program implementation through a series of onsite inspections from 1984-1989. The EQ Program at that time established measures to ensure components met the EQ rule through the 40-year operating license period.

Specific documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment to the report.

.2 Inspection Sample Selection Process

The inspectors selected components for review using information provided by the licensee. The Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Probabilistic Risk Assessment was reviewed and used for selecting components, generally components that had a high Fussell Vesely Importance factor. Additional selection criteria included discussions with plant staff, reviewing procurement, maintenance, and design records, and walking down plant areas susceptible to high-energy line break. Based on these reviews, the inspectors focused the inspection on EQ Program elements and components repaired, modified, or replaced. Components selected included motor-operated valves, air operated valves, and transmitters (pressure, flow, and level) located both inside and outside of containment.

For each component selected, the inspectors evaluated the equipment qualifications of supporting sub-components including seals, lubricants, connectors, control and power cables, solenoids, transducers, limit switches, and terminal blocks.

This inspection constituted 10 samples (2 components of which were located in primary containment) as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.21N, Attachment 1, Section 02.01.

.3 Component Design

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees implementation of the EQ Program as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.49. The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee staff properly maintained the EQ of electrical equipment important to safety through plant life (repair, replacement, modification, and plant life extension),established and maintained required EQ documentation records, and implemented an effective Corrective Action Program (CAP) to identify and correct EQ-related deficiencies and evaluate EQ-related industry operating experience.

This inspection effort included a review of EQ Program-related procedures, component EQ files, EQ test records, equipment maintenance and operating history, maintenance and operating procedures, vendor documents, design documents, and calculations. The inspectors interviewed operators, engineers, maintenance staff, and procurement staff.

Additionally, the inspectors performed in-plant walkdowns of accessible components to verify installed equipment was the same as described in the EQ component documentation files, verify components were installed in their tested configuration, determine whether equipment surrounding the EQ component may fail in a manner that could prevent the EQ component from performing its safety function, and verify that components located in areas susceptible to a high-energy break line were properly evaluated for operation in a harsh environment. Components removed from the EQ Program were reviewed to ensure an adequate basis existed to no longer require the components to meet EQ requirements. The inspectors reviewed procurement records and inspected a sample of replacement parts stored in the warehouse to verify EQ parts approved for installation in the plant were properly identified and controlled; and that storage time and environmental conditions did not adversely affect the components qualified life or service life. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the

. The following 10 EQ components (samples) were reviewed:

K10B-MTR, 12 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Auxiliary Air Compressor Motor SV-2379, Torus to Reactor Building Vacuum Breaker Air Operated Valve AO-2-86A/SV1, 11 Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve Main Control Valve SV-2-71C, SRV C, Air Operator Solenoid Valve MO-2076, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Inboard Steam Isolation Valve (Limitorque Motor Operated Valve)

Raychem Low and Medium Voltage Splices LT-7338B, Torus Wide Range Level Transmitter MO-2011, RHR Division 1 to Torus Spray Inboard Motor Operated Valve; PS-10-101B, Drywell Pressure Transmitter; EP-1728, RHR E to P Converter

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two EQ-related operating experience issues associated with the selected components to ensure that associated generic concerns had been adequately evaluated and addressed by the licensee. The operating experience issues listed below were reviewed as part of this inspection:

Information Notice 2014-04, Potential for Teflon Material Degradation in Containment Penetrations, Mechanical Seals and Other Components; and Information Notice 84-57, Operating Experience Related to Moisture Intrusion in Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Commercial Power Plants.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the selected component problems identified by the licensee and entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed these issues to assess the licensees threshold for identifying issues and the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues. In addition, corrective action documents written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the CAP. The specific corrective action documents sampled and reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Management Meeting

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. K. Scott, and other members of the licensee staff on October 6, 2017. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that some of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary and will be handled in accordance with NRC policy.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

K. Scott, Director, Site Operations

M. Lingenfelter, Site Engineering Director

A. Ward, Regulatory Assurance Manager

D. Bosnic, Director, Support Services

J. Oquist, EQ Engineer

B. Dixon, Programs Engineering

R. Loeffler, Design Engineering

J. Hill, Design Engineering

P. Nordmier, Programs Engineering

A. Kouba, Regulatory Assurance

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

P. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened, Closed and

Discussed

None LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CAP Corrective Action Program EQ Environmental Qualifications NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RHR Residual Heat Removal