IR 05000220/1986017
| ML20247K814 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1989 |
| From: | Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Bradburne J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8906020026 | |
| Download: ML20247K814 (6) | |
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
John.C. Bradburne,' Director, Office of Congressional ~ Affairs.
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.FROM:-
William T. Russell,' Regional Administrator, Region'I SUBJECT:
'ELLISON ALLEGATIONS'(II)
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~ In his May. 11, 1989 letter to you regarding the Ellison allegations, Dr. Henry-Myers: asks whether NRC management considered willfulness on the Local Power
' Range Monitor (LPRM) connector issue and what documentation exists to support the conclusion in Inspection Report 50-220/86-17 that the allegations' " safety implications.were subsequently determined to be minor."
With regard to the willfulness issue it should be noted that as a result of l
~Mr. Ellison's initial allegations, the NRC was aware that his safety concerns potentially involved willful violations.
For this reason, in part, OI was asked to assist the staff,in a transcribed interview of Mr. Ellison on 7/22/87.
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After that interview 11t was determined that the willful violations,'if proved, were committed by working level or first line supervisors.
Therefore, it was
determined that the' investigation of the allegations should be performed by the
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Company, with 01 reviewing that investigation to assure its' thoroughness. As a result ~ of the review of that investigation the matter was referred to D0J. The responses to Dr. Meyer's questions B, C, and D also, in part, address the.
. willfulness' issue and are given below.
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The technical significance of the allegations was extensively documented by
~ Niagara Mohawk :in its evaluations and. thoroughly reviewed and accepted by NRC.
It' is,. in' fact, the broader implications with regard to the safety significance of the violations of the design and procedures that formed the basis for the civil penalty.
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Dr. Myers' specific questions and our answers are as follows.
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- A.
During the time span up to and including July 1986, did Niagara Mohawk employees and/or contractors install "non-safety grade (uncertified)
connectors" in circuitry associated with the Nine Mile Point 1 LPRM's?
Yes.
Page 16 of Inspection Report 50-220/86-17 states "On July 11, 1986 the resident inspector observed portions of safety-related maintenance on the Unit 1 Local Power Range Monitors (LPRM) connectors.
The inspector found two Amphenol Type BNC crimp-on connectors used in
. place of the Amphenol Type SMA connectors required per procedure N1-IMP-LPRM-1. One of the two BNC connectors identified was installed
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in thel cable supplying a signal to LPRM 28-09B.
LPRM 28-09B is one of eight' safety-related LPRMs which provide input to APRM channel 18."
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4T John'Bradburne.
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Let me clarify some possible confusion on the LPRM connectors. The-LPRM connectors used in Nine Mile Point Unit 1 design were SMA-type connectors,'which were gold in color.
The connectors installed by Mr. Ellison with his supervisor s permission on July 10, 1986 were BNC-type connectors, a different connector design having a' silver color. ' Based on the color alone, it was. apparent to everyone involved
'that the BNC-type connectors.were not the correct replacements for the-SMA-type' connectors.
These connectors Were'not' certified as safety. grade, as:they had been purchased by Mr. Ellison at an electronics supply store with petty cash funds provided_by his supervisor. ;However, the certification of these connectors was a.
moot point, as.the BNC-type connectors were not in accordance with
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the reactor.'s design.
Even if they had.been certified as safety grade, the installation of the BNC~ connectors represented a violation of the plant's design and the maintenance procedures that were based on'that
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For information, at Nine Mile Poin_t Unit 1 there are 120 LPRM detectors Within the reactor, each-.of which measure the local neutron flux level and have a separate cable with a connector. -Sixty-four (64) of-the.LPRM detectors are used to provide local neutron flux-levels-into:the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) circuitry, which provides'a measurement of the power of the reactor. The Reactor Protection System (RPS) uses signals from the APRM power measurements to, scram the reactor if power levels are too high. Niagara Mohawk has considered the APRM distinction important as.to whether certified, safety grade connectors were required.
However, regardless of the APRM distinction, all LPRM connectors were to have been SMA-type
.according to the design.
B.
'If'the answer to the foregoing question is "Yes," was such installation
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done with the knowledge that Niagara Mohawk procedures called for I
installation of safety grade connectors?
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In his July 22, 1986 testimony, Mr. Ellison clearly stated that he was well aware that procedure N1-IMP-LPRM-1 specified the use
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of SMA-type connectors and that connectors used on LPRMs providing inputs to the APRMs were required to be certified as safety grade.
Mr. Ellison alleged that his supervisor was also aware of this requirement. The Niagara Mohawk investigations substantiated this.
C.
What NRC document states that "non-safety grade (uncertified)
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connectors" had been installed in circuitry associated with the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 LPRM's and in situations where Niagara Mohawk procedures called for installation of safety grade connectors?
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-John-Bradburne!
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'As; discussed in A. above,-Inspection Report-50-220/86-17. discussed the different type of connectors installed, but does not deal with, explicitly,.the safety grade aspect.of.the connectors, in that use of the wrong type of. connectors was a violation irrespective of the-certification.
Mr.. Ellison also' described this in great detail in his transcribed testimony of July 22, 1986,' on pages 149 to'180.
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.Also, numerous Niagara Mohawk' evaluations _and investigations substan -
tiated this point, and were reviewed during the team inspectior.
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Di What.NRC document, if any, states conclusions as to whether non-safety.
grade connectors had been installed with knowledge that Niagara Mohawk i
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procedures' called for installation of safety grade ' connectors?
Inspection' Report 50-220/86-17 on page 19 states, "These allegations.
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,were substantiated, in that for the allegations associated with the LPRMs'there was an apparent programmatic-deficiency in controlling-the materials, procedural compliance and QC involvement to' ensure
. quality.
First line supervision's knowledge and participation in the ongoing LPRM problem was evident." The report concluded.that i
installation -of BNC.' connectors contrary to the N1-IMP-LPRM-1
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procedure represented an apparent violation.
'While the inspection report could have explicitly described =the safety-grade' aspect, the inspection report clearly concluded that BNC (non-safety grade) connectors had been installed with kno' ledge that Niagara w
Mohawk procedures called for installation of SMA (safety grade)
connectors.
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E.
In. referring to. deficiencies found during the NRC special inspection conducted in response to Mr. Ellison's allegations, Inspection Report 50-220/86-17 stated:
"...their safety implications were subsequently determined to be minor." What analyses, if any, conducted by Niagara Mohawk and/or its contractors and/or the NRC, led to the foregoing statement?
Inspection Report 50-220/86-17 presents a Technical Significance
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.section on each of the allegations, which was based on NRC review of the. Niagara Mohawk evaluations documented in the August 15, 1986 letter to NRC. The summary statement quoted above represented a conclusion based on the separate Technical Significance sections.
taken together.
The. safety significance quoted in the inspection report referred to the technical significance. As discussed below, the broader sense of safety significance including. weak management control of activities and violation of the. design and procedures were addressed during the enforcement conference and the resulting civil y
penalty.
There is no NRC documentation available other than the
inspection report, f
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John Bradburne
To be more specific regarding the willfulness issue, NRC management definitely considered this aspect.
There is no doubt that the installation of uncertified LPRM connectors of an improper design was a deliberate act by Mr. Ellison with the approval of his supervisor. As noted on pages 19 and 20 of Judge Rosenthal's report, this information was turned over to an Assistant United States Attorney in Syracuse for consideration by the Department of Justice.
The act of violating procedures was a factor in the $50,000 Civil Penalty.of April 27, 1987.
As noted in the letter, the civil penalty was issued to
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" emphasize the need for (1) strict adherence to procedures...."
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I do not believe that " Inspection Report 50-220/86-17 drops the question of the safety significance of Ellison's substantiated allegations with statements to the effect that any such safety significance was minor" or that documentation lacks for this conclusion. The inspection report clearly addresses the technical significance of each of the allegations, and this technical significance was the basis for statements on safety significance.
The safety significance of the use of connectors of an improper design and management attitudes at Niagara Mohawk which permitted this to occur are addressed in the documentation supporting the civil penalty.
Specifically, the April 27, 1989 letter transmitting the civil penalty stated, " Individually, the violations might not be categorized at a Severity Level III.
However, collectively, they raise a significant concern for the reasons stated above."
In other words, the technical significance was minor, but the broad safety concern was significant.
I believe that the sources referenced above are generally available, but if you do not currently have any of the sources, please contact Mr. Edward C. Wenzinger, of my staff, and the material will be provided.
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Originni signed Br UILLILd T. RUSSELL William T. Russell Regional Administrator, Region I
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DISTRIBUTION V. Stello J.. ' Tayl o r H. Thompson J. Blaha T. Murley 1.
W. Russell J. Allan W. Kane S. Collins J. Johnson l
W. Cook B. Boger R. Capra M. Slosson EDO 0004484 Docket No. 50-220
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l DISTRIBUTION V. Stello.
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Docket No. 50-220 Public Document Room Local Public Docement Room EDO Reading File State.of New York R
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