IR 05000410/1986069
| ML20207S812 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1987 |
| From: | Collins S, Crescenzo F, Keller R, Lange D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207S796 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-410-86-69OL, NUDOCS 8703200290 | |
| Download: ML20207S812 (75) | |
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U.' S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATION REPORT EXAMINATION REPORT NO. 86-69(0L)
-l FACILITY DOCKET NO. 50-410 l
LICENSEE: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, New York 13202 FACILITY: Nine Mile Point 2 EXAMINATION DATES: December 10, 1986 S 2.k8 7 CHIEF EXAMINER:
sA Frank J. CYescenzo, hactor Engineer Date I
(Examiner)
REVIEWED BY:
@.
[or 3-3'87 David J. Lange, ad BWR Examiner Date
%d b l j-rod 3'3-$7 Robert M. Keller, Chief Date l-Divison of Reactor Projects APPROVED BY:
MM 3IU Samuel J. Collins, Osputy Director Date Division of Reactor Projects i
SUMMARY:
Four Senior Operator retake candidates were administered written examinations at the Region I office. All four candidates passed the examinations, however, only three will be issued licenses.
The fourth candidate must complete an operating / simulator examination (to be administered at a later date) prior to completion of a licensing decision.
8703200290 870317 PDR ADOCK 05000410 V
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REPORT DETAILS
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TYPE OF EXAMS:
Initial X
EXAM RESULTS:
I SR0 I
l Pass / Fail I
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l l Written Exam l 4/0 l
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1 l
l0verall l
4/0 l
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1.
CHIEF EXAMINER:
F. Crescenzo 2.
OTHER EXAMINERS:
M. King (EG&G)
R. Turner 3.
The following table is provided for your consideration of the effective-ness of your training program and identifies those examination questions which produced a class average of 70% or less. As demonstrated by the performance on questions 6.06, 6.07 and 8.01, a knowledge deficiency exists within the area of neutron monitoring sytems.
Question Number Topic Class Avo.
5.01 Rod Worth 67.5%
5.11 Centrifugal pump 62.5%
fundamentals 6.06(d)
NMS interrelationship 25.0%
with RRS 6.07 NMS trips 70.0%
7.01 Immediate actions 16.0%
of N2-0P-29 RRS
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Question-Number Topic Class Avg.
7.06(b)
E0P execution 50%
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7.08 RHR emergency refill 50%
8.01 APRM setpoints and 25%
CMFLPD 8.03 Inoperative bypass 12.5%
8.06 Exemptions from 42%
markup requirements 8.11 Tech specs regarding 56%
inoperative HPCS valves 4.
Since the written examination was administered at the regional office, an examination review and exit meeting were not conducted. Attachment 2 to this report is your written submittal commenting on the SR0 examination.
These comments have been addressed and/or resolution is provided as Attachment 3.
l Attachments:
l 1.
Written Examination and Answer Key (SR0)
2.
Facility Comments on Written Examinations made after Exam Review
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3.
NRC resolutions to facility comments
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ATTACHMENT 1
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U.
S.. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION FACILITY:
NINE MILE POINT 2 REACTOR TYPE:
BWR-GES DATE ADMINSTERED:
86/12/09 EXAMINER:
KING. M.
CANDIDATE INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATE:
Use separate paper for the answers.
Write answers on one side only.
Staple question sheet on top of the answer sheets.
Points for each question are indicated in parentheses after the question.
The passing Crade requires at least 70% in each category and a final grade of at least 80%.
Examination papers will be picked up six,(6)
hours after
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the examination starts.
% OF CATEGORY
% OF CANDIDATE'S CATEGORY VALUE TOTAL SCORE VALUE CATEGORY 25.00 25.00 5.
THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION, FLUIDS,AND THERMODYNAMICS i
25.00 25.00 6.
PLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN, CONTROL, AND INSTRUMENTATION 25.00 25.00 7.
PROCEDURES - NORMAL, ABNORMAL, EMERGENCY AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL 25.00 25.00 8.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, CONDITIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 100.0 Totals
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All work done on this examination is my own.
I have neither given nor received aid.
Candidate's Signature
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NRC RULES AND GUIDELINES FOR LICENSE EXAMINATIONS-
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During the administration of this examination the following rules. apply:
1.
Cheating on the examination means an automatic denial of your application and could result in more severe penalties.
2.
.Restroom trips are to be limited and only one candidate at a time may leave.
You must avoid all contacts with anyone outside the examination room to avoid even the appearance or possibility of cheating.
3.
Use-black ink or dark pencil only to facilitate legible reproductions.
4.
Print your name in the blank provided on the cover sheet of the examination.
5.
Fill in the date on the cover sheet of the examination (if necessary).
6.
Use only the paper provided for answers.
7.
Print your name in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of each section of the answer sheet.
8.
Consecutively number each answer sheet, write "End of Category __" as appropriate, start each category on a new page, write only on one side of the paper, and write "Last Page" on the last answer sheet.
9.
Number each answer as to category and number, for example, 1.4, 6.3.
10. Skip at least three lines between each answer.
11. Separate answer sheets from pad and place finished answer sheets face down on your desk or table.
12. Use abbreviations only if they are commonly used in facility literature.
13. The point value for each question is indicated in parentheses after the question and can be used as a guide for the depth of answer required.
14. Show all calculations, methods, or assumptions used to obtain an answer to mathematical problems whether indicated in the question or not.
15. Partial credit may be given.
Therefore, ANSWER ALL PARTS OF THE QUESTION AND DO NOT LEAVE ANY ANSWER BLANK.
16. If parts of the examination are not clear as to intent, ask questions of the examiner only.
17. You must sign the statement on the cover sheet that indicates that the work is your own and you have not received or been given assistance in completing the examination.
This must be done after the examination has been completed.
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-. 18. When you complete your examination, you shall:
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a.
Assemble your examination as follows:
(1)
Exam questions on top.
'(:2)
Exam aids --figures, tables, etc.
(3)
Answer pages including figures which are part of the answer.
b.
Turn in your copy of the' examination and all pages used to answer the examination questions.
c.
Turn in all scrap paper and the balance of the paper that you did not use for answering the questions.
d.
Leave the examination area, as defined by the examiner.
If after leaving, you are found in this area while the examination is still in progress, your license may be denied or revoked.
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5.
THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION <
Paco
FLUIDS.AND THERMODYNAMICS
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QUESTION 5.01 (3.00)
a. Figure 1, differential rod worth, has a peak at notch 14.
Explain why this peak occurs. [1.0)
b. At what plant conditions, when proceding from cold shutdown to 100%
power, is maximum control rod worth reached ? [1.0]
c. The lesson plan on reactor operational physics explains three reasons
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for using a programmed sequence for rod movement. What are the three reasons 7 [1.0)
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QUESTION 5.02 (3.00)
During control rod motion " rod shadowing" and " coupling of fuel cells" may occur.
Briefly explain these terms and the effects caused by them.
'l QUESTION 5.03 (3.00)
Assume a normal power increase of 10% is made with the flow control valves.
Plot (per the below example) AND BRIEFLY explain the plot of each of the following 6 parameters from the begining of the transient to the final power level (+10%).
(6 0 0.5 ea.)
a. reactivity EXAMPLE:
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i b. void fraction FLOW
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c. reactor pressure REACTIVITY
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l d. reactor power VOID FRAC l..........................
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e, reactor period PRESSURE
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l f. reactor steam flow ETC.
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l TIME
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CATEGORY 5 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
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5.
THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION.
Poca
FLUIDS.AND THERMODYNAMICS
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QUESTION 5.04 (3.00)
For a & b below assume an initial power of 100% reactor power.
a.
Using a plot, DRAW and EXPLAIN indicated reactor power from a SCRAM to 3 minutes after the scram.
[1.50]
b.
Using a plot, DRAW and EXPLAIN. thermal ~ output (including decay heat)
from a scram to 3 minutes after the scram.
[1.50]
QUESTION 5.05 (1.00)
Select the correct answer:
(1.0)
The point of adding heat (POAH)
is when the fission RATE is sufficient to cause fuel temperature to a.
increase.
b. is reached during sub-criticial mulitiplication when Keff is > 0.99.
c. is reached when ALL heat additions overcome heat losses, d. is when reactivity due to VOIDS exceeds the reactivity due to TEMPERATURE.
' QUESTION 5.06 (3.00)
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Describe HOW and WHY the core responds to each of the following rod movements. Include in the discussion the effect on both axial and radial flux distributions. (Assume power is greater than 75%)
a.
The withdrawal of a Deep Control Rod.
(From a deep position to another deep position.)
[1.5]
b.
The withdrawal of a Shallow Control Rod.
[1.5]
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THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION 1.
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FLUIDS.AND THERMODYNAMICS
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QUESTION 5.07 (2.00)
Match each of the four lettered items with one of the numbered items.
1.
MAPRAT 5.
PCIOMR 2.
APLHGR 6.
GEXL 3.
CPR 7.
TOTAL PF 4.
FLPD 8.
PLHGR Parameter by which plastic strain and deformation are limited a.
to less than 1%.
b.
Contains guidelines restricting power ramp rates above the threshold power.
c.
PLHGR over LHGR limit QUESTION 5.08 (2.00)
Explain WHY core orificing is necessary and HOW orificing accomplishes
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this purpose..
QUESTION 5.09 (2.00)
.WHY does the value of the core average delayed neutron fraction (Beta-bar)
DECREASE over core life?
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THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION <
Pega
FLUIDS.AND THERMODYNAMICS
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QUESTION 5.10 (1.00)
i The following are common methods used to continue plant operation beyond the end-of-cycle.
Match them with the statement on the right best describing them.
a.
Derating 1.
Results in decreased plant efficiency but allows b.
Coastdown maintenance of full turbine load, c.
Feedwater temperature 2.
Continued operation at a lower, reduction but constant power level, d.
Excess core flow 3.
Reaching 100% power on a less than 100% flow control line.
4.
Load is allowed to drop while operating with all
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rods out.
QUESTION 5.11 (2.00)
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Explain why centrifugal pumps are usually started with their discharge valves shut AND explain why the booster pumps are started with their discharge valves open.
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6.
PLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN CONTROL. AND INSTREMENTATION Pcco
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QUESTION 6.01 (2.00)
Identify 4 major differences between the 3 RHR loops (systems).
(4 0 0.5 ea.)
Example: RHR B supplies head spray (The example cannot be used for an answer.)
i QUESTION 6.02 (1.50)
List 6 signals / conditions that will trip the CSH diesel generator (DIV 2).
Your answer is to include 3 signals / conditions that will ALWAYS trip the diesel and 3 DIFFERENT signals / conditions that will trip the diesel during test run operation.
QUESTION 6.03 (2.00)
Assume diesel generator EG1 is running for a survellance test in parallel with bus SWG101. Briefly describe the sequence of events and final conditions for each of the following events.(Concern yourself only with EG1 and bus SWG101),
a. A LOCA occurs.
(1.0)
b. A LOOP occurs.
(1.0)
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PLANT SYSTEMS DEEIGHu_qQHIBOL, AND INSTRUMENTATION Pago
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QUESTION 6.04 (2.50)
Identify if each of the following statements is TRUE or FALSE AND if a statement is false explain why it is false.
Concerning ADS operations:
a. To manually initiate ADS, arm and depress any two of the four ADS manual initiation control switches on panel 601, b. A key lock switch on panel 628 OR 631 will open an ADS valve when operated, c. Manual initiation of ADS bypasses all requirements for an AUTO initiation except a low pressure ECC pump running and the 105 second timer.
d. To secure or recover from an ADS actuation, both key lock switches on panel 601 must be used, e. Once manually reset, ADS auto-initiation is not available as the 105 second timer is locked out.
(5 0 0.5 ea.)
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i QUESTION 6.05 (2.50)
For each of the below include applicable setpoints a. List 4 trip signals / conditions of the low speed recire pump.(0.8)
b. List 4 TRIP signals / conditions of the high speed recire pump.(0.8)
(NOTE: NOT high-to-low speed transfer)
c. List 4 high-to-low speed transfer signal / conditions of the recire pump.(0.9)
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PLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN. CONTROL. AND INSTBHMENIATION Paco 10
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QUESTION 6.06 (2.00)
For 4 of the following systems briefly explain the interrelations with the Reactor Recire System (RRS).
(4 @ 0.5 ea.)
Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Control Rod Drive Hydraulics Feedwater Control System Reactor Protection. System Neutron Monitoring-QUESTION 6.07 (1.50)
Explain the difference between the APRM upscale thermal trip and the APRM upscale neutron trip. (Include in you answer a brief description of each trip.
QUESTION 6.08 (2.00)
While observing the control room front panels, what indication (s)
a.
or alarm (s) would you see as a result of:
(1.5)
1. An LPRM detector failing high 7 2. An LPRM detector failing low ?
b.
What is the basis of the setpoint for an LPRM Upscale trip 7 (0,5)
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PLANT SYSTEdg_ DESIGN. CONTRQL. AND INSTRUMENTATION P ga 11
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QUESTION 6.09 (3.00)
Concerning the Rod Worth Minimiser (RWM) on Unit 2:
a.
When a select error occurs on the RWM, STATE whether the operator can still move the rod. (YES or NO)
ASSUME THE RWM IS NOT BYPASSED NO ROD BLOCKS EXIST PRIOR TO SELECTING THE ROD.
(0.5)
b.
EXPLAIN the bases for your decision in part (a).
Consider in your explanation both an attempted insert and withdraw action.(2.5)
QUESTION 6.10 (3.00)
Describe how each of the following REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM scrams may be bypassed?
a.
APRM high flux or power [0.5]
b.
Scram discharge volume high level (0.5]
c.
MSIV closure (0.5)
d.
Manual Scram (0.5]
e.
Turbine control valve fast closure (0.5)
f.
APRM inoperable (0.5)
QUESTION 6.11 (3.00)
List 3 SPECIFIC ways that the Rod Block Monitor (RBM) may be a.
bypassed.
[3 @ 0.5)
b.
How does the RBH utilise the input from a UNBYPASSED LPRM detector that is failed HIGH or failed LOW 7 DISCUSS BOTH cases.
Limit your answer to AVERAGING, COUNT, and INOP circuits. (1.5]
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END OF CATEGORY 6 *****)
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PROCEDURES - NORMAL. ABNORMAL. EMERGEHEY Pcg3 12 AND. RADIOLOGICAL CONTBQL
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QUESTION 7.01 (1.50)
Assume NMP2 is operating at 60% power when both recire pumps trip. A SCRAM does not occur.
What are the immediate step (s) required by N2-OP-29, Reactor Recire.
System.
QUESTION 7.02 (2.00)
Precaution 3 of N2-OP-21, Main Turbine, states "Do not allow first stage pressure to exceed 90 psig during shell warming." Assume an operator allows pressure to CONTINUE to increase above the 90 pais limit. What will occur as a result ?
QUESTION 7.03 (1.50)
What are the 3 immediate actions to be taken on a complete loss of the generator hydrogen seal oil system per procedure N2-OP-22D, Generator Hydrogen Seal Oil ?
QUESTION 7.04 (2.00)
l An ADS-SRV has failed open.
Attempts to close the valve are in progress.
a. What 2 limits (including values) must be observed / monitored [1.0] 7 b. What is the required action if either of the above limits is exceeded ?
(1.0)
QUESTION 7.05 (2.50)
A step in the E0P states: During an ATWS, if power is above 5% or cannot be detrmined then trip the recire pumps.
.
Why is it desirablo AND permissable to leave the recire pumps on l
if power is below 5% 7 (2.5)
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PROCEQQRES - NORMAL. ABNORMALEEGEEI Pcg3 13 AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL
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QUESTION 7.06 (2.00)
a. Due to a transient reactor water level decreases to 145 inches.
What EOP(s) should be executed 7 [1.0]
b. While following the required EOP(s) the turbine bypass valves fail closed and reactor pressure increases to 1045.
How does this effect EOP EXECUTION 7 (1.0)
QUESTION 7.07 (2.00)
While observing the control room panels power begins to increase with no rod motion or recirc flow change.
Loss of feedwater heating is suspected. What are the required actions per N2-OP-8, Feedwater Heaters and Extraction Steam systems ?
QUESTION 7.08 (1.00)
During what conditions is the RHR Emergency Refill Procedure implemented 7 QUESTION 7.09 (2.00)
A decreasing condenser vacuum is detected. Explain why the Condenser Air Removal procedure, N2-OP-9, cautions against using the condenser air removal pumps to restore vacuum 7 QUESTION 7.10 (2.00)
a. What are 2 AUTO initiation signals (including setpoints) for Standby Liquid Control (SLC) ? [1.0)
b. Per N2-OP-36A, SLC system what are 5 indications to be verified after SLC is initiated 7 (1.0)
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PROCEDUPM - NORMAL. ABNORMAL. EMERGENCY Pcga 14 AND_ RADIOLOGICAL CORIBQL
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QUESTION 7.11 (3.50)
, Procedure N2-OP-101A, Plant Start-up, warns that extra caution should be used when pulling rods in the region of criticality to avoid short periods.
Explain the reason for this caution AND how Xenon Concentration, Moderator Temperature, and the Order of Control Rod Withdrawal can affect the operating condition. (3.5)
QUESTION 7.12 (3.00)
N2-OP-101A, Plant Start-Up, requires that a control rod coupling integrity check be performed for each rod as it is pulled to Position 48, and N2-OP-96, Reactor Manual Control Rod Position Indication System, provides instructions for when a rod is not coupled, List three indications you would have if a control rod was found a.
to be uncoupled while you were performing a coupling check.(1.5)
b.
If you have indication of an uncoupled control rod, what three actions are you required to take according to N2-OP-96. (1.5)
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I 8.
ADMI;C.STRATIVE PROCEDURES. CONDITIONSm Pcg3 15 AND ZMITATIONE
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QUESTION 8.01 (1.00)
The APRM Trip Setpoint Formula is (.66W+48%)*T.
Which of the following choices correctly details the definition of
"T" AND when it is applied?
a.
T = FRTP/CHFLPD ; T applied if < 1.0 b.
T = CMFLPD/FRTP ; T applied if < 1.0 c.
T = FRTP/CMFLPD ; T applied if > 1.0 d.
T = CMFLPD/FRTP ; T applied if > 1.0 QUESTION 8.02 (2.00)
List the NMP2 Tech. Spec. definition of the following terms:
a.
Identified leakage b. Limiting control pattern (2 0 1.0 ea.)
QUESTION 8.03 (1.00)
During the performance of a surveilance test it is discovered that all of the turbine stop valves are stuck open.
What are the required Tech. Spec.
action (s) (include applicable times) 7
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QUESTION 8.04 (2.50)
a. During what 2 conditions is " tailgating" into a vital area permitted?
b. Under what conditions may a radiation area be entered without a RWP ?
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDUREM. CONDITIONS.-
PcO3 16
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QUESTION 8.05 (2.00)
a. What type of work (by an operator) in an area protected by a halon fire protection system would require a red markup on the halon system? [1.0)
b. When can the requirment for verification of a markup by a second qualified person be waived 7
[1.0)
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QUESTION 8.06 (2.00)
What three types of testing are exempt from requiring a markup?
r QUESTION 8.07 (2.00)
To complete a job an operator will exceed the whole body dose weekly limit
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of 100 mr.
a. Who will (per S-RP-1) normally authorise the increase 7[1.03 b. What is the maximum the limit may be raised to 7(1.0]
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QUESTION 8.08 (2.00)
a. HOW does the Technical Specifications MCPR operating limit change (INCREASE or DECREASE) when core flow is less than rated?
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i b. WHY is it more probable to violate the MCPR Safety Limit with core
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flow less than rated with no corresponding adjustment to the MCPR
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operating limit?
QUESTION 8.09 (3.00)
a. Explain the difference between an " Appendix R" and a
"Non-Appendix R" Control evacuation / Remote Shutdown.(1.5)
b. What are the major differences when operating the remote shutdown panel for an appendix R shutdown vice a non-appendix R remote shutdown 7 [1.5)
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8.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. CONDITIONS.
Pcga 17 AND LIMITATIONS
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QUESTION 8.10 (1.50)
Explain why N2-OP-3 has a caution on which feed pumps may be used during a plant startup 7 (Include which feed pumps can be used in your answer.)
QUESTION 8.11 (2.00)
For each of the following conditions use the attached Tech. Specs.
and identify all actions required by the applicable Tech. Specs.
e a.
After a HPCS flow test valve 2CSH*MOV111 will not shut.
b.
During a test valve 2CSH*MOV118 will not open from the control panel.
The valve can be cycled manually.
QUESTION 8.12 (2.00)
The plant is operating at 75% power when it is determined that SRV 121 must have its control circuits for all three solenoids de-energized simultaneousely for maintenance.
Use the attached Tech. Specs, to discuss
ALL actions would could be applicable for this case.
QUESTION 8.13 (2.00)
In accordance with the Technical Specifications, the reactor was scrammed due to Suppression Chamber water temperature being greater than 110 degrees F.
The reactor is now in HOT SHUTDOWN, Suppression Pool Cooling is ON, and Suppression Chamber water temperature is 92 degrees F.
CAN YOU STARTUP THE REACTOR AND ENTER OPERATIONAL CONDITION 27 EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER FULLY.
(2.0)
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(***** END OF CATEGORY 8 *****)
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Differential Rod Worth
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EQUATION SHEET s
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Energy (in)
E = aC a = (yg - y )/c g
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g FE = msh w = 6/c A = In 2/tg = 0.693/tg t (eff) = (t,:)(ch
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F = F, e"/T
'
HVI. * 0.693/u sUR = 26.06/7
-
T = 1.44 nT sCa = s/(1 - K,gg)
-
f A [f )
Ca,=s/i1-E,gg,)
a
sun = 26
,
eff)1 " C1 0
'"eff 2
~K Y
T = '(**/o ) + [(f-* o)/A,,g ]
~~
2
-
o 7. g*/ (, _ p; M = 1/(1 - K,gg) = CR /CR
g
T = (I - p)/ 1,gg o g, Cg,K gg) jCl,K,gg)t 8 * IN-1)/K,gg = 2,gg/K,gg eff 3DM, Cl, K gg)jK gg
[1*/TKygg.] + [I/(1 + A,gg )]
1* = 1 x 10" seconds T
a=
,
F = I(V/(3 x 10 0)
'
~I A,gg ? 0.1 seconds A
I = Na
-
Idgg=Id22
.
WATER FARAMETERS Id =Id g
2 1 gal. = 8.345 lba R/hr = (0.5 CE)/d g,,,,,,)
1 sal. = 3.78 liters R/hr = 6 CE/d Cg,,,)
,
1 ft3 = 7.48 gal.
Misctt.t.ANEOUS CONVERSIONS
,
10 Density = 62.4 lbm/ft 1 Curia = 3.7 x 10 dps Density = 1 sm/cm 1 kg = 2.21 1ha
Heat of vaporization = 970 teu/lba 1 hp = 2.54 x 10 BTU /hr
Heat of fusien = 144 Stu/lbm 1 Hw = 3.41 x 10 5tu/hr 1 Atm = 14.7 psi = 29.9 in. Ig.
1 Stu = 778 f t-lbf 1 ft. H O = 0.4333 lbf/in 1' inch a 2.54 cm
F = 9/5*C + 32
'c = 3/9 ('r. 32)
_
. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - - - - - _ _
- - - - - -
..
5.
THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION.
Peso 18 FLUIDS.AND THFnMODYNAMICS
-
.
ANSWER 5.01
.(3.00)
a. Rod worth is proportional to thermal neutron flux.
The peak.is located-
~
at the thermal flux peak in the core. [1.0)
b. When heatup is complete, ~ 1% power. (i.e. No futher temp increase, and-
-void formation is just starting.) [1.0]-
c. 1. Minimize individual' rod worth.
2. Extend core life.(Optimize fuel burnup)
3. Minimize effects of potential transients.
4. Minimize power peaking (Flatten flux profile) [fG0.33'ea.]
~ REFERENCE NMP2 GE BWR ACADEMIC SERIES, REACTOR THEORY,'PG 5-8 & 5-9.
(LESSON OBJECTIVES 2-3, PG 5-2)
NMP2 GE BWR ACADEMIC SERIES, REACTOR THEORY, PG 5-14 (LESSON OBJECTIVE 2-4
& 2-5, PG 5-2)
NMP2 GE BWR ACADEMIC SERIES, REACTOR THEORY, PG 7-6.
(LESSON OBJECTIVES #3, PG 7-2)
ANSWER 5.02 (3.00)
.
ROD SHADOWING: Insertion of a control rod [0.5] changes the flux profile in a reactor [0.5] and has the ability to change rod worth (+ or -) of other (adjacent) control rods [0.5].
[1.5]
Coupling: Coupling of fuel cells occurs when control rods around another (now chosen) have been withdrawn [0.75), resulting in an increased area of influence for the neutron flux [0.75].
(i.e. the control rod will control neutrons over several fuel cells in.a large portion of the core and have a high rod worth.)
[1.5]
' REFERENCE
.
NMP2 GE BWR ACADEMIC SERIES, REACTOR THEORY, PG 5-16 & 5-17.
i.
!
l, i
!
i (*****
CATEGORY 5 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
_.
..
-.
.
5.
THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION.
Pega 19 FLUIDS.AND THERMODYNAMICS
-
ANSWER -
'5.03 (3.00)
!!! The following text describes the power increase transient.
!!!
!!! The-Plots'are from GE RT, Ch 7, pg 7-18 and will-be attached.!!!
!!! to the answer KEY,
!!!
The operator begins increasing flow at pt. one. This causes a DECREASE in void fraction and adds positive reactivity.
Power level begins to rise immediately, increasing fuel element temp.
This implies more heat transfer to the coolant, thus increasing steam generation.
a.
reactivity : increases due to void decrease then returns to zero as fuel temp inc. and voids return adding neg. react, b. void fraction : decreases due to recire flow increase then increases as power increases (stm generation inc.)
Void fraction returns to slightly less than original value due to " doppler",
reactor press. will increase due to the design of c. reactor pressure :
EHC & turbine control system.
d. reactor power : power will increase due to + react. from recire flow increase (or void decrease). Power will stabilize (~ 10% higher) as fuel temp and voids add neg. react.
e. reactor period : period will become + (from infinite), peak, then decrease going slightly neg. then period returns to inf.
(Note: The " negative" period swing is dependent on the rate of flow increase and is not required for full credit.)
f. reactor steam flow: steam flow will increase due to EHC/ pressure control system which will open turbine throttle valves to maintain set pressure.
(.25 for ea. explanation)(.25 for ea. plot)(6 @ 0.5 ea.)
(*****
CATEGORY 5 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
__
_
.
.
.
.
TOP FLOW mCRsAst RECIRCULATION
[2 FLOW NSTART FLOW NCREASE TME NET REACTIVITY ( AKIK)
+
TWE
'
VOlO FR ACTION
_
TWE REACTOR PRESSURE g
Po TME
_ __ 4 g
_
REACTOR
POWER LEVEL TWE
,
.
s
-
RE ACTOR PERIOD
g
,
~
TME
.
s REACTOR
-
'
sTEAu FLOW TWE Figure 7-4 Plant Response to increase in Recirculation Flow in Power Range
The operator begins increasing recirculation flow at point 1 (Figure 7-4).
This causas a decrease in void fraction since the increased coolant flow past fuel elements tends to sweep away voids more rapidly than they are formed.
This causes a positive reactivity addition by the void coefficient of reactivity.
Power level begins to rise immediately, increasing the fuel element temperatures.
This implies more heat transfer to the coolant, thus increasing the steam generation rate.
7 - 18
.-
.. - _ _
..
.
. -
_. _. - _
.. _ _. _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _. _. - _ - _ _ _ _
_. _. _,.. _ _ _ _ _ _.
_
__
__......_--__.__u_____..____..
._
_
__ ;_
_
'.
.
5.
THEORY'OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION-POro 20 FLUIDS.AND THERMODYHAJLCJ C
-
REFERENCE NMP2 GE BWR ACADEMIC SERIES, HT & FF, CH 7, PG 18,19 (LESSON OBJECTIVES 5-5, 5-6, 5-8, PG 7-3.)
ANSWER 5.04 (3.00)
The initial power decrease is due to rapid rod insertion reducing powe a.
to the intermediate range (or low in power range)[0.5]. The long lived neutron precursors then control period at -80 secs [0.5].
.(NOTE: Due to the time (3 minutes) the source range will not be
-
entered.)
..--c...
..
e 9.. men,
tt.. -.
,
...
c.
.,,.c, g
i ' ' ' '
'
.....c..
!
-'
'
.......,
-
....
.
,
CO.5)
....
,
b.
Thermal output will continue at the 100% rate for a few seconds due to the stored energy in the fue1[0.5], Thermal output will then decrease nearly linearly due to storage energy in the structural materials of the reactor system. (Eventually Thermal output will follow an exponential curve of the decaying fisson fragments.)[0.5)
~~
srenta esasy g r/aa
.I ri-,. re-ove r! "
% 's ifror t swr <c y ) An.
,'f s ra v e r ne./ * * r* * * * /s
's C e o 14.< * e-saw-
',
p ra.so 7.* 44 )
s CO.5)
(*****CAhEGORY 5 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
_.
.
.
.
- 5.
THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLAHT OPERATION.
Paco 21 FLUIDS.AND THERMODYNAMICS
.
REFERENCE NMP2 GE BWR ACADEMIC SERIES HT & FF, CH 7, PG 7-22. (LESSON OBJECTIVE 7-1, 7-2, PG 7-4)
GE BWR ACADEMIC SERIES, BASIC ATOMIC & NUCLEAR PHYSICS, CH 6, PG 6-28, 6-29, & 6-30. (LESSON OBJECTIVES 6-1, 6-3, PG 6-3)
ANSWER 5.05 (1.00)
C REFERENCE NMP2 GE BWR ACADEMIC SERIES, REACTOR THEORY, CH 7, PG 7-10 ANSWER 5.06 (3.00)
The core response to the withdrawal of a deep control rod is to a.
raise core power in the upper region of the core, especially in the areas where the rod was withdrawn [.75].
The addition of coupling cells to the core and increased migration length for neutrons will affect the radial flux and thus the total core power will increase (OR: Due to the removal of a non-fission absorber local neutron flux increases and thus
'
the total core power will increase.)[0.75]
b.
The core response to withdrawal of a shallow control rod is to raise the power locally in the region where the control rod is withdrawn.
The local power increase at the core bottom will pull the boiling boundary down, increasing the void content above the withdrawn control rod [.75].
Radial response is limited because of the shadowing effect of nearby rods. The shallow rod strongly affects the axial power shape and not the overall power [.75].
(*****
CATEGORY 5 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
.
..
.
.
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._,
,
-
..
.
.
.
5.
THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION, Page 22 FLUIDS.AND THERMODYNAMICS
.
REFERENCE WNP-2 Reactor Physics VIII Operatng Characteristics, VIII.A.6.C.1) &
2), pg 38 & 39.
LaSalle Rx Physics Review, Rev 1, Aug 1985, pg 176 & 177 NMP2 GE BWR ACADEMIC SERIES, REACTOR THEORY, PG 5-21 (OBJ.
3-4, PG 5-3)
ANSWER 5.07 (2.00)
a.
(0.5)
b.
(0.5)
c.
(0.5)
d.
(0.5)
REFERENCE.
LaSalle Core Thermal Hydraulics,^Rev 2,'Apr 1986, pg 50, 52, & 82 GE Thermodynamics, Heat Transfer, and Fluid Flow, Chapter 9 NMP2 GE Thermodynamics, Heat Transfer, and Fluid Flow, Chapter 9 PG 9-16, 9-46 & 47, 9-24, 9-18 ANSWER 5.08 (2.00)
As the boiling rate increases, two phase flow resistance increases.
This would tend to divert coolant flow from the higher powered center fuel bundles where it is needed the most [1.0].
Orificing has the effect of providing a large resistance to flow so that any additional resistance caused by two-phase flow is acceptably small [1.0].
.
(*****
CATEGORY 5 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
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,
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.-.
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5.
THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION.
Pasa 23 FLUIDS.AND THERMODYNAMICS
.-
REFERENCE LaSalle Reactor Vessel & Internals S/D, Chap 2, Feb 1985, pg 30 G. P.. Heat Transfer and Thermal Limits, pg 28 NMP2' OPERATIONS. TECHNOLOGY, OLT-RXV, PG 15 (OBJ. EO-3, PG 1)
ANSWER 5.09 (2.00)
The fuel composition changes over core life as U 235 is consumed and Pu 239 is produced.
[1.0]
The delayed neutron production of Pu 239 is smaller than that of U 235 [1.0].
REFERENCE LaSalle, Rx Physics Review, Aug. 1985, Rev.
1, P. 96 NMP2 GE BWR ACADEMICS, REACTOR THEORY, PG 3-29 & 30. (OBJ. 4-6, PG 3-3)
,
ANSWER 5.10 (1.00)
a.
b.
C.
d.
[4 @ 0.25 each]
REFERENCE GG, Reactor Theory, Ch. 7, P. 7-52 NMP2 GE BWR ACADEMICS, REACTOR THEORY, PG 7-20 (OBJ 6-1, PG 7-4)
ANSWER 5.11 (2.00)
Cent. pumps are usually started with their discharge valves closed to reduce the work of the pump, or reduce the duration of starting current when starting the pump.[1.0)
The booster pumps are started with the discharge valves open to prevent excessive dp across the their DISCHARGE valve [1.0].
(***** CATEGORY 5 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
_.
'
.,
,
s L5.
THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION.
Paga'24 FLUIDS.AND THERMODYNAMICS
-
REFERENCE NMP2 COND & FW SYS, N2-OP-3, REV 0, PG 12 f
(***** END OF CATEGORY 5 *****)
.
e-
-
,-4
-.
.n,
,.,
,,, - - -.
. -, _
y---
, - -,
p-
-
_.
.
,
.
.
6.
PLANT SYSTEMS' DESIGN. CONTROL. AND INSTRUMENTATION Paco 25
.
.
ANSWER 6.01 (2.00)
a. A & B have HX, C does not b. A & B have spent fuel pool connections, C does not c. A loop supplies CSL testing suction.
d. B loop has service water x-connect.
A & B supply containment spray rings (1 each), C does not.
e.
f. A & B supply suppression pool spray ring, C does not.
g. The A loop shares a jockey pump with LPCS (B & C do not)
h. The B loop has motor-operated flush valves to radwaste.
(A loop has manual-operated fluch valves to radwaste.)
1. The A & B loop have different load sequence times than C loop for LOCA start.
J. The A pump has a different power supply than B and C pump.
k. The A & B loop have sample valves (C does not).
1. The A loop is connected to LPCS through a permanent spool piece (not just for testing)
(4 @ 0.5 ea.)
REFERENCE NMP2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-RHS, PG 2, 3, 4, FIG 1, 2, & 3 (*****
CATEGORY 6 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
.
6.
~ PLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN. CONTROL. AND INSTRUMENTATION Pago 26
.
ANSWER 6.02-(1.50)
a.
engine overspeed b. generator' differential current lockout c. Emergency stop (main control room)
d. Emergency stop (D/G control room)
(a to d: 3 @ 0.25 ea.)
(Emergency stop without location is allowed as 1 answer.)
e.
High Jacket water outlet temp.
f. Gen. loss of excitation.
g. Gen over current.
h. Gen, reverse power.
(Generator lockout is acceptable as 1 answer vice f,g,& h)
1. overcrank j. Low lube oil pressure.
(e to j: 3 @ 0.25 ea.)
REFERENCE NMP2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-EGS, PG 13, 14 (ENABLING OBJECTIVES EO-3, PG 1)
ANSWER 6.03 (2.00)
!
a. When a LOCA occurs the D/G output breaker trips, the D/G continues to l
run unloaded with the offsite source supplying bus SWG101. (1.0)
i b. When a LOOP occurs the D/G would attempt to supply power to offsite (or non-ESF) loads.
Differential over-current relays will trip the offsite feeder breaker to bus SWG101.
The D/G will continue to supply power to
,
j the bus.
(1.0)
l (*****
CATEGORY 6 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
I
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. --
_
.
6.
PLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN. CONTROL, AND INSTRUMENTATION Paga 27
.
REFERENCE NPM2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-SGDS, PG 15 (ENABLING OBJECTIVE EO-3, PG i)
ANSWER 6.04 (2.50)
FALSE, Either the two channel A and/or two channel B control switches a. must be used. (Note: " Division" may be used for " Channel")
Low pressure ECC pump required.)
(Accept :
b. TRUE, (Either the Channel A (panel 628) or B (panel 631) keylock switch will actuate an ADS valve.)
FALSE, The 105 second timer is bypassed, only the low pressure c.
pump is required.
d. FALSE, The keylock switchs are for auto-init inhibit.
ADS is reset by depressing a push button for each channel (division).
(assumes both channels tripped.)
FALSE, The timer is RESET but not locked out. If the conditions still e. exists the timer will run and initiate ADS in 105 seconds.
(5 9 0.5 ea.)
REFERENCE NMP2 OPERATIONSS TECriNOLOGY, OLT-ADS, PG 6, 7, FIG 2, & FIG 5 (ENABLING OBJECTIVES {EO-5, EO-6, PG i)
!
T
f
i i
l (***** CATEGORY 6 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
I
.
~
6.
PLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN. CONTROL. AND INSTRUMENTATION Pasa 28
.
ANSWER 6.05 (2.50)
a.1 suction valve not full open
.2 discharge valve not full open-
.3 RRCS level 2 trip
.4 LFMG lockout (86 relay)
.5 pump motor (86 relay)
.'6 CB-1 in trip or pull to lock
.7 CB-2 in trip or pull to lock
.8 loss of LFMG voltage regulator
.9 RRCS high pressure (1050) with APRM not downscale & 25 sec delay.
.10-incomplete start sequence (4 9 0.2 ea.)
b.1 RRCS level 2 trip (108.8 in.)
.2 suction valve not full open
.3 discharge valve not full open
.4 pump motor (86 relay)
.5 CB-5 in pull to lock-stop
.6 CB-3 in pull to lock.
.7 CB-4 in pull to lock
.8 incomplete start sequence.
(4 @ 0.2 ea.)
c.1 Steam dome temp to recirc loop suction temp differential (<10.7 F for 15 sec.)
.2 Total feed flow less than limit (<30 %).
.3 low level 3 (159.3 in.)
.4 RRCS high reactor pressure trip (>1050)
.5 EOC-RPT trip (4 @ 0.2 ea.)
REFERENCE NMP2, OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-RRS, PG 13, & 14. (ENABLING OBJECTIVES EO-6, EO-7, PG 1)
(*****
CATEGORY 6 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
i
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, _ _ _ _ _
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. _
_. _, _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,
_
_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _. _ _. _.. _.
..
.
_ _ -
_
_-
~
.~
.
6.
PLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN. CONTROL. AND INSTRUMENTATION Pago 29
.
ANSWER 6.06 (2.00)
CCLProvides water to the RRS for cooling the recirc pump motor windings, bearing, and pump mech. seals CRDH Supplies purge water to the RRS for pump seals.
Feedwater Control System RRS receives feedwater flow signals for use in the low power permissive and low total feedwater flow interlocks in the speed transfer logic.
[2 @ 0.25 ea.]
RPS The RPS supplies the EOC-RPT speed transfer signal.
Neutron Monitoring RRS supplies flow signals to the neutron monitoring system.
APRM flux controller receives flux signal from APRMs.[2 @ 0.25 ea.]
(4 @ 0.5 ea.)
'
REFERENCE NMP2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-RRS, PG 15, & 16 ANSWER 6.07 (1.50)
The APRM upscale Thermal trip is compensated by a flow ref signal and will l
vary with recire flow. The setpoint must be exceeded, then a time delay to l
simulate heat flux will elapse before the channel will trip. The APRM upscale neutron trip will trip when the indicated power exceeds a preset level (118%, 15% in startup) (i.e. not flow compensated or a time delay.).
i
'
' REFERENCE NMP2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-APRM,
,
l l
I i
!
l (*****
CATEGORY 6 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
i
I
...
..
.
,6.
PLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN. CONTROL. AND INSTRUMENTATION Pago 30
..
ANSWER 6.08 (2.00)
1. Yellow light-(Accept LPRM upscale light) and LPRM upscale alarm a.
2. White light-(Accept LPRM downscale light) and LPRM downscale alarm
.(2 @ 0.75 ea.)
b.
Trips before LHGR (or thermal) Limit is reached. (0.5)
(Accept: Indicates (possible, probable) local over-power condition)
REFERENCE NMP2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-LPRM, PG 6
' ANSWER 6.09 (3.00)
a.
Yes (0,5)
b.
It can be moved out one notch (0.5) before a withdraw error will block further movement. (0.5)
If the rod was inserted, it will move as far as the operator wants (0.5) unless it is the third insert error. (0.5)
If it is the third insert error, then it would insert only one notch (0.5)
(2.5)
(Note: a "no" answer to part a may be accepted if the answer to part b is correct. That is, the candidate may have answered "no" to part a because " normal" rod withdrawal is not permitted. Part b must be complete and correct for both insert and withdrawal-action.)
REFERENCE EIH:
GPNT, Volume VII, Chapter 9.2; L-RQ-721 NMP2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-RXMC, PG 14, (ENABLING OBJECTIVE EO-5)
1 (*****
CATEGORY 6 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
.
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-,
_.
'
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.
.
,
6.
PLANT-SYSTEMS DESIGN. CONTROL. AND INSTRUMENTATION.
' Paso 31.
.
i
ANSWER 6.10.-
(3.00).
,
Placing Channel-bypass switch to bypass.(" Joystick")-(0,5)
a.
b. Bypassed by a key switch if the mode switch is in Shutdown or Refuel (0.5).
'
c.' Bypassed if the' mode switch is not in Run (0.5).
d. Cannot be bypassed.(accept 10 sec. if mode switch is identified in answer) (0.5)
e. Bypassed when reactor power is less than 30%'by
,
turbine.first stage pressure. (0.5)
,
f. Placing; Channel. bypass switch to bypass (" Joystick")
(Accept: -Inop inhibit swithch)
(0.5)
i
<
REFERENCE
,
t NMP2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-RPS
'
4
ANSWER 6.11 (3.00)
a.
- Manual operation of the RBM BYPASS switch
'
- < 30% power
!
- Edge rod selected
- No rod selected
[3 9 0.5 ea.]
b.
Failed Low:
Removes the LPRM input from the averaging circuit [0.25]
I and provides indication to the counting circuit that the input is INOP [0.25]. The INOP circuit will~only
'-
function if the total LRPMS is less than 50% [0.25].
Failed High:
The higher input is averaged with the other inputs
'
i and processed as if it were a valid signal.
(i.e. Normal count, averaging, and inop circuit j
functions)
[0.75]
REFERENCE NMP2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-RBM, PG 3 & FIG 1.
(ENABLING OBJ. OE-2, OE-3)
+
i I
i
"
(***** END OF CATEGORY 6 *****)
i i
j
--...- -,,
.-,.,...-,...-, - ----.. - - -
.- -- --.,-,
, - _.. -
. -, - - - -. -. - _.. - -
-. - -, - -, - - _ -
.
7.
PROCEDURES - NORMAL. ABNORMAL. EMERGENCY Pega 32'
&HD RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL
.
ANSWER 7.01 (1.50)
Immediately reduce thermal power to the unrestricted zone per Tech Spec fig 3.4.1.1-1 (Fig.. number not required.) with in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. (be in start-up in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in hot S/D in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />)
REFERENCE NMP2 N2-OP-29, REACTOR RECIRC. SYSTEM, REV 1, PG 37 & TECH SPEC 3.4.1.1 ANSWER 7.02 (2.00)
The turbine stops valve closure scram will be un-bypassed (at 119 psig)[1.0]. Since the turbine stops valves are closed during shell warming a SCRAM will occur [1.0].
(The EOC-RPT trip will also actuate, however the recire pumps would be operating in slow speed and the EOC-RPT trip would have no effect.)
REFERENCE
,
NMP2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-RSS, PG 13, & TESCH SPEC. 3.3.4.2, TABLE 3.3.1-1, ITEM 9 ANSWER 7.03 (1.50)
1. Open ADV-162 (H2 dump to roof) (Specific valve number not required.)
2. Trip turbine and follow trip procedure 3. Follow N2-OP-101 if a SCRAM occurs.
REFERENCE NMP2 N2-OP-22D, GENERATOR HYDROGEN SEAL OIL, PG 4 (***** CATEGORY 7 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
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-.
-
..
.
-.-
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.
7.
PROCEDURES ~- NORMAL. ABNORMAL. EMERGENCY'
Pcco 33 AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL
.
ANSWER 7.04 (2.00)
a. 5 minutes [0.'5] (SRV stuck open)
110 F Supp. pool temp. [0.5]
b. Place mode switch to Shutdown.[1.0]
(NOTE: Per NMP2 T.S. and procedures once the above_setpoints are exceeded the option to run back recire pumps to reduce trip severity may not be performed and is incorrect to do so.)
REFERENCE NMP2 E0P LESSON PLAN, EOP-SPT.
. ANSWER 7.05 (2.50)
It is desirable to leave the recire pumps running to maximize a.
boron mixing. [1.25]
b. Tripping the recire, pumps (at low power) results in little if any reduction in power. (or adds little neg. reactivity). [1.25]
REFERENCE NMP2 EOP LESSON PLAN, OLP-RQ, PG 10.
ANSWER 7.06 (2.00)
a. EOP-RL, EOP-RP, E0P-RQ [3 0 0.33 EA.]
b. The Three E0Ps (part a.) should be reentered from the beginning.[1.0]
REFERENCE NMP2 EOP LESSON PLAN, OLP-RL, PG S & 6 (*****
CATEGORY 7 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
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PR0CEDURES - NORMAL. ABNORMAL. EMERGENCY Paco 34 AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL
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ANSWER 7.07 (2.00)
Using recire flow reduce power to 75% or a 20% reduction, whichever is larger [1.5]
If futher power adjustments, beyond the capabilities of the recirc system are required, insert control rods per the reactor analyst instructions. [0.5]
REFERENCE NMP2 FWD HEATERS & EXT STEAM, N2-OP-8, REV 0, PG 9 & 10 ANSWER 7.08 (1.00)
Only if RHR pump A (B) trips during drywell spray / suppression pool spray mode and flow is to be immediately restored.
REFERENCE NMP2 RHR, N2-OP-31, REV 1, PG 41 ANSWER 7.09 (2.00)
The discharge of these pumps is not treated by the offgas system [1.0]
and plant release rates may be exceeded if the pumps are placed in operation during or immediately following high power operation [1.0],
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--OR--
The pumps are not detonation proof (1.0] and using them at power may result in an H2 explosion [1.0]
REFERENCE NMP2 CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL, N2-OP-9, REV 0, PG 12 (***** CATEGORY 7 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
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P"ROCEDURES - NORMAL. ABNORMAL. EMERGENCY Pega 35 AND RADIOLOGICAL-CONTROL
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ANSWER 7.10 (2.00)
a.1 High RPV pressure (1050) with APRMS not downscale (<4%) or inop for greater than 98 seconds. (accept 90-100) [0.5]
.2 Low RPV level (level 2) with APRMS not downscale (<4%) or inop for greater than 98 seconds. (accept 90-100) [0.5]
b.1 SLC storage tank outlets open (MOV1A & MOV1B or pump suction valves)
.2 SLC pumps P1A & PIB, running. (pumps amps)
.3 Squib valves white (or " ready") lights out.
.4 SLC discharge pressure greater than RPV pressure.
.5 SLC storge tank level decreasing.
.6 SLC system flow approx. 86 gpm (2 pumps running)
.7 Power decreasing
.8 RWCU isolation
[5 9 0.20 ea.)
REFERENCE NMP2 SLC, N2-OP-36A, REV1, PG 5 & 7.
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(*****
CATEGORY 7 CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE *****)
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7.
PROCEDURES - NORMAL. ABNORMAL. EMERGENCY Pega 36 AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL
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ANSWER 7.11 (3.50)
1.
Xenon will reduce the flux in the areas of the core in which its concentration is highest and push the flux during startup to areas of lower concentrations [.5].
It will also tend to suppress the flux in the areas where the SRMs are located.[.25]
Control rods with normally low worth (accept edge or peripheral)
may have high worth [.5].
[1.25]
2.
At higher temperatures, (such as you might have at hot standby after a reactor scram), neutrons travel further
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during slowing down[.33] and thus have a greater probability of being absorbed by a control rod [.33].
This effectively increases the worth of the control rods [.33]. [1.0]
3.
If the rods are withdrawn in a sequence that maintains sufficient radial separation [.5), the flux will be loosely coupled [.25], and the rods may be withdrawn in sequence with decreasing rod worths.
That is, the first rod in a group
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is generally worth the most[.5].
[1.25]
(Note: The text for answer 3 was revised. Accept an answer based on the first rod in a group having higher rod worth vise radial separation and/or loosely coupled.)
REFERENCE NMP2 N2-OP-101A, Precaution D.2.0 ANSWER 7.12 (3.00)
a.
1.
Window alarm
" Control Rod Overtravel" 2.
The rod loses the red back light 3.
Loss of position indication on the four rod display 4.
Improper power response.
[3 @ 0.5 ea.]
b.
1.
Select the rod and drive it in to 44, 2.
Withdraw it again to see if the overtravel condition clears.
3.
If it doesn't clear, check Tech Specs for further action.
[3 @ 0.5 ea.]
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PROCEDURES - NORMAL. ABNORMAL. EMERGENCY Psco 37 AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL-
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REFERENCE NMP2 N2-OP-101A, Section E.2.5; N2-OP-96, Section D.2-(Precaution), H.4 s
(***** END OF CATEGORY 7 *****)
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8.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. CONDITIONEx Pega 38 AND LIMITATIONS
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ANSWER 8.01 (1.00)
a REFERENCE GGNS: TS 3.2.2, page 3/4 2-3 NMP2 OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY, OLT-APRM, PG5 & TECH SPEC 3.2.2 ANSWER 8.02 (2.00)
a. Leakage into collection systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of the leakage detection systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
[1.0]
b. A pattern that results in the core being on a thermal hydraulic limit, i.e., operating on a limiting value for APLHGR, LHGR, or MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR).
[1.0]
(Answers need not be verbatim to above but must adequately define the terms.)
REFERENCE NMP2 TECH. SPEC. DEFINITIONS ANSWER 8.03 (1.00)
Initiate a reduction in thermal power within 15 minutes (and reduce first stage pressure to less than 119 psig within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.)
(*****
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IDMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. CONDITIONS.
Paca 39 AND LIMITATIONS
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REFERENCE NMP2 TECH. SPEC. TABLE 3.3.1-1 ACTION 6
' ANSWER 8.04 (2.50)
11.1. During an emergency (0.75)
2. When two people are required to move an object through the gate / door.
(0.75)
b. Only for " pass through" of the area.
Entry for emergency / rescue operations. [2 @ 0.5 ea.]
REFERENCE
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NMP2 SAP, CONTROL OF ACCESS, PG 6 NMP2 S-RP-1, REV 5, PG 4 i
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ANSWER 8.05 (2.00)
a. Any work the would place the operator in a position that would preclude his rapid escape. [1.0]
b. When significant radiation exposure is involved. [1.0]
REFERENCE NMP2 AP, CONTROL OF EQUIPMENT MARKUPS, PG2 & 3.3.1, REV 1, PG4
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ANSWER 8.06 (2.00)
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a. Operators performing surveillance test (0.66]
b. Operators performing instrument checks [0.66]
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c. Operators performing equipment operability tests [0.66]
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. CONDITIONS.
Pcgo 40 AND LIMITATIONS
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REFERENCE NMP2 AP, CONTROL OF EQUIPMENT MARKUP, 3.3.1, PG 2 ANSWER 8.07 (2.00)
a. The operator's supervisor can authorize the increase. [1.0)
b. to the currently authorized quarterly exposure limit (1000 mr) for the operator [1.0]
REFERENCE NMP2 S-RP-1, REV 5, PG 16 ANSWER 8.08 (2.00)
a.-Increase
[0.5]
b. Transients which cause rapid core flow and power increases [.75] come more severe if initiated from low flow / low power conditions.[.75]
[1.5]
(Accept: Critical power at low flow is lower than at high flow conditions. This leads to b above)
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REFERENCE
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LaSalle, Core Thermal Hydraulics, April 1986, Rev. 2, P. 72 NMP2 TECH. SPEC. 3.2.3 & 4.2.3 (BASES)
NMP2 G.E. BWR ACADEMIC SERIES, HT & FF, PG 9-28.
ANSWER 8.09 (3.00)
An appendix R evacuation is an evac, with the potential (i.e. FIRE)[.5]
a. to cause spurious auto action or loss of control of plant equipment [.5]
due to hot shorts, ground etc[.5].
[1.5]
b. The appendix R shutdown requires the use of " divisional disconnect switches to isolate control system from the effects of an appendix R fire [.75]. The disconnects allow operation of systems which are normally systems are defeated [.75).
[1.5]
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iDMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. CONDITIONS.
Pasa 41 AND LIMITATIONS
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- REFERENCE NMP2 RSS, N2-OP-78, REV 1, PG 5 ANSWER 8.10 (1.50)
Feed pumps A or B [0.5] may be used as only FW pmps A & B have high pressure, low flow control valves [1.0]
REFERENCE NMP2 COND & FW, N2-OP-3, REV 0, PG 13 i
ANSWER 8.11 (2.00)
TS ACTION STATEMENTS 3.5.1.C (HPCS inop) & 3.6.3.A (Containment a.
isolation)
b. TS ACTION STATEMENTS 3.6.3.A & 3.5.1.C (TS 3.6.3.A requires MOV118 to be shut to maintain Containment isolation operable,-this require TS 3.5.1.C action because with MOV118 shut HPCS is inop.)
REFERENCE NMP2 TECH SPECS 3.5.1 & 3.6.3.A i
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3.5.1 14 day LCO, 3.3.7.4 R.S.P. 7 day LCO (3.4.2 for safety valves does not apply)
REFERENCE NMP2 TECH SPECS 3.4.2, 3.5.1, & 3.3.7.4 i
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. CONDITIONS.
Paga 42 AND LIMITATIONS-
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' ANSWER 8.13 (2.00)
YES,must have Suppresion Pool water temp less than 110 degrees F before entering Operational Condition 2 with power less than 1%
or 120 F with MSIV closed as permited by Tech. Spec. 3.6.2.1 REFERENCE NMP2 TECH SPECS 3.0.4 & 3.6.2.1
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ATTACHMENT 2
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N3MthH 21297 NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION /P.O. box 32 LYCOMING, NEWYORK 13093/ TELEPHONE (315) 343 2110 December 15, 1986 Mr. Robert Keller United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Keller:
This letter concerns the NRC Cold License Examination administered to four (4)
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 SR0 license candidates on Tuesday, December 9,1986 at Region I Headquarters.
Mr. R. Turner was the lead examiner with Mr. A. Howe assisting.
Due to the fact that the author of this examination was not present during or af ter the exam at Region I, and that Mr. Turner is not thoroughly familiar with the Nine Mile Point Unit II Plant, it was agreed upon that no formal exit interview would be held and that instead we would submit all of our comments in written format to Region I within five (5) working days.
Please find attached our comments relative to this SRO examination.
Normally, most of these comments would have been resolved at the exit interview, but due to time and manpower constraints on both our parts, this was not possible.
We appreciate the efforts of both yourself and your staff in arranging and
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administering this examination on somewhat short notice.
Should you need further explanation or clarification of any of the attached coments, please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,
// YN K. F. Zollitsch Superintendent Training - Nuclear Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station KFZ/sls Attachment LE l ~,,l ::] n
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5.01, Part c Alternate answers t3 this question that are not centained in the key are:
-Minimize power peaking (or flatten flux profile)
-Optimize fuel burnup (or even fuel depletion)
There are further reasons stated in the Control Rods chapter for the purpose of using a programmed rod movement sequence.
Ref:
G.E. Reactor Theory, Control Rods (text) Pg. 5-21 5.03, Part b Vold Fraction - There is an error in the G.E.
text (future revision to be made)that states the void fraction returns to it's original value.
The correct answer should be that it returns to a value slightly lower than it's original value (due to the increase in fuel temperature, noted in the reference, adding some net negative reactivity).
Part e Period.
The example in the text that the curve for period is drawn from is for a step increase in flow (exact amount never identifled in text).
The question stated that this was a normal flow increase so, operationally, a negative period will not be observed.
So answer should be - rises positive then returns to infinity.
Ref:
G.E. Reactor Theory, Reactor Operational Physics, Pg.7-18, 7-19 5.04, Part a The question asked for a plot of reactor power following a scram to be drawn for 3 minutes following the scram.
The key indicated the final portion of the curve labelled " source level" which will not be reached in the first three minutes.
This final portion of the curve should not be required for full credit.
Ref:
G.E. Reactor Theory, Reactor Operational Physics, Pg. 7-22 5.06, Part a An alternate answer (equivalent, but stated differently) can be drawn from the same chapter.
Since a non-fission absorber is removed from the area, local neutron flux increases (this in lieu of stating " adds coupling").
Part b The answer can go on to include a discussion of the reverse power (or reactivity)
effect since this is a
phenomenon discussed in the chapter related to shallow rod withdrawal.
Ref:
G.E. Reactor Theory, Control Rods, Pg. 5-6 and 5-25.
-1-December 1986
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5.11 The part of this questicn asks a generic question that actually only appales to a specific system at Nine Mile 2. It states " thy are the booster pumps started with their discharge valves open".
The only instance where this is done at the plant is when starting the condensate booster pumps.
Several systems exist at Nine Mlle 2 with booster pumps.
One example is the RBCLCW booster pump and they are started with the discharge valve shut.
This question is not specific enough to elicit the desired response in the key, so various reasons should be accepted (no min. flow protection, etc.) or drop Part 2 of the question.
Ref:
N2-0P-3, Pg. 12 and N2-0P-13, Pg. 6 I
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6.01 Question asks for major differences between RHR Loops.
Although an example is given the word major requires the student to determine what is a major difference versus a minor difference.
The key is limited to six responses. The following are also major differences:
The A loop shares a jockey pump with LPCS (B & C do not).
The C loop can only perform the LPCI function.
The 8 loop has motor-operated flush valves to radwaste. The
"A"
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loop has manual valves locally operated.
The A & B loops have different load sequence times than "C" loop i
for LOCA start.
The A pump has a different power supply than "B" and "C" loop.
The A & B loops have sample valves,the C loop does not.
The A loop is connected to LPCS through a permanent spool piece
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(not just for testing).
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6.02 The question asks for signals that will trip CSH diesel generator, a.
The answer key does not reflect low lube oil pressure as an engine shutdown in test run condition.
OP-1008, Rev.1,Section I.3.1.a lists low lube oil pressure as an engine shutdown.
Exam reference also lists low lube oil pressure.
b.
Some students may have referred to emergency stop as manual shutdown.
The emergency stop shutdown location should not be required for credit, since it is not specified in the reference, c.
Diesel shutdowns due to generator problems may have been lumped together as a generator lockout.
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Students should not be required to designate emergency shutdowns s
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since question does not require specific designation.
I-2-December 1986
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6.04 Question does not ask for explanation of true responses.
Alth:: ugh the key does explain them, students should. net be required to explain i'
true responses for full credit.
The word division should be acceptable in place of channel as the
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answer key states; i.e. two division A pushbuttons vice two channel A I
pushbuttons.
6.05 Parts a and b ask for recirculation pump trip signals.
a.
Incomplete start sequence should be acceptable for both part a and part b.
Ref:
OP-29, Rev. 1, Section D.7.0, 0.5.h b.
RRCS Level 2 can also be stated as vessel level of 108.8" (low / low level).
Part c asks for pump transfers to low speed, a.
FCV <19% open is no longer stated per OP-29, Rev. 1, Section D.8.g for response number 2.
b.
Level 3 of 159.3" is not an RRCS level as in response number 3.
Low water level or level 3 should be acceptable per OP-29, Rev.
1, Section D.8.f c.
A point discrepancy exists between the exam and key.
Each response should be worth.225 points vs.2 points.
6.06 RPS interrelationship to RRS could have been stated as flow signals for flow biased scram signals in the RPS.
Neutron monitoring interrelationships could have included APRM signal to flux controller when in flux automatic per RRFC Chapter, Operations Technology, Rev. 3, Pg. 2 under Master Controller.
6.07 Key refers to six-second time delay when in fact the time constant is 6 seconds as per Technical Specification bases 2.2.1.2, Pg. 82-7.
The number of time constants that expire prior to trip is dependent upon how far above the setpoint the power is in an inverse relationship.
The time delay could be almost zero to approximately 30 seconds.
Mention of a time delay to simulate heat flux vice neutron level should be acceptable for full credit.
Upscale neutron trip is listed as 118% on key.
It is 15% when not in run and this should be accepted if mentioned.
-3-December 1986
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' 6.08 a.
1.
LPRM upscale light vice yello 3 light.
2.
LPRM downscale light vice white light.
For both one and two the LPRM meter would respond if proper rod selected on four rod display.
3.
This answer is only true if a rod near that LPRM was selected.
IF not there would be no indication.
If assumed that LPRM was either upscale or downscale from Parts I and 2 might state that annunciator and upscale /downscale indication would clear.
Ref:
LPRM Chapter, Operations Technology, Rev. 3, Pg. 6 and Figure 3.
b.
May also state that alarm set to prevent local overpower condition.
6.09 If explanation in part b was that normal rod movement would not be allowed (i.e. errors and blocks would result) the answer to part a may be N_0.
For part b - any explanation of what causes errors and blocks from the RWM should be accepted for full credit.
Point distribution for required phrases should be relaxed.
6.10.d.
Mode switch to shutdown is a method of manual scram as per RPS, Operations Technology, Rev. 3, Pg. 2. It is bypassed automatically ten seconds after actuation per Table
of RPS, Operations Technology, Rev. 3, Pg. 22.
f.
APRM inop scram signal can be bypassed by an inop inhibit pushbutton in APRM drawer.
This should be accepted if mentioned.
Ref:
APRM, Operations Technology, Rev. 3, Pg. 9.
6.ll.b.
Under failed low the statement about the inop circuit function whenever total LPRM's less than 14 is not true.
This statement applies to APRM inop circuit.
RBM circuit requires 501. of the inputs for averaging.
Ref:
RBM, Operations Technology, Rev. 3, Pg. 3 under Count Circuit.
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7.01 The answer in the key only contains the first step in the off-normal procedure, which is not broken down into "immediate" and " subsequent" actions.
Some answers may be broader in scope, and full credit should not be taken off for failure to mention all of the specifics of the answer in the key.
Ref:
N2-0P-29, Rev. 1, Pg. 27 7.02 The setpoint of 119 psig should not be required.
The reason for the caution stated in OP-21 is not answered in that OP, but rather in OP-101A, and that does not reference the setpoint.
Demonstrated knowledge of removing the TSV closure scram bypass, and the result, should be sufficient.
Ref:
N2-0P-101A, Rev. 1, Pg. 9 Also, the key has two (2) responses that total 1.5 points, but the exam indicates the question to be worth two (2) points.
7.03 Immediately reduce H2 pressure should be an acceptable alternate because it is understood that the only means of immediately reducing
~the pressure in this procedure is by opening the emergency dump valve.
Ref:
N2-OP-22D, Rev. O, Pg. 4
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7.04, Part b The required action to be taken, as outlined in - the LCO. for Safety Relief valves, is to place the mode switch to shutdown.
Reducing recirc flow is a procedural step that is done if temperature has not yet reached 110*F to minimize the effects of
the transient on the plant.
Therefore, the answer should be limited to " Place the mode switch to shutdown".
Ref:
N2-EOP-SPT, Step 5 and NMP2 Tech. Spec. 3.4.2, Action b, Pg. 3/4.4-10.
7.06, Part,'o. An entirely differentf interpretation can be made of this question than the answer key reflects. The question never states e that the pressure was below 1037, making it unclear whether a new entry condit)orr was reached.
A discussion of loss of the
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turbine bypass valves could be given.
An answer that discusses uses of alternate means to control pressure in RP should be p>
l' acceptable for full credit.
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Ref:
N2-EOP-RP, Step 7 t
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7.07 The stcond part of the answer is performed if further reduction in power is - required, and is considered a contingent action.
Equal weighting for that response is a little unfair.
More weight should be given to reducing power the required amount.
Ref:
N2-0P-8, Rev. O, Pg. 10 7.08 This question refers to a procedure which is far from routine.
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policy on this is that it will be referred to when operating in the listed condition, so memorization of this procedure is not required.
This question should be dropped because it 1111cits a very specific answer, to a very specific case that is not required to be memorized.
(That's why this off-normal, for this rare case, was written.)
7.09 Another answer is possible that is located in the Precautions / Limitations Section of the procedure which states that the pumps are not detonation proof and using them at power, with the resultant H2 concern, may be a problem.
Credit should be given for this answer.
Ref:
H2-0P-9, Rev. O, Pg. 2 7.10, Part a " Power greater than 47." (the setpoint) should be acceptable in lieu of saying APRM not downscale.
Part b The key references only a portion of the items to be verified after SLC initiation. Other are:
-Power decreasing-Reactor Water Clean-up (RHCU) isolated These should be accepted among the five items.
Also, the following are equivalents:
l-Pump amps (vs pump running)
-Squib valves fired (vs white light out)
-Pump suction valves open (vs storage tank outlet or MOVIA/B open)
Ref:
N2-0P-36A, Rev. 1, Pg. 7 l
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7.11~
The first part of the question asks for an explanation,;f the caution and the key never answers this, and credit should be given for this which will effect the point distribution.
An acceptable answer will be based on the reactor becoming more responsive (or power changing more rapidly) as criticality is approached.
Equal weighting is not given to all the answer sections in the key, and this is not reflected in the question.
Based on the content of the answer key, equal point distribution would seem warranted.
The answer for Order of Control Rod Withdrawal is not reflected in the reference - it does not discuss coupling (earlier revisions did, however).
The applicable reference revision discusses rod worth being affected by it's axial position in the core, and states that the first rod in a group is generally worth more than successive rods in that group. Answer based on this should be given full credit.
Ref:
N2-0P-101A, REv. 1, Pg. 2 7.12, Part a There are additional indications of an uncoupled rod other than listed in the key.
They are:
-Improper power response-Loss of full out light Part b The procedure is lengthier than the key, and some responses may include other steps.
This should not be marked as incorrect.
Ref:
N2-0P-101A, Rev. 1,Pg. 6 and N2-0P-96, Rev. 2, Pg. 15
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8.03 This question required response from an action statement from Tech.
Spec. Table 3.3.1-1.
This Technical Specification action statement was not provided to the candidates in the exam package.
A page check of the package was conducted during the exam to verify this.
The candidates cannot be expected to remember Technical Specification l
action statements so the question should be deleted.
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l 8,04, Part b Since an RHP is only required under specific conditions any l
condition not specified for requiring one should be acceptable.
Also, an RHP would not be required for an emergency action in a radiation area.
(Example - EPP-3, Section 4.4.1, Pg. 7).
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Also, question states under what conditions implying more than
one and then only gives one condition on the key.
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8.06 Question solicits three responses by asking what "three types of tests" yet 25%
of the credit on the key is awarded for saying" Operators performing" which is not one of the tests, and makes
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the answer four (4) points.
Question states tests that are exempt from markups implying a markup is never required.
The reference does not use the term exempt and in fact some Operator surveillance tests do require markups.
Examples:
N2-OSP-CSH-R001 Prereq. 6.5 - Red Markup N2-OSP-CSL-R @ 001 Step 7.1.6 - Blue Markup N2-OSP-IC5-R 9 001 Step 7.1.8 - Red Markup Based on this, the question should be deleted since it was taken out of context from the reference AP-3.3.1 8.07, b. Could say authorize up to 1000 mr vice current quarterly limit.
Ref:
S-RP-1, Rev. 5, Pg. 2 8.08, b. For part b an argument to the fact that critical power is lower at low flow conditions might also be used for explanation.
Ref:
G.E. BWR Academic Series, Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow, Chapter 9, Pg. 9-28 8.09 Part a was not specific as to differences between evacuation; 1.e.
Answer key required what initiating conditions dillneated the difference.
Some candidates may have described differences in procedural steps between the two types of evacuation since they are significantly different.
If a candidate took this position, full credit should be given.
Ref:
N2-0P-78, Rev. 1, Remote Shutdown Also, Answer key only talked about an Appendix R evacuation. It did not consider a non-appendix R evacuation, although it was asked for in the question.
This should be an alternate means of answering, i-8-December 1986 l
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8.09 b.
Candidates may have explained the effect of operating the disconnects on systems at the remote shutdown panel.
Example N2-0P-78, Rev.
1, Section D.17.
Control of system is shifted to remote shutdown by use of remote transfer switches and not by the dt. connects (with the exception of N2 supply for ADS accumulators).
Key implies disconnects shift control and awards a half point for saying so.
Ref:
N2-OP-78, Rev. 1, Section B., 2nd Paragraph and 4th Paragraph, Pg. 1 8.11 a.
Question would require candidates to know valve numbers.
Answer would change if candidate assumed wrong valve in system.
Also, the question does 'not give enough information to determine that HPCS is inoperable; 1.e. you still have a flow path from suppression pool to vessel.
Question arises over whether enough flow can be developed.
Some candidates may have decided HPCS was operable per LCO and no HPCS action would apply.
b.
Valve not identified except by number.
If HPCS LCO is all that is referenced (as in answer key) then HPCS is operable (valve could be opened and left open).
When primary containment isolation LCO 3.6.3 is referenced, you would determine that the valve must be closed, since it cannot be isolated by remote manual.
When it is closed HPCS would be inoperable.
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Key should reflect reference to 3.6.3.a.
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8.13 Although by the letter of Technical Specifications, a startup to condition two would be allowed you could not go to condition one until temperature is below 90*F.
Some candidates may have said NO and explained why they would not start up if unable to reach condition one.
If the explanation shows an understanding of the Technical Specification, full credit should be awarded.
Also, the answer key should not require mention of 120*F with MSIV's closed, since it is not necessary to fully answer the question.
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-9-December 1986
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ATTACHMENT 3
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RESOLUTIONS TO UTILITY COMMENTS ON NRC SRO LICENSE EXAM OF 12/09/86 Comment on question / answer 5.01:
Part c Alternate answers to this question that are not contained in the key are:
-Minimize power peaking (or flatten flux profile)
-Optimize fuel burnup (or even fuel depletion)
There are further reasons stated in the Control Rods chapter for the purpose of using a programmed rod movement sequence.
Ref:
G. E. Reactor Theory, Control Rids (text) Pg. 5-21 Resolution:
Agree, 1.
Optimize fuel burnup will be accepted for extended core life.
2.
Minimize power peaking or flatten flux profile will be added as 4th answer.
Required answer is 3 of 4.
No point value change.
Comment on question / answer 5.03:
Part b Void Fraction - There is an error in the G.E. text (future revision to be made) that states the void fraction returns to a value slightly lower than it's original value (due to the increase in fuel temperature, noted in the reference, adding some net negative reactivity).
Part e Period.
The example in the test that the curve for period is trawn from is for a step increase in flow (exact account never identified in text).
The question stated that this was a normal flow increase so, operationally, a negative period will not be observed.
So answer should be - rises positive then returns to infinity.
Ref:
G. E. Reactory Theory, Reactor Operational Physics, Pg. 7-18, 7-19
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Recolution:
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' Agr:s, Tho quantion is to bs gredsd na statsd in commsnt.
This in
'e a known error in the text.
Agree, the magnitude of negative " swing" (if any) is dependent on rate of flow increase.
The answer will not require plotting or an explanation of negative period.
Comment on question / answer 5.04:
'T Part a The question asked for a plot of reactor power following a
,
scram to be drawn for 3 minutes following the scram.
The key indicated the final portion of the curve labelled
" source level" which will not be reached in the first three i
minutes.
This final portion of the curve should not be l
. required for full credit.
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Ref:
G.E. Reactor Theory, Reactor Operational Physics, pg 7-22
.
Resolution:
'
i Agree, The portion of the curve labelled " source range" is not required and in fact is wrong if included.
If the " source range" portion of the curve is included without an
explanation of the time frame then points will be deducted.
_
Comment on question / answer 5.06:
Part a An alternate answer (equivalent, but stated differently) can
be drawn from the same chapter.
Since a non-fission absorber is' removed from the area, local neutron flux increases (this in lieu of stating " adds coupling").
i Part b The answer can go on to include a discussion of the reverse i
power (or reactivity) effect since this is a phenomenon i
discussed in the chapter related to shallow rod withdrawal.
Ref:
G. E. Reactory Theory, Control Rods, Pg. 5-6 and 5-25.
)
i Resolution:
Agree, The key points are that TOTAL core power will increase as a result of WITHDRAWAL of a DEEP control rod.
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Agree, an explanation of reverse power is not required.
No points will be lost if a CORRECT explanation is included as part of the answer x
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Comm:nt on quastion/cnswar 5.11:
.
The part of this question asks a generic question that actually only applies to a specific system at Nine Mile 2.
It states
"Why are the booster pumps started with their discharge valves open".
The only instance where this is done at the plant is when starting the condensate booster pumps.
Several systems exist at Nine Mile 2 with booster pumps.
One example is the RBCLCW booster pump and they are started with the discharge valve shut.
This question is not specific enough to elicit the desired response in the key, so various reasons should be accepted (no min. flow protection, etc.) or drop Part 2 of the question.
Ref: N2-OP-3, Pg. 12 and N2-OP-13, Pg. 6 Resolution:
Disagree. The fact that the condensate booster pumps are the only booster pumps started with the discharge valve open limits the bounds of the question.
Because the condensate booster pump are the exception, the operator should be aware of this requirement.
If the candidate assumes (and states)
another system other than condensate, his answer will be graded according to that system operation.
Comment on question / answer 6.01:
Question asks for major differences between RHR Loops.
Although an example is given the word major requires the student to determine what is a major difference versus a minor difference.
The key is limited to six responses.
The following are also major differences:
-The A loop shares a jockey pump with LPCS (B & C do not).
-The C loop can only perform the LPCI function.
-The B loop has motor-operated flush valves to radwaste.
The
"A" loop has manual valves locally operated.
-The A & B loops have different load sequence times than
"C" loop for LOCA start.
-The A pump has a different power supply than "B" and "C" loop.
-The A & B loops has sample valves, the C loop does not.
-The A loop is connected to LPCS through a permanent spool piece (not just for testing).
Resolution:
Agree, the supplied list of differences with the exception of item 2 will be added to the answer key.
Facility supplied answer (item 2)
is non-specific in detail and would eliminate answers a, b,e, and f as acceptable.
The required answer will be 4 of 12.
No change in point value.
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Comment on question / answer 6.02:
+
The question asks for signals that will trip CSH diesel generator.
a.
The answer key does not reflect low lube oil pressure as an engine shutdown in test run condition.
OP-100B, Rev.
1,Section I.3.1.a lists low lube oil pressure as an engine shutdown.
Exam reference also lists low lube oil pressure, b.
Some students may have referred to emergency stop as manual shutdown.
The emergency stop shutdown location should not be required for credit, since it is not specified in the reference.
Diesel shutdowns due to generator problems may have been lumped c.
together as a generator lockout.
d.
Students should not be required to designate emeraency shutdowns since question does not require specific designation.
Resolution:
a. Agree, low lube oil added to list of acceptable answers.
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Required answer is 6 of 9.
No point value change.
b. Disagree, no supporting documents supplied by utility to indicate emergency stop and manual stop are one and the same
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switch.
b. Agree, the location of the emergency stop is not a requir ont but allows Emergency stop to be used for 2 of the equired answers.
Emergency stop without a location or 3 ication of 2 locations is acceptable as 1 answer, c. Agree, generator lockout is acceptable as 1 answsr.
d. Disagree, knowing that an emergency s/d, if required, is available is desirable knowledge7 Comment on question / answer 6.04:
Questiondoesnotaskforexplanatio/
fn of true responses.
Although the key does explain theyr, students should be not required to explain true respon,nss for full credit.
The word " division" should he acceptable in place of " channel" as the answer key states:
1.e. two division A pushbuttons vice two channel A pushbuttons.
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'Rocclution:
Agree, the explanation on the true responses is to assist the
grader if the candidate does provide an explanation.
The response is not required.
Agree,
" division" acceptable vise " channel" per utility comment.
Comment on question / answer 6.05:
Parts a and b ask for recirculation pump trip signals.
,a.
Incomplete start sequence should be acceptable for both part a and part b.
Ref: OP-20, Rev.
1, Section D.7.0, D.S.h
/
b.
RRCS Level 2 can also be stated as vessel level of 108.8" (low / low level).
Part c asks for pump transfers to low speed.
c.
FCV <19% open is no longer stated per OP-29, Rev. 2, Section D.8.g for response number 2.
d.
Level 3 of 159.3" is not an RRCS level as in response number 3.
Low water level or level 3 should be acceptable per QP-29, Rev.
1, Section D.8.f.
e.
A point discrepancy exists between the exam and key.
Each response should be worth.225 points vs.
.2 points.
Resolution:
Agree, incomplete start sequence will be acceptable for both Part A & B.
i Agree, RRCS Level 2 and vessel level of 108.8 will be acceptable.
Agree, FCV <19% open removed from answer key.
Agree, RRCS removedfrom answer key, replaced with low level 3
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l (159.3 in.)
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Disagree, the.1 difference from the total question point valve and total of the individual 12 required answers is ignored r
during grading unless the candidate incorrectly answers the entire question.
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Compant on qucation/cncwor 6.06:
,
RPS interralction hip to RRS could hnvo b :n otettd ca flow cignalo
for flow biased scram signals in the RPS.
Neutron monitoring interrelationshops could have included APRM signal to flow controller when in flux automatic per RRFC Chapter, Operations Technology, Rev. 3, Pg. 2 under Master Controller.
Resolution:
Disagree, Utility answer for RPS is incorrect.
The flow signals are input to NMI (APRM). as indicated in the answer key.
Agree NMI will include APRM signal to flux controller.
NMI interrelations points adjusted to: (2 9 0.25 ea.)
Comment on question / answer 6.07:
Key refers to six-second time delay when in fact the time constant is 6 seconds as per Technical Specification bases 2.2.1.2, Pg. B2-7.
The number of time constants that expire prior to trip is dependent upon how far above the setpoint the power is in en inverse relationship.
The time delay could be almost zero to approximately 30 seconds.
Mention of a time delay to simulate heat flux vice neutron level should be acceptable for full credit.
Upscale neutron trip is listed as 118% on key.
It is 15% when not in run and this should be accepted if mentioned.
Resolution:
Agree, the answer key will be changed to accept answer with a discussion of " time delay to simulate heat flux".
Agree, no credit will be lost for the ADDITION of the 15% trip, However, the answer must indicate this is a reduced or
"STARTUP" setpoint.
Comment on question / answer 6.08:
i a.
1.
LPRM upscale light vice yellow light.
2.
LPRM downscale light vice white light.
For both one and two the LPRM meter would respond if proper rod selected on four rod display.
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3.
This encwar ic only trua if a rod naar thnt LPRM w n
colcctcd.
If not th2ro would ba no indicction.
If assumed that LPRM was either upscale or downscale frcm
Parts 1 and 2 might state that annunciator and upscale /
downscale indication would clear.
Ref: LPRM Chapter, Operations Technology, Rev. 3, Pg 6 and Figure 3.
b.
May also state that alarm set to prevent local overpower condition.
.
Resolution:
a.1 & 2 Agree, color of lamp not required if identified as LPRM upscale or LPRM downscale.
a.3 Agree, since the answer depends on the rod being selected and this was not indicated in the question' part a.3 will be deleted with the points redistributed in the question, part a will be (2 9.75 ea).
b.
Disagree, The LPRM upscale does not prevent a local overpower condition.
However " Indicate a local overpower condition will be acceptable."
Comment on question / answer 6.09:
If explanation in part b was that normal rod movement would not be allowed (i.e. errors and blocks would result) the answer to part a may be NO.
For part b - any explanation of what causes errors and blocks from the RWM should be accepted for full credit.
Point distribution for required phrases should be relaxed.
Resolution:
Disagree, inward rod motion is allowed.
If the candidate clearly and correctly explains the rod movement restriction in part b then credit may be given for a
"no" answer in part a.
However, the examiner cannot assume the candidate's knowledge.
Part b answer must be complete and correct.
Disagree, although the causes of rod blocks and errors must be included, a list of them does not answer the question.
The answer must be directed at the specific reasons the rod will or will not insert / withdrawal.
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- Comm:nt on qu stion/enewar 6.10:
d.
Mode switch to shutdown is a method of manual scram as per RPS,
.
Operations Technology, Rev.
3, Pg 2.
It is bypassed automatically ten seconds after actuation per Table 1 of RPS.
Operations Technology, Rev.
3, Pg 22.
f.
APRM inop scram signal can be bypassed by an inop inhibit pushbutton in APRM drawer.
This should be accepted if mentioned.
Ref: APRM, Operations Technology, Rev.
3, Pg. 9.
Resolution:
Disagree, being a method of manual scram and being the manual scram are not one of the same.
Only the mode switch to S/D scram is bypassed not manual scram.
If the candidata clearly states the mode switch scram is bypassed in 10 sec then credit will be given.
Agree, the normal method to bypass the inop trip would be the joystick.
Since the question did not stipulate normal ops or testing the inop inhibit will be acceptable.
Answer will be scored (1 of 2 0 0.5).
Comment on question / answer 6.11:
b.
Under failed low the statement about the inop circuit function whenever total LPRM's less than 14 is not true.
This statement applies to APRM inop circuit.
RBM circuit requires 50% of the inputs for averaging.
Ref: RBM, Operations Technology, Rev.
3, Pg. 3 under Count Circuit.
Resolution:
Agree,
"14" changed to "<50%".
Comment on question / answer 7.01:
The answer in the key only contains the first step in the off-normal procedure, which is not broken down into "immediate" and " subsequent" actions.
Some answers may be broader in scope,
I
'cnd full credit ch:uld not bo teksn off for failura to cention all
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of tho ep:cifica of tha cnnwar in tha key.
Ref:.
N2-OP-29, Rev. 1, Pg. 27.
Resolution:
Disagree, the desired answer for this question is the first statement of the answer key.
The additional information supplied within parens is to assist ths grader in under-'
standing the procedural step and to assist grading the answer if this information is supplied by the candidate.
Comment on question / answer 7.02:
The setpoint of 119 psig should not be required.
The reason for the caution stated in OP-21 is not answered in that OP, but rather in OP-101A, and that does not reference the setpoint.
Demonstated knowledge of removing the TSV closure scram bypass, and the result, should be sufficient.
Ref:
N2-OP-101A, Rev.
1, Pg. 9 Also, the key has two (2) responses that total 1.5 points, but the exam indicates the question to be worth two (2) points.
Resolution:
Agree, if the answer clearly states the cause of the scram is from removing the TSV closure scram bypass then the setpoint will not be required.
Agree, each section of the question should be worth 1.00 question value remains 2.0.
Comment on question / answer 7.03:
Immediately reduce H2 pressure should be an acceptable alternate because it is understood that the only means of immediately reducing the pressure in this procedure is by opening the emergency dump valve.
Ref:
N2-OP-22D, Rev. O, Pg. 4
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Disagree, it is not understood that the only means of immediately reducing the pressure is via the emers. dump valve.
The candidate must state that the H2 is dumped, vented, or depressurized, etc.
Something to imply
" emergency action".
" Reducing pressure" alone is insufficient. It is agreed that the specific valve number is not required.
C:mment on question / answer 7.04:
b.
The required action to be taken, as outlined in the LCO for Safety Relief Valves, is to place the mode switch to shutdown.
Reducing recire flow is a procedural step that is done if temperature has not yet reached 110 F to minimize the effects of the transient on the plant.
Therefore, the answer should be limited to " Place the mode switch to shutdown".
Ref:
N2-EOP-SPT, Step 5 and NMP2 Tech. Spec. 3.4.2, Action b, Pg.
3/4,4-10.
Resolution:
Agree, per NMP2 T.S. & proc. references.
The required action
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is to place mode switch to s/d.
Since the question states the limits have been exceeded, reducing recire flow is incorrect to perform, and points will be deducted if this is stated.
Comment on question / answer 7.06:
b.
An entirely different interpretation can be made of this question than the answer key reflects.
The question never states that the pressure was below 1037, making it unclear whether a new entry condition was reached.
A discussion of loss of the turbine bypass valves could be given.
An answer that discusses uses of alternate means to control pressure in RP should be acceptable for full credit.
Ref:
N2-EOP-RP, Step 7 Resolution:
Disagree, the information was limited to focus the candidate attention on water level.
The discussion on the loss cf TBV may be acceptable if the candidate states his assumption the pressure was > 1037 psig.
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- * Consent cn qucatien/c'ncrar 7.07:
The second part of the answer is performed if further reduction
in power is required, and is considered a contingent action.
Equal weighting for that response is a little unfair.
More weight should be given to reducing power the required amount.
Ref:
N2-OP-8, Rev. O, Pg. 10 Resolution:
Agree, point value changed to ist part 1.5 2nd part
.5, total question value remains at 2.0.
Comment on question / answer 7.08:
This question refers to a procedure which is far from routine.
Plant policy on this is that it will be referred to when operating in the listed condition, so memorization of this procedure is not required.
This question should be dropped because it illicits a very specific answer, to a very specific case that is not required to be memorized.
(That's why this off-normal, for this rare case, was written.)
Resolution:
Disagree, most EOP/AOP are "far from routine".
How routine the procedure is does not establish the need for knowledge of the procedure.
If plant conditions were serious to cause implementation of the procedure it would be required to be known.
It is agreed that verbation knowledge of the conditions are not required.
Comment on question / answer 7.09:
Another answer is possible that is located in the Precautions /
Limitations Section of the procedure which states that the pumps are not detonation proof and using them at power, with the resultant H2 concern, may be a problem.
Credit should be given for this answer.
Ref:
N2-OP-9, Rev. O, Pg. 2 Resolution:
Agree, The possibility of detonation is accepted and will be added
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to tha cn:wer k:y co cn cn wer.
Comment on question / answer 7.10:
a.
" Power greater than 4% (the setpoint) should be acceptable in lieu of saying APRM not downscale, b.
The key references only a portion of the items to be verified after SLC initiation.
Other are:
-Power decreasing-Reactor Water Clean-up (RWCU) isolated These should be accepted among the five items.
Also, the following are equivalents:
Pump amps (vs pump running)
-Squib valves fired (vs white light out)
-Pump suction valves open (vs storage tank outlet or HOVlA/B open)
Ref:
N2-OP-36A, Rev.
1, Pg. 7 Resolution:
a.
Agree, the setpoint is acceptable vice APRM downscale.
b.
Agree to:
-power decreasing-RWCU insulation and the eqtivalents:
pump amps for pump running
.
pump suction valve for storage tank outlet valves, mov 1A/B.
Disagree to:
squib valves fired This is what is to be verified.
White lights out is the indication.
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Comment on question / answer 7.11:
The first part of the question asks for an explanation of the caution
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and the key never answers this, and credit should be given for this I
which will effect the point distribution.
An acceptable answer will I
be based on the reactor becoming more responsive (or power changing more rapidly) as criticality is approached.
Equal weighting is not given to all the answer sections in the key,
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r cnd thic io not reflectcd in the qucstion.
B2ccd on tho cont;nt of
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- the cncwcr k y, cquel point distribution would caca warrcnted.
- The answer for Order of Control Rod Withdrawal is not reflected in
the reference - it does not discuss coupling (earlier revisions did, however).
The applicable reference revision discusses rod worth being affected by it's axial position in the core, and states that the first rod in a group is generally worth more than successive rods in that group.
Answer based on this should be given full credit.
Ref:
N2-OP-101A, Rev.
1, Pg. 2 Resolution:
Agree, the wording of the question implies a separate answer.
The intent was how xenon, temp and order of control rod withdrawal affects reactor period during a S/U.
If a candidate answers the first part independently of the remainder of the question, his answer will be considered on the whole, including the first part.
Disagree, The point distribution is only.25 points off of equal.
This is intentional as temperature is normally only a minor concern for the operator.
Xenon and rod pattern are more important.
Agree, an answer based on the first rod having higher worth will l
be acceptable.
l l
Comment on question / answer 7.12:
a.
There are additional indications of an uncoupled rod other than listed in the key.
They are:
-Improper power response-Loss of full out light b.
The procedure is lengthier than the key, and some responses may include other steps.
This should not be marked as incorrect.
Ref:
N2-OP-101A, Rev.
1, Pg 6 and N2-OP-96, Rev. 2, Pg. 15 Resolution:
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Agree, the following indication added to the answer key:
-improper power response Disagree, The following indication is not supported in facility refernence.
-loss of full out light Examiner's correction: "No stall flow" is an incorrect answer.
Therefore it is removed from the answer key.
Reference: N2-op-96, pg 15
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c
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- Agrco, tha cnew;r k:y d2airos only tha thrco main stcps.
- No cr:dit lonc if othara (corrtet) cra includ:d.
Comment on question / answer 8.03:
This question required response from an action statement from Tech. Spec. Table 3.3.1-1.
This Technical Specification action statement was not provided to the candidates in the exam package.
A page check of the package was conducted during the exam to verify this.
The candidates cannot be expected to remember Technical Specification action statements so the question should be deleted.
Resolution:
Disagree, The action required by this Tech. Spec. is required within 15 minutes and is expected to be known by an SRO.
Comment on question / answer 8.04:
b.
Since an RWP is only required under specific conditions any condition not specified for requiring one should be acceptable.
Also, an RWP would not be required for an emergency action in a radiation area. (Example - EPP-3, Section 4.4.1, Pg. 7).
Also, question states under what conditions implying more than one and then only gives one condition on the key.
Resolution:
Disagree, the procedure states " pass through".
No support documents provided with comment to justify "any condition not specified for requiring one".
To be acceptable.
Agree, access for emerg/ rescue will be added to answer key.
Agree, answer on key changed to include emerg/ rescue entry.
Points changed for part b (2 9 0.5 ea).
Comment on question / answer 8.06:
Question solicits three responses by asking what "three types of
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ttsta" yot 25% of tha crcdit on tho key is cwardad for scyins
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"Oparntors parformins" which is not ono of tha tacts, and m2kss tha entwar four(4) points.
,
- Question states tests that are exempt from markups implying a markup is never required.
The reference does not use the term exempt and in fact some Operator survellance tests do require markups.
Examples:
N2-OSP-CSH-R001 Prereq. 6.5 - Red Markup N2-OSP-CSL-R 9 001 Step 7.1.6 - Blue Markup N2 OSP ICS R @ 001 Step 7.1.8 - Red Markup Based on this, the question should be deleted since it was taken out of context from the reference AP-3.3.1 Resolution:
Disagree, but to clarify, the answer key will be rewritten:
a.
Operators performing a Surveillance Test b.
Operators performing instrument checks c.
Operators performing equipment operability tests.
(3 9.66 ea)
Disagree, the word exempt does not imply a markup is never required from specific steps within that procedure.
Disagree, the question will not be deleted.
Comment on question / answer 8.07:
b.
Could say authorize up to 1000 mr vice current quarterly limit.
Ref: S-RP-1, Rev. 5, Pg. 2 Resolution:
.
Agree, 1000 mr vise quarterly limit is acceptable and will be added to the answer key.
Comment on question / answer 8.08:
b.
For part b an argument to the fact that critical power is lower
at low flow conditions might also be used for explanation.
I Ref:
G.E. BWR Academic Series, Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow, l
Chapter 9, Pg. 9-28
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,,Rocoiution:
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~tha explanation of C.P. chtnca with flow par GE BWR Agroo, HT.& FR che p.:9-28 will be added to_the answer key.
Comment on question / answer 8.09:
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Part a was not specific as to differences between evacuation
.i.e.
Answer key requirred what-initiating conditions dilineated.
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the difference.
Some candidates may have described differences in procedural steps between the two types.of evacuation since they.are significantly different.
If a candidate took this position, full credit should be given.
Ref: N2-OP-78, Rev. 1, Remote Shutdown Also,' Answer key only talked about an Appendix R evacuation.
I It did not consider a non-appendix R evacuation, although it was asked for in the question.
This should be an alternate means of answering.
Candidates may have explained the effect of operating the disecnnects
on systems at the remote shutdown panel.
Example N2-OP-78, Rev. 1.
Control of system is shifted to remote shutdown.by.use of remote transfer switches and not by the disconnects (with the exception of N2 supply for ADS accumulators).
Key implies disconnects shift control and awards a half point for saying so.
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Ref: N2-OP-78, Rev.
1, Section B, 2nd Paragraph and 4th Paragraph, Pg.
1.
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Resolution:
Agree, either approach could have been used to answer the
question.
Either will be acceptable if the informatien required by the answer key is included.
Agree, the second statement concerning operation of system i
normally controlled from the PGCC is deleted.
The points (.5) will be redistributed within the question, i
Comment on question / answer 8.11:
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4-Answer would change if candidate assumed wrong valve in system.
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Alco, tha quastion doma not Siva snouch information to datsraina
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that HPCS is inopercble; i.e. you still hnva a flew path fron
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suppression pool to vessel.
Question arises over whether enough flow can be developed.
Some candidates may have decided HPCS was operable per LCO and no HPCS action would apply.
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b.
Valve not identified except by number.
If HPCS LCO is all that is referenced (as in answer key) then HPCS is operable (valve could be opened and left open).
When primary containment isolation LCO 3.6.3 is referenced, you would determine that the valve must be closed, since it cannot be isolated by remote manual.
When it is closed HPCS would be inoperable.
Key should reflect reference to 3.6.3.a.
Resolution:
Disagree, candidates were informed during exam that the valve was HPCG valve 2CSH*MOV118.
Disagree, if the answer key is incomplete or incorrect it does not permit the candidate to be incomplete or incorrect.
The purpose of this review is to comment on the key to make it complete and correct.
It is interaction between T.S. 3.5.1.C and 3.6.3.A that makes HPCS inop.
This is what should be identified in answer.
Comment on question / answer 8.13:
Although by the letter of Technical Specifications, a startup to condition two would be allowed you could not go to condition one until temperature is below 90 F.
Some candidates may have said NO and explained why they would not start up if unable to reach condition one.
If the explanation shows an understanding of the Technical Specification, full credit should be awarded.
Also, the answer key should not require mention of 120 F with MSIV's closed, since it is not necessary to fully answer the question.
Resolution:
Disagree, the question specifically asked if condition 2 can be entered per the NMP2 Tech. Spec.
The answer is yes per referenced T.S.