IR 05000410/1986065
| ML20235G291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1987 |
| From: | Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235G041 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-438 NUDOCS 8709290547 | |
| Download: ML20235G291 (3) | |
Text
a **e,q(o.
s s
UNITED ST ATES
>
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COnedlSSION
,
y S
nEGt0N I l
431 F ARK AVENUE 0,
'%
- [
KlNG OF PR US$1 A. PENN1Yt.V ANI A 49406
-
,,,,,
FF Docket No. 50-410
.
l File RI-86-A-143
%
N
.
This relates to your letter dated December 6,1986 and our conversation on
December 11, 1986, in which your expressed concerns regarding the hydraulic l
fluid in the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) actuators at the Nine Mile
'
Point Unit 2 nuclear power plant.
Our inspection regarding this matter has been completed, and our findings are documented in the enclosed pages from Inspection Report 50-410/86-65 dated February 11, 1987.
This concludes the Regional Staff's activities regarding this matter.
We appreciate you informing us of your concerns. We feel that our actions in this matter have been responsive to those concerns; however, should you have further questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely
.
-
i.,
mes C. Linville, C
.f
eactor Projects Sec ion 2C Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure: As stated cc:
Paul Eddy
.informstlon In ty ?'
m accordancetv 'A Was hm Folk.
s_ (ggUdom ofInformatio m~n u
8709290547 870924 PDR FOIA WETTER H87-438 PDR
i.
'
o
'
i (d) The inspector concurred with the licensee's determination l
'
that area dif ferential pressure monitor 2HVC-PDI147 is not required by RG 1.97 to be safety related.
i
'
(e) The inspector reviewed the preoperational test procedure (N2-P0T-53-3, Rev.1) which was conducted to verify that the maximum outside air flow does not exceed 1500 CFM and that L
control room pressure can be maintained as required in the FSAR. The inspector concluded that the current design
'
adequately achieves and maintains these design parameters.
(f) The inspector concluded that the existing design of the
'
control room HVAC system, coupled with the lower Technical Specification limit of 90 degrees F in the control room, will not result in exceeding equipment operating temperature Itmits or endanger control room operators from a habitability standpoint.
Allegation 86-A-143:
An allegation was received concerning the cleanliness of the hydraulic oil being used in the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) actuators. The alleger stated that
. controls on the replacement of the hydraulic oil were inadequate and that the oli in the actuator sumps was contaminated.
MSIV actuators required modification to meet the Technical Specification MSIV closure time requirements.
To eerform the modification, the oil was drained from the actuators. After the completion of the necessary modifications, the hydraulic oil was replaced with new oil.
The resident inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedural controls for the MSIV hydraulic oil replacement and discussed the most recent oil change with licensee representatives involved.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had previously addressed the quality of the hydraulic fluid with the vendor. Oil quality specifications were obtained from the vendor for onsite chemical analysis.
Replacement oil was sampled and found satisfactory prior to use.
Stone & Webster construction personnel, involved with the hydraulic oil replacement, were interviewed and it was determined that clear plastic five gallon containers were used to transport the hydraulic fluid from the 55 gallon storage drums in the warehouse to the Reactor Building for addition to the actuator sumps.
The inspector found this to be acceptable.
After the licensee became aware of this allegation, each RSIV actuator hydraulic oil sump was sampled through a sump drain valve. All samples were satisfactory and the analysis results were documented in the licensee's Chemistry Maintenance Procedure.
Inspector review of this procedure identified no specification for visual clarity / suspended solids.
The lack of a visual clarity check was addressed with the licensee. NMPC had concluded that some discoloration of the oil occurs normally during usage, and that this discoloration was acceptable.
It was determined that
,
l I
i
_ _ _ - __. _ _ - _ _ _ - _
._
_ - _ _ _ _.
_ _ _ -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.. -'
,
,
.
O the hydraulic fluid system filter (40 microns) is designed to remove any particulate and prevent any mechanical fouling of the hydraulic
~
components. One of the filters recently removed was opened for inspector review. The inspector found the filter to be in good condition, consider-ing it had never previously been replaced.
Inspector review of the licensee's actuator maintenance procedure identi-fled that the procedure had not beer revised to reflect the current actuator design.
Via discussion with responsible maintenance personnel, the inspector determined that the proposed revision will also include: how to_ add oil to the actuators, if required; how to check the' oil level; and,
-
how to remove, inspect and clean the system filter.
It was also deter-mined that chemistry procedures will be revised to address the proper hydraulic fluid sample frequency requirements.
Based of the. inspectors' review, the concern could not be substantiated for the MSIV actuators as currently asseebied.
TSe'pending revisions to the maintenance and chemistry procedures will be reviewed by the resident inspectors in a subsequent inspection report.
No violations were identified.
8.
Failure to Identify Inoperable Component - Unit 1 On itovember 21, 1956, the licensee notified the NRC, via the ENS, of a potential loss of the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) due to the failure of Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC) heat exchanger No.
13. Through wall leakage had been discovered during a hydrostatic test conducted en May 20,1986 (during the 1986 refueling outage). The Inservic: Inspection (ISI) group which conducted the test, requested a disposition of the heat exchanger from corporate engineering on June 16, 1986.
Corporate engineering evaluated the heat exchanger, which had been leaking since 1978, as functionally operable and recommended a method of repair. However, no evaluation was done of the effects of a seismic event on the heat exchanger or of the ability of the Condensate Transfer System to supply makeup to RBCLC.
In August 1986, after completion of the refueling outage, a potential 10 CFR 21 report reveiw was initiated. The review identified that, in a seismic event, the end of the heat exchanger could fall off causing a complete loss of RBCLC. This catastrophic failure would render HPCI and CREV inoperable due to lack of cooling water and seal water supplied by RBCLC.
However, this concern was not realized by station personnel until the week of November 9, 1986. The heat exchanger was isolated on November 14, 1986.