05000424/LER-1990-012

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LER 90-012-00:on 900529,discovered That Sequencer Delay Times Not Taken Into Account During Summation Procedure for Control Room Emergency Filtration Sys.Caused by Inadequate Procedure Review.Procedures changed.W/900628 Ltr
ML20055D196
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 06/28/1990
From: Hairston W, Odom R
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
ELV-01825, ELV-1825, LER-90-012, LER-90-12, NUDOCS 9007050133
Download: ML20055D196 (4)


LER-2090-012,
Event date:
Report date:
4242090012R00 - NRC Website

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' Geotpa F%er Company =

333 Pedmoit Avenue ,

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s Atlanta, Georgia 30308 "

'M l Totephone 404 526 3195 '

Maang Address.

40 laverness centor Pwkwa/-

' Fw Office Box 1295; Birminghant Alabama 35201 Telephore 205 B68 5581 June 28, 1990 ,5.somen on rec 3ysem W. G. Halfston,111 Sen.or Vce President

- Nuclear Oceations ELV-01825 460 DocketiNo. 50-424' U." S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk-

' Washington, D. C. 20555

- Gentlemen:

V0GTLE' ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

, INADEQUATE TESTING LEADS TO INADEQUATELY PERFORMED SURVElllANCE' In'accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the-enclosed report related to an event which was discovered on May 29, 1990.

Sincerely,

, NY W. G. Hairston, III WGH,III/NJS/gm

Enclosure:

LER 50-424/1990-012 xc: Georaia Power Company Mr. C.. K.'McCoy Mr.: G. -Bockhold, Jr.

Mr. P. D. Rushton Mr. R. M. Odom

. NORMS-g U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission Mr. S. D. -Ebneter, Regional Administrator -

Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. B. R. Bonser,' Senior Resident inspector, Vogtle 9007050133 900628 Z g 'gDR ADOCK 05000424 7 q.

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On 5-29-90,'a system engineer was performing ESFAS response time summations based on results from tests completed during the Spring 1990 refueling outage.

The summation procedure requires that the response time for the Control. Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) be de'grmined. It was found that no response time had been measured for either of the unit's Control Building-Control Room (CBCR) fans. Further review revealed that sequencer delay times (also a part of the overall. CREFS response time) had not been taken into account in the original performance of this surveillance on either unit. The Shift Supervisors were notified of this condition and Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) were initiated for both Units 1 and 2 which required starting two trains of the CREFS in tne emergency mode.

The cause of this event was an inadequate review of the basis for the Control Room Emergency Filtration System response time which resulted in inadequate procedures. The review failed to account for sequencer delay times as required by.the Technical Specifications.

The four affected fans in Unit 1 and Unit 2 have been tested and their response times were within expected values. Sequencer delay times have been measured on both trains for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and the summed response times are ithin allowable values.

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A. = REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT  !

,,. This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the plant ,

E operated in violation of Technical Specification (TS) requirements for  !

? performing surveillances. j B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT At the time of the discovery of this event, both Unit I and Unit 2 were  !

operating -in Mode 1 (power operation) at 100% of rated thermal- power. There_ j was no inoperable equipment which contributed to the occurrence of this  !

event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

-Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.2 requires that the .

response-time of each Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)  !

function be demonstrated to be within its time limit at least once per 18 months. Definition 1.12 of the Technical Specifications states that these  ;

times "...shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading '

delays where applicable.  ;

, On 5-29-90, a system engineer was performing CSFAS response time summations

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based on results from tests completed during the Spring 1990 Unit I refueling outage. Step 5.9.31 of procedure 54800-1, " Engineered Safety

-Features Response Time Summation Four Channel Systems," requires using the ,

response time for the. Control Building Control Room (CBCR) filter unit fan .

1-1531-N1-002 in these' summations. .However, it was found that no response time had been measured for this fan or the opposite train CBCR filter unit fan. Further review revealed that the sequencer delay times had not been taken into account during the Spring 1990 surveillance or the previous  ;

surveillances for Unit 1 or Unit 2.  !

The Shift Supervisors were notified of this condition and Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) were initiated for the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) for both Units 1 and 2 which required starting two trains of the CREFS in the emergency mode.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT The cause of this event was an inadequate review of the basis for the CREFS response time which resulted in inadequate procedures for obtaining the response times. No procedure adequately took into account TS definition 1.12, which requires the inclusion of sequencer delay times.

- NRC Peree 3EBA (tL80)

OAM 304A_ U 8. CUCLLa2 E.81ULA10RY COMMtOSeO41

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0;O O;3 or 0;3 T w nr - . w ,w e w asu unn E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT The response times for all 4 CREFS fans, and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 sequencer delay times were found to be within expected values. Additionally, no event has occurred that required the operation of the CREFS to protect the occupants of the control room. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or public health and safety as a result of this event.

F .~ CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. In accordance with Action Statement 27 of TS.3.3.2, two trains of the CREFS were placed in operation in the emergency mode.
2. On 6-7-90, the four affected fans in Unit I and Unit 2 were tested and their response times were found to be within expected values.

Procedures were developed and testing was conducted to measure sequencer delay times on Unit 1 and Unit 2. On 6-28-90, these times were found to be'within the acceptance criteria.

'3. The appropriate procedures are being changed to ensure sequencer delay times and fan response times are included in response time tests.

These procedures will be revised prior to the ESFAS testing scheduled to be performed during the next refueling outages. For Unit 2, the next refueling outage is scheduled for September,1990. For Unit 1, the next

-refueling outage is scheduled for September, 1991.

4. The FSAR will be revised during the next annual update to reflect the basis for.the CREFS response time requirements.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Failed Components None
2. Previous Similar Events:

None

3. Energy Industry Identification System Code:

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System - JE Control Building Control Room liVAC - VI N!.C Penn 306A (6491