ML17306A802
| ML17306A802 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 11/02/2017 |
| From: | Simmons P Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML17306A802 (185) | |
Text
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000 Spring City, Tennessee 37381 November 2, 2017 10 cFR 50 4 10 CFR 50.71(e)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-90 and NpF-96 NRC Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391
Subject:
watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Periodic submission for Changes Made to the WBN Technical Specification Bases and Technical Requirements Manual References'. 1 . TVA letter to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 Periodic Submission for Changes Made to the WBN Technical Specification Bases and Technical Requirements Manual," dated April 22, 201 6 (M1161 134077)
- 2. NRC letter to TVA, "lssuance of Facility Operating License No.
NPF-96, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2," dated October 22, ZO1S (ML 1s251As87)
The purpose of this letter is to provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with copies of changes to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification (TS) Bases and to provide copies of changes to the Unit 1 and 2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). Copies of the TS Bases, through Revision 13T for Unit 1 and Revision 11 for Unit 2, are provided in accordance with WBN Units 1 and 2 TS Section 5.6, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program." ln addition, copies of changes to the wBN Units 1 and 2 TRM, through Revision 64 for Unit 1 and Revision 7 for Unit 2, ate provided in accordance with WBN TRM Section 5.1, "Technical Requirements (TR) Control Program." These changes have been implemented at WBN during the period since WBN Unit 1's last update (Reference 1) and since the issuance of the operating license for WBN Unit 2 (Reference 2). These changes meet the criteria described within the above control programs for which prior NRC approval is not required. Both control programs require such changes to be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.71(e).
The WBN TS Bases and TRM updates for the table of contents and change pages are provided in the enclosures.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 November 2,2017 Enclosures 1 and 2 to this submittal provide the WBN Unit 1 TS changes. Enclosures 3 and 4 to this submittal provide the WBN Unit 1 TRM changes. Enclosures 5 and 6 to this submittal provide the WBN Unit 2 TS changes. Enclosures 7 and 8 to this submittal provide the WBN Unit 2 TRM changes.
There are no new regulatory commitments in this letter. Should you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact Kim Hulvey, Manager of Watts Bar Site Licensing, at (423) 365-77 20.
Respectfully, Paul Simmons Site Vice President Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Enclosures:
1 - WBN Unit 1 Technical Specification Bases - Table of Contents 2 - WBN Unit 1 Technical Specifications Bases - Changed pages 3 - WBN Unit 1 Technical Requirements Manual - Table of Contents 4 - WBN Unit 1 Technical Requirements Manual - Changed pages 5 - WBN Unit 2 Technical Specification Bases - Table of Contents 6 - WBN Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases - Changed pages 7 - WBN Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual - Table of Contents 8 - WBN Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual - Changed pages cc (Enclosures):
NRC RegionalAdministrator - Region ll NRC Senior Resident lnspector - Watts Bar Nuclear plant NRR Project Manager - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
ENCLOSURE 1 WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPEGIFICATION BASES TABLE OF CONTENTS E-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES LtsT oF ACRONYMS ........................ vi LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES ........,.,.. Viii B 2.0 SAFEW LIMITS (SLs)............ ...8 2.0-1 B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs ...... B 2.0-1 B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL ... B 2.0-8 B30 LrMrrNG CONDTTON FOR OPEMTTON (LCO)APPlrCABrlrrY............................B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR)APPLrCABlLlry.......... ............8 3.0-10 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .....8 3.1-1 B 3.1 .1 SHUTDO\A/I{ MARGTN (SDM) T"w > 200"F ......8 3.1-1 B 3.1 .2 SHUTDO\ N MARGIN (SDM) T"w < 200'F ......83.1-7 B 3.1 .3 Core Reactivity................. ..............8 3.1-12 B 3.1 .4 ModeratorTemperature Coefficient (MTC).......... ..................8 3.1-18 B 3.1 .5 Rod Group Alignment Limits........... .................... B 3.1-24 B 3.1 .6 Shutdown Bank lnsertion Limits........ .................8 3.1-35 B 3.1 .7 ControlBank lnsertion Limits ........8 3.140 B 3.1 .8 Rod Position lndication..... B 3.148 B 31.9 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions MODE 1 ................... ...............8 3.1-55 B 3 1 10 PHYSlCSTESTSExceptionsMODE2.................. ...............B3.1$2 B 3.2 PO\A/ER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS ..........83.2-1 B 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (FO(Z)) .. .. . .......83.2-1 B 3.2.2 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (F"aH)......... ..................8 3.2-12 B 3.2.3 AxtAt FLUXDTFFERENCE (AFD).. . . . ..........8 3.2-19 B 3.2.4 QUADRANTPO\ /ERTlLTRATlO(OPTR) ......83.2-24 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION,...... ..B 3.3.1 B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) 1nstrumentation................................................ B 3.3-1 B 3.3.2 Eng ineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) lnstrumentation................ ....................B 3.3-O4 B 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) lnstrumentation................ ...8 3.3-121 B334 Remote Shutdown System ............B 3.3-141 B 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG)
Start lnstrumentation ..............B 3.3-147 B 3.3.6 Containment Vent lsolation lnstrumentation............ B 3.3-154 B 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation lnstrumentation................ ................ B 3.3-163 B338 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)
Actuation lnstrumentation................ .............8 3.3-171 (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 Revision 90
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS).......... ..........8 3.4-1 B 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits B 3.4-1 B 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticahty . ........ ... ............. B 3.4 B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits........... .............B 3.4-9 B 3.4.4 RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2......... ................8 3.4-17 B 3.4.5 RCS Loops-MODE 3................... ....................83.4-21 B 3.4.6 RCS Loops-MODE 4................... ....................B 3.4-27 B 3.4.7 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Fi11ed............ .....8 3.4-33 B3.48 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled..... .....B 3.4-38 B 3.4.9 Pressurizer.. ...............8 3.44'l B 3.4.10 PressurizerSafetyValves .............B 3.446 B 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS)...... ................8 3.4-5'l B 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) B 3.4-58 B 3.4.1 3 RCS Operational 1EAKAGE.................. ...........B 3.4-74 B 3.4.14 RCS Pressure lsolation Valve (PlV) Leakage....... ..................8 3.4-81 B 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection lnstrumentation................ ................8 3.4-87 B 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity B 3.4-93 B 3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube lntegrity ...............8 3.4-99 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLTNG SYSTEMS (ECCS) ....................B 3.5-1 B 3.5.1 Accumulators ...........B 3.5-1 B 3.5.2 ECCS-Operating.......... ..............8 3.5-10 B 3.5.3 ECCS-Shutdown.......... .............8 3.5-20 B 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)....... .....83.5-24 B35s Seallnjection F1ow............. ............8 3.5-31 B 3.6 CoNTAlNMENT SYSTEMS.................. .B 3.6-1 B 3.6.1 Containment ...............8 3.6-1 B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks ...................8 3.6 B36.3 Containment lsolation Valves .......8 3.6-14 B 3.6.4 Containment Pressure...... .............8 3.6-28 B36.s Containment Air Temperature............... ............. B 3.6-31 B36.6 Containment Spray Systems.................. ...........B 3.6-35 B 3.6.7 Hydrogen Recombiners - Deleted .....................B 3.6-43 B36.8 Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS) ..................8 3.6.49 B 3.6.9 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) ....B 3.6-55 B 3.6.10 Air Return System (ARS). .... . .....B 3.660 B 3 6.11 lce Bed ..8 3.6-65 B 3.6.12 lce Condenser Doors....... 83.6-74 B 3.6.1 3 Divider Barrier lntegrity........ ..........8 3.6-84 B 3.6.14 Containment Recirculation Drains . B 3.6-90 B 3.6.15 Shield Building.................. ..............8 3.6-95 (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 Revision 82,94
TABLE OF CONTENTS (conttnued)
B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS,.. ..........B 3,7.1 B 3.7.1 Main Steam SafetyValves (MSSVS)...... ...........8 3.7-1 B 3.7.2 Main Steam lsolation Valves (MSlVs) 83.7-7 B 3.7.3 Main Feedwater lsolation Valves (MFlVs) and Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVS) and Associated Bypass Va1ves.......... ........ B 3.7-13 B 3.7.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)...... ..............8 3.7-20 B37.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW System......... ..........8 3.7-24 B 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) .83.7-U B 3.7.7 Component Cooling System (CCS).......... .......8 3.7-38 B37.8 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW System........ .............8 3.743 B 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)........... ....83.748 B 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) .......B 3.7-51 B 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature ControlSystem (CREATCS). B 3.7-58 B 3.7.12 Aufliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)...... ........8 3.7$2 B 3.7.1 3 Fuelstorage PoolWater Level............ ...............B 3.768 B 3.7.14 Secondary Speclfic Activity................. ...............8 3.7-71 B 3.7-1 5 Spent FuelAssembly Storage ......8 3.7-75 B 3.7-16 Component Cooling System (CCS) - Shutdown.... ................8 3.7-78 B 3.7-17 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System Shutdown.... B 3.7-83 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS... .....8 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating ..............B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown.... ..........B 3.8-37 B 3.8.3 DieselFuelOil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air................ B 3.843 B 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating.... ..........8 3.8-54 B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown.... ..........8 3.8-70 B386 Battery CellParameters............... ..83.8-74 B 3.8.7 lnverters-Operating........ ............8 3.8-81 B 3.8.8 lnverters-Shutdorarn ...................B 3.8-85 B38.9 Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.89 B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown....... ..............B 3.8-99 B 3.9 REFUELTNG OPERATlONS.................. ....................B 3.9-1 B 3.9.1 Boron Concentration......... ..............8 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Unborated Water Source lsolation Valves ........ B 3.9-5 B3.93 Nuclear lnstrumentation ................ B 3.9-8 B 3.9.4 Deleted B 3.9-12 B3.95 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation
- High Water Level B 3.9-17 B396 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation
- Low Water Leve! ................... B 3.9-21 B 3.9.7 Refueling Cavity Water Leve1............ ..................8 3.9-25 B39.8 Deleted . B 3.9-29 B 3.9.9 Spent FuelPoolBoron Concentration................... ..................B 3.9-33 B 3 9.10 Decay Time............ ...B 3.9-35 Watts Bar-Unit 1 Revision 123
LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title Paqe Paqe B 3.8.1-2 TS Action or Surveillance Requirement (SR)
Contingency Actions........ .................... B 3.8-36 B 3.8.9-1 AC and DC ElectricalPower Distribution Systems....... .B 3.8-98 Watts Bar-Unit 1
LIST OF FIGURES Fiqure No. Title Page B 2.1.1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limits vs Boundary of Protection ...................8 2.0:7 B 3.1.7-1 Control Bank lnsertion vs Percent RTP............. ......... B 3.147 B 3.2.1-1 K(z) - Normalized Fq(z) as a Function of Core Height ...83.2-11 B 3.2.3-1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE Acceptable Operation Limits as a Function of RATED THERMAL POWER ..83.2-23 Watts Bar-Unit 1
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 1 ot 2)
Acronym Title ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ACRP Auxiliary Control Room Panel ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AFD Axial Flux Difference AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System ARO All Rods Out ARFS Air Return Fan System ADV Atmospheric Dump Valve BOC Beginning of Cycle CAOC Constant Axial Offset Control CCS Component Cooling System CFR Code of Federal Regulations COLR Core Operating Limits Report CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System CSS Containment Spray System CST Condensate Storage Tank DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EFPD Effective Full-Power Days EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EOC End of Cycle ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning LCO Limiting Condition For Operation MFIV Main Feedwater lsolation Valve MFRV Main Feedwater Regulation Valve MSIV Main Steam Line lsolation Valve MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient NMS Neutron Monitoring System ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual PCP Process Control Program PDMS Power Distribution Monitoring System PIV Pressure lsolation Valve PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve PTLR Pressure and Temperature Limits Report QPTR Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio RAOC Relaxed Axial Offset Control RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal RTP Rated Thermal Power Watts Bar-Unit 1 Revision 104
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 2 of 2)
Acronvm Title RTS Reactor Trip System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SG Steam Generator SI Safety lnjection SL Safety Limit SR Surveillance Requirement UHS Ultimate Heat Sink Watts Bar-Unit 1 vil
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B 3.4-22 0 B 3.4-69 0 B 3.4-23 82 8.3.4-70 0 B 3.4-24 0 B 3.4-71 7 B 3.4-25 79 B 3.4-72 7 B 3.4-26 29 B 3.4-73 89 B 3.4-27 123 B 3.4-74 82 B 3.4-28 123 B 3.4-75 82 B 3.4-29 123 B 3.4-76 82 B 3 4-30 123 B 3 4-77 82 B 3.4-31 123 B 3.4-78 82 B 3.4-32 79 B 3.4-79 82 B 3.4-33 79 B 3.4-80 82 B 3.4-34 79 B 3.4-81 0 B 3.4-35 82 B 3.4-82 0 B 3.4-36 79 B 3 4-83 0 B 3.4-37 29 B 3.4-84 0 B 3.4-38 0 B 3.4-85 89 B 3.4-39 68 B 3.4-86 89 B 3.4-40 0 B 3,4-87 92 B 3.4-41 0 B 3.4-88 12 B 3.4-42 0 B 3.4-89 92 B 3.4-43 0 B 3.4-90 92 B 3.4-44 29 B 3.4-91 92 B 3.4-45 29 B 3.4-92 92 B.3.446 0 B 3.4-93 52 B 3.447 0 B 3.4-94 118 B 3.4-48 0 B 3.4-95 52 B 3.4-49 89 B 3.4-96 118 B 3.4-50 89 B 3.4-97 118 B 3.4-51 0 B 3.4-98 118 B 3.4-52 42 B 3.4-99 82 B 3.4-53 6B B 3.4-1 00 82 B 3.4-54 42 B 3.4-101 82 B 3.4-55 42 B 3.4-102 82 B 3.4-56 42 B 3.4-103 82 B 3.4-57 89 B 3.4-104 82 B 3.4-58 0 B 3.5-1 0 B 3.4-59 0 B 3.5-2 39 B 3 4-60 0 B35-3 39 B 3.4-61 0 B 3.5-4 39 B 3.4-62 0 B 3.5-5 0 B 3.4-63 0 B 3.5-6 98 B 3.4-64 0 B 3.5-7 98 B 3.4-65 68 B 3.5-8 0 B 3.4-66 0 B 3.5-9 98 B 3.4-67 68 B 3.5-1 0 61 B 3.4-68 0 B 3.5-1 1 0 Watts Bar-Unit 1 xil Revision 123
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Revision Page Revision Nu.mher: Number. N.-u.mh"p"r; Number:
B 3.6-72 36 B 3.7-21 0 B 3.6-72a 36 B 3.7-22 68 B 3.6-73 36 B 3.7-23 24 B 3.6-74 0 B 3.7-24 0 B 3.6-75 0 B 3.7-25 0 B 3.6-76 0 B 3.7-26 0 B 3.6-77 0 B 3.7-27 0 B 3.6-78 36 B 3.7-28 68 B 3 6-79 0 B 3.7-29 0 B 3.6-80 6 B 3 7-30 0 B 3.6-81 6 B 3.7-31 89 B 3.6-82 21 B 3.7-32 20 B 3 6-83 6 B 3.7-33 89 B 3.6-84 0 B 3.7-34 0 B 3 6-85 0 B 3 7-35 41 B 3.6-86 0 B 3.7-36 0 B 3.6-87 0 B 3.7-37 29 B 3.6-88 0 B 3.7-38 136 B 3.6-89 0 B 3.7-39 0 B 3.6-90 0 B 3.740 136 B 3.6-91 0 B 3.741 136 B 3.6-92 0 B 3.742 136 B 3.6-93 0 B 3.743 0 B 3.6-94 0 B 3.744 0 B 3.6-95 129 B 3.745 0 B 3.6-96 129 B 3.746 0 B 3.6-97 129 B 3.747 0 B 3.6-98 129 B 3.748 0 83 6-99 129 B 3.7-49 0 B 3.7-1 31 B 3.7-50 29 B 3.7-2 31 B 3.7-51 91 B 3.7-3 41 B 3.7-52 91 B 3.74 121 B 3.7-53 91 B 3.7-5 121 B 3.7-54 117 B 3.7-6 89 B 3.7-55 122 B 3.7-7 0 B 3.7-56 122 B 3.7-8 0 B 3.7-57 91 B 3.7-9 0 B 3.7-57a 91 B 3.7-10 0 B 3.7-58 64 B 3.7-11 0 B 3.7-59 64 B 3.7-12 89 B 3.7-59a 134 B 3.7-13 76 B 3.7-60 45 B 3.7-14 0 B 3.7-61 64 B 3.7-1 5 0 B 3.7-62 119 B 3.7-16 0 B 3.7-62a 119 B 3.7-17 76 B 3.7-63 119 B 3.7-18 89 B 3.7-64 119 B.3.7-19 89 B 3.7-65 119 B 3.7-20 0 B 3.7-66 35 Watts Bar-Unit 1 xiv Revision 136
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Revision Page Revision Number. Numb.p-r; Nurnber: N-u.mh"gn B 3.7-67 119 B 3.8-22 115 B 3.7-68 119 B 3.8-23 115 B 3.7-69 0 B 3.8-24 0 B 3.7-70 119 B 3.8-25 0 B 3.7-71 47 B 3.8-26 115 B 3.7-72 0 B 3.8-27 19 B 3.7-73 0 B 3.8-28 50 B 3.7-74 0 B 3.8-29 115 B 3.7-75 61 B 3 8-30 0 B 3.7-76 61 B 3.8-31 115 B 3.7-77 61 B 3.8-32 132 B 3.7-78 123 B 3.8-33 0 B 3.7-79 123 B 3.8-34 125 B 3.7-80 123 B 3.8-35 125 B 3.7-81 123 B 3.8-36 125 B 3.7-82 123 B 3.8-36a 132 B 3.7-83 123 B 3.8-37 0 B 3.7-84 123 B 3.8-38 0 B 3.7-8s 123 B 3.8-39 0 B 3.7-86 123 B 3.8-40 0 B 3.7-87 123 B 3.841 0 B 3.7-88 123 B 3.842 0 B 3.7-89 123 B 3.8-43 0 B 3.7-90 123 B 3.8-44 0 B 3.8-1 125 B 3.845 0 B 3.8-2 132 B3846 0 B 3.8-3 132 B 3.847 55 B 3.8-4 125 B 3.8-48 55 B 3.84a 125 B 3.849 0 B 3.84b 125 B 3 8-50 0 B 3.8-4c 125 B 3.8-s1 29 B 3.8-5 125 B 3.8-52 106 B 3.8-6 0 B 3.8-53 29 B 3.8-7 132 B 3.8-54 105 B38-8 132 B 3 8-55 0 B 3.8-8a 132 B 3,8-56 113 B38-9 132 B 3.8-57 113 B 3.8-1 0 132 B 3.8-58 0 B 3.8-1 0a 132 B 3.8-59 0 B 3.8-1 1 132 B 3.8-60 0 B 3.8-12 132 B 3.81 69 B 3.8-1 3 132 B 3 8-62 0 B 3.8-14 132 B 3.8-63 112 B 3.8-1 5 132 B 3.8-64 66 B 3 8-16 125 B 3.8-65 19 B 3.8-17 0 B 3 8-66 19 B 3.8-18 29 B 3.8-67 19 B 3.8-1 I 125 B 3.8-68 0 B 3.8-20 125 B 3.8-69 0 B 3.8-21 115 B 3.8-70 0 Watts Bar-Unit 1 Revision 132
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B 3 .8-71 0 B 3.9-1 I 0 B 3.8-72 0 B 3 9-20 0 B 3.8-73 0 B 3.9-21 0 B 3.8-74 0 B 3.9-22 68 B 3.8-75 0 B 3.9-23 68 B 3.8-76 0 B 3.9-24 0 B 3.8-77 0 B 3.9-25 119 B 3.8-78 0 B 3 9-26 45 B 3.8-79 0 B 3.9-27 119 B 3 8-80 0 B 3.9-28 45 B 3.8-81 97 B 3.9-29 119 B 3 8-82 97 B 3.9-30 119 B 3.8-83 97 B 3.9-31 119 B 3.8-84 75 B 3.9-32 119 B 3.8-85 0 B 3.9-33 86 B 3.8-86 97 B 3.9-34 0 B 3.8-87 75 B 3.9-35 119 B 3.8-88 0 B 3.9-36 119 B 3.8-89 125 B 3.8-90 0 B 3.8-91 78 B 3.8-92 0 B 3.8-93 78 B 3.8-94 0 B 3.8-95 0 B 3.8-96 0 B 3.8-97 0 B 3.8-98 124 B 3 8-99 0 B 3 8-100 0 B 3.8-101 0 B 3.8-102 0 B 3.9-1 0 B 3.9-2 0 B 3.9-3 68 B 3.94 0 B 3.9-5 0 B39-6 68 B 3.9-7 0 B 3.9-8 0 B39-9 0 B 3.9-1 0 0 B 3.9-1 1 0 B 3.9-12 119 B 3.9-1 3 119 B 3.9-14 119 B 3.9-15 119 B 3.9-16 119 B 3.9-17 0 B 3.9-1 8 23 Watts Bar-Unit 1 xvt Revision 125
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintalned by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT NPF-20 11-09-95 Low Power Operating License Revision 1 12-08-95 Slave Relay Testing NPF-90 02-07-96 Full Power Operating License Revision 2 (Amendment 1) 12-08-95 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Suction Requirement Revision 3 03-27-96 Remove Cold Leg Accumulator Alarm Setpoints Revision 4 (Amendment 2) 06-13-96 lce Bed Surveillance Frequency And Weight Revision 5 07-03-96 Containment Airlock Door lndication Revision 6 (Amendment 3) 09-09-96 lce Condenser Lower lnlet Door Surveillance Revision 7 09-28-96 Clarification of COT Frequency for COMS Revision 8 11-21 -96 Admin Control of Containment tsol. Valves Revision 9 04-29-97 Switch Controls For Manual Cl-Phase A Revision 10 (Amendment 5) 05-27-97 Appendix-J, Option B Revision 11 (Amendment 6) 07-28-97 Spent Fuel Pool Rerack Revision 12 09-10-97 Heat Trace for Radiation Monitors Revision 13 (Amendment 7) 09-11-97 Cycle 2 Core Reload Revision 14 10-10-97 Hot Leg Recirculation Timeframe Revision 15 02-12-98 EGTS Logic Testing Revision'16 (Amendment 10) 06-09-98 Hydrogen Mitigation System Temporary Specification Revision 17 07-31-98 SR Detectors (Visual/audible indication)
Revision 18 (Amendment 11) 09-09-98 Relocation of F(Q) Penalty to COLR Revision 19 (Amendment 12) 10-19-98 Online Testing of the Diesel Batteries and Performance of the 24 Hour Diesel Endurance Run Watts Bar-Unit 1 XVii Revision 19
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 20 (Amendment 13) 10-26-98 Clarification of Surveillance Testing Requirements for TDAFW Pump Revision 21 11-30-98 Clarification to lce Condenser Door ACTIONS and door lifi tests, and lce Bed sampling and flow blockage SRs Revision 22 (Amendment 14) 11-10-98 COMS - Four Hour Allowance to Make RHR Suction Relief Valve Operable Revision 23 01-05-99 RHR Pump Alignment for Refueling Operations Revision 24 (Amendment 16) 12-17-98 New action for Steam Generator ADVs due to lnoperable ACAS.
Revision 25 02-08-99 Delete Reference to PORV Testing Not Performed in Lower Modes Revision 26 (Amendment 17) 12-30-98 Slave Relay Surveillance Frequency Extension to 18 Months Revision 27 (Amendment '18) 01-15-99 Deletion of Power Range Neutron Flux High Negative Rate Reactor Trip Function Revision 28 04-02-99 P2500 replacement with lntegrated Computer System (lCS). Delete Reference to ERFDS as a redundant input signal.
Revision 29 03-13-00 Added notes to address instrument error in various parameters shown in the Bases.
Also corrected the applicable modes for TS 3.6.5 from 3 and 4 to 2,3 and 4.
Revision 30 (Amendment 23) 03-22-00 For SR 3.3.2.10, Table 3.3.2-1, one time relief from turbine trip response time testing. Also added Reference 14 to the Bases for LCO 3.3.2.
Revision 31 (Amendment 19) 03-07-00 Reset Power Range High Flux Reactor Trip Setpoints for Multiple lnoperable MSSVS.
I Revision 32 O4-13-OO Clarification to Reflect Core Reactivity and I nltrc Behavior.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 xvilt Revision 32
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 33 0s-02-00 Clarification identifying four distribution boards primarily used for operational convenience.
Revision 34 (Amendment 24) 07-07-00 Elimination of Response Time Testing Revision 35 08-14-00 Clarification of ABGTS Surveillance Testing Revision 36 (Amendments 22 and 25) 08-23-00 Revision of lce Condenser sampling and flow channel surveillance requirements Revision 37 (Amendment 26) 09-08-00 Administrative Controls for Open Penetrations During Refueling Operations Revision 38 09-17-00 SR 3.2.1.2 was revised to reflect the area of the core that will be flux mapped.
Revision 39 (Amendments 21and 28) 09-1 3-00 Amendment 21 - lmplementation of Best Estimate LOCA analysis.
Amendment 28 - Revision of LCO 3.1 .10, "Physics Tests Exceptions - Mode 2."
Revision 40 09-28-00 Clarifies WBN's compliance with ANSI/ANS-19.6.1 and deletes the detailed descriptions of Physics Tests.
Revision 41 (Amendment 31) 01-22-01 Power Uprate from 3411 MWt to 3459 MWt Using Leading Edge Flow Meter (LEFM)
Revision 42 03-07-01 Clarify Operability Requ irements for Pressu rizer PORVs Revision 43 05-29-01 Change CVI Response Time from 5 to 6 Seconds Revision 44 (Amendment 33) 01-31-02 lce weight reduction from 1236 to 1110 lbs per basket and peak containment pressure revision from 11 .21 to 10.46 psig.
Revision 45 (Amendment 35) 02-12-A2 Relaxation of CORE ALTERATIONS Restrictions Revision 46 a2-25-42 Clarify Equivalent lsolation Requirements in LCO 3.9.4 Watts Bar-Unit 1 xix Revision 46
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool malntained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Speclfication Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 47 (Amendment 38) 03-01-02 RCS operational LEAKAGE and SG Alternate Repair Criteria forAxial Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking (oDSCC)
Revision 48 (Amendment 36) 03-06-02 lncrease Degraded Voltage Time Delay from 6 to 10 seconds.
Revision 49 (Amendment 34) 03-08-02 Deletion of the PoslAccident Sampling System (PASS) requirements from Section 5.7.2.6 of the Technical Specifications.
Revision 50 (Amendment 39) 08-30-02 Extension of the allowed outage time (AOT) for a single diesel generator from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 14 days.
Revision 51 11-14-02 Clarify that Shutdown Banks C and D have only One Rod Group Revision 52 (Amendment 4'l) 12-20-02 RCS Specific Activity Level reduction from
<1.0 pCi/gm to <0.265 pCi/gm.
Revision 53 (Amendmenl42) 01-24-A3 Revise SR 3.0.3 for Missed Surveillances Revision 54 (Amendment 43) 05-01-03 Exigent TS SR 3.5.2.3 to delete Sl Hot Leg lnjection lines from SR untilUlC5 outage.
Revision 55 05-22-03 Editorialcorrections (PER 02-015499),
correct peak containment pressure, and revise l-131 gap inventory for an FHA.
Revision 56 07-10-03 TS Bases for SRs 3.8.4.8 through SR
- 3. 8.4. 1 0 clarifi cation of inter-tier connection resistance test.
Revision 57 08-11-03 TS Bases for B 3.5.2 Background information provides clarification when the 9 hrs for hot leg recirculation is initiated.
Revision 58 (Amendment 45) 09-26-03 The Bases for LCO 3.8.7 and 3.8.8 were revised to delete the Unit 2 lnverters.
Revision 59 (Amendment 46) 09-30-03 Address new DNB Correlation inB.2.1.1 and B,3.2.12 for Robust FuelAssembly (RFA)-2.
Revision 60 (Amendmenl4T) 10-06-03 RCS Flow Measurement Using Elbow Tap Flow Meters (Revise Table 3.3.1-1(10) &
Watts Bar-Unit 1 Revision 60
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 61 (Amendments 40 and 48) 1 0-14-03 lncorporated changes required to implement the Tritium Program (Amendment 40) and Stepped Boron Concentration increases for RWST and CLAs (Amendment 48) depending on the number of TPBARS installed into the reactor core.
Revision 62 10-15-03 Clarified ECCS venting in Bases Section B 3.5.2 (WBN-TS-03-1 9)
Revision 63 12-08-03 The contingency actions listed in Bases Table 3.8. 1-2were reworded to be consistent with the NRC Safety Evaluation that approved Tech Spec Amendment 39.
Revision 64 (Amendment 50) 03-23-04 lncorporated Amendment 50 for the seismic qualification of the Main Control Room duct work. Amendment 50 revised
.CREVS,"
the Bases for LCO 3.7.10, and LCO 3.7 .11,'CREATCS." An editorial correction was made on Page B 3.7-61.
Revision 65 04-01-04 Revised the Bases for Action B.3.1 of LCO 3.8.1 to clarify that a common cause assessment is not required when a diesel generator is made inoperable due to the performance of a surveillance.
Revision 66 05-21-04 Revised Page B 3.8-64 (Bases for LCO 3.8.4) to add a reference to SR 3.8.4.13 that was inadvertently deleted by the changes made for Amendment 12.
Revision 67 (Amendment 45) 03-0s-05 Revised the Bases for LCOs 3 .8.7, 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 to incorporate changes to the Vital lnverters (DCN 51370). Refer to the changes made for Bases Revision 58 (Amendment 45)
Revision 68 (Amendment 55) 03-22-05 Amendment 55 modified the requirements for mode change limitations in LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 by incorporating TSTF-359, Revision 9.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxt Revision 68
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REV!SIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 68 (Amendment 55 and 56) 03-22-05 Change MSLB primary to secondary leakage from 1 gpm to 3 gpm (WBN-TS-03- 14).
Revision 69 (Amendment 54) 04-04-05 Revised the use of the terms inter-tier and inter-rack in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.10.
Revision 70 (Amendment 58) 1 0-17 -05 Alternate monitoring process for a failed Rod Position lndicator (RPl) (TS-03-1 2).
Revision 7 1 (Amendment 59) 02-01-06 Temporary Use of Penetrations in Shield Building Dome During Modes 1-4 (WBN-TS-04 -17)
Revision 72 08-31-06 M inor Revision (Corrects Typographical Error) - Changed LCO Bases Section 3.4.6 which incorrectly referred to Surveillance Requirement 3 .4.6.2 rather than correctly identifying Surveillance Requirement 3.4.6.3.
Revision 73 09-1 1-06 Updated the Bases for LCO 3.9.4 to clarify that penetration flow paths through containment to the outside atmosphere must be limited to less than the ABSCE breach allowance. AIso administratively removed from the Bases for LCO 3 .9.4 a statement on core alterations that should have been removed as part of Amendment 35.
Revision 74 09-16-06 For the LCO section of the Bases for LCO 3.9.4, adrninistratively removed the change made by Revision 73 to the discussion of an LCO note and placed the change in another area of the LCO section.
Revision 75 (Amendment 45) 09-18-06 Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter for Channel 1-ll of the Vital lnverters (DCN 51370).
Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxii Revision 75
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 76 (Amendment 45) 09-22-06 Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter for Channel 1-lV of the Vital lnverters (DCN 51370).
Revis ton 77 (Amendment 45) 10-10-06 Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter for Channel 1-l of the Vital lnverters (DCN 51370).
Revision 78 (Amendment 45) 10-13-06 Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter for each of the Vital lnverters (DCN 51370).
Revision 79 (Amendment 60, 61 and 1 1-03-06 Steam Generator Narrow Range Level
- 64) lndication lncreased from 6a/o to 32% (WBN-T5-05-06) Bases Sections 3.4.5, 3.4.6, and 3.4.7.
Revision 80 1 1-08-06 Revised the Bases for SR 3.5.2.8 to clarify that inspection of the containment sump strainer constitutes inspection of the trash rack and the screen functions.
Revision 81 (Amendment 62) 11-15-06 Revised the Bases for SR 3.6. 11.2, 3.6.11.3, and 3.6.11.4 to address the lncrease lce Weight in lce Condenser to Support Replacement Steam Generators (WBN-TS-05-0e) [sGRP]
Revision 82 (Amendment 65) 11-17-06 Steam Generator (SG) Tube lntegrity (wBN-rs-05-1 0) [SGRP]
Revision 83 11-20-06 Updated Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.6.5 to clarify that the number of unobstructed spray nozzles is defined in the design bases.
Revision 84 1 1-30-06 Revised Bases 3.6.9 and 3.6.15 to show the operation of the EGTS when annulus pressure is not within limits.
Revision 85 03-22-07 Revised Bases 3.6.9 and 3.6.15 in accordance with TACF 1-07-0002-065 to clarify the operation of the EGTS.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxiii Revision 85
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 86 01-31-08 Figure 3.7.15-1 was deleted as part of Amendment 40. A reference to the figure in the Bases for LCO 3.9.9 was not deleted at the time Amendment 40 was incorporated into the Technical Specifications. Bases Revision 86 corrected this error (refer to PER 130e44).
Revision 87 02-12-08 lmplemented Bases change package TS 13 for DCN 52220-A. This DCN ties the ABI and CVI signals together so that either signal initiates the other signal.
Revision 88 (Amendment 67) 03-06-08 Technical Specification Amendment 67 increased the number of TPBARs from 240 to 400.
Revision 89 (Amendment 66) 05-01-08 Update of Bases to be consistent with the changes made to Section 5.7 .2.11 of the Technical Specifications to reference the ASME Operation and Maintenance Code Revision 90 (Amendment 68) 10-02-08 lssuance of amendment regarding Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System completion times, bypass test times, and su rveillance test intervals Revision 91 (Amendment 70) 11-25-2008 The Bases for TS 3.7.10, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)"
were revised to address control room envelope habitabi ity.
I Revision 92 (Amendment 71) 11-26-2008 The Bases for TS 3.4.1 5, "RCS Leakage Detection lnstrumentation" were revised to remove the requirement for the atmospheric gaseous radiation monitor as one of the means for detecting a one gpm leak within one hour.
Revision 93 (Amendment 74) 02-09-2009 Updates the discussion of the Allowable Values associated with the Containment Purge Radiation Monitors in the LCO section of the Bases for LCO 3.3.6.
Revision 94 (Amendment 72) 02-23-2009 Bases Revision 94 [Technical Specification (TSX Amendment 72 deleted the Hydrogen Recombiners (LCO 3.6.7) from the TS and moved the requirements to the Technical Requirements Manual.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxiv Revision 94
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administratave tool maintained by WBN Lacensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 95 03-05-2009 Corrected an error in SR 3.3.2.6 which referenced Function 6.9 of TS Table 3.3.2-1.
This function was deleted from the TS by Amendment 1.
Revision 96 (Amendment 75) 06-19-2009 Modified Mode 1 and 2 applicability for Function 6.e of TS Table 3.3.2-1 ,
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System lnstrumentation." This is associated with AFW automatic start on trip of all main feedwater pumps. ln addition, revised LCO 3.3.2, Condition J, to be consistent with WBN Unit 1 design bases.
Revision 97 (Amendment 76) 09-23-2009 Amendment 76 updates LCO 3.8.7, "lnverters - Operating" to reflect the installation of the Unit 2 inverters.
Revision 98 (Amendments 77, 79, & 10-05-2009 Amendment 77 revised the number of
- 81) TPBARS that may be loaded in the core from 4OO to 704.
Amendment 79 revised LCO 3.6.3 to allow verification by administrative means isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured.
Amendment 81 revised the allowed outage time of Action B of LCO 3.5.1 from t hour to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Revision 99 10-09-2009 Bases Revision 99 incorporated Westinghouse Technical Bulletin (TB) 08-04.
Revision 100 11-17-2009 Bases Revision 100 revises the LCO description of the Containment Spray System to clarify that transfer to the containment sump is accomplished by manualactions.
Revision 101 02-09-2010 Bases Revision 101 implemented DCN 52216-A that will place both trains of the EGTS pressure controlvalve's hand switches in A-AUTO and will result in the valves opening upon initiation of the Containment lsolation phase A (ClA) signal.
They will remain open independent of the annulus pressure and reset of the ClA.
Revision 102 03-01-2010 Bases Revision 102 implemented EDC 52564-A which addresses a new single failure scenario relative to operation of the EGTS post LOCA.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 Revision 102
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 103 04-05-2010 Bases Revision 103 implemented NRC guidance "Application of Generic Letter 80-30" which allows a departure from the single failure criterion where a non-TS support system has two 100% capacity subsysteffis, each capable of supporting the design heat load of the area containing the TS equipment.
Revision 104 (Amendment 82) 09-20-2010 Bases Revision 104 implemented License Amendment No. 82, which approved the BEACON-TSM application of the Power Distributing System. The PDMS requirements reside in the TRM.
Revision 105 10-28-2A10 DCN 53437 added spare chargers 8-S and 9-S which increased the total of 125 VDC Vital Battery Chargers to eight (8)
Revision 106 01-20-2011 Revised SR 3.8.3.6 to clarify that identified fuel oil leakage does not constitute failure of the surveillance.
Revision 107 (Amendment 85) 02-24-2011 Amendment 85 revises TS 3.7.11, "Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS). Specifically, the proposed change will only be applicable during plant modifications to upgrade the CREATCS chillers. This "one-time" TS change will be implemented during Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Cycles 10 and 1 1 beginning March 1,2A1 1, and ending April 30,2012.
Revision 108 03-07-2011 Bases Revision 108 deletes reference to NSRB to be notified of violation of a safety limit within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in TSB 2.2.4. Also, corrected error in SR 3.3.2.4 in the reference to Table 3.3.1-1 . lt should be Table 3.3.2-1 .
Revision 109 04-06-2011 Bases Revision 109 clarifies that during plant startup in Mode 2 the AFW anticipatory auto-start signal need not be OPERABLE if the AFW system is in service. PER 287712 was identified by NRC to provide clarification to TS Bases 3.3.2, Function 6.e, Trip of All Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pumps.
Revision 1 10 04-19-2011 Clarified the text associated with the interconnection of the ABI and CVI functions in the bases for LCO 3.3.6, 3.3.8, 3 .7.12 and 3 9.8.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxvi Revision 1 10
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 11 1 05-05-2011 Added text to several sections of the Bases for LCO 3.4.16 to clarify that the actual transient limit for l-131 is 14 pCilgm and refers to the controls being placed in AOI-28.
Revision 112 05-24-2011 DCN 55076 replaces the existing four 125-Vdc DG Battery Chargers with four sets of redundant new battery charger assemblies.
Revision 1 13 06-24-2011 Final stage implementation of DCN 55076 which replaced the existing four 125-Ydc DG Battery Chargers with four sets of redundant new battery charger assemblies.
Revision 114 12-12-2011 Clarifies the acceptability of periodically using a portion of the 25o/o grace period in SR 3.0.2 to facilitate 13 week maintenance work schedules.
Revision 1 15 12-21-2011 Revises several surveillance requirements notes in TS 3.8.1 to allow performance of surveillances on WBN Unit 2 6.9 kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators while WBN Unit 1 is operating in MODES 1, 2,3, or 4 Revision 1 16 06-27-2012 Revises TS Bases 3.8.1 , AC Sources -
Operating, to make the TS Bases consistent with TS 3.8.1, Condition D Revision 117 07 2012 Revises TS Bases 3.7 .1 0, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS), to make the TS Bases consistent with TS 3 .7.10, Condition E Revision 1 18 01-30-2013 Revises TS Bases 3.4.16, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to change the dose equivalent l-1 31 spike limit and the allowable value for control room air intake radiation monitors.
Revision 1 19 08-17 -2013 Revises TS Bases 3.3.6, 3.3.8, 3.7.12, 3.7 .1 3, 3 .9.4,3.9.7 , 3.9.8, and adds TS Bases 3.9.10 to reflect selective implementation of the Alternate Source Term methodology for the analysis of Fuel Handling Accidents (FHAs) and make TS Bases consistent with the revised FHA dose analysis.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxvii Revision 1 19
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 120 01-23-2014 Revised the References to TS Bases 3.1.9, PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - Model , to document NRC approval of WCAP 12472-P-A. Addendum 1-A and 4-4., Addendum 1-A approved the use of the Advance Nodal Code (ANC-Phoenix_ in the BEACON system as the neutronic code for measuring core power distribution. ls also approved the use of fixed incore self-powered neutron detectors (SPD) to calibrate the BEACON system in lieu of incore and excore neutron detectors and core exit thermocouples (CET). For plants that do not have SPDs Addendum 4-A approved Westinghouse methodology that allow the BEACON system to calculate CET uncertainty as a function of reactor power on a plant cycle basis during power ascension following a refueling outage.
Revision 121 08-04-2014 Revises references in TS Bases 3.7.1 for consistency with changes to the TS Bases 3.7.1 references approved in Revision 89.
Revision 122 (Amendment 94) 01-1 4-2014 Revises TS Bases 3.7 .1 0, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) to make the TS Bases consistent with TS 3.7 .1 0, Actions E, F, G, and H.
Revision 123 (Amendment 104) 03-16-2016 Amendment 104, TSB Revision 123 adds TS 83.7.16, "Component Cooling System (CCS) - Shutdown" and adds TS 83.7.17, "Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW)
System - Shutdown.
Revision 124 02-12-2016 Revises TS Bases Table 83.8.9-1 , "AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems,"
the second Note.
Revision 125 (Amendment 84, 102, 03-16-2016 Revises TS Bases Section 83.8-1 , "AC 1 03) Sou rces-Operating. "
Revision 126 03-18-2016 Revises TS Bases Section 83 .7.7, "Component Cooling System" the 1B and 28 surge tank sections.
Revision 127 04-1 8-2016 Revises TS Bases Section B 3.6.4, "Containment Pressure" and 83.6.6, "Containment Spray System to change the maximum peak pressure from a LOCA of 9.36 psig.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxvill Revision 127
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT Revision 128 06-27 -16 Revises TS Bases Section 83.6.8, "Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS)", to delete sentence regarding Hydrogen Recombiners that are abandoned.
Revision 129 08-1 9-16 Revises TS Bases Section 3.6.15, "Shield Building," to clarify the use of the Condition B note.
Revision 130 12-22-16 Revises TS Bases Sections 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.3 to reflect the deletion of TS 3.9.4 in WBN Unit 1 TS Amendment 92.
Revision 131 (Amendment 107) 01-1 3-17 Revises TS Bases Section 3.5.4, " Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), Applicable Safety Analyses" Revision 132 (Amendment 1 10) 01-17-17 Revises TS Bases Section 3.8.1 , 'AC Sources -Operating" Revision 133 (Amendment 111) 03-1 3-17 Adds TS Bases Section 3.0.8 for I noperability of Snubbers.
Revision 134 (Amendment 112) 04-25-17 Revise TS Bases Section 3.7.11Action A.1 regarding CREATCS.
Revision 135 05-1 7 -17 Revises TS Bases Section 83.3.3, "PAM lnstrumentation" Revision 136 (Amendment 1 13) 05- 17 -17 Revises TS Bases Section 83 .7.7 "CCS' Revision 137 (Arnendment 114) 07 17 Revises TS Bases Section B SR 3 .0.2 to add a one-time extension for the surveillance interval.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 xxtx Revision 137
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
Watts Bar-Unit 1
ENCLOSURE 2 WBN UNIT 1 TECHNIGAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGED PAGES E-2
LCO Applicability B30 B 3.0 LTMTTTNG CONDTTTON FOR OPERATTON (tCO) APPLlCABlLTTY BASES LCOs LCO 3.0.1 through LCO 3.0.8 establish the general requirements applicable to all I Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.
LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met (i.e.,
when the unit is in the MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability statement of each Specification).
LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated ACTIONS shall be met. The Completion Time of each Required Action for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point in time that an ACTIONS Condition is entered. The Required Actions establish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when the requirements of an LCO are not met. This Specification establishes that:
- a. Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification; and
- b. Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met within the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified.
There are two basic types of Required Actions. The first type of Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limit is the Completion Time to restore an inoperable system or component to OPEMBLE status or to restore variables to within specified limits. lf this type of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a shutdown may be required to place the unit in a MODE or condition in which the Specification is not applicable. (Whether stated as a Required Action or not, correction of the entered Condition is an action that may always be considered upon entering ACTIONS.) The second type of Required Action specifies the remedial measures that permit continued operation of the unit that is not further restricted by the Completion Time. ln this case, compliance with the Required Actions provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-1 Revision 133 Amendment 111
LCO Applicability B30 BASES LCO 3.0.7 There are certain specialtests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the plant. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select plant performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions.
Test Exception LCOs 3. 1 .9 and 3.1 . 1 0 allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless othenrvise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This willensure allappropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.
The Applicability of a Test Exception LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Test Exception LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. lf it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Test Exception LCO, the requirements of the Test Exception LCO shall be followed.
LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.8 establishes conditions under which systems are considered to remain capable of performing their intended safety function when associated snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s). This LCO states that the supported system is not considered to be inoperable solely due to one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s).
This is appropriate because a limited length of time is allowed for maintenance, testing, or repair of one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s) and appropriate compensatory measures are specified in the snubber requirements, which are located outside of the Technical Specifications (TS) under licensee control. LCO 3.0.8 applies to snubbers that only have seismic function. lt does not apply to snubbers that also have design functions to mitigate steam/water hammer or other transient loads. The snubber requirements do not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), and, as such, are appropriate for control by the licensee.
When applying LCO 3.0.8.a, at least one train of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system must be OPEMBLE during MODES when AFW is required to be OPERABLE. When applying LCO 3.0.8.a during MODES when AFW is not required to be OPERABLE, a core cooling method (such as Decay Heat Removal(DHR) system) must be available. When applying LCO 3.0.8.b, a means of core cooling must remain available (AFW, DHR, equipment necessary for feed and bleed operations, etc.). Reliance on availabitity of a core cooling source during modes where AFW is not required by TSs provides an equivalent safety margin for plant operations were LCO 3.0.8 not applied and meets the intent of Technical Specification Task Force Change Traveler TSTF-372, Revision 4, 'Addition of LCO 3.0.8, lnoperability of Snubbers."
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-9 Revision 133 Amendment 111
LCO Applicability B30 BASES LCO 3.0.8 When a snubber is to be rendered incapable of performing its related support (continued) function (i.e., nonfunctional) for testing or maintenance or is discovered to not be functional, it must be determined whether any system(s) require the affected snubbe(s) for system OPEMBLILITY, and whether the plant is in a MODE or specified condition in the Applicability that requires the supported system(s) to be OPERABLE.
lf an analysis determines that the supported system(s) do not require the snubber(s) to be functional in order to support the OPERABILITY of the system(s), LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. lf the LCO(S) associated with any supported system(s) are not currently applicable (i.e., the plant is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO), LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. lf the supported system(s) are inoperable for reasons other than snubbers, LCO 3.0.8 cannot be used. LCO 3.0.8 is an allowance, not a requirement. When a snubber is nonfunctional, any supported system(s) may be declared inoperable instead of using LCO 3.0.8.
Every time the provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are used, WBN Unit 1 willconfirm that at least one train (or subsystem) of systems supported by the inoperable snubbers will remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads. A record of the design function CNL-16-061 Page E-23 of 30 of the inoperable snubber (i.e., seismic vs. non-seismic) and the associated plant configuration willbe available on a recoverable basis for NRC staff inspection.
LCO 3.0.8 does not apply to non-seismic snubbers. The provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are not to be applied to supported TS systems unless the supported systems would remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads. The risk impact of dynamic loadings other than seismic loads was not assessed as part of the development of LCO 3.0.8. These shocktype loads include thrust loads, blowdown loads, water-hammer loads, steam-hammer loads, LOCA loads and pipe rupture loads.
However, there are some important distinctions between non-seismic (shocktype) loads and seismic loads which indicate that, in general, the risk impact of the out-of-service snubbers is smaller for non-seismic loads than for seismic loads. First, while a seismic load affects the entire plant, the impact of a nonseismic load is localized to a certain system or area of the plant. Second, although non-seismic shock loads may be higher in totalforce and the impact could be as much or more than seismic loads, generally they are of much shorter duration than seismic loads. Third, the impact of non-seismic loads is more plant specific, and thus harder to analyze generically, than for seismic loads. For these reasons, every time LCO 3.0.8 is applied, at least one train of each system that is supported by the inoperable snubber(s) should remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads.
lf the allowed time expires and the snubber(s) are unable to perform their associated support function(s), the affected supported system's LCO(s) must be declared not met and the Conditions and Required Actions entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-9a Revision 133 Amendment 111
LCO Applicability B30 BASES LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.8.a applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing (continued) their associated support function(s) to a single train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system or to a single train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.a allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The72 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubbe(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function and due to the availability of the redundant train of the supported system.
LCO 3.0.8.b applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s) to more than one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.b allows 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubbe(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function.
LCO 3.0.8 requires that risk be assessed and managed. lndustry and NRC guidance on the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(aX4) (the Maintenance Rule) does not address seismic risk. However, use of LCO 3.0.8 should be considered with respect to other plant maintenance activities, and integrated into the existing Maintenance Rule process to the extent possible so that maintenance on any unaffected train or subsystem is properly controlled, and emergent issues are properly addressed. The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be a qualitative awareness of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more snubbers are not able to perform their associated support function.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-9b Revision 133 Amendment 111
SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES (continued)
SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic performance of the Required Action on a "once per . . ." interval.
SR 3.0.2 permits a 25o/o extension of the interval specified in the Frequency.
This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.9.,
transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities). On a one-time basis the surveillance interval for those surveillances listed in TS Table 3.0.2-1 are allowed to be extended as identified on Table SR 3.0.2-1. The one-time surveillance interval extensions expires on November 30,2017.
The 25o/o extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which lhe 25o/o extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS, and the surveillance requirement will include a note in the frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 does not apply." An example of an exception when the test interval is not specified in the regulations, is the discussion in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, that SR 3.0.2 does not apply. This exception is provided because the program already includes extension of test intervals.
As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25o/o extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per . . ."
basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing lhe 25o/o extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified, with the exception of surveillances required to be performed on a 31-day frequency. For surveillances performed on a 31-day frequency, the normal surveillance interval may be extended in accordance with Specification 3.0.2 cyclically as required to remain synchronized to the 13-week maintenance work schedules. This practice is acceptable based on the results of an evaluation of 31-day frequency surveillance test histories that demonstrate that no adverse failure rate changes have occurred nor would be expected to develop as a result of cyclical use of surveillance interval extensions and the fact that the total number of 31-day frequency surveillances performed in any one-year period remains unchanged.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.0-1 1 Revision 10, 114, 137 Amendment 5, 114
PAM lnstrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO 23. Refuelino Water Storaoe Tank Level (continued)
RWST water level is used to verify the water source availability to the ECCS and Containment Spray (CS) Systems. lt alerts the operator to manually switch the CS suction from the RWST to the containment sump. lt may also provide an indication of time for initiating cold leg recirculation from the sump following a LOCA.
- 24. Steam Generator Pressure Steam pressure is used to determine if a high energy secondary line rupture has occurred and the availability of the steam generators as a heat sink. lt is also used to verifu that a faulted steam generator is isolated. Steam pressure may be used to ensure proper cooldown rates or to provide a diverse indication for natural circulation cooldown.
- 25. Auxiliarv Buildino Passive Sumo Level Auxiliary Building Passive Sump Level, a non-Type A Category 1 variable, monitors the sump level in the auxiliary building. The two functions of this indication are to monitor for a major breach of the spent fuel pit and to monitor for an RCS breach in the auxiliary building (i.e., an RHR or CVCS line break). The purpose is to verify that radioactive water does not leak to the auxiliary building. The Auxiliary Building Passive Sump Level monitor consists of two channels on separate power supply.
Both channels provide inputs to lCS. The calibrated range of the two I monitors are 12.5" to72.5".
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3 3-134 Revision 135
RWST B 3.5.4 BASES APPLICABLE volume. The deliverable volume limit is set by the LOCA and containment SAFETY ANALYSES analyses. For the RWST, the deliverable volume is different from the total (continued) volume contained since, due to the design of the tank, more water can be contained than can be delivered. The minimum boron concentration is an explicit assumption in the main steam line break (MSLB) analysis to ensure the required shutdown capability. The maximum boron concentration is an explicit assumption in the inadvertent ECCS actuation analysis, although it is typically a nonlimiting event and the results are very insensitive to boron concentrations. The maximum temperature ensures that the amount of cooling provided from the RWST during the heatup phase of a feedline break is consistent with safety analysis assumptions;the minimum is an assumption in both the MSLB and inadvertent ECCS actuation analyses, although the inadvertent ECCS actuation event is typically nonlimiting.
The MSLB analysis has considered a delay associated with the interlock between the VCT and RWST isolation valves, and the results show that the departure from nucleate boiling design basis is met. The delay has been established as 27 seconds, with offsite power available, or 37 seconds without offsite power.
For a large break LOCA Analysis, the minimum water volume limit of 370,000 gallons and the minimum boron concentration limit is used to compute the post LOCA sump boron concentration necessary to assure subcriticality.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3 5-26 Revision 13, 61 , 88, 98 , 131 Amendment 7 , 40, 48, 67 ,77 , 1A7
RWST B3.54 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The large break LOCA is the limiting case since the safety analysis (continued) assumes least negative reactivity insertion.
The upper limit on boron concentration of 3300 ppm is used to determine the maximum allowable time to switch to hot leg recirculation following a LOCA. The purpose of switching from cold leg to hot leg injection is to avoid boron precipitation in the core following the accident.
ln the ECCS analysis, the containment spray temperature is assumed to be equal to the RWST lower temperature limit of 60"F. lf the lower temperature limit is violated, the containment spray further reduces containment pressure, which decreases the rate at which steam can be vented out the break and increases peak clad temperature. The acceptable temperature range of 60'F to 105'F is assumed in the large break LOCA analysis, and the small break analysis value bounds the upper temperature limit of 105'F. The upper temperature limit of 105'F is also used in the containment OPEMBILITY analysis. Exceeding the upper temperature limit will result in a higher peak clad temperature, because there is less heat transfer from the core to the injected water following a LOCA and higher containment pressures due to reduced containment spray cooling capacity. For the containment response following an MSLB, the lower limit on boron concentration and the upper limit on RWST water temperature are used to maximize the total energy release to containment.
The RWST satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO The RWST ensures that an adequate supply of borated water is available to cool and depressurize the containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA),
to cool and cover the core in the event of a LOCA, to maintain the reactor subcritical following a DBA, and to ensure adequate level in the containment sump to support ECCS and Containment Spray System pump operation in the recirculation mode.
To be considered OPERABLE, the RWST must meet the water volume, boron concentration, and temperature limits established in the SRs.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.5-27 Revision 13, 61 , 131 Amendment 7, 40, 48, 107
Containment B 3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for SAFETY ANALYSES the establishment of containment OPERABILIry.
(continued)
The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO Containment OPEMBILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to < 1.0 L", except prior to the first start up after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test. At this time, applicable leakage limits must be met.
Compliance with this LCO will ensure a containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis.
lndividual leakage rates specified for the containment air lock (LCO 3.6.2), purge valves with resilient seals, and Shield Building containment bypass leakage (LCO 3.6.3) are not specifically part of the acceptance criteria of '10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. Therefore, leakage rates exceeding these individual limits only result in the containment being inoperable when the leakage results in exceeding the acceptance criteria of Appendix J, Option B.
APPLICABILITY ln MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. ln MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-3 Revision 10, 130 Amendment 5
Containment Air Locks B3.62 BASES (continued)
APPLICABILITY ln MODES 1,2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. ln MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the containment air locks are not required in MODES 5 and 6 to prevent leakage of radioactive materialfrom containment.
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and exit to perform repairs on the affected air lock component. lf the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed for most repairs. lt is preferred that the air lock be accessed from inside containment by entering through the other OPEMBLE air lock. However, if this is not practicable, or if repairs on either door must be performed from the barrel side of the door then it is permissible to enter the air lock through the OPERABLE door which means there is a short time during which the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the OPERABLE door). The ability to open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. After each entry and exit, the OPERABLE door must be immediately closed.
A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable air lock. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and a subsequent inoperable air lock is governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.
ln the event the air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 3 directs entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment."
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-8 Revision 130
Containment lsolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES LCO times in the FSAR (Ref. 2).The normally closed containment isolation valves are (continued) considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, automatic valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves/devices are those listed in Reference 2.
Purge valves with resilient seals and shield building bypass valves meet additional leakage rate requirements. The other containment isolation valve leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," as Type C testing.
This LCO provides assurance that the containment isolation valves will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the containment boundary during accidents.
APPLICABILITY ln MODES 1,2,3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. ln MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the containment isolation valves are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow paths, to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator (licensed or unlicensed) at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. ln this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation is indicated. For valve controls located in the control room, an operator (other than the Shift Operations Supervisor (SOS), ASOS, or the Operator at the Controls) may monitor containment isolation signal status rather than be stationed at the valve controls. Other secondary responsibilities which do not prevent adequate monitoring of containment isolation signal status may be performed by the operator provided his/her primary responsibility is rapid isolation of the penetration when needed for containment isolation. Use of the Unit Control Room Operator (CRO) to perform this function should be limited to those situations where no other operator is available.
A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-17 Revision 130
Containment Pressure B 3.6.4 B3 6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4 Containment Pressure BASES BACKGROUND The containment pressure is limited during normal operation to preserve the initial conditions assumed in the accident analyses for a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or steam line break (SLB). These limits also prevent the containment pressure from exceeding the containment design negative pressure differential
(-2.0 psid) with respect to the Shield Building annulus atmosphere in the event of inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System or Air Return Fans.
Containment pressure is a process variable that is monitored and controlled.
The containment pressure limits are derived from the input conditions used in the containment functional analyses and the containment structure external pressure analysis. Should operation occur outside these limits coincident with a Design Basis Accident (DBA), post accident containment pressures could exceed calculated values.
APPLICABLE Containment internal pressure is an initialcondition used in the DBA SAFEry ANALYSES analyses to establish the maximum peak containment internal pressure. The limiting DBAs considered, relative to containment pressure, are the LOCA and SLB, which are analyzed using computer pressure transients. The worst case LOCA generates larger mass and energy release than the worst case SLB.
Thus, the LOCA event bounds the SLB event from the containment peak pressure standpoint (Ref. 1).
The initial pressure condition used in the containment analysis was 15.0 psia.
This resulted in a maximum peak pressure from a LOCA of 9.36 psig. The containment analysis (Ref. 1) shows that the maximum allowable internal containment pressure, P" (15.0 psig), bounds the calculated results from the limiting LOCA. The maximum containment pressure resulting from the worst case LOCA, does not exceed the containment design pressure, 13.5 psig.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-28 Revision 44, 55 ,76, 127 Amendment 33
Containment Spray System B3.66 BASES BACKGROUND The operation of the ice condenser, is adequate to assure pressure suppression (continued) during the initial blowdown of steam and water from a DBA. During the post blowdown period, the Air Return System (ARS) is automatically started. The ARS returns upper compartment air through the divider barrier to the lower compartment. This seryes to equalize pressures in containment and to continue circulating heated air and steam through the ice condenser, where heat is removed by the remaining ice and by the Containment Spray System after the ice has melted.
The Containment Spray System limits the temperature and pressure that could be expected following a DBA. Protection of containment integrity limits leakage of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment.
APPLICABLE The limiting DBAs considered relative to containment OPERABILITY are the SAFETY ANALYSES loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and the steam line break (SLB). The DBA LOCA and SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No two DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed, in regard to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one ESF bus, which is the worst case single active failure, resulting in one train of the Containment Spray System, the RHR System, and the ARS being rendered inoperable (Ref. 2).
The DBA analyses show that the maximum peak containment pressure of 9.36 psig results from the LOCA analysis, and is calculated to be less than the containment design pressure. The maximum peak containment atmosphere temperature results from the SLB analysis. The calculated transient containment atmosphere temperatures are acceptable for the DBA SLB.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-37 Revision 44, 55, 76, 127 Amendment 33
HMS B 3.6.8 BASES BACKGROUND When the HMS is initiated, the ignitor elements are energized and heat up to a (continued) surface temperature > 't700"F. At this temperature, they ignite the hydrogen gas that is present in the airspace in the vicinity of the ignitor. The HMS depends on the dispersed location of the ignitors so that local pockets of hydrogen at increased concentrations would burn before reaching a hydrogen concentration significantly higher than the lower flammability limit. Hydrogen ignition in the vicinity of the ignitors is assumed to occur when the local hydrogen concentration reaches a minimum 5.0 volume percent (v/o).
APPLICABLE The HMS causes hydrogen in containment to burn in a controlled manner SAFETY ANALYSES as it accumulates following a degraded core accident (Ref. 3). Burning occurs at the lower flammability concentration, where the resulting temperatures and pressures are relatively benign. Without the system, hydrogen could build up to higher concentrations that could result in a violent reaction if ignited by a random ignition source after such a buildup.
The hydrogen ignitors have been shown by probabilistic risk analysis to be a significant contributor to limiting the severity of accident sequences that are commonly found to dominate risk for plants with ice condenser containments. As such, the hydrogen ignitors are considered to be risk significant in accordance with the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO Two HMS trains must be OPERABLE with power from two independent, safety related power supplies. For this plant, an OPERABLE HMS train consists of 33 of 34 ignitors energized on the train.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-50 Revision 128
Shield Building B 3.6.1 5 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.15 Shield Building BASES BACKGROUND The shield building is a concrete structure that surrounds the steel containment vessel. Between the containment vessel and the shield building inner wall is an annular space that collects containment leakage that may occur following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) as well as other design basis accidents (DBAs) that release radioactive material. This space also allows for periodic inspection of the outer surface of the steel containment vessel.
During normal operations when containment integrity is required, annulus vacuum is established and maintained by the annulus vacuum control subsystem. ln emergencies, in which containment isolation is required, this subsystem is isolated and shut down because it performs no safety-related function (Ref.4).
The nominal negative pressure for the annulus vacuum control equipment is 5-inches of water gauge. This negative pressure level, chosen for normal operation, ensures that the annulus pressure will not reach positive values during the annulus pressure surge produced by a LOCA in the primary containment.
The annulus vacuum control subsystem also aids in containment pressure relief by exhausting to the auxiliary building exhaust stack the containment vent air that goes through the containment vent air clean up units and is discharged into the annulus.
During an emergency, the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the shield building and the steel containment vessel. Filters in the system then controlthe release of radioactive contaminants to the environment. The shield building is required to be OPEMBLE to ensure retention of containment leakage and proper operation of the EGTS.
Several normal plant evolutions can cause the annulus pressure to exceed its limits briefly; containment venting, both the normal or alternate method, testing of the EGTS, annulus entries, and auxiliary building isolations. These activities cause an inrush of air into the annulus, lowering in the annulus vacuum until the annulus vacuum control fans can return annulus vacuum to within limits.
The containment vent system is a non-safety related system, which provides continuous pressure relief during normal operation, by allowing containment air outflow through the 8-inch containment penetration through two 100% redundant air cleanup units (ACUs), containing HEPA/charcoalfilters, into the annulus with the motive force being the pressure differential between the containment and the annulus. Depending on the inflow into the annulus when containment vent is initiated, annulus pressure may not be within limits untilthe annulus vacuum (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-95 Revision 129
Shield Building B 3.6.15 BASES BACKGROUND control system can recover the annulus vacuum.
(continued)
An alternate containment pressure relief function (containment vent) is provided by way of a configuration alignment in the reactor building purge ventilating system. This function is accomplished by opening lower compartment purge lines (one supply and one exhaust) or one of the two pairs of lines (one supply and one exhaust) in the upper compartment. To prevent inadvertent pressurization of containment due to supply and exhaust side ductwork flow imbalances, the supply ductwork airflow may be temporarily throttled as needed (Ref.5).
During resting of the EGTS, alignment of the system to the annulus for the test causes an inrush of air from the EGTS ducting increasing annulus pressure. This inrush of air can cause annulus pressure to exceed the annulus pressure limit untilthe EGTS fan is started, stopping the inrush allowing the annulus vacuum control fan to restore annulus pressure to within limits.
APPLICABLE The design basis for shield building OPERABILITY is a LOCA.
SAFETY ANALYSES Maintaining shield building OPERABILITY ensures that the release of radioactive materialfrom the containment atmosphere is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analyses.
The shield building satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO Shield building OPERABILITY must be maintained to ensure proper operation of the EGTS and to limit radioactive leakage from the containment to those paths and leakage rates assumed in the accident analyses.
APPLICABILITY Maintaining shield building OPEMBILITY prevents leakage of radioactive material from the shield building. Radioactive material may enter the shield building from the containment following a DBA. Therefore, shield building OPERABILIW is required in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 when DBAs could release radioactive material to the containment atmosphere.
ln MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure limitations in these MODES. Therefore, shield building OPERABILITY is not required in MODE 5 or 6.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-96 Revision 129
Shield Building B 3.6.15 BASES ACTIONS 4.1 ln the event shield building OPERABILITY is not maintained, shield building OPEMBILITY must be restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Twenty-four hours is a reasonable Completion Time considering the limited leakage design of containment and the low probability of a Design Basis Accident occurring during this time period.
8.1 The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is based on engineering judgment. The normal alignment for both EGTS control loops is the A-Auto position. With both EGTS control loops in A-Auto, both trains will function upon initiation of a Containment lsolation Phase A (ClA) signal. ln the event of a LOCA, the annulus vacuum control system isolates and both trains of the EGTS p.essure control loops will be placed in service to maintain the required negative pressure. lf annulus vacuum is lost during normal operations, the A-Auto position is unaffected by the loss of vacuum. This operational configuration is acceptable because the accident dose analysis conservatively assumes the annulus is at atmospheric pressure at event initiation. (Ref. 3)
A Note has been provided which makes the requirement to maintain the annulus Note: pressure within limits not applicable for a maximum of t hour during: Ventilating The highlighted text on operations, Required annulus entries, or Auxiliary Building isolations. Ventilating this page and the operations include containment venting, the Reactor Building Purge Ventilating following page was System alternate containment pressure relief function, and testing of the incorporated as part of Emergency Gas Treatment system. ln addition to Note makes the requirement to Amendment 59. This maintaintheannulusDressurewithinlimitsnotapplicabteffif;fi amendment also added a series of notes to Technical Specification 3.6.15. As stated in NRC's Safety Evaluation for Amendment 59 (NRC's letter dated January 6, 2006), these controls were only applicable until WBN Unit 1 entered Mode 5 at the start of the Cycle 7 refueling outage. The highlighted text in this Bases section and the notes in Technical Specification 3.6.15 will be deleted via a future amendment to the Tech n ica I Specifications.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-97 Revision 15 ,29, 101 , 129
Shield Building B 3 6 15 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)
C.1 and C.2 lf the shield building cannot be restored to OPEMBLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE sR 3.6.15.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that shield building annulus negative pressure is within limit (equal to or more negative than - 5 inches water gauge, value does not account for instrument error, Ref. 2) ensures that operation remains within the limit assumed in the containment analysis. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency of this SR was developed considering operating experience related to shield building annulus pressure variations and pressure instrument drift during the applicable MODES.
sR 3.6.15.2 Maintaining shield building OPERABILITY requires maintaining each door in the access opening closed, except when the access opening is being used for normal transient entry and exit. The 31 day Frequency of this SR is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the other indications Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-98 Revision 15 , 29, 101 , 129
Shield Building B 3.6.1 5 BASES of door status that are available to the operator.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.15.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR would give advance indication of gross deterioration of the concrete structural integrity of the shield building. The Frequency of this SR is the same as that of SR 3.6.1.1. The verification is done during shutdown.
sR 3.6.15.4 The EGTS is required to maintain a pressure equal to or more negative than
-0.50 inches of water gauge ("wg) in the annulus at an elevation equivalent to the top of the Auxiliary Building. At elevations higher than the Auxiliary Building, the EGTS is required to maintain a pressure equalto or more negative than -0.25 "wg. The low pressure sense line for the pressure controller is located in the annulus at elevation 783. By verifying that the annulus pressure is equal to or more negative than -0.61 "wg at elevation 783, the annulus pressurization requirements stated above are met. The ability of a EGTS train with final flow >
3600 and s 4400 cfm to produce the required negative pressure during the test operation provides assurance that the building is adequately sealed. The negative pressure prevents leakage from the building, since outside air will be drawn in by the low pressure at a maximum rate < 250 cfm. The 18 month Frequency on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 1) guidance for functional testing.
REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, "Design, Testing and Maintenance C riteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety-Featu re Atmospheric Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
- 2. Watts Bar Drawing 147W605-242, "ElectricalTech Spec Compliance Tables."
- 3. DCN 52216-A, "Elimination of A-AUTO STANDBY Hand Switch Position for EGTS Pressure Control Loops."
- 4. WBN UFSAR Section 6.2.3.2.2, "Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGrS).',
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.6-99 Revision 15, 29, 101 , 129
CCS B 3.7.7 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.7 Component Cooling System (CCS)
BASES BACKGROUND The CCS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient.
During normal operation, the CCS also provides this function for various nonessential components, as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CCS serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System, and thus to the environment.
The CCS is arranged as two independent, full-capacity cooling trains, Train A and B. Train A in unit 1 is served by CCS Hx A and CCS pump 1A-A. Pump 1B-B, which is actually Train B equipment, is also normally aligned to the Train A header in unit 1. However, pump 1B-B can be realigned to Train B on loss of Train A.
Train B is served by CCS Hx C. Normally, only CCS pump C-S is aligned to the Train B header since few nonessential, normally-operating loads are assigned to Train B. However, pump 1B-B can be realigned to the Train B header on a loss of the C-S pump.
ln addition, CCS Pump 2B-B may be substituted for CCS Pump C-S supplying the CCS Train B header provided the OPERABILITY requirements for the pump are met and the pump is in operation. CCS Pump 2B-B only receives a safety injection (Sl) actuation signal from Unit 2. The presence of a Unit 1 Sl signal will have no effect on CCS Pump 2B-B. lf CCS Pump 2B-B is aligned as a substitute for CCS Pump C-S, then Unit 1 CCS Train B would not be OPERABLE because CCS pump 2B-B does not start if a Unit 1 Sl signal is generated. However, if CCS Pump 2B-B pump is in operation, and an Sl Signal is generated, it will continue to operate. ln the event of a loss of offsite power, with or without an Sl signal present, CCS pump 2B-B will be automatically sequenced onto its respective diesel and continue to perform its required safety function.
Each safety related train is powered from a separate bus. An open surge tank in the system provides pump trip protective functions to ensure that sufficient net positive suction head is available. lt is preferred that the 1B and 28 surge tank sections be aligned o the associated operable CCS pump(s); however, aligning a single 1B or 28 surge tank section provides an operable surge tank for the associated pump(s).The pump in each train is automatically started on receipt of a Sl signal, and all nonessential components will be manually isolated.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.7-38 Revision 136 Amendment 113
CCS B 3.7.7 BASES LCO CCS Train B is also considered OPEMBLE when:
(continued)
- a. Pump 2B-B and associated surge tank are OPEMBLE; and
- b. Pump 2B-B is in operation; and
- c. The associated piping, valves, heat exchanger, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
The isolation of CCS from other components or systems not required for safety may render those components or systems inoperable but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the CCS.
APPLICABILITY ln MODES 1,2,3, and 4, the CCS is a normally operating system, which must be prepared to perform its post accident safety functions, primarily RCS heat removal, which is achieved by cooling the RHR heat exchanger.
ln MODE 5 or 6, the OPERABILITY requirements of the CCS are determined by the systems it supports.
ACTIONS A.1 Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," be entered if an inoperable CCS train results in an inoperable RHR loop. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.
lf one CCS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPEMBLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. ln this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CCS train is adequate to perform the heat removalfunction. The72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPEMBLE train, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
B.1 and B.2 lf the CCS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.740 Revision 136 Amendment 113
CCS B 3.7.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE sR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the C-S pump is powered from the normal power source when it is aligned for OPERABLE status. Verification of the correct power alignment ensures that the two CCS trains remain independent. The 7-day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with procedural controls governing breaker operation, and ensures correct breaker position.
sR 3.7.7.2 This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the CCS flow to individual components may render those components inoperable but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the CCS.
Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the CCS flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for CCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.
The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.
sR 3.7.7.3 This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the CCS valves on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The CCS is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative control. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
sR 3.7.7.4 This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the CCS pumps on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The CCS is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.741 Revision 136 Amendment 113
CCS B 3.7.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.4 (continued)
REOUIREMENTS at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from reliability standpoint.
The SR is modified by a Note that eliminates the requirement to verify CCS pump 2B-B starts automatically on an actual or simulated Unit 1 Sl actuation signal.
Because CCS pump 2B-B is supporting Unit 1 operation and the pump does not receive a Unit 1 Sl actuation signal, ensuring CSS pump 2B-B is in operation ensures the pump will continue to operate if a condition requiring a Unit 1 Sl actuation signal exists. lf a LOOP occurs, the SR continues to require verification of an automatic start on a simulated or actual loss of offsite power actuation signal.
sR 3.7.7.5 This SR assures the operability of Unit 1 CCS Train B when CCS Pump 2B-B is substituted for CCS Pump C-S. Because CCS Pump 2B-B does not receive a Sl actuation signal from Unit 1, by verifying the pump is aligned and in operation, assurance is provided that Unit 2 CCS Train B will be operable in the event of a Unit 2 Sl actuation with a loss of CCS Train A.
This SR is modified by a Note that states the alignment and operating verification requirement is only required to be met when CCS pump 2B-B is being used to support the OPERABILITY of CCS Train B. When CCS pump 2B-B is not supporting the OPERABILITY of CCS Train B the other SRs provide the necessary and appropriate verifications of the CCS Train OPERABILITY.
The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient considering other indications and alarms avaihbb to the operator in the control room to monitor CCS performance.
REFERENCES 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 9.2.2, "Component Cooling System."
- 2. Watts Bar Component Cooling System Description, N3-70-4002.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.742 Revision 136 Amendment 1 13
CREATCS B 3.7.11 BASES ACT!ONS A.1 (continued)
DELETED (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.7-59a Revision 64, 107, 134 Amendment 50, 85, 112
AC Sources - Operating B381 BASES BACKGROUND A single offsite circuit is capable of providing the ESF loads. Two of these (continued) circuits are required to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation.
The onsite standby power source for each 6.9 kV shutdown board is a dedicated DG. WBN uses 4 DG sets for Unit 1 operation. These same DGs will be shared for Unit 2 operation. A DG starts automatically on a safety injection (Sl) signal I (i.e., low pressurizer pressure or high containment pressure signals) or on an 6.9 kV shutdown board degraded voltage or loss-of-voltage signal (refer to LCO 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) DieselGenerator (DG) Start lnstrumentation").
After the DG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective 6.9 kV shutdown board after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of 6.9 kV shutdown board loss-of-voltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with an Sl signal. The DGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the 6.9 kV shutdown board on an Sl signal alone. Following the trip of offsite power, a loss-of-voltage signal strips all nonpermanent loads from the 6.9 kV shutdown board. When the DG is tied to the 6.9 kV shutdown board, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective 6.9 kV shutdown board by the automatic sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG by automatic load application.
ln the event of a loss of preferred power, the 6.9 kV shutdown boards are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a LOCA.
Certain required plant loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the DG in the process. Within the required interval (FSAR Table 8.3-3) after the initiating signal is received, all automatic and permanently connected loads needed to recover the plant or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.
Ratings for Train 1A, 18, 2A and 28 DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service rating of each DG is 21400 kW with 10olo overload permissible for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. The ESF loads that are powered from the 6.9 kV shutdown boards are listed in Reference 2.
The capability is provided to connect a 6.9 kV FLEXS DG to supply power to any of the four 6.9 kV shutdown boards. The 6.9 kV FLEX DG is commercial-grade and not designed to meet Class 1E requirements. The FLEX DG is made available to support extended Completion Times in the event of an inoperable DG. The FLEX DG is made available as a defense-in-depth alternate source of AC power to mitigate a loss of offsite power event. The FLEX DG would remain disconnected rom the Class 1E distribution system unless required during a loss of offsite power.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-2 Revision 125,132 Amendment 84, 103, 1 10
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the SAFEry ANALYSES FSAR, Section 6 (Ref. 4) and Section 15 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Goolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.
The OPEMBILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the Accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the plant. This results in maintaining at least two DG's associated with one load group or one offsite circuit OPERABLE during Accident conditions in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.
The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2xii).
LCO Two qualified circuits between the Watts Bar Hydro 161 kV switchyard and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power System and separate and independent DGs for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.
Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the plant.
Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining acceptable frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the 6.9 kV shutdoup boards.
Offsite power from the Watts Bar Hydro 161 kV switchyard to the onsite Class 1E distribution system is from two independent immediate access circuits. Each of the two required circuits are routed from the switchyard through a 161 kV transmission line and one of four 161 to 6.9 kV transformers (common station service transformers (CSSTs)) to the onsite Class '1E distribution system.
Normally the two required circuits are aligned to power the 6.9 kV shutdown boards through CSST C and CSST D. However, one of the two required circuits may also be aligned to power two shutdown boards in the same load group through either CSST A or CSST B and its associated Unit Boards, either directly from the CSST through the Unit Board or by automatic transfer from the Unit Station Service Transformer (USST) to the CSST. Use of CSST A or B as an (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B38-3 Revision 125, 132 Amendment 103, 1 10
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS A.3 (continued)
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. With one required offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the plant safety systems. ln this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System.
The72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. lf Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DG is inoperable and that DG is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 10 days. This could lead to a total of 13 days, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the offsite circuit. At this time, a DG could again become inoperable, the circuit restored OPEMBLE, and an additional 10 days (for a total of 23 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 13 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The'AND" connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 13 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.
As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock.' This will result in establishing the'timE zero" althe time that the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-7 Revision 125, 132 Amendment 103, 1 10
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and C.1 (continued)
To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one or more DGs inoperable in Train A OR with one or more DGs inoperable in Train B, it is necessary to verify the availability of the required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met.
However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon required offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.
8.2 ln order to extend the Required Action B.5 Completion Time for an inoperable DG lrom 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 1 0 days, it is necessary to evaluate the availability of the 6.9 kV FLEX DG within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> upon entry into LCO 3.8.1 and every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
Since Required Action B.2 only specifies "evaluate," discovering the 6.9 kV FLEX DG unavailable does not result in the Required Action being not met (i.e., the evaluation is performed). However, on discovery of an unavailable 6.9 kV FLEX DG, the Completion Time for Required Action B.5 starts lhe72 hour and/or 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> clock.
6.9 kV FLEX DG availability requires that:
- 2) 6.9 kV FLEX DG supporting system parameters for starting and operating are verified to be within required limits for functional availability (e.9., batter state of charge).
The 6.9 kV FLEX DG is not used to extend the Completion Time for more than one inoperable DG at any one time.
8.3 and C.2 Required Actions 8.3 and C.2 are intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train systems, such as the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, are not included. Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable features associated with a train, redundant to the train that has inoperable DG(s).
The Completion Time for Required Actions B.3 and C.2 are intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal 'time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." ln this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-8 Revision 50, 125, 132 Amendment 39, 84, 103 , 110
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS 8.3 and C.2 (continued)
- a. An inoperable DG exists; and
- b. A required feature on the other train (Train A or Train B) is inoperable.
lf at any time during the existence of this Condition (one or more DGs inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.
Discovering one or more required DGs in Train A or one or more DGs in Train B inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DGs, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is Acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-8a Revision 132 Amendment 1 10
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.3 and C.2 (continued) ln this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class '1E Distribution System.
Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the OPEMBILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
8.4.1.8.4.2. C.3.1 and C.3.2 Required Actions B.4.1 and C.3.1 provide an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DG. lf it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG(s) does not exist on the OPERABLE DG(s), SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. For the performance of a Surveillance, Required Action B.4.1 is considered satisfied since the cause of the DG(s) being inoperable is apparent. lf the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition F of LCO 3.8.1 would be entered if the other inoperable DGs are not on the same train, otherwise, if the other inoperable DGs are on the same train, the unit is in Condition C. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists, and Required Actions B.4.1 and 8..2 are satisfied. lf the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPEMBILITY of that DG(s).
ln the event the inoperable DG(s) is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either 8.4.'1 ,8.4.2, C.3.1 or C.3.2, the corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> constraint imposed while in Condition B or C.
According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 11), 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DG(s) is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG(s).
B.5 ln Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 1O-day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources (including the 6.9 kV FLEX DG), a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-9 Revision 50, 125, 132 Amendment 39, 84, 103 , 110
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.5 (continued) lf the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is or becomes unavailable with an inoperable DG, then action is required to restore the 6.9 kV FLEX DG to available status or to restore the DG to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from discovery of an unavailable 6.9 kV FLEX DG. However, if the 6.9 kV FLEX DG unavailability occurs sometime after 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of continuous DG inoperability, then the remaining time to restore the 6.9 kV FLEX DG to available status or to restore the DG to OPERABLE status is limited to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The72 hour and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Times allow for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock.' The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time only begins on discovery that both an inoperable DG exists and the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is unavailable. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time only begins on discovery that an inoperable DG exists for 2 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is unavailable.
Therefore, when on DG is inoperable due to either preplanned maintenance (Preventive or corrective) or unplanned corrective maintenance work, the Completion Time can be extended from72 hours to 10 days if the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is verified available for backup operation.
The Fourth Completion Time for Required Action B.5 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. lf Condition B is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restored OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 3 days. This could lead to a total of 13 days, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the DGs. At this Time, an offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DGs restored OPERABLE, and an additionalT2 hours (for a total of 20 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 13-day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. THE "AND' connector between the 1O-day and 13-day Completion Times mean that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-10 Revision 50, 65, 125, 132 Amendment 39, 84, 110
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.5 (continued)
Compliance with the contingency actions listed in Bases Table 3.8.1-2 is required whenever Condition B is entered for a planned or unplanned outage that will extend beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. lf Condition B is entered initially for an activity intended to last less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or for an unplanned outage, the contingency actions should be invoked as soon as it is established that the outage period will be longer than72 hours.
As in Required Action B.3, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "Time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This will result in establishing the "time zeto" atthe time that the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-10a Revision 132 Amendment 1 10
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS c.4 (continued)
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93, (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
ln Condition C, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 72hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. Restoration of at least on DG within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> results in reverting back under Condition B and continuing to track the "time zero" Completion Time for one DG inoperable.
The second Completion Time for Required Action C.4 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. lf Condition C is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restored OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to72 hours. This could lead to a total of 144 hours0.00167 days <br />0.04 hours <br />2.380952e-4 weeks <br />5.4792e-5 months <br />, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the DGs. At this time, an offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DGs restored OPEMBLE, and an additionalT2 hours (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and C are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 6 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.
As in Required Action C.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal 'time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock.' This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition C was entered.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3 8-11 Revision 50, 65, 125, 132 Amendment 39, 84, 1 10
AC Sources - Operating B3.8 1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 I (contin ued)
Required Action D.1, which applies when two required offsite circuits are I inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions.
The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safe$ trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train features, such as the turbine driven auxiliary pump, are not included in the list.
The Completion Time for Required Action D.1 is intended to allow the operator I time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero'for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." ln this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:
- a. All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A required feature is inoperable.
lf at any time during the existence of Condition D (two required offsite circuit. l inoperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.
Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable (e.9., combinations that involve an offsite circuit and one DG inoperable, or one or more DGs in each train inoperable). However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-12 Revision 50, 125, 132 Amendment 39, 84, 103, 1 10
AC Sources - Operating B3.8 1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)
- a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
- b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable required offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.
With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. ln fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, lhe24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.
According to Reference 6, with the available offsite AC sources, two less than required by the LCO, operation may continu e for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. lf two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, unrestricted operation may continue. lf only one offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.
E.1 and E.2 Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if allAC sources to it were inoperable, resulting in de-energization.
Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition E is entered with no AC source to any train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition E to provide requirements for the loss of one offsite circuit and one or more DGs in a train, without regard to whether a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train.
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition E for a period that should not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3 8-1 3 Revision 50, 125, 132 Amendment 39, 84, 103, 110
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued) l ln Condition E, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electricalpower I system and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition D I (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
F.1 and F.2 I With one or more DGs in Train A inoperable simultaneous with one or more DGs I in Train B inoperable, there are no remaining standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.
According to Reference 6, with one or more DGs in Train A inoperable simultaneous with one or more DGs in Train B inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
G.1 and G.2
,tth" t"*rble AC electric power sources cannot be restored to OPEMBLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-14 Revision 50, 125, 132 Amendment 39, 84, 1 10
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS H.1 and 1.1 (continued)
Condition H and Condition I corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies cannot be guaranteed. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The plant is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.
SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important REQUIREMENTS areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPEMBILITY of the DGs are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9), as addressed in the FSAR.
Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable. 6800 volts is the minimum steady state output voltage and the 10 second transient value. 6800 volts is 98.6% of the nominal bus voltage of 6900 V corrected for instrument error and is the upper limit of the minimum voltage required for the DG supply breaker to close on the 6.9 kV shutdown board. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 7260Y is 1 10% of the nameplate rating of the 6600 V motors. The specified 3 second transient value of 6555 V is 95% of the nominal bus voltage of 6900 V. The specified maximum transient value of 8880 V is the maximum equipment withstand value provided by the DG manufacturer. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. The steady state minimum and maximum frequency values are 59.8 Hz and 60.1 Hz.
These values ensure that the safety related plant equipment powered from the DGs is capable of performing its safety functions.
sR 3.8.1.1 This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power.
The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred power source, and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-1 5 Revision 50, 125, 132 Amendment 39, 84 , 102, 1 10
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.19 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 18 months.
For the purpose of this testing, the DGs shall be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The DG engines for WBN have an oil circulation and soakback system that operates continuously to preclude the need for a prelube and warmup when a DG is started from standby.
This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that the performance of the Surveillance for DG 1A-A or 1B-B would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Examples of unplanned events may include:
- 1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available;and
- 2) Post corrective maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPEMBLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILIry or reliabilig.
sR 3.8.1.20 This SR verifies that DG availability is not compromised by the idle start circuitry, when in the idle mode of operation, and that an automatic or emergency start signalwill disable the idle start circuitry and command the engine to go to full speed. The 18 month frequency is consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths and is considered sufficient to detect any degradation of the idle start circuitry.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-32 Revision 1 15, 132 Amendment 89, 1 10
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 Bases Table 3.8.1-2 TS Action or Surueillance Requirement (SR) Contingency Actions Contingency Actions Applicable TS Applicable to be lmplemented Action or SR Modes
- 1. Verify that the offsite power system is stable. This action sR 3.8.1 .14 1,2 will establish that the offsite power system is within single-Action B.5 1,2, 3, 4 contingency limits and will remain stable upon the loss of any single component supporting the system. lf a grid stability problem exists, the planned DG outage will not be scheduled.
- 2. Verify that no adverse weather conditions are expected sR 3 .8.1 .14 1,2 during the outage period. The planned DG outage will be postponed if inclement weather (such as severe Action B.5 1,2, 3, 4 thunderstorms or heavy snowfall) is projected.
3 Do not remove from service the ventilation systems for Action B.5 1,2,3,4 the 6.9 kV shutdown boardrooms, the elevationTT2 transformer rooms, or the 480-volt shutdown board rooms, concurrently with the DG, or implement appropriate compensatory measures.
- 4. Do not remove the reactor trip beakers from service Action B.5 1,2, 3, 4 concurrently with planned DG outage maintenance.
- 5. D not remove the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater Action 8.5 1,2, 3, 4 (AFW) pump from service concurrently with a Unit 1 DG outage.
- b. Do not remove the AFW level control valves to the steam Action 8.5 1,2,3,4 generators from service concurrently with a Unit 1 DG outage
- 7. Do not remove the opposite train residual heat remove Action 8.5 1,2, 3, 4 (RHR) pump from service concurrently with a Unit 1 DG outage.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.8-36a Revision 50, 125, 132 Amendment 39, 84, 1 10
ENCLOSURE 3 WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS E-3
TABLE OF CONTENTS TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ............................ v LIST OF FlGURES.... ...................... vi LIST OF ACRONYMS ..................... vii LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES ........ viii 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 TR 3.0 TR 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ............3.1.1 TR 3.1 .1 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Shutdown .............3.1-1 TR 3.1 .2 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Operating ............. 3.'l-3 TR 3.1.3 Charging Pump, Shutdown ..............3.1-5 TR 3.1.4 Charging Pumps, Operating..... ........3.1-6 TR 3.1.5 Borated Water Sources, Shutdown.... ................... 3.1-8 TR 3.1 6 Borated Water Sources, Operating .. 3.'t-10 TR 3 1.7 Position lndication System, Shutdown 3.1-13 TR 3.3 TNSTRUMENTATTON ..................... ............... 3.3-1 TR 3.3.1 ReactorTrip System (RTS) lnstrumentation........ ......................3.3-1 TR 3 3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) lnstrumentation................ ..............3.3-5 TR 3.3.3 Movable lncore Detectors................ .3.3-12 TR 3.3.4 Seismic lnstrumentation............... .... 3.3-14 TR 3.3.5 Turbine Overspeed Protection ......... 3.3-18 TR 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection System........ ...3.3-20 TR 3.3.7 Plant Calorimetric Measurement............ 3.3-22 TR 3.3.8 Hydrogen Monitors ......3.3-24 TR 3.3.9 Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) ....3.3-26 TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS).......... ..................3.4-1 TR 3.4.1 SafetyValves, Shutdown ..................3.4-1 TR 3.4.2 Pressurizer Temperature Limits ........... ................. 3.4-3 TR 3.4.3 RCS Vents ................... 3.4-5 TR 3.4.4 Chemistry.... .................3.4-7 TR 3.4.5 Piping System Structurallntegrity ....3.4-10 TR 3.6 CoNTAlNMENT SYSTEMS.................. ........ 3.6-1 TR 3.6.1 lce Bed Temperature Monitoring System .............3.6-1 TR 3 6.2 lnlet Door Position Monitoring System ..................3.64 TR 3.6.3 Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System ........ 3.66 (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 Technical Req uirements Revision 56
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
TR 3.7 PISNT SYSTEMS ....................3.7-1 TR 3.7.1 Steam Generator Pressure/
Temperature Limitations .....3.7-1 TR 3.7 2 Flood Protection Plan ..3.7-3 TR 3.7.3 DELETED, 3.7.10 TR 3.7.4 Sealed Source Contamination.................,. 3.7-22 TR 3.7.5 Area Temperature Monitoring .............. 3.7-26 TR 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ......,........3.8.1 TR 3 8.1 lsolation Devices........ ..3.8-1 TR 3.8.2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices ..............3.8-5 TR 3.8.3 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices........ 3.8-10 TR 3.8.4 Submerged Component Circuit Protection 3.8-17 TR 3.9 REFUELTNG OPERATlONS................... ....... 3.9-1 TR 3.9.1 Deleted........ ................. 3.9-1 TR 3 9.2 Communications.............. ................. 3.9-2 TR393 Refueling Machine....... ..................... 3.9-3 TR394 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building . 3.9-5 5.0 ADMlNlSTMTlVE CONTROIS................ ...5.0-1 5.1 TechnicalRequirements (TR) ControlProgram ...5.0-1 (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 Technical Requirements Revision 62
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
BASES B30 TECHNICAL REQUTREMENTS (TR) AND TECHNICAL SURVETLLANCE REQUTREMENTS (TSR)
APPLICABlLtry .............. B 3.0-1 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B 3.1-1 B 3.1 .1 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Shutdown.... .. B 3.1-1 B 3.1 .2 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Operating.... .. B 3.'t-5 B 3.1 .3 Charging Pump, Shutdown. ...... B 3.1-9 B 3.1 .4 Charging Pumps, Operating ..... B 3.1-11 B 3.1 .5 Borated Water Sources, Shutdown 83.1-14 B 3.1 .6 Borated Water Sources, Operating..... B 3.1-18 B 3.1 .7 Position lndication System, Shutdown.... ....... B 3.1-23 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1 ReactorTrip System (RTS) lnstrumentation . B 3.3-1 B3.32 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) B334 B3.33 Movable lncore Detectors. ................ B 3.3-7 B 3.3.4 Seismic lnstrumentation................ B 3.3-10 B 3.3.5 Turbine Overspeed Protection B 3 3-14 B 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection System B 3.3-18 8.3.3.7 Plant Calorimetric Measurement............. B 3.3-21 B33.8 Hydrogen Monitors...... 83.3-25 B 3.3.9 Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS)........ 83.3-30 B 3.4 REACTOR COOl-ANT SYSTEM (RCS)........... B 3.4-1 B 3.4.1 SafetyValves, Shutdown .......... B 3.4-1 B 3.4.2 Pressurizer Temperature Limits........... .......... B 3.44 B 3.4.3 RCS Vents... .........83.4-7 B 3.4.4 Chemistry B 3.4-10 B 3.4.5 Piping System Structural lntegrity........ .......... B 3.4-14 B 3.6 CoNTAlNMENT SYSTEMS.................. ........ B 3.6-1 B 3.6.1 lce Bed Temperature Monitoring System......... B 3.6-1 B 3.6.2 lnlet Door Position Monitoring System........ ... B 3.6 B 3.6.3 Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System . B 3.6-10 B 3.7 PI.ANT SYSTEMS 83.7.'I B 3.7.1 Steam Generator Pressure/Temperature Limitations.... .....8 3.7-1 B 3.7.2 Flood Protection Plan...... ..........83.74 B3.73 DELETED... .......... B 3.7-12 B 3.7.4 Sealed Source Contamination.................. ..... B 3.7-18 B 3.7.5 Area Temperature Monitoring.............. .......... B 3.7-22 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8-1 B3.8 1 lsolation Devices .. B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices ....... B 3.8-7 B38.3 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices B 3.8-15 B 3.8.4 Submerged Component Circuit Protection.... B 3.8-19 (continued)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
B 3.9 REFUELING B 3.9-1 B 3 9.1 Deleted B 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Communications.............. B 3.9-3 B3.93 Refueling Machine....... B 3.9-5 B 3.9.4 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage (continued)
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LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title Paqe 1.1-1 MODES ...1.16 3.3.1-1 ReactorTrip System lnstrumentation Response Times........ .....3.3-3 3.3.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Response Times.......... ....................3.3-7 3.3.4-'l Seismic Monitoring lnformation... ......3.3-17 I
3.7.3-',t - 3.7.3-5....... ...........DE1ETED I 3.7.5-1 Area Temperature Monitoring...... ..........1.......... ....3.7-29 3.8.3-1 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices Which Are Bypassed UnderAccident Conditions................. ...3.8-12 3.8.4-1 Submerged Components With Automatic De-energization UnderAccident Conditions ..3.8-19 Watts Bar-Unit 1 Technical Req uirements Revision 62
LrsT oF FTgURES LJ$J_9 F M r sc E.L_LAN EqU_S ts Hppl3rs Al_{ p_ pRpG RAMS.
Core Operating Limits Report Watts Bar-Unit 1 vi Technical Req uirements Revision 62
Lrsr oF ACB9NYMS A-g"IgIry"m Tille ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ACRP Auxiliary Contro! Room Panel ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AFD Axial Flux Difference AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System ARO All Rods Out ARFS Air Return Fan System ARV Atmospheric Relief Valve BOC Beginning of Cycle ccs Component Cooling Water System CFR Code of Federal Regulations COLR Core Operating Limits Report CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System CSS Containment Spray System CST Condensate Storage Tank DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EFPD Effective Full-Power Days EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EOC End of Cycle ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning LCC Lower Com partment Cooler LCO Limiting Condition For Operation MFIV Main Feedwater lsolation Valve MFRV Main Feedwater Regulation Valve MSIV Main Steam Line lsolation Valve MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient NMS Neutron Monitoring System ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual PCP Process Control Program PDMS Power Distribution Monitoring System PIV Pressure lsolation Valve PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve PTLR Pressure and Temperature Limits Report QPTR Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio RAOC Relaxed Axial Offset Control RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal RTP Rated Thermal Power RTS Reactor Trip System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SG Steam Generator SI Safety lnjection SL Safety Limit SR Surveillance Requ irement UHS Ultimate Heat Sink Watts Bar-Unit 1 vil Technical Req uirements Revision 46
TECHN ICAL REQU I REMENTS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Revision Page Revision I)-,l,um..b.sr Numb.e-r N."u.m.h""e"r IYumh"cr i 56 3.1-4 0 ii 62 3.1-5 38 iii 62 3.1-6 51 iv 53 3,1-7 0 V 62 3 1-8 0 vi 62 3.1-9 37 vii 46 3,1-1 0 0 viii 64 3.1-11 33 ix 64 3.1-12 0 x 64 3.1-12a 42 xi 62 3.1-13 8 xii 22 3.3-1 0 xiii 37 3.3-2 0 xiv 47 3.3-3 34 XV 58 3.3-4 44 xvi 64 3.3-5 0 1 .1-1 0 3.3-6 0 1.1-2 22 3.3-7 26 1.1-3 0 3.3-8 36 1.1-4 31 3.3-9 3 1.1-5 0 3.3-10 0 1.1-6 0 3.3-11 49 1.2-1 0 3.3-12 46 1.2-2 0 3.3-13 0 1.2-3 0 3.3-14 40 1.3-1 0 3.3-15 40 1.3-2 0 3 3-16 0 1.3-3 0 3.3-17 19 1.3-4 0 3.3-18 38 1 3-5 0 3 3-19 38 1 3-6 0 3.3-20 63 1.3-7 0 3.3-21 0 1 3-8 0 3.3-22 23 1.3-9 0 3.3-23 23 1 .3-10 0 3.3-24 45 1.3-11 0 3.3-25 45 1.3-12 0 3.3-26 46 1.3-13 0 3.3-27 46 1.4-1 0 3.3-28 46 1.4-2 0 3.4-1 0 1.4-3 0 3.4-2 0 1.4-4 0 3.4-3 0 3.0-1 38 3.4-4 0 3.0-2 38 3.4-5 0 3.0-3 39 3.4-6 0 3.0-4 38 3.4-7 0 3.1-1 38 3.4-8 0 3.1-2 0 3.4-9 0 3.1-3 51 Watts Bar-Unit 1 vill Technical Req uirements Revision 64
TECHNICAL REQUI REMENTS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Revision Page Revision Number Number Number Number 3.4-10 64 3.8-7 0 3.4-11 0 3 8-8 0 3.4-12 52 3.8-9 25 3 6-1 0 3 8-10 0 3.6-2 0 3.8-1 1 0 3.6-3 0 3.8-12 0 3.6-4 56 3.8-1 3 0 3.6-5 56 3.8-14 55 3.6-6 0 3.8-1 5 60 3.6-7 0 3.8-16 59 3.7-1 0 3.8-17 0 3.7-2 0 3.8-18 18 3.7-3 17 3.8-19 18 3.7-4 17 3.9-1 53 3.7-5 17 3.9-2 0 3.7-6 17 3.9-3 28 3.7-7 17 3.9-4 28 3.7-8 17 3 9-5 0 3.7 -9 17 5.0-1 24 3.7 -10 62 3.7 -11 62 3.7 -12 62 3.7-13 62 3.7 -14 62 3.7 -15 62 3.7-16 62 3.7 -17 62 3.7-18 62 3.7 -19 62 3.7-20 62 3.7-21 62 3.7-22 43 3.7-23 0 3.7-24 0 3,7-25 0 3.7-26 40 3.7 -27 40 3.7-28 4A 3.7-29 2 3.7-30 2 3.8-1 0 3.8-2 0 3 8-3 0 3.8-4 25 3.8-5 0 3.8-6 0 Watts Bar-Unit 1 ix Technical Req uirements Revision 64
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Revision Page Revision NUmbef NumFer Numh.e.r Number B 3.0-1 0 B 3.3-13 19 B 3.0-2 0 B 3.3-14 0 B30-3 0 B 3 3-15 38 B 3.A4 38 B 3.3-16 6 B 3.0-5 38 B 3 3-17 38 B 3.0-6 0 B 3.3-18 63 B 3.0-7 0 B 3 3-19 63 B 3.0-8 0 B 3.3-20 63 B 3.0-9 50 B 3 3-21 23 B 3.0-10 39 B 3.3-22 23 B 3.0-11 39 B 3.3-23 23 B 3.0-12 38 B 3.3-24 23 B 3.1-1 0 B 3.3-25 45 B 3.1-2 0 B 3.3-26 45 B 3.1-3 38 B 3.3-27 45 B 3.14 0 B 3.3-28 45 B 31-5 51 B 3.3-29 45 B 3.1-6 0 B 3 3-30 54 B 3.1-7 20 B 3.3-31 54 B 3.1-8 20 B 3.3-32 46 B 3.1 -9 38 B 3.3-33 46 B 3 1-10 41 B 3.3-34 54 B 3.1-11 51 B 3.4-1 0 B 3.1-12 0 B 3.4-2 0 B 3.1-1 3 41 B 3.4-3 0 B 3. 1-14 0 B 3.4-4 0 B 3.1-15 20 B34-5 0 B 3. 1-16 37 B34-6 0 B 3. 1-17 37 B 3.4-7 0 B 3.1-18 0 B 3.4-8 0 B 3.1-19 0 B34-9 0 B 3 1-20 20 B 3.4-10 0 B 3. 1-21 27 B 3.4-11 0 B 3 1-22 37 B 3.4-12 0 B 3 1-23 0 B 3.4-13 0 B 3. 1-24 0 B 3.4-14 64 B 3.1-25 I B 3.4-15 38 B 3.3-1 0 B 3.4-16 52 B 3.3-2 0 B 3.6-1 0 B 3.3-3 0 B 3.6-2 20 B 3.34 22 B 3.6-3 20 B 3.3-5 22 B36-4 0 B 3.3-6 0 B 3.6-5 0 B 3.3-7 46 B 3.6-6 10 B 3.3-8 46 B36-7 56 B 3.3-9 46 B 3.6-8 61 B 3 3-10 19 B 3.6-9 0 B 3.3-11 40 B 3.6-10 0 B 3.3-12 40 B 3.6-1 1 0 Watts Bar-Unit 1 Techn ical Req uirements Revision 64
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Revision Page Revision Numbe.!: Number Number Nunbg,,r:
B 3.6-12 0 B 3.8-22 18 B 3.7-1 36 B 3.9-1 53 B 3.7-2 38 B 3.9-2 53 B 3.7-3 36 B39-3 0 B 3.74 57 B 3.9-4 0 B 3.7-5 17 B 3.9-5 28 B 3.7-6 17 B 3.9-6 0 B 3.7-7 17 B 3.9-7 28 B37-8 17 B 3.9-8 0 B 3.7-9 17 B 3.9-9 0 B 3.7-10 17 B 3.7-11 17 B 3.7-12 62 B 3.7-13 62 B 3.7-14 62 B 3.7-15 62 B 3.7-16 62 B 3.7-17 62 B 3.7-18 0 B 3.7-19 43 B 3.7-20 0 B 3.7-21 0 B 3.7-22 0 B 3.7-23 20 B 3.7-24 40 B 3.7-25 40 B 3.8-1 0 B 3.8-2 0 B 3.8-3 0 B 3.84 0 B 3.8-5 0 B 3.8-6 25 B 3.8-7 25 B 3.8-8 0 B 3.8-9 0 B 3.8-10 0 B 3.8-1 1 0 B 3.8-12 0 B 3.8-13 25 B 3.8-14 25 B 3.8-15 0 B 3.8-16 0 B 3.8-17 0 B 3.8-18 0 B 3.8-19 0 B 3 8-20 0 B 3.8-21 0 Watts Bar-Unit 1 xi Technical Req uirements Revision 62
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - REVISION LISTING Revisions lssued SUBJECT Revision 0 09-30-95 lnitial lssue Revision 1 12-06-95 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 2 01-04-96 Area Temperature Monitoring - Change in MSSV Limit Revision 3 02-28-96 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Suction Requirement Revision 4 08-18-97 Time-frame for Snubber Visual Exams Revision 5 08-29-97 Performance of Snubber Functional Tests at Power Revision 6 09-08-97 Revised Actions for Turbine Overspeed Protection Revision 7 09-12-97 Change OPAT/OTAT Response Time Revision 8 09-22-97 Clarification of Surveillance Frequency for Position lndication SYstem Revision I 10-10-97 Revised Boron Concentration for Borated Water Sources Revision 10 '12-17-98 ICS lnlet Door Position Monitoring - Channel Check Revision 1't 01-08-99 Computer-Based Analysis for Loose Parts Monitoring Revision 12 01-15-99 Removalof Process ControlProgram from TRM Revision 13 03-30-99 Deletion of Power Range Neutron Flux High Negative Rate Reactor Trip Function Revision 14 04-07-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 15 M-07-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 16 04-13-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 17 05-25-99 Flood Protection Plan Revision 18 08-03-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 19 10-12-99 Upgrade Seismic Monitoring lnstruments Revision 20 03/13/00 Added Notes to Address lnstrument Error for Various Parameters Revision 21 C/,l13l00 COLR, Cycle 3, Rev 2 Revision 22 07107100 Elimination of Response Time Testing (continued)
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TECHNICAL REQU IREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - REVISION LISTING Revis"ip.np_ lssued SUBJECT Revision 23 01122101 PlantCalorimetric(LEFM)
Revision 24 03/19/01 TRM Change Control Program per 50.59 Rule Revision 25 05115101 Change in Preventive Maintenance Frequency for Molded Case Circuit Breakers Revision 26 05129101 Change CVI Response Time from 5 to 6 Seconds Revision 27 01131102 Change pH value in the borated water sources due to TS change for ice weight reduction Revision 28 02105102 Refueling machine upgrade under DCN D-50991-A Revision 29 02126102 Added an additional action to TR 3.7.3 to perform an engineering evaluation of inoperable snubbe/s impact on the operability of a supported system.
Revision 30 06/05/02 Updated TR 3.3.5.1 to reflect implementation of the TIPTOP program in a Technical lnstruction (Tl).
Revision 31 10t31t02 Correct RTP to 3459 MWt (PER 02-9519-000)
Revision 32 09/17 t03 Editorial correction to Bases for TSR 3.1.5.3.
Revision 33 10t14t03 Updated TRs 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 and their respective bases to incorporate boron concentration changes in accordance with change packages WBN-TS-02-14 and WBN-TS-03-017 .
Revision 34 05t14144 Revised ltem 5, "source Range, Neutron Flux" function of Table 3.3.1-1 to provide an acceptable response time of less than or equal 0.5 seconds. (Reference TS Amendment 52.)
Revision 35 04/06/05 Revised Table 3.3.2-1, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation systems Response Times," to revise containment spray response time and to add an asterisk note to notation 13 of the table via Change Package WBN-TS-04-16.
Revision 36 09/25106 Revised the response time for Containment Spray in Table 3.3.2-1 and the RTr.ror values in the Bases for TR 3.7.1 Both changes result from the replacement of the steam generators.
Revision 37 1 1/08/06 Revised TR 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 and the Bases for these TRs to update the boron concentration limits of the RWST and the BAT, continued Watts Bar-Unit 1 Technical Req uirements Revision 37
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REVISION LISTING Rpv"isiens lssued SUBJECT Revision 38 11129106 Updated the TRM to be consistent with Tech Spec Amendment 55. TRM Revision 38 modified the requirements for mode change limitations in TR 3.0.4 and TSR 3.0.4 by incorporating changes similar to those outlined in TSTF-359, Revision 9. (T5-06-24)
Revision 39 04116107 Updated the TRM to be consistent with Tech Spec Amendment 42.
TRM Revision 39 modified the requirements of TSR 3.0.3 by incorporating changes similar to those outlined in TSTF-358.
(TS-07-03)
Revision 40 05124107 Updated the TRM and Bases to remove the various requirements for the submittal of reports to the NRC. (TS-07-06)
Revision 41 05125107 Revision 41 updates the Bases of TR 3.1.3, 3.1.4 and 3.4.5 to be consistent with Technical Specification Amendment 66. This amendment replaces the references to Section Xl of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code with the ASME Operation and Maintenance Code for lnservice Testing (lST) activities and removes reference to "applicable supports" from the IST program.
Revision 42 0312012008 Revision 42 updates Figure 3.'1.6 to remove the 240 TPBAR Limit.
Revision 43 0711712008 Revision 43 removes a reporting requirement from TR 3.7.4, "Sealed Source Contamination." The revision also updates the Bases for TR 3.7.4.
Revision 44 1011012008 Revision 44 updates Table 3.3.1-1 to be consistent with the changes approved by NRC as Tech Spec Amendment 68.
Revision 45 02i232009 Added TR 3.3.8, "Hydrogen Monitors,'and the Bases forTR 3.3.8.
This change is based on Technical Specification (TS) Amendment 72 which removed the Hydrogen Monitors (Function 13 of LCO 3.3.3) from the TS.
Revision 46 09120n010 Revision 46 implements changes from License Amendment 82 (Iechnical Specification (TS) Bases Revsion 104) for the approved BEACON-TSM application of the Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS).
Revision 47 1010812010 Revision 47 changes are in response to PER 215552 which requested clarification be added to the TRM regarding supported system operability when a snubber is declared inoperable or removed from service.
continued Watts Bar-Unit 1 xtv Technical Req uirements Revision 47
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REVISION LISTING Revisions lssued SUBJECT Revision 48 0411212011 CANCELLED Revision 49 0512412011 Revision 49 updated Note 14 of Table 3.3.2-1to clarify that the referenced time is only for'partial' transfer of the ECCS pumps from the VCT to the RWST.
Revision 50 1211212011 Clarifies the acceptability of periodically using a portion of the 25%
grace perid in TSR 3.0.2 to facilitate 13 week maintenance work schedules.
Revision 51 08/09/20'1 3 Adds a note to TR 3.1 .2 and TR 3. 1 .4 to permit securing one charging pump in order to supporting transition into or from the Applicability of Technicat Specification 3.4.12 (PER 593365).
Revision 52 08/30/2013 Clarifies that TR 3.4.5, "Piping System Structural lntegri$," applies to all ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 piping systems, and is not limited to reactor coolant system piping.
Revision 53 1211212013 Technical Specification Amendment 92 added Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.10, "Decay Time," which was redundant to Technical Requirement (TR) 3.9.1, "Decay Time." Revision 53 removes TR 3.9.1 from the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) and the TRM Bases.
Revision 54 0112312014 TRM which updates Technical Requirement (TR) 3.3.9, "Power Distribution Monitoring System," to reflect the Addendum to WCAP 12472-P-4.
Revision 55 0111412015 Provided in the attachment is TRM Revision 55 which revises TRM Table 3.8.3-1 pages 3 and 5, Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices which are bypassed under accident conditions.
This revision results in the valves requiring their Thermal Overload Bypasses to be operable.
Revision 56 0/,13012015 This revision restructures TR 3.6.2 CONDITIONS, REQUIRED ACTIONS, and COMPLETION TIME(s) to address two distinct cases of system inoperability. TRM BASES B 3.6.2 was also revised to coincide with the changes described above and to include additional detail regarding use of indirect means for performing channel checks Revision 57 0510712015 This revision changes the elevation of the Mean Sea Level by submergence during floods vary from 714.5ftto 739.2 ft in TRM Bases B 3.7.2, Flood Protection Plan.
Revision 58 0511912015 This revision is an administrative change in TRM Bases 3.4.5 background information.
(continued)
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TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REVISION LISTING Revisions l"s.s-ued S"U"BJE9T Revision 59 1011312015 This revision adds the Unit 1 and Unit 2 FCV67-0066 and FCV-67-0067 valves to TRM Table 3.8.3-1 .
Revision 60 0O10112016 This revision is to add 2-FCV-70-153 valve to TRM Table 3.8.3-1 Sheet 4 of 5.
Revision 61 0212'112017 Revises TRM Bases 3.6.2 "lnlet Door Position Monitoring System" actions.
Revision 62 0313112017 This revision deletes TRM and TRM Bases section 3.7.3, Snubbers" via the License Amendment 111.
Revision 63 511712017 Revises the obsolete analog system that was limited to monitoring 1 sensorfor each RCS collection point.
Revision &l 8122t17 Clarified ASME Code Class in the section description in Section 3.4.5, Piping System Structural lntegrity. I I
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ENGLOSURE 4 WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL CHANGED PAGES E-4
Loose-Part Detection System TR 3.3.6 TR 3 3 INSTRUMENTATION TR 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection System TR 3 3.6 The Loose-Part Detection System shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.
NOTE TR 3.0.3 is not applicable.
ACT!ONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Both channels of one or 4.1 Document in accordance with ln accordance with more collection regions of the Corrective Action Program. the Corrective Action Loose-Part Detection Program.
System inoperable > 30 days.
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Piping System Structural lntegrity TR 3.4.5 TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS TR 3.4.5 ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 Piping System Structural lntegrity TR 3.4.5 The structural integrity of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components in all systems shall be maintained in accordance with TSR 3.4.5.1and TSR 3.4.5.2.
APPLICABILITY: AIIMODES.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Structural integrity of any ASME Restore structural integrity of Prior to increasing Code Class 1 component(s) not affected component(s) to within Reactor Coolant within limits. limit. System temperature
> 50oF above the minimum temperature required by NDT considerations.
lsolate affected component(s). Prior to increasing Reactor Coolant System temperature
> 50oF above the minimum temperature required by NDT considerations.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.4-10 Revision 38, 52,64 Tech nical Requ irements
Snubbers TR 3.7.3 TR37 PLANTSYSTEMS TR 3.7.3 Deleted Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.7-10 through 21 Revision 62 Techn ica! Requirements 03/31117
Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices TR 3.8.3 Table 3.8.3-1 (Page 4 of 5)
Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devi ce' under lH [: ,fE"?f,tr;:o VALVE NO. FUNCTION 1-FCV-67-141 Containment lsolation Upper 1-FCV-72-21 Containment Spray Pump Suction 1-FCV-72-22 Containment Spray Pump Suction 1-FCV-72-2 Containment Spray lsolation 1-FCV-72-39 Containment Spray lsolation 1-FCV-72-40 RHR Containment Spray lsolation 1-FCV-72-41 RHR Containment Spray lsolation 1-FCV-72-44 Containment Sump to Header A - Containment Spray 1-FCV-72-45 Containment Sump to Header B - Containment Spray 1-FCV-26-240 Containment Isolation 1-FCV-26-243 RCP Containment Spray lsolation 1-FCV-68-332 RCS PRZR Relief 1-FCV-68-333 RCS PRZR Relief 1-FCV-70-153 RHR Heat Exchanger B-B Outlet 2-FCV-70-153 RHR Heat Exchanger B-B Outlet 1-FCV-70-156 RHR Heat Exchanger A-A Outlet 1-FCV-67-9A ERCW Strainer Backwash 2-FCV-67-9A ERCW Strainer Backwash 1-FCV-67-9B ERCW Strainer Flush 2-FCV-67-98 ERCW Strainer Flush 1-FCV-67-10A ERCW Strainer Backwash 2-FCV-67-10A ERCW Strainer Backwash 1-FCV-67-108 ERCW Strainer Flush 2-FCV-67-1 0B ERCW Strainer Flush (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.8-15 Revision 60 Tech nical Requirements
Loose-Part Detection System B 3.3,6 B3 3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection System BASES BACKGROUND The Loose-Part Detection System consists of twelve sensors with associated pre-amplifiers, signalconditioners and digitalsignal processor units, and a CPU with its supporting equipment. Two sensors are located at each of the six natural collection regions around the Reactor Coolant System. These regions consist of the top and bottom plenums of the reactor vessel and the primary coolant inlet plenum to each of the four steam generators. The entire system is described in Reference 1.
The Loose-Part Detection System provides the capability to detect acoustic disturbances indicative of loose parts within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary. This system is provided to avoid or mitigate damage to RCS components that could occur from these loose parts. The Loose-Part Detection System Technical Requirement is consistent with the recommendations of Reference 2.
APPLICABLE The presence of a loose part in the RCS can be indicative of degraded reactor SAFETY ANALYSES safety resulting from failure or weakening of a safety-related component. A loose part, whether it be from a failed or weakened component, or from an item inadvertently left in the primary system during construction, refueling, or maintenance, can contribute to component damage and materialwear by frequent impacting with other parts in the system. Also, a loose part increases the potential for control-rod jamming and for accumulation of increased levels of radioactive crud in the primary system (Ref. 2).
The Loose Part Detection System provides the capability to detect loose parts in the RCS which could cause damage to some component in the RCS. Loose parts are not assumed to initiate any DBA, and the detection of a loose part is not required for mitigation of any DBA (Ref. 3).
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-1 I Revision 63 Tech nical Requirements jst17 t17
Loose-Part Detection System B 3.3.6 BASES (continued)
TR TR 3.3.6 requires the Loose-Part Detection System to be OPERABLE. This is necessary to ensure that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the RCS and avoid or mitigate damage to the RCS components. This requirement is provided in Reference 2.
APPLICABILITY TR 3.3.6 is required to be met in MODES 1 and2 as stated in Reference 2.
These MODES of applicability are provided in Reference 2.
The Applicability has been modified by a Note stating that the provisions of TR 3.0.3 do not apply.
ACTIONS 4.1 lf both channels of one or more collection regions of the Loose-Part Detection System are inoperable for more than 30 days, document the inoperability of the channels in accordance with Corrective Action Program.
TECHNICAL TSR 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK for the Loose-Part Detection System once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.
ln addition, the Loose-Part Detection System performs an automatic system self-test each day which provides a printable daily report and displays any faults discovered during he test. The CHANNEL CHECK activity will review the daily report, observe the display to determine if any faults were discovered during the system self-test, verifl the system is in an operable condition and verify there are no alarms. The CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-1 I Revision 63 Tech nical Requ irements 05/1 7117
Loose-Part Detection System B3.36 BASES TECHNICAL TSR 3.3.6.1 (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance and the Surveillance Frequency are provided in Reference 2.
TSR 3.3.6.2 A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is to be performed every 31 days on each required channelto ensure the entire channelwill perform the intended function.
This test verifies the capability of the Loose-Part Detection System to detect impact signals which would indicate a loose part in the RCS. The Surveillance and the Surveillance Frequency are provided in Reference 2.
TSR 3.3.6.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. The Surveillance Frequency of 18 months is based upon operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. The Surveillance and the Surveillance Frequency are provided in Reference 2.
Reference 1 describes the use of the built-in capabilities of the system to verify proper channel calibration. This is an acceptable option to using a mechanical impact device for sensors located in plant areas where plant personnel radiation exposure is considered by Plant Management to be excessive.
REFERENCES 1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section7.6.7, "Loose Part Monitoring System (LPMS)
System Description."
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1 .133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors."
3 WCAP-1 1618, "MERITS Program-Phase ll, Task 5, Criteria Application,"
including Addendum 1 dated April, 1989.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.3-20 05117117 Tech n ical Requ irements Revision 11,63
Piping System Structural lntegrity B 3.4.5 B 3 4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
B 3.4.5 ASME Class 1,2, and 3 Piping System Structural lntegrity BASES BACKGROUND lnservice inspection and pressure testing of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components in all systems are performed in accordance with Section Xl of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Ref. 1) and applicable Addenda, as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) (Ref. 2). Exception to these requirements apply where relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i) and (a)(3). ln general, the surveillance intervals specified in Section Xl of the ASME Code apply. However, the lnservice lnspection Program includes a clarification of the frequencies for performing the inservice inspection and testing activities required by Section Xl of the ASME Code. This clarification is provided to ensure consistency in surveillance intervals throughout the Technical Specifications. Each reactor coolant pump flywheel is, in addition, inspected as recommended in Regulatory Position C.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.'14, Revision 1, August 1975 (Ref. 3).
APPLICABLE Certain components which are designed and manufactured to the requirements SAFETY ANALYSES of specific sections of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code are part of the primary success path and function to mitigate DBAs and transients. However, the operability of these components is addressed in the relevant specifications that cover individualcomponents. ln addition, this particular Requirement covers only structural integrity inspection/testing requirements for these components, which is not a consideration in designing the accident sequences for theoretical hazard evaluation (Ref .4).
TR TR 3.4.5 requires that the structural integrity of the ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components in all systems be maintained in accordance with TSR 3.4.5.1 and TSR 3.4.5.2. ln those areas where conflict may exist between the Technical Specifications and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, the Technical Specifications take precedence.
(continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3.4-14 Revision 58, 64 Tech nical Req uirements
lnlet Door Position Monitoring System B 3.6.2 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS c.1 (continued) lf the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a condition where OPERABILITY of the lnlet Door Position Monitoring System is not required. This is accomplished by immediately entering Technical Specification LCO 3.6.12, Condition D, which requires placing the plant in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from fullpower in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
TECHNICAL TSR 3.6.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK for the lnlet Door Position Monitoring System once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. lt is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK helps to ensure that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each TADOT. The dual switch arrangement on each door allows comparison of open and shut indicators for each zone as well as a check with the annunciator window.
When equipment conditions exist that prevent the preferred direct comparison of open and shut indicators for each zone as described above, indirect methods may be employed to verify that the inlet doors are shut. The indirect methods include the performance of a continuity check of the circuit used by the annunciator window, by monitoring ice bed temperature, or by monitoring ice condenser and containment parameters. The annunciator continuity check can confirm if one or more inlet door zone switch contacts are closed which would represent an open inlet door. The lce Bed Temperature Monitoring System can be used to provide confirmation of inlet door closure by confirming there is uniform equilibrium temperature in the ice bed. lce condenser and containment parameters such as temperature and humidity can also be used to determine if an ice condenser inlet door is open.
When indirect methods are used to verify ice condenser inlet doors are shut, a technical analysis must be completed and documented in accordance with the corrective action program. ln those instances when a technical analysis can not be made within the allowed Completion Time, the lnlet Door Position Monitoring System must be declared lnoperable and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.12, Condition D must be entered immediately.
2t21t17 Watts Bar-Unit 1 B36-8 Revision 61 Techn ical Req u irements
Snubbers B 3.7.3 BASES B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.3 Deleted Watts Bar-Unit 1 B 3 .7 -12 thoru gh 17 Revision 62 Tech nical Requ irements 03/31117
ENCLOSURE 5 WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES TABLE OF CONTENTS E-5
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS I LIST OF TABLES Vi Vi LIST OF ACRONYMS ...... vii LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES x B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) B 2.0-1 B 2.1 .1 Reactor Core SLs B 2.0-1 B 2.1 .2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL ... B 2.0-7 B 3.0 LTMITING CONDTTTON FOR OPERATTON (LCO)
APPLICABILITY ... B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVElLLANCE REQUTREMENT (SR) APPLlCABlLlTY ... B 3.0-11 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ...... B 3 .1-1 B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) - T",s ) 200'F B 3.1-1 B 3.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) - T",s ( 200'F B 3.1-8 B 3.1 .3 Core Reactivity ... B 3 .1-12 B 3 .1.4 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) B 3.1-18 B 3.1 .5 Rod Group Alignment Limits B 3.1-25 B 3.1 .6 Shutdown Bank lnsertion Limits B 3.1-35 B3.1 .7 Control Bank lnsertion Limits B 3 .1-40 B 3.1 .8 Rod Position lndication B 3.1-48 B 3.1 .9 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 1 ...... B 3 .1-57 B 3.1 .10 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 2 ...... B 3.1-64 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3.2-1 B 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (Fo(Z)) B 3.2-1 B 3.2.2 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (pXs) B 3.2-14 B 3.2.3 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) B 3.2-21 B 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TlLT RATlO (OPTR) B 3.2-26 Watts Bar - Unat2 (continued)
TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION .... B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) lnstrumentation ... B 3.3-'1 B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) lnstrumentation .. ........ B 3.3-64 B 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) lnstrumentation... B 3.3-122 B 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System B 3.3-138 B 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start lnstrumentation ... B 3.3-144 B 3.3.6 ContainmentVent lsolation lnstrumentation ... ..... B 3.3-151 B 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)
Actuation lnstrumentation ... B 3.3-159 B 3.3.8 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) Actuation lnstrumentation ... ....... B 3.3-165 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ........ B 3.4-1 B 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits . ... . B 3 .4-1 B 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality . .... B 3.4-6 B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PfD Limits B 3.4-9 B 3.4.4 RCS Loops - MODES 1 and 2 B 3.4-16 B 3.4.5 RCS Loops - MODE 3 B 3.4-24 B 3.4.6 RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4-25 B 3.4.7 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops t,i'"o B 3.4-31 B 3.4.8 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4-35 B 3.4.9 Pressurizer B 3.4-38 B 3 .4.10 P ress urizer Safety Valves B 3.4-42 B 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS) B 3.4-46 B 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) B 3.4-52 B 3 .4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4-65 B 3.4.14 RCS Pressure lsolation Valve (PlV) Leakage B 3 .4-71 B 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection lnstrumentation B 3.4-76 B 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity B 3.4-82 B 3 .4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube lntegrity B 3.4-88 Watts Bar - U nal 2 (continued)
TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.5 B 3.5-1 B 3.5.1 Accumulators B 3.5-1 B 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating B 3.5-9 B 3.5.3 B 3.5-20 B 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) B 3.5-24 B 3.5.5 Seal lnjection FIow B 3.5-30 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6-1 B 3.6.1 Containment ... . a B 3.6-1 B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks B 3.6-6 B 3.6.3 Containment lsolation Valves B 3.6-13 B 3.6.4 Containment Pressure B 3.6-27 B 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature .. .. r .... B 3.6-30 B 3.6.6 Containment Spray System ... .... B 3.6-34 B 3.6.7 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION B 3.6-41 B 3.6.8 Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS) B 3.6-42 B 3.6.9 Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) B 3.6-48 B 3.6.10 Air Return System (ARS) B 3.6-54 B 3.6.1 1 lce Bed B 3,6-59 B 3 .6.12 lce Condenser Doors B 3.6-69 B 3.6.13 Divider Barrier lntegrity B 3.6-78 B 3.6.14 Containment Recirculation Drains B 3.6-83 B 3.6.15 Shield Building B 3.6-87 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7-1 B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVS) B 3.7-1 B 3.7.2 Main Steam lsolation Valves (MSlVs) .... B 3.7-8 B 3 .7.3 Main Feedwater lsolation Valves (MFlVs) and Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVS) and Associated Bypass Valves B 3.7-13 B 3.7.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) ... .... B 3.7-19 B 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW System B 3.7-23 B 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) ... ... ... B 3.7-32 (continued)
Watts Bar - Unit2
TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued) 83.7.7 Component Cooling System (CCS) ....... B 3.7-36 B 3.7.8 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System B 3.7-42 B 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ... B 3.7-47 B 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) ....... B 3.7-50 B 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS) ........ B 3.7-59 B 3 .7.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) .... B 3.7-63 B 3 .7.13 Fuel Storage PoolWater Level ... B 3.7-68 B 3 .7.14 Secondary Specific Activity .. B 3.7-71 B 3.7 .15 Spent FuelAssembly Storage B 3.7-74 B 3 .7.16 Component Cooling System (CCS) - Shutdown .. B 3.7-77 B 3 .7.17 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) - Shutdown B 3.7-84 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8-38 B 3,8,3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, B 3.8-43 B 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating B 3.8-53 B 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8-68 B 3.8.6 Battery Parameters B 3.8-72 B 3.8.7 lnverters - Operating B 3.8-78 B 3.8.8 B 3.8-82 B 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8-86 B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8-95 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9-1 B 3.9.1 Boron Concentration B 3.9-1 B 3,9.2 Unborated Water Source lsolation Valves B 3.9-5 B 3.9.3 N uclear I nstrumentation B 3.9-8 B 3.9.4 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION B 3.9-1 1 B 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9-12 (continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS (continued)
B 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal(RHR) and Coolant Circulation - LowWater Level ... B 3.9-16 B 3.9.7 Refueling CavityWater Level ... B 3.9-20 B 3.9.8 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION B 3.9-23 B 3.9.9 Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration ... B 3.9-24 B 9.10 Decay Time ......,. B 3.9-26 Watts Bar - Untz
TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES TABLE NO TITLE PAGE B 3 .8.1-2 TS Action or Surveillance Requirements Contingency Actions... ... ... . 83.8-37a B 3.8.9-1 AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems B 3.8-94 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE NO. TITLE PAGE B 2.1 .1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limits vs. Boundary of Protection B 2.0-6 B 3 .1 .7-1 Control Bank Insertion vs. Percent RTP B 3.1-47 B 3.2.1-1 K(Z) - Normalized F a(Z) as a Function of Core Height B 3.2-13 B 3.2.3-1 TYPICAL AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE Acceptable Operation Limits as a Function of RATED THERMAL POWER B 3.2-25 Watts Bar - Unit 2 VI Amendment 5
Lrsr oF ACRqNYMS ACRONYM TITLE ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ACRP Auxiliary Control Room Panel AFD Axial Flux Difference AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System ARFS Air Return Fan System ARO All Rods Out ARV Atmospheric Relief Valve ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers BOC Beginning of Cycle CAOC Constant Axial Offset Control CCS Component Cooling Water System CFR Code of Federal Regulations COLR Core Operating Limits Report CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System CSS Containment Spray System CST Condensate Storage Tank DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EFPD Effective Full-Power Days EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EOC End of Cycle (cont[ueq)-
Watts Bar - Unit2 vll
LIST OF ACRONYMS ACRONYM TITLE ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning LCO Limiting Condition For Operation MFIV Main Feedwater lsolation Valve MFRV Main Feedwater Regulation Valve MSIV Main Steam Line lsolation Valve MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient NMS Neutron Monitoring System ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual PCP Process Control Program PIV Pressure lsolation Valve PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve PTLR Pressure and Temperature Limits Report QPTR Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio RAOC Relaxed Axial Offset Control RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System (continued)
Watts Bar - Unit2 viii
LLSr OF ACSONWS ACRONYM TITLE RHR Residual Heat Removal RTP Rated Thermal Power RTS Reactor Trip System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SG Steam Generator SI Safety lnjection SL Safety Limit SR Surveillance Requirement UHS Ultimate Heat Sink Watts Bar - Unit 2 tx
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)
PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 0 B 3.0-7 0 0 B 3.0-8 0 0 B 3.0-9 0 0 B 3.0-10 0 0 B 3.0-10a 7 5 B 3.0-10b 7 0 B 3.0-10c 7 0 B 3.0-1 1 0 0 B 3.0-12 10 x 11 B 3.0-13 0 xi 0 B 3.0-14 0 xii 0 B 3.0-15 0 xiii 0 B 3.0-16 0 xiv 0 B 3.0-17 0 xiv 8 B 3.0-18 0 XV 0 B 3.1-1 0 xvi 11 B 3.1-2 0 xvii I B 3.1-3 0 xviii 6 B 3.1-4 0 xix 1 B 3.1-5 0 xx 0 B 3.1-6 0 xxi 11 B 3.1-7 0 B 2.0-1 0 B 3.1-8 0 B 2.0-2 0 B 3.1-9 0 B 2.0-3 0 B 3.1-10 0 B 2.A-4 0 B 3 .1-11 0 B 2.0-5 0 B 3 .1-12 0 B 2.0-6 0 B 3.1-13 0 B 2.0-7 0 B 3 .1-14 0 B 2.0-8 0 B 3.1-15 0 B 2.0-9 0 B 3.1-16 0 B 2.0-10 0 B 3 .1-17 0 B 3.0-1 7 B 3.1-18 0 B 3.0-2 0 B 3.1-19 0 B 3.0-3 0 B 3.1-20 0 B 3.0-4 0 B 3.1-21 0 B 3.0-5 0 B 3.1-22 0 B 3.0-6 0 B 3.1-23 0 Watts Bar - Unit 2 Revision 11
TECHN ICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)
PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3.1-24 B 3.1-62 B 3.1-25 B 3.1-63 B 3.1-26 B 3.1-64 B 3.1-27 B 3.1-65 B 3.1-28 B 3.1-66 B 3.1-29 B 3.1-67 B 3.1-30 B 3.1-68 B 3 .1-31 B 3l_69 B 3.1-32 B 3.1-70 B 3.1-33 B 3.2-1 B 3.1-34 B 3.2-2 B 3.1-35 B 3.2-3 B 3.1-36 B 3.2-4 B 3.1-37 B 3.2-5 B 3.1-38 B 3.2-6 B 3.1-39 B 3.2-7 B 3.1-40 B 3.2-8 B 3 .1-41 B 3.2-9 B 3.1-42 B 3.2-10 B 3.1-43 B 3 .2-11 B 3.1-44 B 3.2-12 B 3.1-45 B 3.2-13 B 3.1-46 B 3.2-14 B 3 .1-47 B 3.2-15 B 3.1-48 B 3.2-16 B 3.1-49 B 3.2-17 B 3.1-50 B 3.2-18 B 3.1-51 B 3.2-19 B 3.1-52 B 3.2-20 B 3.1-53 B 3.2-21 B 3.1-54 B 3.2-22 B 3.1-55 B 3.2-23 B 3.1-56 B 3.2-24 B 3 .1-57 B 3.2-25 B 3.1-58 B 3.2-26 B 3.1-59 B 3.2-27 B 3.1-60 B 3.2-28 B 3.1-61 B 3.2-29 Watts Bar - Unit2 xi
TECHN ICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)
PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3.3-36 B 3.2-30 B 3.3-37 B 3.2-31 B 3.3-38 B 3.3-1 B 3.3-39 B 3.3-2 B 3.3-40 B 3.3-3 B 3.3-41 B 3.3-4 B 3.3-42 B 3.3-5 B 3.3-43 B 3.3-6 B 3.3-44 B 3.3-7 B 3.3-45 B 3.3-8 B 3.3-46 B 3.3-9 B 3.3-47 B 3.3-10 B 3.3-48 B 3.3-11 B 3.3-49 B 3.3-12 B 3.3-50 B 3.3-13 B 3.3-51 B 3.3-14 B 3.3-52 B 3.3-15 B 3.3-53 B 3.3-16 B 3.3-54 B 3.3-17 B 3.3-55 B 3.3-18 B 3.3-56 B 3.3-19 B 3.3-57 B 3.3-20 B 3.3-58 B 3.3-21 B 3.3-59 B 3.3-22 B 3.3-60 B 3.3-23 B 3.3-61 B 3.3-24 B 3.3-62 B 3.3-25 B 3.3-63 B 3.3-26 B 3.3-64 B 3.3-27 B 3.3-65 B 3.3-28 B 3.3-66 B 3.3-29 B 3.3-67 B 3.3-30 B 3.3-68 B 3.3-31 B 3.3-69 B 3.3-32 B 3.3-70 B 3.3-33 B 3.3-7 1 B 3.3-34 B 3.3-72 B 3.3-35 B 3.3-73 Watts Bar - Unil 2 xii
TECHN ICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)
PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3 .3-111 B 3.3-74 B 3.3-112 B 3.3-75 B 3.3-1 13 B 3.3-76 B 3 .3-114 B 3.3-77 B 3.3-1 15 B 3.3-78 B 3.3-1 16 B 3.3-79 B 3 .3-117 B 3.3-80 B 3.3-1 18 B 3.3-81 B 3.3-1 19 B 3.3-82 B 3.3-120 B 3.3-83 B 3.3-121 B 3.3-84 B 3.3-122 B 3.3-85 B 3.3-123 B 3.3-86 B 3.3-124 B 3.3-87 B 3.3-125 B 3.3-BB B 3.3-126 B 3.3-89 B 3.3-127 B 3.3-90 B 3.3-128 B 3.3-91 B 3.3-129 B 3.3-92 B 3.3-130 B 3.3-93 B 3.3-131 B 3.3-94 B 3.3-132 B 3.3-95 B 3.3-133 B 3.3-96 B 3.3-134 B 3.3-97 B 3.3-135 B 3.3-98 B 3.3-136 B 3.3-99 B 3.3-137 B 3.3-100 B 3.3-138 B 3.3-101 B 3.3-139 B 3.3-102 B 3.3-140 B 3.3-103 B 3 .3-141 B 3.3-104 B 3.3-142 B 3.3-105 B 3.3-143 B 3.3-106 B 3.3-144 B 3.3-107 B 3.3-145 B 3.3-108 B 3.3-146 B 3.3-109 B 3.3-147 B 3.3-1 10 B 3.3-148 Watts Bar - Unit2 xiii
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PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3.4-18 B 3.3-149 B 3.4-19 B 3.3-150 B 3,4-20 B 3.3-151 B 3,4-21 B 3.3-152 B 3.4-22 B 3.3-153 B 3.4-23 B 3.3-154 B 3.4-24 B 3.3-155 B 3.4-25 B 3.3-156 B 3.4-26 B 3.3-157 B 3.4-27 B 3.3-158 B 3.4-28 B 3.3-159 B 3.4-29 B 3.3-160 B 3.4-30 B 3.3-161 B 3.4-31 B 3.3-162 B 3.4-32 B 3.3-163 B 3.4-33 B 3.3-164 B 3.4-34 B 3.3-165 B 3.4-35 B 3.3-166 B 3.4-36 B 3.3-167 B 3.4-37 B 3.3-168 B 3.4-38 B 3 .4-1 B 3.4-39 B 3.4-2 B 3.4-40 B 3.4-3 B 3.4-41 B 3.4-4 B 3.4-42 B 3.4-5 B 3.4-43 B 3.4-6 B 3.4-44 B 3.4-7 B 3 .4-45 B 3.4-B B 3.4-46 B 3.4-9 B 3.4-47 B 3.4-10 B 3.4-48 B 3 .4-11 B 3.4-49 B 3.4-12 B 3.4-50 B 3.4-13 B 3.4-51 B 3.4-14 B 3.4-52 B 3.4-15 B 3.4-53 B 3.4-16 B 3.4-54 B 3.4-17 B 3.4-55 Watts Bar - Unit 2 xiv Revision 8
TECHNICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)
PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3.4-92 B 3.4-56 B 3.4-93 B 3.4-57 B 3.4-94 B 3.4-58 B 3.5-1 B 3.4-59 B 3.5-2 B 3.4-60 B 3.5-3 B 3.4-61 B 3.5-4 B 3.4-62 B 3.5-5 B 3.4-63 B 3.5-6 B 3.4-64 B 3.5-7 B 3.4-65 B 3.5-8 B 3.4-66 B 3.5-9 B 3.4-67 B 3.5-10 B 3.4-68 B 3.5-11 B 3.4-69 B 3,5-12 B 3,4-70 B 3.5-13 B 3 .4-71 B 3.5-14 B 3.4-72 B 3.5-15 B 3.4-72 B 3.5-16 B 3.4-73 B 3 .5-17 B 3.4-74 B 3.5-18 B 3.4-75 B 3.5-19 B 3.4-76 B 3.5-20 B 3.4-77 B 3.5-21 B 3.4-78 B 3.5-22 B 3.4-79 B 3.5-23 B 3.4-80 B 3.5-24 B 3.4-81 B 3.5-25 B 3.4-82 B 3.5-26 B 3.4-83 B 3.5-27 B 3.4-84 B 3.5-28 B 3.4-85 B 3.5-29 B 3.4-86 B 3.5-30 B 3.4-87 B 3.5-31 B 3.4-88 B 3.5-32 B 3.4-89 B 3.5-33 B 3.4-90 B 3.6-1 B 3.4-91 B 3.6-2 Watts Bar - Unit2
TECHNICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)
PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3.6-40 0 B 3.6-3 B 3 .6-41 0 B 3.6-4 B 3.6-42 0 B 3.6-5 B 3.6-43 0 B 3.6-6 B 3.6-44 0 B 3.6-7 B 3.6-45 0 B 3.6-8 B 3.6-46 0 B 3.6-9 B 3.6-47 0 B 3.6-10 B 3.6-48 0 B 3.6-1 1 B 3.6-49 0 B 3.6-12 B 3.6-50 0 B 3.6-13 B 3.6-51 0 B 3.6-14 B 3.5-52 0 B 3.6-15 B 3.6-53 0 B 3.6-16 B 3.6-54 0 B 3.6-17 B 3.6-55 0 B 3.6-18 B 3.6-56 0 B 3.6-19 B 3.6-57 0 B 3.6-20 B 3.6-58 0 B 3.6-21 B 3.6-59 11 B 3.6-22 B 3.6-60 0 B 3.6-23 B 3.6-61 0 B 3.6-24 B 3.6-62 0 B 3.6-25 B 3.6-63 0 B 3.6-26 B 3.6-64 11 B 3.6-27 B 3.6-65 0 B 3.6-28 B 3.6-66 0 B 3.6-29 B 3.6-67 0 B 3.6-30 B 3.6-68 0 B 3.6-31 B 3.6-69 0 B 3.6-32 B 3.6-74 0 B 3.6-33 B 3 .6-71 0 B 3.6-34 B 3.6-72 0 B 3.6-35 B 3.6-73 0 B 3.6-36 B 3.6-74 0 B 3.6-37 B 3.6-75 0 B 3.6-38 B 3.6-76 0 B 3.6-39 B 3.6-77 0 Watts Bar - Unit2 XVI Revision 11
TECHN ICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)
PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3.7-24 B 3.6-78 B 3.7-25 B 3.6-79 B 3.7-26 B 3.6-80 B 3.7-27 B 3.6-81 B 3.7-28 B 3.6-82 B 3.7-29 B 3.6-83 B 3.7-30 B 3.6-84 B 3.7-31 B 3.6-85 B 3.7-32 B 3.6-86 B 3.7-33 B 3.6-87 B 3.7-34 B 3.6-88 B 3.7-35 B 3.6-89 B 3.7-36 B 3.6-90 B 3 .7-37 83.6-91 B 3.7-38 B 3 .7-1 B 3.7-39 B 3.7-2 B 3.7-4A B 3.7-3 B 3.7-41 B 3.7-4 B 3.7-42 B 3.7-5 B 3.7-43 B 3.7-6 B 3.7-44 B 3.7-7 B 3.7-45 B 3.7-8 B 3.7-46 B 3.7-9 B 3.7-47 B 3 .7-10 B 3.7-48 B 3 .7-11 B 3.7-49 B 3.7-12 B 3.7-50 B 3 .7-13 B 3 .7-51 B 3.7-14 B 3.7-52 B 3 .7-15 B 3.7-53 B 3 .7-16 B 3.7-54 B 3.7-17 B 3.7-55 B 3.7-18 B 3.7-56 B 3.7-19 B 3.7-57 B 3.7-20 B 3.7-58 B 3.7-21 B 3.7-59 B 3.7-22 B 3.7-60 B 3.7-23 B 3.7-61 Watts Bar - Unit2 xvii Revision I
TECHNICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)
PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3.8-10a B 3.7-62 B 3.8-1 1 B 3.7-63 B 3.8-12 B 3.7-64 B 3.8-12a B 3.7-65 B 3.8-12b B 3.7-66 B 3.8-13 B 3 .7-67 B 3,8-14 B 3.7-68 B 3.8-15 B 3.7-69 B 3.8-16 B 3 .7-70 B 3.8-17 83.7-7 1 B 3.8-18 B 3.7-72 B 3.8-19 B 3.7-73 B 3.8-20 B 3,7-74 B 3.8-21 B 3.7-75 B 3.8-22 B 3.7-76 B 3.8-23 B 3.7-77 B 3.8-24 B 3.7-78 B 3.8-25 B 3.7-79 B 3.8-26 B 3.7-80 B 3.8-27 B 3.7-81 B 3.8-28 B 3.7-82 B 3.8-28a B 3.7-83 B 3,8-29 B 3.7-84 B 3.8-30 B 3.7-85 B 3.8-31 B 3.7-86 B 3.8-32 B 3.7-87 B 3.8-33 B 3.7-88 B 3.8-34 B 3.8-1 B 3.8-35 B 3,8-2 B 3.8-36 B 3.8-3 B 3.8-37 B 3.8-4 B 3.8-37a B 3.8-5 B 3.8-38 B 3.8-6 B 3.8-39 B 3.8-7 B 3.8-40 B 3.8.8 B 3.8-41 B 3.8-9 B 3.8-42 B 3.8-10 B 3.8-43 Watts Bar - Unit2 xviii Revision 6
TECHN ICAL SPECI F!CATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)
PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3.8-81 B 3 .8-44 B 3.8-82 B 3.8-45 B 3.8-83 B 3.8-46 B 3.8-84 B 3.8-47 B 3.8-85 B 3.8-48 B 3.8-86 B 3.8-49 B 3.8-87 B 3.8-50 B 3.8-88 B 3.8-51 B 3.8-89 B 3.8-52 B 3.8-90 B 3.8-53 B 3.8-91 B 3.8-54 B 3.8-92 B 3.8-5s B 3.8-93 B 3.8-56 B 3.8-94 B 3.8-57 B 3.8-95 B 3.8-58 B 3.8-96 B 3.8-59 B 3.8-97 B 3.8-60 B 3.8.98 B 3.8-61 B 3.9-1 B 3.8-62 B 3.9-2 B 3.8-63 B 3.9-3 B 3.8-64 B 3.9-4 B 3.8-65 B 3.9-5 B 3.8-66 B 3.9-6 B 3.8-67 B 3,9-7 B 3.8-68 B 3.9-8 B 3.8-69 B 3.9-10 B 3.8-70 B 3.9-11 B 3 .8-71 B 3.9-12 B 3.8-72 B 3.9-13 B 3.8-73 B 3.9-14 B 3.8-74 B 3.9-15 B 3.8-7s B 3.9-16 B 3.8-76 B 3 .9-17 B 3.8-77 B 3.9-18 B 3.8-78 B 3.9-19 B 3.8-79 B 3.9-20 B 3.8-80 B 3.9-21 Watts Bar - Unit2 xtx Revision 1
TECHN ICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)
PAGE AMENDMENT PAGE AMENDMENT NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3.9-22 0 B 3.9-23 0 B 3.9-24 0 B 3.9-25 0 B 3.9-26 0 B 3.9-27 0 B 3.9-28 0 Watts Bar - Unit2
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING (This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updated without formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)
REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECT NPF-20 10-22-15 Low Power Operating License Revision 1 2-12-16 TS Bases Table B 3.8.9-1 , "AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems" Revision 2 3-18-16 Revise TS Bases 83,3.7, "Component Cooling System (CCS)," regarding the 1B and 28 surge tank sections.
Revision 3 7 16 Revise TS Bases 83.6.4, "Containment Pressure," and 83.6.6, "Containment Spray System" regarding the maximum peak containment pressure from a LOCA of 11 .73 psig.
Revision 4 8-1 9-16 Revise TS Bases 83.6.15, "Shield Building," to clarify the use of the Condition B note.
Revision 5 1-17 -17 Revises TS Bases B 3.8.1 "AC-Sources" Revision 6 2-24-17 Revises TS Bases B 3.7 .7 , "Component Cooling System (CCS)," and B 3.7.16, "Component Cooling System (CCS) -
Shutdown".
Revision 7 3-13-17 Adds TS Bases B 3.0.8 for lnoperability of Snubbers.
Revision 8 4-7 -17 Revises TS Bases B 3.4.6.3 to correct the steam generator minimum narrow range level.
Revision 9 4-25-17 Revises TS Bases 83.7-10 CREVS.
Revision 10 7 17 Revises TS Bases SR 83.0.2 for a one-time extension of the Alternating Current Sources.
Revision 11, Amendment 14 9-29-17 Revises TS Bases 83.6.11 to change the ice mass weight.
Watts Bar - Unit 2 xxt Revision 11
ENCLOSURE 6 WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGED PAGES E-6
LCO Applicability B 3.0 B 3.0 LtMtTtNG CONDITlON FOR OPERATTON (LCO) APPLtCABtLtTy BASES LCOs LCO 3.0.1 through LCO 3.0.8 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless othenruise stated.
LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met (i.e., when the unit is in the MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability statement of each Specification).
LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated ACTIONS shall be met. The Completion Time of each Required Action for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point in time that an ACTIONS Condition is entered. The Required Actions establish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when the requirements of an LCO are not met. This Specification establishes that:
- a. Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification; and
- b. Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met within the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified.
There are two basic types of Required Actions. The first type of Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limit is the Completion Time to restore an inoperable system or component to OPERABLE status or to restore variables to within specified limits. lf this type of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a shutdown may be required to place the unit in a MODE or condition in which the Specification is not applicable, (Whether stated as a Required Action or not, correction of the entered Condition is an action that may always be considered upon entering ACTIONS.) The second type of Required Action specifies the remedial measures that permit continued operation of the unit that is not further restricted by the Completion Time. ln this case, compliance with the Required Actions provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-1 Revision 7 Amendment 6
LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES (continued)
LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.8 establishes conditions under which systems are considered to remain capable of performing their intended safety function when associated snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s). This LCO states that the supported system is not considered to be inoperable solely due to one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s). This is appropriate because a limited length of time is allowed for maintenance, testing, or repair of one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s) and appropriate compensatory measures are specified in the snubber requirements, which are located outside of the TechnicalSpecifications (TS) under licensee control. LCO 3.0.8 applies to snubbers that only have seismic function. lt does not apply to snubbers that also have design functions to mitigate steamlwater hammer or other transient loads. The snubber requirements do not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(cX2Xii), and, as such, are appropriate for control by the licensee.
When applying LCO 3.0.8.a, at least one train of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system must be OPERABLE during MODES when AFW is required to be OPERABLE. When applying LCO 3.0.8.a during MODES when AFW is not required to be OPERABLE, a core cooling method (such as Decay Heat Removal (DHR) system) must be available. When applying LCO 3.0.8.b, a means of core cooling must remain available (AFW, DHR, equipment necessary for feed and bleed operations, etc.).
Reliance on availability of a core cooling source during modes where AFW is not required by TSs provides an equivalent safety margin for plant operations were LCO 3.0.8 not applied and meets the intent of Technical Specification Task Force Change Traveler TSTF-372, Revision 4, "Addition of LCO 3.0.8, lnoperability of Snubbers."
When a snubber is to be rendered incapable of performing its related support function (i.e., nonfunctional) for testing or maintenance or is discovered to not be functional, it must be determined whether any system(s) require the affected snubber(s) for system OPERABLILITY, and whether the plant is in a MODE or specified condition in the Applicability that requires the supported system(s) to be OPERABLE.
lf an analysis determines that the supported system(s) do not require the snubbe(s) to be functional in order to support the OPERABILITY of the system(s), LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. lf the LCO(S) associated with any supported system(s) are not currently applicable (i.e., the plant is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO), LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. lf the supported system(s) are inoperable for reasons other than snubbers, LCO 3.0.8 cannot be used. LCO 3.0.8 is an allowance, not a requirement. When a snubber is nonfunctional, any supported system(s) may be declared inoperable instead of using LCO 3.0.8.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-10a Revision 7 Amendment 6
LCO Applicability B30 BASES LCO 3.0.8 Every time the provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are used, WBN Unit 2 will confirm (continued) that at least one train (or subsystem) of systems supported by the inoperable snubbers will remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads. A record of the design function of the inoperable snubber (i.e.,
seismic vs. non-seismic) and the associated plant configuration will be available on a recoverable basis for NRC staff inspection.
LCO 3.0.8 does not apply to non-seismic snubbers. The provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are not to be applied to supported TS systems unless the supported systems would remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads. The risk impact of dynamic loadings other than seismic loads was not assessed as part of the development of LCO 3.0.8. These shocktype loads include thrust loads, blowdown loads, water-hammer loads, steam-hammer loads, LOCA loads and pipe rupture loads. However, there are some important distinctions between non-seismic (shocktype) loads and seismic loads which indicate that, in general, the risk impact of the out-of-service snubbers is smaller for non-seismic loads than for seismic loads.
First, while a seismic load affects the entire plant, the impact of a nonseismic load is localized to a certain system or area of the plant.
Second, although non-seismic shock loads may be higher in totalforce and the impact could be as much or more than seismic loads, generally they are of much shorter duration than seismic loads. Third, the impact of non-seismic loads is more plant specific, and thus harder to analyze generically, than for seismic loads. For these reasons, every time LCO 3.0.8 is applied, at least one train of each system that is supported by the inoperable snubbe(s) should remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismic loads.
lf the allowed time expires and the snubbe(s) are unable to perform their associated support function(s), the affected supported system's LCO(s) must be declared not met and the Conditions and Required Actions entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
LCO 3.0.8.a applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s) to a single train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system or to a single train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.a allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The72 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function and due to the availability of the redundant train of the supported system.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit2 B 3.0-10b Revision 7 Amendment 6
LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.8.b applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of (continued) providing their associated support function(s) to more than one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.b allows 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function.
LCO 3.0.8 requires that risk be assessed and managed. lndustry and NRC guidance on the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) (the Maintenance Rule) does not address seismic risk. However, use of LCO 3.0.8 should be considered with respect to other plant maintenance activities, and integrated into the existing Maintenance Rule process to the extent possible so that maintenance on any unaffected train or subsystem is properly controlled, and emergent issues are properly addressed. The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be a qualitative awareness of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more snubbers are not able to perform their associated support function.
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-10c Revision 7 Amendment 6
SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3 0,1 Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is (continued) required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordancewith SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current tt43DE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. ln these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of performing its function. This will allow operation to proceed to a tvDDE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed.
sR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic performance of the Required Action on a "once per. . ." interval.
SR 3.0.2 permits a25o/o extension of the interval specified in the Frequency. This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.9., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities). On a one-time basis the surveillance interval for the surveillances listed in TS Table 3.0.2-1 are allowed to be extended as identified on Table SR 3.0.2-1. The one-time surveillance interval extension expires on November 30, 2017.
The25o/o extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformancewith the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply.
These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS, and the surveillance requirement will include a note in the frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 does not apply." An example of an exception when the test interval is not specified in the regulations, is the discussion in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, that SR 3.0.2 does not apply. This exception is provided becausethe program already includes extension of test intervals.
As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per . . ." basis. The25o/o extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required (continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.0-12 ffisndm ent 12, Revision 10
RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE sR 3.4.6.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that one required RCS or RHR loop is in operation when the rod control system is not capable of rod withdrawal. Verification includes flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor RCS and RHR loop performance.
sR 3.4.6.3 SR 3.4.6.3 requires verification of SG OPERABILITY. SG OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring that the secondary side narrow range water level is greater than or equalto 6% (value does not account for instrument error, Ref. 1). lf the SG secondary side narrow range water level is less than 6%, the tubes may become uncovered and the associated loop may not be capable of providing the heat sink necessary for removal of decay heat. The 12-hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room to alert the operator to the loss of SG level.
sR 3.4.6.4 Verification that the required pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional RCS or RHR pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pump. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.
REFERENCES None Watts Bar - Unit2 B 3.4-30 Amendment 8 Revision 8
Containment Pressure B 3.6.4 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4 Containment Pressure BASES BACKGROUND The containment pressure is limited during normal operation to preserve the initial conditions assumed in the accident analyses for a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or steam line break (SLB). These limits also prevent the containment pressure from exceeding the containment design negative pressure differential G2.0 psid) with respect to the shield building annulus atmosphere in the event of inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System or Air Return Fans.
Containment pressure is a process variable that is monitored and controlled. The containment pressure limits are derived from the input conditions used in the containment functional analyses and the containment structure external pressure analysis. Should operation occur outside these limits coincident with a Design Basis Accident (DBA), post accident containment pressures could exceed calculated values.
APPLICABLE Containment internal pressure is an initial condition used in the DBA SAFETY analyses to establish the maximum peak containment internal pressure.
ANALYSES The limiting DBAs considered, relative to containment pressure, are the LOCA and SLB, which are analyzed using computer pressure transients.
The worst case LOCA generates larger mass and energy release than the worst case SLB. Thus, the LOCA event bounds the SLB event from the containment peak pressure standpoint (Ref. 1).
The initial pressure condition used in the containment analysis was 15.0 psia. This resulted in a maximum peak containment pressure from a LOCA of 11.73 psig. The containment analysis (Ref. 1) shows that the maximum allowable internal containment pressure, Pa (15.0 psig), bounds the calculated results from the limiting LOCA. The maximum containment pressure resulting from the worst case LOCA does not exceed the maximum allowable calculated containment pressure of 15.0 psig.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unat2 B 3.6-27 Revision 3
Containment Spray System B 3.6.6 BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE The limiting DBAs considered relative to containment are the loss of SAFETY coolant accident (LOCA) and the steam line break (SLB). The DBA ANALYSES LOCA and SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No two DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed, in regard to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one ESF bus, which is the worst case single active failure, resulting in one train of the Containment Spray System, the RHR System, and the ARS being rendered inoperable (Ref. 2).
The DBA analyses show that the maximum peak containment pressure of 11.73 psig results from the LOCA analysis, and is calculated to be less I than the containment maximum allowable pressure of 15 psig. The maximum peak containment atmosphere temperature results from the SLB analysis. The calculated transient containment atmosphere temperatures are acceptable for the DBA SLB.
The modeled Containment Spray System actuation from the containment analysis is based on a response time associated with exceeding the containment High-High pressure signal setpoint to achieving fullflow through the containment spray nozzles. A delayed response time initiation provides conservative analyses of peak calculated containment temperature and pressure responses. The Containment Spray System total response time of 234 seconds is composed of signal delay, diesel generator startup, and system startup time.
For certain aspects of transient accident analyses, maximizing the calculated containment pressure is not conservative. ln particular, the ECCS cooling effectiveness during the core reflood phase of a LOCA analysis increases with increasing containment backpressure. For these calculations, the containment backpressure is calculated in a manner designed to conservatively minimize, rather than maximize, the calculated transient containment pressures in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix K (Ref. 3).
Inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System is evaluated in the analysis, and the resultant reduction in containment pressure is calculated. The maximum calculated steady state pressure differential relative to the Shield Building annulus is 1.4 psid, which is below the containment design external pressure load of 2.0 psid.
The Containment Spray System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(cX2Xii).
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.6-36 (continued)
Revision 3
lce Bed B 3.6.11 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1 1 lce Bed BASES BACKGROUND The ice bed consists of over 2,404,500lbs of ice stored in 1944 baskets within the ice condenser. lts primary purpose is to provide a large heat sink in the event of a release of energy from a Design Basis Accident (DBA) in containment. The ice would absorb energy and limit containment peak pressure and temperature during the accident transient. Limiting the pressure and temperature reduces the release of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment in the event of a DBA.
The ice condenser is an annular compartment enclosing approximately 300o of the perimeter of the upper containment compartment, but penetrating the operating deck so that a portion extends into the lower containment compartment. The lower portion has a series of hinged doors exposed to the atmosphere of the lower containment compartment, which, for normal plant operation, are designed to remain closed. At the top of the ice condenser is another set of doors exposed to the atmosphere of the upper compartment, which also remain closed during normal plant operation. lntermediate deck doors, located below the top deck doors, form the floor of a plenum at the upper part of the ice condenser. These doors also remain closed during normal plant operation. The upper plenum area is used to facilitate surveillance and maintenance of the ice bed.
The ice baskets contain the ice within the ice condenser. The ice bed is considered to consist of the total volume from the bottom elevation of the ice baskets to the top elevation of the ice baskets. The ice baskets position the ice within the ice bed in an arrangement to promote heat transfer from steam to ice. This arrangement enhances the ice condenser's primary function of condensing steam and absorbing heat energy released to the containment during a DBA.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.6-59 Revision 11 Amendment 14
lce Bed B 3.6.1 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE sR 3.6.11.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The weighing program is designed to obtain a representative sample of the ice baskets. The representative sample shall include 6 baskets from each of lhe 24 ice condenser bays and shall consist of one basket from radial rows 1,2,4,6, 8, and 9. lf no basket from a designated row can be obtained for weighing, a basket from the same row of an adjacent bay shall be weighed.
The rows chosen include the rows nearest the inside and outside walls of the ice condenser (rows 1 and 2, and I and 9, respectively), where heat transfer into the ice condenser is most likely to influence melting or sublimation. Verifying the totalweight of ice ensures that there is adequate ice to absorb the required amount of energy to mitigate the DBAs.
lf a basket is found to contain less than 1237 lb of ice, a representative sample of 20 additional baskets from the same bay shall be weighed.
The average weight of ice in these 21 baskets (the discrepant basket and the 20 additional baskets) shall be greater than or equal to 1237 lb al a 95% confidence level. [Value does not account for instrument error.]
Weighing 20 additional baskets from the same bay in the event a Surveillance reveals that a single basket contains less than 1237 lb ensures that no local zone exists that is grossly deficient in ice. Such a zone could experience early melt out during a DBA transient, creating a path for steam to pass through the ice bed without being condensed. The Frequency of 18 months was based on ice storage tests and the allowance built into the required ice mass over and above the mass assumed in the safety analyses. Operating experience has verified that, with the 18 month Frequency, the weight requirements are maintained with no significant degradation between surveillances.
sR 3.6.11.3 This SR ensures that the azimuthal distribution of ice is reasonably uniform, by verifying that the average ice weight in each of three azimuthal groups of ice condenser bays is within the limit. The Frequency of 18 months was based on ice storage tests and the allowance built into the required ice mass over and above the mass assumed in the safety analyses. Operating experience has verified that, with the 18-month Frequency, the weight requirements are maintained with no significant degradation between surveillances.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.6-64 Revision 11 Amendment 14
Shield Building B 3.6.15 BASES (continued)
B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.15 Shield Building BASES BACKGROUND The shield building is a concrete structure that surrounds the steel containment vessel. Between the containment vessel and the shield building inner wall is an annular space that collects containment leakage that may occur following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) as well as other design basis accidents (DBAs) that release radioactive material.
This space also allows for periodic inspection of the outer surface of the steel containment vessel.
During normal operations when containment integrity is required, annulus vacuum is established and maintained by the annulus vacuum control subsystem. ln emergencies, in which containment isolation is required, this subsystem is isolated and shut down because it performs no safety-related function (Ref. 2). The nominal negative pressure for the annulus vacuum control equipment is 5-inches of water gauge. This negative pressure level, chosen for normal operation, ensures that the annulus pressure will not reach positive values during the annulus pressure surge produced by a LOCA in the primary containment.
The annulus vacuum control subsystem also aids in containment pressure relief by exhausting to the auxiliary building exhaust stack the containment vent air that goes through the containment vent air clean up units and is discharged into the annulus.
During an emergency, the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the shield building and the steel containment vessel. Filters in the system then controlthe release of radioactive contaminants to the environment. The shield building is required to be OPERABLE to ensure retention of containment leakage and proper operation of the EGTS.
Several normal plant evolutions can cause the annulus pressure to exceed its limits briefly; containment venting, both the normal or alternate method, testing of the EGTS, annulus entries, and auxiliary building isolations. These activities cause an inrush of air into the annulus, lowering the annulus vacuum until the annulus vacuum controlfans can return annulus vacuum to within limits.
The containment vent system is a non-safety related system, which provides continuous pressure relief curing normal operation, by allowing containment air outflow through the 8-inch containment penetration (continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.6-87 Revision 4
Shield Building B 3.6.15 BASES (continued)
BACKGROUND through two 100% redundant air cleanup units (ACU)s, containing (continued) HEPA/charcoalfilters, into the annulus with the motive force being the pressure differential between the containment and the annulus.
Depending on the inflow into the annulus when containment vent is initiated, annulus pressure may not be within limits unit the annulus vacuum control system can recover the annulus vacuum.
An alternate containment pressure relief function (containment vent) is provided by way of a configuration alignment in the reactor building purge ventilating system, This function is accomplished by opening lower compartment purge lines (one supply and one exhaust) or one of the two pairs of lines (one supply and one exhaust ) in the upper compartment.
To prevent inadvertent pressurization of containment due to supply and exhaust side ductwork flow imbalances, the supply ductwork airflow may be temporarily throttled as needed (Ref. 3).
During testing of the EGTS, alignment of the system to the annulus for the test causes an inrush of air from the EGTS ducting increasing annulus pressure. This inrush of air can cause annulus pressure to exceed the annulus pressure limit until the EGTS fan is started, stopping the inrush allowing the annulus vacuum controlfan to restore annulus pressure to within limits.
APPL!CABLE The design basis for shield building OPERABILITY is a LOCA.
SAFETY Maintaining shield building OPERABILITY ensures that the release of ANALYSES radioactive materialfrom the containment atmosphere is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analyses.
The shield building satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(cX2Xii).
LCO Shield building OPERABILITY must be maintained to ensure proper operation of the EGTS and to limit radioactive leakage from the containment to those paths and leakage rates assumed in the accident analyses.
APPLICABILITY Maintaining shield building OPERABILITY prevents leakage of radioactive materialfrom the shield building. Radioactive material may enter the shield building from the containment following a DBA. Therefore, shield building OPERABILITY is required in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 when DBAs could release radioactive materialto the containment atmosphere.
In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure continued Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.6-88 Revision 4
Shield Building B 3.6.15 BASES (continued)
APPLICABILITY limitations in these MODES. Therefore, shield building OPERABILITY is (continued) not required in MODE 5 or 6.
ACTIONS A.1 ln the event shield building OPERABILITY is not maintained, shield building OPERABILITY must be restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is a reasonable Completion Time considering the limited leakage design of containment and the low probability of a Design Basis Accident occurring during this time period.
8.1 The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is based on engineering judgment. The normal alignment for both EGTS control loops is the A-Auto position.
With both EGTS controlloops in A-Auto, both trains willfunction upon initiation of a Containment lsolation Phase A (ClA) signal. ln the event of a LOCA, the annulus vacuum controlsystem isolates and both trains of the EGTS pressure control loops will be placed in service to maintain the required negative pressure. lf annulus vacuum is lost during normal operations, the A-Auto position is unaffected by the loss of vacuum. This operational configuration is acceptable because the accident dose analysis conservatively assumes the annulus is at atmospheric pressure at event initiation.
A Note has been provided which makes the requirement to maintain the annulus pressure within limits not applicable for a maximum of 't hour during; Ventilating operations, Required annulus entries, or Auxiliary Building isolations. Ventilating operations include containment venting, the Reactor Building Purge Ventilating System alternate containment pressure relief function, and testing of the Emergency Gas Treatment system.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.6-89 Revision 4
Shield Building B 3.6.15 BASES SURVEILLANCE sR 3.6.15.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The EGTS is required to maintain a pressure equalto or more negative than -0.50 inches water gauge (" wg) in the annulus at an elevation equivalent to the top of the Auxiliary Building. At elevations higher than the Auxiliary Building, the EGTS is required to maintain a pressure equal to or more negative than -0.25" wg. The low pressure sense line for the pressure controller is located in the annulus at elevation 783. By verifying that the annulus pressure is equalto or more negative than -0.61" w9 at elevation 783, the annulus pressurization requirements stated above are met. The ability of a EGTS train with final flow >3600 cfm and <4400 cfm to produce the required negative pressure during the test operation provides assurance that the building is adequately sealed. The negative pressure prevents leakage from the building, since outside air will be drawn in by the low pressure at a maximum rate <250 cfm. The 18 month Frequency on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 1) guidance for functionaltesting.
REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, "Design, Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmospheric Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
- 2. WBN UFSAR Section 6.2.3.2.2, "Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)."
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.6-91 Revision 4
CCS B 3 .7.7 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3 .7.7 Component Cooling System (CCS)
BASES BACKGROUND The CCS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, the CCS also provides this function for various non-essential components, as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CCS serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW System, and thus to the environment.
The CCS is arranged as two independent, full-capacity cooling trains, Train A and Train B. Train A in Unit 2 is served by CCS Hx B and CCS pump 2A-A. Pump 2B-B, which is actually Train B equipment, is also normally aligned to the Train A header in Unit 2. However, pump 2B-B can be realigned to Train B on loss of Train A.
Train B is served by CCS Hx C. Normally, only CCS pump C-S is aligned to the Train B header since few non-essential, normally-operating loads are assigned to Train B. However, pump 2B-B can be realigned to the Train B header on a loss of the C-S pump. During Unit 1 outages CCS Heat Exchanger A may be substituted for CCS Heat Exchanger C to maintain CCS Train 28 operable under certain conditions. Refer to FSAR Section 9.2.2for required system alignments.
Each safety related train is powered from a separate bus. An open surge tank in the system provides pump trip protective functions to ensure that sufficient net positive suction head is available. lt is preferred that the 1B and 28 surge tank sections be aligned to the associated operable CCS pump(s); however, aligning a single 1B or 28 surge tank section provides an operable surge tank for the associated pump(s).The pump in each train is automatically started on receipt of a safety injection signal, and all non-essential components will be manually isolated.
CCS Pump 'lB-B may be substituted for CCS Pump C-S supplying the CCS Train B header for Unit 2 provided the OPERABILITY requirements are met.
Additional information on the design and operation of the system, along with a list of the components served, is presented in the FSAR, Section 9.2.2 (Ref. 1). The principalsafety related function of the CCS is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This may be during a normal or post accident cooldown and shutdown.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-36 Revision 6
CREVS B 3.7.10 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)
An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
E.1 lf both CREVS trains are inoperable in MODE 1 ,2,3, or 4, due to actions taken as a result of a tornado, the CREVS may not be capable of performing the intended function because of loss of pressurizing air to the control room. At least one train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> restoration time is considered reasonable considering the low probability of occurrence of a design basis accident concurrent with a tornado warning.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
F.1 and F.2 lf one CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time of Condition E, the plant must be placed in a MODE that minimizes accident risk. TO achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
G.1 ln MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies with two CREVS trains inoperable or with one or more CREVS trains inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-55 Revision 9 Amendment I
CREVS B 3 .7.10 BASES ACTIONS H.1 (continued) lf both CREVS trains are inoperable in MODE 1,2,3, ot 4, for reasons other than Condition B or Condition E the CREVS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
SURVEILLANCE sR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check of this system. The systems need only be operated for > 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. The 31-day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy.
sR 3.7.10.2 This SR verifies that the required CREVS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREVS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 6).
The VFTP includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.
sR 3.7.10.3 This SR verifies that each CREVS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 18 months is based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.7-56 Revision 9 Amendment 9
CCS - Shutdown B 3 .7.16 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3 .7.16 Component Cooling System (CCS) - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND The general description of the Component Cooling System (CCS) is provided in TS Bases 3.7.7, "Component Cooling System." The CCS has a Unit 2 Train A header supplied by CCS Pump 2A-A cooled through CCS Heat Exchanger (HX) B. Unit t has a separate Train A header containing HX A supplied by CCS Pump 1A-A. The Train B header is shared by Unit 1 and Unit 2 and contains HX C. Flow through the Train B header is normally supplied by CCS Pump C-S. CCS Pump 1B-B can be aligned to supply the Train B header, but it is normally aligned to the Unit 1 Train A header. Similarly, CSS Pump 2B-B can supply cooling water to the Train B header, but is normally aligned to the Unit 2 Train A header. During Unit 1 outages CCS Heat Exchanger A may be substituted for CCS Heat Exchanger C to maintain CCS Train 28 operable under certain conditions. Refer to FSAR Section 9.2.2for required system alignments. The following describes the functions and requirements within the first 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after shut down, when the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is being used for residual and decay heat removal.
During a normal shutdown, decay heat removal is via the reactor coolant system (RCS) loops until sometime after the unit has been cooled down to RHR entry conditions (T"o6 < 350oF). Therefore, as LCO 3.7.16 becomes Applicable (entry into Mode 4) the RCS loops are still OPERABLE. Entry into MODES 4 and 5 can place high heat loads onto the RHR System, CCS and the Essential Raw Cooling Water System (ERCW when shutdown cooling is established. Residualand decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is transferred to CCS via the RHR HX. Heat from the CCS is transferred to the ERCW System via the CCS HXs. The CCS and ERCW systems are common between the two operating units.
During the first 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown, the heat loads are at sufficiently high levels that the normal pump requirement of LCO 3.7.7 for one CCS pump on the Train B header may not be sufficient to support shut down cooling of Unit 2, concurrent with either a nearly simultaneous shutdown of Unit 1 or a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) on Unit 1, with loss of offsite power and a single failure of Train A power to 6.9 kV Shutdown Boards 1A-A and 2A-4.
ln either scenario, CCS Pump C-S would normally be the only pump supplying the Train B header and the Train B header would be supplying both the Unit'l RHR Train B HX and the Unit 2 RHR Train B HX. During the Unit'1 LOCA scenario, the Unit I RHR Train B HX would be cooling (continued)
Watts Bar-U nat 2 B 3 .7-77 Revision 6
CCS - Shutdown B 3 .7.16 BASES BACKGROUND the recirculating Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) water from the (continued) containment sump.
To assure that there would be adequate CCS flow to both units' RHR Train B HXs, prior to placing RHR in service for Unit 2, either CCS Pump 1B-B or 2B-B would be aligned to the CCS Train B header.
With two CCS pumps on the Train B header, CCS willsupply at least 5000 gpm to the Unit 'l RHR Train B HX and 5000 gpm to the Unit 2 RHR Train B HX.
The alignment of either CCS Pump 1B-B or 2B-B to the CCS Train B header before entry into MODE 4 places both units in an alignment that supports LOCA heat removal requirements and allows the other unit to proceed to cold shutdown. Having the CCS pumps realigned while a unit being shut down with steam generators available for heat removal, precludes the need for manual action outside of the main control room to align CCS should a LOCA occur. lf a LOCA occurs with the concurrent loss of the Train A 6.9 kV shutdown boards, CCS Pump 1B-B or 2B-B will be started from the main control room, if the pump is not already in operation. Both CCS pumps must be running before the RHR pump suction is transferred from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to the containment sump to ensure adequate cooling is maintained. lf a LOCA occurs, the C-S pump automatically starts on a safety injection (Sl) actuation from either unit. The CCS pump control circuits are designed such that, if a pump is running and a loss of power occurs, the pump will be automatically reloaded on the DG. With this alignment, two CCS pumps will be available if a LOCA occurs on one unit when the other unit is being shut down.
Alternatively, the unit being shut down can remain on steam generator cooling for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> before RHR is placed in service. lf a LOCA occurred on the other unit, CCS would only be removing heat from one RHR HX.
A single CCS pump and CCS HX provides the required heat removal capability.
After the unit has been shut down for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, a single CCS pump on Train B provides adequate flow to both the Unit 1 and the Unit 2 RHR Train B HXs.
lf the single failure were the loss of Train B power, the normal CCS alignment is acceptable, because CCS Pump 1A-A supplies the Unit 1 RHR Train A HX and CCS Pump 2A-A supplies the Unit 2 RHR Train A HX. CCS Pump 2A-A does not provide heat removal for Unit 1.
Additional information on the design and operation of the system, along with a list of the components served, is presented in the FSAR, Section 9.2.2 (Ref. 1). The principalsafety related function of the CCS is (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit2 B 3.7-78 Revision 6
CCS - Shutdown B 3 .7.16 BASES BACKGROUND the removal of heat from the reactor via the RHR System. This may be (continued) during a normal or post accident cool down and shut down. The Unit 1 CCS Train A header is not used to support Unit 2 operation.
APPLICABLE The CCS functions to cool the unit from RHR entry conditions in MODE 4 SAFETY (T*ra < 350oF), to MODE 5 (T-ro < 200oF), during normal operations. The ANALYSES time required to cool from 350oF to 200'F is a function of the number of CGS and RHR trains operating. One CCS train is sufficient to remove heat during subsequent operations with T"oro < 200oF. This assumes a maximum ERCW inlet temperature of 85'F occurring simultaneously with the maximum heat loads on the system.
The design basis of the CCS is for one CCS train to remove the post LOCA heat load from the containment sump during the recirculation phase, with a maximum CCS HX outlet temperature of 110'F (Ref. 2).
The ECCS LOCA analysis and containment LOCA analysis each model the maximum and minimum performance of the CCS, respectively. The normal maximum HX outlet temperature of the CCS is 95oF, and, during unit cooldown to MODE 5 (T*ro < 200"F), a maximum HX outlet temperature of 110'F is assumed. The CCS design based on these values, bounds the post accident conditions such that the sump fluid will not increase in temperature after alignment of the RHR HXs during the recirculation phase following a LOCA, and provides a gradual reduction in the temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to the RCS by the ECCS pumps.
The CCS is designed to perform its function with a single failure of any active component, assuming a loss of offsite power.
CCS - Shutdown satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(cX2)(ii).
Watts Bar-Unit 2 B 3.7-79 (continued)
Revision 6
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES BACKGROUND The onsite standby power source for each 6.9 kV shutdown board is a (continued) dedicated DG. WBN uses 4 DG sets for Unit 2 operation. These same DGs are shared for Unit 1 operation. A DG starts automatically on a safety injection (Sl) signal (i.e., low pressurizer pressure or high containment pressure signals) or on a 6.9 kV shutdown board degraded voltage or loss-of-voltage signal (Refer to LCO 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start lnstrumentation."). After the DG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective 6.9 kV shutdown board after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of 6.9 kV shutdown board loss-of-voltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with an Sl signal. The DGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the 6.9 kV shutdown board on an Sl signal alone.
Following the trip of offsite power, a loss-of-voltage signal strips all nonpermanent loads from the 6.9 kV shutdown board. When the DG is tied to the 6.9 kV shutdown board, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective 6.9 kV shutdown board by the automatic sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG by automatic load application.
ln the event of a loss of preferred power, the 6.9 kV shutdown boards are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a LOCA.
Certain required plant loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the DG in the process. Within the required interval (FSAR Table 8.3-3) after the initiating signal is received, all automatic and permanently connected loads needed to recover the plant or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.
Ratings for Train 1A, 1B, 2A and 28 DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service rating of each DG is 4400 kW with 10% overload permissible for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. The ESF loads that are powered from the 6.9 kV shutdown boards are listed in Reference 2.
The capability is provided to connect a 6.9 kV FLEXS DG to supply power to any of the four 6.9 kV shutdown boards. The 6.9 kV FLEX DG is commercial-grade and not designed to meet Class 1E requirements. The FLEX DG is made available to support extended Completion Times in the event of an inoperable DG. The FLEX DG is made available as a defense-in-depth alternate source of AC power to mitigate a loss of offsite power event. The FLEX DG would remain disconnected rom the Class 1E distribution system unless required during a loss of offsite power.
Watts Bar - Unit2 B 3.8-2 (continued)
Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3,8.1 BASES ACTIONS A.2 (continued)
Discovering no offsite power to one train of the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the other train that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.
The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to Train A and Train B of the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature.
Additionally,lhe 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
A.3 According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. With one required offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potentialfor a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potentialfor a challenge to the plant safety systems. ln this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System.
The72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. lf Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DG is inoperable and that DG is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 10 days. This could lead to a total of 13 days, since initialfailure to meet the LCO, to restore the offsite circuit. At this time, a DG could again become inoperable, the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 10 days (for a total of 23 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 13 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is (continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-9 Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS A.3 (continued) considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "A\]Q' connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 13 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.
As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."
This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered.
B.1 and C.1 To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one or more DGs inoperable in Train A OR with one or more DGs inoperable in Train B, it is necessary to verify the availability of the required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform,"
a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1 .1, it is inoperable. Upon required offsite circuit inoperabilityr additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.
8,2 ln order to extend the Required Action B.5 Completion Time for an inoperable DG from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 10 days, it is necessary to evaluate the availability of the 6.9 kV FLEX DG within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> upon entry into LCO 3.8.1 and every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter. Since Required Action 8.2 only specifies "evaluate," discovering the 6.9 kV FLEX DG unavailable does not result in the Required Action being not met (i.e., the evaluation is performed). However, on discovery of an unavailable 6.9 kV FLEX DG, the Completion Time for Required Action B.5 starts the72 hour and/or 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> clock.
6.9 kV FLEX DG availability requires that:
- 2) 6.9 kV FLEX DG supporting system parameters for starting and operating are verified to be within required limits for functional availability (e.9., batter state of charge).
The 6.9 kV FLEX DG is not used to extend the Completion Time for more than one inoperable DG at any one time.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-10 Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS 8.3 and C.2 (continued)
Required Actions 8.3 and C.2 are intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train systems, such as the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, are not included. Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable features associated with a train, redundant to the train that has inoperable DG(s).
The Completion Time for Required Actions B.3 and C.2 are intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." ln this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:
- a. An inoperable DG exists; and
- b. A required feature on the other train (Train A or Train B) is inoperable.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3 8-10a Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.3 and C.2 (continued) lf at any time during the existence of this Condition (one or more DGs inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.
Discovering one or more DGs in Train A or one or more DGs in Train B inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DGs, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action.
Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is Acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.
ln this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
8.4.1 and 8.4.2 and C.3.1 and C.3.2 Required Actions B.4.1 and C.3.1 provide an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. lf it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG(s) do not exist on the OPERABLE DGs, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. For the performance of a Surveillance, Required Action 8.4.1 is considered satisfied since the cause of the DG(s) being inoperable is apparent. lf the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition F of LCO 3.8.1 would be entered if the other inoperable DGs are not on the same train, otherwise if the other inoperable DGs are on the same train, the unit is in Condition C.
Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists, and Required Actions B.4.1 and 8.4.2 are satisfied. lf the cause of the initial inoperable DG(s) cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DGs, performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that DG(s).
(continued)
Wats Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-11 Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS 8.4.1 8.4.2 1 and C. .2 (continued) ln the event the inoperable DG(s) is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either 8.4.1,8.4.2, C.3.1 or C.3.2 the corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under lhe 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> constraint imposed while in Condition B or C.
According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DG(s) are not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG(s).
B.5 ln Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 1O-day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources (including the 6.9 kV FLEX DG), a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
lf the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is or becomes unavailable with an inoperable DG, then action is required to restore the 6.9 kV FLEX DG to available status or to restore the DG to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from discovery of an unavailable 6.9 kV FLEX DG. However, if the 6.9 kV FLEX DG unavailability occurs sometime after 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of continuous DG inoperability, then the remaining time to restore the 6.9 kV FLEX DG to available status or to restore the DG to OPERABLE status is limited to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The72 hour and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Times allow for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time only begins on discovery that both an inoperable DG exists and the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is unavailable. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time only begins on discovery that an inoperable DG exists for > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is unavailable.
Therefore, when on DG is inoperable due to either preplanned maintenance (Preventive or corrective) or unplanned corrective maintenance work, the Completion Time can be extended trom72 hours to 10 days if the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is verified available for backup operation.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-12 Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.5 (continued)
The Fourth Completion Time for Required Action 8.5 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. lf Condition B is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restored OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 3 days.
This could lead to a total of 13 days, since initialfailure to meet the LCO, to restore the DGs. At this Time, an offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DGs restored OPERABLE, and an additionalT2 hours (for a total of 20 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 13-day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. THE'AND" connector between the 1O-day and 13-day Completion Times mean that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.
Compliance with the contingency actions listed in Bases Table 3.8.1-2 is required whenever Condition B is entered for a planned or unplanned outage that will extend beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. lf Condition B is entered initially for an activity intended to last less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or for an unplanned outage, the contingency actions should be invoked as soon as it is established that the outage period will be longer than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
As in Required Action 8.3, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "Time zero" for,beginning the allowed outage time "clock."
This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-12a Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS q,.4 (continued)
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93, (Ref. 6), operation may continue in ConditionCforaperiod that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
ln Condition C, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class '1E Distribution System. fhe 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. Restoration of at least on DG within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> results in reverting back under Condition B and continuing to track the "time zero" Completion Time for one DG inoperable.
The second Completion Time for Required Action C.4 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. lf Condition C is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restored OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for upto72 hours.
This could lead to a total of 144 hours0.00167 days <br />0.04 hours <br />2.380952e-4 weeks <br />5.4792e-5 months <br />, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the DGs. At this time, an offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DGs restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and C are UAND' entered concurrently. The connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 6 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.
As in Required Action C.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."
This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition C was entered.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-12b Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)
Required Action D.1, which applies when two required offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is that Regulatory Guide 1 .93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.
Single train features, such as the turbine driven auxiliary pump, are not included in the list.
The Completion Time for Required Action D.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." ln this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:
- a. AII required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A required feature is inoperable.
lf at any time during the existence of Condition D (two required offsite circuits inoperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the i m med iately accessible offsite power sources.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-13 Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)
Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable (e.9., combinations that involve an offsite circuit and one DG inoperable, or one or more DGs in each train inoperable). However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:
- a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
- b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable required offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.
With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. ln fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.
According to Reference 6, with the available offsite AC sources, two less than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. lf two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, unrestricted operation may continue. lf only one offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.
E.1 and E.2 Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if allAC sources to it were inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition E is entered with no AC source to any train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition E to provide requirements for the loss of one offsite circuit and one or more DGs in a train, without regard to whether a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train.
According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition E for a period that should not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
(continued)
Wafrs Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-14 Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources
- Operating B 3,8.1 BASES ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued) ln Condition E, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition D (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
F.1 and F.2 With one or more DG(s) in Train A inoperable simultaneous with one or more DG(s) in Train B inoperable, there are no remaining standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.
According to Reference 6, with one or more DG(s) in Train A inoperable simultaneous with one or more DG(s) in Train B inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
G.1 and G.2 lf the inoperable AC electric power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-15 Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS H.1 and 1.1 (continued)
Condition H and Condition I correspond to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies cannot be guaranteed.
At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The plant is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.
SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all REQUIREMENTS important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8).
Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functionaltests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9), as addressed in the FSAR.
Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable. 6800 volts is the minimum steady state output voltage and the 10 seconds transient value. 6800 volts is 98.6% of the nominal bus voltage of 6900 V corrected for instrument error and is the upper limit of the minimum voltage required for the DG supply breaker to close on the 6.9 kV shutdown board. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 7260 V is 1 10% of the nameplate rating of the 6600 V motors. The specified 3 second transient value of 6555 V is 95% of the nominal bus voltage of 6900 V. The specified maximum transient value of 8880 V is the maximum equipment withstand value provided by the DG manufacturer. The specified minimum and maximum transient frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61 .2 Hz, respectively.
The steady state minimum and maximum frequency values are 59.8 Hz and 60.1 Hz. These values ensure that the safety related plant equipment powered from the DGs is capable of performing its safety functions.
sR 3.8.1.1 This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred power source, and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-16 Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.14(continued)
REQUIREMENTS Note 3 establishes that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Examples of unplanned events may include:
- 1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available; and
- 2) Post-corrective maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability.
Prior to performance of this SR in MODES 1 or 2, actions are taken to establish that adequate conditions exist for performance of the SR. The required actions are defined in Bases Table 3.8.1-2.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-28a Revision 5 Amendment 5
AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES Bases Table 3.8.1-2 TS Action or Surveillance Requirement (SR) Contingency Actions Contingency Actions Applicable TS Applicable to be Implemented Action or SR Modes
- 1. Verify that the offsite power system is stable. This sR 3.8 .1 .14 1,2 action will establish that the offsite power system is Action 8.5 1,2,3,4 within single-contingency limits and will remain stable upon the loss of any single component supporting the system. lf a grid stability problem exists, the planned DG outage will not be scheduled.
- 2. Verify that no adverse weather conditions are sR 3.8 .1 .14 1,2 expected during the outage period. The planned DG Action 8.5 1,2,3,4 outage will be postponed if inclement weather (such as severe thunderstorms or heavy snoMall) is projected.
- 3. Do not remove from service the ventilation systems Action 8.5 1,2,3,4 for the 6.9 kV shutdown boardrooms, the elevation 772 transformer rooms, or the 480-volt shutdown board rooms, concurrently with the DG, or implement appropriate compensatory measures.
- 4. Do not remove the reactor trip beakers from service Action 8.5 1,2,3,4 concurrently with planned DG outage maintenance.
- 5. D not remove the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater Action 8.5 1,2,3,4 (AFW) pump from service concurrently with a Unit 1 DG outage.
- 6. Do not remove the AFW level control valves to the Action 8.5 1,2,3,4 steam generators from service concurrently with a Unit 1 DG outage
- 7. Do not remove the opposite train residual heat Action B.5 1,2,3,4 remove (RHR) pump from service concurrently with a Unit 1 DG outage.
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-37a Revision 5 Amendment 5
Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 Table B 3.8.9-1 (page 1 of 1)
AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems TYPE VOLTAGE TRAIN A* TRAIN B" AC safety 6900 v Shutdown Board 1A-A, 2A-A Shutdown Board 1B-B, 2B-B buses 480 V Shutdown Board 1A1-A, 142-A Shutdown Board 181-8, 1B.2-F 2A1-4,242-A 2B1.8,282.8 Rx MOV Board 1A1-A**, 142-A Rx MOV Board 1B1-8**, 1B.2-B-2A1-A,242-A 2B1-8,282-8 C & A Vent Board 1A1-A, 142-A C & A Vent Board 181-8, 182-B 2A1-A,2A2-A 281-8,2B,2-B Diesel Aux Board 1A1-A, 142-A Diesel Aux Board 181-B, 1B.2-B^
2A1-A, 242-A 28_1-8,282-8 Rx Vent Board 1A-A**, 2A-A Rx Vent Board 1B-B**. 2B-B AC vital 120 V Vital channel 1-l Vital channel 1-ll buses Vita! channel 2-ll Vital channel 2-l Vital channel 1 -lll Vital channel 1-lV Vital channel 2-lll Vital channel z-lV DC buses 125 V Board I Board lt Board ilt Board IV
" Each train of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is a subsystem.
- For WBN Unit 2, the 480V Reactor MOV Boards 1A1-A and 1B1-B and 480V Reactor Vent Boards 1A-A and 1B-B are available for economic and operational convenience. The boards contain no Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) Required loads. The boards are considered part of the Unit 1 / Unit 2 Electrical Power Distribution System and meet Unit 2 TS Requirements and testing only while connected. WBN Unit 2 is designed to be operated, shutdown, and maintained in a safe shutdown status without any of these boards or their loads. As such, the boards may be disconnected from service without entering an Unit 2 LCO provided their loads are not substituting for an Unit 2 TS required load.
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.8-94 Revision 1
ENCLOSURE 7 WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS E-7
TABLE OF CONTENTS TECHN ICAL REQUI REMENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS I LIST OF TABLES V LIST OF FIGURES VI LIST OF MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND PROGRAMS vi LIST OF ACRONYMS ...... vii LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES ix TR 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.1-1 TR 1.1 Definitions 1 .1-1 TR 1.2 Logical Connectors 1.2-1 TR 1.3 Completion Times 1.3-1 TR 1.4 Frequency 1.4-1 TR 3.0 APPLICABILITY 3.0-1 TR 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ...... 3.1-1 TR 3.1 .1 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Shutdown 3.1-1 TR 3.1 .2 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Operating 3.1-3 TR 3.1 .3 Charging Pump, Shutdown 3.1-5 TR 3.1 .4 Charging Pumps, Operating 3.1-6 TR 3.1 .5 Borated Water Sources, Shutdown 3.1-8 TR 3.1 .6 Borated Water Sources, Operating 3.1-10 TR 3.1 .7 Position lndication System, Shutdown 3.1-14 TR 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3-1 TR 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) lnstrumentation ... 3.3-1 TR 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System . 3.3-4 TR 3.3,3 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION ... 3.3.11 TR 3.3.4 Seismic lnstrumentation ... 3.3-12 TR 3.3.5 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION ... 3.3-16 TR 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection System ...... 3.3-17 TR 3.3.7 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION ... ....... 3.3-18 TR 3.3.8 Hydrogen Monitor .. 3.3-19 TR 3.3.9 Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) . 3.3-21 Watts Bar - Unit 2 (continued)
Technical Requirements
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ........ 3.4-1 TR 3.4.1 Safety Valves, Shutdown .. 3.4-1 TR 3.4.2 Pressurizer Temperature Limits .. 3.4-3 TR 3.4.3 Reactor Vessel Head Vent System 3.4-5 TR 3.4.4 Chemistry 3.4-7 TR 3.4.5 Piping System Structural lntegrity 3.4-10 TR 3.6 CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS ... ........... 3.6-1 TR 3.6.1 lce Bed Temperature Monitoring System .......,. 3.6-1 TR 3.6.2 lnlet Door Position Monitoring System ... 3.6-4 TR 3.6.3 Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System .... 3.6-6 TR 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7 -1 TR 3.7.1 Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature Limitations... 3.7-1 TR 3.7.2 Flood Protection Plan 3.7-3 TR 3.7.3 3.7-5 TR 3.7.4 Sealed Source Contamination 3.7-16 TR 3.7.5 Area Temperature Monitoring 3.7-19 TR 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8-1 TR 3.8.1 lsolation Devices 3.8-1 TR 3.8.2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices 3.8-4 TR 3.8.3 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices ............ 3.8-8 TR 3.8.4 Submerged Component Circuit Protection 3.8-15 TR 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS ... 3.9-1 TR 3.9.1 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION ... 3,9-1 TR 3.9.2 Communications ... ......... 3.9-2 TR 3.9.3 Refueling Machine ......... 3.9-3 TR 3.9.4 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building ...... 3.9-5 TR 5.0 ADMlNlSTRATlVE CONTROLS ...... ............. 5.0-1 TR 5.1 Technical Requirements Control Program ....... 5.0-1 Watts Bar - Unit 2 Technical Requirements Revision 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BASES B 3.0 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT (TR) AND TECHNICAL SURVEI LLANCE REQUI REMENT (TSR) APPLICABILITY B 3.0-1 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ...... B 3 .1-1 B 3.1.1 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Shutdown B 3 .1-1 B 3.1 .2 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Operating B 3.1-5 B 3.1 .3 Charging Pump, Shutdown B 3.1-9 B 3 .1.4 Charging Pumps, Operating B 3.1-12 B 3.1 .5 Borated Water Sources, Shutdown B 3.1-15 B 3.1 .6 Borated Water Sources, Operating B 3.1-19 83.1 .7 Position lndication System, Shutdown B 3.1-24 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) lnstrumentation ... B 3.3-1 B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) lnstrumentation ... B 3.3-4 B 3.3.3 RESERVED FOR FUTRE ADDITION ...... B 3.3-7 B 3.3.4 Seismic lnstrumentation ... B 3.3-8 B 3.3.5 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION ... B 3.3-13 B 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection System B 3.3-14 B 3.3.7 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION ... B 3.3-17 B 3.3.8 Hydrogen Monitor B 3.3-18 B 3.3.9 Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) B 3.3-22 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4-1 B 3.4.1 Safety Valves, Shutdown B 3.4-1 B 3.4.2 Pressurizer Temperature Limits B 3.4-4 B 3.4.3 Reactor Vessel Head Vent System... B 3.4-7 B 3.4.4 Chemistry B 3.4-10 B 3.4.5 Piping System Structural lntegrity B 3.4-13 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ... B 3.6-1 B 3.6.1 lce Bed Temperature Monitoring System B 3.6-1 B 3.6.2 lnlet Door Position Monitoring System B 3.6-6 B 3.6.3 Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System B 3.6-10 Watts Bar - Unt2 iii Technical Requirements
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BASES B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7-1 B 3 .7.1 Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature Limitations...... B 3 .7-1 B 3.7.2 Flood Protection Plan B 3.7-4 B 3 .7.3 B 3.7-8 B 3.7.4 Sealed Source Contamination B 3,7-15 B 3 .7.5 Area Temperature Monitoring B 3.7-19 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 lsolation Devices B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8-7 B 3.8.3 Motor Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices B 3.8-13 B 3.8.4 Submerged Component Circuit Protection B 3.8-16 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS ... B 3.9-1 B 3.9.1 RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION ... . B 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Communications... 83.9-2 B 3.9.3 Refueling Machine B 3.9-4 B 3.9.4 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building ...... B 3.9-7 Watts Bar - Unit 2 iv Technical Requirements Revision 5
Lrsr ot....IA.P"f=E$.
TABLE NO. TITLE PAGE 1 .1-1 MODES 1 .1-6 3.0.2-1 Technical Surveillance Requirement...... 3.0-5 3.3 .1-1 Reactor Trip System lnstrumentation Response Times 3.3-2 3.3.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Response Times 3.3-5 3.3 .4-1 Seismic Monitoring I nstrumentation 3.3-15 3.3.9- 1 Power Distribution Monitoring (PDMS) lnstrumentation ... 3.3-23 3.7.3-1 Deleted 3.7-8 3.7.3-2 Deleted 3.7-9 3.7.2-3 Deleted 3.7 -11 3.7.3-4 Deleted 3.7-12 3.7.3-5 Deleted 3.7-14 3.7.5-1 Area Temperature Monitoring 3.7-22 3.8.3-1 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices Which Are Bypassed Under Accident Conditions 3.8-9 3.8.4-1 Submerged Components \Mth Automatic Watts Bar - Unit 2 Technical Requirements
LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE NO. TITLE PAGE 3.1.6 Boric Acid Tank Limits Based on RWST Boron Concentration Level 1 RwsTConcentration ... 3.1-'13 3.7.3-1 IELETED v 3,7-15 LIST OF MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND PROGRAMS Core Operating Limits Report Watts Bar - Unit2 VI Tech nical Requirements
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 1 ot 2)
ACRONYM TITLE ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ACRP Auxiliary Control Room Panel AFD Axial Flux Difference AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System ARFS Air Return Fan System ARO All Rods Out ARV Atmospheric Relief Valve ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers BOC Beginning of Cycle CCS Component Cooling Water System CFR Code of Federal Regulations COLR Core Operating Limits Report CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System CSS Containment Spray System CST Condensate Storage Tank DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EFPD Effective Full-Power Days EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EOC End of Cycle ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning LCC Lower Compartment Cooler LCO Limiting Condition For Operation MFIV Main Feedwater lsolation Valve MFRV Main Feedwater Regulation Valve MSIV Main Steam Line lsolation Valve MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve (continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 vii Technical Requirements
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Page 2 ot 2)
ACRONYM TITLE MTC M oderator Tem peratu re Coefficient N/A Not Applicable NMS Neutron Monitoring System ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual PCP Process Control Program PDMS Power Distribution Monitoring System PIV Pressure lsolation Valve PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve PTLR Pressure and Temperature Limits Report QPTR Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio RAOC Relaxed Axial Offset Control RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal RTP Rated Therma! Power RTS Reactor Trip System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SG Steam Generator SI Safety lnjection SL Safety Limit SR Surveillance Requirement TSR Technical Surveillance Requirement UHS Ultimate Heat Sink Watts Bar - Unit 2 vill Technical Requirements
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PAGE REVISION PAGE REVISION NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 0 1.4-2 5 1.4-3 0 1.4-4 5 3.0-1 V 0 3.4-2 Vi 0 3.0-3 vii 0 3.0-4 viii 0 3.0-5 ix 7 3.0-6 x 7 3.1-1 xi 0 3.1-2 xii 7 3.1-3 xiii 0 3.1-4 xiv 7 3.1-5 1 .1-1 0 3.1-6 1.1-2 0 3.1-7 1 .1-3 0 3.1-B 1.1-4 0 3.1-9 1 .1-5 0 3.1-10 1 .1-6 0 3.1-11 1.2-1 0 3.1-12 1.2-2 0 3.1-13 1.2-3 0 3.1-14 1.3-1 0 3.3-1 1.3-2 0 3.3-2 1.3-3 0 3.3-3 1.3-4 0 3.3-4 1.3-5 0 3.3-5 1.3-6 0 3.3-6 1.3-7 0 3.3-7 1.3-8 0 3.3-8 1.3-9 0 3.3-9 1 .3-10 0 3.3-10 1.4-1 0 Watts Bar - Unit 2 tx Technical Requirements
TECHN ICAL REQU I REMENTS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PAGE REVISION PAGE REVISION NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 3.3-1 1 3.7-4 3.3-12 3.7 -5 3.3-13 3.7-6 3.3-14 3.7-7 3.3-15 3.7-8 3.3-16 3.7-9 3.3-17 3.7-10 3.3-18 3.7 -11 3.3-19 3.7-12 3.3-20 3.7-13 3.3-21 3.7-14 3.3-22 3.7 -15 3.3-23 3.7-16 3.4-1 3.7 -17 3.4-2 3.7 -18 3.4-3 3.7 -19 3.4-4 3.7-20 3.4-5 3.7-21 3.4-6 3.7-22 3.4-7 3.7-23 3.4-8 3.8-1 3.4-9 3.8-2 3.4-10 3.8-3 3.4-11 3.8-4 3.4-12 3.8-5 3.6-1 3.8-6 3.6-2 3.8-7 3.6-3 3.8-8 3.6-4 3.8-9 3.6-5 3.8-10 3.6-6 3.8-1 1 3.7 -1 3.8-12 3.7-2 3.8-13 3.7-3 3.8-14 Watts Bar - Unit 2 Technical Requ irements
TECHNICAL REQU I REMENTS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PAGE REVISION PAGE REVISION NUMBER ,,,,,,,,,,.1)1tJMHqm,,,,,,,,,,,,
NUMBER NUMBER 3.8-15 0 B 3.1-7 3.8-16 0 B 3.1-8 3.8-17 0 B 3.1-9 3.8-18 0 B 3.1-10 3.8-19 0 B 3 .1-11 3.8-24 0 B 3 .1-12 3.9-1 0 B 3.1-13 3.9-2 0 B 3.1-14 3.9-3 0 B 3.1-15 3.9-4 0 B 3.1-16 3.9-5 0 B 3 .1-17 5.0-1 0 B 3.1-18 B 3.1-19 B 3.0-1 0 B 3.1-20 B 3.0-2 0 B 3 .1-21 B 3.0-3 0 B 3.1-22 B 3.0-4 0 B 3.1-23 B 3.0-5 0 B 3.1-24 B 3.0-6 0 B 3.1-25 B 3.0-7 0 B 3.1-26 B 3.0-8 0 B 3.3-1 B 3.0-9 0 B 3.3-2 B 3.0-10 0 B 3.3-3 B 3.0-11 0 B 3.3-4 B 3.0-12 0 B 3.3-5 B 3.0-13 0 B 3.3-6 B 3 .0-14 0 B 3.3-7 B 3.0-1s 0 B 3.3-8 B 3 .1-1 0 B 3.3-9 B 3.1-2 0 B 3.3-10 B 3.1-3 0 B 3.3-1 1 B 3.1-4 0 B 3.3-12 B 3.1-5 0 B 3.3-13 B 3.1-6 0 B 3.3-14 Watts Bar - Unit 2 xt Technical Requirements
TECHNICAL REQU !REMENTS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PAGE REVISION PAGE REVISION NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER B 3.3-15 B 3.6-8 B 3.3-16 B 3.6-9 B 3.3-17 B 3.6-10 B 3.3-18 B 3.6-11 B 3.3-19 B 3.6-12 B 3.3-20 B 3 .7-1 B 3.3-21 B 3.7-2 B 3.3-22 B 3.7-3 B 3.3-23 B 3.7-4 B 3.3-24 B 3.7-5 B 3.3-25 B 3.7-6 B 3.3-26 B 3.7-7 B 3 .4-1 B 3.7-8 B 3.4-2 B 3.7-9 B 3.4-3 B 3.7-10 B 3.4-4 B 3.7-11 B 3.4-5 B 3.7-12 B 3.4-6 B 3.7-13 B 3.4-7 B 3 .7-14 B 3.4-8 B 3.7-15 B 3.4-9 B 3.7-16 B 3.4-10 B 3.7-17 B 3 .4-11 B 3 .7-18 B 3.4-12 B 3.7-19 B 3.4-13 B 3.7-20 B 3.4-14 B 3.7-21 B 3.4-15 B 3.7-22 B 3.6-1 B 3.8-1 B 3.6-2 B 3.8-2 B 3.6-3 B 3.8-3 B 3.6-4 B 3.8-4 B 3.6-5 B 3.8-5 B 3.6-6 B 3.8-6 B 3.6-7 B 3.8-7 Watts Bar - Unit 2 xii Technica! Requirements
TECHN ICAL REQU I REMENTS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES PAGE REVISION PAGE REVISION NUMBER NUI\,l,pHS .,, ,,,,,
NUMBER NUMBER B 3.8-8 0 B 3.8-9 0 B 3.8-10 0 B 3.8-11 0 B 3.8-12 0 B 3.8-13 0 B 3.8-14 0 B 3.8-15 0 B 3.8-16 0 B 3.8-17 0 B 3.8-18 0 B 3.8-19 0 B 3.9-1 0 B 3.9-2 0 B 3.9-3 0 B 3.9-4 0 B 3.9-5 0 B 3.9-6 0 B 3.9-7 0 B 3.9-8 0 Watts Bar - Unit 2 xiii Technical Requirements
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - REVISION LISTING Revisions Issued SUBJECT Revision 01 11125115 Revises TRM and TRM Bases section 3.7.3, "Snubbers".
Revision 02 05122116 TR Table 3.3.1-1, "Reactor Trip System lnstrumentation Response Times" , to change the overtemperature and over power times.
Revision 03 06127116 TR Table 3.8.3-1, "Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices which are Bypassed under Accident Conditions", add valve 2-FCV-70-133 and delete 4 obsolete valves.
Revision 04 02121117 Revises TRM Bases 3.6.2, "lnlet Door Position Monitoring System," Actions.
Revision 05 AgB1l17 Revises TRM and TRM Bases to delete section 3.7.3 "Snubbers."
Revision 06 07lOAl17 Revises TRM section 3.0, "TechnicalSurveillance Requirements (TSR) Applicability" and adds Table 3.0.2-1.
Revision 07 08122117 Revises the TR 3.4.5 Title to add ASME Class 1,2, and 3 in the TRM and Bases. Also revised TSR Table 3.0.2-1 to add two addition TSRs.
Watts Bar - Unit 2 xiv Technical Requirements
ENCLOSURE 8 WBN UN'T 2 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUAL CHANGED PAGES E-8
TSR Applicability TR 3.0 3.0 TECHNTCAL SURVETLLANCE REQUTREMENT (TSR) APPLTCABTLTTY TSR 3.0.1 TSRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individualTRs, unless otherwise stated in the TSR.
Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the TR. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the TR except as provided in TSR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on lnoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.
TSR 3.0.2 The specified Frequency for each TSR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met. ln addition, for each of the TSRs listed in TSR Table 3.0.2-1 the specified Frequency is met if the Surveillance is performed on or before the date listed on Table TSR 3.0.2-1. This extension of the test intervals for these TSRs is permitted on a one-time basis and expires October 31,2017.
For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.
lf a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per . . ."
basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance, Exceptions to this Requirement are stated in the individual Requirements.
TSR 3.0.3 lf it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the TR not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the risk impact shall be managed.
lf the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the TR must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.
When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the TR must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.
Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.0-3 (continued)
Technical Requirements Revision 6
TSR Applicability TR 3.0 3.0 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TSR) APPLICABILITY (continued)
TSR Table 3.0.2-1 Frequency Tech nical Surveillance Description of TSR Requirement Extension Requirement (TSR)
Limit Boration Flow Paths - Demonstrate that each automatic valve in the flow 3 1.2.3 path actuates to its correct position on an actual or simulated actuation 10131 t17 signal.
3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Containment Pressure High - Safety lnjection - Containment lsolation 1 0t31t17 2.a.3 Phase A - Verify ESFAS Response Time.
3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Containment Pressure High - Safety lnjection - Auxiliary Feedwater 10t31t17 2.a.5 Pumps - Verify ESFAS Response Time.
3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Containment Pressure High - Safety lnjection - Essential Raw Cooling 1 0/3 1t17 2.a.6 Water - Verify ESFAS Response Time 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Containment Pressure High - Safety lnjection - Component Cooling 10131117 2.a.8 System - Verify ESFAS Response Time 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Containment Pressure High - Safety lnjection - Start Diesel Generators 1 0/3 1 t17 2.a.9 - Verify ESFAS Response Time 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Pressurizer Pressure Low - Safety lnjection - Containment lsolation 1AB1t17 3.a.3 Phase A - Verify ESFAS Response Time.
3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Pressurizer Pressure Low - Safety lnjection - Auxiliary Feedwater 1 0/31117 3.a.5 Pumps - Verify ESFAS Response Time.
3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Pressurizer Pressure Low - Safety lnjection - Essential Raw Cooling 1 0/3 1t17 3.a.6 Water - Verify ESFAS Response Time 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Pressurizer Pressure Low - Safety lnjection - Component Cooling 10t31t17 3.a.8 System - Verify ESFAS Response Time 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Pressurizer Pressure Low - Safety lnjection - Staft Diesel Generators 1 0/3 1 t17 3.a.9 Verify ESFAS Response Time 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Steam Line Pressure Low - Safety lnjection - Containment lsolation 10t31t17 5.a.3 Phase A - Verify ESFAS Response Time.
3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Steam Line Pressure Low - Safety lnjection - Auxiliary Feedwater 1 0/3 1 t17 5.a.5 Pumps - Verify ESFAS Response Time.
3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Steam Line Pressure Low - Safety lnjection - Essential Raw Cooling 14t31t17 5.a.6 Water - Verify ESFAS Response Time 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Steam Line Pressure Low - Safety lnjection - Component Cooling 10t31t17 5.a.8 System - Verify ESFAS Response Time 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Steam Line Pressure Low - Safety lnjection - Staft Diesel Generators 1 0/3 1 t17 5.a.9 Verify ESFAS Response Time 3.3.2.1 f able 3.3.2-1, ltem Containment Pressure High High - Containment Spray - Verify ESFAS 10/31117 6.a Response Time 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Containment Pressure High High - Containment lsolation - Phase B 1 0/3 1 t17 6b Verify ESFAS Response Time 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem RWST Level-Low Coincident with Containment Sump Level - High and 10t31t17 10 Safety lnjection - Verify ESFAS Response Time Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.0-5 Technical Requirements Revision 6
TSR Applicability TR 3.0 3.0 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TSR) APPLICABILITY (continued)
TSR Table 3.0.2-1 Frequency Technical Surveil lance Description of TSR Requirement Extension Requirement (TSR) Limit 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Loss-of-Offsite Power - Verify ESFAS Response Time 1 0/31t17 11 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem Loss of Voltage/Degraded Voltage - Verify ESFAS Response Time 1At31t17 14 Reactor Vessel Head Vent System - Verify that the upstream manual 10/31t17 3.4.3.1 RVHVS isolation valve is locked in the open position.
Reactor Vessel Head Vent System - Verify flow through the RVHVS 3.4.3.3 10t31117 paths during venting.
Submerged Component Circuit Protection - Verify that the components as shown in Table 3.8.4-1 are automatically de-energized on a simulated 10t31t17 3.8.4.2 accident signal and that the components remain de-energized when the accident signal is reset.
Perform function test on representative sample of > 10% of each type of 3.8.1 .1 1 0/31t17 molded-case circuit breaker.
Select and functionally test representative sample of > 10% of each 0/31t17 3.8.2.3 1 type of molded case circuit breaker.
Watts Bar - U nat 2 3.0-6 Technical Req uirements Revision 7
RTS lnstrumentation TR 3.3.1 Table 3.3 .1-1 (Page 1 of 2)
Reactor Trip System lnstrumentation Response Times FUNCTIONAL UNIT RESPONSE TIME
- 1. Manual Reactor Trip N/A
- 2. Power Range, Neutron Flux a, High s 0.5 second (1)
- b. Low < 0.5 second (1)
- 3. Power Range, Neutron Flux
- a. High Positive Rate N/A
- b. High Negative Rate Deleted
- 4. lntermediate Range, Neutron Flux N/A
- 5. Source Range, Neutron Flux s 0.S seconds (1)
- 6. Overtemperature AT s g seconds (1)
- 7. Overpower AT s g seconds (1)
B. Pressurizer Pressure
- a. Low s 2 seconds
- b. High s 2 seconds
- 9. Pressurizer Water Level--High N/A (continued)
(1) Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from the detector output or input of first electronic component in channel.
Watts Bar - U nit 2 3.3-2 Revisian 2 Technical Requirements
Piping System Structural lntegrity TR 3.4.5 TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
TR 3.4.5 ASME Class 1,2, and 3 Piping System Structural lntegrity TR 3.4.5 The structural integrity of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components in all systems shall be maintained in accordance with TSR 3.4.5.1 and TSR 3.4.5.2.
APPLICABILITY: AII MODES.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Structural integrity of any Restore structural Prior to increasing ASME Code Class 1 integrity of affected Reactor Coolant component(s) not within component(s) to System temperature limits. within limit. > 50oF above the minimum temperature required by NDT considerations lsolate affected Prior to increasing component(s). Reactor Coolant System temperature
> 50oF above the minimum temperature required by NDT considerations.
(continued)
Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.4-10 Revision 7 Technical Requirements
Snubbers TR 3.7.3 TR 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS TR 3.7,3 DELETED Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.7- 5 through 15 Technical Requirements Revision 5
Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices TR 3.8.3 Table 3.8.3-1 (Page 6 of 6)
Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices Which Are Bypassed Under Accident Conditions VALVE NO. FUNCTION 2-FCV-70-1 33 lsolation for RCP Oal Coolers & Therm Barriers Watts Bar - Unit 2 3.8-14 Revision 3 Technical Requirements
7 Piping System Structural lntegrity B 3.4.5 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
B 3 .4.5 ASME Class 1,2, or 3 Piping System Structural lntegrity BASES BACKGROUND lnservice inspection and pressure testing of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components in all systems are performed in accordance with Section Xl of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Ref. 1) and applicable Addenda, as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) (Ref. 2). Exception to these requirements apply where relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i) and (aX3). ln general, the surveillance intervals specified in Section Xl of the ASME Code apply.
However, the lnservice lnspection Program includes a clarification of the frequencies for performing the inservice inspection and testing activities required by Section Xl of the ASME Code. This clarification is provided to ensure consistency in surveillance intervals throughout the Technical Specifications. Each reactor coolant pump flywheel is, in addition, inspected as recommended in Regulatory Position C.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, August 1975 (Ref. 3).
APPLICABLE Certain components which are designed and manufactured to the SAFETY requirements of specific sections of the ASME Boiler and Pressure ANALYSES Vessel Code are part of the primary success path and function to mitigate DBAs and transients. However, the operability of these components is addressed in the relevant specifications that cover individual components.
ln addition, this particular Requirement covers only structural integrity inspection/testing requirements for these components, which is not a consideration in designing the accident sequences for theoretical hazard evaluation (Refs. 4 & 5).
Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-13 (continued)
Technical Requirements Revision 7
lnlet Door Position Monitoring System B 3.6.2 BASES ACTIONS 91" (continued) lf the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a condition where OPERABILITY of the lnlet Door Position Monitoring System is not required. This is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
TECHNICAL TSR 3.6.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK for the lnlet Door Position Monitoring System once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. lt is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK helps to ensure that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each TADOT. The dual switch arrangement on each door allows comparison of open and shut indicators for each zone as well as a check with the annunciator window. When equipment conditions exist that prevent the preferred direct comparison of open and shut indicators for each zone as described above, indirect methods may be employed to verify that the inlet doors are shut. The indirect methods include the performance of a continuity check of the circuit used by the annunciator window, by monitoring ice bed temperature, or by monitoring ice condenser and containment parameters. The annunciator continuity check can confirm if one or more inlet door zone switch contacts are closed which would represent an open inlet door. The lce Bed Temperature Monitoring System can be used to provide confirmation of inlet door closure by confirming there is uniform equilibrium temperature in the ice bed. lce condenser and containment parameters such as temperature and humidity can also be used to determine if an ice condenser inlet door is open.
When indirect methods are used to verify ice condenser inlet doors are shut, a technical analysis must be completed and documented in accordance with the corrective action program. ln those instances when a technical analysis cannot be made within the allowed Completion Time, (con!!nuedl Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.6-8 Revision 4 Technical Requirements
7 Snubbers B 3 .7.3 BASES B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.3 DELETED Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3 .7-8 through 14 Revision 5 Technical Requirements