ML20082A571

Forwards Summary of All Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed Per 10CFR50.59 from 931001-940930

ML20082A571
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	04/01/1995
From:	Rehn D DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9504040114
Download: ML20082A571 (111)

Text

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I E LJ Duke PbwerCompany .kx Catawba Nuclear Generation Department 1ireuavn 4800 ConcordRoad v ~.t:1,D6 Ofnce .

York,SC29745 m: M!%%

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April 1,1995 ,

i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 j Subject. Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 4 199410 CFR 50.59 Report  !

i Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, find attached a summary of all changes, tests, and experiments whcih were completed under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 from October 1,1993 to September 30,1994.

Very truly yours, c -

D.L.Rehn GCD/5059COV.495 Attachment xc- (w/o attachments)

S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator, Region il i

R. J. Freudenberger I

Senior Resident inspector R. E. Martin, ONRR

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ADOCK o500o413 PDR

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- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  !

. April 1,1995.

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bxc . (w/o attachments)

G.A.Copp M. E. Patrick

! Z. L Taylor y (w/ attachments) l Group File: 801.01 l Catawba Document Control: 801.01 4

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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

SUMMARY

OF PROCEDURE-RELATED 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS i

Description PT/2/A/4200/09A '

'Ibe change to this procedure is to allow a different method of generating an Autostart signal to the CA System in the performance of the Auxiliary Safeguards Test. ,

Evaluation The CA systern will be aligned as before and operated in the same manner. The diffennt method of rescrating an Autostad signal does net affect the CA system or other systems in any way as prior to this change.

Description i PT/0/A/4550/03E This procedure is an audit of Moveable Incore Detector Records. The change is purelyadministrative in nature to reflect similar changes to HP procedures and other administrative process changes.

Evaluation This procedure is an Audit of Records and is administrative and the changes to this procedust reflect administrative process changes. Therefore there is no safety concerns as a itsult of this change. l Description i

PT/2/A/4700/013 Description ,

This change allows the 2A ASP Functional Test to be performed with KC Pump 2A1 and valve 2RN-67A unavailable. The 2A1 KC Pump will be substituted with 2A2.

f Evaluation The unavailability of the valve has no affect on performance of the test. The valve can be tested at a ,

later time. The Either of the KC Pumps will satisfy the interlocks necessary to perform this test. l Therefore there is no safety question.

PT/2/B/4600/07 Description This entire procedure has been deleted.

l Procedures j Page 1 l

l 1

hahtAt!an i This procedure has been deleted and combined into another procedure. l l

PT/1/B/4600/03 i Description This entire procedure has been deleted. _  ;

Evaluation This procedure has been deleted and combined into another procedure. {

P PT/0/A/4150/27 Description This entire procedure has been deleted.

Evaluation This procedure has been deleted and combined into another procedure.

PT/1/A/4200/26 Description Changes made to this procedure include: 1) Insuring that ND Pump A and B are drained,2)

Change "!V" to "DV" (double verification) on certain steps,3) Deleted "lV" on certain steps,4) t provide options on where to check ND Pump discharge pressure, control room or local.

Evaluation None of these changes create any new failure modes or create any new possibility of an accident or reduce the margin of safety.

PT/2/A/4200/26 Description Changes made to this procedure include: 1) changing Performance Technicians to Operations Test technicians,2) Change "IV" to "DV"(double verification) on certain steps,3) Deleted "IV" on certain steps,4) provide options on where to check ND Pump discharge pressure, control room or ,

local. r Evaluation None of these changes create any new failure modes or create any new possibility of an accident or ,

reduce the margin of safety.

Procedures Page 2

PT/0/A/4400/22A and B Description This procedure change included new DV and SV requirements and steps to collect additional data for trending purposes as well as other editorial changes.

Evaluation None of the changes to this procedure impact any safety Analysis or represent a change to a safety related system or component. No margin of safety is affected or reduced.

PT/0/A/4400/24 Description The change to this procedure involved changing the method of data collection, specifying test

. equipment, Prerequisite conditions were added, and Acceptance Criteria was modified to match the procedure for current plant and Tech Spec conditions. -

Evaluation .

Conservatism's were built in to the values used for temperature limit in the acceptance criteria and setting the depth of probe. Temperature measuring equipment error was incorporated in the acceptance criteria.

PT/1/B/4450/15 and PT/2/B/4450/15 Description Changes were made to reflect organizational changes, deleted sections of the procedure that performed Moisture Analysis testing, added testing method information in the " Oil Analysis" section, and changed some test equipment connection locations. '

Evaluation The changes made were administrative, and Moisture Analysis is covered in another procedure, I added additional information to better perform Oil Analysis, and provided more convenient test points.

PT/1/A/4400/06A and B and PT/2/A/4400/06A and B Description his change modified RN System Flow requirements stated in this NS Hz Capacity Test  ;

Evaluation His powedurt references the RN Flow Balance procedure to obtain the RN flow to the NS Hz as determined in the last RN Flow Balance. This flow is used to determine NS Hs operability by ensuring it meets the required RN flow for the fouling factor calculated in this test.  ;

PT/1/A/4400/03A and B and PT/2/A/4400/03A Procedures Page 3

l Description The change to this procedure will allow the Testing of KC Train 1A without rendering it inoperable.  !

This is accomplished by moving the throttling of flow frons the pump discharge manual valve to the '

ND Hz discharge throttle valve. This valve is air operated and a temporary Heise gage is lastalled t to affect the throttling.

Evaluation Valves and other equipment needed to pedorm a safety function am not rendered in operable and will pedoras as designed in the event of an ESF signal.

PT/1/A/4400/03B Description The change to this procedure will allow the Testing of KC Train 1B without rendering it inoperable.

This is accomplished by moving the throttling of flow from the pump discharge manual valve to the ND Hz discharge throttle valve. This valve is air operated and a temporary Heise gage is installed to affect the throttling, e Evaluation Valves and other equipment needed to pedorm a safety function are not rendered in operable and will pedorm as designed in the event of an ESF signal.

PT/1/A/4200/21A Description This change provides guidance for Differential Pressure Test and system lineups related to these tests for 89-10 testing in the KC system.

Evaluation The testing will be pedermed in a mode where the KC system is not required by Tech Specs. There i am sufficient precautions and alignments that allow for the support of systems important to the shutdown condition.

PT/1/A/4200/61 and PT/2/A/4200/61 l Description This is a new procedure for the purpose of flushing the RN assured make up sipping to the KC ,

system to ensure there is no build up of clams.

1 I

Evaluation The assured make up is not required for system operability, its function is to allow for system make up due to normal system leakage during the post accident period when normal make up may not be available. Seismic concerns are addressed for the hose and adapters necessary for the flush.

Changes made to reflect organizational changes and to reflect FSAR information.

Procedures Page 4

l E5aluation No new failures are introduced by this change and the probability of an accident is not increased or -

created.

PT1/N4200/04E Description l i

This change reflects organizational changes.

Evaluatlee This change does not involve any technical information. -

FT/1/N4200/13G Descrintion This change changes valve stroke time from 10 seconds to 15 seconds.

Evaluation These valves are manually operated from the control room during an accident. The increase in stroke is not a concern as these valves receive no ESF signal, therefore these valves are not subject to response time requirements of Tech Specs.

PT/0/N4400/26B Description This is a new procedure to perform Differential Pressure testing on 1RN4B, RN supply five the SBNSWP. This is done by Isolating from the lake and letting PIT level decrease to the setpoint which will cause the Valve to open.

Evaluation The opposite RN train will be aligned in is accident alignment for the test duration. The D/G will be verified to be operable for the performance of this test ensuring that IRN4B will be operable with the lake isolation closed. Mini-flow path alignments are verified to be available Time delay that prevents operator intervention to control RN equipment has been shortened for this test. All equipment that is not already in their safety alignment will remain capable of positioning the safety position if required.

PT/0/N4200/13 Description This change allows IWV testing of valve IRN48 in an abnormal alignment. This is due to other RN valve work in progress.

Evaluation The opposite RN Train will be aligned to the SBNSWP during this test. A control room operator will be stationed to secure RN pumps in the event that the Valve does not function properly during Procedures Page 5

the test causing a loss of suction source to the pumps. Personnel will be stationed at the valve to open it manually should it not function pmperly.

j PT/0/A/4450/008E Description r This change causes the Hot Gas Bypass valve to be closed during the Pedormance Test of the YC Chi.':ers to petvent adversely affecting data taken during the test.

• Evaluation +

The purpose of the Hot Gas Bypass valve is to allow the chiller to operate at low load conditions. -

Instructions are pavvided to abort the test and reinstall the function of the Hot Gas Bypass valve if a i load decrease in noticed. A the current time the load on the chiller is not in a low load condition and the function of the Hot Gas Bypass valve is not needed.

PT/0/A/4450/008E Description This change allows the use of non-safety related test equipment to be connected to the Chiller to measurekollect data during the performance of the YC Chiller Pciformance Test.

Evaluation i

The train being tested is declared inoperable for the pe formance of the test because of the non-  ;

safety equipment connected to it. The equipment remains available through the test. The opposite train is verified operable for the performance of this test.

PT/0/A/4400/08A and B Description The changes to this RN Flow Balance procedure include deletion of the 30 day conditional operability due to low flow to the motor upper hearing oil cooler, addition of a requirement to have the strainers in backwash for the duration of the test, revising the pump minimum and maximum flow and deleting a requirement to maintain flow above 11,000 gpm when aligned to the SBNSWP.

Other changes were added that west editorial or added clarification.

Evaluation The flows to the motor cooler now must meet required flows otherwise the pump will be considered inoperable. This ensures proper flows are maintained at all times. The strainer backwash flow requirement was added to account for the potential flow loss of the other strainer even though the other pump is not in service. The minimum and maximum flow was revised to agree with those specified in the Design Basis. The 11,000 gpm requirement was due to pressure concera with the D/G piping. This piping has been evaluated for the pressure at minimum flow conditions and determined to be acceptable, r

Procedures Page 6

PT/0/N4600/26 i

DescHotles This changed incorporated a computer spread sheet to calculate NC Temperaturt Calibration data lastead of using hand calculations.

Evaluation Itesults of the use of the spetad sheet have proven to be cc,asistent with calculations previously performed by hand in this procedure. The computer program is a contmiled and approved prwgram.

PT/0/N4150/01 Description This change clarifies the conditions under which the procedure can be performed.

1 Evaluation The specified condition that was in the procedure was only for convenience. The procedure can be performed with the plant at a power above the specified range up to 100%.

PT/0/N4220/002 Description This is an new procedure to verify the flow capacity of the WZ Pumps.

Evaluation No equipment in the WZ system is required for the mitigation of an accident or to recover froen an accident.

PT/0/N4400/08D Description This change provides a temporary means of measuring the flow rate and pressure drop associated with the KC Hz , with the RN control valve full open and its cavitrol tube bundle removed.

Evaluation ,

'Ihe fully opening of the RN control valve invalidates the RN flow balance. In order to compensate, prior to the test, the travel stop position of the valve will be recorded Once the travel stop is moved from this position, a person will be stationed at the valve untilit is returned to the original position. If an ESF signal is received during this test the person would be able to reposition the valve to the original position in approximately I minute. This is within the response time of the RN system specified in Tech Specs.. 3 Procedures Page 7

l

- PT/0/A/4150/19A  ;

Descripties l

This change restricts dilution of the NC System to only when all NC Pumps are running, this change also changes the alignment of the NV Pump mini-flow to the suction of the NV Pump during dilution.

r Evaluation In the event of a LOCA cooling water to the Seal Water HX will isolate. In this condition the mini-flow will temperature will heat up, to preclude overheating procedures direct operators to malign -

the mini-flow back to the VCT with in 45 minutes, which will ensum the NV Pumps are not '

overheated.  ;

The requimment to have all NC pumps swaning will precluded any possibility of premature criticality.

PT/0/A/4550/12 Description This is an new procedure which provides instruction on fuel reconstitution.

Evaluation This process does not jeopardize any safety related equipment. The only loading over the Spent Fuel Pool is a fuel assembly, which has already been analyzed.

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PT/n/A/4400/08G Deserlotion ,

This is a new procedure to evaluate flow degradation of the RN system while maintaining the RN Train operable. .i Evaluation During the Test all components not already in their safety position will remain capable of positioning to their safety position if required. All equipment will be operated within their design specifications. Procedure guidance provides assurance that there will always be adequate mini-flow protection for the RN pumps.

PT/0/A/4400/08B .

Description This change allows the use of both RN Pumps on Train B to be utilized to meet flow requirements to components and ensure operability. the change allows the use of a second pump regardless of which i pump is not able to meet the one pump flow balance, i

Evaluation Balancing the system with two pumps does not degrade the systems ability to respond as required to j mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Procedures Page 8 l

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4 li l.

I PT/2/N4200/09 Descristico ne usost significant change to this procedure is the adding of guidance to ensure the shunt and UV trips to the Reactor Trip Breakers are verified.

Evaluation De verification of Reactor Trip Breakers was added in response to an OEP item and NRC information Notice 93-15. De CRDM feeder breakers will be tagged open to prevent the CRDMs  !

from being energized. The train under test will be inoperable while the opposite train will remain operable. ,

1 PT/0/N4150/31 and PT/0/N4550/12 Descrintion This change provides guidance to document fuel movements during ultrasonic testing.

Evaluation Then am no changes in the consequences of an accident and no equipment impodant to safety is affected.

PT/0/N4450/15A Description This change provides for the notification of the Control Room of alarms that could be actuated during the test.

Evaluation Some valves in the VI system will be opened slightly to obtain air samples for the purpose of measuring moisture content. This change will not affect the system in any significant way.

PT/0/N4400/26A Description This is a new procedure for performing Differential Pressure Tests on valves in the RN system associated with the RN Emergency law Pit Level Swap to the SNSWP.

Evaluation RN Train being tested will remain operable with the valve from the SNSWP in the closed position.

The valve remains capable of opening upon receipt of an ESF signal. The opposite RN train will be aligned to the SNSWP which is its accident alignment. During the test all components not already in their safety position, will remain capable of positioning to their safety position if required.

PT/0/N4400/08 Description Procedures Page 9

This change provides a method of verifying RN flow to the NS Hs 1 A is within design specifications j following cleaning of the Hz.

1 Evaluation This procedure restores the system to the system flow balance condition prior to the cleaning of the l Hz and ensures proper flow to the NS Hz. No increase in the probability of an accident results and .

will not increase the probability or consequences of a component malfunction. l PT/2/N4200/09, PT/1/A/4200/30A and B.PT/2/A/4200/30A and B, PT/1/A/4200/18/A and B, PT/2/A/4200/18A and B, PT/1/A/4200/13E, PT/2/A/4200/13E and 13K j Descriotion This change lacreases the allowable stroke time of several CA , CF, and SM valves.

Evaluation This change in allowable stroke times is to reflect a change to the Technical specifications per amendments 107 and 101.  ;

PT/1/A/4200/27 and PT/2/A/4200/27 Descrintion This change allows Unit % NW valves to be tested per a single train.

Evaluation This is a rearrangement of the testing sequence and does not have any affect on acceptance criteria.

It allows the performance of the procedure to be more efficient.

PT/2/A/4200/19 Description This change allows 2FD42 to be tested without the removal of the valve cover. This resulted from a modification to allow the stroke of the valve without creating an inoperability.

Evaluation l The change improves the testing method where there is no inoperability created to perform the test.

PT/1/A!4200/13C and PT/2/A/4200/13C i

Descrintion This change deletes the inservice test for various RN Valves as the ESF signal has been deleted to these valves.

Evaluation The ESF signal to various RN valves has been deleted by modification (CE40108) to the valve. As a result these valves are no longer required to be part of the inscnice test program (IWV).

f Procedures Page 10

PT/2/A/4200/14C Descriptico Various editorial, format,' and minor wording changes were made to this procedure.

Evaluation None of these changes impact the Safety Analysis nor do they represent any change to safety related systems or components. -

PT/1/A/4200/13H and PT/2/A/4200/13H Description This is a re-type of this procedure.

Evaluation This procedure is performed when the reactor is defueled, with the head off, and in no-mode. There is no safety related function that this system performs while in this condition. No Technical Specifications apply while in this condition.

PT/1/A/4250/13B and PT/2/A/4250/13B Description This change is a re-type of the procedure. Outstanding changes that were not typed into the procedure previously were typed. No new changes were incorporated with this retype.

Evaluation The re-type of this procedure does not increase the probability of an acrident or the malfunction nor consequences of the malfunction of safety equipment.

t PT/2/A/4700/13 Description This changes provides for sliding links to defeat the open signal to valves 2N154A and 2NI76A ( Cold Leg Accumulators) rather than depressing relay plunger.

Evaluation This test will be performed where the Cold Leg Accumulators will not be required operable. The sliding links only affect these valves. The position of the sliding links will be verified to be returned to there proper position upon completion of the test.

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l PT/2/A/4200/04E Description This change reflected an organizational change.

Procedures Page 11

Evaluation Theet were no changes of a technical nature. No safety related system is affected by this change.

PT/1/A/4400/01 and PT/2/A/4400/01 Description his is a st-type to the ECCS Flow Balance procedure.

Evaluation The ECCS Flow Balance is performed when the reactor is defueled (no-mode). In this condition there is no requirement for operability of ECCS Systems. Thest is no accident evaluated while the reactor is in this condition and there is no possibility of creating an accident different fmm any already evaluated in the FSAR.

PT/1/A/4200/13E and PT/2/A/4200!13E Description This change adds a section to the procedure to allow differential pressure stroke testing of the motor-operated isolation valves on the discharge of the CA pumps.

Evaluation This test will not be pe formed in a mode that requiets the CA system to be operable. Adequate contmis have been included tin the procedure to ensure the equipment is operated in accordance with appropriate limits and conditions.

PT/2/A/4200/28A Description This change allows the stroke time testing of two RF valves when the valves art also aligned for another test.

Evaluation When these valves are stroked all prerequisite conditions are met for both procedures there for no ,

adverse conditions are created. l PT/2/A/4200/2IB Description This change provides for the proper line-ups to perform 89-10 valve static'and/or differential pressure testing of several KC valves.

Evaluation This testing is performed during Mode 5,6 or No-mode. The KC system is only required to be operable in Modes 1 - 4. Ilowever the system supports other systems important to safety, during a  :

shutdown condition. Sufficient precautions and alignments are included in the procedure to ensure Procedures Page 12

' the support inaction is not adversely affected. Other requinments, such as containment closure, have also been considered.

PT/2/A/4200/31 Descristlos This change allows the stroking of 2SV25B with 2SV1 mot closed.

E5aluation This test will be performed when the Unit is in Mode 5 with no steam or liquid pressure in the eystem. In this condition there is no nuclear or personnel safety concern.

PT/2/A/4400/03D Description This change deletes the following: the requirement to inspect KC system correct orifice plate installation; changing which sliding link to use to fail KC valves to their respective travel stops; the requirement to use test instrumentation to measure ND Hs flow.

Evaluation The orifice plate inspection was an LER commitment. Tbc requirement has been met. To ensure future compliance administrative controls have been implemented and appropriate maintenance procedures revised. .

The ND Flow was thought to over range the process instrumentation during the performance of this test. This is not the case, so test instrumentation is not needed.

The sliding links that this change uses perform the same function as the previous links with respect to failing the valves open. These links are easier to access. l PT/2/A/4250/03B l 1

Description i The change was to incorporate new data as a result of pump rotating element change out.

Evaluation The rotating element on the 2B CA pump was replaced. This condition requires new data to be incorporated with the new rotating cicment. This does not affect safety in any way.

PT/2/A/4400/03A Description The change was to incorporate new data as a result of pump rotating element change out.

I Evaluation l l

The rotating element on the 2A1 KC pump was replaced. This condition requires new data to be incorporated with the new rotating element. This does not affect safety in any way.

Procedures Page 13

I PT/1/A/4350/02E and PT/2/A/4350/02E Description This change incorporates the following: a provision to provide a means to ensure that the Main Turbine can be reset with a turbine load inhibit for pedermance of this test; a different means to control S/G levels by using the 'A' Feedwater Heater Outlet Isolation Valves; change the response tisme of the CF isolation from 5.8 to 10.8 seconds; deleted the allowance that the CF Control and Bypass Valves are not required to be available.

Evaluation The only safety significant change is the change in allowable response time for CF Isolation. The procedure change reflects a Tech Spec Amendment that was previously approved. The other j changes do not affect safety adversely. l PT/2/A/4200/09C Description The changes to this procedure eliminate redundant steps and makes changes to sequence to provide for clarity and improve the efficiency of pedorming this procedure.

Evaluation No sinactures, systems, or components addressed in the FSAR are affected, nor does this change j involve procedures described in the FSAR.

PT/2/A/4700/013 Description '

This is a new procedure to functionally check ASP controls and indications.

I Evaluation This test will be performed in two parts. One part will be performed in No-Mode when the reactor is defueled. This part will simulate a transfer of control to the ASP. Certain NI and ND valves will be verified to move to their ASP position and control from the control room will be verified to be disabled.

The second part will be pedormed when the Unit is in Mode 5 and will require the ASP transfer -

switched to be placed in LOCAL and CONTROL ROOM positions. The valves tested in Part I will be placed in a position w hich will not have an adverse affect on the plant. Valves required to automatically' position on the transfer to LOCAL will be verified to reposition w ben the transfer is made. Also control room control will be verified to be disabled. When the transfer switch is placed back in the CONTROL ROOM position, control room control will be verified to be enabled and ASP control disabled.

The test is performed w hen the plant is in a condition where there is not a requirement for this equipment to be operabic. Steps are written to ensure any system alignments and equipment protection has been performed to preclude any abnormal system / equipment operation. Limits and precautions have been incorporated into the test that allow termination of the test should problems arise.

Procedures Page 14

1 i

PT/2/N4200/09  !

Descriptios l

l This change enables the lead Sequencer to be reset and pumps shutdown while maintaining relays -

energized.

1 Evaluation ,

The purpose of this change is to allow data to be taken on the VC/YC system without nanning the pumps started by this test any longer than necessary. A sliding link will be used to defeat only the i Safety Injection signal to the Sequencer. The Sequencer will respond to a Blackout signal. The - i Safety Injection signal is normally blocked in Mode 5, which is when this test is performed. Since the Sequencer's ability to itspond to a Blackout la mot impaired there is no safety question.

PT/1/N4200/09 and PT/2/N4200/09 Description This change allows for more efficient and less time consuming documentation ofIWV Stroke Time Tests.

Evaluation This is only a reformatting of the preceduet and does not affect test method or acceptance criteria.

PT/2/N4200/09 Description  :

This change allows the Hydrogen Skimmer Fan to be run with Valve 2VX1 A closed. This valve will not open during the test due to a loss of control power to part of the VX circuitry.

Evaluation This change places the VX system in the same alignment as used in the quarterly test of the fan as required by Tech Specs. This being the normal method there is no safety question. -

PT/2/N4200/13G Description Stroke time for several NI valves has clianged from 10 seconds to 15 seconds.

Evaluation The increased stroke times are not a concern. The valve actuators were changed on these valves that are manually operated from the control room during an accident. They receive no Safety signal therefore the valves are not subject to Tech Spec requirements for ESF Response Times.

PT/2/N4450/03C Description Procedures Page 15

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o

' A damper was removed by modification that was required to be leak tested. This testing is no longer needed in the procedure. Also a new Enclosure has been added to test the integrity of two other dampers with VA in its LOCA Alignment.

Evaluation The design basis function of the VE system will not be affected by this change theerfore there is not a safety concern with this change.

PT/2/A/4450/05A and PT/2/4450/05B [

Description This change is to verify proper operation of the VX Fan following modification of the control circuit.

(Post Mod Test)

Evaluation This test will verify that the VX system will meet its design basis as described in the FSAR. This test is performed prior to Mode 4 which is the Mode VX is required operable.

' PT/2/A/4450/05A and PT/2/4450/05B Description -

This change is to reflect modification of the control circuit of the VX Fan. A "VX Air Fan Permit" {

light and key switch was added.

Evalustion This test will verify that the VX system will meet its deign basis as described in the FSAR. This test is performed prior to Mode 4 which is the Mode VX is required operable. ,

- PT/1/A/4250/03A Description  :

This change nill allow Differential Pressure Testing of 1CA58A per 89-10.

Evaluation This test will be conducted in a mode w here CA is not required for operability. The Pump will be run in its normal recire alignment with some flow sent to the S/G to set up D/P conditions.  ;

Administrative controls are provided to ensure nanout or deadhead conditions are avoided. I PT/1/A/4400/01 Description J This change adds a method for performing a head curve and flow verification on the ND pump during mode 5.

Procedures Page 16 l

j I

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' E5aluation i ne method pmvides for an alignment of the ND pump act nquired by Tech Specs to be aligned to i the FWST and discharging back to the FWST for the performance of the head verification. The i opposite Trala of ND will be aligned to the 140ps and discharging back to the loops for decay beat

• • • '*I* -

l To perfoms the flow verification the ND pump is aligned to the 14op and discharging back to the  !

cold legs. The Operable Train of ND is also aligned la its normal RHR neede and operating. In accordance with Tech Specs. De operabic pump can be stopped for the performance of surveillance testing. . When the Operable ND pump is stopped the Pump la test is started providing flow thmugh injection lines and cost cooling is malatained. Flow verification data is taken at this time. At all l times one ND pump and at least two S/Gs are maintained la accordance with Tech Specs for the l purpose of decay heat removal Performance of this test will not affect any analysis la the FSAR.

All Tech Spec /FSAR required equipment is maintained for the duration of this test. i PT/0/A/4150/22 Description

{

This is a complete procedure re-type.

Evaluation i This procedust is for performing the total core re-load. His is not a pmcedure described in the FSAR but does complies with the description in FSAR p.1.4 on how to load fuel This precedure is i also in compliance to 89-03, Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling j Operations. The Accident discussed in the FSAR 15.4.7, Inadvertent Imading and Operation of a >

Fuel Assembly in an Improper Location is also bounding for this procedure. Identifying fuel assemblies as they are loaded into the core is required per Reg. Guide 5.29. All fuel assemblies .

going into the core are identified to be in their proper locations with their proper inserts. l PT/1/A/4200/41C  !

Description j This re-type of this procedure involved incorporating existing changes, converting the proceduet to

]

enclosure format, removing unnecessary independent verifications and making small verbiage i changes to improve procedure flow..

Evaluation None of the changes impact any Safety Analysis nor do they represent any change to a safety related system.

PT/1/A/4700/012 Description This procedure will verify a position or actually open/close or stop/ start of various equipment that is part of the Standby Shutdown Facility.

Evaluation This procedure is being performed in a Mode of operation w here the components being tested , or used la conjunction with the test, are not required to be operable. Additional requirements specify other conditions necessary to be met that nill ensure no plant systems or equipment will be Procedures Page 17

I jeopardized by the pedormance of the test. By pedorming'the pacedure in this manner there will  !

not be any adverse affect on Safety or unit operation. - i PT/1/A/4350/128 '

Description  ;

This is a new procedure to demonstrate acceptable response of the governor and voltage regulator to l load changes after either device has undergone maintenance.

Evaluation Since this precedert is to verify proper operation of the D/G following maintenance the D/G is inoperable until pedormance is proven acceptable. The opposite train D/G will be unaffected during this test and will be available to supply emergency power if needed. All equipment will be run in previously alignments that have been demonstrated as acceptable. No safety concern is created by this test.

t 4

PT/1/A/4400/13H Description This is a re-t3pc of the NI and NY Check Valve Test.

Evaluation

'Ihis test provides assurance that adequate ECCS flows will be delivered to the Reactor Coolant system in the event of a LOCA. This test is pedermed when the reactor vesselis open and there is no fuel in the core. NI and NV pumps will inject into the vessel through the cold legs and hot legs with suction provided by the ND pumps. With the unit in this condition there is no safety concern created by this procedure.

B&WFC FS-001, Retype 1 Approved 04/25/94 Setup, Checkout, Disassembly, and Packing of the ECHO-330 System ,

Description '

This procedure describes the sequence of operations required to setup, check out, disassemble, and pack the ECHO-330 system at a nuclear power plant. The significant revisions to this pmcedure  ;

include a step added that requires notification of the task leader and site representative if a ,

calibration is found to be unacceptable and a note was added to require a systesa verification once/ shift or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> prior to the start ofinspections,in the estat of site delays.

Evaluation There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment important to safety. This procedure does not require any off-normal operation of the safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents -

than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Useing the B&WFC ECHO-330 System for ultrasonic testing of the assemblics does not jespardize the equipment that is important to safety.

It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS. ,

B&WFC FS-002, Retype 1 Approved 04/25/94 Operating Instructions for the ECHO-330 System Description This procedure was developed to provide instructions for the fuel inspection team in the operation of the ECHO-330 equipment. The significant revision to this procedure were editorial in nature.

Evaluation Procedures Page 18

d There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created

. by this procedure. Dere is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment impedant to safety. His procedure does not require any oK-normal operation of the safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Uslag the B&WFC ECHO-330 System - l for nitrasonic testing of the assemblies does not jespardize the equipment that is impedant to safety. l It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS. l 4 1 B&WFC FS-083, Retype O Approved 04/25/94 ,

Fuel Rod Visual Esamination

• Description _ _

his procedust details the instructions for visual examination of selected fuel rods. Fuel rods of l~

Intact assemblies or assemblies which are being reconstituted or retaged may be inspected per this precedure. This retype added a step to ensure that work is stopped and management is contacted if  ;

, a step in the precedure cannot be completed. A " work around" requires a precedure change.

Evaluation There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created  ;

by this procedure. There is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment impodant to safety. This precedure does not require any off-normal operation of tiu: i safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accident 1 .!

than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26 *

[ 00-0113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fuels Company elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS. -

i I

B&WFC FS-085, Retype 0 Approved 04/25/94 i Contigency Plan for Problems Encountered During Fuel Rod Handling

- Description  :

This procedure outlines the steps to take to recover from a fuel rod that partially or completely  ;

separates during reconstitution or recaging. The signicifant revisions in this retype include l prerequisities and precautions.limitiation (includes requirement to evacuate / notify control room in i the event of a handling action); contigency steps added in the event of a a F/R is severed during  :

recon, recage, or eddy current; added steps to control the inspection of broken rods; and added  ;

steps to control the removal of broken rods.

Evaluation There is no increase in the pavbability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment impodant to safety. This procedure does not require any off-normal operation of the safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents i than those that have aircady been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26- -t 00-0113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fuels Company .

elevator, it does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS. l B&WFC FS-086, Retype 0 Apprvved 04/27/94 Eddy Current Inspection of Fuel Rods l Description 3 This pascedure is provided for the eddy current inspection of fuel rods during the fuel assembly l reconstitution. The'signicifant revision included in this retype was a step added that requires i notification of the task leader and site representative if a calibration is found to be unacceptable.

Evaluation t There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the i'

Procedures I

Page 19 l

i

- . - - = . - . .

b equipasent important to safety. This procedure does not require any off-normal operation of the safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents than those that have already been adderseed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26-00-0113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fuels Company _

elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS.

B&WFC FS-109, Retype 0 Approved 04/27/94 Controlling Procedure for Recaging of Mk-BW Fuel Assemblies 6 Description This procedurt details the instavctions and requirements for recaging of Mark BW fuel assemblies.

'ne signicifant revision included in this retype was a step to ensure thorough inspection of each piece of equipment prior to dunking it in the pool (addresses FME concern).

Evaluation  :

There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no increased pubability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment important to safety. This procedure does not require any off-normal operation of the safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26-00-4113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fuels Company elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS.

B&WFC FS-110, Retype 0 Approved 04/27/94 Contrwiling Procedure for Reconstitution of Mk-BW Fuel Assemblies Description This procedure details the instructions and requirements for reconstitution of B&W Mark BW fuel

. assemblies. The signicifant revision included in this retype was a step to ensure thorough inspection of each piece of equipment prior to dunking it in the pool (addresses FME concern).

Evaluation There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment important to safety. This procedure does not require any off-normal operation of the safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26-00-0113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fuels Company elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS.

B&WFC FS-111, Retype 0 Appmved 05/05/94 Fuci Rod Handling for Mk-BW Fuel Assembly Reconstitution Description This procedure details the instivctions and requirements for fuel rod handling during fuel reconstitution of B&W Mark BW fuel assemblies. The signicifant revisions in this retype include a j

change to the restriction on tensile load that can be applied to F/Rs during rod removal, Le. 50%

above the steady state load, and also added steps to prmide contingiencies in the event steady state load limit is reached, Le. allows rotation only if rod is reinserted.

Evaluation There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment imposiant to safety. This procedure does not require any off-normal operation of the safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26-l Procedures Page 20

00-0113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fuels Company elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS.

3 B&WFC FS-112, Retype 0 Approved 05/05/94 ,

Top Nonle Removal and Re-Installation Description This procedum details the instmetions and requirements for mmoval and re-installation of a BWFC MK-BW fuel assembly top moule as required for reconstitution or recaging operations.

The significant revision included in this retype is a note added to allow the top nonle to be removed frone the pedestal with lebooks and placed on the safety tray.

Evaluation There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no incmased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment important to safety. This procedum does not requist any off-normal operation of the -

safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26-00-0113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fuels Company elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS.

B&WFC FS-113, Retype 0 Approved 05/05/94 Fuel Rod Handling for Mk-BW Fuel Assembly Regaging Description This procedure details the requirements for fuel rod handling during fuel regaging of B&W Marir BW fuel assemblics. The signicifant revisions in this retype include a change to the restriction on tensile load that can be applied to F/Rs during red removal, i.e. 50% above the steady state load, and also added steps to provide contingiencies in the event steady state load limit is reached, Lc.

allows rotation only if rod is reinserted.

Evaluation There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment important to safety. This procedure does not require any off-normal operation of the safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-15S3.26-00-0113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fuels Company 1 elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS.

B&WFC FS 122, Retype O Approved 03/21/94 BWFC Fuel Elevator Instatallation, Setup, and Disassembly Description This procedure details the instructions and requirements for installation, setup, and disassembly of the fuel elevator designed and built by BWFC for use by BWFC field service personnel. The signicifant change in this retype is a step added to ensure thorough inspection of each piece of equipment prior to dunking it in the pool (addresses FME concern).

Evaluation There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment important to safety. This procedure does not require any off-normal operation of the safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26-00-0113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fuels Company elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS.

Procedures Page 21

L f B&WFC FS-126, Retype 0 Approved 05/03/94 i Fuel Rod Handling Tool Imad Monitoring System Setup, Calibration, and Operations Description This pmcedust details ihe requirements for setup, calibration, and operation of the fuel rod l

handling load monitoring system used during reconstitution and recaging of fuel sasemblies. The significant changes in this retype include a stquirement added for the hoist to be load tested once per year and changes to specific steps associated with the setup / checkout of the hoist travel / load limits.

r Evaluation There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no incitased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the I equipnient important to safety. This procedurt does not require any off-normal operation of the i safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26-00-0113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fuels Company elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS.

B&WFC FS-706, Retype o Approved 04/27/94 Field Servise Temporary Procedure Changes l Description l The pupose of this procedure is to define the responsibilities for the preparation and control of )

temporary procedures at a nuclear power plant. This is the original issue of this procedure. I Evaluation There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created by this procedure. There is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the equipment important to safety. This procedure does not require any off-normal operation of the safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26-00-0113 documents the assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fucis Company elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS.

B&WFC FS-903, Retype 0 Approved 04/27/94 Reconstitution Load Cell Instrumentation Setup Description This procedure defines the method to load cell instrumentation setup. This is the original issue of this procedure.

Evaluation i There is no increase in the probability or consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR created I by this procedure. There is no increased probability or consequences of a malfunction of the )

equipment important to safety. This procedure does not require any off-normal operation of the j safety equipment that could cause additional accidents or greater consequences of those accidents j

^

than those that have already been addressed in the FSAR. Engineering calculation CNC-1553.26-00-0113 documects the. assessments, analysis and considerations of the B&W Fucis Company elevator. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined by TS.

EP/1/A/5000/01 and EP2/A/5000/01 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EP/1/A/5000/02 and EP/2/A/5000/02 Critical Safety Function Station Trees EP/1/A/5000/03 and EP/2/A/5000/03 Loss of All AC Power EP/1/A/5000/1A and EP/2/A/5000/l A Reactor Trip Response Procedures Page 22

l:

EP/1/A/5000/IA1 and EP/2/N5000/lAl Natural Circulation Cooldown EP/1/N5000/1B and EP/2/A/5000/1B S/I Termination Following Spuriouse S/I EP/1/A/5000/1C and EP/2/A/5000/1C High Energy Line Break Inside Containment EP/1/A/5000/1C1 and EP/2/A/5000/IC1 S/I Termination Following High Energy Line Break Inside Containment EP/1/A/5000/102 and EP/2/A/5000/IC2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization EP/1/A/5000/1C3 and EP/2/A/5000/1C3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation l EP/1/A/5000/1C4 and EP/2/A/5000/1C4 Transfer to Hot 14g Recirculation l EP/1/A/5000/1CS and EP/2/A/5000/1C5 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation EP/1/A/5000/IC6 and EP/2/N5000/1C6 LOCA Outside Containment EP/1/A/5000/1D and EP/2/A/5000/1D Steam Line Bmak Outside Containment )

EP/1/A/5000/1D1 and EP/2/A/5000/1D1 S/I Termination Following Steam Line Break EP/1/A/5000/1E and EP/2/A/5000/IE Steam Generator Tube Ruptum EP/1/N5000/IE1 and EP/2/A/5000/IE1_ Post SGTR Alternate Cooldown and Depressurization EP/1/A/5000/IE2 and EP/2/A/5000/IE2 SGTR Alternate Cooldown Using Backfilling EP/1/A/5000/1E3 and EP/2/A/5000/1E3 SGTR With Continuous Leakage - Subcooled Recovery  !

EP/1/A/5000/IE4 and EP/2/A/5000/IE4 SGTR With Continuous leakage - Saturated Recovery l EP/1/A/5000/1E6 and EP/2/A/5000/1E6 SGTR Cooldown Using ND l EP/1/A/5000/2A1 and EP/2/A/5000/2A1 Nuclear Power Generation /ATWA EP/1/A/5000/2A2 and EP/2/A/5000/2A2 Loss of Core Shutdown EP/1/A/5000/2B1 and EP/2/A/5000/2B1 Inadequie Core Cooling EP/1/A/5000/2B2 and EP/2/A/5000/2B2 Degraded Core Cooling EP/1/A/5000/2B3 and EP/2/A/5000/2B3 Saturated Core Cooling ,

EP/1/N5000/2C1 and EP/2/A/5000/2C1 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink EP/1/A/5000/2C2 and EP/2/A/5000/2C2 S/G Overpressure EP/1/A/5000/2C3 and EP/2/A/5000/2C3 S/G High Level

]

EP/1/N5000/2C4 and EP/2/A/5000/2C4 Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities i I

EP/1/A/5000/2C5 and EP/2/A/5000/2C5 S/C I4w Level EP/1/A/5000/2D1 and EP/2/A/5000/2D1 Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions EP/1/A/5000/2D2 and EP/2/A/5000/2D2 Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions EP/1/A/5000/2D3 and EP/2/A/5000/2D3 High Pressurizer Pressure EP/1/A/5000/2E1 and EP/2/A/5000/2E1 High Containment Pressure EP/1/A/5000/2E2 and EP/2/A/5000/2E2 Incomplete Containment Isolation EP/1/A/5000/2F1 and EP/2/A/5000/2F1 Pressurizer Flooding EP/1/A/5000/2F2 and EP/2/A/5000/2F2 Low NC System Insentory EP/1/A/5000/2F3 and EP/2/A/5000/2F3 Volds In Reactor Vessel EP/1/A/5000/3A and EP/2/A/5000/3A Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without S/I Required EP/1/A/5000/3B and EP/2/A/5000/3B Loss of All AC Power Recovery With S/I Required Des 6.ntion Based on a commitment made to the NRC in a letter dated July 16, 1992, in response to Requalification Exam Inspection Report 50-413/92 300, Duke Power Company committed to upgrade Emergency Procedures to conform to the requirements of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Emergency Response Guidelines (ERG). The above emergency procedures were deleted on 03/28/94, and subsequently replaced with new upgraded emergency procedures.

Evaluation This change complies with TS 6.8.1, which requires written emergency proceds be established, implemented and maintained. The emergency procedures will still exist, the procedures and titles will be changed to conform to the WOG ERG convention. Based on review, the assumptions stated in the accident analysis are still intact and the deletion of the previously listed emergency procedures does not create an USQ.

Procedures Page 23 l 1

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f ::

, HP/0/B/1000/10, Changes 0-19 Approved 08/25/94 Determination of Radiation Monitor Setpoints Description

'De purpose of this procedere is to detennine the setpoints of raditiation monitors.

Evaluation 2 EMF-37 (iodine monitor) received a new detector and as a msult a new calibration was completed.

The new calibration and channel checks were then used to calculate a new sensitivity (correlation factor) for the mnitor. This change placed the new calculation into the body of the procedum and also placed new sensitivity value into enclosure 5.1. This change does not affect any section of TSs and there were no USQ as a result of the change. No systems or components are affected that directly impact plant safety concerns.

HP/0/B/1000/30, Retype 10 Approved 10/21/93 -

Removal ofitems Fmm RCA/RCZA and Use of Release / Radioactive Material Tags Description The purpose of this procedure is to establish and define rad controls for the removal of items from a RCZ and/or fmm the RCA, to establish and define rad controls for transporting items from a RCZ to the RCA and back, and to describe the use of RP tags on materials. Changes to this pmcedure requires a minor change to the last paragraph of the FSAR, Section 12.5. Specifically, we now allow

. qualified Chemistry personnel to monitor samples and transport to a chemistry laboratory for analysis, providing it is < 100 mrem /hr py con *act and prior RP notification. Other changes included clarification of movement of radioactise nuterials to and from RCA/RCZs.

Evaluation J This pmcedure does not affect any stemtures, systems, or components. It does not involve any tests or experiments and does not require an USQ evaluation.

l HP/0/B/1000/30, Change 1 Appmved 08/31/94 Removal of items From RCA/RCZA and Use of Release / Radioactive Msterial Tags Descrintion The purpose of this procedure is to establish and Cefine rad controls for the removal of itemt fmm a i RCZ and/or from the RCA, to establish and define rad controls for transporting items from a RCZ j

! to the RCA and back, and to describe the use of RP tags on materials. This procedure change i deletes the entire procedure so that the System RP Manual Directive HI-10 can be sdopted.  !

Evaluation  !

This procedust does not involve testing, experiments, or safety related systems, and is not an USQ.

HP/0/B/1005/06 Changes 0-0 Approved 08/30/94 Recharging Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Description Activities covered in this procedurr concern an approved method to recharge self-contained breathing appartus and operate the Ingersol-Rand, Baon H high pressure air compressor.

Evaluation This revision incorporates changes to the references, moves some limits and precautions into the body of the procedure, changed format to the new RP format, revised sections to add clarity to filling process and compressor operation. There activities will not increase the probability of an accident as stated in section 15 of the FSAR, or create any situation that could cause an accident that has not already been evaluated in the FSAR. These activities are also found to be in compliance with all applicable requirements of section 12 of the FSAR. In addition, activities covered in this Procedures Page 24 L_.__ . _ _ . . . _ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

, , . - . - . . - - -~ ._ - .

- . p 4

i i

i e

- .I procedure am not addressed in section 16 of the FSAR or section 6 of the TSs. Therefore, the '

margin of safety as defined in the basis will not be reduced. 3 4-  ;

HP/0/B/1006/10, Change 0-2 Approved 04/13/94 Shipment of Solidified Radwaste Description I

- The purpose of this procedure is to provide lastructions for preparation and shipmeut of solidified radioactive wast to BWMF and to ensure shipments comply with applicable BWMF site disposal criteria, federal and date regulations, and facility license requirements. This revision updates the procedure in all respects, reorganized and reformatted several sections, clarified and expanded . i munnerous sections, calcs, and bases, espanded and standardized somenclatuit throughout , ,

corrected errors and deficiencies, and changed software references and methodology from ,

WASTETRAK to RADMAN. -  :

Evaluation  :

This revision required no change to TS or the FSAR, and does not involve an USQ. This procedure 5 and its revision are entirely consistent with all relevant statements and requirements contained in  ;

TS and in the FSAR. This procedure does not affect any station structures, systems, or components.

This procedure has no bearing on station equipment important to safety, nor on any TS or FSAR ,

bases or evaluations.

{

IP/2/B/3010/05R, Change 2 Appenved 08/23/94 Calibration Procedure for Condensate Booster Pump Suction Header Pressait and Generator lead Rejection Bypass Control Instruments  !

DeKriptION l Valve 2CM-83 provides a flow path from the discharge of the hotwell pumps (HWPs), around the condensate polishing demineralizers and the G and F stage feedwater heaters, directly to the suction of the condensate booster pumps (CBPs). By circumventing the pressure drops associated with demineralizers and heaters, a greater suction pressure can be maintained by the CBPs. Valve 2CM43 is designed to modulate open as necessary to maintain CBP suction petssure and will fail  ;

open upon aveciving a generator load rejection bypass signal to assure maximum bypass flow / suction pressure is availabic. This in turn decreases the probability of a CBP trip on low suction pressure, thereby decreasing probability of a feedwater pump trip on low suction pressure. This prwcedust ,

change will add output blocking on loop 2CMLP5550, inform operations personnel to isolate 2CM-  !

83 for stroking, and will correct editorial changes withing the procedure. e Evaluation i This procedure change can be broken into four parts. The first part of this procedure change will add output blocking on loop 2CMLP5550, the output blocking will isolate pressure switch 2CMPS5551 and 2CMPS5550. Pressure switch 2CMPS5551 is part of the 2/3 logic for CBP trip on emeregency low suction pressure. The remaining two pressure switches for the 2/3 are 2CMPS5552 and 2CMPS5553. These two pressure switchws will remain in service while 2CMPS5551 is isolated.

This will reduce the trip logic to 2/2 logic. The second part of the procedure change will also add output blocking for pressure switch 2CMPS5550. Output blocking on this pressure switch will prevent HWP fasm starting on low-low suction pressure. The third part of the precedure change  !

will instruct operations to isolate 2CM43 to allow IAE to st:Ske the valve. The final part of this i precedure changes is being made for editorial corrections. This failust mode for 2CM43 remaining i closed, or C2CMPS$550 or 2CMPS5551 not actuating is aircady present in that a failure of a  ;

transmitter could produce the same result. Consequently, there are no new failure modes created by j these procedure changes. The opening of 2CM43 on generator load rejection is discused in section i 10.4.75.22 of the FSAR. Additionally, the valve is not discussed in either section 15.2.2 (tass of External Imad) or section 15.2.7 (Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow) or in any other section of the  ;

FSAR or TSs. The valve serves no safety function. There are no scismic interaction concerns. .

There are no USQ associated with this procedure change. l Procedures Page 25 i i

1 1

IP/1/A/3174/02, Change l' __ _

Approved 08/25/94 Containment Air Release and Addition System (VQ)

Description i

This procedure change involves adding new range and calibration at 50% and 100% to enclosures 11.1.1 and 11.1.2, and page 3 of section 11.1.1, pages 1 and 2 of section 11.1.4 and sectie:: 11.1.5 are l deleted. '

Evaluation The VQ system is not nuclear safety related. The change in the range and the way this loop is i calibrated does not affect stnctions, systems, or components referenced in the FSAR in a significant j manner, does not appear significant enough to be included in the FSAR, does not involve tests or l experiments as described in the FSAR, nor does it require a changes to TSs. No USQ exists.

IP/2/A/3174/02, Change 4 Approved 08/25/94 Containment Air Release and Addition System (VQ)

Description This precedure change involves adding new range and calibration at 50% and 100% to enclosures 11.1.1 and 11.1.2, and page 3 of section 11.1.1, pages 1 and 2 of section 11.1.4 and section 11.1.5 are ,

deleted. I Evaluation l The VQ system is not nuclear safety related. The change in the range and the way this loop is calibrated does not affect structions, systems, or components referenced in the FSAR in a significant  ;

manner, does not appear significant enough to be included in the FSAR, does not involve tests or j esperiments as described in the FSAR, nor does it require a changes to TSs. No USQ exists. 1 i

MP/0/A/7150/001, Retype 5 Approved 11/02/93 Ice Basket Cmciform Removal Description The purpose of this procedure is to provide a method of removing the cmciforms fissa the ice baskets. Changes made in this revision through section 11.3 consist of updates current standard format and the inclusion of statement in the safety and special tool sections, and section 11.4 was added to cover the use of the new remote tab / screw grinding tool.

Evaluation l This procedure has been compared to TS, the FSAR, design documents, and station procedures to ensuit that the actions it controls will maintain the ice baskets in their as-built /as-designed condition. Since the baskets will be maintained in an operable condition through the use of this l procedure, the possibility, consequences, or probability of a malfunction will be reduced. Therefost, l no USQ exists.  ;

I MP/0/A/7150/004, Retype 9 Approved 04/27/94 Component Cooling Pump Corrective Maintenance Description The purpose of this procedure is to provide a method of corrective maintenance for Goulds Model 3405 size 10 x12-17 component cooling pumps. The rewrite of this maintenance procedure was i initiated to incorporate several miscellaneous procedure enhancements. The significant changes to the technical content include additional procedure steps which deal with pump arbuild utilizing a pre-assembled estating element; a method for fitting the bearing cap to the bearing housing has changed to make use of PLASTIGAGE clearance indicator; construction isometric drawings for the Class C pump casing bent piping have been added; statement added that allows coupling alignment by either the dial indicator or Optalign method; and instamment calibration procedures for all the Procedures Page 26

KC pumps have been added to the reference section. Numerous other changes which do not affect technical content have been made for the sake of clarity, step continuity, and overall procedure enhancement.

Egaluation Since this procedure outlines steps for the complete teardown of an essential ECCS component,10 I

CFR 50.59 screening is applicable. The execution of the procedure returns the pump to an as-designed or as-intended condition. .It is concluded that an USQ will not be created as a result of the performance activities described in this procedure.

MP/0/A/7150/004A, Retype 0 . Appmved 04/27/94 Component Cooling Pumps Rotating Element Assembly Description This pmcedure has been created for the purpose of providing a method for the assembley of the rotating element podion of the KC pump. Other than being' " extracted" steps from MP/0/A/7150/004, the most significant change involves the setting of casing / impeller wear ring clearance.

Evaluation Since this procedure outlines steps for the assembly of the internals of an essential ECCS component,10 CFR 50.59 screening is applicable. The changes made by the separation of this procedure frce the " parent" procedure have been reviewed in reference to approved vendor manuals, design documents, and station procedures to ensure that the maintenance activities return the equipment to the intended as-built /as-designed condition. It is concluded that an USQ will not be created as a resuM of the performance of the maintenance activities described in this procedure.

MP/0/A/7150/032, Retype 3 Approved 05/22/94 Nuclear Service Water Strainer Corrective Maintenance Description The purpose of this procedure is to provide a method for corrective maintenance on the nuclear service water strainers. Changes incorporated into this retype include changing a step sequence involving closure of thed strainer hand-hold covers, elimination of a torque requirement for the closure studs / nuts of the stainer and cover, caution statement added concerning blown.out gasket, enhancement was made to the strainer drawing, overall enhancements were made by eliminating data sheet enclosures and providing signature within the body of the procedure, and a QA pads list was included.

Evaluation 1 Since this procedure curlines steps for the complete teardown or removal of an essential nuclear service water component,10 CFR 50.59 screening is applicable. The execution of this pmcedure returns the pump to an as-designed or as-intended condition. It is concluded that an USQ will not be created as a result of the performance of the maintenance activities described in this procedure.

MP/0/A/7150/032, Retype 4 Approved 05/24/94 Nuclear Service Water Strainer Corrective Msintenance Description The purpose of this procedure is to provide a method for corrective maintenance on the nuclear service water strainers. Changes incorporated into this retype include clarification of removal and replacement of the backwash arms; step changed to remove backwash assembly bolts 37C and 37D rather than 37B; and climination of numerous QA inspections not associated with Class C pressure boundary integrity.

Evaluation The changes incorporated into this retype do not change the precedural intent of returning the equipment to the as-found/as-designed condtion. The changes made have been reviewed in Procedures Page 27 l

reference to approved vendor manuals, design documents, and station procedures, to ensure that the esaintenance activities return the equipni:st to as-found/as-dsigned conditolons. It is concluded that an USQ will not be created as a result of the performance of the maintenance activities described in this procedert.

MP/0/A/7150/039 Restricted Change 11 Approved 06/23/94 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Removal and Replacement Description His is a restricted change for working NC Pump 2B seals on the backscat during U2EOC6 restart.

The following changes were made: prerequisities were addded to ensure the correct procedure changes are being used and to ensure adequate phone communications established with control reons; additional steps added to lower the pump shaft to the pump backseat without lowering system .l water level; additional steps added to use the same hydraulic tool to lift the pump shaft up to couple j with the spool piece. j Evaluation l This precedure, including the changes, has been reviewed against approved vendor manual, design documents, and station procedures to ensurt that the pump is returned to as-built /as-designed .

condition. Westinghouse Field Service provided assistance in the development of these proceduet I changes and a representative will be available to assist in the maintenance activity. Executing this procedure , including the changes, will ensure the pump complies with FSAR r.ccident analysis.

Since this procedure returns the pump to as-built /as-designed condition, the pouiblity, consequences, and probability of a malfunction in the pump or a supporting system will be reduced.

Derfore, no USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7150/073, Retype 11 Approved 12/09/93 S/G Primary Manway Covers Removal and Replacement Description l The purpose of this procedure is to provide a method of removal and replacement of the steam generator primary manway covers. The changes in this revision deal with further clarification of steps and brings the procedure into consistency with McGuire's primary manway precedure.

Evaluation This procedure change does not change the design intent of the steams generators, nor does it change the ability of the steam generators to perform their design function. Therefore, the effect of this procedure is not significant with respect to the FSAR, nor does it warrant inclusion in the 13AR.

This procedure does not include tests or experiements not addressed in the FSAR.

MP/0/A/7150/073, Retype 12 Approved 05/12/94 S/G Primary Manway Covers Removal and Replacement l' Description The purpose of this procedure is to provide a method of removal and replacement of the steam generator primary manway covers. The changes in this revision are minor in nature and for further clarificatoion of the procedure and also bring the procedure into consistency with McGuire's primary manway covers tensioner R&R procedure.

[ Evaluation j The enchancements to this procedure will not change the design intent of the steam gancrator or

y. pressurizer, and therefore do not warrant inclusion in the FSAR. This procedure does not involve tests or experiments not addressed in the FSAR. Based on the previous considerations, no USQ exists concerning this procedure change.

MP/0/A/7150/084, Retype 4 Approved 05/12/94 f

Procedures Page 28

l Reasoval and Replacement of Manway Studs Using Four or Eight Single Stud Tensioners and Single Stud Tensioning Description .

The purpose of this procedure is to provide single stad tensioning capabilities on manways using four  !

er eight Blach single stud tensioners. Tbc changes in this revision are minor in nature and for further clarificatolon of the procedure and also bring the procedure into consistency with McGuire's single stud tensioner procedure. t Evaluation ,

The enchancements to this procedure will'not change the design latent of the steams generator or pressurizer, and therefore do not warrant inclusion in the FSAR. This pmcedure does not involve tests or experiments not addressed in the FSAR. Based on the pmious considerations, no USQ esists concerning this procedure change. .

MP/0/A/7150/088, Retype 2 Approved 05/18/94 l Ice Condenser Basket Disassembly and Reassembly -

Description The purpose of this procedure is to provide a method of disassemly and reassembly of the ice [

condenser baskets. Changes in this retype include revisions to allow the removal and replacement of damaged basket sections from the lower plenum of the ice condenser, guidance has been provided for use of either two or three foot replacement basket sections, and a statement has been added that allows the removed parts to be evaluated for possible reuse.

Evaluation This procedure has been compared with TS, the FSAR, design doccuments, and station procedures to ensure that the actions it controls will maintain the ice baskets in their as-built /as-designed condition. . Since the ice baskets will be maintained in an operable condition through the use of this precedure, the possiblitity, consequences, or probability of a malfunction will be reduced.

Therefore, no USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7150/097, Retype 2 Approved 10/13/93 Standby Makeup Pump Pulsation Dampers Preventative Maintenance Inspection Description This procedure is provided to perform preventative maintenance and servicing on the NV pulsation i dampers associated equipment. This retype makes enhancements to the procedure methods used to collect data as well as incorporating major change #1.

Evaluation This retype is an enhancement to the existing procedure and its use to verify proper damper charge.

There will be no affect on damper operation as a result of this procedure retype. This retype does ,

not affect the damper's design. There will be no increase in the consquences of probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR. The possibility of a ,

different malfuention to equipment will not be created by this retype. There will not be an increase in the pewbability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR. The possiblity of an accident different than any presiously evaluated in the FSAR will not be created by this retype. No margin of safety defined in the bases of TS will be reduced by this retype. Therefore, this procedure retype does not create an USQ.

MP/0/A/7150/099, Retype 5 Approved 05/12/94 Steam Generator Nonle Dam Installation and Removal Description  ;

The purpose of this procedurt is to provide a method of installation and removal of the steam l generator nonle dams. The changes included in this retype are minor in nature and to bring the Procedures Page 29

4 precedure into consistenancy with McGuire's steam generator primary manway covers tensioner RAR procedure.

E5aluation The enchancements to this procedure will not change the design intent of the steam generator or ,

pressurizer, and therefore do not warrant inclusion in the FSAR. This precedure does not involve [

tests or experiments not adderssed in the FSAR. Based on the previous considerations, no USQ esists concerning this procedure change.

MP/0/A/7150/105, Retype 0 Approved 11/02/93 Reactor Vessel 14wer Internals Removal and Replacement Eggcription This procedure provides instructions for removal and replacement of the reactor vessel lower internals. With all fuel removed from the core the laternal will be lifted from the vessel and transported, via the polar crane, to the lower internals storage stand. The internals will remain under water in the stand while inspections are performed in the vessel. After inspections are complete, the laternals will be transported back to the vessel.

Evaluation This procedure will be used to maintain the internals in the original design requirements and specifications. The FSAR and TS have been reviewed and are not adversely affected by this procedure. Based on this, an USQ evaluation is not required for this procedure.

MP/0/A/7150/105, Retype 1 Approved 11/10/93 Reactor Vessel Lower Internals Removal and Replacement -

Description This procedure provides instnactions for removal and replacement of the reactor vessel lower internals. T51s retype changed the direction the cab would face for Unit 1 in order to have a better view of internal guide pins and location markers.

Evaluation Changes made in this retype do not affect the intent of any additional steps in this procedure. Based on this, an USQ evaluation is not required for this procedure.

MP/0/A/7150/105, Change 1 Approved 11/13/93 Reactor Vessel Lower Internals Removal and Replacement Description This procedure provides instructions for removal and replacement of the reactor vessel lower laternals. Steps were deleted by this procedure change which required containment closure be in effect prior to beginning lower internal removal from the reactor vesscL Evaluation

'Ihe steps to be deleted had originally been removed from the procedure prior to approval but were inadvertently re-inserted due to a word processing error.

MP/0/A/7450/003, Retype 4 Approved 12/08/93 ,

Refrigerant Charge for YC Chillers Description ,

This procedure provides a method for charging the YC chiller unit and/or the storage tanks with refrigerant. This ret 3pc included changes to give more clarification which allows a way to charge an operating chiller directly from a refrigerant cylinder. This provides better control of exactly how much refrigerant Is being added to the chiller when small amounts are being added.

Evaluation l

Procedures I Page 30

Maintenance perforased under this procedure has been reviewed againg appmved vendor manuals, I

design docuanents, and station precedures to ensure that maintenance controlled by this procedure .

will return this chiller to as-built /as-designed condition. These actions will ensure the chillers conspliance with FSAR accident analysis. Since these chiller will be returned to as-designed .

conditions, the possiblity, consequences, or probability of a malfunction will be reduced. Therefore, no USQ exists.

II MP/0/A/7450/W, Metype 5 - Appproved 04/11/94 Refrigerant Charge Nr YC Chillers  ;

Description _ l This pmcedure provides a method for charging the YC chiller unit and/or the storage tanks with refrigerant. This retype included changes to allow tranfer of refrigerant from the chiller to storage  !

tanks. This provides the ability to trim the change until the optimum Icvel of refrigerant is '

achieved.

Evaluation Maintenance performed under this procedure has been reviewed againg appmved vendor manuals, .

design documents, and station procedures to ensure that maintenance controlled by this procedure ,

will retum this chiller to as-built /as-designed condition. These actions will ensure the chillers compliance with FSAR accident analysis. Since these chiller will be returned to as-designed conditions, the possiblity, consequences, or probability of a malfunction will be reduced. Therefore, no USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7450/012, Retype 3 Apprv,ved 11/11/93 Auxiliary Shutdown Panet Air Conditioning Unit Electric Motor Removal and Replacement  !

Descrintion This procedure provides a method for electric motor removal and installation for the auxiliary ,

shutdown panel air conditioning unit. This retype included removal of the helt tension cs!culation,  !

which was replaced by a table containing the necessary information to properly tension the fan belt, .

added a note to indicate that material laspection of bolting material is not required if only the belt is i changed, and a data sheet was deleted and replaced by sign-off steps within the procedure body. l Evaluation -i This pacedure has been compared with TS, the FSAR, design doccuments, and station procedures i to ensure that the actions it controls will maintain the auxiliary shutdown panel air conditioning units in their as-built /as-designed condition. The changes described above will enhance the maintenance of the units. Since the units will be maintained in an operable condition through the  !

use of this procedure, the possiblitity, consequences, or probability of a malfunction will be reduced.

Therefore, no USQ exists. ,

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! MP/0/A/7450/013, Retype 3 Approved 04/20/94 l Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Air Conditioning Unit Condensers Corrective Maintenance Description This procedurt prvvides a method for removal and replacement of water cooled condensers and for cleaning condenser tubes on all auxiliary shutdown panel air conditioning units. This retype included adding additional line items to assist the technicians in performing their work, the body of  !

the precedust was changed to provide the necessary guidance for the removal and replacement of the refrigernt condenser, and an enclosure was added to provide a means of documenting QA parts used and for comments.

Evaluation This precedure has been compared with TS, the FSAR, design doccuments, and station procedures  ;

to ensure that the actions it controls will maintain the auxiliary shutdown panel air conditioning units in their as-built /as-designed condition. Since the units will be maintained in an operable Procedures Page 31

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. condition through the use' of this procedure, the possiblitity, consequences, or probability of a mealfunction will be reduced. Therefort, no USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7450/034, Retype.1 Approved 04/11/94  ;

YC Chiller Pumpout Unit Operation  :

Description This procedure provides a means to transfer refrigerant between the chiller unit and the storage tanks. A change was made to allow transfer nfrigerant frons the chillers to the storage tanks. This provided the ability to trim the charge until the optimuns level of refrigerant is achieved.

E Evaluation  ;

Maintenance pedermed under this procedure has bece reviewed againg approved vendor manuals, design documents, and station procedures to ensure that maintenance controlled by this procedure will return this chiller to as-built /as-designed condition. These actions will ensuit the chillers compliance with FSAR accident analysis. Since these chiller will be returned to as-designed conditions, the possiblity, consequences, or probability of a malfunction will be reduced. Therefore, no USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7450/040, Retype 1 Approved 04/11/94 '

YC Chiller Preventative Maintenance Description This procedure provides a method of preventative nialatenance for control rooms chillers. . Revision in this retype include changing the precedure to a new format, adding steps to provide neort complete guidance to field technicians, added maintenance rep and QA sign-offs, and added several note statements toc provide additional guidance.

Evaluation Maintenance performed under this procedure has been reviewed against approved vendor manuals, '

design docusucuts, and station peocedures to ensure that maintenance controlled by this pitscedure will return this chiller to as-built /as-designed condition. These actions will ensure the chillers compliance with FSAR accident analysis. Since these chiller will be returned to as-designed conditions, the possiblity, conu quences, or probability of a malfunction will be reduced. Therefore, no USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7450/043, Retype 0 Approved 03/22/94 YC Chiller Guide Vane Assembly Corrective Maintenance Description This procedure has been developed to provide a trained technician guidance in performing corrective maintenance on theYC chiller guide vane assembly.

Evaluation Maintenance pedormed under this procedure has been reviewed against approved vendor mancals, design documents, and station procedures to ensuit that maintenance controlled by this procedure will return this chiller to as-built /as-designed condition. These actions will ensure the chillers ,

compliance with FSAR accident analysis. Since the chiller will be atturned to as-designed j' conditions, the possiblity, consequences, or probability of a malfunction will be reduced. Therefort, no USQ exists.

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MP/0/A/7450/046, Retype 1 Approved 03/22/94 YC Chiller Compressor and Motor Assembly Corrective Maintenance 1' Descrintion This procedure provides a method for corrective maintenance for the control room chiller compressor and motor assembly. Changes in this retype include format revision, rearrangement of ,

l Procedures Page 32 i

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various steps and sections to make the procedure more user friendly, thec addition of a procedure indes, and addition of several note and caution statements to give additional guidance. >

Evaluation Maintenas:e performed under this proceduet has been reviewed against approved vendor manuals, design documents, and station procedures to ensure that maintenance controlled by this procedure will return this chiller to as-built /as-designed condition. These actions will ensure the chilkrs :

compliance with FSAR accident analysis. Since the chiller will be returned to as-desi;ned conditions, the possiblity, consequences, or probability of a malfuncelon will be reduced. Therefort, j no USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7450/079, Retype 0 Approved 09/14/94 Air Flow Monitoring Device Maintenance Descriptico This pacedure provides guidance and instruction to maintenance personnel to adequately perform maintenance on various safety-related air flow monitoring devices located within the plant.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will not affect structures, systems, or components addressed l l-in the FSAR in such a way as to change the design, function, or operations of the systems, simetures, or components. Rather, this procedure will ensure that the affected components will be maintained in their as-built /as-designed condition for station operation. It does not warrant inclusion in the FSAR, or affect procedures and experiments in the FSAR. An USQ does not exist.

MP/0/A/7650/002, Retype 4 Approved 09/23/93 Lubrication of Safety Related Equipment Description This procedure provides a method of lubrication of safety related equipment. This retype adds -

provisions to caputure the approximate volume of lubricant added when a only a irservoir is being '

added to, deletes reference to a directive which has been deleted, and guides mechanical l maintenance la the lubrication of safety-related equipment. ,

Evaluation Lubrication performed in accordance with this procedust does not present an USQ. l MP/0/A/7650/053, Retype 6 Aproved 09/30/94 Installation of Red Head Anchors Description This procedure provides a method for attaching to concrete structures using concrete expansion anchors.

Evaluation This pacedust is being revised due to the changes made to the old specifications and issuance of new specification, and to enhance the administrative processes. The new revision will ensure compliance with the new anchor installation and inspection requirements. Per the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for minor modification CE-60208, these changes will not affect the structural integrity of ,

the existing /to be installed anchors. No USQs are created by the procedure revision.

MP/0/A/7650/056, Retype 7 Aproved 10/19/93 Heat Exchanger Corrective Maintenance Description This procedure provides a method of corrective maintenance of heat exchangers. The emphasis of this procedure revision was to provide more detailed instrwetions and documentation for  ;

maintenance activities related to safety related heat exchangers which included addition of a Procedures Page 33

1 i

I reference documents, note added to allow use of alternated cleaning methods by authorization of CE ny, revised verification of bolting material documentation format, revised documentation format-for cover bolt-up to reduce duplication, added steps to ensure temporary pressure test gauges are reasoved during heat exchanger restoration pmcess, added step as an additional verification, and added enclosure which is reference manual for PD pump.

Evaluation Implementation of this pacedure revision does not change the intended design function or safety funciton of affected beat exchangers. When.this pacedure was originally developed, use of approved manufactuer's instmetions, mquirements of ASME Code Section lII and other approved ,

sources were incorporated into a maintenance pmcedure intended to assistain the beat exchanger's lategrity and reliability. The content of this revision supports the original developonent intention without comprimisy the component's integrity to perform its safety function. Implementation of this pacedure revision does not increase the propability or consequences of an accident or equipment malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR. No new failure modes or unreviewed operating characteristics art created as a result of this revision. Therefore, considering previously evaluated 1 accident scenarios in the FSAR, the possiblity of a new once different than aircady myiewed does -i mot appear to exist. The margin of safety as defined in the bases to any TS will not be reducesd.

Based on these considerations, no USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7650/056, Retype 8 Apppmved 03/10/94 Heat Exchanger Corrective Maintenance Description This procedure provides a method of corrective maintenance of heat exchangers. The major emphasis of of this pmcedure revision was to provide most detailed instmctions and documentation for maintenance actitivites related to safety related heat exhangers, a reference document (PIP 2-C93-0439) was added, and added step of maintenance instructions to disposition any up-set metal on i beat exchanger cover flanges under fastener turned element to reduce fasterner relationation and possible cover gaskety leaks.

Evaluation Implementation of this procedust revision does not change the intended design function or safety funciton of affected heat exchangers. .When this' procedust was originally developed, use of approved manufactuer's instructions, requirements of ASME Code Section III and other approved sources were incorporated into a maintenance procedure intended to maintain the heat exchanger's integrity and reliability. The content of this stvision supports the original development intention without comprimisy the component's integrity to perform its safety function. Implementation of this pmcedure revision does not increase the propability or consequences of an accidect or equipment malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR. No new failure modes or unreviewed operating characteristics are created as a result of this revision. Therefore, considering previously evaluated  ;

accident scenarios in the FSAR, the possiblity of a new once different than aircady reviewed does i not appear to exist. The margin of safety as defined in the bases to any TS will not be reducesd. j Based on these considerations, no USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7650/079. Retype 6 Approved 07/11/94 Safety Related Door Corrective Maintenance Description This precedure provides a method of corrective maintenance on QA condition 1 and QA condition 3 1 doors. The purpose of the procedure retype was to reflect Selected Licensee Commitments fire I barrier door changes and to delete control room door seal inspections. i Evaluation ~ l The deletion of certain fire related doors and control room door seal inpsections from this procedure j has no affect on the probability of any accident evaluated in the SAR. The changes in this retype have ao affect on the probability or consequences of the malfunction of equipment important to i

Procedures Page 34

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safety evaluated in the SAR nor does it create the possibility for analfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR. This change will not adversely effect any simcture, systens, or component important to the safe operation. No USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7650/199, Retype 7 Aproved 05/09/94 )

Cleaning of Containment Spray Heat Exchanger i Description i This procedure provides amthod of cleaning of the NS beat exchanger (shell side). The primary j revisions in this retype include removing steps directing a pre-flush operaion, adding lastmetions to maintenance crews relatie to back-filling heat exchangers and relieving subsequent trapped / pressurized air pocket in outlet piping within isolation boundary, and added guidance for maintenance crew to apply slight air pressure at top of heat exchanger during set-up operations I when reasoving water from heat exchanger inventory and during stad of pump for recirculation to  ;

niaintain a positive pressure on heat exchanger system to overcome frictional line losses. )

Evaluation j Performance of this maintenance activity does c.ot create the possibility of an accident yet I unreviewed in the FSAR. Opening and closing shcIl isolation valves, as part of the NS beat exchanger equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR, does no incitase the probability or conseque.nces of a malfunction of these components. The intended function of these components is l not altered. The infrequent manipulation of these valves as required by the cleaning procedure  ;

should not morersely increase change of equipment malfunction. No other possiblities of equipment malfunction impWant to safety concerning this cleaning activity are known or created. The margin of safety defined in applicable TS is not reduced. No USQ exists.

MP/0/A/7650/111, Retype 2 Apppmved 03/15/94 Retubing Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Supply Unit Heat Exchanger Description 4 This pmcedure provides a method of removal and replacing the auxiliary shutdown panel supply unit heat exchanger tubes. The major emphasis of this retype is to provide more detailed instmetions and documentation for maintenance retubing and re-rolling activities related to the safety related heat exchanger. Changes include adding a reference document, adding an enclosure for identification of individual QA parts used for the job, added a section for determining optimum tube rolling verification ID, revised tube re-installation process and documentation format, removed requirement of hydro test which is not required for tubing under 1" and changed hydro to a gas pressure test to verify leak tightness of tube joints, and added section to resolve concerns involing re-miling leaking tubes.

Evaluation Implementation of this procedure revision does not change the intended design function or safety function of affected heat exchangers. When this pmcedure was originally developed, use of approved manufactuer's instructions, requirements of ASME Code Section III and other approved sources wert incorporated into a maintenance procedure intended to maintain the heat exchanger's integrity and relishility. The content of this revision supports the original development intention ,

without comprimisy the component's integrity to perform its safety function. Implementation of this I procedure revision does not increase the propability or consequences of an accident or equipment malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR. No new failure modes or unreviewed operating ,

characteristics are created as a result of this revision. . Therefore, considering previously evaluated I accident scenarios in the FSAR, the possiblity of a new once different than already reviewed does  !

not appear to exist. The margin of safety as defined in the bases to any TS will not be reduced. 1 Based on these considerations, no USQ exists. I I

)

! OP/1/A/6150/06, Retype 12 Approved 11/03/93 Procedures Page 35

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l Draining the Reactor Coolant System Description The purpose of this procedure is to describe the proper procedere for draining the reactor coolant systens. The changes made to this pacedure in this retype include human factors and editorial  !

changes, change in the definition of reduced inventory, limits and precautions were changed to l remove qualifying statements as to the reason why NC level would be drained below 6.5% and when 6.5% NC level or greater should be maintained, enclosure was added to pmvide option of draining the S/G tubes via mitagen injection, step was added to insure pressurizer is not pressurized prior to opening INC-300, note was added to specify pesformance of steps 2.49 through 2.52 is contigent upon whether or not the refueling cavity walls are being washed, old step deleted and new note added because sample results are not needed at this time, initial condition 1.2 of enlosuit 4.11 uses 19,000 gallons for sufficient holdup capacity per design calc, step changed to most clearly state information needed to convey to RP, step and caution added to allow option of increasing the drain down rate for completely draining the NC loops by closing the NCDT outlet and recire valves, old step deleted to clarify the appropriate place to notify IAE to press the " AUTO CAL" button, changed step to reduce the maximum ND beat exchanger outlet flow to 1125 spm for 5.5% NC -

system level, limit and precaution added to ensure S/G tubes are drained prior to fill and ven if the :

NC system is drained below 20%, caution added to meet requirements of drain down below 32% NC system level, steps added to meet various requirements for drain down below 25% NC system level with S/G tubes filled or drained, enclosure changed to require all four power sources available to ensure ND operability, steps added to close reactor head vent valves if NC level is raised aboe 17%

pressurizer cold cat to prevent raising the water level above the open vent valves, enclosure revised to reference NC mid-range level lastmmentation for logging NC system level when less than 25%

with OAC unavailabic, step revised to more clearly state what conditions are required before lower range RVLIS can and should be used to monitor NC level and in provide the WMS W/O number for ,

ensuring RVLIS is available, enclosures revised to add NI hotleg levels, S/G bowl drain entry was omitted, S/G tube plugging and S/G nozzle dam instatilation were modified, steps added or modif**d to casure the pressurizer and reactor vessel head is vented if not draining for NC System per enclosure 4.1, steps added to lock out OAC points after the PORVs are open for nitrogen venting, ,

enclosure changed to reflect new boron concentrations.

Evaluation The presiously stated changes are designed to enhance the performance of this procedure incorporating current human factor philosophies. These changes will not result in a degradation of any system. The operation of the NC system as discussed in FSAR Section 5.1 and 5.4, the ND system as discussed in FSAR section 5.4.7 and the NV system as discussed in FSAR section 9.3.4 and the accident analysis of Chapter 15 will not be changed. No USQ is judged to be created.

OP/1/A/6350/05, Restricted Change 29 - Approved 03/16/94 Alternate AC Power Sources i Description The purpose of this restricted procedure change is to add enclosure 4.21 to return 1ELXC to its normal source via a hot-bus transfer.

Evaluation No USQ is associated with the addition of enclosure 4.21 to this procedure. No change to either the FSAR or TS is required as a result of this procedure change.

. OP/0/B/6400/13, Change 34 Approved 06/27/94 OP for the Cooling Tower Water Treatment System (YT)

Description This pacedure change was made to delete valves associated with the addition of hyprochlorite to the cooling towers. These valves are listed in a new procedure, OP/0/B/6400/41, Operating Procedure for the Addition of an Algicide to the Cooling Towers.

Procedures Page 36

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Evaluation I

This procedure change does not affect stmetures, systems, or components that are addressed in the

- FSAR in a significant manner, appear significant enough as to requin inclusion in the FSAR, I involve procedures as described in the FSAR in a significant manner, or involve tests or experiments l not addressed in the FSAR. J

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OP/0/B/6500/25, Revision 5 Approved 09/01/94 OP for Preparing and Isolating the Various Components of the WS System for Maintenance Descriotion This procedure provides instructions for preparing and isolating the various components and '

instruments in the WS System.

Evaluatiss ,

The primary intent of this new revision is to place this procedure in line with Chemistry's pmcedure adherence guideline, especially in the addition of signoff steps. These changes will give greater control over the shutdown and maintenance of the WS system components, and therefore there will be less chance of an accident or error occurring. This change will not affect stmetures, systems, or components that addressed in the FSAR in a significant manner, appear significant enough to requist inclusion in the FSAR, involve procedures as described in the FSAR in a significant manner, -

nor involve tests or experiments not addressed in the FSAR. No USQs exists.

PMIG-046 Approved 09/19/94 Mechanical Calibration Lab (Cold)

Descrintion ,

This procedure provided guidance for performing PM inspection and senice on the air conditioning l system for the mechanical calibration lab located in the service building shop area.

Evaluation This procedure is being deleted. The guidance provided by this procedure has been incorporated

, into the task description section of the predefined preventative maintenance work orders. The HVAC equipment for the calibration lah does not interface with plant components or systems which affect the plant operation in a significant manner. No USQs exists.  ;

PMIG-056 Approved 09/19/94 Mechanical Calibration Lab (Hot)

Description This procedure provided guidance for performing PM inspection and service on the air conditioning system for the mechanical calibration lab located in the auxiliary building.

Evaluation This pmcedure is being deleted. The guidance prmided by this procedure has been incorporated into the task description section of the predefined preventative maintenance work orders. The

~

HVAC equipment for the calibration lab does not interface with plant components or systems which affect the plant operation in a significant manner. No USQs exists.

TN/2/A/0130/MM/01A, Original Approved 03/29/94 Procedure for Empicmentation of Minor Mod CE-60130 Work Unit 01 Description Minor mod CE-60130 removes the control circuit used to control the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine governor speed. This mod will permanently maintain the CA pump turbine governor at maximum speed speed setting. This purpose of this procedure is to provide guidance in the removal of two potentiometers, Call on 2MC10 and IPD on the 2AFWPTCP, soldenoid valve 2SASV5020, i

Procedures Page 37

. - . . . ~ . , - - -

converter 2SAEP5020,' and associated wiring, tubing, etc. - The procedure will be perfomed under  ;

work order #94009941.

Evaluation No TS will be entered as a result of this procedure. The procedure will not affect the bases for any system as stated la TS, nor will any T3 changes result from the implementation of this procedart.

The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluatd in the FSAR will not .i lacrease, nor will any accident different from those evaluated in the FSAR be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated la the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TS will not be changed as a result of this procedure. This pmcedure will not create any USQ.

l TN/1/A/0133/MM/01A, Original Approved 02/10/94 Procedure for Implementation of Minor Mod CE40133 Work Unit 01 Descriction Minor mod CE40133 adds momentary test pushbuttons with valve position lights for valve IFD22.

The test switch will allow IWV testing by pressing and holding the test pushbutton and timing the operation of the valve indicating light.' The new test switch / light will be installed on ITBOX0336. <

The purpose of this pricedure is to prvvide guicance in the lastallation of the test pushbuttons and  !

position lights on ITBOX0336 for A-train valve IFD22. This procedure will be p(rformed under work order #94003073.

Evaluation '

The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not facrease, nor will any accident different than those evaluated in the FSAR be created. The f,srobability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TS will not change as a result of this procedure. This procedure will not create any USQ.

i TN/1/A/0133/MM/02A, Original Approved 02/10/94 i Procedure for Implementation of Minor Mod CE40133 Work Unit 02 Description Minor mod CE40133 adds momentary test pushbuttons with valve positica lights for valve IFD62. I The test switch will allow IWV testing by pressing and holding the test pushbutton and timing the operation of the valve indicating light. The new test switch / light will be installed on 1TBOX0338.

'Ihe purpose of this procedure is to provide guicance in the installation of the test pushbuttons and posilloa lights on ITBOX0338 for B-train valve IFD62. This prwcedure will be performed under work order #94003083.

Evaluation The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated in the FSAR be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TS will not change as a result of  ;

this precedure. This procedure will not create any USQ.-

TN/2/A/0134/MM/01A, Original Approved 02/10/94 Procedure for Implementation of Minor Mod CE40134 Work Unit of Description Minor mod CE40134 adds momentary test pushbuttons with valve position lights for valve 2FD22.

The test switch will allow IWV testing by pressing and holding the test pushbutton and timing the operation of the valve indicating light. The new test switch / light will be installed on 2TBOX0336.

The purpose of this procedure is to provide guicance in the installation of the test pushbuttons and Procedures Page 38

l i

t f j position lights on 2TBOX0336 for A-train valve 2FD22. This procedure will be performed under

, work order #93090246. i Evaluation The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated in the FSAR be created. The 1 probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in ,

the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TS will not change as a result of this procedure. This procedure will not create any USQ.

J TN/2/A/0134/MM/02A, Original Approved 02/10/94 Procedure for Implementation of Minor Mod CE-60134 Work Unit 02 Descriotion Minor mod CE-60134 adds momentary test pushbuttons with valve position lights for valve 2FD62. l Tbc test switch will allow IWV testing by pressing and holding the test pushbutton and timing the operation of the valve indicating light. The new test switch / light will be installed on 2TBOX0338.

The purpose of this pmcedure is to provide guicance in the installation of the test pushbuttons and position lights on 2TBOX0338 for B-train valve 2FD62. This procedure will be performed under work order #93090383.

Evaluation The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not I increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated in the FSAR be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be lacreased. The margin of safety as stated in TS will not change as a result of this procedure. This procedure will not create any USQ.

l TN/0/A/0203/MM/01A, Original Approved 03/24/94  ;

Procedure for Implementation of Minor Mod CE-60203 Work Unit 01 Description l

This pmcedure will implement minor mod CE-60203 work unit 01. The minor mod will add the '

torque switch bypass circuit for valves 1RN0001A and 1RN005A and rewire the line ground connection for valves 1RN003A indication lights in 1EATC10 to allow' isolation of the indicating lights by opening sliding link terminal blocks. Tje contmiling work orders are 94014816 for IAE med work in IEATC10 and 2EATC10,94013547 for IAE valve team for 1RN001A, and 94013913 for IAE valve team for 1RN005A.

Evaluation The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated la the FSAR will not incitase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated in the FSAR be created. Tbc pmbability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TS will not change as a result of this pmcedure. This procedure will not create any USQ.

TN/0/A/0203/MM/02A, Original Approved 03/24/94 Proceduct for Impicmentation of Minor Mod CE-60203 Work Unit 02 l Description I This procedure will implement minor mod CE-60203 work unit 02. The minor mod will add the q torque switch bypass circuit for valves 1RN002B and 1RN006B and move a conductor in IEATC11 ~

and 2EATC11 to place an isolation point in the line ground circuits for valves 1RN004B and IRN00378. The controlling work orders are 94014891 for IAE mod work in 1EATC10 and 2EATC11,94013497 for MOV crew for 1RN002B, and 94013923 for MOV crew for 1RN0068.

Evaluation Procedures Page 39

i i

l

)

The probability and/or consequences of an' accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will 'not ~ ,

increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated in the FSAR be created. De probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The snargin of safety as stated in TS will not change as a result of -

this procedure. This procedure will not create any USQ.

TN/2/A/0300/00/02A, Retype 1 Aproved 03/23/94 :

Procedure for Insplementation of NSM CN-20300, Rev 0, Work Unit 02 Description NSM CN-20300 relocates the volumetrics pneumatic module and remote control unit outside the personnel air lock and bypass leakage enclosure to an auxiliary building location. Relocation of this equipment will reduce personnel exposurt during maintenance and testing activities as well as improve equipment reliabity. This procedure outlines activities associated with the upper personnel air lock activities. Work order #91061504 for the electrical mod group, #91070340 for the instrumentation mod group, #91070366 for the mechanical mod group, and #91070334 for the IAE group will be utilized to perform activities on this procedure.

Evaluation The upper personnel air lock door will be out of service during the implementation of this procedure. A minimum of one door must be closed to allow for fuel movement to take place (Mode 6). No work associated with procedure will start until unit 2 is in No Mode. The upper personnel air lock and containment isolation valves art not required to be operable during this period of time.

No system or component will be prevented from performing any function important to safety while this work is being performed. No TS will be entered as a result of this procedure. The procedure will not afect the bases for any system as stated in the TS, nor will any TS changes result from the implementation of this procedure. The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously ,

evaluated in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different from those evaluated in the FSAR be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to '

safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TS will not changes as result of this procedure. This procedure will not create an USQ.

TN/2/A/0300/06/03A, Retype 1 Approved 03/23/94 Precedure for Implementation of NSM CN-20300, Rev 0, Work Unit 03 Description ,

NSM CN-20300 relocates the volumetric pneumatic control unit outside the personnel air lock and  !

bypass leakage enclosure to an auxiliary building location. Relocation of this equipment will reduce ,

personnel esposure during maintenance and testing activities as well as improve equipment I reliability. This procedure outlines activities associated with the lower personnel air lock activities. l Work order #91661505 for the electrical mod group, #91070431 for the instrumentation mod group, i

1. 91070450 for the mechanical mod group, and #91070424 for the IAE group will be utilized to perform activities on this procedure.

Evaluation The lower personnel air lock door will be out of service during the implementation of this procedure.

A minimum of one door must be closed to allow for fuel movement to take place (Mode 6). No work associated with procedure will start until unit 2 is in No Mode. The upper personnel air lock and containment isolation valves are not required to be operable during this period of time. No system or component will be prevented from performing any function important to safety while this work is being performed. No TS will be entered as a result of this procedure. The procedure will not affect the bases for any system as stated in the TS, nor will any TS changes result from the implementation of this procedurt. The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different from those evaluated in the FSAR be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as l Procedures Page 40 l

. - .- - - - = ~ . - --- - - ~

I evaluated in the FSAR will not be lacreased. The margin of safety as stated in TS will not changes

- as itsult of this procedure. This precedure will not create an USQ.  :

i TN/2/A/0370/06/07A, Original - Approved 03/31/94 Procedure for implementation of NSM CN-20370, Rev 8, Work Unit 07 Description This modification replaces the existing General Electric Turbine Supervisory (TSI) System for the .

main turbine, generator, and exciter equipnient, thereby improving overall system utliability and  ;

dependability. The system will provide more reliable data by means of a data display on the turbine floor and thmugh new indicators in the control room. This procedure will control the equipment i installation, wiring revisions and testing for work unit 7.

Evaluation The TSI is not described in detail la the FSAR; it provides no safety related function. There are no TSs applicable to the system. The procedure will not affect the bases for any system as stated in TSs, nor will any TS changes result from the implementation of this procedure. The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be created, nor will any accident different from those evaluated in the FSAR be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure. This procedure will not create any USQ.

TN/5/A/0441/00/01A, Original Approved 05/12/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-50441, Rev 0, Work Unit 01 ,

Description NSM CN-50441, Revision 0, WU01 removes from service ITT Electro-hydraulic Actuators on YC valves 1YC-026,058,196,203,208, and 214. The hydraulic actuators will have their fluid drained.

The power and control wiring will be disconnected, and the actuators will be abandoned in place.

Also, two thermometers will be installed in the battery rooms.

Evaluation The changes made by this procedure will not adversely affect the ability of any other system to perform its design function. VC/YC performs the function of maintaining an environment that enables the proper functioning of equipment contained in the served areas. The YC system penvides only cooling functions in support of the VC/YC system. The YC system performs no direct functions that affect consequences (dose) except to the extent that the environment allows the temperature sensitive equipment to control mechanical equipment. This procedure will not degrade the performance of the VC/YC system with respect to this criteria. The implementation of this procedure will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR, nor will implementation of this procedure incitase the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated,' or different than any already evaluated,in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the basis of TSs is unaffected and no USQ exist.

TN/5/A/0441/00/02A, Original Approved 05/12/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-50441, Rev 0 Work Unit 02 Description NSM CN-50441 Revision 0. WUO2 removes from service ITT Electro-hydraulic Actuators on YC valves 1YC-100,150,264,270,274, and 281. The hydraulic actuators will have their fluid drained.

The power and control wiring will be disconnected, and the actuators will be abandoned in place.

Evaluation ~

The changes made by this procedure will not adversely affect the ability of any other system to perform its design function. VC/YC performs the function of maintaining an environment that Procedures Page 41

enables the proper functioning of equipment contained in the served areas. The YC system provides only cooling functions in support of the VC/YC system. The YC system performs no dirtet functions '

that affect consequences (dose) except to the extent that the environment allows the temperature sensitive equipment to control mechanical equipment. This procedure will not degrade the performance of the VC/YC system with respect to this criteria. The implementation of this procedert will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR, nor will implementation of this procedure increase the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction presicusly evaluated, or different than any already evaluated,in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the basis of TSs is unaffected and no USQ exist..

TN/5/A/0441/00/03A, Original Approved 05/12/94 Procedust for Implementation of NSM CN-50441, Rev 0, Work Unit 03 DeKrIDtioO NSM CN-50441, Revision 0, WUO3 deletes wiring from VC isolation desices HAK (ID80) and HAL (ID81) in IELCP0058 and removes wiring in IELCP0057. The deletion of this wiring requires A Train to be out of service. Therefore, this procedure will be impicmented during an assigned window when Train A is scheduled to be out of senice.

Evaluation The changes made by this procedure will not adversely affect the ability of any other system to perform its design function. No control changes are being made to the rest of the system due to this procedure, so the capability of VC to move air and therefore create pressure differences is not affected. Since this procedure will be implemented with Train A out of sersice, and post -

modification testing will be performed prior to Train A being returned to service, this procedure will not degrade the performance of the VC system. No new failures are introduced. . The ,

implementation of this procedure will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR, nor will implementation of this procedure increase the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction presiously evaluated, or different than any aircady evaluated, in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the basis of TSs is unaffected and no USQ exist.-

l TN/5/A/0441/00/04A, Original Approved 05/12/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-50441, Rev 0, Work Unit 04 Description NSM CN-50441, Revision 0, WUO4 deletes wiring from VC isolation devices IIAK (ID80) and HAL (ID81) in 2ELCP0058 and removes wiring in 2ELCP0057. The deletion of this wiring requires B Train to be out of sersice. Therefore, this procedure will be implemented during an assigned window when Train B is scheduled to be out of service.

Evaluation The changes made by this procedure will not adversely affect the at>ility of any other system to perform its design function. No control changes are being made to the rest of the system due to this procedure, so the capability of VC to move air and therefore create pressure differences is not affected. Since this procedure will be implemented with Train B out of service, and post modification testing will be performed prior to Train B being returned to service, this procedure will not degrade the performance of the VC system. No new failures are introduced. The implementation of this procedure will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident presiously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR, nor will implementation of this procedure increase the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated,in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the basis of TSs is unaffected and no USQ exist.  ;

Procedures Page 42

t TN/2/A/0669/06/02A, Original Approved 02/16N  ;

Procedure for Implesmentation of NSM CN-02669, Re 0, Work Unit 02  ;

Description NSM CN-20669, Rev 0, will add vibration me ntering sensors and sensor electronics for the Train A and Train B centrifugal charging pumps (CCPs). This instivmentation will be used for monitoring of machine performance for maintenoce purposes. ,

Evaluation .

His procedust will be imple:nented with U2 la Modes 5,6, or No Mode when NV Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A is not required operable or available. All components being aNected by '

electrical isolations for this pacedure have been evaluated and deterreined to have no effect on the safe operation of U2 la Modes 5,6, or No Mode. The implementation of this procedure will not lacetase the probability or consequences of as accident previously evaluated, or diNestat than any ,

already evaluated in the FSAR, nor will implementation of this procedust increase the pmbability or consequences of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated, or different than any aletady evaluated,in the FSAR. The naargin of safety defined in the basis of TSs is unaffected and no USQ exist.  ;

e TN/2/A/0669/00/02B, Original Approved 02/16/94 Pmcedure for Implementation of NSM CN-20669, Rev 0 Work Unit 02  ;

Description .

NSM CN-20669, Rev 0, will add vibration monitoring sensors and sensor electronics for the Train A and Train B centrifugal charging pumps (CCPs). This instrumentation will be used for monitoring .

of machine performance for maintenance purposes.

Evaluation This procedure will be implemented with U2 in Modes 5,6, or No Mode when NV Centrifugal  !

Charglag Pump 2B is not required operable or available. All components being affected by electrical isolations for this procedure have been evaluated and determined to have no effect on the safe operation of U2 in Modes 5,6, or No Mode. The implementation of this procedure will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different than any  !

aletady evaluated in the FSAR, nor will implementation of this pincedure increase the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated, or different than any already i evaluated,in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the basis of TSs is unaffected and no USQ exist.

TN/2/A/0676/00/04A, Retype 1 Approved 02/11/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-20676, Rev 0, Work Unit 04 Description NSM CN-20676, Rev 0, replaces existing Barton Filled capillary system used to monitor containment sump level with GEMS float type level instammentation. This procedure applies to "A" Train work specified in NSM CN 20676.

Evaluation The changes made by this procedure will not adversely affect the ability of any other system to perform its design function. CNS Site Directive 3.1.30 paragraph 6.3.4 (Containment Sump Recirculation Capability) states that a minimum of one containment level instavment should be functional except in No Mode. Accordingly, this procedure can be implemented in Modes 5 or 6 if existing Train B containment sump level instivment 2NILT5270 is functional or in No Mode with 2NILT5270 not functional. The new level instivmentation installed by this procedure are powered from Class IE busses and mounted per seismic qualifications. The five level transmitters are connected to a receiver gauge to a single output of 4-20 mA. A power supply will be removed fmen existing circuitry, so the loads on affected power supplies will remain within design limits. The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase. The probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety addressed in the Procedures Page 43

FSAR will not be increased. This precedure will not adversely affect any safety limits, setpoints, or operating parameters so the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any TS will not be reduced.

It is concluded that an USQ is not applicable to this procedure.

TN/2/A/0676/06/05A, Retype 1 Approved 02/11/94 l Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-20676, Rev 0, Work Unit 05 Descripties NSM CN-20676, Rev 0, replaces existing Barton Filled capillary system used to monitor containneent ,

sump level with GEMS float fype leni instamentation. This procedure applies to "B" Train work l specified in NSM CN-20676.

E5aluation ne ebanges made by this procedure will not adversely affect the ability of any other system to performs its design function. CNS Site Directive 3.1.30 paragraph 6.3.4 (Containment Sump  ;

Recirculation Capability) states that a minimum of one containment level instrument should be functional except in No Mode. Accordingly, this procedure can be implemented in Modes 5 or 6 if exist!.ng Train A containment sump level lastmment 2NILT5260 is functional or in No Mode with -

2NILT5260 not functional. The new level lastamentation lastalled by this procedure are powered l froni Class IE busses and mounted per seismic qualifications. - The five level transanitters are connected to a receiver gauge to a single output of 4-20 mA. A power supply will be removed from  !

existing circuitry, so the loads on affected power supplies will remain within design limits. The . ,

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase. The  :

probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment impodant to safety addressed in'the l FSAR will not be increased. This procedure will not adversely affect any safety limits, setpoints, or .

operating parameters so the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any TS will not be reduced. ,

It is concluded that an USQ is not applicable to this procedure.  ;

TN/2/A/0676/00/06A, Retype 1 Approved 02/11/94  !

Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-20676, Rev 0, Work Unit 06  !

Description l NSM CN-20676, Rev 0, replaces existing Barton filled capillary system used to monitor containment sump level with GEMS float type level instamentation. This precedure will control installation of ten new level transmitters and their associated wiring. Included in this procedure att cable pulling activities, mounting of support to accommodate cable pulling, new cable installations to electrical penetrations 2PENTO121 and 2PENTO138. .)

Evaluation No changes made by this procedure will adversely affect the ability of any systers to perform its design function. Based upon research of Catawba FSAR , Catawba TSs, and the final scope document (CNC-1503.13-00-0470),it is concluded that an USQ is not applicable to this procedure.  ;

TN/2/A/0683/00/02A Approved 07/28/94  :

Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-20683, Rev 0, Work Unit 02 Description This precedure provides guidance for the deletion of controls for the auxiliary building ventilation damper 2ABF-D-17, and modification for moisture climinator heater PRHDS-2B (2HETR0265) controls, to allow the heaters to energize only if fan ABFX-2B (2FMTR0191) is anning, rather than i depending on damper position. Damper 2ABF-D-17 will be permanently locked open.

Evaluation Dampers will be isolated which will place both U1 and U2 in a 7 day TS window. Moisture l eliminator heater PRDS-2B and heater control cabinet 2ELCP0155 will also be isolated by do not affect the operability of the VA system, however, TS 3/4.7.7 sequires the heater to be operable i within 7 days or notification of the return to service of the beater must be made within 30 days. The r Procedures l Page 44 l

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l dampers will fait closed, which will prevent the fans freni stading. This will make Train B VA-inoperable, but Train A VA will not be affected. His work will be performed while Train A is operable.' De probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. The pmbability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment imponant to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure. l TN/2/A/0683/00/03A Approved 07/28/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-20683, Rev 0, Wort Unit 03 Description ,

This procedure provides guidance for modification of the moisture eliminator heater PRHDS-2A  !

(2HETR0264) controls by rewiring the laternals of heater control cabinet 2HETR0154. - i Evaluatico ,

The implementation of this procedure will require the electrical isolation of the moisture climinator I heater PRHDS-2A (2HETR0264) and heater control cabinet 2HETR0154. This isolation does not affect the operability of the A Train VA system but does require the heaters to be operable within 7 days or file a repen with the NRC as specified in TS 3/4.7.7. The laternal wiring changes in ,

2ELCP0154 will be performed and power will be restored to the isols'.ed equipment. His work will

• require approximately two days to complete, which will return tie heaters to operable before any fanber action is required. De probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. He probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment impodant to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.  !

TN/2/A/0683/00/04A Approved 07/28/94 Procedust for Implementation of NSM CN-20683, Rev 0, Work Unit 04 Description i This procedure provides guidance for the revision of the control of the VE A Train filter unit heater .

2HETR0239. The control cabinet for the heater 2HETR0239 will be revised laternally to remove the backup contactors from the circuit but will leave them in place to use as future replacement of the controlling contact 9r. The control circuit will be revised to add a start permissive from 2AVF-2A (2FMTR0006) to the control circuit for 2HETR0239.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will involve the electrical isolation of annulus ventilation fan 2AVF-2A and VE A Train filter unit heater and block the auto close permissive for damper 2AVS-D-4. Damper 2AVS-D-2 will fail closed. Dampers 2AVS-D-3 and 2AVS-D-5 will fail open. This will place U1 in a 7 day TS window. Annulus ventilation fan 2AVF-2A will be unable to stan and damper 2AVS-D-4 will fail open. This will make U2 Train A inoperable. TS 3/4.6.1.8 requires Both A and B Train be operabic, or that an inoperable train be restored to operable within 7 days, or put the unit in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The VE A Train filter unit heater is also a TS item. . If the heater is not restored within 7 days, a special report is required within 30 days. The pavbability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment imponant to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.

TN/2/A/0683/06/05A Apprvved 07/28/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-20683, Rev 0, Work Unit 05 Description Procedures Page 45

\

l This procedure ymvides guidance for the revision of the control of the VE B Train filter unit beater 2HETR0240. The control cabinet for the beater 2HETR0240 will be revised laternally to reasove j the backup contactors from the circuit but will leave thens in place to use as future replacement of l the controlling contactor. The control circuit will be revised to add a start permissive from 2AVF- l 2B (2FMTR0007) to the control cirruit for 2HETR0240. l Evaluation .

The implenientation of this procedure will lavolve the electrical isolation of annulus ventilation fan l 2AVF-2B and VE B Trala filter unit heater and block the auto close permissive for damper 2AVS- j D-9. Damper 2AVS-D-7 will fait closed. Dampers 2AVS-D-8 and 2AVS-D-10 will fall open. The  !

fans will not stad which makes B Train VE inoperable, however, A Train VE will be operable. 'lli i 3/4.6.1.8 requires Both A and B Train be operable, or that an inoperable train be restored to I operable within 7 days, or put the unit in Hot Standby within tbc mest 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. "Ihe VE B Train fiher unit beater is also a TS item. If the ,

beater is not restored within 7 days, a special report is required within 30 days. The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased, nor will i any accident different than those evaluated be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.

i TN/2/A/0683/00/06A Approved 07/28/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-20683, Rev 0, Work Unit 06  !

Description '

This procedure provides guidance to revise the controls for VF A Train filter heater 2A1 and VF A i Trale filter unit beater 2A2. The backup contactors in the control cabinets for the heater sill be removed frons the circuit but the contactors will be left in the cabinet for use as replacements for the ,

controlling contactors. A start permissive from VF A Train fuci pool exhaust fan 2A1 and a start i permissive from VF A Train fuel pool eshaust fan 2A2 will be added to the contmis for VF A Train l filter unit 2A2. These permissives will ensure no single fault will allow the heaters to energize '

without tbc fans running. l Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will involve the electrical isolation of VF A Train fucI pool exhaust fan 2A1, VF A Train fuel pool eshaust fan 2A2, VF A Train filter unit heater 2Al, and VF-A Trala filter unit heater 2A2. The auto close perinissive for VF filter unit 2A Train A miniflow outlet valve will be blocked and fuel pool exhaust damper A will fail open. This will make A Trale  ;

inoperable, however, B Train will be operabic. TS 3/4.9.11 requires that at least one train of VF be operable when irradiated fuel is in the storage pool. If B Train VF becomes inoperable, no fuel movement can take place. The VF A Train filer unit heater 2A1 and VF A Train filter unit heater 2A2 are also TS items under 3/4.9.11. If the heaters are not operable within 7 days, a special report is required within 30 days. The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created.

The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in tbc FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.

TN/2/A/0683/00/07A Approved 07/28/94 Pmcedure for Implementation of NSM CN-20683, Rev 0, Work Unit 07 Description This procedust provides guidance to revise the controls for VF B Train filter heater 2BI and VF B Train filter unit heater 2B2. The backup contactors in the control cabinets for the heater sill be removed from the circuit but the contactors will be left in the cabinet for use as replacements for the  !

controlling contactors. A start permissive from VF B Train fuel pool eshaust fan 2BI and a start permissive from VF B Train fuel pool exhaust fan 2B1 will be added to the controls for VF A Train Procedures Page 46

]

+ - . - - -. - - ..

i filter unit 2B2. These permissives will ensure no single fault will allow the heaters to energise

- without the fans running.

n Evaluatica ,

The impleasentation of this procedure will lavolve the electrical isolation of VF B Trala fuel pool  ;

exhaust fan 281 VF B Trala fuel pool exhaust fan 2B2, VF B Train filter unit heater 2B1, and VF B l Train filter unit heater 2B2. The auto close permissive for VF filter unit 2B Train B miniflow outlet valve will be blocked and fuel pool exhaust damper B will fall opea. This will make B Trala

• inoperable, however, A Train will be operable. TS 3/4.9.11 requires that at least one train of VF be operable when irradiated fuel is in the storage pool. If A Trale VF becomes inoperable, no fuel  ;

movenient can take place. 'Ihe VF B Trala filter unit heater 2B1 and VF B Train filter unit beater 2B2 are also TS items under 3/4.9.11. If the heaters are not operable within 7 days, a special report is required within 30 days. The probability and/or consequences of as accident previously evaluated t

- la the FSAR will not be lacreased, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created.

The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated la she FSAR will not be increased. The neargin of safety as stated la TSs will not change as a result of this precedure.

TN/1/A/1276/06/02A, Original Approud 10!21/2 Procedust for ImplementatioG of NSM CN-11276, Rev 0. Work Unit 02 Description NSM CN-11276, Rev 0, will provide vibration monitoring sensors and a sensor electronics system to mionitor the conditions of centrifugal charging pump 1A. This instrumentation will be used for monitoring of machine performance for maintenance purposes.

Evaluation This procedure will be implemented with U1 in No Mode. All components being affected by electrical isolations for this procedure have beca evaluated and determined to have no effect on the safe operation of U1 in No Mode. The implementation of this procedure will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR, nor will implementation of this procedure increase the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated,in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the bases of TSs is unaffected and no USQ esist.

1 TN/1/A/1276/00/02B, Original Approved 10/21/93 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-11276, Rev 0, Work Unit 02 Description ,

NSM CN-11276, Rev 0, will provide vibration monitoring sensors and a sensor electennics systent to  ;

monitor the conditions of centrifugal charging pump 18. This instrumentation will be used for '

monitoring of machine performance for maintenance purposes.

Evaluation This procedure will be implemented with U1 in No Mode. All components being affected by electrical isolations for this procedure have been evaluated and determined to have no effect on time safe operation of U1 in No Mode. The implementation of this procedurt will not increase the j probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated la the FSAR, nor will implementation of this procedure increase the probability or 1 consequences of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated, or different than any already ,

evaluated,in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the bases of TSs is unaffected and no USQ crist.

TN/1/A/1278/00/01 A, Original Approved 03/28/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-11278 Rev 0, Work Unit 01 Precedures  ;

Page 47 i

, . . . , - - ~ _ , ., . .

1 Description his procedure will provide guidance to relocate 1 EMF 48 mest to its NM sample line la order to '

eliminate the " hot spot" for personnel that exists with the present location and to replace it with as adjacent-to-line monitor. The processing module for IEMF48 will be replaced due to the new neoalter type and will be relocated for IPRADMON BAY 4 to the 1ARADMON cabinet for the  ;

same reason. ,

Evaluation The implementation of this proceduit will not affect the bases for any of the systemas as stated la ,

TSs. All components aNected by electrical isolations for this procedure have beca evaluated and determined to have no effect on the safe operation of U1. As a result, the pawbability and/or  ;

conseruences s of an accident previously evaluated la the FSAR will not be created nor will any ,

accident differrat than that evaluated in the FSAR be created, ne probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated la the FSAR_will not be increased.

The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure. This procedure does not create any possibility of malfunctions of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR. This procedust will not create any USQ.

TN/1/A/1278/06/02A, Original Appewved 03/28/94 Procedust for Implementation of NSM CN-11278, Rev 0 Work Unit 02 ,

Description '

This procedure will provide guidance to remove the high differential pressure over-dde switch and indication from the control circuit of containment isolation valve INM26B.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will not affect the bases for any of the systems as stated la  ;

TSs. All components affected by electrical isolations for this procedust have been evaluated and determined to have no effect on the safe operation of UI. Containment isolation valve INM-26B will be deactivated and secured in its isolation (closed) position during the performance of this psucedure ,

to prevent violating TS 3/4.6.3. As a result, the probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be created nor will any accident different than that evaluated in the FSAR be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipnient important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety 7 as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure. This procedure does not create any i possibility of malfunctions of equipment isnportant to safety different than any already evaluated in ,

the FSAR. His precedure will not create any USQ.

TN/1/A/1288/00/01 A, Original Approved 07/19/94 Proceduet for lastallation of NSM CN 11288/00, Work Unit 01 Description This procedure provides guidance for the deletion of controls for musiliary building ventilation damper 1ABF-D-17, and modification for moisture eliminator PRIIDS-1B (IHETR0265) controls to allow the heaters to energize only if fan ABFXF-1B (IFMTR0191) is running, rather than '

depending on damper position. Damper IABF-D 17 will be permanently locked open.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will require the electdcal isolation of various dampers and fans which will place U1 and U2 in 7 days TS windows. Tbc dampers will fail closed, which will prevent the fans from starting. This will make B Train VA inoperable, however, A Train VA will not be affected. This work will be performed while A Train is operable. The dampers controls will be removed from damper 1ABF-D-17 and the damper will be permanently locked open. The internal wiring changes in IELCP0155 will be performed and power will be restored to all of the ,

isolated equipment, after which the VA system will become operable again,in both units. This work >

will require appresimately three days to connplete, which will allow return to operability before any further action is required. The powbability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated Procedures Page 48

,. b- 3

- in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. The . ,

probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in -

the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.

i TN/1/A/1288/00/02A, Original Approved 07/19/94 Procedure for Installation of NSM CN-11288/00, Work Unit 02 Description This procedure provides guidance for the revision of the control circuit of the A Train VC moisture

- separator heater 1HETR0213. The control cabinet for heater 1HETR0213 will be revised laternally to remove the backup contactors from the circuit but abandon them in place to use as future replacement of the controlling contactors if needed. Tbc control circuit will be revised to add a start persmissive from 1FMTR0168 to the control circuit of 1HETR0213.

Evaluation .

The implementation of this procedure will involve the electrical isolation of U1 control room area pressurized filter train 1 1CRA-PFT-1, and VC A Train moistuit separator heater 1HETR0213. -

This will place both units in a 7 day TS window. This work will require approximately two days to -

complete, which will allow return to operability before any further action is required. The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be incitased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.

TN/1/A/1288/00/03A, Original Approved 07/19/94 Procedure for Installation of NSM CN-11288/00, Work Unit 03 Descriotion This procedure provides guidance for the revision of the control circuit of the B Train VC moisture

• separator heater 2HETR0213. The control cabinet for heater 1HETR0213 will be revised internally to remove the backup contactors from the circuit but abandon them in place to use as future replacement of the controlling contactors if needed. The control circuit will be revised to add a start permissive from 2FMTR0168 to the control circuit of 2HETR0213.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will involve the electrical isolation of U2 control room area pressurized filter train 12CRA-PFT-1, and VC B Train moisture separator heater 2HETR0213.

This will place both units in a 7 day TS window. This work will require approximately two days to complete, which will allow return to operability before any further action is required. The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.

TN/1/A/1288/00/04A, Original Approved 07/19/94 Procedure for Installation of NSM CN-11288/00, Work Unit 04 Description This procedure provides guidance for the revision of the control of the VE A Train carbon bed demister heater 1HETR0239. The control cabinet for heater 1HETR0239 will be revised internally to atmost the backup contactors from the circuit but abandon them in place to use as future replacement of the controlling contactors if needed. The control circuit will be revised to add a start permissive for 1HETR0239.

Evaluation Procedures Page 49

>p e The implearentation'of this pricedure will involve the electrical isolation of annulus ventilation faa 1AVF-1A ;md VE A Trale carbon bed demister heater 1HETR0239 and block the auto close permissive Nr damper 1AVS-D-4. Damper I AVS-D-2 will fait closed. Damper 1AVS-D-3 and 1AVS-D-5 wik fall open. This will place U1 in a 7 day TS window. Annulus ventilation fan IAVF-1A will be unable to start and damper 1AVS-D-5 will fait closed. Dampers 1AVS-D-3 and 1AVS-D-5 will fall open. This will make U1 Trala'A inoperable. This work will require approximately two days to complete, which will allow return to operability before any fudber action is required. The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be j increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.

1 TN/1/A/1288/06/05A, Original Apprvved 07/19/94 Procedure for Installation of NSM CN-11288/00, Work Unit 05 Description This procedure provides guidance for the revision of the control of the VE B Train carbon bed

- demister heater 1HETR0240. The control cabinet for heater 1HETR0240 will be revised internaCy to remove the backup contactors from the circuit but abandon them la place to use as future ,

replacement of the controlling contactors if needed. The control circuit will be revised to add a stad J permissive from 1AVF-1B to the control circuit for IllETRG240.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will involve the electrical isolation of annulus ventilation fan 1AVF-18 and VE B Train carbon bed demister heater 1HETR0240 and block the auto close permissive for damper 1AVS-D-9. Damper 1AVS-D-7 will fall closed. Damper 1AVS-D-8 and 1AVS-D-10 will fall open. The fans will not stad which make B Train VE inoperable, however A Train VE will be operable. This work will require approximately three days to complete, which will allow return to operability before any further action is required. The probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. The probability and/or consequences of a j malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The {'

margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.

TN/1/A/1288/00/06A, Original Approved 07/19/94 Procedure for Installation of NSM CN-11288/00, Work Unit 06 Description .;

This procedure provides guidance to revise the controls for VF A Train moisture separator heater  !

1A1 and VF A Train moisture separator heater 1A2. The backup contactors in the control cabinets for the heater sill be removed from the circuit but the contactors will be left in the cabinet for use as replacements for the controlling contactors. A start permissive from VF A Train fuel pool exhaust fan 1A1 will be added to the control for VF A Train moisture separator heater 1A1 and a stad permissive from VF A Train fuel pool exhaust fan I A2 will be added to the controls for VF A Train moisture separator heater 1A2. These permissives will ensure no single fault will allow the heaters to energize without the fans running.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will involve the electrical isolation of VF A Train fuel pool exhaust fan IA1, VF A Train fuel pool exhaust fan I A2, VF A Train moisture separator heater 1A1, and VF A Train moisture separator heater 1A2. The auto close permissive for VF filter unit 1A Train A miniflow outlet valve will be blocked and fuel pool exhaust damper A will fail open. This will make A Train inoperable, however, B Train will be operable. This work will require approximately three days to complete, which will allow return to operability before any further action is required. TS 3/4.9.11 requires that at least one train of VF be operable when irradiated fuel is in the storage pool. If B Train VF becomes inoperr.ble, no fuel movement et a take place. The Procedures ,

Page 50 l

y VF A Train moisture separator heater IA1 and VF A Train moisture separator heater 1A2 are also TS items under 3/4.7.6. If the heaters are not operable within 7 days, a special report is required within 30 days. The pmbability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment impodant to safety as evaluated in.

the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.

L I

TN/1/A/1288/00/07A, Original Approved 07/19/94 Pmeedure for Installation of NSM CN-11288/00, Wort Unit 07 Description This procedure provides guidance to revise the controls for VF B Train meisture separator heater IB1 and VF B Train moisture separator heater 1B2. The backup contactors in the control cabinets for the heater sill be removed from the circuit but the contactors will be left in the cabinet for use as replacements for the controlling contactors. A start permissive from VF B Train fuel pool exhaust fan 181 will be added to the control for VF B Train moisture separator heater 1B1 and a stad permissive fmsa VF B Train fuel pool exhaust fan IB2 will be added to the controls for VF B Train moisture separator heater 1B2. These permissives will ensure no single fault will allow the heaters to energize without the fans running.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will involve the electrical isolation of VF B Train fuel pool exhaust fan 181, VF B Train fuel pool exhaust fan IB2, VF B Train moisture separator heater 181, and VF B Train moisture separator heater 1B2. The auto close permissive for VF filter unit 1B Train B miniflow outlet valve will be blocked and fuel pool exhaust damper B will fail open. This will make B Train inoperable, however, A Train will be operable. This work will require approximately three days to complete, which will allow return to operability before any further action is required. TS 3/4.9.11 requires that at least one train of VF be operable when irradiated fuel is in the storage pool If B Train VF becomes inoperable, no fuel movement can take place. The VF B Train moistunt separator heater 1B1 and VF A Train moisture separator heater IB2 art also TS items under 3/4.7.6. If the heaters are not operable within 7 days, a special report is required within 30 days. The probability and/or consequences of an eccident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this pescedurt.

l TN/1/A/1288/00/10A, O'riginal Approved 07/19/94 I Procedure for Installation of NSM CN-11288/00, Work Unit 10 Description This procedure provides guidance for the revision of the control circuit of the VA A Train pump room demister heater 1 A. The control cabinet for heater 1HETR0264 will be revised internally to remove the backup contactors from the circuit but spare them in place to use as future replacement of the controlling contactors,if needed.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will involve the electrical isolation of U1 control room area A l Train pump room demister heater I A. This will place U1 in a 7 day TS window. This work will J require approximately two days to complete which will allow the heater to be returned to operability l before any further action is required. he probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased, nor will any accident different than those evaluated be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The margin of safety as stated in TSs will not change as a result of this procedure.

Procedures Page 51

H TN/1/A/1301/06/01A, Original Approved 06/30/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-11301/00, Wort Unit of Description This procedure provides guidance for implementing circuit revisions associated with the auxiliary j building Train IA VA system filtered exhaust. .

Evaluation .

The musiliary building Train IA V". $ysterr. S!? red exhaust will be disabled but the Train IB VA system filtered exhaust will stP; be in service as required b , TS 3/4.7.7. Humidity sensors for pump _ ,

rooms heater PRHDS-1A demister section 1A will be disabled. CSAE valves 1ZJ-473 and IZJ-074 ,

will fail with the ZJ system bypassed to the unit stack. Higi Inlet fire stat 1 VATS 5640 on filter unit ABFU-1A will be disabled and unfiltered exhaust fan ABUX -iA will not trip on a fist signal frans  ;

the fire stat. This instrument will be abandoned in place. The Train 1A VA sp2m filtered exhaust must be returned to service in less than 7 days. This procedure will be scheduled to ensure that Train IA VA system filtered exhaust is returned to service in less than 7 days. Humidity sensors are for indication only and air not required for pump room demister section I A heater PRHDS-1A to be opersble as required by TSs. h is permissible to discharge the ZJ system to the unit stack vent.

during this procedurt since no credit was taken for the operation of the filtered exhaust system and the resultant affect on the offsite dose calculation as denoted in TS. No USQ is associated with this procedure.

l l

TN/2/A/1301/00/01 A, Original Approved 07/21/94 -

Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-21301/00, Work Unit 01 l Description This procedust provides guidance for implementing circuit revisions associated with the auxiliary building Train 2A VA system filtered exhaust.

Evaluation The auxiliary building Train 2A VA system filtered exhaust will be disabled but the Train 2B VA syste=n filtered exhaust will still be in service as required by TS 3/4.7.7. Humidity sensors for pump i room heater PRHDS-2A demister section 2A will be disabled. CSAE valves 2ZJ-073 and 2ZJ-074

will fail with the ZJ system hypsssed to the unit stack. High inlet fire stat 2 VATS 5640 on filter unit ,

4 ABFU-2A will be disabled and unfiltered exhaust fan ABUXF-2A will not trip on a fist signal front the fire stat. This instrument will be abandoned in place. The Train 2A VA system filtered exhaust must be returned to service in less than 7 days. Humidity sensors are for indication only and are not

required for pump room demister section 2A heater PRHDS-2A to be operable as required by TSs.

! It is perm ssible to discharge the ZJ system to the unit stack vent during this procedure since no credit was taken for the operation of the filtered exhaust system and the resultant affect on the offsite dose calculation as denoted in TS. No USQ is associated with this procedure.

x

- TN/1/A/1301/00/02A, Original Approved 06/30/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-11301/00, Work Unit 02 Dittr.i,gli2B i This procedure provides guidance for implementing circuit revisions associated with the musiliary

building Train 1A and 2A non-safety portion of the VA filtered exhaust system, unfiltered exhaust i

system, and sapply units.

, Evaluation The non safety portion of the auxiliary building Train 1A and 2A filtered exhaust will be out of service, Train IB and 2B will be in service. Auxiliary building dampers 1(2)ABF-D-11,1(2)ABF-D-13, and 1(2)ABF-D-16 will receive a signal to fait closed but will remain open because this dampers will be disabled in the open position prior to the start of this procedure. All post LOCA controls for the Train 1A and 2A unfiltered exhaust fans will be disabled. Post LOCA controls will be removed i

Procedures Page 52

and post LOCA cabinet 1ELCP0189 will be abandoned in place per this procedure. No USQ is  ;

asseelsted with this procedure. J l

)

TN/2/A/1301/06/02A, Original Approved 07/21/94  !

Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-21301/00, Work Unit 02 Descrintles This procedure provides guidance for implementing circuit revisions associated with the auxiliary building Train 2A non-safety portion of the VA filtered exhaust system, unfiltered exhaust system, and supply units. 1 Evaluation ne non-safety portion of the auxiliary buP4ing Train 2A filtered exhaust will be out of service, Train 2B will be in senice. Auxiliary bui16ng dampers 2ABF-D-11,2ABF-D-13, and 2ABF-D-16 j will receive a signal to fall closed but will remain open because this dampers will be disabled in the

)

open position prior to the start of this procedure on NSM CN-11301/00. No USQ is associated with this pescedure.

TN/1/A/1301/06/03A, Original Approved 06/3M4 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-11301/00, Werk Uait 03 Description This procedure penvides guidance for implementing circuit revisions associated with the auxiliary building Train IB VA system filtered exhaust.

l DJlJ!A!!2!!

The auxiliary building Train 1B VA s] system filtered exhaust will be disabled but the Train 1A VA system filtered exhaust will still be in senice as required by TS 3/4.7.7. Humidity sensors for pump room heater PRHDS-1B demister section IA will be disabled. CSAE valves 1ZJ-073 and 1ZJ-074 will fail with the ZJ system bypassed to the unit stack. High inlet fire stat IVATS5700 on filter unit ABFU-1B will be disabled and unfiltered exhaust fan AhUXF-1B will not trip on a fire signal from the fire stat. This instrument will be abandoned in place. De Train IB VA system filtered exhaust must be returned to service in less than 7 days. This proceduct will be scheduled to ensuit that Train 1B VA system filtered exhaust is returned to senice in less than 7 days. Humidity sensors are for indication only and are not required for pump room demister section 1B heater PRHDS-1B to be operable as required by TSs.. It is permissible to discharge the ZJ system to the unit stack vent during this procedure since no credit was taken for the operation of the filtered exhaust system and the ersultant affect on the offsite dose calculation as denoted in TS. No USQ is associated with this procedure. j i

i TN/2/A/1301/00/03A, Original Approved 07/21/94 '

Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-21301/00, Work Unit 03 Description This procedure provides guidance for implementing circuit revisions associated with the musiliary building Train 2B VA system filtered exhaust.

Evaluation 1 The auxiliary building Train 2B VA s] system filtered exhaust will be disabled but the Train 2A VA l system filteerd exhaust will still be in service as required by TS 3/4.7.7. Humidity sensors for pump i room beater PRHDS-2B demister section 2B will be disabled. CSAE valves 2ZJ-073 and 2ZJ-074 will fail with the ZJ system bypassed to the unit stack. High inlet fire stat 2 VATS 5700 on filter unit ABFU-2B will be disabled and unfiltered exhaust fan ABUXF-2B will not trip on a fire signal from tbc fire stat. This instivment will be abandoned in place. The Train 2B VA system filtered exhaust must be returned to senice in less than 7 days. Humidity sensors are for indication only and are not required for pump room demister section 2B heater PRHDS-2B to be operable as required by TSs.

It is permissible to discharge the ZJ system to the unit stack vent during this procedure since no Procedures Page 53

credit was taken for the operation of the filtered exhaust system and the resultant affect on the offsite dose calculation as denoted in TS. No USQ is associated with this procedure.  ;

TN/1/A/1301/00/04A, Original . Appmved 06/30/94 ,

Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN 11301/00, Work Unit 04 Description This procedure provides guidance for implementing circuit revisions associated with the auxiliary building Train 18 and 2B non-safety portion of the VA filtered exhaust system, unfiltered exhaust system, and supply units.

Evaluation The non-safety portion of the auxiliary building Train 1B and 28 filtered exhaust will be out of service, Train 1 A and 2A will be in service. Auxiliary building dampers 1(2)ABF-D-4,1(2)ABF-D-4, and 1(2)ABF-D-18 will receive a signal to fail closed but will remain open because this dampers will be disabled in the open position prior to the start of this procedure. All post LOCA controls for the Train 18 and 2B unfiltered exhaust fans will be disabled. Post LOCA controls will be removed and post LOCA cabinet 1ELCP0190 will be abandoned in place per this procedure. No USQ is associated with this procedure.

TN/2/A/1301/00/04A, Original Approved 07/21/94 Precedure for Implementation of NSM CN-21301/00, Work Unit 04 Description This procedure provides guidance for implementing circuit revisions associated with the auxiliary building Train 2A non-safety portion of the VA filtered exhaust system, unfiltered exhaust system, and supply units.

Evaluation The non-safety portion of the auxiliary building Train 2A filtered exhaust will be out of senice, Train 2B will be in service. Auxiliary building dampers 2ABF-D-11,2ABF-D-13, and 2ABF-D-16 will receive a signal to fail closed but will remain open because this dampers will be disabled in the open position prior to the start of this procedure on NSM CN-11301/00. No USQ is associated with this procedure.

TN/1/A/1303/06/01A, Original Approved 08/17/94 Procedure for implementation of NSM CN-11303, Work Unit of Description This procedure provides guidance to implement the A train portion of NSM CN-11303, rev 0. This modificationwill replace electrohydraulic annulus ventilation (VE) system isolation damper 1 AVS-D-5 with a mechanical backdraft damper, and delete all electrical controls and indicators associated with it. Some electrical work will be performed " hot", by lifting leads in cabinet 1ESFBCA. Wodc

. may be performed with U1 in any mode. A temporary blind flange will be installed at the unit vent while replacement of the damper is being performed. This will protect the workers from the 7 possibility of exposure to noble gases during the replacement of the damper. Systems VA, VF, and VQ will be shut down while the temporary blind flange is being installed, and while it is being removed. VF will fail to the safe, or unfiltered mode while plug P-05-09 in IMC5 is open for modification work.

Evaluation All components affected by electrical isolation for this procedure have been evaluated and determined to have no adverse effects on the operation of the plant. The implementation of this procedure will not create or increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different from those already evaluated in the FSAR. Nor will the implementation of this procedure create or increase the probability or consequneces of an equipment malfunction Procedures Page 54

m ,

I I

previously evaluated, or different than any laready evaluated in the FSAR The naargin of safety '

defined in the bases of TSs in unaffected and no USQ will be created.

TN/2/A/1303/00/01A, Original Approved 08/17/94 Precedure for Implenientation of NSM CN-21303, Work Unit 01 Description This procedure provides guidance to implement the A train portion of NSM CN-21303, rev 0. 'Ihis moodificationwill replace electrohydraulic annulus ventilation (VE) system isolation damper 2 AVS-D-5 with a mechanical backdraft damper, and delete all electrical controls and indicators associated with it. Some electrical work will be performed " hot", by lifting leads in cabinet 2ESFBCA. Work misy be performed with U2 in any niede. A temporary blind flange will be installed at the unit vent while replacement of the damper is being performed. This will protect the workers from the possibility of exposure to noble gases during the replacement of the damper. Systems VA, VF, and-4 VQ will be shut down while the temporary blind flange is being lastalled, and while it is being atmoved. VF will fall to the safe, or unfiltered mode while plug P4549 in 2MC5 is open for modification work.

Evaluation All components affected by electrical isolation for this procedure have been evaluated and ,

determined to have no adverse effects on the operation of the plant. The implementation of this procedure will not create or increase the probability or consequences of an accident pmbsly evaluated, or different from those already evaluated in the FSAR Nor will the implementation of this procedure create or increase the probability or consequacces of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated,9r different than any laready evaluated in the FSAR The margin of safety .

defined in the bases of TSs in unaffected and no USQ will be created.

TN/1/A/1303/00/02A, Original Approved 08/17/94 ,

Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-11303, Rev 0 Work Unit 02 Description This procedure provides guidance to implement the B train portion of NSM CN-11303, rev 0. This modificationwill replace electrohydraulic annulus ventilation (VE) system isolation damper 1 AVS-D-10 with a mechanical backdraft damper, and delete all electrical controls and indicators associated with it. Some electrical work will be performed " hot", by lifting leads in cabinet IESFBCB. Work may be performed with U1 in any mode. A temporary blind flange will bc  ;

installed at the unit vent while replacement of the damper is being performed. This will protect the workers from the possibility of exposure to noble gases during the repicach4 af the damper.

Systems VA, VF, and VQ will be shut down while the temporary blind flange is being installed, and i while it is being removed Evaluation All components affected by electrical isolation for this procedure have beer evaluated and determined to have no adverse effects on the operation of the plant. The implementation of this procedure will not create or increase the probability or consequences of an accident presiously evaluated, or different from those already evaluated in the FSAR Nor will the implementation of this procedure create or increase the probability or conseguneces of an equipment malfunction pmhsly evaluated, or different than any laready evaluated in the FSAR The margin of safety defined in the bases of TSs in unaffected and no USQ will be created.

TN/2/A/1303/00/02A, Original Approved 08/17/94

. . scedure for Implementation of NSM CN-21303, Work Unit 02 .;

Description This precedure provides guidance to implement the B train portion of NSM CN-21303, rev 0. This modificationwill replace electrohydraulic annulus ventilation (VE) system isolation damper 2 AVS-Procedures Page 55

D-10 with a mechanical backdraft damper, and delete all electrical controls and indicators associated with it. Some electrical work will be performed " hot", by lifting leads in cabinet 2ESFBCB. Work may be pesformed with U2 in any_ mode. A temporary blind flange will be lastalled at the unit vent while arplacement of the damper is being performed. This will protect the workers frena the possibility of exposure to noble gases during the replacement of the damper.

Systems VA, VF, and VQ will be shut down while the temporary blind flange is being installed, and while it is being removed.

Evaluation All consponents affected by electrical isolation for this procedure have been evaluated and determined to have no adverse effects on the operation of the plant. De implenientation of this pacedure will not create or increase the pmbability or consequences of an accident previously ,

evaluated, or differrat from those already evaluated in the FSAR. Nor will the implenientation of this procedure create or increase the probability or consequaeces of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated, or different than any arcady evaluated in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the bases of TS:in unaffected and no USQ will be created.

TN/2/A/1306/00/01A, Original Approved 03/21/94 Procedure for Impicmentation of NSM CN-21306, Rev 0 Work Unit 01 Descriplio3 This proceduru applies to the replacement of 4" carbon steel CF to CA piping with 6" stainless steel piping. The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidelines for the replacement of CF to CA piping to 2A S/G.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will not create or increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different from those already evaluated in the FSAR. Nor will the implementation of this procedure create or increase the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety defined in the bases of TSs in unaffected and no USQ will be created.

TN/2/A/1306/06/02A, Original Approved 03/21/94 Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-21306, Rev 0 Work Unit 02 Description This procedure applies to the replacement of 4" carbon steel CF to CA piping with 6" stainless steel piping. The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidelines for the replacement of CF to CA piping to 2D S/G.

Evaluation The implementation of this procedure will not create or increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different from those already evaluated in the FSAR. - Nor will 1 the implementation of this procedure create or increase the probability or conserguences of an equipment malfunction prevkmsly evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety defined in the bases of TSs in unaffected and no USQ will be created.

TN/2/A/1306/00/03A, Original Approved 03/21/94 Precedure for Implementation of NSM CN-21306, Rev 0 Work Unit 03 ,

Description his pescedure applies to the replacement of 4" carbon steel CF to CA piping with 6" stainless steel piping. The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidelines for the repIncement of CF to CA piping to 2B S/G.

Evaluation ne implementation of this procedure will not create or increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different from those already evaluated in the FSAR. Mr will Procedures Page 56

l L- l l

the lesplementation of tlais procedure create or increase the probability or consequences of an egalpment malfunction previously evaluated, or different than any almady evaluated in the FSAR. . .;

The usargin of safety defined in the bases of TSs in unaffected and no USQ will be created. ,

TN/2/A/1306/00/04A, Original Approved 03/21/94 i Procedure for Implesmentation of NSM CN-21306, Rev 0 Work Unit 64 Descrintion _

This pescedure applies to the replacement of 4" carbon steel CF to CA piping with 6" stainless steel ,

piping. The purpose of this procedun is to provide guidelines for the replacement of CF to CA  ;

piping to 2C S/G.

Evaluation  :

The implementation of this procedure will not create or increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different from those already evaluated in the FSAR. Nor will the implementation of this procedure create or increase the probability or consequences of an ;

equipasent malfunction previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety defined in the bases of TSs in unaffected and no USQ will be created.

i TN/2/A/1331/06/01A, Original Approved 02/28/94 t Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-21331. Rev 0 Work Unit of Description This procedure applies to circuit revisions associated with valves 2ND001B and 2ND0002A specified j by NSM CN-21331. Wiring revisions will be performed to remove the autoclosure interlocks from the control circuits of valves 2ND0001B and 2ND0002A. Affected contacts for the ACI relays in cabinets 2AUXSFGA and 2AUXSFGB will be changed from normally closed position to normally j open. i Evaluation The changes made by this procedure will not adsersely affect the ability of any other system to perform its design function. Several benefits will be italized by removing the autoclosure interlocks. The main benefit is reducing the probability to " Loss of Decay Heat Removal". Deletion of the ACI will ensuer availability of RHR relief valves for additional LTOP protection. The l changes to the controls for the ND system suction isolation valves will be made during mode 6 or no mode. The need to close these valves following NC system pressure does not exists in either of these modes. No activitity performed in carrying out the changes in this modification will result in spurious closure of these valves. The operation of the ND system will not be degraded by the implementation. No other equipment used for any phase of either normal shutdown cooling, fuel handling, or the processing of radioactive fluids is adversely affected. Therefore, this implementation procedure (TN) will not inirease the probability of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. Power will be removed from the control circuits during this implementation. Therefore, no interiocks with any of the ND system suction isolation valves will be affected during the implementation. This TN will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR. No other system used to mitigate any accident is adversely affected.  !

Therefore, this TN will not increase either the probability or, consequences of a malfunction of -l equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. This TN will not create the possibility of a 4 malfunction of a diffterent type than any evaluated in the FSAR. The TN will not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. This TN does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS. No USQ is associted with this TN.

l TN/2/A/1331/00/01A, Retype 1 Approved 05/02/94 Procedure for Impicmentation of NSM CN-21331, Rev 0 Work Unit 01 Description Procedures Page 57

' This procedure applies to circuit revisions associated with valves 2ND001B and 2ND0002A specified by NSM CN-21331. Wiring mvisions will be pedormed to remove the autoclosure laterlocks frone the control circuits of valves 2ND0001B and 2ND0002A. Affected contacts for the ACI misys in cabinets 2AUXSFGA and 2AUXSFGB will be changed from normally closed position to normally

• Pen-Evaluation The changes made by this procedure will not adversely affect the ability of any other system to pederne its design function. Several benefits will be malized by removing the autoclosun latedocks. The main benefit is reducing the probability to " Loss of Decay Heat Removal". Deletion of the ACI will ensure availability of RHR relief valves for additional LTOP protection. The changes to the controls for the ND system suction isolation valves will be made during mode 6 or no mode. The need to close these valves following NC system pressure does not exists in either of these modes. No activitity pedermed in carrying out the changes in this modification will result in ,

spurious closure of these valves. The operation of the ND system will not be degraded by the '

implementation. No other equipment i. sed for any phase of either normal shutdown cooling, fuel handilug, or the processing of radioactive fluids is adversely affected. Therefore, this implementation procedure (TN) will not increase the probability of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. Power will be removed from the control circuits during this implementation. Therefore, no interlocks with any of the ND system suction isolation valves will be affected during the implementation. This TN will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR. No other system used to mitigate any accident is adversely affected.

Therciore, this TN will not increase either the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. This TN will not create the possibility of a malfunction of a diffterent type than any evaluated in the FSAR. The TN will not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. This TN does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS. No USQ is associted with this TN.

l TN/2/A/1331/06/02A, Original Approved 02/28/94 I Procedure for Implementation of NSM CN-21331, Rev 0 Work Unit 02 Description This procedure applies to circuit revisions associated with valves 2ND036B and 2ND0037A specified l by NSM CN-21331. Wiring revisions will be performed to remove the autoclosure interlocks from l the control circuits of valves 2ND0036B and 2ND0037A. Affected contacts for the ACI relays in cabinets 2AUXSFGA and 2AUXSFGB will be changed from normally closed position to normally opec. 1 Evaluation The changes made by this procedure will not adversely affect the ability of any other system to pedorm its design function. Several benefits will be realized by removing the autoclosure latedocks. The main benefit is reducing the probability to " Loss of Decay IIcat Removal". Deletion of the ACI will ensure availability of RIIR relief valves for additional LTOP protection. The changes to the controls for the ND system suction isolation valves will be made during mode 6 or no mode. The need to close these valves following NC system pressure does not exists in either of these modes. No activility performed in carrying out the changes in this modification will result in i spurious closure of these valves. The operation of the ND system will not be degraded by the l Implementation. No other equipment used for any phase of either normal shutdown cooling, fuel j handling, or the processing of radioactive fluids is adversely affected. Therefore, this TN will not '

increase the probability of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. Power will be removed from the control circuits during this implementation. Therefore, no interlocks with any of the ND system -

section isolation vahes will be affected during the implementation. This TN will not create the l possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR. No other system used to mitigate any accident is adversely affected. Therefore, this TN will not increase either the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. This TN will not create the possibility of a malfunction of a diffterent type than any Procedures ,

Page 58

I evaluated in the FSAR. The TN will not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the -

FSAR. This TN does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS. No USQ is associted with this TN.

TN/2/A/1331/00/02A, Retype 1 Approved 05/02/94  :

Procedure for implementation of NSM CN-21331, Rev 0 Work Unit 02 .l Description This pmcedure applies to circuit revisions associated with valves 2ND036B and 2ND0037A specified by NSM CN-21331. Wiring revisions will be pedermed to nmove the autoclosure laterlocks from i the control circuits of valves 2ND0036B and 2ND0037A. Affected contacts for the ACI relays in cabinets 2AUXSFGA and 2AUXSFGB will be changed from normally closed position to normally

• Pen.

Evaluation The changes made by this pmcedure will not adversely affect the ability of any other system to j perform its design function. Several benefits will be realized by removing the autoclosun laterlocks. The main benefit is reducing the probability to " Loss of Decay Heat Removal". Deletion of the ACI will ensure availability of RIIR relief valves for additional LTOP protection. The changes to the controls for the ND system suction isolation valves will be made during mode 6 or no  ;

mode. The need to close these valves following NC system pressure does not exists in either of these  !

modes. No activitity pedormed in carrying out'the changes in this modification will result in I spurious closure of these valves. The operation of the ND system will not be degraded by the )

implementation. No other equipment used for any phase of either normal shutdown cooling, fuel j handling, or the processing of radioactive fluids is adversely affected. Therefore, this TN will not 1 increase the probability of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. Power will be removed from the control circuits during this implementation. Therefore, no interlocks with any of the ND system suction isolation valves will be affected during the implementation. This TN will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR. No other system used ,

to mitigate any accident is adversely affected. . Therefore, this TN will not increase either the  ;

probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. This TN will not create the possibility of a malfunction of a diffterent type than any evaluated in the FSAR. The TN will not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the l FSAR. This TN does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS. No USQ is I associted with this TN.

TN/2/A/3100/CE/01 A, Original Approved 03/03/94 Procedure for Impicmentation of Exempt Change CE-3100, Work Unit 01 Description In order to comply with the ASME Code Section XI ISI requirements, a radiographic examination must be performed on the weld located between 2B S/G and the 32" diameter main steam (SM) piping. In order to pedorm this radiography efficiently, a hole is needed in the SM system (pmcess) piping to allow access inside the piping. This exempt change was originated to provide the access hole for the radiographic examination of this weld. After the examination is complete, the hole will be plugged. The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidance for the drilling of the hole and the lastallation of the half-coupling and the pipe plug.

Evaluation _

S/G 2B and its associated main steam line will be out of senice during the installation phase of this l c pmcedure. Drilling of the hole and installation of the half-coupling and pipe plug will be performed j during Mode 5,6, or No Mode. Containment integrity will be maintained while the affected main steam line is open to containment. Testing will be pedormed in accordance with the Post Modification Testing Program. A visual inspection for leaks will be performed in Mode 3 with the affected SM piping at normal system temperature and pressure. This inspection will not affect the function or operation of the SM system. System isolations or abnormal alignments are not required.

Procedures l Page 59

. - . . . - - - - . ~ .- -_- .. .. .

l Implementation of this' procedure does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident or equipment malfunction already evaluated in the FSAR. . No new operating modes or characteristics are introduced by this pmcedure, therefore, this procedure does not create the possiblity for accident or equipment malfunction which is different than already evaluated in the FSAR. This procedust will not reduce the margin of safety as defined by any TS bases. There are I no USQ associated with the implementation of this pmcedure.

TN/1/A/4318/CE/01 A, Original Appmved 02/22/94 Procedum for Implementation of Exempt Change CE-4318, Work Unit 01 DeKriptIon .

This procedure provides guidance to implement CN-4318. This modification makes wiring changes ,

in order to pmvide separate 120VAC power sources for ORNLT7360 (RN Pit B Differential 14 vel -

Across Screen) and IRNLT7370 (RN Pump Intake Pit B I4 vel) along with associated components.

To pnvent the auto sway of RN water source (suction) from Lake Wylies to the SNSWP and auto start of the RN pumps during implementation of this minor modification, a temporary power source will be suppled to the Pit B Emergency I4 Level relay logic to defeat the 14-Lo Level signal when the B Train pit level instrumenation is de-energized. The B Train pit level instrumentation will be declared inoperabic in accordance with TSs.

Evaluation All components being affected by electrical isolations for this procedure have been evaluated. RN suction will be alligned to the SNSWP prior to beginning implementation of_ this minor modificatolon. The implementation of this procedure will not increase or create the pmbability or -

consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR. Nor will implementation of this procedure increase or create the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the bases of TS is unaffected and no USQ i will be created.  ;

TN/1/A/4319/CE/01 A, Original Approved 02/22/94 Pacedure for Implementation of Exempt Change CE-4319, Work Unit of Description I This procedure provides guidance to implement CN-4319. This modification makes wiring changes l In order to pmvide separate 120VAC power sourtes for ORNLT7390 (RN Pit A Differential Level Across Screen) and IRNLT7400 (RN Pump Intake Pit A level) along with associated components.  :

To prevent the auto sway of RN water source (suction) from Lake Wylics to the SNSWP and auto start of the RN pumps during implementation of this minor modification, a temporary power source i will be suppled to the Pit A Emergency Lo Level relay logic to defeat the Lo-Lo level signal when j the A Train pit level instivmenation is de-energized. The A Train pit level instmmentation will be declared inoperable in accordance with TSs.

Evaluation All components being affected by electrical isolations for this pmcedure have been evaluated. RN section will be alligned to the SNSWP prior to beginning implementation of this minor  ;

modificatolon. The implementation of this procedure will not increase or create the probability or -

l consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the '

FSAR. Nor will implementation of this procedure increase or create the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction ^previously evaluated or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the bases of TS is unaffected and no USQ will be created.

TT/0/A/9100/059, Changes 0-0 Approved 10/25/93 Control Room Area Chiller Lead (2CRA-C-1)

Procedures Page 60

. _ ~ -- _. _ .- -. - _ _ - .

i Descrintion The purpose of tble test is to increase the YC Chiller B (2CRA-C-1) cooling load to its design basis .

capacity by operating the VC systesa beaters in order to determine the additional economlaer float va ve capacity with the condenser head pressure controller setpoint between 130 and 150 psig.

Chiller data will be collected and pedormance parameters evaluated prior to making existing TSM 93003060-01 permanenent.. ,

Evaluation i VC/YC Train A will be operable and evallable as the redundant train during the implementation of this TT. VC Train B will be operable during the test. YC Traic B will be technically inoperable but avslable during this test. The YC system will be technically inoperable but available to pedouse its design basis function during the test. Control room habitability will not be challenged during this test. Thenfore, the probability of accidents parviously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. Since no new failures are introduced, no accidents different than any evaluated in the FSAR are created. The consequneces of a malfunction of equipment lacportant to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. Since the maximum continuous-duty ratings for electrical equipment and instrumentation w;il not be exceeded, the probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety different than already evaluated in the FSAR will not be created.

The continuous acceptable pedormance of the filtration, pressurization, and cooling components of the VC/YC system ensure the removal of radioactive materials, prevention of readioactive leaks into the control room from adjacent areas, and continued operation of electrical instnamentation and i controls to maintain uninterivpted safe occupancy of the control room during i:ost-accident shutdown. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not increase with the implementation of this proceduit. Based on this evaluation, the neargin of safety .

as defined in the bases of TSs is not reduced. There are no USQs created by the implementation of this test.

'IT/0/A/9100/059, Changes 2 Approved 10/28/93 Control Room Area Chiller Load (2CRA-C-1)

Description The purpose of this test is to increase the YC Chiller B (2CRA-C-1) cooling load to its design basis capacity by operating the VC system heaters in order to determine the additional economizer float

• valve capacity with the condenser head pressure controller setpoint between 130 and 150 psig.

Chiller data will be collected and performance parameters evaluated prior to making existing TSM 93003060-01 permanenent.- This change allows the test coordinator to vary the frequency of monitoring certain parameters based on the specfic activities going on at the time. Change also made to add steps to adjust the head pressure controller setpoint in the range of 90-150 psig in order to obtain data at varying condenser RN flowrates.

Evaluation The YC chiller will be declared inoperable for the entire time the setpoint is changed. 'Ihe probability and consequences of an accident, whether or not previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by changing the' head pressure controller setpoint because VC/YC system is not an accident initiator as described in the FSAR. The probability and consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, whether or not previously evaluated in the FSAR, will not be increased by this change because the range the head pressure will be adjusted to has been shown to be acceptable for proper chiller operation. The margin of safety as defined in the bases to any TS will not be reduced because the setpoint will be returned to the normal range prior to declaring the chiller operabic. No USQ exists. .

'IT/0/A/9100/63, Change 0-0 Approved 07/28/94 RN Discharge Valve Isolation Test DescrIntion Procedures Page 61

.- . . . - ~ _ -. -- . . .

r The purpose of this procedure is to verify the operational readiness of nuclear service water (RN) discharge valve controls.

Evaluation This verification will be performed 'by falling the individual relays one at a time, after aligning the train not under test to the SNSWP to protect plant operation, and verifying the affected components ,

activate properly. RN pumps are specified by pump, to ensure the test will not cause problems with plant operation if a failure should occur. Actuation will be performed by lifting leads to reasove power from relays. Other leads affected by the mod have been verified to be tested by this retest.

The jumpers are double verifeled to be placed correctly and also removed. The leads are double verified also and will be removed and reinstalled by qualified IAE technicians. There is a time at +

the beginning of the B train portion of the test where there is no discharge path for B train. At this time B train is not in operation and operable. If an Ss or blackout should occur during this tinne operator action can align a discharge path to the SNSWP. An USQ is not created by this test. This test does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR because it is only testing one train at a time and the other train is aligned to its assured source / discharge, k does not create the possibility of a different type of accident not evaluated in the FSAR since the valves are falling to accident alignment. It does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. If does not create the possibilbity of a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR and does not reduce the margin of safecty.

TT/0/A/9100/63, Change 1 Approved C7/29/94 RN Discisarge Valve Isolation Test ,

Description The change is being issued to prevent RN pumps on the train being tested from nanning without the -

ability to be secured promptly. The change entails racking out both pump breakert en the train under test before any leads are lifted to prevent the pumns from stanting.

Evaluation  ;

If an landvertent short occu s, a fuse could blow resulting in an artificial emergency low pit level signal. This signal will cause a swap to the pond with all four RN pumps receiving a start signal.

The two minute time (which prevents securing the RN pumps) on the train under test will not ,

receive power until the fuse is replaced, thereby preventing the pumps from being secured expeditiously. The pump breakers being racked out are on the train of RN under test which has ,

aletady been declared inoperable and the breatkers are double verified to be racked back in by the procedure. An USQ is not carated by this change. This change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR because the train affected has already been declared inoperable and the other train is aligned to its assured source / discharge. It does not create the possibility of a different type of accident not evaluated in the FSAR. It does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. If does not create the possiblibity of a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in  ;

the FSAR and does not reduce the margin of safeety.

TT/0/A/9100/63, Change 2 Approved 07/29/94 RN Discharge Valve Isolation Test Description The change is being issued to ensure the A train valves are in the correct alignment (if operations

. already has B train in the pond alignment) and to correct typographical erros discovered on the P enclosures.

! Evaluation If operations has already aligned the B train to the pond, valve 1RNSA will be closed per their procedure. The valve is required to be in the open position for performace of section 12.1 and the addition of this step will ensure the valve is open in the event pond alignment has been completed Procedures Page 62

prior to execution of the procedure. This change will not affect the performance of the B train of RN, which is providing cooling to the plant, because it is one of iwo isolation valves for the B pit frons the lake. The other valve to the B pit for the lake,1RN068, will remain closed to ensure isolation and prevent draining the pond to the lake. An USQ is not created by this change. This change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR because the train affected is aligned to its assured source / discharge and is still isolated from the ,

lake. It does not curate the possibility of a different type of accident not evaluated in the FSAR. It does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety '

evaluated in the FSAR. If does not create the possiblibity of a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR and does not reduce the margin of safeety.

TT/2/A/9200/075, Change 0-0 Approved 05/24/94 Flow Verification for 2KCFE5530 (Annubar)

Description This procedure is designed to determinen the flow coeffient of 2KCFE5530 as a function of flow rate. This will allow flow measurement over the usable flow range of KC train 2A.

Evaluation Pc formance of this test will not adversely affect unit operation or degrad any affected equipment.

The pmbability or consequences of an accident or safety related equipment malfunction already evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of pe: forming this test. A train of the KC system will be operable during this test to pmperly respond to an ESF signal by automatically entering the appmpriate emergency alignment. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or safety related equipment malfunction different than that previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be created and entrance into TS LCO will not occur. Since the equipment and systems affected by this procedure are being operated within their design bases, the margin of safety will not be reduced.

Based on this, no USQ exists.

TT/2/A/9200/076, Change 0-0 Approved 05/24/94 Flow Verification for 2KCFE5540 (Annubar)

Description 3

This procedure is designed to determine the flow coeffient of 2KCFE5540 as a function of flow rate.

This will allow flow measuerment over the unable flow range of KC train 2B.  !

Evaluation I Performance of this test will not adversely affect unit operation or degrad any affected equipment.  !

The probability or consequences of an accident or safety related equipment malfunction already evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of performing this test. A train of the KC system will be operable during this test to properly respond to an ESF signal by automatically entering the appropriate emergency alignment. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or safety related equipment malfunction different than that previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be created and entrance into TS LCO will not occur. Since the equipment and systems affected by this pmcedure are being operated within their design bases, the margin of safety will not be reduced.

Based on this, no USQ exists.

1 Procedures Page 63

l

SUMMARY

OF NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION-RELATED 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS NOTE: The first number designates the unit on which the modification was performed (i.e., CN-1MW ladicates Unit 1 CN-2MN indicates Unit 2, CN-5NN indicates ,

i

that it is shared for both units.

CN-11048, Rev. O Description Power to fuel elevator 1MMTR0072 could not be disconnected locally at the fuel elevator control

, panet Motor contactor had malfunctioned, causing the crane to overrun stops and narmwly miss falling off into the pool. This modification added a disconnect switch to the outside of the fuel -E elevator control panel to locally disconnect power la case of a contactor malfunction.

Evaluation No equipment or stivcture used to handle or store spent fuel was affected by this modification. No equipment used for any ' phase of power generation, shutdown cooling, or radwaste treatment was affected. No new power demands were created. Compliance with Appendis R criteria was not degraded. Therefore, the modification did not increase the probability of an accident evaluated in the SAR. The new fuel elevators function as before the modification. No new failure modes were identified. Thus, the modification did not create the possibility of an accident of a different type frons any evaluated in the SAR. No equipment used to mitigate any accident was affected by the modification. Thus, the modification did not increase either the probability or the consequences of a  !

malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR. Likewise, the modification did i mot citate the possibility of a malfunction of a different type from any evaluated in the SAR. There was no adverse affect on compliance with either seismic or Appendix R criteria. Neither any fission ,

product barrier nor any source term evaluation was adversely affected. Thus, the modification did not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the SAR. Neither any setpoint, design limit, nor operating characteristics were changed. Thus, the modificatica did not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.

CN-10957, Rev. 0 ,

Descrintion Fire hose cabinet IRF-264, located in Room 419 Elevation 577',in the Unit 1 Mechanical Penetration Room, was partially blocked by hangers and pipes such that cabinet door could not be completely opened. Operation of fire hose could have been delayed in an emergency. This modification moved the cabinet into the corridor of Room 419, where no obstructions exist.

Evaluation The new cabinet location allows the hose to provide the water coverage required for fire protection in the area. 'Itc piping remained Class H and is still suitable for the pressure and temperature of the system. A piping interaction review was completed. Civil Engineering completed a review of stress analysis and hanger /suppods. No new wall penetrations or water drains were required. The RF systene is able to perform as designed to provide water coverage in a panicular area. Since the piping was adequately designed for system parameters, and an interaction analysis was completed, no system or equipment was adversely affected. Therefore, there was no increase in the probability of an accident or of a malfunction of equipment impodant to safety evaluated in the SAR. No safety related system or equipment was adversely affected. Neither any fission product barrier nor source term evaluation was affected. Therefore, the consequences of an accident or of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR were not increased. Since the fire coverage is adequate, and the piping review has precluded adverse interaction with safety systems, there was no Modifications Page1

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creation of the possibility for an accident or for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated la the SAR. No setpoint, design limit, or operating parameter was affected by this NSM. Thus, the

' modification did not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.

5 CN-11277, Rev. O Description Concerns were identified about the seismic / wind loading capability of the 4" CF and 2" SM piping ,

between the Turbine Building and the Doghouse. This modification upgraded affected piping to Class F to meet seismic / wind loading requirements.

Evaluation This upgrade lacreased the reliability of the subject lines for seismic and tornado events, precludlag potential breaks of these lines, thereby reducing the likelihood of a feedwater system pipe break.

This upgrade also prevents any undesirable interactions due to breaks in the vicinity of the diesel generator or control room air intakes. This part of the CF system is not used for accident mitigation. No common failure modes were created by this modification. The upgraded piping does not perform any new functions. No Appendix R concerns were created. . No accidents previously considered incredible were made credible by this NSM. No new break locations were created in the yard. No changes in safety limits, setpoints, or plant parameters were initiated because of the modification. The fission product barriers (RCS pressure boundary, containment, fuel pellets, and cladding) were not degraded. No assumptions made in any accident analysis were affected by this NSM.

CN-11064, Rev.1 Descrintion Certala air actuated Borg-Warner gate valves used to dump condensate from steam headers to the condenser had problems falling to the open position. This modification replaced these valves with  ;

double disc gate valves. This revision replaced valves 1HB006 and 1HB007.

Evaluation The maaterial and design specifications of the valves were not degraded by the modification. Tbc loads associated with normal operation were not adversely affected. The VI system was not adversely affected. Neither any other system used for power generation, nor any system used for either shutdown cooling, fuel handling, or radwaste treatment was adversely affected. The - ,

consequences of the failure of one of the affected valves is bounded by the consequences of the 1 inadvertent opening of a steam generator relief or safety valve. No new failure modes were identified. No equipment used in accident mitigation was affected by the modification. The seismic qualification of the affected components was not degraded. Neither any fission product barrier nor any soorte term evaluation was adversely affected. Neither any setpoint, design limit, nor any operating parameter was adversely affected.

CN-11005, Revs. 3 and 4 Descrintion .

Excessively conservative methods of anal3 sis required the installation of many unnecessary snubber hangers. Snubbers require periodic surveillance, testing, and maintenance, which entails large j i expenditures of manpowrr and undesirable radiation esposure. This modification removed or replaced certain snubbers with struts.

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f Etaluation Systems used in normal plant operations were not adversely affected by the modification. No new l pipe break locations were identified. The ability of the fluid systems affected by the modification to function under stresses associated with normaal operation was not degraded. Analyses of post-accident loadings for the systems important to safety affected by the modification were performed.

These analyses showed that the affected systems remained capable of withstanding the safe shutdown earthquake without loss of ability to pe form their safety functions. Compliance with GDC 2 was not adversely affected. Tbc frequency of challenges to systems used to mitigate accidents was not increased. Neither any fission product barrier nor any source terni evaluation  !

was degraded. Frons the safety review,it was evident that the probability of failure of a piping  ;

systems during or following an earthquake was not increased when the number of snubbers was  ;

reduced per this modification. Thus, the margin of safety of the affected systems with respect to an earthquake was not reduced. There was no change to any setpoint, design limit, or operating parameter.

CN-11331, PCO 1476 +

Description WCAP-11736-A," Residual Heat Removal System Autoclosure Interlock Removal Repod for the Westinghouse Owners Group" stated that the status lights on the operator's panel should remain functional after power has been removed from the valves. The original design did not provide for direct valve position indication if power to the valve control circuit is remmed by opening the valve breaker. In reviewing the associated technical specification changes pedaining to deletion of the '

interlock, the NRC expressed concern over the lack of direct valve position indication and approved the changes contingent upon modifying the design to allow for indication independent of valve power. This project change order for NSM CN-11331 modified the design. For valves 1ND001B and 1ND036B, this PCO removed the power source for the indicating lights, both control room and auxiliary shutdown panel, and computer points from the valve control power transformer circuit and placed them on panciboard IEKPB, breaker 29. This provides power to the position indicating devices ergardless of the status of power to the valves. For valves 1ND002A and IND037A, power for the isolators, w hich in turn provide valve status for the control room, auxiliary shutdown panel, and standby shutdown facility indicating lights, and power for the computer points was removed fmni the valve control power transformers and placed on standby shutdown facility power source, 1EMXS, control power transformer F03B. This provides power to the position Indicating devices regardless of the status of power to the valves. Additionally, the new annunciator cirruits for both valves west placed in the valve control room contml circuit in order to meet the requirements of ,

1 Design Criteria DC-1.02-01.

Evaluation Performing the above modifications satisfied the NRC's concerns for valve indication and also provided full compliance with WCAP-11736-A. The NRC approved the technical specification changes.

CN-50433, Rev. O Description ITT actuators were unreliabic, resulting in excessive maintenance costs and poor VC/YC system reliability. This modification removed the ITT actuators and associated circuitry. Dampers west positioned in mid-position and locked in place or existing dampers were replaced with backdraft  ;

dampers.

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m E5aluation The IE electrical power being recovered by removing these damper actuators and fans did not  ;

degrade the affected power supplies. No new failures were introduced. The battery room exhaust I

. flow was not reduced even with the fans removed. No control changes were made as part of this NSM. The system will actuate on an ESFAS or LOOP signal and this did not change as a result of

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this NSM. VC/YC was not degraded due to this NSM. The criteria on which VC was accepted {

(Safety Evaluation Report Sections 6.4 and 9.4 and Standard Review Plan Sections 6.4 and 9.4) were  ;

still preserved. No safety limits, setpoints, or limiting safety system settings were affected by this i NSM.

i CN-10437, Rev. 0 ,

Description Operators parviously had to walk across concrete beams and pipes to access valves in the Unit 1 l Mechanical Penetration Room at $60 +0 elevation. This modification installed grating similar to that in Unit 2 to allow for easier access. t Evaluation 4 The platform was seismically designed (QA 4). Platform location was reviewed to preclude potential .

damage to safety related equipment and piping. No function of any system was affected by this change. All materials used were suitable for the platform. No safety parameters or design limits  :

were adversely affected. There were no unreviewed safety questions associated with this NSM. t CN-11064, Rev. 5 Description Certain air actuated Borg-Warner gate valves used to dump condensate from steam headers to the .

condenser had problems falling to the open position. This modification replaced these valves with double disc gate valves. This revision replaced valves ISP019, ISP023, ISP033, ISP037, ISP040, and ISP099 Evaluation .

These valves have the potential to be an accident initiator. FSAlt Section 15.2.7 evaluates a possible scenario that could result from a malfunction causing a valve to stay open. If the valves stayed open after draining condensate, some steam would be diverted from the FWPTs to the condenser, bypassing the FWPTs. If the steam flow could not be accommodated by the FWPTs' governor valve, the FWPT would decrease speed and result in a decrease in feedwater flow to the steam generators. 1 This scenario is bounded by the analysis in 15.2.7. The replacement valves were a more reliable design and no new failures were created. No equipment used in accident mitigation was affected by this NSM. The new valves west consistent in quality and design specification. No Appendix R ,

concerns or control changes were created. The fuel, cladding, RCS pressure boundary, '

containment, and reactor building were not affected by this NSM. No assumptions made in any safety analysis were affected. No safety limits, setpoints, or limiting safety system settings were affected.

CN-11318, Rev. 0 l

Description l Failure of valve IKF007 had occurred due to vibration caused by continuous throttling use. The  !

same valve is also used in a similar application for IKF022. This modification replaced 1KF007 and 1KF022 with valves designed to withstand continuous throttling.

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Esaluation De replaced valves did not affect the design conditions or the operating parameters of the system.

No accident initiators were affected by the modification. No fission product barriers or source term evaluations were adversely affected. No system used to mitigate an accident was adversely affected and there were no changes relative to any other system. Design review was completed to assure that compliance with seismic criteria was not degraded. No new failure modes were generated.

Compliance with Appendis R criteria was not degraded since there was no electrical involvement.

This modification did not affect any safety limits, actpoints, or operating parameters.

CN-11224, Rev. 9 Description  !

Problems had been encountered with the atmospheric dump valves at Catawba. The pmblems I included failure to open on demand, valve lastability and oscillations in the mid-stroke position, and )

excessive seat leakage. This modification performed the following:

1. The one piece piston rings were replaced with two piece wedge style piston rings. Furthermose, the velocity coefficient of each pilot valve in the plug / stem assemblics was increased. i

2. The seating angle on both the plug and seat rings was modified to achieve tighter shutoff. The l

empty seat rings and seat ring spacers were replaced with one piece seat ring / spacer designs, j

3. The position and air relay output was changed to allow instmment air to be routed to the top of the valve actuators.

4. A bonnet drain line with a continuous drain orifice was added to each valve.

5. De disc stacks were weld characterized to create a smoother transition in flow as the valves move between the full open position and the full closed position.

Evaluation The valves are closed during normal plant operation. The probability ofinadvertent valve opening was not increased. The ability of the valves to discharge steam was not significantly degraded. No new failure modes were found to be identified with the modification. The valves are not used for accident mitigation. They have no interface with any plant system used for accident mitigation.

The consequences of a valve inadvertently opening remained bounded by the analysis of an increase la secondary steam flow reported in Sections 15.1.3,15.1.4, and 15.1.5 of the FSAR. Neither any fission product barrier nor any source term evaluation was affected by the modifications. Neither I any setpoint, design limit, nor any operating parameter was affected.

CN-11320, Rev. O Description During the Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection audit, it was identified that newer relays were needed to prevent actuation of the undervoltage protection system with the resultant diesel generator starts and separation of IE busses from offsite power. This modification replaced existing relays with a high accuracy ITE-27N relays with a narrower operating band.

Evaluation The configuration of the degraded voltage sensing circuits was not affected by the modification. The pmbability ofisolation of an EPC bus from the EPB system was not increased. Loads on affected power supplies remained within design specification. No sneak circuits were created as a result.

The frequency of challenges to the diesel generators and the EQB system was not increased.

Compliance with seismic, environmental, and Appendix R criteria was not degraded. The changes to the degraded voltage setpoints added margin to the trip and minimum allowable setpoints of TS Table 3.3-3, item 10b.

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CN-11281, Rev. O Description The containment sump level instrumentation was experiencing operational problems due to leakage of the lastrument capillaries. This modification replaced the Barton filled capillary system with GEMS float type level instrumentation.

Evaluation The lastrumentation installed by this modification is QA Condition 1, powered frona Class 1E sources, and mounted per seismic qualifications. These changes did not adversely affect the ability of any system to perform its design function. No accident laitiators were affected by the modification. No system used to mitigate an accident was adversely affected. Loads on power supplies remained within design limits. The new lastrumentation is qualiGed for operation in a post-accident environment.

CN-11333, Rev. O Description This modification installed one N-16 monitor per steam line as the four steam lines enter the Unit 1 Turbine Building on the 594 level. Output modules were installed in one pradmon cabinet in the control room. Necessary power / signal / chart recorder / annunciator and OAC connections were provided.

Evaluation The new monitors have no control functions. They have no direct interfaces with equipment used for any phase of either power generation or conversion or transmission, normal shutdown cooling, fucI handling, or the processing of radioactive fluids. Loads on affected power supplies remained within design specifications. No sneak circuits were created. The ability of EMF 33 to pe Torni as l designed was not degraded by the modifications. No other equipment provided to mitigate accidents l was affected. Compliance with neither any scismic, environmental, nor any Appendix R criteria l was adversely affected. No failure mode was converted into a common cause failure mode. The ability to respond to a steam generator tube leak was not adversely affected by the modification. No other source term evaluation was affected. No fission product barrier was degraded.

CN-11264, Rev. O j Description The previous moisture separator reheater tubes were 90/10 Cu/NI. Copper had been shown to be a cause of steam generator tubing outside diameter intergranular stress corrosion cracking.

Transport studies confirmed that the MSR tube bundles were the major source of copper. This snodification replaced the Cu/Ni MSR tube bundles with bundles utilizing stainicas steel tubes or -

lastalled a complete MSR.

Evaluation There were no increases in the opevating basis stress of either the MSR, any MSR component, or ,

any interfacing equipment or stivcture. The turbine thermal cycle was not adversely affected. l Design pressures and temperatures remained unaffected. Steam generator tube integrity was not degraded with the modification. No new failure modes were identified. The MSRs are not used to mitigate any accident. No equipment used to mitigate any accident was modified.

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CN-11230, Revs. O and 1 Description Maintenance on VP butterfly valves and their actuators was difficult to achieve due to lack of lifting devices and difficulty in accessing them. This modification designed and installed a lifting device at each valve location capable of removing the actuator and/or the entist valve. Also, some of the valve locations required platforms for safe access.

Evaluation This modification did not directly affect the ability of any mechanical or electrical system to pesforms its design function. No equipment used for any phase of normal plant operations was adversely affected by the modification. Loads on affected power supplies armained within design specifications. No equipment used to mitigate any accident was adversely affected by the l modification. Compliance with Appendix R criteria was not degraded. The load capacities of all )

lifting devices west reviewed and found to he adequate.  :

CN-11253, Rev. O Description Valves INIO95A and 360 experienced reverse flow conditions during system operation. The design of these valves caused the valve to close during reverse flow and then the Ni system pumps had to be started to recpen the valves. This modification provided a more reliable valve for these valves that can function properly during reverse flow conditions.

Evaluation This NSM added and replaced valves with no control circuitry changes. The NI test header modified by this NSM is not in any of the ECCS flowpaths related to NI for injection or recirculation. This test header is isolated during normal operation but the containment isolation function served by IN195A is an ESF as it isolates the potential radioactive material inside containment from connecting systems. This NSM did not degrade the performance of the ECCS aspects of the Ni system. No ECCS boundary leakage was introduced because the design of these valves was expected to be as leak tight as the previous valves. All of the added components were of the same class and quality as the system to which they were added. No Appendix R concerns were introduced. No new credible failuits were introduced. This modification did not affect the fuel, cladding, or NC pressure boundary. The containment boundary was not degraded.

CN 11276, Rev. O Description Due to the design of the centrifugal charging pumps (multiple stages, sleeve bearings),it was impossible to obtain useful data on the bearing housing using accelerometers. The purpose of this modification was to provide the " front end" vibration monitoring sensors and sensor electronics system to monitor the condition of the pumps.  ;

Evaluation The centrifugal charging pump vibration monitoring system is not safety related. It is not used to mitigate any accident. It has no interfaces with any other instmmentation or controls of either the NV system or any other system. The vibration monitors and cabinets containing the rack mounted electronics were mounted QA Condition .t. This will eliminate undesirable interactions with these components and safety related equipment following an carthquake. There was no adverse impact on the pressure boundary of any pump. Operation of the pumps was not adversely impacted. Loads on Modifications Page 7 l

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the aNected power supply remained within design specifications. He availability and capacity of the NV systems to function as designed la support of power generation, nonnal shutdown cooling, or fuel handling was not adversely aNected by the modification. No USQ was created.

CN 19809, Rev. O Description his usodification impmved the suaillary service building HVAC system milability by mdesigning the HVAC control logic. The revised control logic allows a particular AHU to operate as long as the ama served is properly exhausted, his will prevent unaccessary shutdowns of the IIVAC due to failure of ventilation equipament la the musillary building or shutdowns associated with ventilation equipaient failure in the other unit.

Evaluation This modification did not affect the design conditions or the operating parameters of any system. No systems used to mitigate an accident was adversely affected and there were no changes relative to any other system. No unidentified electrical circuits were generated as a result of the modification. No '

new failure modes were generated. This modification did not affect any safety limits, setpoints, or operating parameters.

CN-11251, Rev. O Descrintion This modification replaced valves 1NIO56,1N1057,1NIO67,1NIO68, IN1078,1NIO79,1NIO90, and 1N1091. The previous valves were Kerotest air-operated, fall-closed globe valves and had a history of seat leakage problems. The replacement valves are Anchor Darling air-operated, fall-closed, double-disc gate valves.

Evaluation Since this modification added and replaced valves with no control circuitry changes, there was no ,

effect on the frequency of any accident. No accidents previously thought incredible were made i credible by this modification.' The NI test header modified is not in any of the ECCS flowpaths related to NI for injection or recirculation.- This test header is isolated during normal operation.

This modification did not degrade the performance of the ECCS aspects of the NI system because the modified components are not in those flow paths. No ECCS boundary leakage was introduced.

All of the added components were of the same class and quality as the system to which they were added. No control changes were required. No safety margins were reduced.  !

CN-50424, Rev. O Description This modification identified the safe shutdown pathway requirements and added the unit cyclers as required to cycle the battery in the emergency battery lighting units to help maintain the life of the batteries.

Evaluation No accident initiators were affected by the modification. Loads on interfacing power supplies remained within design specifications. No interfaces with plant or unit controls were affected. The capacity ofik emergency eight-hour battery lighting system to provide battery powered lighting to essential areas and pathways was not degraded. The availability of emergency lighting to essential Modifications Page 8 l

1 L plant areas and pathways was not adversely affected. There was no adverse impact to the reliability of the batteries. No margin of safety was reduced.

CN-50437, Rev. 0 Descristion The carbon vane typc sampie pumps for EMFs 41,(1/2) 42,43 (A/B),(1/2) 35,36,37, and (1/2) 38, 39,40 tended to deteriorate. The carbon dust then clogged sample lines, filters, and sample cartridges. This modification replaced the pumps for these EMFs with a type that is more reliable.

Evaluation This modification only affected the sample pumps for the subject EMFs. None of the anonitors are -

the initiators of any accidents evaluated in the FSAR. No control changes were made. The function of the monitors was not changed. No new failures were created. No seismic interaction concerns -

wen int wduced. No Appendix R concerns were creatal. No fission product barriers were adversely impacted.

CN-50448, Rev. 0 ,

Description ITT Hydramotors have been unreliable and have caused excessive maintenance. This modification revised the actuator with a NH95 style actuator and changed the actuator on damper 1(2)CRA-D-7 (control swom area air handling unit discharge isolation damper) so that the damper falls open instead of closed.

Evaluation This modification made VC/YC more reliable by eliminating active components and replacing active components with passive ones. This modification eliminated damper failures. The IE electrical power being recovered by removing these damper actuators and fans does not degrade the affected power supplies. The local HVAC cabinets were not degraded due to the elimination of the indicating lights. He ductwork containing the modified dampers is still qualified considering the reduction in weight. No new failures were introduced. No control changes were made to the rest of the system. VC/YC pressurization and filtration functions were not degraded below technical specification acceptance criteria. The criteria of acceptance for the VC system (Standard Review Plan Sections 6.4 and 9.4) were preserved.

CN-50436. Rev. 0 Description This modification was implemented to resolve several problems associated with the WZ system. The modification provided the capability to performance test the WZ sump pumps, reduced the need for corrosion related maintenance and repairs, and assured that the design of the auxiliary building -

postion of the system is consistent with the systems safety requirements.

Evaluation Tbc design bases of the WZ system were not affected by these changes. No system used to mitigate an accident was adversely affected. The limited scope of these changes and their lack ofinfluence on other systems generated no new failure modes. Compliance with Appendix R criteria was not degraded. No USQ was associated with this modification.

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l CN-50439, Rev. O Description The CCTV switching equipment was replaced by a state of the art microprocessor contalled matrix t switcher. Digital video image capture capability was added to the alarm assessment system. All 6" preview monitors were replaced by selectable monitors. Two sequencing monitors also were added.

Evaluation l Neither the CAS/SAS nor associated equipment are safety related. Dey art not used to mitigate l any accident. ' No equipment which is designed to mitigate any accident was affected by this anodification. No equipnient used for any phase of either power generation, decay heat removal, fucI handling, or radwaste treatment was adversely aNected by the modification. Loads on all power  ;

distribution equipment remained within design specifications. The provisions for security monitoring pawvided within the CAS/SAS were not degraded by the modification. No new failurt ,

noodes were identified.

CN-50434, Rev. O Description -

This NSM modified the drinking water (YD) system to effectively render the supply side non--  !

functional to accommodate the new offsite water supply from York County. The existing piping and .

components in YD armained in place to serve as a distribution system. The supply sources from ,

filtered water (YF) and other unnecessary system interfaces were isolated by closing and locking certain valves. Power was removed from the YD pumps. Additionally, some piping was cut and capped.

Evaluation .

The YD system is not an accident initiator and modifying it can not make it one. The YD system is not an accident mitigation system and therefore has no impact on the mitigation of any accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety. This modification isolated some instrumentation, tripped and locked some breakers, and disconnected power to the YD control panet All of the  ;

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affe:ted components are non-safety and have no undesirable interactions with any SSCs. No control functions were added. No new failure modes were introduced. No USQ was created.  !

CN-11010  !

Description:

This modification will remove the auto start function from the Refueling Water Storage Tank '

(FWST) Missile Wall Sump Pump and replace it with manual start capability. The existing level switch will be used to generate an annuncistor in the control room.

Evaluation i The affected instrumentation is not safety related. The integrity of the FWST and the Missile Wall

• are not affected by this modification. The operation of the FWST and its capabilities as a water source are not affected. The potential for releasing contaminated water from the sump is reduced by this modification instead of the automatic function. Therefore it has been determined that this I modification does not create an unreviewed safety question. ,

CN-11234 Modifications Page 10 i

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Description:==

His snodification will paavide the Unit 1 and Unit 2 backbones to be connected to the Catawba LAN/ Wide Area Network (WAN) administrative loops.

Evaluation No equipsacet used in accident mitigation is affected by this modification. Compliance with neither Appendis R or seismic criteria is degraded. Therefore this modification does not create an marrviewed safety question.

CN-11255

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Description:==

His modification removes interfaces between the Boron Regeneration System (NR and the Chemical Volume and Control System (NV). In addition the modification removes NR flow element loop NRFT5010. lastly the modification will gage relief valve INR114. These are all being done to remove the NR system since it is not used at Catan ba.

Evaluation The components being removed can be removed without adversely affecting the unit operation since the system is not used and remains isolated. The NV systm is not degraded by the armoval of these laterfaces. The NR system is being declassified from clase 8 to Class G. It has been determined that no equipment important to safety will be adversely affected in interactions with the NR system following an earthquake. Seismic qualification of the NV and NB equipment is not degraded. There is no adverse affect on the NV system pressure boundary. No undesirable interactions with the NV letdown line are created. Theerfore it has been determined that this modification does not carate an unreviewed safety question.

CN-11311

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Description:==

This anodification installs instrument taps and indicating pressure gauges to measure nuclear senice water system (RN) differential pressure for each of the component cooling (KC) Hz. These instruments will be used to measuit the performance of the Hz.

Evaluation:

This modification does not make the RN system any len reliable and does not create any new failuer modes. No control changes are being made. The accident irsponse of the RN system will remain mechanted. No interaction with any other safety related or non-safety related system is carated.

Derefoer is has been concluded that this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question. -

CN-20297

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Description:==

Modifications Page 11

This modification replace a float type level lastament on the Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System (KD) standpipe with new differential pressure level instmmentation.  ;

raluation The lastrumentation affected'Is not safety related. All code and design requirements have beca met f' la the lastallation of the new instrumsentation. The KD standpipe as well as other components used to mitigate the consequences of as accider.t are not adversely affected by this modification. No ,

setpoints, operating parameters, or safety limits are adversely affected by this modification. .

Therefore it has been detennised that this modification does not represent an unreviewed safety question.

t CN-20300

Description:

Then . codification relocates the Pneumatic Module (PM) and the Remote Contal Unit (RCU), which are part of the asegrated Ixak Rate Testing (ILRT) unit, from inside the containment Personnel -

Airlock (PAL) to a mort easily accessible location in the auxiliary building. Instrumentation penetration isolation valves are being replaced to comply with Reg Guide 1.97. Power supplies for these valves will be changed also.

Evaluation The function of the PAL will not be adversely affected by this modification. The changes will place the PM and RCU in a less harsh environment. The ability of the Instrument Air System to supply the newly routed instrument's power supply are not adversely affected by this modification. The '

fail safe feature of the containment isolation valves is not adversely affected by this modification.

Therefore it has been concluded that this modification does not create an unreviewed safety questice.

CN-20349 Descrintion:

This mod!fication installs normal AC, emergescy AC and emergency DC general area lighting and AC receptacles in the inboard doghouse.

Evaluation

. The doghouse lighting is not an accident initiator, does not exceed the associated supply's design capacity and it will be QA 4 mounted to avoid seismic interaction in the doghouse. Therefore it has been determined that this modification does not create an untrvlewed safety question.

CN-20370 Descrintion: j This modification replaces the turbine supervisory instrumentation (TSI) w hich is considered to be unreliable and inaccurate with more reliable and accurate systems. The modification also affects  ;

one control avom chart recorder and turbine trip system.

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Evaluation ,

This modification replaces existing non-safety systems with other non-safety systems used to  !

unonitor main turbine operating conditions. The laterfaces between the TSI and the turbine trip systems will be upgraded to improve reliability and will minimize the possibility of an unnecessary trip. TSI has no reactor safety function and will not aNect the consequences of an analyzed accident. - ,

Escept for the turbine wear trip. TSI is not an accident initiator, however, a failure will not create an accident which has not been considered in the FSAR.

CN-20402

Description:

This modification will remove the auto start function from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) Missile Wall Sump Pump and repInce it with manual start capability. The existing level switch will be used to generate an annunciator in the control room.

Evaluation The aNected instrumentation is not safety related. The integrity of the FWST and the Missile Wall are not affected by this modification. The operation of the FWST and its capabilities as a water ,

source art not affected. The potential for releasing contaminated water from the sump is reduced by this modification instead of the automatic function. Therefore it has been determined that this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question.

CN-20433

Description:

l The operation of the New Fuel Elevator can be stopped with a disconnect switch. This switch is not easily accessible. This modification adds an additional circuit breaker at an easily accessible location on the wall near the New Fuel Elevator.

Evaluation No equipment or stivcture used to handle or store spent fuel is affected by this modification. No new power demands art added. There is no adverse affect on compliance with either seismic or Appendix R criteria. Therefore this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question.

l CN-20602 I l

Description:

This modification installs a dedicated 3" Reactor Vessel IIcad vent to aid in draindown. A 3" butt 4 weld pipet is added to the an unused Upper IIcad Injection pipe sub located at the 180 deg position 4 on the reactor vessel. Two double disk gate valves with leakoffs will also be added.

Evaluation

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The piping attached up through the 2nd isolation valve will be QA Condition 1, Class A. All design conditions are the same as the original reactor coolant system. A schedule 160 guard pipe is pevvided from the pipet to the CRDM seismic support as protection for the Control Rod Drives.

The isolation valves are manual and can only be operated be operated when the reactor is shutdown.

The probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not incitased.

No new failure modes will be created by this modification. Therefore it is concluded that this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question.

CN-20612

Description:

This modification installs lifting devices capable of removing the actuator or an entire Containment Purge (VP) containment isolation valve at each inside valve location. Provisions are added to drawings to allow holes to be drilled in stiffener rings outside containment for installing temporary' lifting devices for the outside Containment Purge containment isolation valves.

Evaluation In general, lifting devices, platforms, and rerouted cable trays are seismically designed and QA _

condition 4. The exceptions to this statement are review in the safety analysis and determined to not citate an unreviewed safety question. The VP valves have been rcYleWed against NUREG-0612 and found to acceptable with respect to suspended loads inside containment. The load capacity of the lifting devices have been reviewed and determined to be adequate. One smoke detector will be removed. It has been determined that adequate apacity to detect the presence of a fire is adequate to equipment important to safety. Therefore it bas been determined that this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question.

CN-20619

Description:

)

This modification will provide the Unit 1 and Unit 2 backbones to be connected to the Catawba ' l LAN/ Wide Area Network (WAN) administrative loops. i Evaluation No equipment used in accident mitigation is affected by this modification. Compliance with neither Appendix R or scismic criteria is degraded. Therefore this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question. 1 CN-20624

Description:

Dis modification will replace 600 amp rating lugs with 800 amp rating lugs. MCCs with MC800 Amp incoming breakers will be affected.

Evaluation:

i l

De availability of the MCCs used for the distribution of power to loads required for nonnal plant operation is not affected by this modification. The interfaces among equipment used for accident Modifications Page 14 l

I snitigation and between them and their power soortes are not adsenely affected by the anodifications. No single failure need is associated with this modification. Derefont this it has been determined that this ,

needification does not create an unreviewed safety quedian l l

CN-20639 Descdotion:

His anoddication pavvides Containment Chilled Water (YV) systens as the monnal cooling water supply to the Upper Containment Ventilation Units (UCVUs). Pdor to this modification the cooling water was supplied by the Nuclear Senice Water (RN) system.

Evaluation:

Since the system is not degraded and the perfonnance should actually be enhanced, the expected fisquency of challenges to the system should not be expected. Also, no new failure modes are created. No contswl changes are being made. Since the RN non<ssential loads are not considered in the minimum RN ,

pump flow evaluation, this modification will not degrade RN pump operation. No assumptions made in j any accident analysis are affected by this modification. De ability to maintain containment temperature within the requierd Tech Spec values is not degraded. Herefore,'it has been determined that this

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needification does not citate an unseviewed safety question.

CN-20655 Descdotion: I nis modification replaces the Meistuer Separator Reheaters (MSRs) tube bundles with stainless steel l (Alloy 439 - cf). He arplacement tube bundles will have incitased capacity to accommodate larger Steam  !

Generaton.

Evaluation:

nest met no incitases in the operating basis stress of either the MSR, any MSR component, or any laterfacing equipment or structure. The Turbine thermal cycle is not adversely affected. Design persaures and temperatunts armain unaffected. The pavbability of either turbine trip or failust of the IEr blades is not incerased as a result of this modification. The MSRs air not used to mitigate any accident. Arbine operating charactedstics are not adstrsely affected. Herefont it has been detennined that this modification does not create an unitsiewed safety question.

CN 20668 ,

}

Descdotion:

Reactor Coolant (NC) system drain vahts will bc arplaced with vahts fnun a differrat manufactuser. It is anticipated that the new vahes will be less likely to stick in the closed position.

Evaluation:

De NC system patssure boundary is not degraded as a itsult of this modification. De probability of a LOCA is not increased. No equipment used to mitigate any accident is affected by this modification. De response of the ECCS to an accident is not degraded. De amount of identified leakage is not incitased Modifications Page 15 j l

g with this omdification. Hertfoot it has been detennined that this snodification does not create an E

unreviewed safety question.

-l CN-20669

Description:

This modification adds 16 vibration monitoring sensors (accelerometers, velocity transducers and eddy current probes) to the centrifugal charging Pumps (CCP). j Evaluation:

The ability of the Chemical Volume and Control (NV) system to function as designed in support of normal power generation, shutdown, or fuel handling is not adversely affected by this modification.

No equipment used to mitigate any accident is affected by this modification. Therefore it has been determined that this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question.

CN-20674 Descrintion:

His modification changes the logic for both Main Feedwater (CF) and Main Steam (SM) isolation indication lights so that the lights will light when an isolation of the CF or SM system is initiated automatically as well as .~.anually.

Evaluation:

De only circuits modified att those which control the actuation of the CF and SM isolation Indication lights. No contml logic for either the SM or CF system is affected. De probability of inadvertent actuation is not increased. De ability neither the CF or SM systems to mitigate an accident is affected.

Derefore,it has been detennined that this modification does not citate an untryiewed safety question.

CN-20676

Description:

)

This modification replaces the existing containment emergency recirculation sump capillary lastamentation with a Delaval float type continuous level sensing system, in addition, the receiver gauges for loops N15260 and NIP 5270 scale markings will be changed to a more convrational labeling system. The capillary system has experienced numerous problems since ind A .lon.

Evalustion:

These changes will not adversely affect the ability of any system to perform its design function. No system used to mitigate an accident is adversely affected. Moreover, the espressed purpose of this modification is to improve the availability and reliability of the containment water level sensing lastnamentation. Therefore it has been determined that this modification does not create an

. unreviewed safety question.  ;

CN-21306

Description:

Modifications Page 16

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i his modification replaces 4" carbon steel CF and CA piping, lacluding the CA tempering flow ,

4 piping with 6" stainless steel piping.

Evaluation: ,

No control changes are being made and no procedural changes are required by this modification. =i ne isoistion valve's stroke times are unaffected. The piping has been analyzed and qualified : l consistent with the applicable criteria appropriate for the various classes involved. No assumptions  ;

minde is any accident analysis have beca comp:3mised related to the 20% flow assumption to the upper mozzle at " hot zero" power. Therefore, the smargin of safety as defined in Tech Specs is not ,

nduced therefore this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question. r 4

CN-21312 i

Description:

l This modification separates the RESET function for Main Steam Bypass Valves 2SM-9,10,11,& 12 frons the CLOSED function of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MISV) 2SM-1. Currently, all four  :'

MSIV Bypass valves are reset by push-button 2SM48, and the "SM ISOL Train A" push-button.

SM48 also

• loses 2SM-1. This could potential result in a Reactor Trip by an inadvertent closure of 6 2SM-1 r.M resetting the Bypass valves.  ;

i Evaluation:

This qf'Leation will orduce the potential for the FSAR 15.2.4 accident (" Inadvertent Closure of a j j MfP/'h e separating the SM-1 valve closure function from the bypass reset function. This t 4: used.tdion will not affect the operation of the MSIV or MSIV bypess valves to respond to any -

safety signal. Therefore it is concluded that this modification does not create an unreviewed safety I questloc.

CN-21314

Description:

This modification installs redundant solenoid valves in parallel to the electrical and pneumatic cinuits for the Feedwater Control Valves (FCV). Two solenoids will be placed in parallel with the existing solenoid to improve the reliability of the FCV circuits for keeping the FCV's open during power operation.

Evaluation:

The likelihood of an event repersented and bounded by a loss of feedwater in the FSAR is not incerased. This modification has been compared against NSAC-125 with regards to does this modification " increase the probability of malfunction of equipinent important to safety". The effect j

, of the anodification on the performance of the FCV's was evaluated and it was determined that the j sbility of the FCV to perform as assumed in the accident anulysis would not be degraded below the i

. design basis requirements. In addition the NRC guidance with ergards to the increase in probability i of a malfunction was addressed and determined to also be satisfied. Therefore it was determined I that this tuodification does not create an unreviewed safety question.

1 Modifications Page 17

i CN-21321

Description:

. This modification revises control circuits to cenolve 2 concerns with the Containment Air Return System:

-1) ne Containment Air Return Fan (VX CARF) could continue to run after containment pressure has decreased below the low pressuit set pint due to a postulated single failure. ,

2) An earlier modification nmoved the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS)

• Interlock with the Hydrogen Skimmer Fan (HSF) since it had been determined that this ,

interlock is not necessary. However the indication for this interlock was not removed and ,

could be a source of confusion.

This modification revises the control circuitry to address these two concerns.

Evaluation ,

The reliability of the CPCS in preventing excessive operation of the VX CARF Subsystem has been ,

enhanced. The reliability of the CPCS in permitting the activation of the VX System has not been  !'

degraded. The interfaces between the CPCS and the Containment Spray (NS) System has not been modified. No other system used to mitigate accidents has been modified. Therefore, it has been determined that this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question.

CN-21333 Desedution:

This modification provides additional capacity to monitor the plants secondary systems for signs of a S/G tube leak by lastallation of nitmgen-16 moniton (N-16) near the main stearn lines on Unit 2.

Evaksation De new N-16 monitors have no contml functious. Existing EMF 33 is not degraded by this modification.

No other equipment used to mitigate accidents is affected. He ability to itspond to a S/G tube leak is not advenely affected by this modification. Derefore it is concluded that this modification does not create an unstdewed safety question.

• CN-53024 l Descriotio q f

his modification adds a chlorine gas system as part of the Filtered Water (YF) and Drinking Water i systems. De garpose is to chlorinate these systems. He chlorine gas bottles will be located in a chlorination house in the transfonner yard.

Modifications Page 18

Evaluation i

i De analysis of Control Room habitability following an accident is not expected to increase as a resuk of this modification. De safety related consequences of an unlikely explosion of the chiodne tanks is bounded by the loss of offsite power accident (LOOP) due to the passimity of the tanks to the auxiliary transfonners. No other accident scenado mported in the FSAR is affected either by the current YD and l YF hypochlorite system or the chiodnation system. Henfore it has been detennined that this modification dose not represent an unitilewed safety question.

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Modifications Page 19 '

SUMMARY

OF NUCLEAR EXEMPT CHANGES RELATED TO 10 CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS i Enemot Chaner CE-2066 Descdotion Changes the type of heat trace cable that protects the tubing for instruments ORIM5030 and ORLJ'T5920 (Discharge pressure freni RL Pumps).

Evaluation ne type of controller is not changed, nor is the operation of these instmments. Neither the heat trace or the instmments are safety misted. No changes to FSAR or Tech Specs required.

Esemot Channe CE-2356 (Unit 1) and Exempt Chanee CE-2357 (Unit 2)

Descdotion De non-safety related "CA TDP Running" timing relay, associated timer and optical isolators an disconnected fran each CA TDP contml circuit.

Evaluation De circuits affected are not used for any phase of power generation or transmission, nonnal shutdown cooling, fuel handling, or rad treatment. No component used for any of the presious activities menariated with nonnat plant operation is affected. No equipnient used to mitigate any accident is affected. No new failust niodes are created, noris any fission pmduct barriers affected. No changes to the FSAR or Tech Specs is required.

Esemnt Channe CE-2844 l

DtKditLit!! .  !

Changes the setpoints for the level alarms for the Boric Acid Tank.

Evaluation his change, based on calculated required usable wlumes to be maintained in the BAT for modes 1 through 6, assures required volumes are available. It accounts for the un-usable volume below the outlet ,

aanle of the BAT and reduces indicated tank volume inaccuracy. It has no affect on the icwl l instrwnientation' ability to per'onn their safety related function and allows for more conservatin level i indication.

Esemot Channe CE ?s51 Desedntion Prnvides for tiv. addition of a hot gas bypass line to each Containment Ventilation chiller system (YV) to reduce the number of tr!ps caused by low load conditions.

Evaluation De YV system is not used to support any phase of operation of cither plant pdmary systems or secondary systenis, it affects only YV system, which are not used to mitigate and accident. The ability of the YV system to maintain containment lower compartment temperatures to within the limits assumed is not affected. No setpoints, design limits or operating parameters are affected.

Exempt Changes Page1

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Enemot Channe CE-3862 (Unit 1) and CE-3863 (Unit 2)

Descdotion Converts instrument loops which measurt Reactor Coolant level fnna merse acting wet leg transmitters to direct acting with dry reference leg transmitters.

Evaluation his mod eliminates problems ammarlared with leakage fnun reference leg, temperature changes inside

• ' - - ; excess calibration equipment, and inaccuracies etc. By alkming the low pressure side of the tramannitters to be vented when the head is vented ensures that both reference locations are maintained at

=*=maaphede pressure. De indications in the control room stay the same with no diferences in the method of measurtsnent being noticeable. No seismic concenas since mounting does not change.

Conversion fnun merse to direct is a sonware change on the smart transmitters. This method of DP measurtinent is standard thnmghout the industry.

Exemnt Channe CE-3882 Description Replace Ice Condenser Glycol Recistuistion Pumps with a design which is much more reliable.

Evaluation De new pump motors are Reliable high efficiency nudors and art designed to reduce cost and nicchanical losses, as well as winding power losses. It therefort operates at a lower current, which reduces headng temperatures.. Dese motors are capable to better withstand transient conditions such as mervoltage, medoading, etc. The operation of the ice condenser system is not affected. There are seismic concerns arising as a result of this change, nor is any safety related equipment affected.

Exempt Channe CE-3935 Description Replaces the spring pack on vahts IND-59B (Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B Miniflow) with a spdng pack that is sired for it's application.

Evaluation Spdag pack currently used allows a minimum setting for 82 ft-lbs and does not prmide an adequate set-up range for the valves GL 89-10 test prvgram. Per Generic Ixtter 89-10, this valve requires a minimum torque of 46 ft-lbs. The new spring pack prmides a range of 55 to 145 ft-lbs. He new pack has the same fit, form and function as the old, and does not affect the ability of the vahts to perfonn its safety function, nor does it affect the operation of the residual heat remm al system.

Esemnt Chanee CE-3951 Descdotion ~

To mise the Control Raoen Area Clilled Water System (YC) contruller setpoint of the chiller condenser head pressure to a range of 130 to 170 psi.

Evaluation De preious 110 psi setpoint was insufficient to adequately retuni refdgerant to the evaporator to prnent low refrigerant temperaturt trips. De new range continues within operating design limits and Exempt Changes Page 2

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I redeces the possibility of a low evaporator afdgerant tdp and is below the high condenser refdgerant tdp setpoint of 220 pai his chany increases the availabihty of the system.

Enemot Chanac CE-3952 ,

Desedstion Replace 3 inch Rockwell-Edward equi-wedge gate valve with Anchor Dading Doublealise gate valve for i l

2NC-31B (Par PORY Black Valve).

i Evaluation Esistag i * - " - e actuator is reinsed to avoid any changes in elecidcal circuitry. He design and seismic report shows valves is qualified with this I.Jaitorque actuator. The end-tMed dis ===ala==

between existing and E;' ---=2 valves are the same. No odestation changes are required. His mod has negligible effect on existing neienw analysis and support / restraint designs, nor are their any i negligible differences in weight and center of gravity. New valve will be artested, per Tech Spec  ;

requirennents, pdor to putting in senice. i Escmnt Channe CE-3999 Descdotion increases the containment puty entilation system (VP) supply unit filter DP from 1 inwc to 2 inwc.

Evaluation Due to the type of fihers used, norinal DP should be 0.8 inwc for new clean filters. His accounts for 0.55 l

inwc across the pre-fiker and 0.25 inwc across the 2nd filter (vadcell). De current 1 inwc setpoint reflects i very little run time on the filtm. Based on experience,2.0 inwc is enore adequate for this application.

His subsystem is not addressed in Tech Specs and does not involve nuclear safety related equipment.

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Esemat Channe CE-4000 i l

Desedp60s l

Changes the range of the EDG LO LO Imbe Oil transmitters froni "O - 60 PSIG" to "O - 100 PSIG", and nconfigusts the engine start timer to allow display of a decimal point.

Evaluation De present range of "O - 60 PSIG" is not large enough to accommodate the pressure escalations seen on the engine at engine start, k has been obsened that pressures increase to 90 PSIG upon start, which is acceptable, but mer-ranges these transmitters, sending a Im Imbe Oil Pressure Trip signal to the EDG.

The higher range prevents inadsertent trips frum such a tdp signal Hese EDGs art required to be at rated speed within 11 seconds. The original EDG Control Panel timers had failed and were obsolete. De newer timers lastalled had decimal point indications, but did not display. After discussions with the vendor,it was decided that the configuration switches would need to be l

changed to enable this function. De 2/3 Im Im Imbe Oil Pressure function is addressed in the FSAR only as an emergency idp function. This change does not affect this function in any way. Only internal calibration changes are made to enmer the entist range of tube oil perssures are measured. The change to the timer does not affect the ability to record EDG start time and provides no control function.

Esemnt Channe CE-4027 Exempt Changes Page 3

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U Descdotion Changes the Contal Room Ventilation Systens (VC) thennostat setpoints fmm 75 degrees F to 74 desmes  ;

F to suflect the 74 degree setpoint in the FSAR. .

Evaluatios ..

This change does not affect the ability of the VC system to maintain acceptable limits for normal and emergency operating conditions and the accident analysis is not affected. his mod does not affect safety.

related q '. e- as a separate safety related loop operates cooling contrels as stquired.

Esemot Channe CE-40%

Desedation Adds open torque switch hypass to valse 2RN-388, safety related valve. His prevents the vahe actuator fram tdpping prior to fully unmenting off of the vahe seat against ==d=== DP and fdction loads for the i open circuit only.

Evaluation This change only incerases vahr reliability for its intended function and does not affect any petsent signals that initiate valve nudion. Valve operator speed and capacity is unaffected and does not change open and closure times.

Exemot Channe CE-4071 Descdotion Resernes installation of the personnel aldock equalization line containment isolation vahts, to allow j testing ALARA. This new orientation places the vahts in a conservatist leak-rate test odentation (accident pressure under the scat). .

Evaluation While these valves air safety related, the change presents no new seismic component failure concess and the closing function remains the same. No changes to mitigate an accident are invoked. Containment isolation is not affected and the ability to test these vahes is maintained. No Appendix R concerns att identified since there is neither any new electrical changes nor any new fire barrier penetrations.

Exemot Ganee CE-4072 Rinit 1) and CE-4073 Rinit 2)

Desedation De esempt change cosers replacement of various vahts actuaton, spring paM, torque switch settings, provides open torque switch bypass contacts and bypasses the open torque switch for the entire trasti span for certain vahts, in order to meet the arquirements of NRC Genede letter 89-10.

Evaluation NRC Genede Ixtier 89-10 requires a higher level of operability detennination and maintenance of cdtical motor operated vahes and established cdteda to select vahes requiring a higher level of surstillance and the degate of surveillance. The vahts and their operators must be tested under design basis conditions or test data must be extrapolated to vedfy operability under design basis conditions. De vahts affected by this change sneet the selection cdteda and are modified accordingly by this change to ensuet maintenance of their intended safety function.

Esemot Channe CE-4100 Rinit 1) and CE-4101 Ginif2 Exempt Changes j Page 4 '

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Mx<

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Descdotion Replaces stem and gate for vahes NY 312A and 314B with that of a different material to increase the yield  !

strength and structural limit of these vahes, to meet the requimnents of Ge.ncric Ietter 89-10. l l

Evaluation nis change will reduce the ->=t of thmut overshoot and increase the vahe stroke times. His champ therefort does not affect the ability of the vahts to perform their safety function, but anhamma that ability.

ne electrical charactedstics maain the same.

Esemot Channe CE-4109 (Unit 1 and CE-4110 (Unit 2)

Descdotion j lacreases the maximum thmst torque limit and replaces the motor pinion gear and worme shaft in the actuators for the Steam Generator PORY Block valves.

Evaluation Dese changes are implemented to upgrade the vahts to the requimnents of Generic letter 89-10 and do not afhtt any present signals that initiate valves motion. De vaht stroke times will increase, which will ,

not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. >

Esemot Channe CE-4115 Descdotion Revises the vahts thewst values for ISV-258, Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere, per the requimnents of Genede Imiter 85-03, due to changes in design's undervoltage calculation method and increases the i tolerance froen 2% to 7%.

Evaluation his change does not affect any present signals that initiate vahts motion, nor is the vahe operator speed j and capacity affected. Open and closure times do not change and the vaht's ability to perform its safety J function is not affected.  !

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Esemot Channe CE-4140 l Descdotion Adds the Borg Wamer past numbers for line item number 10 on CNM 1205.12-0041.002 to list the P/N's requirement to make up this QA 1 assembly.

Evaluation The addition of this information ensuits that the correct pasts are used to make up a Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Actuador Nitrogen Supply Tubing Assembly using safety related parts. Hertfore this )

change enhances the margin of safety in this application.

Esemot Channe CE-41fl0 Description Changes the setpoints for the YF Clearwell Tank lesel controls.

Evaluation Esempt Changes Page 5

Dis champ lacreases the operating window for the tank and champs the 1&C list to accannt for a 26" reference leg and changes the outline drawing for the Clearwell tank to show actual elevation off the floor. -

I I

Esemot Channe CE-4208 (Unit 1) and CE-4209 (Unit 2) l Descdotion Adds acceleraneters and cables frani the acceleraneters to cannecton nearby, to a lac =*iaa outside of the l VC Switchyar Air Handling Units.

Evaluation 4 It was deserviined that obtaining fan beadng dbration readings with hand applied tramadaren is unsafe. I Dese readings are a asee===sy part of functionally vedfying pisper operation of the fans following repair.

Outside cannections facilitate safe function testing. His change does not pose any additional chauenses to the enfatlag air handling unit. De stud avasating is most than adequate and the cable is secured at a admissuna of three locations along each short run (four feet long total) by stainless steel tie wist, with no laterference w/ belt ddve. Nor does this change challenge the structural integrity of the unit.

Esemot Channe CE-4210 Descdotion Changes niodel number for OYMML 2870 and adds this manual loader to the I&C list and flow diagrasa.

Evaluation

, His manual loader does not serge a safety related function and the new model pe forms the same fonn, fit and function.

Esemot Channe CE-4223 Description '

Revenes installation of the valves 1MISV 5232 & 5233 installed on 3/4 inch tubing line which conne from 1 EMF- 38,39 & 40, to allow testing ALARA. This new odentation places the vahrs in a conservative leak-rate test odentation (accident perssuir under the seat).

Evaluation  ;

While these valves are safety related, the change pitsents no new seismic component failust concerns and the closing function remains the same. No changes to mitigate an accident are involved. Containment isolation is not affected and the ability to test these valves is maintained. No Appendix R concerns are identified since there is neither any new electrical changes nor any new fist barder penetrations.

Esemot Channe CE-4232 Desedntion Chanys the Safety Injection Pump perssuir reducing sleest locknut from a 416 to a 410 stainless steel material, which is less susceptible to starse corrosion cracking, 1

Evahtation I ne pump manufacture now supplies this locknut as an acceptable substitute. Its installation does not l affect the safe operation of the pump, and the pump will continue to operate as befort. De new locknut )

i can better withstand hannful environmental efforts that cause states corrosion.

Exempt Changes Page 6

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4 Eseniet Channe CE-4269 Descdotion i Adds as leal =*Ia= valve to the piping supply header to the Recipmcating Charging Pump Fluid Ddve-Cooler to allow non-outap mainten==ce wods on the piping header.

Etaluation ,

De new laalmela= vahr is a stainless steel vnhe which esceeds all design mquimnents, De weight of the valve does not cause any stress concems or chang operation of the RN systens in any way. Engineedag ,

evaba*la== concerning the addition of this vidve has determined no resukant detrimental eaaave=ces i

Esemot Channe CE-4281 Description Replaces the spring pack on IFW-33A (FWST Recirr 140p Isolation) to one that is better sized for the appikation.

Evaluation Valve requimnents requires a minimum torque of 20 ft-lbs. The spdngpack currently used has a minimum setting of 82 ft-lbs and does not prmide adequate setaap range per the requimnents of Genedc I4tter 89 *0. The new springpack pnnide adequate torque for the existing vahr to perform k's safety hanction. The new spdngpack has the same fonn, fit and function as the original spdngpack, his change does not affect operation of the FW system and appropriate artests and functionals are perfonned ,

pdor to retuming the vahr to senice.

Exempt Channe CE-4283 I Descdotion Replaces the spring pack on IFW-49B (FWST Recirc Loop Isolation) to one that is better sized for the application.

Evaluation Vahr requimnents requires a minimum torque of 20 ft-lbs. De spdngpack curerntly used has a minimum setting of 82 ft-lbs and does not provide adequate set-up range per the requimnents of Generic letter 89-10. The new springpack provide adequate torque for the existing valve to perfonn k's safety i function. He new spdngpack has the same fonn, fit and function as the original springpack. His  !

change does not affect operation of the FW system and appropriate artests and functhmals are performed l prior to retuming the vahr to senice.  !

Exempt Channe CE-4284 Description Changes filter cartridge design for the letdown filters, Evaluation ne new filter cariddge retains 99% of particles 5 mkren and lagier, while the old filter retained 98% of particles 25 mienms and larger, ne new filter has a laqeer effective filter area, prmiding an ability to retain nicar particles, Fiher changcout should be about the same frequency as present due to retention of smaller particles. The additional weight of the new filter is within acceptable limits and does not warrant l l

Exempt Changes Page 7

F a fonnal w'-le reanalysis. De design parameters for the new fiher exceeds cdteda as specified in the FSAR.

Esemot Channe CE-4289 Descdotion Replace existing valve 2RN-45 (20 inch manual drain valve to the lake for RB B train wpply header) to a i fabricated blank :;::' ;' = l Evaluation De existing valve has been identified as leaking by the seat and contdbuting to the existing marginal systeen flow rates obtained dudag testing. De valve's intended purpose is non-safety related and serves only as a drain path to the lake for maintenance purposes only and maintaining RN System Pressure Boundary. A replacement valve was considered and detennined to be cost penhibitive. De existing valve was used in conjunction with an existing parallel drain valve, which will be sufficient for all maintenance activity draining, The spool-piece will weigh 300 lbs less than the valve. System integdty will be checked pdor to putting the new spool-piece in senice.

E33!!!!d Channe CE-4292 Desedotion Adds pennanent 4 inch connections to the piping supply and discharge headers to the station air compressor aftercoolers to allow the addition of temporary cooling water to the piping header.

Evaluation De new connections are added to the non-safety low pressure service water system (RL) and exceeds all design requirements. Dese new connections do not affect any existing supports and does not change operation of the RL system in any way. Engineering Evaluation s conce ming the addition of these connections has detennined no resultant deidmental consequences.

Exempt Chanee CE-4293 (YC Chiller 1 A) and CE-4295 (VC Chiller IB)

Desedotion Adds isolation valves to the piping header to the Control Room Ventilation Chiller to allow non cutage maintenance work on the piping header.

Evaluation Dese new isolation valves exceed all design require.nents. De weight of the valves do not cause any stress concerns or change operation of the RN system in any way. Engincedng Evaluation a concerning the addition of this valve has determined no resultant detdmental consequences.

Exempt Channe CE 4301 Description Replaces Cooling Tower Make-Up Valve Actuators with actuaton of a higher torque. Existing actuators haw required high maintenance in the past.

Evaluation Rated torque of the new actuators is more than adequate to ddve the 18 inch valves and will function to satisfy the original design requirements. De weight of the new actuaton is much less than the original Exempt Changes Page 8

I l

actuaten. He system is non-==riear safety related and is not required for the safe shutdown of a unit. i Heae new actuaton win have no significant isnpact on the proper operation of the system. - ne elecidcal .I G- ' " are at a lower vahage and will therefon require a stepalown transformer at the valw, but .

I

- less elecidcity that the odginal actuator.

Esemat Channe CE-4307 Descdollon Adds 2 low point drains and respectiw isolation valves to the B train side of the Nuclear Senice Water System (RN) for draining due to moodification work.

Evaluation Each new low point drain will be 2 inches in dinameter with 2 inch valves. Dey wiu not affect esisting supports nor require new supports. No new mat ==le concerns are created by this modsficaelan. The new valves meet or exceeds all design requirennents. %e miodification does not affect RN system operation, operation parameters or function in any way (installed for maintenance actisities only).

4 Esemot Channe CE-4309 .

Descdotion ,

Deletes lewi gauge and computer point for a Hydrogen Generator level switch which was abandoned under NSM CN-50364.

Evalustloo .

' Dis switch was used for indication only and had no contal function. It was part of a support system that had no affect on the safe operation or shutdown of a unit and was non-nuclear safety related. His instrument nor function was referenced in the FSAR. No operating functions, parameters, safety limits or setpoints are changed. ,

Esemot Channe CE-4314 ,

Description Adds 3 hi-point vents to the Nuclear Senice Water System (RN) to allow for pmper filling / venting and ,

subsequent hydm testing following installation of isolation valves 1RN-E51. E52, E53 and E54. j i

Evaluation Each new hi point vent is 1 inch in diameter with I inch valves. Dey will not affect existing supports nor require new supports. No new seismic concerns are created by this modification. The new whts meet or exceeds all design requirements. De modification does not affect RN system operation, operation parameten or function in any way (installed for maintenance activities only).

Exemnt Channe CE-4316 Desedntion Adds 4 hi-point ents to the Nuclear Senice Water System (RN) to allow for proper filling / venting and i subsequent hydm testing following installation ofisolation vahes 1RN E49 E50, E62 and E63. l j

Evaluation  ;

!I Exempt Changes Page 9

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Each new hi point vent is 1 inch in diameter with 1 inch valves. %ey will not affect existing supports nor require new supports. No new seismic concerns are created by this naodification. De new valves meet or l esceeds all design requirements. De modification does not affect RN system operation, operation parameters or function in any way (installed for maintenance methities only).

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Exempt Changes Page 10 I

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l Esemat Channe CE-4317 Description Adds 2 low point drains and respectist isolation vahts to the B train side of the Nuclear Service Water Systens (RN) for draining due to modification work.

Evaivation ne new low point drain on the RN Supply header will be 4 inches in dl==***r and the low point drain on  ;

the RN Return header will be 6 laches. They will not affect existing supposts nor mquire new supports.  !

No new seismic concems are created by this madification. De new valves meet or exceeds all design requirements, ne modification does not affect RN system operation, operation parameters or function in any way (installed for maintenance activities only).

Esemot Chanse CE-4343 Descdotion l 4 Adds note to drawing CNM 1201.144M)51, Sheet 1 & 3 to show that item numbers 66,67, and 69a are Non-QA Condition.

Evaluation His drawing is of the Incore Instimmentation System (ENA) and is non-safety stlated but the incert flux thimbles, high pressure seals and Epide tubes since they serve as a reactor coolant system pressum boundary. Item number 66 (flare fitting),67 (heat shdnk) and 69 (flare fitting caplug used during initial ladaMafion only) Art non-QA condition. His change does not mise the system's function as stated in the FSAR or Tech Specs. No other change is being made except to the drawing note.

Esemot Chanse CE-4346.

Description In light of adding the Containment Spray System (NS) Heat Exchanger heat loads to the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system for cooling, flow control vaht RN291 & 351 needed modification to accommodate a lower presmet drop acesas the vahe. His change modifies the valves' Cavitrol V tdm to accommodate a miuced pressure deep and increase flow rate acinas the vahe while experiencing acceptable levels of cavitation / vibration acines the vahr.

Evaluation His sinali increase in valve capacity was miewed and found acceptable. He trasti stop of the contaul valves will be re-set during the subsequent flow balance, ne lacrease in vaht capacity may slightly increase the susceptibility of casitation but will be extremely minor with respect to noise and sibration and certainly within acceptable limits. He machining operation will have a negligible effect on the existing weight and support / restraints.

Esemat Channe CE-4348 Desedation Repairs leaking Component Cooling Heat Exchanger by cutting out flow, welding in naale / cap over flawed area to reinstate full confidence in the presmre boundary of the heat exchanger and to eliminate any future concems related to the structural integrity of the heat exchanger.

Evr.luation ne welds to be performed air fully compatible with existing design seguirements and a hydro test will Exempt Changes Page 11

verify sadsfactory pressure boundary, equivalent in confidence to the odginal heat exchanpr. De KC .

systems wiR perform as originaHy intended with no chany in perfonnance, ne added matedal is insignificant to the existing naams of the heat eschampr. No electdcal changes are made by this chany.

i Exemnt Channe CFA362 Descdotion Administratively ensum demineralized water valves 1YM-369 & 478 are not opened simultananuely, which would ramme backflow to the YM tank, by mising flow diagrams to indicate valve 1YM 368 wiM be ad=I=l=*ratively open and 1YM-478 nonnaHy closed.

Evaluation AM .+04 affected procedures wiu be mised to suflect these required valw positions. he Dennineralized Water System (YM)is not a safety related systema and perfonns no safety function. His chany is editadal in nature and only sents to enhance operating procedures.

Exempt Channe CFA365 Descdotion Replaces certain sections of carbon steel piping which supplies steam to the Steam Driven Auxiliary >

Feedwater Pump (CAPT) with stainless steel piping, ne carison steci piping was found degraded due to the effects of heat tracing on the piping, Evaluation New piping represents no change inun the current piping classification, nor will the pipe design pressure and temperature change. The new stainless steel piping is compatible with the interfacing cadion steel segments, steam flow and endennment. Existing pipe supports are adequate and will not require modification. No other mechanical or elecidcal component is affected by the modification.' Neither the CAPT nor the auxiliary steam subsysteau aligned to it are used for any phase of either power generation or -

conversion or transmission, nonnal shutdown cooling, fuel handling, or the pnicessing of radioactive fluids. No equipment used in direct support of these methities of nonnal plant operation are affected by this modification. Compliance with seismic cdteda is not degraded. Neither any fission product barrier nor any sourte tenn Evaluation is affected. t Exemnt Chanee CFA378 Descdotion Re-rnutes valve stem leak-off lines from a common header that dirrets leak-off line flow to the reactor coolant drain tank to the containment floor drains and sump.

Evaluation his change routes NON-reactor coolant leakage to the containment sumps. Re-rnuting of these leak <iff lines will allow proper measurement of identified and unidentified leakage according to Tech Specs. His chany does not affect the operation of the system or function of the leak-off lines. Installation will be in '

. acconlance with existing approved maintenance procedurts.

Esempt Channe CFA379 Exempt Changes Page 12

l Descdotice Installs an orifice coupling and four new valves, tag nuniben 2NI-483,484, and 486, downstream of valve

. 2NI-423. AM affected drawings will be redsed to rdlect these changes.  ;

I Evaluation l Die champ allows a pernianent means of bleeding off pressure trapped between the U2 Cold Leg )

Discharp Aark valves and the Safety Injection pump discharp check valves. If this pressure is not  ;

reduced, the header relief vahes could lift, which is undesirable. The odfice diameter has been sized to  :

restdct flow to a naaximune of 1.0 gym at 1750 psig, his flow is routed to the containment sump which l already receives radioactive effluents fnun other sources. . De additional weight of the new valves, '

couplings, orifice and other parts and determined them to be acey-m It has been determined that .i there will be no thennal expansion concems. Accordingly, the new valves and couplings do not degrade i safety perfonnance facton in any way. Dese valves are not required for unit shutdown and meet all requirements for plant operation and safety.

Exemnt Channe CE-4383 Desedntion .

Replaces the esisting dual coil electrical trip solenoid vahr (ETSV) wkh the new single coil ETSV which ,

has been destloped by GE. The old version has been known to fail an average of 6 times / year, pdmarily >

due to high temperatures. l Evaluation De new coil charactedstics, both electmnically and mechanically, are equivalent to the original De finned coil design operates at kmer temperatures and has eliminated the mechanical weakness where the l common elecidcal lead joined the two coils on the old solenoid. The new ETSV mounts identically as the -i old. De function of the E'ISV does not change.

+

Enemnt Channe CE-4390 a

Descdotion Re-enutes vahe stem leak-off lines fmm a common header that directs leak-off line flow to the reactor ,

coolant drain tank to the containment floor drains and sump.

Evaluation This change routes NON-reactor coolant leakage to the containment sumps. Re-inuting of these leak-off lines will allow proper measurement of identified and unidentified leakage according to Tech Specs. His 7

change does not affect the operation of the system or function of the leak-offlines. Installation will be in

~

accordance with existing approved maintenance prvcedures, i

Esemot Channe CE-4394  !

Descdotion Replaces the vendor supplied starter for the Containment Chilled Water System (YV) Chiller Pump-Out -

Unk which involves mounting a remote starter and rewiring the associated control panci and tenninal box. %c existing feeder breaker and associated cable will be used.

Evaluation he chiller pump <mt unit is used to remove refrigerant from the chiller for maintenance purposes. De  :

YV systent is non-nuclear safety triated nor scismic related or an engineered safety feature system. No credit has been taken for operation of the system dudng accident conditions.

Exempt Changes Para 13 l l

l Exemot Channe CE-4413 (Chiller " A") and CE-4418 (Chiller "B")

Descdotion

• Adds a new drain vahr to the Nuclear Senice Water System (RN) return side of the Contest Roone Chiller Unit to drain for maintenance purposes.

Evaluation The addition of this 3 inch drain does not affect any existing supposts nor arquire any new supports. De mannclated drain valve meets or exceeds the design requirements for this system. The change does not change the function of the RN system in any way and sents as connaience for maintenance draining ,

purposes only.

Exempt Channe CE-4421 Descdotion Resises vendor drawings contained in the vendor operation and maintenance manual for the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Supply Unks (ASPSU) to allow, as an alternative, the use of standard refrigeration flair fittings to make the refrigerant tubing connections at the entering and leasing points on the condenser.

Additionally, the requirement to seal the threaded fittings on the condensers with solder or epoxy will be deleted.

Evaluation The matedal condition of the fittings will comply the QA1 condition of the ASPSU. This modification does not affect the function or the integdty of the ASPSU. The use of flare fittings to join tubing with components is a standard practice in the industry and is an acceptable alternative to the currently used fittings. ' The use of epoxy or solder is considered " ultra-conservatiw" in tenns of reducing leaks and deesned unnecessary. This change sents to enhance maintenance actisities for the ASPSUs by prmiding greater accessibility for the removal of the unit condenser when necessary, which increases reliability and availability.

Esempt Channe CE-4457 Descdotion Replaces the 10 ft-lb motors on valves 1RN-3A and 4B with 15 ft-Ib motors per the requirements of Generic Letter 89-10. De existing moton art marginal for these valve applications.' The limiting factor is the undennitage stall torque. Dese new motors will require larger merload heaters.

Evaluation ne new motors incerase the undenshage stall torque. Dese new motors weigh appsvulmately 20 lbs more than the original design motors and are 4.25 inches longer. De added weight and length do not  :

create a seismic concern and they mount and operate the same. De only electdcal concern requires the l Installation of the larger medoad heaters. The new motors art better insulation specifications which is rated for radiation and higher temperatuir rise than the existing motors. ,

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Esemot Channe CE-4477 Desedetion Adds note to flow diagram for vahr INI-95A to key maintenance personnel that EGS quick connecton Exempt Changes Page 14

. . . .- - - - . . _ ~ .

I aret==ta wwhich will prove beneficial dudag mmoval and replacement activities for this actuator in the .  ;

future. i Evaluation

- De new EGS caamector is a pre-wired pin and socket connector that will allow pre-widag of the conductors inside the actuator. His pre-wiring will reduce the potential for wiring erron due to advene field candi* lama and reduce time spent in radiation areas. Appmpdate documents west revised to allow use of the EGS connectors on Rotodc and IJmitorque actuators. Seismic qualification for the connectors on MOVs is appenpriately documented.

Exemot Channe CE4489 Descdotion Resnoves the control function of the Fuel Pool Filter Unit 2A2 Preheater Dermal Cutout.

Evaluation De filter unit preheater controls wear originally supplied with Fenwal thermal cutouts, his panicular cutout is persently inoperable and a qualified arplacement unit is not available. Dese instmments have becosne a reliability concern and have been deleted in various other HVAC systems. While the filter carbon bed preheaters and associated contents are not essential for proper fiker unit operation per Tech Spec Amendment 84, the perheaters function to extend the life of the carbon beds. Remosing this cutout frons the control cirtuit will restoit FPFU 2A2 operability, pennitting the pstheaters to energize as the .

associated Fuel Pool Exhaust Fan is started. De system will still function as designed.

Exempt Channe CFA492 Description Revises the low level instrumentation setpoints located in Containment Sumps "A" and "B" to terminate '

the sump pumps at 7 inches femen the bottom of the sumps instead of the current 6 inches.

D3!P8t!!!!!

Several problems have been encountered with pumps loosing suction and not cutting off. His change will insust that a sufficient volume of water remains within the sump to pment casitation of the pumps. Upon miest of the calculation which established 6 inches as the cutoff setpoint,it was detennined that 6 inches was c'aosen pdmadly based on maintaining pump suction. Seven inches will prmide an additional inch of suction cmerage. The sumps will continue to operate as originally intended. De probability of equipment malfunction will be arduced as a resuk of this change.

Exempt Channe CFA496 pesedntion Adds notes to the Rotork Maintenance Manual Volume II Parts Listing to add part numbers for the new LVDT nudor end cap o-dngs.

Evaluation  !

This change pimides additional parts option that will allow the pennanent installation of a LVDT motor end cap that has a removabic endcap plug. This end cap plug may be temporadly armmed during Motor l Operated Vahe testing to accanmodate linear radable dimensional transfonner to monitor spring pack j deflection. His new style of endcap will be safer than the type of LVDT adapter presently in use. J l

l Excmpt Changes Page 15 l

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.l Exemnt Channe CE-4502 ,

Descdotion Revises drawings to aflect the as-buik configuration of the emerpacy battery lights in the Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) which includes deleting two emerpacy battery lighting unit details on a flow diagram and changing the description of the load connected to breaker 20 in lighting panelboard SFL from "DC IJghting" to " Emergency Battery Lights" on the flow diagram and Law Voltage Betaker List" for

. panelboard SFL.

Evaluation -

De normal and essertency lighting systerns are not safety related. Eximing emergency battery lights naardhi is adequate illumination for access / egstes and essential equipment. It was detennined that compliance with applicable Appendix R cdteda is not degraded. No field work is required, only editodal changes to applicable documentation.

- Exemnt Channe CE-4516 Descdotion .i Re-routes vahe stem leak-off lines frum a common header that dirtets leak-off line flow to the reactor coolant drain tank to the containment floor drains and sump.

Evaluation His change routes NON-reactor coolant leakage to the containment sumps. Re-routing of these leak-off .

lines will allow proper measurement of identified and unidentified leakage according to Tech Specs. This i change does not afect the operaton of the system or function of the leak-off lines. Installation will be in j accordance with existing approved maintenance procedures.

Exemnt Channe CE-4525

• Desedntion Replaces Main Steam System vahrs 2SM-81,42 and 43 with a new valves that has a larger Limitorque operator.

Evaluation All aNected drawings will be revised. The vahts art of dmilar design except for the physical size. De end-to<nd diferences are minor. Reducing inserts will be used to adapt the new 2 inch to the 1 1/2 inch carbon steel line. Because of the larger operator, a stress analysis was perforned and additional supports wills be a part of this change, as well Appropdate electrical control center changes are incorporated as well. Slight differences in temperature and pressure ratings hase been detennined acceptable. The flow coefficient will remain the same.

E3cmnt Channe CE-4542 Desedution lacorporates changes manufacturer made to Dresser Relief Vahe Maintenance Manual, specifically adjusting ring settings for Dersser 1900 series relief vahts.

Evaluation his change affects the adjusting ring settings and the amount of blowdown. This change comes as a resuk of obtaining the latest technical information available from the manufacturer to maintain and Exempt Changes Page 16

Impawve the performaare of the valve to ks highest level His change does not degrade the effectiveness of any SSC, nor does k require a change to the FSAR.

I Esemot Channe CE-4546 Descriptios .

Renuwes thne 1 inch piping samples fnun the Auxiliary Steam System (SA) due to potential piping j degradation caused by heat tracing, Half coupling and pipe plup will be lastalled to seal the pipe wall fawns which sample piping is to be taken for material examination.

1 Evaluation ne pipe samples taken canald of Class B & C piping. De replace ===8 half coupling and pipe plugs art l Class B. He pipe design persaurs and temperatuit r-Ima unchanged and these couplings and plugs, which are canton steel, mate up to carbon steel piping. Piping statsses and pipe supports are not -

adversely affected by this anodification. No other mechanical or electrical component is affected by these changes.

k Exempt Channe CE-4561 Description Downgrades the QA condition of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Actuaton air cylinden. l Additionally, k changes part numbers for the air manifold seal kits.

Evaluation The part number changes att purely administrative in natuat and do not affect the parts themselves.

Wonling in the Equipment Qualification Maintenance Manual (EQMM) was mis-interpetted as this ,

manual stated that " Actuator seals must be replaced every 5 years". k was mis-interparted to mean all of the seals contained in the air cylinder and the air vahr manifolds. Hence, the soft goods kit for the air cylinders west initially deemed EQ related and west procured as QA Condition 1. A subsequent miew revealed that the 5 year repalecment interval is clearly defined for the air vaht manifolds only. An evaluation detennined that should failure of one of the components of the air cylinder should fail, the MSIV would fail to its fall-safe positon of " closed". The valve manufacturer concurs wkh the conclusion that there art no credible failures associated with the air cylinder seals that could pment the MSIVs ,

fnun closing.

1 Esempt Channe CFA604 Description Replaces Safety Injection System vaht 2NI 485 fnun a metal-to-metal seat design to a soft seat assembly.

Evaluation his original vaht could not pass the Type C leak rate test. The new soft seat assembly valve is specifically designed for use in systems applicable to Type C leak rate testing, His change is insignificant to the plant. De valve flow coefficient, the weight, the center of gravity, etc. all armain the same. He only system affect is the enhanced ability is to seal merne flow for vaht 2NI-485.

. Exempt Channe CE-4619 j t

Exempt Changes Page 17 l

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8 Descdotion i Champs the Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System (NC) Pump #1 seal hi leakaff alarm setpoints to accanat for higher than expected leakage from NCP 2B to 5 spm on NC Pump 28 and to 4 gpm on NC Pumps 2A,2C, and 2D (total seal injection flow of 21 gpm)

Evahiation ,

During nonnal operation for nonnal NC Pump operation, the limitations on #1 seal leakage is defined in Westinghouse Praautions, Unitations, and Setpoint document as 5.0 gpm. AdditionaHy, Westinghouse  ;

letter DAP-88-591 (dated June 30,1988) defines conditions for confia== operation as follows:

Nonaal How: 1.0 - 5.0 gym Maulmma Lissits0J -6.0 gym l Derefore, the high leakoff alann can be set to 5.0 gpm concerning normal pump operation.

During SSF operation, seal injection was pewided by the Standby Makeup Pump which is designed to pewide 26 gpm to all seals during a kiss of normal charging, Additional measures taken will be to incorporate the use of a Compensatory Action to limit identified leakage to less than 4 gym. Dese increased NC Pump #1 seal leakoff flows do not affect the time required to man the SSF.

Esemot Channe CE-4651 Desedation Hewirts Nuclear Senice Water System (RN) Pond swap relays DH and DI in cabinets IEATC9 and 2EATC9 to climinate single failure concern.

i Evaluation Originally,if relay DH in_1 (2)EATC9, which is normally enegized, failed dudng a Blackout or Safety ,

lajection design basis event,it would result in isolation of the RN discharge flowpaths for all components (A and B Train) except for the Deisel Generators. Consequently, this change will rewise relays DH and DI in 1 (2)EATC9 such that vahts 1RN-57, 54A, and 63A are on relay DH in 1EATC9. The ,

contsponding B Train vahts will be similarly wired to relay DH in 2EATC9. In this manner, a failure of )

the DH relay would cause the tdan related pond isolation valve to open while the lake isolation vahe and  !

the discharp header seperation valve would close, i i

Esemot Channe CE-60000 Descdotion Ecplaces personnel nidock latch assemblics with latch assemblics with better thermal pndection.

I Evaluation De new latch assemblies functions exactly the same as the odginal, with some changes to the latches respective Tenninal Boxes. His als a Non-QA modification and it does not affect the FSAR or the Tech Specs in any way.

Exempt Channe CE-60009 Desedotion Replaces the following four inch stdp Control Room chart arcorders: SM7 (TRI), SM8 (TR2), SM9 j (TR3), SM10 (YR4) located on 2MC2; ND4 (2NDCR-5060) and ND5 (2NDCR-5070) located on 2MC7 I with Westrnaics Recorden T4E3 chart recorders.

l Exempt Changes Page 18

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3 Evaluation . .

Design Engineedag has qualified the Westronics recorders and their associated equipment for seimasie  ;

response and control board interactions and to Duke Power Standards. His change has no effect on HED of the Content Room or the safe shutdown of the units,in that they prmide indication only and serve no coWrelling fhaction. Dese recorders are not safety related.

i Esemat Channe CE40010 (Unit 1) and CE-60011 (Unit 2)

Descdotion  !

Installs a phone in the vestible area inside containment at the lower sidock.  ;

i Evaluation His phone is not safety related, nor does it affect any safety elated equipment. It does not laduce any i failure modes, nor are any operating parameters, safety limits or setpoints changed. l 1

Esemot Channe CE40012 i

Descdotion Inw n. a telephone cable freen Micawwase tenninal cabinet MWTC2 located on elevation 594, column  !

IN-33 to FTC17 located on elevation 594, column Q-34. Converts MWTC-2 to PTC-25 and changes -

' IECM 510 and 1ECM 511 to ECI cables.

Evaluation l Dese cables and panels are not safety related and do not inselse any equipment and / or system that is i safety related. This cable does not induce any new failust modes, nor are any operating parameters, j safety limits, or setpoints changed.

s Exemnt Channe CE40017 ,

Desedntion .

Modifi-s the fore alarms currently monitored in the guardhouse adjacent to the engincedag warehouse l such that they will alann in the Contnd Room through an automatic dialing telephone systems. De site i masembly / evacuation alanus currently initiated in the guardhouse will be tied into the plant system.

Evaluation 1 l

Dis noodification, which involves the ECI and ERT Systems, have been evaluted by Engineering, and l detennined to have no adverse affects on system operation. De work performed is not safety stisted and j does not affect any safety related SSCs, nor equipnwnt important to safety. 1 i

Esemot Chanee CE40022 Description l Replaces the Estedine 1124E chart recorden on 1DGCPA and 3DGCPB with Westronics DDRIO digital data recorders.

Evaluation ne existing Estedine recorders are ohnelete and do not adequately prmide the necessary data for proper trending and innbleshooting of the diesel generators. He power and signal connections for the Exempt Changes Page 19

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P Westionics recorden are the same, with minor differences in the layout of the tenniaals, k was i detenmined that the weight difference and chad maanting does not adversely affect theor seismic j 7 - ' Dese recorders do not perfona a safety function and are not evaluated in the FSAR, nor do they degrade the effectiveness of any SSC important to safety.

Esemot Channe CFA0024 Descristics .

Disco ==aren spare wiring at the Cotrol Roons Annuciator Windows, coor =Ia=*=* penetrations 1PENIV238 and 2PENH238 and SATC-7 for vadeus RF / RY vahe tamper switches, The esisting manaciniar windows in the Control Room wiu be replaced by blank annuciator window panels, De RF/RY valve _

tamper switches wiu be abandoned in place.

Evaluation Vahe tamper switches were originally lastalled on RF/RY valves to pimide valves position indication. It was planned to use this arrangement to reduce operator vahe position vedfication inspection time. A NRC concern was raised regan'ing the use of un-supervised electrical circuits for the fire pentection vahe tamper swicthes. Duke responded by stating that the fire protection valves would be locked in the proper  ;

pushion, except for anoter operated vahes because they are prmided with separate and redundant position indication by the tamper switch and the RF/RY vahr conteel board. De locked vahes will be inspected at thirty day latervals to ensure correct valve position. De use of tamper switches was neser conomitted l to or accepted by the NRC as an acceptable method for verifiying vahe positons, his change does not degrade the program established to verify proper vahe position., nor will it adsersely affect any SSC required for the safe operation of the plant.

Esemot Channe CE-60033 i Descdotion Replaces chart recorden on the Waste Gas System (WG) Analyser Racks A and B that prmide trending capability of percent H2 and ppm O2 within the Catalytic Hydrogen Rewmbiner Package with Westronics 2100 chart recorders.

Evaluation Dese reconten and associated equipment have been qualified for seismic response. De replacement of these recorden has no effect on the safe shutdown of the plant in that they preide indication and output to local annunciaton for Hi and Hi Hi H2 only and provide no conteviling function. His one for one replacement does not affect the recorders present functions, Exempt Channe CF40034 Wnit 1) and CE-60035 (Unit 2)

Descdotion Redesigns the lastallation of existing condenser steam jet air ejector system (ZJ) level gauges which nionhan the lower 3/4 of the loop seals for radiation monitor EMF-33 and replaces the carton steel piping of the loop with stainless steel Dene loops raust maintain level to prevent entry of air frene the Turbine

Bids, Evaluation A tnne empty level is difficult to identify and the seal loop Isolation vahes are suseptahic to air inleakage.

For these reasons, the design is modified such that the gauges measure a 12 inch span, with the 9 inch level equhilent to the top of the loop seal Since water level in the loop seals is nonnally maintained at the top Esempt Changes Page 20

- - .,. -, -. -' +'

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, of the seal, prmidding overiapping nacamressent will resuk in an unambiguous indication of water level in -

the topmost 9 inches of the loop seals. The vendor supplied laal=*Ia= valws will be rennoved and standard '

- root vahes wig be indaued i

The cadon steel piping is being replaced due to observed connaien.

These loop seals and ==macInted gauges are not inaportant to safety, have no QA Ca= Aria = assigned, and are not addressed in any Tech Spec.

Enemot Channe CF40059 Wnk 1) and CE-60060 Wnit 2)

Description Moves Tuding Bldg sump flow swkches fruns the inlet side of EMF 31 to the outlet side of the monitor due to past clogging problenis of the switch, which prevents a loss of flow alarm or by creating a loss of flow. A y-strainer and bypass around the strainer is I=dalled between the r=4ac=*ed flow swithc and the outlet of -

EMF 31, but not pdor to the monitor since a non-representative sample could resuk. .

Evaluation

'Ihe new y-strainer, valves, and associated piping are non-safety related and base no effect on the design basis of EMF 31 or the function or operability of the sump systens since they meet the pressure and i temperature design conditions for this portion of the sump systent. ,

Esemot Channe CE 400di4 Wnit 1) and CFA0114 Wnit 2)

Description l Enhances operator interface softwart for the 1.47 Bypass Indication System (EMA) which includes hot i key for alann history backup to disk, display oflast alann only, system check for DOS errors upon failure '

(failure of the display will not affect the Control Roon alann panel).

Evaluation  !

No Tech Specs are affected by this modification, nor does it degrade the effectiveness of any SSC evaluated in the FSAR, only enhances the ability of the operators to quickly detennine the stans of nionitored systems and components. It does not add any new systems or components significant to plant operation (monitoring system only).

Esemot Channe CE-6M71 l Description Adds new manual isolation valve in each Instrument Air (VI) line sening each Main Steam Isolation Vahe (MSIV). and streutes tubing, a new manual valve installed in each VI line sening each MSIV Bypass Yahe, and relocates filter regulators in the tubing to the Bypass Vahrs.

Evaluation

& MSIVs and associated bypass vahes are air operated and fait close upon receipt of Main Steam Isolation signal N VI system is non-safety related and only interfaces with safety related systems on the basis that upon " loss of air", these components fail to the " safe" position. The closing function of these vahts requires a stewke time, but there is no requirement to open the vahes after they close.

Exempt Changes Page 21 1

Dis snodific=*3a= improves personnel safety due to the uhr manipulations as the assessibility of these ,

vahes will be impamed. De tubing and valves are non-safety related. No new line break interactions l have been created by this modification. i Enemot Channe CE40093 ,

1 Description Adds flhen to the contml air supply for EDG Engine Starting Air System (VG) vahts on the U/1 VG air dryer skids.

Evaluation Due to vahe switching problems, a previous mod changed the conteel air ea== action for the dryer conteel .,

vehes froen the putlet of the dryer skid to the inlet. While this solved the pmblem, the conteil air was no i longer fem a dry source. Moisture could potentially damage the air operated vahts. His mod pswvides a mechamism for atmodng moisture fissa the control air and analysis has determined that the addition of these filters have no adverse affect on the QA-4 qualification of the VG dryer skids. De VG dryers do not performs a safety function and are located in a portion of the VG System piping that is Class F. His need does not change any setpoints.

Esemot Channe CE40097 / CE40101/ CE40103 (Unit 1) and CE40098 / CE40100 / CE40102 / CE-60104 (Unit 2)

Description Pavvides a niore reliable means for detecting the persence of stem leakoff for the Chemical Volume and Control System (NV) by installing three-way vahts in the stem leakoff lines such that leakoff can be configured to pass leakoff flow to the Recycle Hold +p Tank or the sample port for identification and measuresnent.

Evaluation

The operationof the NV system is not affected by this mod. Components which perform accident mitigation functions are not advenely affected by this mod, nor are other components used to mitigate i accidents. De leakoff sample valves art Duke C. ass E, as att the pipe segments into which they are installed An earthquake will not lead to an intersystems LOCA as a itsult of this mod, theerfort the designation of E Class for these lines is acceptable with respect to seismic interactions.

Esemet Channe CF40129 Description Adds two Chtler Hammer pushbuttons to the Ausiliary Feedwater Pump Turtaine speed control circuit to prmide parallel contml of the pump tuttiine (CAPT), one button in the Control Room and the other at the Aus Feedwater Pump Turbine Contevi PancL Thesc pushbuttons replace the variable speed potentiometers which do not prmide the necessary flow to the steam generators at minimum speed setting.

Evaluation

Upon receiving a valid start, the CAPT will accelerate to full speed. This mod does not change or contavl the steam suppy vahts to the CAPT No sneak circuits are associated with this mod. No esisting calbe is it-routed or added. The new components are seismically mounted on the pancis, thus no advene affect to the seismic qualification. His mod does not affect compliance nith Appendis R.

Esempt Changes Page 22

h m Enesent Channe CE44133 (Unit 1) and CE-60134 mnit 2)

Descdotice Provides mosnentary pushbuttons with valve position lights for the EDG fuel oil supply vahes for test Purposes.

Evab=81a=

Existing valves are equiped with position indicat!ag reed switches. Testing these vahts involved partial heading of the valve to connect the test equipment. His mod allows for testing of the valves without diensantling, nducing the potential for wiring errors and increasing availability of the vahes. % cse valves are safety related but this oned does not affect their latended function. Worst case failust is that it fails closed,its safety irlated position, which is addressed in the FSAR.

Exemot Channe CE-60137 Descdotion Provides separate contaul power for the Auxiliary Bldg Cooling Water System (YN) Pump Contmis such that Pumps #2 & #3 do not trip when power is removed from Pump #1.

Evaluation i System functionality mnains the same. His syste:n provides cooling water flow for various non-safety HVAC and heat exchanger systems. Since any of the three pumps can be removed without affecting either of the other two pumps, systems reliability will be enhanced.

Exemot Channe CE44146 mnit 1) and CE44147 mnit 2)

Descriot.lggt Increases the time delay associated with the annuciator circuits for the " Low Residual Heat Removal System (ND) How to Reactor Coolant System (NC) Cold legs) lamp to 2 minutes, which would exist when low flow is detected by the ND flow transmitters and the associated ND pump breaker is closed.

Evaluation i ne irlay and annuciator cirtuit is non-safety related. A Human Perfonnance Enhancement System Evaluator and operator sunty determined it beneficial to incitase the time delay for the ND breaker intedock. Dent was a concent that an Operator could inadsestantly acknowledge the alann befoer noticing which lamp was in the alarm condition. Increasing the time delay to 2 minutes would ensure that the annuciator lamp would remain in the alann condition for 2 minutes. He new relay is manufactured by the same manufacturer and is the same size and weight. His circuit has no contml functions and no logic changes are being made.

Exempt Channe CE44152 Descdotion Installs a sightglass to the Hotwell to monitor Hotwell level when the Auxiliary Feedwater sy stem (CA) is taking suction from the Hotwell to enable Operators to monitor level in the Hotwell as it sents as a suction souree to the CA system.

Exempt Changes Page 23

j

-l Eval ==83a=

De sightglass, which is i==8alled on the condenser,is of the same quality and desip as the condenser itself and does not degrade condenser pressure boundary. The response folkming a CA acusatan and -

i , =4 alignment to the Hotwell mal == unchanged. No proceduits that mitigste an accident are changed. Neither the volume of the Hotwell, CA condesasate storage tank, or the upper sury tank is changed by this and.

Esemot Channe CE40156 Descdotion Adds a 1" drain to Aux Steam piping to prevent water hanumer, by draining the water fruen piping pdor to connecting Aux Steam to the Main Steam to Aux Equipment system (SA). '

Evaluation

Patsenting water hammer will prevent pipe support damage and damage to piping and coenpoents.

There is no elecidcal invohement associated with this mod and the piping is non-safety realted. His mod does not affect the seismic qualifiaction of the system.

)

i Esemot Chanee CE40162 Descdotion -)'

Reclassifies the design pressuit of the Safety Injection System (NI) pump discharge header fruen 1750 peig at 200 degrees to 1900 psig at 200 degrees to incarse the operating margin between the set point of the atlief vahts and the header's normal pressure during testing, l

Evaluation

- : His mod does not add any new components or piping to the NI System, nor are thest any dange to operating, testing or emergency precedures. De relief vahr setpoint does not affect the design basis accident alignment or operating parameters with respect to appavaching the atlief vahr set pressure. He nonnal or accident operation of the NI system is not affected by this mod. In practice, this header pressuit is not alkmed to build up since doing so would result in Tech Spec lesel, pressure and bodc acid concentration pavblems. Its pressuit is manually maintained to 600 psig by suutine operator adjustment of a smallleakoff flow.

Esemnt Channe CE40178 (Unit 1) and CE40179 (Unit 2)

Description Replaces the snomentary switch on the Main Feedwater Pumps faint standard that is use for merspeed tdp test with a maintained keykxk switch.

Evaluation

De switch being irplaced bypasses the function of the idp relay so that the mechanical merspeed trip cylinder may be exertised. When in the bypass position, this relay bypasses both the elect ical and mechanical merspeed idps for the Feedwater Pump Turbine. Ilowever, esen if the relay is in the bypass position,if the gmtenor detects an actual mtrspeed condition, then the function of the relay is merridden, Exempt Changes Page 24

the bypass of the tdp' relay is removed, and the m.W idp mechanisms functions monnally. De use' of a keylock switch for replacement for this relay pervents the inadvedant failure to retum to the unlocked Po8Itio8' Esemot Channe CE40lR3 Description Adds the details for the new temporary lifting beam used in the Nuclear Service Water System (RN) .

, Puesp Simctant to lift the bonnet on cedain RN check valves, to design drawings and adds cladfying -

notes on k's limitations.

Evaliantia=

1 De lastaliasian of this temporary lifting beam has beca evaluated for seismic loads in the unloaded case.

Clarmlakiana document that this beam is adequate to itsist aclamaic loads in the unloaded condition. De beam is not qualified for seismic loads while making a lift and theitfostdoes not adsersely affect any SSCs impedant to plant safety. While making a lift, the associated train of RN is alatady inoperable. The use of this beam is pmcedurally contmiled to ensure the impact on the operability of the RN system is appmpdately coordinated with Operations.

Exempt Channe CE40194 Descdotion Replaces cedain failed and leak!ng single bellows Heater Bleed System (HE) expansion joints with a two-ply bellows expansion joint, adds additional shroud length and atmoves Sibration monitors imm expansion joints.

Evaluation

De design pressure of the E bleed steam line is 65 psia with a design temperature of 298 degrees. De piping is Class G, non0 safety related and non-seismic. Dese joints are located inside of the condenser which is also non-safety and non-sicamic. De additional shroud lengths are an extension of the existing pads of these expansion joints and are compatible with interfacing pads. The sibration monitors to be remmed are not needed and the structuralintegrity of the expansion joints art not degraded as a itsult.

Exempt Channe CE.60195 Descdotion Adds an optional detail to use a bolted splice connectian on the Pressudzer top head insulation support steel to make the removal and erstoration of this steel easier and less time consuming. i Evaluation

De bolted splice connections are designed for original design loads prmided in the vendor stress report.

It is documented that the splice connections are adequate for all original load cases, therefore this mod does not adstreely affect any SSCs.

ExemDi ChanEe CE40203 Exempt Changes Page 25

r. 1 i

Descdotion Adds interposing relay and tongue switch bypass for Nuclear Service Water System (RN) vahes IRN-1A, 2B,3A,48,5A anet 68. It also adds an isolation point for vahes 1RN-36A and 378.

1 Evalaution: NRC Genedc I4tter 89-10 requires a higher lewl of operability determination and i l

unaina *=== ef critical motor operated vahes. Due to the unavailability of existing limit switch contacts, an interposing miay is added to multiply contacts for vahes IRN-1 thesugh 6. His mod increases the reliability of these vahes to open. This mod does not affect any present signals that initiate vahe unevensent, nor is vahe speed or capacity affected.

Exemnt Channe CE-60261 Descdotion Issues Westinghouse Manual "MPM-DS Breaker" to supereede the existing Mainte== ace Program

' Manual MPM-WOGREDS 416-01.

Evalaution: Dis new meanual is intended to replace the older maintenance program nianual No field west is required and is strictly an updating of the manufactuser's maintenance progr1un annual Nuclear Station Modification CN-20396 ,

Desedntion Re-analyzes sosne piping models using new technology in order to remme snubbers, which will result in i rdsced radiological exposure and maintenance costs.

Evaluation

De new technology invohed is called "alternstin damping values" and "altermathe spectral

)

broadening procedures". Dese two methodoligies result in less seismic energy being applied to the piping systems and fewer required sr.ubbers. The analysis results show all code requistments att still antisfied  :

and no new pipe break locations air created. There air no functional changes being made to any systems )

affected by this NSM. l l

Nuclear Station Modification CN-20644 -

Description I

Replaces Safety Injection System (NI) vahes 2NI-56,57,67,68,73,79,90 and 91 which are air operated, '

failed closed globe vahes. Dese vahe types haw a history of seat leakage problems which causes fluctuations in Cold leg Accumulator levels, which can affect unit avaliability. j Evaluation  :

Dese valves are Class B, QA-1 vahes. De new vahe air actuators wiu remain faila:losed air operated but the operator will be a diaphragm type wrsus the existing piston / cylinder arrangement. De new .

valves will be double-disc gate vahes which should pimide a better seal and minimize leakage. Dere ast i no valve control logic changes., nor are their no new cables requistments. No Appendix R concerns were identified. The existing supporting equipment does not need to be changed. l l

l Exempt Changes Page 26

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g.

f :^

SUMMARY

OF SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS RELATED TO 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS SLC Section 16.11  ;

Description

!?

His SLC change: 1) Changed all references of " Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report" to " Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report", and 2) Revised dissolved /entralmed noble gas _

concentration of SLC 16.11-1 from 1E-4 to 2E-4 microCi/ml total activity. In addition, the entire SLC Section 16.11 was retyped, reformatted, and reissued effective 8/1/94.

Evaluation .

Change 1) was made to be consistent with change to technical specifications which allowed report to be provided on an annual basis (reference TS Amendments 109 (Unit 1) and 103 (Unit 2)). Change

2) was encouraged by the NRC as part of compliance with new 10CFR20. No USQ was created by the above changes.

SLC Section 16.8 (Table 16.8-1)

Description This SLC change consisted of editorial changes to Tables 16.8-1 A and 16.8-1B to make the tables consistent with field configurations. Several device numbers la the tables did not reflect their as-built system leads. Also, the title of Table 16.8-1B was changed from " Unit 1" to " Unit 2". .

Evaluatloa ,

l The above changes were editorial and did not require field work, changes to plant procedures or programs. No operating parameters, safety limits, or setpoints were changed. Tbc probability or i consequences of an accident as evaluated in the SAR were not increased. The possibility for an l accident of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR were not created. The probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR, 4

were not increased. The possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR were not created. In conclusion, there were no USQs created by these changes and it did not regire any changes to technical specifications.

l SLC Changes j Page1 j

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