IR 05000395/1998001

Insp Rept 50-395/98-01 on 980111-0221.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20217G465
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	03/20/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217G436	List: ML20217G430 ML20217G443 ML20217G465
References
50-395-98-01, 50-395-98-1, NUDOCS 9804020359
Download: ML20217G465 (27)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

. Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Report No.: 50-395/98-01 Licensee': South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G)

Facility: V. C. Sumer Nuclear Station Location: P. O. Box 88 Jenkinsville. SC 29065 Dates: January 11 - February 21, 1998 Inspectors: B. Bonser. Senior Resident Inspector T. Farnholtz. Resident Inspector R. Gibbs. Reactor Inspector. RII-(Sections M8.1, and M8.2)

P. Kellogg. Reactor Inspector. RII (Section E8.1)

W. Miller Reactor Inspector. RII (Sections F2.1.-F2.2. F F5.1. F8.1, and F8.2)

Approved by: R. C. Haag. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure 2 L ,

9804020359 980320 PDR 0 ADOCK 05000395 PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V. C. Summer Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report No. 50-395/98-01 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week-period of resident ins)ection: in addition, it includes the results of announced inspections ]y three regional inspector Doerations

• A detailed system walkdown found that the emergency feedwater system was able to perform its design functions for normal-and accident conditions (Section 02.1).

• During an emergency drill operators exhibited good control and communications while implementing emergency operating procedures (Section 05.1).

Maintenance e Maintenance activities associated with the B diesel generator, the A charging pump. the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump, and the train A sequencer were performed in accordance with applicable procedures. Good maintenance practices and coordination of work activities were noted (Section M1.1).

• The surveillance test performed to obtain the total reactor coolant system flow rate was adequate. The test was performed in accordance with the approved procedure and the results were within the acceptance criteria (Section M1.2).

• Portions of the feedwater isolation logic circuit that had not been

)reviously tested were adequately incorporated into Solid State

)rotection System (SSPS) testing 3rocedures. An unresolved item was identified pending a review of SS)S Technical Specification operability and testing requirements (Section M1.3).

Enaineerina-

• - An unresolved item was identified concerning inconsistencies between relief valve testing requirements in the valve inservice test program controlling procedure and the referenced implementing test procedure The licensee is reviewing the actual testing that was performed on relief valves to determine if the applicable ASME Section XI testing requirements were satisfied (Section E1.1).

.- Licensee's actions concerning a broken fuel injection pump tappet assembly hold down stud on the B diesel generator were considered adequate. The engineering evaluation was sufficiently detailed to L support.the corrective actions (Section E1.2).

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• ' A non-cited violation was identified concerning a failure to correctly translate condensate storage tank design basis information into-specifications, procedures, and instructions (Section E1.3).

Plant Sucoort e A violation was identified involving a lack of adecuate )rogrammatic controls for temporary shielding. Temporary shielcing tlat remained in place for longer than six months was not evaluated in accordance with engineering requirements (Section R1.2).

• An emergency drill met its objectives and provided beneficial training to the site emergency organization (Section P5.1).

.- The licensee's actions following an inadvertent attempted introduction of a handgun into the protected area were appropriate. Security personnel demonstrated good knowledge and performance during this event (Section S4.1).

• The low number of inoperable or degraded fire protection components, in conjunction with the good material condition of the fire protection

.com)onents and fire brigade equipment, indicated that appro)riate emplasis was placed on the maintenance and operability of tie fire protection equipment and components (Section F2.1).

• Ekcellent surveillance inspection and test procedures were provided for fire barriers and the fire protection water distribution system (Section F2.2),

e Evaluations to justify the differences between as-built fire barrier penetration seals and corresponding test reports were not readily available. Based on the inspector's reviews, no immediate concerns exist. The licensee has initiated a project to resolve these differences (Section F2.3).

• The fire brigade organization and training were up-to-date and met the requirements of the site procedure. The fire brigade demonstrated good response and fire fighting performance during a simulated fire brigade drill (Section FS.1).

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Reoort Details Summary of Plant Status The unit began this inspecticn period at approximately 100 percent power and remained at that level for the entire inspection perio I. Doerations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operation In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious: specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections belo Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71707)

a. Insoection Scoce (71707)

The inspectors conducted a detailed system walkdown of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Syste b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors conducted a detailed system walkdown of the EFW system to assess the general condition of system com)onents including labeling, to verify that system valve positions match tie system drawings and station operating procedures, and to assess plant housekeeping around system component The inspectors considered that the EFW system was able to perform its design function for both normal and accident condition No misaligned valves were identified and component labeling was adequat Several minor discrepancies and questions identified were resolved promptly by the licensee. The inspectors also reviewed the applicable sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and identified no discrepancies, c. Conclusions A detailed system walkdown found that the Emergency Feedwater System was able to perform its design functions for normal-and accident condition .1 Doerator Trainina and Qualification a. Insoection Scone-(71707)

The inspectors observed a training drill in the simulator in which operators responded to and recovered from a loss of all Alternating Current (AC) powe l

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2 bservations and Findinas On February 18. during an emergency drill, the~ inspectors observed-operators in the control room simulator respond to and recover from a loss of all AC power. The use of several Emergency 0perating Procedures (EOP)_was observed. The inspectors observed good control and communication by the control room staff in response to the simulate emergenc ^ Conclusions During an emergency drill operators exhibited good control and communications while implementing emergency operating procedure II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 -General Comments Insoection Scoce (62707)

The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities:

• Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet (PMTS) 9720546. Diesel Generator (DG) Area B Ventilation . Air Supply Fan B Moto * PMTS 9720906, Operational Check of the B DG 7.2 kV Breake . Work Request (WR) 9800106. Rework Welds on A Charging Pum * PMTS 9721556. A Charging Pump Motor Preventative Maintenanc * PMTS 9720077. Lubrication Check on Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (TDEFW) Pum * PMTS 9714612. Lubrication Check on TDEFW Pump Turbin .. WR 9719148. Add, Adjust, or Repack TDEFW Pump Turbine Steam Supply Valv .- PMTS 9712339. Disassemble. Clean, and Reset TDEFW Pump Turbine Lube.011. System-Relief Valve, e WR 9719205, Repair or Replace TDEFW Pump Local Discharge Pressure Indicato = WR 9801886, Troubleshoot. Train A Sequencer C- __

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3 Observations and Findinas The observed maintenance activities were performed as required by the applicable. procedures. Proper tools and equipment were at the job site and used in an appropriate manner. ~The maintenance technicians were knowledgeable and demonstrated good maintenance practices. Good coordination of work activities for different tasks on the same equipment was note Conclusions Maintenance activities associated with the B diesel generator. the A and the charging pump, thewere train A sequencer turbine driven emergency performed feedwater in accordance pump,ble with applica procedures. Good maintenance practices and coordination of work activities ~were note M1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Flow Rate Measurement Insoection Scoce (61726)

The inspectors reviewed and observed the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)-205.002, "RCS Flow Rate Measurement." Revision .The purpose of this test was to determine the total RCS flow rate to ensure compliance with Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirement'4.2.3.5. This test is performed at least once per 18 month Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the methodology and data gathering performed during the RCS flow rate measurement test to determine the adequacy of this effort. The plant was maintained in a steady state condition and precision data was obtained for feedwater venturi differential pressure, feedwater temperature, steam pressure. RCS temperature. RCS pressure.

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and other required parameters. This data was then used to calculate feedwater flow rate, steam enthalay. Steam Generator (SG) heat rate. RCS inlet and outlet enthalpy, and otler necessary values for each of the three loops. Finally, the RCS flow rate in each loop was calculated and a total RCS flow rate of 303.590 gallons per minute (gpm) was obtaine The acceptance criteria, specified in Section 9.0 of STP-205.002, was a minimum of 283.600 gpm and a maximum of 321.300 gpm. The calculated flow rate was well within the acceptance criteria. The inspectors

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reviewed the data sheets and the calculations and identified no concerns with the performance _of this surveillance tes Conclusions

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The surveillance test performed to obtain the total reactor coolant system flow rate was adequate. The test was performed in accordance

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with the approved procedure and the results were within the acceptance criteri M1.3 Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Actuation Test Insoection Scooe (61726)

The inspectors observed the >erformance of STP-345.037 " Solid State Protection System Actuation _ogic and Master Relay Test. Train A."

Revision 14. This procedure was revised on January 23, 1998.-to include information supplied by Westinghouse in a Technical Bulletin (ESBU-TB-97-09) dated December 30. 199 Observations and Findinas The licensee performed STP-345.037 to functionally verify that the Train A SSPS and the automatic actuation logic and relays were operable, and to verify the response time of A reactor trip breaker. The inspectors observed this test to assess the effectiveness of additional steps placed in the procedure to test a portion of an SSPS circuit that had not been previously tested. Westinghouse notified the licensee that the feedwater isolation memory circuit and the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) source range block memory circuit may not have been fully tested during previous semi-automatic testing of the system. The concerns described in the technical bulletin were not plant specific since there are significant differences in SSPS logic between Westinghouse plants. This required a detailed review of the V. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) SSPS drawings. The P-10 circuit problem did not apply to VCSNS because the source range nuclear instruments remain energized throughout power operation of the reacto The feedwater isolation circuit at VCSNS did require additional testing to fully verify its proper operation. The feedwater isolation circuit consists of three inputs: Safety Injection (SI). SG Hi-Hi water level, and reactor trip (P-4). Of.these inputs. the SI and SG Hi-Hi water level inputs are further divided on the logic card so as to provide two identical signals for each input. This results in five input circuits on the logic card, each being passed through an isolation diode. This

. logic card provides a feedwater isolation signal when two input signals are present. Previous testing techniques tested only the following combinations of inputs:

• SI with SG Hi-Hi water level

• SI with reactor trip

• SG Hi-Hi water level with reactor trip Using this testing arrangement, a failed isolation diode in either the SI or SG Hi-Hi water level. inputs would not be identified. The test procedure was revised to reset the reactor trip input and to test the SI input by itself and the SG Hi-Hi water level. input by itself in addition

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to the three combinations described abov Each of these inputs would sup)ly two input signals and should result in a feedwater isolation if bot 1 circuits were functioning properly. This revised testing technique effectively tested all five isolation diodes and circuits using existing test equipmen The inspectors reviewed the revised test procedure and observed the performance of the test using the revised procedure on January 30, 199 The technicians performing the test were knowledgeable and successfully completed each ste) as required. No concerns were identified with the revision or with t1e performance of the tes This testing issue was originally identified by another utility on November 11, 1997, and reported to the industry on November 14. 199 The Engineered Safety Feature ActLation System (ESFAS) automatic actuation logic and relays are required to be operable in accordance with TS 3.3.2 and are required to be demonstrated operable in accordance with TS 4.3.2.1. The NRC is reviewing this issue to determine if previous testing satisfied the TS requirements, if the licensee complied with TS once initially notified of this potential testing inadequacy, and if 10 CFR 50.73 reporting requirements were followed. The licensee's position on this issue was that 3revious TS surveillance testing had satisfied TS requirements and tie SSPS testing changes they implemented were enhancements to the testing methodolog Pending completion of this review, this issue is identified as an Unresolved Item (URI) 50-395/98001-0 Conclusions Portions of the feedwater isolation logic circuit that had not been areviously tested were adequately incorporated into Solid State protection System testing procedures. An unresolved item was identified pending a review of SSPS Technical Specifications operability and testing requirement M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (62706)

M (Closed) IFI 50-395/97002-01: Maintenance Rule scoping of System Structures and Components (SSCs) used in E0Ps. During the Maintenance Rule baseline inspection, the inspectors identified several SSCs in the E0Ps that were not included in the scope of the licensee's Maintenance Rule arogram. At the time of the Maintenance Rule baseline inspectio the NRC had recently issued new guidance. Regulatory Guide 1.16 Revision 2. concerning incorporation of equipment used in E0Ps into Maintenance Rule program Thus at that time, the licensee was in the process of reviewing this new guidance and incorporating it into their

)rogram. The licensee has now re-scoped the SSCs in their Maintenance tule program by completing a line-by-line review of the E0PS. Results of this re-scoping were inspected by reviewing a list of SSCs that were added to the Maintenance Rule program and reviewing a listing of

. specific SSCs which were not added as a result of the licensee's

. classification of these as "non-significant" during re-scopin No

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deficiencies were noted while reviewing the re-scoping effort. The inspectors also verified that the specific SSCs discussed in the baseline ins)ection report had been included in the scope of the Maintenance Rule program. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the historical review had been com)leted for these SSCs, that performance criteria had been estaalished, and that monitoring of the SSCs was being accomplished. Based on this inspection, the licensee's corrective actions for re-scoping of E0P SSCs in the Maintenance Rule program were determined to be adequat M8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-395/97002-03: failure to take appropriate corrective action for an (a)(1) Structure, System, or Component (SSC). During the Maintenance Rule baseline inspection, the inspectors identified that the licensee had not taken appropriate corrective action for repetitive failures of several leak detection switches which had been classified as (a)(1) under the Maintenance Rule. The licensee's response to the violation attributed the problem to noncompliance with Station Administrative Procedure (SAP)-1141. "Nonconformance Control Program,"

and action taken for Nonconformance Control Notice (NCN)-5304. This procedure required that NCNs be implemented or routed to System and Component Engineering for re-evaluation within 90 days of issuanc Corrective action for this deficiency was taken by CER 97-0476 which was issued during the baseline inspection. Corrective actions included review and correction of all open NCNs having similar conditions, revision of SAP-1141 to assign s compliance with the 90-day rule,pecific responsibility for trackingand replacem an improved mode In order to evaluate the corrective actions for this violation, the inspectors reviewed the actions taken from the licensee's responses, dated July 17 and December 19. 1997 Additionally the NCN and CER were reviewed for proper corrective action and closure. The inspectors noted that the CER provided objective evidence of the licensee's review for other similar existing conditions. The inspectors verified that the revision to SAP-1141 assigned tracking responsibility for the 90-day rule as committed to in the violation response. The inspectors also reviewed the design change for re)lacement of the level switches. The inspectors compared the old switc1 design to the new design, and concluded that the new switches should prove to be more reliable. The design change addressed a population of 40 switches. Thirty-two of the switches had already been replaced. Three switches were scheduled to be deleted due to no emergency core cooling Jiping running through those I s ) aces. Five switches were scheduled to 3e replaced by June 30, 199 T1e inspectors reviewed the failure history of these five switches and determined that they had ex)erienced only one failure since 1993. The inspectors reviewed the'worc orders that replaced the switches addressed in the violation, verified they had been replaced with the new switche and reviewed the plans to replace the remaining switches. Based on this

. inspection, the licensee's corrective actions for the level switches were determined to be adequate, i

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III. Enaineerina El Conduct of Engineering-El.1 Relief Valve Inservice Testina (IST) Proaram Insoection Scooe'(37551)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Inservice Test (IST) program for valves as described in General Test Procedure (GTP)-302. " Inservice Testing of Valves., Second Ten Year Interval." Revision 9. The licensee-identified an apparent difference between the relief valve testing program and the applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)Section XI Code requirements. This finding was documented on Condition Evaluation Report (CER) 98-0075 dated January 22. 1998, Observations and Findinas

- On January 1.1994, the licensee began the second ten year interval for inservice testing. At that time, the licensee committed to the requirements contained in the 1989 Edition of the ASME Section XI Code, no addend This edition refers to Operations and Maintenance (0M)- " Requirements for Inservice Performance Testing of Nuclear Power Plant i Pressure Relief Devices," for the testing of applicable safety and relief valves. When the second ten year interval began, the licensee revised GTP-302 to reflect the new requirements contained in the later edition of the ASME Section XI Cod The IST requirements for relief valve testing were detailed in GTP-30 These requirements were consistent with the re the applicable ASME Section XI Code and OM- quirements In addition. GTP-302 contained in contained a table listing all valves which were required to be tested in accordance with this procedure. A total of 86 valves were classified as safety / relief valve For each valve included in the IST program an STP was referenced as the procedure to be used to implement the testing requirement The licensee identified an apparent inconsistency between the requirements for relief valve testing contained in GTP-302 and the testing performed in accordance with the applicable STP. As an example, GTP-302. Section 5.4.4 " Pressure Relief Device Testing." Paragraph " Periodic Testing," Subparagra)h 4.b. states. in part. that the

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following_ requirements are to 3e met during-testing of Class 2 and 3 pressure relief devices: visual examination. seat tightness testing, set pressure determination and determination of compliance with seat tightness criteria. However, the implementing test procedure listed for many of the relief valves was STP-401.003. " Code Relief Valves ASME XI Test." Revision 4 which did not address visual inspection, seat tightness testing, or determination of compliance with seat tightness criteri In' addition. Section 1.0 of STP 401.003, states that this procedure is specific for the letdown flow control header relief valve

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(XVR08117-CS): but as stated earlier. this STP is referenced for many of the relief valves in the IST progra Another concern documented in CER 98-0075 was that the procedures used to conduct relief valve testing were not the procedures referenced in GTP-302. Many relief valves were tested using Mechanical Maintenance Procedure (MMP)-445.005. " Maintenance. Repair and Testing of Relief Valves." Revision 13. This procedure contains steps to disassembl . rework reassemble, and test relief valve However, this was not the procedure that was specified to be used to perform the ASME required IST testing. Work that was accomplished under MMP-445.005 may satisfy the ASME test requirements that were not performed by the specific referenced procedures, however, at the end of the inspection period the licensee had not completed their review and were not able to make this determinatio In response to the concerns documented on CER 98-0075. the licensee initiated a root cause analysis to determine why the ASME Section XI Code requirements for the second ten year interval were not effectively translated into implementing procedures. In addition the licensee initiated a complete valve IST program review to determine if all ASME

. requirements are included in the IST program and that the valves listed as subject to IST testing is complete and accurate. Pending completion of these efforts, this issue is identified as URI 50-395/98001-0 Conclusions An unresolved item was identified concerning inconsistencies between relief valve testing requirements in the valve inservice test program controlling procedure and the referenced implementing test procedure The licensee is reviewing the actual testing that was performed on relief valves to determine if the applicable ASME Section XI testing requirements were satisfie El.2 Diesel Fuel In.iection Pumo Stud Insoection Insoection Scooe (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's engineering efforts concerning a broken B Diesel Generator (DG) fuel injection pump tappet assembly hold down stud. The broken stud was identified during a routine preventive maintenance tas Observations'and Findinas On January 12. 1998. the licensee performed Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet (PMTS) 9720700 to inspect the fuel injection pump tappet assembly hold down studs on the B DG. This task is performed every six months on each DG and consists of inspecting a total of 24 studs per DG (two per fuel injection Jump). During this inspection, a broken stud was identified on tie number 2 fuel injection pump. The broken portion of

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the stud along with'the attached nut was recovere A review of historical records revealed that a broken stud was identified on the number 1 fuel injection pump on the B DG in January 1986. A second stud broke while adjusting the number 3 fuel injection pump on the same DG at that same time. As a result of these two event the licensee instituted a PMTS to periodically inspect these studs. No other broken studs were identified until the recent observation in January 1998. The purpose of the studs was to secure the fuel injection pump linkage adjustment to prevent movemen When the broken stud was identified the licensee wrote NCN 98-0043 to document the event and the corrective actions. The broken stud and nut were replaced along with the associated intact stud and nut on the number 2 fuel injection pump. This NCN disposition was discussed with the DG vendor who concurred with the proposed course of action. The engineering evaluation was sufficiently detailed to support the corrective actions. The DG was successfully run following this wor The inspectors considered the actions taken to be adequate and no operability concerns were identified, Conclusions A review of the licensee's actions concerning a broken fuel injection pump tappet assembly hold down stud on the B DG was considered adequat The engineering evaluation was sufficiently detailed to support the corrective action E1.3 Condensate Storaae Tank Volume Insoection Scooe (37551)

The inspectors reviewed a discrepancy between the TS required Condensate Storage Tank (CST) volume and the actual volume requirements, Observations and Findinas On February 12. the licensee identified a discrepancy between the actual CST inventory requirements and the required TS volume of 172.700 gallons stated in TS 3.7.1.3 " Condensate Storage Tank." The existing TS value was based on a sum of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) required volume of 150.000 gallons arid the unusable volume of the tank calculated to be approximately 22.700 gallon The required CST volume is based on sufficient water to cool the plant to the point where the residual heat removal system can complete the cooldown. The TS required inventory of 172.700 gallons, however, was incorrect. Prior to the plant uprate in May 1996 the licensee identified that the actual EFW required volume in the CST was 155,000 gallons. For the plant uprate, that raised maximum plant authorized core power level from 2775 Megawatts thermal (Mwt) to 2900 Mwt. a new CST volume of 158.570 gallons was identified to be. required for EF .

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This raised the total CST inventory that should have been specified in the TS for EFW requirements to approximately 181.270 gallon The licensee failed to recognize the impact of the plant uprate and corresponding increase in CST inventory on the fS and therefore did not amend the TS or revise the appropriate plant procedures for the correct required inventory in the CS During this review the inspectors identified that a note was incorrect on the CST figure (Figure VI-12. dated 2/6/87) maintained in the curve book in the control room. The note stated that volume below the EFW pump suction is 12.302 gallons. This unusable volume has been calculated by the licensee to be approximately 22.700 gallons. The inspectors informed the licensee of this observatio When this issue was identified the licensee prepared a Station Order alerting plant operators to the actual required volume in the CST and set an administrative low limit of 14 feet which corresponds to greater than 181.270 gallons as measured by the CST level instrumentation. This low limit ensures that the maximum CST volume for EFW would be available. The licensee also recognized that the CST low level alarm setpoint was incorrect and was preparing further action to revise this setpoint. The licensee also performed a data review and determined that level in the CST had not been below 19.5 feet since June 1. 1996. The licensee stated that a TS amendment request would be submitted to reflect the correct CST volume requirement. The licensee does not believe the failure to properly translate CST volume requirements into applicable plant documents is indicative of a problem with their engineering processes or program This failure to implement adequate design controls for the CST is a violation. The licensee failed to correctly translate design basis information into specifications procedures, and instructions. This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section VII. of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is identified as NCV 50-395/98001-0 c. Conclusions A non-cited violation was identified concerning failures to correctly translate condensate storage tank design basis information into specifications, procedures, and instruction E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)

E8.1 (Ocen) Insoection Follow uo Item 50-395/97013-01: failure of the A DG during a surveillance test. The A DG failed the monthly surveillance test on November 11, 1997, due to load instability. The licensee began troubleshooting the DG to determine if the )roblem was related to the governor electronic control unit (EGA) or t1e hydraulic actuator (EGB).

Following some indeterminate testing, the licensee replaced both the EGA and EGB. The licensee made several maintenance starts of the A DG and l

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made adjustments to the governor. The A DG was declared operable on November 14 following a successful retest. The A DG failed the weekly surveillance test on November 21 due to load instabilities that prevented the diesel from being fully loaded. Trcubleshooting identified high resistance across contacts of the Isochronous/ Droop relay. Additionally, two contacts of the relay did not change state when the relay was energized. The relay was replaced and the A DG was declared operable on November 22. following a successful retes The A DG failed the weekly surveillance on December 2 due to load instability. The load swings observed on this occasion were comparable to those observed on November 11. During troubleshooting, the output of the EGA was noted to be spiking. The EGA was replaced with a unit from the warehouse. The licensee performed a maintenance run during which the governor worked satisfactorily during the initial no load, loading, and unloading conditions. However, when the output breaker was opened a frequency swing was observed. Additional adjustments were performed to attempt to obtain stable operations from the EGA and EGB. Stable operation could not be achieved. Management decided to replace the installed EGA with the previously removed EGA which had been refurbished by the vendor. The A DG was declared operable on December 5. following successful testin On December 30. a weekly surveillance of the A DG was conducted. The diesel started and loaded properly. However, when the output breaker was opened, significant frequency (speed) oscillations were observe The A DG was declared inoperable and a troubleshooting )lan was initiated to address the aroblem. Troubleshooting of t1e EGA did not identify any spiking of tie output. Following several EGB oil changes oscillations were not observed. The A DG was started for additional testing on January 1. 1998. After the output breaker was opened large frequency swings were observed. The vendor service representative believed that the cause of the problem was binding in the fuel racks or the yield link. The yield link was replaced and the fuel rack linkages at each injector pump and the cross connect members were inspecte No binding was identified. Following a one hour run the diesel again started to oscillate when its output breaker was opened. After this occurrence, management decided to replace the EGB. Testing of the diesel following the EGB replacement was performed and the governor was adjusted. Three confidence runs were )erformed to assure the oscillation problems were resolved. T1e data collected during these runs indicated the A DG was ready for surveillance testing. All testing was completed satisfactorily on January 5 and the A DG was declared operabl The ins)ectors reviewed the history of the EGAs and EGB: installed on A DG and 1 eld discussions with the licensee's staff. The following issues had been identified and were being addressed by the license Refurbishment by the vendor of the EGA units consisted of the replacement of several Mylar and electrolytic ca)acitors. Three potentiometers on the EGA were also replaced. W111e the aging of capacitors was well known, problems with aging of the potentiometers was

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not. The vendor had indicated that while the capacitors were replaced due to an aging concern, there had been only one failure of an EGA unit due to capacitor failure. The more frequent failure cause was that of the potentiometers. One of the EGAs which had been refurbished failed the licensee's bench test. The licensee returned the unit to the vendor who then conducted a test similar to the licensee *s. The EGA failed again. This test failure identified that the vendor did not test as long as the licensee and that the failure.. spiking of te out time to develop. The licensee also identified potential she'pu f life took concerns with the EGA and EGB unit The inspectors concluded that the licensee had conducted a thorough review of the EGA and EGB failures. Several issues were still being evaluated by the licensee, these included aging of components, failure of an EGB unit, vendor testing methodolcgy, and governor upgrades. This item remains open pending the completion of the licensee's review of these. issue I Plant Suooort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls RI.1 General Comments The inspectors observed radiological controls during the conduct of tours and observation of maintenance activities and found them to be-acceptabl R1.2 Temocrary Shieldina Procram Insoection Scooe (71750)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's temporary shielding program. The i licensee identified temporary shielding packages installed in the plant for extended periods without the appropriate engineering evaluation Observations and Findinas On February 5 the licensee identified in CER 98-129 that Health Physics-(HP) procedural guidance on temporary shielding did not contain adequate controls to ensure shielding was removed or received an engineering review when it was installed longer than six months. Seven Temporary Shielding Requests (TSRs) were identified that had been installed in the plant longer than six months and had not received appropriate

' engineering evaluation The temporary shielding program is administered by HP through Health Physics Procedure, (HPP)-819, " Temporary Shielding Evaluatio Installation, and Removal," Revision 9. As part of the approval process for temporary shielding. engineering performs a technical evaluation to identify any special restrictions that may apply. Engineering evaluations for TSRs are performed in accordance with Engineering e

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Services Procedure '(ES)-409, " Engineering Evaluation of Scaffoldin Temporary Shielding and Designated Storage Area Change Requests."

Revision The evaluations are performed on the basis that the temporary shielding.will not be installed longer than the job duration listed on the TSR cover sheet requesting the engineering evaluatio Procedure ES-409 states, "If.the scaffolding or shielding is to remain in place for longer than the lesser of the duration of the project or six months it should be addressed as a ' Change to the facility'

requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to be completed conforming to the requirements of our license and design basis." Procedure ES-409 states that this can be accomplished through a permanent )lant modification.or dispositioning a shielding evaluation with a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluatio Two shielding packages installed on September 30, 1994 and October 1, 1994 were originally planned to be in place for one month during an outag Both TSRs were installed on safety related or quality related pi)in The other five TSRs were installed in 1996 and early 1997 on otler equipment in the plant including high dose radioactive waste storage areas, temporary demineralizers, a waste processing high integrity container, and the boron concentration measurement syste The duration of the shielding requests varied from one month to six months and two listed an " unknown" duration. Engineering evaluations were performed for each of the TSRs. The engineering evaluations for the two TSRs of unknown duration had no indication from engineering that further review would be necessary after six month The inspectors concluded that this was a programmatic failure of the temporary shielding program in that HPP-819 had not adequately controlled or limited the time temporary shielding was installed or referenced the engineering requirements that would address the shielding as a change to the facility after it had remained in place for more than six months. The inspectors also concluded that the interface between HP and engineering was weak in that the engineering reviews for the TSRs had not documented a time limitation on the TSRs although two of the shielding requests reviewed by engineering had indicated they would be installed for an unlimited duration. Procedure HPP-819 also requires a tracking log. The status of temporary shielding was logged, however, the log was not effective in maintaining the status of installed shielding, and did not ensure shielding was removed once the job duration on the TSR was exceede The inspectors also observed that there were no periodic audit requirements of the installed temporary shieldin At the close of the inspection period, engineering was reviewing the seven TSRs that had been installed greater than six months. A preliminary review identified no concerns. The failure to establish adequate controls for temporary shielding installed in the plant is identified as a Violation (VIO) 50-395/98001-0 _

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14 Conclusions A violation was identified involving a lack of adequate )rogrammatic controls for temporary shieldin place for longer than six monthsaswnotTemporary evaluatedshielding tlat remained in accordance with in engineering requirement P5 ' Staff Training and Qualification in EP P5,1 Observation of Emeroency Drill

, ' Insoection Scooe (71750)

The ins)ectors observed a training drill conducted in the simulator and the Tec1nical Support Center (TSC).

b. . Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed a training emergency drill on February 18 from the simulator control room and the TS The inspectors concluded that the drill met its objectives and provided beneficial training to the site emergency organization. The inspectors had one significant observation. The Shift Supervisor (SS), acting as the interim Emergency Director (ED), and the ED did not ap) ear to be familiar with the guidelines for turning over responsi)ilities from the interim ED to the ED. This turnover normally occurs when the TSC is activated and staffed. The ED position was turned over before it should have occurred. This led to confusion as to whom was responsible for declaration of an emergency classification. The licensee also recognized this drill discrepancy and is reviewing additional trainin Conclusions An emergency drill met its objectives and provided beneficial training to the site emergency organizatio S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 General Comments (71750)

The inspectors observed security activities including compensatory measures during the conduct of plant tours and plant activities and

.found them to be acceptabl S4 ' Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance S4,l'. Attemoted Introduction of a Handoun into the Protected Area (PA)

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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to an event'where an individual attem)ted to introduce a handgun into the PA. This event was-documented on CER 98-0078 and Security Incident Report (SIR) 98003 Observations and Findinas On January 24, a licensee employee attempting to enter the PA through the access portal search area was found in possession of a handgu Requirements when entering the PA include placing all hand carried articles on an X-Ray machine conveyor belt to allow a security officer to ins)ect their contents. At 7:03 p.m. the security officer operating the X-Ray equipment observed the image of a handgun on the monitor. The officer took control of the bag containing the gun and conducted a search of its contents. A handgun with ammunition was confiscated at that time. The individual attempting to enter the PA was detained and denied access. Central security was notified and the individual's badge was deactivated to prevent access until an investigation could be conducte An interview was conducted with the individual, the on-duty Shift Supervisor, and security personnel. The individual stated that he had inadvertently left the handgun in the bag and that he intended to leave the gun in his personal vehicle. The gun was placed in the arms room pending completion of the investigation. At 8:03 3.m. on January 2 the licensee made a one hour notification to the NRC to describe this even The licensee conducted an investigation to determine the facts surrounding this event. The individual's work performance was reviewed and a check with local law enforcement agencies was made to verify that no recent law enforcement problems had occurred. No evidence of any problems was discovered that would indicate anything other than an inadvertent action as stated by the individual. The individuals access was reinstated following the conclusion.of the investigation. On January 26 at 11:46 a.m.. the licensee retracted the NRC notification and classified the event as a security logable event. The inspectors reviewed this event and did not identify any concerns. The licensee's actions to identify the handgun, deny access to the individual. and conduct a thorough investigation was appropriate. Security personnel demonstrated good knowledge of the requirements for such an event and performed in accordance with established procedure Conclusions

'The licensee's actions following an inadvertent attempted introduction of.a handgun into the protected area were appropriate. Security personnel demonstrated good knowledge and performance during this event.

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F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment

- F2.1 Doerability of Fire Protection Facilities and Eouioment (64704) Insoection Scooe The-inspectors reviewed the fire protection impairment log for fire protection components and the o)en ~ maintenance work requests on fire protection features to assess t1e licensee's performance for maintaining fire protection components in service. In addition, walkdown inspections were made to assess the material condition of fire protection systems, equipment. features and fire brigade equipmen Observations and Findinos (1) Ooerability of Fire Protection Eauioment and Comoonents As of February 13, there were no fire protection components listed in the impairment log as degraded. There were 19 open maintenance work requests of which 11 involved components designed to provide protection for safety-related components. These work requests were less than one year old, did not result in any component being inoperable and were to correct minor problems, such as leaking valve The inspectors reviewed the system engineer's monthly assessment of the fire protection systems. Prior to March 1997, the system engineer's assessments of the fire protection systems were graded

" Yellow" or considered to be in need of increased management and maintenance attention due to the number and type of identified problems. In March 1997, the system engineer's assessment of the fire protection systems was changed from " Yellow" to " Green" (good) due to performance improvement This change was due to completion of the modifications to the fire detection system, resolution of corrective maintenance problems affecting several fire protection components and the lack of any new identified inoperable or significant maintenance issues on the fire protection systems. The system engineer's assessment of the fire protection system's performance has remained good since March 199 During tours of the plant, the inspectors noted that the material condition of the fire protection features was good and the systems

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were well maintaine (2) Fire Briaade Eauioment The turnout gear for the fire brigade members was stored in lockers on elevation 412 of the control building and on elevation 436 of the turbine building. A sufficient number of turnout gear,

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consisting of helmets, coats, pants, boots, gloves, etc.. was

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provided to equip fire brigade members expected to respond in the m

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cvent of a fire or other emergency. . The equipment was properly stored and well maintaine ; Conclusions The low number of inoperable or degraded fire protection components, in conjunction with the good material condition of the fire protection ,

com)onents and fire brigade equipment, indicated that appro)riate  ;

emplasis was placed on the maintenance and operability of t1e fire i protection equipment and component F2.2 Surveillance of Fire Protection Features and Eouioment .

I Insoection Scooe (64704)

The inspectors reviewed STP-728.049, " Intermediate Building Elevations 426'-422' Fire Barrier Inspection." Revision 3, and the following i

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completed surveillance and test procedures for compliance to the requirements of the NRC approved commitments in the " Summer Fire ,

Protection Evaluation Report":

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STP-128.021. " Fire w rvice Three Year Flow Test." Revision 1 Completed September 26, 1997,

- STP-728.038, " Auxiliary Building Elevation 426*-451' Fire Barrier Inspections." Revision 2. Completed November 6. 199 l l

- STP-728.043. " Control Building Elevation 448' Fire Barrier l Inspection.~ Revision 2. Completed August 27, 199 I

- STP-728.048. " Intermediate Building Elevation 436' Fire Barrier I Inspection." Revision 3. Completed November 18, 199 l Observations and Findinas l Twenty procedures were developed for the surveillance inspection of fire barriers. The inspection ~ procedures, acceptance criteria, and data documentation requirements for these procedures were essentially the same. The ins for the fire barriers on elevation 422'pectors-426' of reviewed STP-728.049 the intermediate building. The procedure I included a sketch of the walls to be inspected, penetration location, and data sheets identifying each element to be inspected. The inspectors considered these surveillance inspection procedures to be of excellent qualit The completed fire barrier surveillance procedures reviewed by the inspectors had been com)leted appropriately and met the acceptance criteria. Work orders lad been properly submitted for identified

. discrepancies.and the discrepancies had been reinspected following

' completion of the required repairs. The licensee was performing an-inspection every 18 months of all fire barriers and fire barrier penetrations. The " Summer Fire Protection Evaluation Report" only

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required an inspection of 10 percent of the fire barrier penetrations every 18 months. The inspection of all penetrations each 18 months was considered a positive feature in the implementation of the fire

protection program to assure operability.of the fire barrier In the early 1990's, portions of the facility's fire protection water distribution system were found to be partially obstructed due to interior plaing corrosion. This piping was cleaned and, subsequently.

i flow tests lad been performed annually to evaluate the performance of the piping system. The inspectors reviewed completed STP-128.021 which was performed on September 26, 199 This procedure required comprehensive flow tests of the fire protection water distribution  ;

system and evaluations of the flow test data. The 1997 test data indicated that a sufficient quantity of water was available to meet the fire protection demands. In addition, the data did not indicate an a)preciable pressure drop or flow reduction from the 1996 test dat T1e licensee stated that they were planning to continue flow tests and evaluations to monitor system performanc ,

! Conclusions Excellent surveillance inspection and test procedures were provided for the fire barriers and fire protection water distribution syste F2.3 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals (64704) Insoection Scooe

The ir spectors reviewed a sample of the facility's fire barrier penetration seal installations to determine if the installed penetration seals met the design documents and were bound by configurations which i had satisfactorily passed a fire test that met the requirements of NRC Generic Letter 86-10 and NRC Information Notices 88-04, 88-56 and 95-2 Observations and Findinas

' The inspectors inspected each of the following fire barrier penetration seals and reviewed the licensee's design and referenced test report for each seal:

PE LOCATION SIZE SEAL TEST REPORT COMMENTS TRACE IN CONFIGURATION N0./ Design N INCHES AB-236 Wall between Control 43x75' 18" silicone without Carborumdum 1/ Engineering -

and Auxiliary 61dg damming board " silicone avaluation I and Rooms CB 12-03 with damming require l and AB 12 17 board _-_ ___ _ -__-_____- _____ - _- ____-__ _ - ____ -_ ____ __ - _ _ - __ - _ -

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PE LOCATION SIZE SEAL TEST REPORT COMMENTS TRACE IN 'CCNFIGURATION NO./ Design N INCHES CB 1237 Wall between Rooms CB 30x72 10" Silicone without BISCO . Tested with 1" 12-03 and CB 12-04 daming board overlap on each 9 3/4" Silicone side of a wal without daming Installed with 2" boards, overlap on one side of a wal Evaluation require ' Wall between Rooms IB 28x27 10" Silicone and 3" PCA-0CT 76 PCA-0CT 76 failed 36-02 and IB 36-03 B1500 elastomer 9" Silicone tha test. Requires pressure seal without daming evaluation, without daming boards, boards18-335 Wall between Rooms IB 10x30 10" Silicone without BISCO Tested with 1" 36-02 and IB 36 04 daming board overlap on each 9 3/4" silicone side of a wal without daming installed with 2" boards, overlap on one side of a wall Evaluation require IB-471 Floor between Rooms 9" 10" Silicone with 3" BISCO Evaluation IB 36-03 sleeve elastomer pressure 748-49 required, and IB 26-02 sea " Silicon Floor between Rooms 15x48 10" Silicone with BISCO Evaluation IB 36-03 and IB 26-02 34" elastomer 748-220 require pressure sea " Silicone with 1" daming boar In late 1997, the licensee initiated a project to evaluate all of the facility's fire barrier penetration seals to determine if the "As Built" configurations met the design requirements. The evaluation will determine if the seals are either bound by a tested configuration or justified by an engineering evaluation. Discrepancies will be corrected or additional evaluations will be performed. Previously, in 1987.'the licensee identified a number of fire barrier penetrations which did not meet the design or test requi>ements. This issue was resolved by performing engineering evalur.tinns to justify the installation of approximately 21 seals and upgradng or modifying approximately 15 penetration seals. The current preiect will reevaluate this issue and provide enhanced documentation on the facility's fire barrier penetration-seals. This project was scheduled to be completed in April-199 During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed a sample of the various types of penetration seals installed at the facility. The design of penetration seals inspected.did not fully conform to the referenced fire test for the seals. It appeared that an evaluation was required for the

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seals which were different from an acceptable tested configuration to justify that these seals would perform their design function. These penetration seals did not meet the basis of the design due to one or more of the following:

. Penetration size exceeded the tested penetration siz * Penetration seals' free space exceeded the free space of the tested configuratio . Seal configuration was different from tested configurations i.e.,

tested configurations extended one-inch on both sides of the barrier whereas the installed configuration was flush on one side of the barrier and extended two-inches on the other side of the barrie . Seal penetration was of a different configuration (cable trays in lieu of a pipe) than the tested configuratio . Installed penetration seals utilized an elastomer pressure seal material on one side of the seal, whereas the tested i configuration did not utilize the elastomer materia i The licensee stated that evaluations for configuration differences were probably performed; however, these evaluations were difficult to locate and retrieve. Evaluations previously performed for penetration seals which did not meet the design and tested configurations were documented by a number of different means such as vendor work packages, modification packages, field change requests to installation modification or design packages, condition reports, engineering change requests, request for engineering evaluations, engineering information requests, etc. The licensee's fire barrier penetration seal revalidation project would locate each of these evaluations and assimilate and document this information for future retrieveabilit During the plant tours and inspection of the above penetration seals, the inspectors noted that the penetration seals appeared to be well maintained. In addition, all penetration seals were being inspected every 18 months by the licensee's surveillance program. Any identified discrepancies were repaired. Based on the licensee's efforts to maintain the as-built configuration for seal barrier seals and the extent of differences between the test reports and the actual plant penetrations seals, the inspectors concluded that this issue was not an immediate concern. The licensee's completed fire barrier penetration seal revalidation project will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection and will be tracked as an Inspecticn Followup Item (IFI)

50-395/98001-0 c. Conclusions Evaluations to 'iustify the differences between as-built fire barrier penetrationsealsandcorrespondingtestreportswerenotreadily

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availabl Based on the inspector's reviews, no immediate concerns exist. The licensee has initiated a project to: 1) review all fire barrier penetration seals for conformance to the design requirements and referenced fire tested configurations: 2) enhance design basis documentation for the seals; and 3) correct any identified discrepancie F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification F5.1 Fire Briaade (64704) Insnection Scoce The inspectors reviewed the fire brigade organization and training 3rogram for compliance with the NRC approved " Summer Fire Protection Evaluation Report."

b. Observations and Findinas The site fire brigade organization and training requirements were implemented by Procedure FPP-026. " Fire /HAZMAT Response." Revision Each fire brigade member was required to receive initial, quarterly and annual fire fighting training and to satisfactorily complete an annual medical evaluation and certification for partici)ation in fire brigade fire fighting activitie In addition, each memaer was required to participate in at least one fire brigade drill per yea At the time of this inspection. 64 operations personnel and 31 maintenance personnel were on the plant's fire brigade. A sufficient number of personnel was available to meet the staffing requirements for the facility's operational requirements and the fire brigade complement of one team leader and at least five members per shif The inspectors reviewed the fire brigade organization training and medical records for the fire brigade members and verified that the training and medical records were up-to-date. Additional information on the review of the fire brigade program is located in Section F l The inspectors witnessed a fire brigade drill on February 12. 199 involving a simulated fire in the Auxiliary Boiler Building east of the power block com) lex. The response of the fire brigade to the simulated fire included t1e fire brigade leader, three brigade members from operations and five brigade members from maintenance. Two security officers and two maintenance employees also responded to the fire scen The fire brigade members responded to the fire in full turnout gear and with self contained breathing apparatus. The response was timely and the brigade demonstrated the proper use of fire fighting equipment and tactic Comraunications between the brigade leader, the control room and brigade members were good. The fire brigade leader's direction and performance were also good. A critique to discuss the brigade performance and recommendations for future enhancement was held following the drill.

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c. Conclusions

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The fire brigade organization and training were up-to-date and met the requirements of the site procedure. The fire brigade demonstrated good response and fire fightirg performance during a simulated fire brigade dril F8 Hiscellaneous Fire Protection Issues (92904)

F (Closed) URI 50-395/96011-07: fire brigade personnel were not required to participate in at least two fire brigade drills per year. The licensee's commitment to comply with the fire brigade organization and training guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1. " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1. 1976. and the 1977 document entitled Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities. Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance" were reviewed and approved by the NRC in the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report dated February 1981. These documents required the fire brigade to participate in drills but did not specify the number of drills to be performed per year. Procedure FPP-026. " Fire /HAZMAT Res'onse."

Revision 2. requires fire brigade drills to be performed once eac1 quarter for each operating shift and for all brigade members to participate in at least one drill per year. The inspectors reviewed the drills performed during 1997 and verified that each operations shift participated in a fire brigade drill at least once per quarte Additional special drills were performed as needed to permit all operations and maintenance personnel assigned to the fire brigade to participate in at least one drill per year. The licensee was in compliance with the fire brigade licensing requirements

therefore, this unresolved item is close F8.2 (Closed)IFI 50-395/96011-06: resolution of battery failures on 8-hour Appendix R emergency lighting units. The licensee had enhanced the

)reventive maintenance and surveillance requirements for the 8-hour

)attery-powered emergency lighting units. Also, the Appendix R 8-hour emergency lighting units had been added to the components covered by the Maintenance Rule and a 95 percent operability requirement had been established for these units. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's reliability trending data for these lights and noted that the failure rate for the past 18 months was 1.9 percen The licensee stated that the operability of the battery powered lighting units was to continue as a part of the Maintenance Rule requirement This should assure a high operability level for these lighting units is maintained and addresses the inspectors' previous concern Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors aresented the inspection results to members of licensee management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on February 27, 199 .

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The licensee acknowledged the findines presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

' Licensee F. Bacon Manager. Chemistry Services L. Blue. Manager. Health Physics S. Byrne. General Manager. Nuclear Plant Operations R. Clary Manager. Quality Systems M. Fowlkes. Manager. Operations S. Furstenberg. Manager. Maintenance Services D. Lavigne. General Manager Nuclear. Support Services

.G. Moffatt. Manager. Design Engineering K. Nettles. General Manager. Strategic Planning and Development H. O'Quinn, Manager. Nuclear Protection Services A. Rice. Manager. Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience G. Taylor. Vice President. Nuclear Operations R. Waselus Manager.-Systems and Component Engineering R. White. Nuclear Coordinator. South Carolina Public Service Authority B. Williams General Manager. Engineering Services G. Williams. Associate Manager. Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations i? 62706: Maintenance Rule IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 64704: Fire Protection Program IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92903: Followup - Engineering IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support ITEMS OPENED CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED i Ooened 50-395/98001-01 URI review solid state protection system TS operability and' testing requirements (Section M1.3)

50-395/98001-02 URI relief valve testing requirement inconsistencies in the valve inservice testing program controlling-procedure and the referenced implementing test {

procedures (Section E1.1) j 50-395/98001-03 NCV failure to correctly translate condensate storage tank design basis information into specification .

procedures, and instructions (Section E1.3)-

50-395/98001-04 VIO failure to establish adequate programmatic controls for temporary shielding'(Section R1.2)

50-395/98001-05 IFI licensee's completed fire barrier penetration seal-revalidation project will be reviewed (Section F2.3)

Closed 50-395/97002-01 IFI Maintenance Rule scoping of systems, structures and components used in emergency operating procedures (Section M8.1)

'50-395/97002-03 VIO failure to take appropriate corrective action for an (a)(1) structure, system, or component (Section M8.2)

50-395/98001-03 NCV failure to correctly translate condensate storage tank design basis information into specifications, procedures, and instructions-(Section E1.3)

50-395/96011-07 URI fire brigade personnel were not required to participate in at least two fire brigade drills per year (Section F8.1)

'50-395/96011-06 IFI resolution of battery failures on 8-hour-Appendix R emergency lighting units (Section F8.2)

Discussed 50-395/97013-01 IFI failure of the A diesel generator during a surveillance test (Section E8.1)

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