IR 05000269/1986024

Insp Repts 50-269/86-24,50-270/86-24 & 50-287/86-24 on 860908.No Noncompliance or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Surveillance,Maint,Verification of ESF Lineups & Followup Items

ML20214V491
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	09/19/1986
From:	Bryant J, Peebles T, Sasser M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214V481	List: IR 05000269/1986024 ML20214V477
References
TASK-2.B.3, TASK-TM 50-269-86-24, 50-270-86-24, 50-287-86-24, NUDOCS 8610020315
Download: ML20214V491 (9)

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jp Pf0 UNITED STATES

,f 0q'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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$ ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET, *I '* ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323 l \**.../

1 Report Nos: 50-269/86-24, 50-270/86-24, and 50-287/86-24 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Inspection Conducted: Au st 12 - September 8, 1986 Inspectors: [$.

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B'af.e Signed Approved by:

T. Peebles, Section Chief f[/f[5

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D&te ' Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, ' announced inspection was conducted on-site. inspecting in the areas of operations, surveillance, maintenance, verification of engineered safety features lineups, inspector followup items, followup of noncompliance items and outage activitie Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no items of non-compliance or deviations were identifie o 8610020315 DR 860919 ADOCK 05000269 PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Conta'ted c

• M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager

• T. B. Owen, Maintenance Superintendent R. L. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent T. S. Barr, Technical Services Superintendent C. L..Harlin, Compliance Engineer

• D. S. Compton, Assistant Engineer, Compliance J. T. McIntosh, Station Services Superintendent B. McAllister, Support Engineer J. Shaw, I&E Coordinator R. Oglesby, I&E Supervisor

• L. J. Benge, Chemistry Staff Coordinator

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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer Resident Inspectors

• C. Bryant

• K. Sasser

• Attended exit intervie . Exit Interview

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 10, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) VIO 269/86-18-02: Failure to Follow Valve Surveillance Procedur Corrective actions taken by the licensee have been reviewed and found to be satisfactor . Inspector Followup Items and Unresolved Ittms (Closed) Unresolved Item 269, 270, 287/85-10-04: Station Battery Operation and * :intenance. This item raised a number of questions based on a review of the licensee's battery program. Additional reviews have determined that a violation or deviation did not exist. This item is close (Closed) IFI 269,270,287/86-20-01: Security Access Doors. The licensee has completed the upgrading of security locks on various access door . . _ , ..- - - . _ - - _ -

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2 Unresolved Items

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Unresolved items are matters about which mere information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. One unresolved item was identified during this inspection and is discussed in paragraph 10. Plant Operations The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications (TS), and administrative control Control room logs, shift turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinel Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics and performance personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily ba' si Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during week days and on weekends. Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performanc Actions observed were conducted as required by Operations Management Procedure 2- The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of T Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition . Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basi The areas toured included the following:

Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Units 1 and 2 Penetration Rooms Units 1,2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1,2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Standby Shutdown Facility Unit 2 Reactor Building During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 began the report period shut down to repair steam generator tube leaks. Twenty-one tubes were plugged in steam generator (SG) 1A. These included one leaking tube; eight tubes with wall thickness reduced by 40% or more; and twelve tubes with less than 40% wall reduction but which exhibited high cycle fatigue. In SG 18 one leaking tube and one other were plugge Unit I was placed back on line at 12:05 p.m. on August 1 Except for a brief power reduction on August 28 to 15% in order to repair a control valve EHC oil leak on the main turbine, the unit operated at essentially full power the remainder of the report perio . .

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Unit 2 operated at essentially 100% power until it was taken off line at 12:15 a.m. 'on August 16 for a 65 day refueling outage. The shutdown is discussed in more detail in paragraph 1 Unit 3 operated at essentially full power throughout the reporting perio No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Testing The surveillance tests listed below were reviewed and/or witnessed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequac The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies.noted, and review of completed wor The~ tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was complete Surveillances reviewed are as follows:

PT/1/A/0150/228 Shutdown Valve Functional Test

?T/1/A/0150/22C Refueling Valve Functional Test PT/3/A/115/08 Reactor. Building Isolation and Verification CP/1,2,3/A/2002/4D Test Procedure for Post Accident Liquid Sampling System Surveillances witnessed in whole or part:

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! PT/1/A/0150/22A Operating Valve Functional Test, Unit 1 PT/1/A/0600/12 Turbine Driven EFWP Performance Test No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Activities Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting

. period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described work that was not within the skill of the trade. Activities, procedures and work requests were examined to verify proper authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and . exposure control, proper return of equipment to service, and that limiting conditions for operation were met.

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Maintenance witnessed in whole or in part:

MP/0/A/1210/11 Limitorque Operator Disassembly Refurbishment, and Reassembly WR 52739E Upgrade 2CA Cell #2 Maintenance work requests reviewed in detail:

WR 50734E Low Cell Voltage on Cell #2 of 2CA Battery WR 51946E Cell #2 of 2CA Has Low Voltage, Change or Jumper Out Cel WR 51980E Upgrade Cell #2 of 2CA (Replacement Cell)

WR 52436E Perform Equalizing Charge on 2CA Battery Bank During the inspectors' review of the above referenced procedures on Instrument and Control Battery #2CA, several discrepancies were noted which, if not corrected, could result in future problems. Recent changes in the

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Technical Specifications' interpretation of the number of required station l batteries and the time period that a battery can be taken out of service appeared to be causing procedural problems. The procedures had not been revised to reflect the more restrictive TS interpretation and there appeared to be inconsistencies in the documentation associated with maintenance to upgrade cell number 2 in battery 2CA. Based on more d'etailed discussions with the licensee's personnel the inspectors' have determined that there were no violations of TS or failure to provide the required maintenance on the battery. Corrective action is being taken by the licensee to ensure that all procedures and TS requirements are in agreement and that station personnel are adequately trained in their use. The inspectors will continue to follow these developments during the course of future inspection No violations or deviations were identifie . Resident Inspector Safeguards Inspection In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shif ts of the security force was observed in the. conduct of daily activities which included; protected and vital areas access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory post In addition, the Resident Inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected and vital areas barrier integrity and verified interfaces between the security

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organization and operations or maintenance?

No violations or deviations were identifie . Post Accident Sampling System (TMI Item II.B.3)

During a review of the status of TMI items the residents became aware of operational problems with the . Station's Post Accident Sampling System (PASS). At the Oconee Station this TMI item consists of two systems, one to

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sample the reactor building gas-and a separate system to sample reactor coolant (RCS) and the reactor building ncrmal sump (RBNS). The latter system is known as the Post Accident Liquid Sampling (PALS) syste The PALS system was originally installed during 1982. The subsequent functional testing and declaration of operability was the subject of much correspondence between the licensee and the NRC. On March 18, 1983, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order addressing several TMI items, including II. .The Order required implementation. of the system in accordance with the licensee's proposed schedule. In August 1983 a licensee letter notified the NRC of environmental qualification problems with some system valves but that

"in all other respects, installed PALS meets requirements of II.B.3 and the Confirmatory Order".

In December 1984 the PALS system procedure was revised to include acceptance criteria based on those in use for the PALS system at the licensee's McGuire Station. Those criteria resulted from corrective action following NRC violations on the system at McGuire. Oconee Technical Specifications (TS) 6.4.4 was approved by the NRC, effective October 31, 1985, - requiring "a program that en'sures the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant

.... under accident conditions".

The inspectors reviewed results of surveillance tests conducted during 1986 for all three units and some tests conducted in 1985 for Unit 2. In almost all of the tests reviewed the acceptance criteria were not met. Also noted was that the section of the surveillance procedure for sampling the RBNS has not been performed during 1986 due to equipment problems on each of the three unit There are no completed surveillance procedures in the licensee's document control syste All completed procedures are being retained by the responsible engineer since the steps pertaining to acceptance criteria have not been signe By memorandum dated August 13, 1986, the licensee notified NRC Region II of continuing problems with the system and that a schedule for resolving the problems would be forthcoming by January 198 The residents expressed concern that failure to meet acceptance criteria during the surveillance testing places the operability of the system in question. As a minimum, the system may have been inoperable since October 31, 1985, at which time TS 6.4.4 became effectiv Because of questions concerning operability of the PALS system the inspectors feel that further review by Region II specialists is necessary in-order to determine if a violation of Oconee TS exists. Therefore this will be listed as an unresolved item, UNR 50-269, 270, 287/86-24-01: Operability of the Post Accident Liquid Sampling System.

1 Potential Runcut of Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pumps On August 28, the licensee, under 10 CFR 50.73 a.2.v and 50.72 b.2.iii, notified the NRC of inadequate design of the EFW system. The determination was based on the results of an engineering review of the EFW system with

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respect to the potential for pump runout to occur during transient conditions. This review was prompted by the recent NRC Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI).

During the SSFI conducted by the NRC during May and June, 1986 the inspectors raised the possibility of EFW pump damage due to excessive flew (pump runout) occurring during design basis transients. The licenset's engineering staff undertook further engineering evaluation and determined that adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) is not assured under certain design basis conditions. The events in question involve steam generator depressurization coupled with either high EFW flow or flow control valve failure (open). In -some ca'ses, together with a single failure, the system would be incapable of performing its design functio Based on the SSFI concerns and the licensee's Design Engineering Department review, a Design Nonconformance Report was issued on July 31. Additional reviews, documented in internal memos dated August 4 and 20, provide details of the specific transients of concern and the mitigations provided by the operating procedure In summary, all identified transients which could cause potential runout conditions to occur are also excessive heat transfer (overcooling)

transients. As such, the Station Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)

provides the operator actions required to mitigate overcooling and in doing so should. prevent any extended runout conditions from occurring. The operator guidance involves throttling the EFW flow control valves and/or tripping the pump (s) in conditions of excessive overcoolin In addition to reviewing the E0P and other appropriate procedures to ensure that mitigating guidance for pump runout is included, the Station Operations Superintendent has taken the following actions: The EFW operating procedure, referenced in the E0P, has been reissued,-

with an added enclosure highlighting actions to be taken to mitigate pump runou . A training package has been issued for review by all Station licensed personnel. The package provides the results of the engineeri.ng revie . A copy of .the engineering review has been provided to the Oconee Training . Center for review to ensure that the information is included in operator training materia Design Engineering is evaluating potential modificatiens to the EFW system to reduce the reliance on operator actions for mitigation of pump runout scenario Based on the above, the resident inspectors have concluded that administrative controls are adequate for continued operation. As previously noted, this problem was identified during the SSFI. Region II will complete

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its review of this issue during evaluation of the unresolved item identified in the SSFI report (see UNR 50-269,270,287/86-16-14).

12. Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCU)

Based on an NRC finding during the recent Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI), see report 86-14, related to the EQ of lubricants used in Limitorque valve operators, the licensee undertook a review of the overall lubrication program at the Oconee Station, to be completed by September During this review the Oconee Maintenance staff determined that the lubrication being used in the RBCU fan motors did not appear to be qualified for use in harsh environ The lubrication in question is Texaco Premium RB, currently in use in the RBCU fan motors. The fan motors are manufactured by Joy / Relianc The >

Oconee station Equipment Qualification Reference Index (EQRI) references the '

qualified lubricant as Chevron SRI #2 greas This would appear to invalidate the use of Texaco Premium R Review of the EQRI for other -

motors which are subject to harsh environments, (HPI, LPI, & RBS pump motors) revealed documented test data indicating that Texaco Premium RB lubricant is qualified to radiation exposure up to 1 x 10E8 rads and can withstand temperatures up to 382 degrees Fahrenheit without degradatio Based on the test data, the Texaco Premium RB grease is EQ qualified for use in harsh environs identified in the licensee's earlier responses to IE Bulletin 79-01. While the EQRI references Texaco for HPI, LPI, and RBS pump motors, it could have referenced use of the same grease for the RBCU fan motors, 'or as a suitable substitute. This is not the same situation as addressed in the SSFI where Marfak grease was not determined to be qualified l

for use in Limitorque operator The resident inspectors reviewed the applicable documents to confirm the licensee's conclusions. It is felt that failure to document Texaco Premium RB as an acceptable EQ lubricant for the RBCU fan motors was an oversight on the licensee's part. Therefore, there are no violations or deviations identified at this tim The l'icensee plans to provide a letter report to Region II providing a detailed explanation for the discrepancy in EQ documentation for RBCU lubricants. This will be : listed as an inspector followup item pending receipt and review of the letter report; IFI 50-269, 270, 287/86-24-02, EQ Documentation for RBCU Lubricant e 1 Unit 2 Refueling Outage t Unit 2 shut down on August 16 for the cycle 8-9 refueling outage, which is scheduled for 65 d'ays. Some of the major work scheduled is installation of reactor vessel level instrumentation (RVLIS); replacement of seals, journal box, and all rotating parts of two reactor. coolant pumps; refurbisment of

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approximately 100 Limitorque valve operators and MOVATS testing of about 60 valves; complete disassembly and rework of feedwater pump turbines; water slap and sludge lancing of both steam generators; and installation of a new atmospheric dump valve on each main steam header and other modification to facilitate cool down through atmospheric dumpin At the end of the reporting period, 40 Limitorque valves operators have been refurbished and 16 MOVATS tested; defueling has been completed; and sludge lance and water slap of the steam generators has been completed. About'600 pounds, total, of sludge was removed from the steam generators. The outage is proceeding ahead of schedule to dat Replacement of reactor coolant pump internals as routine preventive maintenance is a program that has been initiated. It is planned to replace internals of two pumps on each refueling outage at least until all have been reworked once. The inspectors have monitored Limitorque valve rework and have found it to be controlled and carefully performe No violations or deviations were identifie