ML20215N807

3 Emergency Preparedness Exercise on 861015

ML20215N807
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	10/23/1986
From:	Lynch T Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION
To:	Hackney C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
NUDOCS 8611070298
Download: ML20215N807 (27)

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OBattelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories P.O. Box 999 Rahland, Nshington U.$A 99352 Telephone (509) 375-3782 Telex 15-2874 October 23, 1986 -

E Mr.' Charles Hackney N-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 'i OG 3 iin b)i tyg Region IV ,

611 Ryan Plaza Drive -

Suite 1000 Arlington TX 76011

Dear Charles:

WATERFORD-3 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OCTOBER 15, 1986.

Enclosed is the final report of T.P. Lynch and A. K. Loposer who were the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) participants during the exercise. Only minor changes have been made to the drafts given to you prior to leaving the site. The areas covered by PNL include:

T.P. Lynch - Operational Support Center, H.P. Access Control Point ~

A.K. Leposer - Control Room If you have any question regarding this report please contact me on FTS (509) 375-3782 or T. P. Lynch on FTS (509) 375-3794.

Sincerely, u' 4M James D. Jamison Timot P. L ch Technical Leader Research Scientist Emergency Preparedness Group Emergency Preparedness Group Health Physics Technology Section Health Physics Technology Section HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT JDJ/TPL:lem Enclosure cc: DB Matthews, w/ enclosure stA2588a! ge68jjg2 F

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WATERFORD-3 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE October 15, 1986 A. Name: Timothy P.. Lynch B. Assignment: Operational Support Center, Health Physics Ass'ess Control Point.

C. Site Personnel Contacted: B. Crawley, Training Instructor; R. Azzarello, Emergency Planning Manager; D. Landeche, Health Physics Supervisor;

' Jack Lewis, Emergency Planning Coordinator; S. Lubinski, Emergency Planner; W. Favaloro, Training Instructor.

D. Positive Observations:

e The OSC was activated in a timely manner.

> e Solutions to the inplant problems were aggressively pursued.

• Communications with the Control Room and TSC were good.

• Status boards for plant parameters and the inplant teams were kept up to date.

• Personnel accountability was effectively maintained.

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e The critiques at the H.P. control point and the OSC were good.

E. Negative Observations:

e : The inplant radiological conditions encountered by the majority of the

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reentry teams did not challenge the health physics staff's. ability to pre-plan for an activity where personnel could receive a significant dose.

• The Emergency Team Briefing Sheets should allow for an approval signature by either the OSC supervisor or the Radiological Controls ' Coordinator.

Training should be provided for OSC personnel to ensure the forms are completely filled out.

e The telephones in the OSC should have an indicating light to facilitate identifying which phone is ringing.

• The use of headsets by communicators and reducing the volume of the P.A.

in the OSC supervisors office are recommend'ed due to the noise level during P.A. announcements in the OSC.

e The criterion for OSC activation ^ contained in EP-2-101 should be modified to reflect the minimum staffing levels contained in Table 5-1 of the Emergency Plan.

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e A checklist should be developed for use by the OSC supervisor during activation of the OSC.

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• A' continuous air monitor should be placed in operation in the OSC.

F .' Chronology:

Time Observation 0735 Arrive at the OSC l

07442 P.A. announcement that an. Unusual Event has been declared based on seismic activity.

0802 Repeat announcement on Unusual Event.

0837- P.A. announcement for declaration of Alert based on loss of both shutdown cooling trains.

0850 1-H.P.,.2 Chem. techs, 10 Mech., 5 Electricians and 3 I and C signed in on roster board.

0855 ~ OSC supervisor briefs staff.on plant conditions which includes the "A and "B" LPSI pumps 00S.

0900 Repair teams are briefed for work on pumps.

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Time Observation 0905. John Megahay assumes duties of E. D. Communicators set up. P.A.

system loud especially in OSC supervisor's office. OSC checks with TSC to determine ~if other teams are inplant.

0910 TSC informed that "B" LPSI pump is operational and the "A" LPSI pump needs a weld repair and that a team is being dispatched.

0914 OSC supervisor declares the OSC operational and informs the TSC.

0918 Work' authorizations complete for the two repair teams. P.A.

announcement that both the OSC and TSC are activated.

0935 Team #1 returns to OSC.

0927 . Team #2 receives briefing for job to replace turbo charger on EDG "B".

0930 Radio check with repair team #2. Team #1 is debriefed. "B" LPSI pump is operational.

0940 Portable instruments (ion chamber,-G.M.)~in current calibration.

0944 Reactor trips, offsite power is lost and the "A" EDG fails to start.

An SAE is declared. Team #3 prepares to check seismic monitors and team #4 prepares for repair of diesel generator "A" output breaker, i

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Time Observation 0950 SAE' announced over the-P.A'. Personnel told to report to their assembly areas.

1000 Document control and warehouse personnel report to OSC to afford access.to needed equipment and manuals or procedures.

1012 Rescue team readies to locate three persons not accounted for. Not needed, persons found, i-1015 Personnel accountability for repair teams is being maintained.

Inplant teams periodically call in to OSC.

1032 P.A. announcement that accountability is complete.

e l 1024 Offsite assembly point reports everyone accounted for and they have been surveyed for contamination.

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1037. Determination made that the EFAT responsibility has been assumed by the TSC and those persons are deleted from the security accountability log. Logs are being utilized by each of the phone l

communicators.

1050- Plant parameter data is being kept current on the status board.

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Time Observation 1110 P.A. announcement that a G'eneral Emergency is declared based on ,

degraded core sequence and loss of feed water capability.

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1122 EFW pump repairs will take about twelve' hours - repo'rt to the TSC. '

Defeating interlocks will allow an intertie to be established i between the "A"'and'"B" buses which could provide LPSI power. '

s 1130 P.A. announcement that the EOF has been activated and the-E0F ,

director is Fred Drummond.

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1225 Arrive at the -4 H.P. control point. < k 1304 EFAT arrives at the -35 ft. elevation location of the victim.

~ 1.341 Outside on the west side of the RAB at door 27. Ambulance is covered with herculite for contamination control. Spoke with .

controller, Bob'Crawley, and he noted the drill inside the plant '

went well and the priority was the victims medical conditions and that good radiological practices were followed. .

1400 Review of the RWP and H.P. surveys. Maximum dose rates were $5

R/hr.

1415 A review of the Emergency Team Briefing Sheets shows that reentry teams not originating in the OSC did not have a management approval 6

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4 - Time Observation

y signature as did the sheets for. teams from the OSC. The RCC should y,

s. be added as on alternate.

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. 1450 Instruments e'-e source checked with a button source and acceptable range is taped on side of the instruments checked.

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1524 Exercise Termination. Attended critique at the H.P. control point.

The critique was comprehensive. Discussed the OSC performance with lead _ controller (Spence Lubinski). It. appears that a good job was done.

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WATERFORD-3 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE October 15, 1986 t

I A. Name: A. K. Loposer 4

B. Assignment: Control Room

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C. Site Personnel Contacted: R.Azzarello,E.P.Manaher;M.Phillippe, Controller (Control Room); R. Pollock, Controller (Control Rcom);

0. Pipkins, Controller (Control Room); T. Brown, Shift Supervisor; M. Bourgeoise, Shift Supervisor; J. Luehman, NRC Senior Resident; J. Lewis, Controller (TSC).

D. Positive Findings:

• Control Room operators were professional and businesslike in their drill E performance. Their attitude was excellent and they " played the gane".

They utilized lull periods to brainstorm various options for corrective action and for accident mitigation.

e The operators made frequent reference to procedures and to piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID's). Their competency in the use of their procedures, and their familiarity with them,- reflected good training and practice.

e' A good infonnation _ turnover occurred when the Shift Supervisor was relieved as Emergency Coordinator, and this relief was clearly announced to Control Room personnel.

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• ' Bound logs were used and were well kept.

e Operators' attempted to foresee problems and take early action. For example:

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1. The' communicator reminded the Emergency Coordinator of the need for

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the first 30 minute notification update about five minutes before it

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was due.

2. A boronometer reading was requested just prior to isolating LETDOWN.

3. Safety Injection was anticipated and manually initiated about.one minute prior to the Safety Injection Activation signal (SIAS) being

$riggered automatically.

• The cooperation and accomodation between the regular shift personnel and ejercise shift personnel was excellent.

S-E. llegative Observations:

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• One item of prompting was noted at 0748 when a monitor suggested to the i

communicator that "this would be a good time to try out your answering

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system". Where the communicator' asked-the monitor if he should make a tape, the monitor indicated that he should. Whether or not the communicator would have taken this action without the prompt is unknown.

• Incident to notifications to parishes and state agencies, the communicator provided the telephone number for call-back verification.

1 Section 5.1.4.2 of EP-2-010, " NOTIFICATIONS AliD COMMUNICATIONS" states:

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"...the receiver of the message should at their discretion call back and i

verify the validity of the message on the pre-established call back numbers provided to the agencies." When the communicator provides the number for call-back incident to this notification the validity of any-call-back verification is defeated.

• The leak / crack on the discharge piping from "A" LPSI pump was reported at 0820. The Emergency Coordinator did not' declare an ALERT until 0838, 18 ,

minutes later. This time appeared somewhat excessive.

. . A delay in accountability occurred when the Shift Supervisor was.

mistakenly led to believe that the Shift auxiliary operators who were out in the plant were not required to check in for accountability. The delay this created impacted adversely on achieving timely accountability.

e There was no radiological check point set up at the entrance to the Control Room /TSC area to guard against inadvertent contamination of those spaces by persons entering who may have become contaminated enroute. An arrangement similar to that used at the E0F would appear adequate.

F. Chronology:

Time Objective 0645 Initial conditions established.

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o t Time Objective 0735 Seismic event message passed.

-0744 Shift Supervisor (S/S) declared notice of Unusual Event (N0VE).

4 0753 Completed initial notifications to St. Charles and St. John's Parishes and to Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness-(L0EP).

0758 Waterford Plants #1.and #2 notified.

0812 NRC(HQ)notificationcompleted.

0818 First update to state and parishes sent.

0820 Message on weld crack / leak on LPSI pump-"A" was passed.

0838 Emergency Coordinator (EC) declared ALERT.

'0841 S/S-des' ired to start shutdown /cooldown but.was deterred by controller in order to maintain scenario.

0844 Alert notification passed to parishes and state (L0EP and Louisiana Nuclear Energy' Division (LNED)).

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0845 Word Passed directing personnel in emergency response facilities to key in to accountability card readers.

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Time Objective 0838 Mr. MeGahay arrived Control Room preparatory to relieving as E.C. 0905 Mr. MeGahay relieved S/S as Emergency' Coordinator (EC).

0913 TSC infonned S/S that LPSI pump "B" was operable and surveillance completed. (This was incorrect, and was so reported to TSC by SS.).

0925 LPSI pump "B" operable 0940 Loss of off-site power message passed.

0945 Attempts to close the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) "A" output breaker were unsuccessful.

0950 EC (in TSC)' declared Site Area Emergency (SAE).

0956 E0F activation commenced.

1011 Successfully closed 00G tie breaker to "83" bus.

1018 Emergency Feed Water (EFW) pump "A" tripped-out as it was started.

1025 Letdown monitor in Hi-Alarm status.

1033 Accountability announced complete. Secured (isolated) letdown due to high activity.

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Time -0bjective

-1054' "A/B" EFW pump overspeeds.

1059 Report received of 12 hrs. to repair bent stem on valve MS-416.

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1103 EC declared General Emergency (GE).

1205 Unsuccessfully attempted to start EFW pump "A" - tripped on over d

current.

1 1216 Steam generators (SG) have boiled dry. CUE card #36 passed, showing that CVR - 201 indicates both open.and shut.

1224- Successfully started EFW pump "A". Pressurizer relief lifted -.did not-fully reseat.

1230 Operators manually initiated safety injection-due to decreasing reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure.

~1231 Safety injection activation signal (SIAS) received.

1257 Completed taking PASS sample.

1303 Terminated emergency boration.

1305 ~ Report of medical emergency.

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. Time Objective 1352 Repairs / attempts to shut CVR-201 still unsuccessful, i

1433 CVR-201 shut,' release terminated.

E' 1444 ' HPSI flow throttled to 300 GPM.

1524 ' Exercise terminatied.

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ATTACHMENT 1~

OPEN~ ITEMS

1. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-01). This item was reported completed by the licensee as of April 4,1984. Procedures EP-1-010, UNUSUAL EVENT; EP-1-020, ALERT; EP-1-040, GENERAL EMERGENCY; all contained box-notes specifying that the alarm is to be sounded prior to the P/A announcement.

Incident to the annual exercise' conducted on October 15, 1986, it was observed.that this practice.was correctly followed. The item is CLOSED.

2. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-02). This item was reported completed by the licensee as of May 23, 1984. During the exercise conducted on October 15, 1986, it was observed that the volume of the site announcing system in the Shift Supert>isor and Communicator Station areas was adequate, the level of the volume in the main area of the Control Room seemed low. This volume was adjustable higher, but was set at the level preferred by the operators. The item is closed.

3. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-03). The-licensee reported this item completed as of November 28, 1984. Incident to the annual exercise conducted on October 15, 1986, a check of procedures in use in the Control Room was.made. All procedures checked were noted to be CONTROLLED COPIES. The item is CLOSED.

4. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-04) The licensee reported this item completed as of October 25, 1984. During the annual exercise conducted 15

on October 15,.1986, the NRC inspector observed the communicator prepare and insert ALERT tapes, and a shift to an information tape directing

-callers to the.TSC, after the TSC activated. The escalation to-SITE AREA EMERGENCY occurred after TSC activation, thus no observation of a shift of tapes from ALERT to SITE AREA EMERGENCY was available. The operation, as observed, was performed correctly. . The item is CLOSED.

5. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-05). The licensee reported this item completed as of November 28, 1984. During the course of the annual exercise conducted on October 15, 1986, the SHIFT SUPERVISOR /EMERGEt!CY COORDINATOR conducted sufficient status briefings of his personnel to assure they were adequately informed. The item is CLOSED.

6. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-24)- The inspector noted that procedure EP-2-101 specifies the assembly point for the Fire Brigade and the Emergency First Aid Team as the +7 ft. elevation. .It was noted during the exercise that the Search of Rescue Team assembled in the OSC and the Emergency First Aid Team assembled at the +7 ft elevation. The item is CLOSED.

7. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-25) The inspector noted that procedure EP-2-101-instructs both the operations personnel and the Radiological Controls Coordinator to ensure that health physics coverage is provided for the Fire Brigade. Briefings given to the Search and Rescue Team in the OSC include'd having them report to the H.P. access control point at the -4 ft, elevation which they did. The item is CLOSED.

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8. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-26) The inspector noted that status board drawings of the +7 ft. elevation and several other locations in.both the reactor auxiliary building and the reactor containment building were available in the OSC. The item is CLOSED.

9. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-27) :The. inspectors noted that procedure EP-2-060 includes an equipment inventory sheet. Kits were inventoried during the exercise using the checklist to account for the equipment.

The item is closed.

10. .(CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-28) The inspector noted that the security / accountability desk was located near the entrance to the OSC during the exercise. The item is CLOSED.

11. (CLOSED) Open item (382/8410-29) ~The inspector noted that the OSC roster board has been divided into several sections which included electrical, mechanical, health physics, instrumentation and control, operation's, chemistry and other. The item is CLOSED.

12. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8410-30) The inspector noted that procedure EP-2-034 requires surveys of occupied areas onsite such as the OSC and E0F. The OSC locker contained equipment and instrumentation needed for measuring dose rates, taking of air samples and analyzing air samples.

The item is CLOSED.

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13. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8525-01). The licensee reported that corrective action for this item had'been completed as of December 30, 1985. During the annual exercise conducted on October 15, 1986, the NRC inspector noted that this requirement is supported in each of the procedures for the four emergency classifications, specifically, EP-1-010, 020, 030, and 040. It was further observed during the exercise that notification of NRC-Headquarters was completed (for the NOVE) at 0812, 31 minutes following the declaration of the NOUE at 0741. No further notifications

.were made (per NRC-HQ request) until exercise termination. The' item is CLOSED.

14. (CLOSED) Open Item (382/8525-02). The licensee reported that corrective act' ion (procedure revisions) would be completed as of March 3, 1986. A review of the four emersency classification procedures, EP-1-010, 020, 1 030, and 040, confirmed that these procedures now reflect adequate support for providing periodic updates to state and local agencies at regular intervals, nominally 30 minutes. Observations during the annual exercise conducted on October 15, 1986, substantiated that periodic updates were provided. The item is CLOSED.

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15. Improvement Items listed in Report 50-382/85-25 were reviewed with the I

following observations:

• The' communicator's telephone was located in an area accessible to him.

However, there was not a dedicated instrument for the HOT LINE. Rather, the H0T LINE was one of six lines available on that instrument.

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• The Shift Supervisor was observed making some degree of use of other station personnel in filling out forms, etc. In any case, such duties as he did retain himself did not appear to degrade or dilute the performance' of his primary duties.

• The Resource Book was reviewed and found to contain a note alerting communicators that the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) telephone number shown is for normal working hours, with . supplementary information regarding off-hours notification of LNED to be done by Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (L0EP). A discussion with the assigned communicator confirmed his understanding of this arrangement.

e- The communicator assigned in'the Control Room to make the state and local notifications also performed the 10 CFR 50.72 communication requirement.

This kept him very busy, but in this instance he was able to complete. all required notifications as specified.

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ATTACHMENT 2 EXERCISE SCENARIO The exercise scenario was reviewed to determine if provisions had been made to exercise the-licensee's emergency preparedness organization in accor-dance with the requirements of 10CFR 50 Appendix E-Section F and the guidance contained in NUREG 0654 Section 11.n. The review included an evaluation'of

..the adequacy of both the operational and radiological aspects of the scenario.

. Specific areas reviewed included the objectives, controller messages, plant-parameter data, sequence of events, onsite and offsite radiological data. The results of the review are as follows:

• The scenario contained a narrative summary of everits which occurred and the rationale behind the events;

• Scenario messages were adequate to maintain the scenario timeline; e The plant parameter data and radiological data were adequate to support the sequence of events;

• The scenario challenged the operations personnel's capability for emergency detection, classification and subsequent notifications.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER The Operational Support Center (OSC) was activated in a timely manner.

Solutions to problems in the plant were pursued aggressively and effective use of the OSC resources was demonstrated. Status boards were maintained with the current conditions. Communication with the control room and the TSC were very good however the noise icvel during PA announcements was excessive. Personnel 20

c accountability in the OSC was effectively maintained. Reentry teams were briefed on the radiological conditions that could be anticipated.

The following are recommended improvement items:

e The inplant radiological conditions encountered by the majority of the reentry teams did not challenge the health physics staff's abi'.ity to pre-plan for an activity where personnel could receive a significant dose. Future health physics drill scenarios should contain radiological conditions that will challange the health physics staff.

• The Emergency Team Briefing Sheets should allow for an approval signature by either the OSC Supervisor or the Radiological Controls Coordinator.

Training should be provided for OSC personnel to ensure the forms are filled out completely.

• The telephones in the OSC should have an indicating light to facilitate identifying which phone is ringing.

• The use of headsets by communicators and reducing the volume of the P.A.

system in the OSC supervisors offices are recommended due to the noise level during P.A. announcements in the OSC.

-e The criterion for OSC activation contained in EP-2-101 should be modified to reflect the minimum staffing levels contained in Table 5-1 of the Emergency Plan.

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e A checklist should be developed for use by the OSC supervisor during activation of the OSC.

• A continuous air monitor should be placed in operation in the.0SC.

No violations or deviations were identified.

CONTROL ROOM Initial conditions were provided to the control room staff assigned as exercise participants at 0645, and included the following:

a. The plant had been operating at an almost constant 100% power for the past 30 days after a refueling outage.

b. "A/B" charging pump was out of service due to severe packing gland leaks.

Packing on order,

c. "A/B" HPSI pump out of service due to bearing failure. . Expect replacement parts 10/16/86.

d. "B" Emergency Diesel Generator out of service due to a turbo-charger bearing failure.

e. "A" Emergency Feedwater Pump'was operable, but operating in the " alert" range for vibrations.

f. "B" LPSI Pump out of service for oil change and lubrication; surveillance expected to complete by about 0930.

The exercise began at 0735 when a seismic event was felt in the plant and corroborated by a seismic _ event alarm actuation and by the Strong Motion Accel-22

erograph system showing the yellow event alann illuminated. The licensee de-clared a Notification of Unusual Event and made the appropriate notifications, while at the same time initiating a plant walk-down for damage assessment.-

The walk-down revealed, at about 0820, that the discharge piping on the "A" Low Pressure Safety' injection (LPSI) Pump had been cracked and the leakage had sprayed onto the pump motor. A weld repair was required, and in the interim

.both LPSI pumps would be out of service. As a result the licensee declared an ALERT at 0838. Again, notifications were made.

Another casualty of the earthquake, but not observable during the walk-down, was the containment vacuum relief isolation valve, CVR 201, which moved of f its seat but continued to indicate closed on the Reactor Control Panel. Th>t breach of containment did not become evident until later in the exercise.

The Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated and the Shift Supervisor (S/S) relieved as Emergency Coordinator (EC) at 0905.

The "B" LPSI pump was returned to service at 0925, but at 0940 a total loss of AC power occurred, commencing with a loss of off-site power and compounded by failure of the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator output breaker to close after the diesel started. A station black-out resulted and at 0950 the licensee declared a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

i At 1011 the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator output breaker was closed which restored power to some systems and components.

At 1018 the Emergency Feed Water (EFW) pump "A" was reported failed; at 1054 the "A/B" EFW Pump overspeed and tripped. With levels dropping in both steam generators the licensee declared a GENERAL EMERGENCY at 1103 based on a degrading core sequence and loss of all feedwater capability. Subsequently 23

both steam generators boiled dry about 1216 and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) i pressure commenced increasing. At 1225, almost simultaneously with restoration and restart of A" EFW Pump, the pressurizer relief valve lifted, then failed to reseat.

At'about 1230 the quench tank rupture disk ruptured, relieving the quench tank to containment atmosphere, then through the previously described failed containment vacuum relief valve, and the Shfeld Building Ventilation System to atmosphere. This release continued until the containment vacuum relief valve was closed at 1433.

With "A" EFW Pump operating and feeding a steam generator, a controlled cooldown was initiated.

At about 1305 a medical einergency occurred, a simulated heart attack and subsequent' contamination. The injured victim was administered emergency first aid and evacuated to West Jefferson General Hospital where he was treated and decontaminated.

With the release terminated the basic exercise was terminated at 1524. A 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time jump was' simulated and recovery planning was conducted.

The NRC inspectors observed that control room personnel consulted appropriate (CONTROLLED COPY) procedures for the events. Initial notifications to the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (L0EP) and to both Parishes were made within 15 minutes after the events were classified.

Subsequent follow-up~ notifications were made as specified in the procedures.

Initial notification to NRC Headquarters was at 0812, 31 minutes after NOUE classification. Control Room operators exhibited professionalism, an excellent attitude, and good foresight. Bound logs were used and were well-kept.

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'The following improvement items are recommended:

• When notifications are nade to Parishes and state agencies the communi-cator should exercise care to differentiate between the pre-established call back numbers, and a number which can be used for obtaining aupli-fying information in the event the dedicated hot line is lost or that additional information is required. Communicators should be instr ucted not to refer to a number provided as a " verification" or " validation" call back number. If an agency desires to validate a suspected bogus call they should use the number previously provided to them.

• Make procedural provisions for establishing a radiological check point at the entrance to the CONTROL ROOM /TSC area to guard against contamination of those areas by persons entering who may have become contaminated enroute. An arrangement similar to that used at the EOF would appear adequate.

.The following negative observations were made:

o The leak / crack on the discharge piping from "A" LPSI Pump was reported at 0820. The Emergency Coordinator did not declare an ALERT until 0828, 18 minutes later. This time delay appeared excessive.

e One item of prompting was noted at 0748 when a monitor was heard to suggest to the communicator that "this would be a good time to try out your answering system". When the communicator asked the monitor if he should make the tape the monitor indicated that he should. Whether or not the communicator would have taken this action without the prompt is unknown.

• A minor delay in accountability occurred when the Shift Supervisor was mistakenly led to believe that the shift Nuclear Auxiliary Operators who 25

V were out in the plant were not required to check in for accountability.

The delay this created impacted adversely on achieving timely accountability. (0BJECTIVE A.1.q. refers).

No violations or deviations were identified.

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