Text

Informs That Staff Completed Review of Markup of AP600 TS Which Contained Compilation of Over 100 Commitments Made in Resolution of Open Items,Submitted on 980313.Problems Noted by Staff During Review & Markup of TS Pages Encl
	ML20216C120
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	04/09/1998
From:	Quay T; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Liparulo N; WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
References
	NUDOCS 9804140334
	Download: ML20216C120 (56)
	v • d • e

C, '

April 9, 1998

- Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo, Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Analysis Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division -

Westinghouse Electric Corporation P.O. Box 355 '

Pittsburgh, PA 15230

SUBJECT:

ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE FINAL REVIEW OF AP600 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TSs)

Dear Mr. Liparulo:

In a letter dated March 13,1998, Westinghouse provided the staff with a markup of the AP600 technical specification (TS) which contained a compilation of over 100 commitments made in the resolution of staff ope 1 items. The staff has just completed its review of this markup and still has some concems. Most of the problems noted by the staff appear to be editorialin nature and should be quickly resolvable. However, some items may result in additional technical issues. 1 Because of the extremely tight schedule for issuance of an advanced final safety evaluation report for the AP600, the staff believes that a meeting during the week of April 13,1998, would i be the most expeditious way to resolve the remaining concerns. Enclosed as an Enclosure 1 to this letter are the problems noted by the staff during its review of the final TSs. Enclosure 2 i

provides a staff markup of the TS pages highlighting the spccific problem locations. The.

j discussion and resolution of these items should form the agenda for the upcoming meeting The j staff has also been reviewing the containment closure and auxiliary building ventilation TSs for fuel handling that were submitted by Westinghouse letter to the staff dated April 1,1998. These

! TSs will also be discussed during the meeting.

Please contact Bill Huffman on my staff to arrange the meeting. If you have any other questions regarding this matter, you may contact me at (301) 415-1118.

Sincerely, l .

original signed by:

Theodore R. Quay, Director

. Standardization Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No.52-003

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DATE 04/ 1 /98 04/q /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 9804140334 980409 F PDR ADOCK 05200003

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E PDR

e, ; e -.

i - Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo Docket No.52-003

l. Westinghouse Electric Corporation AP600 0

. cc: Mr. B/ A. McIntyre ' .

Mr. Russ Bell l- Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Senior Project Manager, Programs Westinghouse Electric Corporation Nuclear Energy Institute Energy Systems Business Unit _1776 l Street, NW P.O. Box 355 Suite 300 4

Pittsburgh, PA 15230 - Washington, DC 20006-3706.-

Ms. Cindy L. Haag .

Ms. Lynn Connor

, Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing ~ Doc-Search Associates j Westinghouse Electric Corporation Post Office Box 34 Energy Systems Business Unit Cabin John, MD 20818 Box 355 -

Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Dr. Craig D. Sawyer, Manager Advanced Reactor Programs Mr. Sterling Franks GE Nuclear Energy

!- .U.S. Department of Energy 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-754 -

i NE-50 San Jose, CA 95125 -

.19901 Germantown Road Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Robert H.'Buchholz

, GE Nuclear Energy ' ,

! Mr. Frank A. Ross 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-781 U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 San Jose, CA 95125 Office of LWR Safety and Technology

(; 19901 Germantown Road Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.

I Germantown, MD 20874 Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott -

600 Grant Street 42nd Floor Mr. Charles Thompson, Nuclear Engineer Pittsburgh, PA 15219 AP600 Certification NE-50 Mr. Ed Rodwell, Manager 19901 Germantown Road PWR Design Certification Germantown, MD 20874 Electric Power Research Institute L 3412 Hillview Avenue L Mr. Robert Maiers, P.E. Palo Alto, CA 94303

( Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Bureau of Radiation Protection L - Rachel Carson State Office Building P.O. Box 8469 Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469

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AP600 Technical Specification Concems EDITORIAL. TYPOGRAPHICAL or CONSISTENCY PROBLEMS

1) Page 1.1 Need to close parentheses under definition of ESF Response Time.

2) Page 1.1-4:- La should be corrected to 0.1%.

l l 3) Page 1.3-1: *lf situations are discovered that..." (instead of which)

! 4) Pages 3.3-24 through 3.3-26

! The LCO 3.3.2 CONDITION descriptions for Conditions U, V, Y, Z, and AA contain the l clause "...of Table 3.3.2-1 specified condition ..." This is inconsistent with the other ,

I CONDITION descriptions and should be deleted.

5) Page 3.8-9 i

LCO 3.8.4 should read "... distribution subsystems required by LCO 3.8.6.. "

l

6) Page B 3.0-5 The Shutdown Matrix is not consistent with the actual tech specs in several areas:

- Where visible level in pressurizer is discussed, the table should be changed to pressurizer level 220%.

l - The matrix should refer to RCS pressure boundary Intact rather than closed.

- The matrix should refer to upperintemals in place rather than reactor intemals in place

7) Page B 3.0-10 l

LCO 3.0.8: The first sentence should be clarified to note that this LCO only applies to Mode 5 and 6. e g., " LCO 3.0.8 establishes the actions when in Af0 DES 5 or 6 that must be implemented..."

Page B 3.0-11 The first paragraph on this page states that "This specification delineates the requirements

for placing the unit in a safe MODE or other specified conditions..."

l LCO 3.0.8 does not require any MODE changes. The sentence should be changed to read something like "This specification delineates the requirements for placing ormaintaining the unit in a safe condition ..."(delete reference to MODE or other specified conditions).

8) Page 3.3-66 ADS Actuation should be included as initiating CMT actua. ion.

l 9) Pages 3.3-67,3.3-80, and 3.3-88 l

The nomenclature for ADS should be made consistent in the tech specs

" ADS Actuation," " ADS Stage 1," and " ADS Stages 1,2 and 3" are all used in the same l apparent context.

~

l

)

Enclosure 1 l

l

8. -0 2

10) Page B 3.3-68.

The discussion in the first paragraph on process lines penetrating containment are isolated on ESF signals. What ESF signals is this referring to? -

11) Page B 3.3-70 _ .

The discussion in the first paragraph of Function 4.c.(1) is garbled and needs to be cor-rected. J

12) Page B 3.3-75 .

- There is no discussion in the Main Feedwater Control Valve Isolation BASES on the need for manual isolation capability in MODES 2 and 3. ]

4 l'

13) Page B 3.3-81 The CMT level-1 actuation of ADS stages 1,2, and 3 (Function 9.a) is only needed in MODE 5 with pressurizer level above 20% per Table 3.3.2-1.

14) Pages B 3.3-82, B 3.3-83, B 3.3-84 The BASES descriptions should refer to the proper name of the actuating signal rather than a function number (e.g. " Manual Initiation Coincident with RCS Wide Range Pressure - Low or ADS stage 1,2 & 3 Actuation - rather than Function 9)

- See Function 10.a 10.b,11,11.s and 11.e for this type usage.

15) Page 3.3-82 Function 10.b uses the nomenclature " Delayed." This is confusing and should either be deleted or clarified. l i

~ 16) Pages B 3.3-90 and B.3.3-91 .

' The last sentences for functions 15.a and 15.c refer to administrative controls to block RCS boron addition in MODE 6. This in not correct,- TS LCO 3.9.2 covers this condition.

17). Page B 3.3-94 .. .

. The last sentence under the discussion of function 17.a is irrelevant to the TSs and should be deleted.

Page B 3.3-98 Similarly, the last sentence under function 20.b is irrelevant.

- 18) ' Page 3.3-99 The BASES description of Function 21.s is inconsistent with the function 18.d description i: and should be clarified.

L 18) Page B 3.3-95 ;

E Midway through the BASES discussion on function 18.b, the verbiage is garbled : "When the !

l- steam line pressure-low and manually blocked..." This should be corrected.

- 19) Page B 3.3-98 _ .

The discussion of function 20 should be revised to clarify that the protection of control room operators during movement of irradiated fuel is a defense-in-depth function.

1 i

I e o 3

20) Page B 3.3-102 l The definition of ESFAC Logic should be included in the BASES.

l

21) Page B 3.3-102 and Page B 3.3-103 -

The function 25 a and 26.a BASES discussions focus on the ADS valve operability. Why is ADS valve operability singled-out? Can it be deleted?

In addition, the discussion in paragraph 25.a should be clarified to state:". . three divisions will still be available to provide redundant actuation for all ESF Functions."

I

22) Page B 3.3-105 The discussioi. ..: lie third paragraph talks about entry in LCO 3.0.3. It may be appropriate to include a clarification that LCO 3.0.3 applies to MODES 1 through 4 and that for MODES 5 and 6, the licensee should enter LCO 3.0.8.

23) Page B 3.3-129 The discussion under item 8 refers to the extended range pressure transmitter covering three times the containment design basis pressure which is stated to be O to 180 psig.

Three times the AP600 containment design basis pressure would be 3x45 = 135 psig. This inconsistency should be corrected.

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

24) Page 1.1 No bases in SSAR for calling PRHR HX tube leakage *ldentified." 1 Page 3.4 LCO 3.4.8 has no BASES in SSAR for allowing PRHR HX tube leakage !

25) Pages 3.3-26 and 3.3-27 The Logical connectors for the Required Actions of Conditions Y and AA do not appear to be correct.

26) Pages 3.4-20 and 3.4-22 The LOGIC for Condition A of LCOs 3.4.12 and 3.4.13 appears to be incorrect. The following appears to be what Westinghouse intended:

A. One flow path inoperable ,

@ l One Stage 1 ADS flow path inoperable AND One Stage 2 ADS flow path inoperable M

One Stage 1 ADS flow path inoperable AND One Stage 3 ADS flow path inoperable l 27) Page 3.6-13 I

LCO 3.6.6 does not require entry into LCO 3.0.3 if both PCCS water cooling flow paths are inoperable. This is not consistent with the STS actions for totalloss of an ESF function.

L

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.o .

4

]

28) Page 3.7-13

- LCO 3.7.6 should be applicable for both CORE ALTERATIONS and MOVEMENT OF ARRADIATED FUEL. This is needed to ensure that the MCR Habitability System is operable during movement of irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool. )

Also see Page B 3.3-98 _. .

The BASES discussion of function 20 notes that MCR lsolation is necessary during movement of irradiated fuel.' This is inconsistent with the applicability for Tech Spec LCO 3.7.6 that covers CORE ALTERATIONS only. The applicability of TS 3.7.6 should be 'j corrected to cover movement of irradiated fuel.'

Similarly, on Pages 3.8-5,3.8-9, and 3.8-14 LCOs 3.8.2,3.8.4, and 3.8.6 should extend the APPLICABILITY to Core Alterations and Movement of Irradiated Fuel ,

'29) Page 3.3-68 The BASES discussion on containment isolation (Function 3) should clarify what contain-ment isolation valves receive an isolation signal from a manual initiation in MODES 5 and 6.

Are all containment isolation valves required to get a signal or are just the penetrations with direct connection between the containment and outside? For example,'does Westinghouse expect RNS to be isolated in MODE 5 from a manual containment isolation signal?

30) Pages B 3.3-80, B 3.3-82, B 3.3-83

' The BASES discussion for Function 9.a,10.a and 10.b state that the function must be operable in MODES 5 and 6 when the ADS valves are not open. The is not consistent with Table 3.3.2-1 which show that manual actuation of ADS stages 1,2 and 3 must be operable in all MODES with no conditions on the open or closed status'of the ADS valves, i

31) Page B 3.3-83 and B3.3 .

The discussion of the RCP trip under function 11 refers to CMT actuation. Per.

I Table 3.3.2-1, this function is from manual CMT action '- not all CMT actuation signals.

1

'32) .Page 3.3-85 . . l l-The second paragraph discussion under function 12 states the passive containment cooling ')

l ' actuation function "... initiates water flow by gravity by opening one of two fail open valves."

.This is incorrect. the signal should open both isolation valves.

i~ 33) Page B 3.3-93 The BASES discussion for function 16.d states that Containment Radioactivity High-2 ,

isolation of CVS makeup is not required in MODE 4 because there is no credible DBA that l could release radioactivity during this mode. This is inconsistent with the BASES discus-

'sions for functions 12.b,19.a, and 20 which state that MODE 4 is applicable since potential i

. for a DBA still exists.

1 i

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.- o 5-

34) Page B 3.3 _

Function 18.d description of the P-12 interlock states that this is only required to be operable in MODES 1,2, and 3. How does this ensure availability of the b!ock for midloop operations -

which would be done in MODES 4 or 57 Also, it appears that the P-12 block can be used to block automatic actuation of the Hot Leg _

level initiation of feed and blood frorn the IRWST if RNS is lost during mid-loop operations.

- This is contrary to the staff's current understanding of this AP600 shutdown feature.

35) Page B 3.3-99 The description of the IRWST Injection flow paths under function 22 also describes the IRWST recirculation flow paths. The discussion of the recirculation flow paths should be deleted from this function description since it is covered by the function 23 description.

37) Page B 3.3-101 The actuation of the IRWST containment sump recirculation valves occurs on a Low-3 IRWST tank level coincident with a safeguards actuation signal. It would appear that the automatic containment recirculation path opening will not take place with an IRWST low level unless the operators manually actuate a safety injection signal. Thus, if the IRWST is draining in MODE 5 due to a low hot leg level initiated feed and bleed, containment recirculation will not automatically take place. In addition, it may never occur in MODE 6 since the safeguards actuation circuitry is not required for MODE 6. This inconsistency needs to be corrected.

TABLE 3.3.2-1 PROBLEMS GLOBAL TABLE 3.3.2-1 PROBLEMS

, 38) Many of the shutdown MODE 5 and 6 instrumentation and control operability requirements in I

tech spec Table 3.3.2-1 are inconsistent with the associated equipment operability LCO '

requirements or with other related l&C functions in Table 3.3.2-1. In some early discussions with Westinghouse on this matter, Westinghouse indicated that having l&C operability requirements for mechanical systems which are not required is not a safety issue. The staff however, is still concemed that the l&C requirements in Table 3.3.2-1 may cause confusion for the plant operator or regulator as to what is the goveming operability requirements.

For example, manual Safeguards Actuation (Function 1.a) is required for MODES 1 through 5. CMT Actuation is required anytime Safeguards Actuation is required (Function 2.c). However, the CMTs are not required to be operable in MODE 5 if the pressure boundary is not intact (LCO 3.5.3). What would be the tech spec requirement for actuation of the CMT from a manual safeguards actuation signal during MODE 5 with the pressure boundary open.

- Other examples include:

I-

(a) PRHR Actuation on ADS stage 1,2 &3 actuation (Functrion 13.d). The ADS stage 1,2

&3 actuation signal must be operable in MODES 1 through 6 (See Function 9.a),

however, the PRHR only need be operable for MODES 1 through MODE 5 with pressure boundary intact (see LCO 3.5.5) t

6 (b) The BASES discussion for Containment isolation (Function 3) states that automatic containment isolation is only required for MODES 1 through 4. However, Table 3.3.2-1 states that Containment isolation is required from a maunual PCCS initiation signal (Function 3.b) which is required to be operable in MODES 5 and 6. In addition, Containment isolation must be operable from a Safeguards Actuation (Function 3.c) which is required in MODE 5. Therefore, Table 3.3.2-1 indirectly requires the l&C circuitry for automatic containment isolation to be operable in both MODES 5 and 6 which is contrary to the BASES.

(c) The manual main feedwater control valve isolation signal is only required to be operable in MODES 1 through 4 (see Funtion 6.a). However, the main feedwater control valve -

isolation is also required to be operable from a safeguards actuation signal (Function 6.c) which is required to be operable in MODE 5 (Function 1.e). The required status of the feedwater isolation valve signal for MODE 5 is therefore indeterminate.

(d) The manual main feedwater pump trip is required to be operable for Modes 1 through 4 (Function 7.a) while automatic initiation from the safeguards is also required I (Function 7.c). Safeguards actuation is required in MODE 5, therefore, it might be i concluded that main feedwater pump trip is also required in MODE 5.

39) Some Table 3.3.2-1 functions will provide both the applicable Modes and refer to another initiating Function (e.g.14a. or 16b. for Safeguards Actuation) while in other cases it refers to the initiating function without the applicable modes ( See function 11e.) It is not clear to the staff what is required when the applicable modes and conditions specified for a refer-enced function are different from the requirements for the function elsewhere in the table.

For example, the Normal Residual Heat Removal isolation on a Safeguards Actuation signal is required only for MODES 1,2 and 3 per Function 17.a. However, a safeguards actuation signal must be operable in MODES 4 and 5 as well. What is the reguirement for RNS isolation on a safeguards actuation signal in MODES 4 or 57 ;

1 TABLE 3.3.2-1 EDITORIAL COMMENTS

40) Page 3.3-41:

Function 22.b should be ADS Stage 4 rather than ADS 4th Stage.

41) Westinghouse should provide a note stating that note (k) has been deleted from the table.

f ?6. Technical Specifications 3

Shutdown Comoletion Times / Mode Definitions The AP600 plant design is different from current Westinghouse designs in that the systems l normally used for MODE reduction am non-safety systems; and therefore, are npj covered by i LCO requirements in Technical Specifications. The passive safety systems, which shut down the plant require a longer period of time to accomplish mode changes and can not reduce the RCS temperature to below 200*F.

LCO and Bases "TBD" Information In cases where the detailed design, equipment selection, or other efforts are not sufficiently

' complete to establish the information required to be specified in Technical Specifications, i

e p ;i [TBD]" (to be determined) has been specified. Additionally, some of the information, such g as that established by startup testing, will not be available until a plant is constructed.

\# g, 1

1 Revision: 22 April 6,1998 16.1-2 [ WBStingh00SB Enclosure 2 l

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

CORE OPERATING The COLR is the unit spepific document that LIMITS REPORT (COLR) provides parameter limits for the current reload ;

cycle. These cycle specific parameter limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 5.6.5. Plant operation within l these parameter limits is addressed in individual Specifications.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I 131 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I 131 (microcuries/ gram) that alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity.and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132. 1 133, 1 134, and 1 135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in ICRP Publication 30. " Limits for Intake of Radionuclides by Workers," 1978 1981.

DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 DOSE EQUIVALENT XE 133 shall be that concentration of Xe 133 (microcuries per gram) that alone would produce the same deep dose equivalent as the quantity and isotopic mixture of noble gases (Kr 85m, Kr 85.

Kr 87. Kr 88, Xe 131m. Xe 133m, Xe 133, Xe 135, and

, Xe 138) actually present. The dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table 2.3 of EPA Federal Guidance Report No.11. " Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion," EPA 520/188- )

020, September 1988. '

ENGINEERED SAFETY The ESF RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval FEATURE (ESF) RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF TIME actuation setpoint-at the channel sensor until the l ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required position $ The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or ,

total steps-so that the entire response time is measured.

(Continued) 1.1-3 04/98 Amendment 0 bioi in.

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

)

L. The maximum allowa - r ;a r" containment leakage rate, L , shall 0.12)t c" primary containment air weight per day at. L a alated peak containment

- pressure (P,).

LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall bc: ;

J I

a. Identified GAKAGE

~

1. LEAKAGE, such as that from seals or valve packing,-that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank:

2. LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located- ,

and known either not to interfere with the l operation of leakage detection' systems or not l to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE:

i l

3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through-a steam generatotJ 5G) to the Secono l _gg w3 7

Systeni; 'or '-

l c ! . RCS 4 LEAKAGE through the passive residual heat

/w.{(9 '

removal heat exchanger (PRHR HX) to the- !

In containment Refueling Water Storage Tank N .I 4 '4' f d -

(IRWST).

{* I p / .

~ ~

b.

Unidentified LEAKW !

All LEAKAGE that is not identified LEAKAGE.

c. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except SG LEAKAGE and PRHR HX tube LEAKAGE) through a nonisolatable fault in a RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.

MODE' A MODE shall correspond to any N inclusive combination of core reactivity walition, power level, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.

(continued)

@ AP600 1,1 4 04/98 Amendment 0 Ap01was%esec\iG0101.,084bs0198 A

Completion Times 1.3 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.3 Completion Times

JRPOSE The purpose of this section is to establish the Completion Time convention and to provide guidance for its use.

BACKGROUND Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) specify minimum requirements for ensuring safe operation of the unit. The ACTIONS associated with an LCO state Conditions that typically describe the ways in which the requirements of the LCO can fail to be met. Specified with each stated Condition are Required Action (s) and Completion Time (s).

DESCRIPTION The Completion Time is the amount of time allowed for completing a Required Action. It is referenced to.the time of i discovery of a situation (e.g., inoperable equipment or )

variable not within limits) that requires entering an ACTIONS Condition unless otherwise specified, providing the unit is in a NODF. or specified condition stated in the Applicability of the LCO. Required Actions must be completed prior to the expiration of the specified Completion Time. An ACTIONS Condition remains in effect and the Required Actions apply until-the Condition no longer exists or the unit is not within the LCO Applicability.

MP If situations are discovered drtth require entry into more thanf' one Condition at a time within a single LCO (multiple Conditions), the Required Actions for each Condition must be-performed within the associated Completion Time. When in multiple Conditions, separate Completion Times are tracked for each Condition starting from the time of discovery of the ;

situation that required entry into the Condition, i Once a Condition has been entered, subsequent trains, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition, unless specifically stated. The Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply to each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.

(continued)

I h'AP600 1.3 1 04/98 Amendment 0 AP01N100105.r00491900

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME U. Required Action and U.1 Be in MODE 5. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Cnenlatinn

? e I'b',,[ *

h nWmet? U.2 Initiate action to open the RCS pressure 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months boundary and establish a pressurizer level 2 20%.

V. Required Action and V.1 Restore the T associatM cnenletion inoperable 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months ~7

'p' T 'able 3.3.2-1) channel (s). ,'

s cified Conditjion .

g

+

_hcN

"* E V.2.1 Be in MODE 5. 180 hours0.00208 days 0.05 hours 2.97619e-4 weeks 6.849e-5 months AND.

V.2.2 Initiate action to 180 hours0.00208 days 0.05 hours 2.97619e-4 weeks 6.849e-5 months open the RCS pressure boundary and establish a pressurizer level 2 20%.

W .- Required Action and W.1 If in MODE 5 with the Immediately associated Com RCS open and Time not met. pletion < 20% pressurizer-level, initiate action to be MODE 5 with the RCS pressure boundary open and a 20*

level . pressurizer AND W.2 If in MODE 5. isolate Immediately the flow path from the domineralized i

' water storage tank to the RCS by use of at least one cicsed and de activated automatic valve or closed manual valve.

AND (continued)

' h AP600 3.3-24 04/98 Amendment 0 A801uschaposi19030002.e00432798

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A _

Y. Required Action and Y.1.1 If ia EiODE in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months assocw M rnanleti MODE 5.

ime f Table .1 -

specified Condition AND not met.

Y.1.2 If in nGDE 4 cr 5, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months initiate action to establish a pressurizer level

> 20% with the RCS pressure boundary b, intact.

.v

.. or M Y.2 If in MODE 6. Immediately e

g initiate action to be C '

in MODE 6 with the water level > 23 feet i L,/6 t' above the top of the g reactor vessel C> fiange.

C '

AND Y.3 Suspend positive Immediately 1

reactivity additions.

Z. Required Action and Z.1 --

-- NOTE - ---

associated Cn=nht Flow path (s) may

,Ilme;of~ Table 3.3.21 be unisolated W ied Condition intermittently ;

not met.

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l under !

akinistrative controls. :

(continued) h AP600 AP01ueensposu4030302M033000 3.3 26 04/98 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Z. (continued) Isolate the affected 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months flow path (s) by use of at least one closed manual or j closed and deactivated automatic valve.

Z.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l AND Z.2.2 Be in MODE 4 with the 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months I RCS cooling provided by the RNS.

AA. Required Action and AA.1.1 -

NOTE--- -

associated cn=nlet

Flow ath(s) may be of Table 3.3.2 l' uniso ated smcifiad intermittently under i no; met. Condition)

' a&iinistrative

! controls.

Isolate the affected 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months i

/ flow path (s).

%r MD

\l AA.1.2.1 Isolate the 7 days affected flow path (s)

A by use of at least I

~\ one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual s valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

^

l 7 (s > ed AA.1.2.2 Verify the Once per 7 days affected flow path is 9 .

isolated.

f bM - -

(continued)

(

b c,sl. - ts % che S'<k b AP600 3.3 27 04/98 Amendment 0 Ae01\nechosec\18030302.#08433000

0 ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME AA. (continued) AA.2.1 If in MODE 4, be in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l MODE 5.

J h .

I AA.2.2 If in MODE 4 or 5, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

] initiate action to establish a V[k pressurizer level

> 20%.

t( AN j v <

AA.2.3 If in MODE 6, Immediately l initiate action to be 1 in MODE 6 with the !

water level > 23 feet j above the top of the reactor vessel flange.

i BB. One channel BB.1.1 Place channel in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months inoperable. bypass.

AND l BB.1.2 Continuously monitor 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months l hot leg level.

h AP600 3.3 28 04/98 Amendment 0 AP01uechosec\18030302.#06 033098

o .

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 11 of II)

Engineered Safeguards Actuation system Instrumentation APPLICAsLE NODES OTNER SPECIFIED REQUIRED . SpaVE'ILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CNANNEL5 CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT

20. Main Control Room Isolation and Air Supply Initiation

a. Control Room Air 1.2.3.4 2 F.0 SR 3.3.2.1 [s 2x10

supply Radiation $n 3.3.2.4 curies /m'

- Nign 2 SR 3.3.2.5 Dose SR 3.3.2.6 Equivalent I-131)

Note (h) 2 G.K SR 3.3.2.1 [s 2x10 4 sm 3.3.2.4 curies /m' SR 3.3.2.5 Dose SR 3.3.2.6 Eau 1 valent I-131]

b. sattery Charger 1.2,3,4 4 divisions a,0 SR 3.3.2.3 (a343 v*]

Input voltage - SR 3.3.2.4 Low Note (h) 4 divisions G,K SR 3.3.2.3 (a 143 v']

SR 3.3.2.4

21. Auxiliary sprav and Purification Line Isolation

a. Pressurizer 1.2 4 B.L 5R 3.3.2.1 [20.0s*)

, water Level - sn 3.3.2.4 l Low 1 5R 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.6

22. In-Containment

Refueling water 5torage Tank (IRwST)

Injection Line valve l Actuation j a. Manual 1.2.3.4(3) 2 switch E.N 5R 3.3.2.3 N/A j Initiation sets

4C ").$.6 2 switch C.Y 5R 3.3.2.3 N/A sets

b. AD 4 age Refer to Function 10 (ADS stage ctuation) for initiating functions Ac and requirements.

c. Coincident RC5 4C ").5.6 1 per loop ss.y SR 3.3.2.1 (a 3 in.

Loop 1 and 2 Not sa 3.3.2.4 above inside Leg Level - SR 3.3.2.5 surface of Low 2 SR 3.3.2.6 the bottom of the ht

, less) l (continued)

(h) During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and during CORE ALTERATIONS.

(j) with the RCS not being cooled by the normal Residual Neat Removal System (RMS).

(n) with the RCS being cooled by the RNS. 1 l

l I

h AP600 3.3 41 04/98 Amendment 0 APo1wechspectieo3o3o2.ro6-o330e8

RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.8 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS).

3.4.8 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.8 RCS operat!ional LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE

b. 0.5 gpm unidentified. LEAKAGE,

)- ( c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE from the RCS

k. d. 1000 gallcas per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through 'ooth steam generators (SGs),

e.

{gp. 500 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one SG, and

'e '

f. 500 gallons per day primary to IRWST. LEAKAGE through-the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (PRHR HX).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,'2. 3, and 4.

i ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

A. RCS LEAKAGE not A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months i within limits for limits. I reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE.

B.. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6. hours ;

associated Completion Time not met. AND

.OR B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months Pressure boundary.

LEAKAGE exists.-

4

, . moimim h AP600 -

3.4 12- 04/98 Amendment 0

ADS - Operating 3.4.12 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.12 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) - Operating

.)

LCO 3.4.12- The ADS, including 10 flow paths, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS l COWITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIE A. One flow path A,1 Restore flow path (s) to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable. OPERABLE status.

? % je One stage 1 ADS flow path and one stage 2 04 q

or stage 3 ADS flow path inoperable. -]

YL B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. AE

@ B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months Requirements of LCO 6

not met for reasons '

'i other than Condition A.

t i n- rA s-- M

~ '

.s91 A as e n suf%mo -f w g~k ~~ & '

b AP600 g4 3.4 20 04/98 Amendment 0 n gpq t Ms i k - f ~ ~l' 4 %

_ . _ P 2 _.6 M 5 M S . [(' " f* * '~~

, , ADS - Shutdown, RCS Intact 3.4.13 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) -

3.4.13 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) - Shutdown, RCS Intact LCO 3.4.13 The ADS, including 9 flow paths, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: DODE 5 with RCS pressure boundary intact.

l ACTIONS l C0lOITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIE l A. One required flow A.1 Restore flow path (s) to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months i path inoperable. OPERABLE status.

E t One required stage 1 -

ADS flow path and one Lg)f required stage 2 or stage 3 ADS flow path O; '

k inoperable.

s-l B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate action to be in Immediately associated Completion MODE 5, with RCS open Time not met. and > 20% pressurizer level.

E Requirements of LCO not met for reasons other than Condition A.

e

@ AP600 Ap01penhoped1003041SJ06033000 3.4 22 04/98 Amendment 0

.. . . _ _ . . . - - - ,- - ~.-

l~ PCS - Operating l 3.6.6 3.6 CONTAll#ENT SYSMJtS l

3.6.6 Passive Containment Cooling Syster. (PCS) - Operating l

LCO 3.6.6 The passive conteinment cooling system shall be OPERABLE.

l l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

l ACTIONS ColOITION REQUIRED ACTION COWLETION TIME A. One passive A.1 Restore flow path to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months containment cooling OPERABLE status.

water flow path i

inoperable.

,{

B. Water storage tank temperature not B.1 Restore water storage tank to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months 1 within limit.

l Water storage tank ;

voltane not within limit.

l l

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in M(EE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Conditions A Als or B. C

]C.2 Be in M(EE 5. 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months

(

OR LCO not met for n jp.

s.

e-reasons other than A Tj S.

or B.

r jfs. \h g

L S

T y Q

s

- , _AP60,0 _ _

3.6 13 04/96 Amendment 0

, g

Main Control Room Habitability System (VES) 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Main Control Room Habitability System (VES)

LCO 3.7.6 The Main Control Room (MCR) Habitability System shall be s ,

OPERABLE. 1 I

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 '

During movement of irr fuel assemblies, l During CORE ALTERATI . I ACTIONS os mJ s tu dd C0li)ITION RE M ON COMPLETTN'y!,m ,

h A. One VES valve or A.1 Restore VES valve or 7 days damper inoperable. damper to OPERABLE status.

B. MCR air temperature B.1 Restore MCR air 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months not within limit. temperature to within i limit.

O C. Loss of integrity of C.1 Restore MCR pressure 24 ho s NCR pressure boundary to OPERABLE boundary. status D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 rs associated Completion Time of Conditions A, AE B, or C not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months E. Required Action and E.1 Sus and CORE Immediately associated Cospletion ALTERATIONS.

Time of Nditions A, 8, or C not met AW ;

during movement of irradiated fuel or E.2 Su ecad movement of Immediately during CORE 1rradiated fuel ALTERATIONS. assemblies.

I (continued)

@ AP600 3.7-13 04/98 Amendsert 0 AP01 N 10000MISJOF482798

l , ,

r l DC Sourc:;s - Shutdown 3.8.2

.., 3.8 ELECTRICAL POER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 DC Sources - Shutdown

! LCO 3.8.2 DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support the DC electrical xmer distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.6. "Distri xstion Systems - Shutdown."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

)q .r ' Co e Al Ow */ W -

i. ACTIONS 7.wJ M EN COWITION REQUIRED ACTION CONPLETION TIE

! A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately DC electrical power required features subsystems inoperable.

inoperable.

E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS m po O QDN A.2.2 Initiate action to Immediately l suspend operations with l a potential for j draining the reactor vessel.

i M l A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately !

suspena operations '

involving positive <

reactivity addititm.

M A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status.

(

$__AP600 -

3.8 5 04/98 Amendment 0

Invert;rs - Shutdown l 3.8.4 I 1

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.4 Inverters - Shutdown l l

LCO 3.8.4 Inverters shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class IE ;

power distribution subsystems 4 LCO 3.8.6, " Distribution 1 Systems - Shutdown." [ p u y.( %

> U l

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. I a Gs.r.- Caa. Bt 4<Am p er fun + -

yy .

~Cesa..kJ %

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately I inverters inoperable. required features l inoperable.

E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Imediately C ="5 egg !

FA j A.2.2 Initiate action to Inseediately suspend operations with a potential for cl raining the reactor vessel. l M

A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

M A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.

(

h AP600 3.8 9 04/98 Amendment 0

3.8 ELECTRICAL P(NER SYSTEMS

}

3.8.6 Distribution Systems - Shutdown LCO 3.8.6 The necessary portions of DC and AC instrument and control bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

s~& b>< Con A l4.en b ~s er ks ACTIONS i 7/M/

COWITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately '

DC or AC instrtment supported required and control bus features inoperable.

electrical power distribution OR subsystems im,Mrable. A.2.1 Sus and CORE Immediately

I y b/%=S~d 9<3

,,J:ral A.2.2 Initiate action to Inmediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. !

AND A.2.3 Initiate action to Ismediately suspend operations involving positive l reactivity additions.

M A.2.4 Initiate actions to Immediately restore required DC and AC instrument and control bus electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status.

i h AP600 3.8 14 04/98 Amendment 0 APC1wecausect10030000JfS032900

LC0 Applicability B 3.0 BASES LC0 3.0.6 redundant OPERABLE support system are OPERABLE. thereby (continued) ensuring safety function is retained. If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LC0 in which the loss of safety functions exists are required to be entered.

LCO 3.0.7 There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. Tnese special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics.

to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Test Exception LCO 3.1.8 allows specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit wrformance of these special tests and operations, w11ch otherwise could not be perforned if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.

The Applicability of a Test Exception LC0 represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Com/.ancewithTestException LCOs is optional. A special cperation may oe performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Test Exception LCO or under the other applicable TS !

requirements. If it is desired to wrform the special ;

operation under the provisions of t1e Test Exception !

LCO. the requirements of the Test Exception LC0 shall be '

followed.

+- Ah.Js4 5 A lo LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.8 establishes the actions hat must be implemented when an LCO is not met and:

a. An associated Required Action and Completion Time is not met and no other Condition applies; or

b. The condition of the unit is not specifically I addressed by the associated ACTIONS. This means that no combination of Conditions stated in the ACTIONS can be made that exactly corresponds to the actual condition of the unit.

(continued)

M #900 APOI N 1003.#0D082398 B 3.0 10 04/98 Amendment 0

LCO Applicability B 3.0 !

BASES

_ap#[M LCO 3.0.8 sS fication delineates the requirements for (continued) x plac1 he unit in a safe = r ethr r - -ifid' condit on when operation cannot be maintained within the limits for safe operation as defined by the LCO and its ACTIONS. It is not intended to be used as an operational convenience that permits routine voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service in lieu of other alternatives that would not result in redundant systems or cwgreits being inoperable.

Upon entering LCO 3.0.8, I hour is allowed to prepare for an orderly plan of action which optimizes plant i safety and equipment restoration. The Shutdown Safety Status Trees provide a systematic method to explicitly detenmine the status of the plant during shutdown conditions, after entering MODE 5. A set of plant l parameters is monitored and if any parameter is outside l of its defined limits, a transition is made to tne Shutdown Emergency Response Guidelines. These guidelines provide preplanned actions for addressing parameters outside defined limits.

l Actions required in accordance with LCO 3.0.8 may be terminated and LCO 3.0.8 exited if any of the following occurs:

]

a. The LCO is now met.

l

b. A Condition exists for which the Required Actions have now been performed.

c. ACTIONS exist that do not have expired Comaletion Times. These Completion Times are applica)1e from the point in time that the Condition is initially entered and not from the time LCO 3.0.8 is exited.

In MODES 5 and 6. LCO 3.0.8 >rovides actions for Conditions not covered in otier Specifications and for multiple concurrent Conditions for which conflicting actions are specified.

O h

_AP600_ _ B 3.0 11 04/98 Amendment 0

s e2*tswa9ntenNW B 3.3.2 BASES -

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, 1.e. RCS Cold Leg Teyrature (Tg ) - Low (continued)

~

' /

LCDs and The LCO requires four channels of Tcoid - Low to be APPL}CABILITY DPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with any main steam isolation valve open and above P-11 when the RCS boron concentretion is below that necessary (

(

to meet the SDM requirements at an RCS temperature of 200*F. At these conditions, a secondary side {

break or stuck open valve could result in the rapid cooldown of the primary side. Four channels are provided in each loop to permit one channel to be in

' tri or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no si e random failure will disable this trip F ion. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, this Function is not needed for accident detection and mitigation because the cold leg temperature is reduced below the actuation setpoint.

2. CNT Actuation CNT Actuation provides the passive injection of borated water into the RCS. Injection provides RCS makeup water and boration duri transients or accidents when the nomal makeu System (CVS)p is supp lo t ory from the Chemical insufficient. Twoand Volume tanks are Control available to provide passive injection of borated water.

CMT injection sitigates the effects of high energy line breaks by adding primary side water to ensure maintenance or recove of reactor vec31 water level following a Q

h g. LOCA. and rating to ensure recovery or maintenance of SHUTDOWN MARGIN following a steam line break. CMT f

pi- Valve Actuation is initiated by the Safeguards Actuation signal, Pressurizer Level - Qormanually.

The RD769dii . Inst manual and automatic CNT Valve A Actuation be OPERABLE in MODES 1 through 4. Manual actuation of the CNT valves is additionally re MODE 5 with the RCS >ressure boundary intact. quired in Automatic actuation initiated >y Pressurizer Water Level - Low 2 is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 with the RCS pressure boundary intact. Automatic actuation of this Function is ;

not required in MODE 5 with the RCS pressure boundary i o>en or MODE 6 because the CMTs are not required to be 0 TRABLE in these MODES.

2.a. Manual Initiation Manual CMT Valve Actuation is accomplished by either of two switches in the main control room. Either switch activates all four ESFAC divisions.

(continued)

{s j

@ B 3,3 66

_AP600 _ 04/98 Amendment 0

3 . - - _

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 1 BASES

( APPLICABLE 2.b. Pressurizer Water Level - Low 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and This Function also initiates CU Valve Actuation APPLICABILITY from the coincidence of pressurizer level below the (continued) Low 2 Setpoint in any two of the four divisions.

This function can be manually blocked when the pressurizer water level is below the F-12 Setpoint.

This Function is automatically unblocked when the pressurizer water level is above the P 12 Setpoint.

De Setpoint reflects both steady state and adverse envircnnental instrument uncertainties as the detectors provide protection for an event that results in a harsh environment.

2.c. Safeguards Actuation

%g CNT Valve Actuation is also initiated by all

\

y)FunctionsthatinitiatetheSafeguardsActuation signal. The CMT Valve Actuation Function requirements are the same as the re 3 the Safeguards Actuation Functions.quirements Therefore, thefor

,j b

y requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.21.

Instead, Function 1 is referenced for all initiating g\

Functions and requirementr..

b2 . ADS Actuation The CNTs are actuated any time stage 1 ADS is ,

actuated. The CNT Actuation Function requirements !

for the stage 1 ADS are the same as the requirements for their ADS Fun:: tion. Therefore, the recuirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.21. Insteac ,

Function 9 is referenced for all initiating :

functions and requirements.

p0

3. Containment Isolation Contairment Isolation provides isolation of the containment atmosphere and selected process systems which xmetrate containment from the environment. mis

unction is necessary to prw.t or limit the release of radioactivity to the environment in the event of a large break LOCA.

(continued)

\~

b

_AP60 _0 B 3.3 67 04/98 Amendment 0

t#7.Y2 "t BASES 3 N APPLICABLE 3. Containment Isolation (continued) !

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and Containment Isolation is actuated by the feguards APPLICABILITY Actuation signal, manual actuati ainment cooling.or manually. P nes ating contairment are isolated ESF signals.

Manual and automatic initiati (ld ainment Isolation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, when n

M[

Q *} b containment integrity is required. Manual initiation is ired in MODE 5 and MODE 6. Manual initiation of this ion in M00ES 5 and 6 is not applicable if the 3 #

process lines penetrating containment are isolated. This

N c vides the capabilit to manually initiate containment solation duri all . Automatic actuation is not

@jto* required in S 5 and 6 because manual initiation is

&,6 0 sufficient to mitigate the consequences of an accident in these MODES.

et 3.a. Manual Initiation h #,

Manual Containment Isolation is accomplished by t 6e

/1 either of two switches in the main control room.

$' Either switch actuates all four ESFAC divisions.

3.b. Manual Initiation of Passive Containment Cooling )

Containment Isolation is also initiated by Manual QV Initiation of Passive Containment Cooling. This is accomplished as described for ESFAS Function 12.a.

gp\. k, .b @' 3.c. Safeguards Actuation

" Containment Isolation is also initiated by all Functions that initiate the Safeguards Actuation C[ a ff f

signal. The Containment Isolation Function

irements are the same as the irements for 4

{b G }. t Safeguards Actuation Function. refore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1.

$ ,~ Instead, Function 1 is referenced for all initiating

,^ functions and requirements.

V 4. _ Steam Line Isolation Isolation of the main steam lines provides protection in the event of an SLB inside or outside containment. Ra)1d isolation of the steam lir:ts will limit the steam breac (continued) d h

_AP600 _ B 3.3 68 04/98 Amenchent 0

. . B 3.5 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and 4.b. Containment Pressure - High 2 (continued) O The Contairment Pressure High 2 setpoint has APPLICABILITY been specified as icw as reasonable, without creating potential fee sourious trips during normal ations, consistent with the TMI action item

( 0933. Item II.E.4.2) guidance. The LCO rocs 1res four channels of Containment Pressure -

High 2 to be OPERABLE in KEES 1, 2, 3 and 4, with any main. steam valve open, when there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary side to ressurize the containment followiny a pipe break.

our channels are provided to permi; one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. There would be a significant increase in the contairment ressure, thus allowing detection and closure of tw MSIVs. In MODES 5 and 6 there is not enough energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment to the Contairment Pressure - High 2 setpoint.

4.c. Steam Line Pressure (1) Steam Line Pressure - Low

[o%u Steam Line Pressure - Low provides closure of A g the MSIVs in the event of an SLB to maintain at U Q 4l least to limit the mass and energy release to ainment and limit blowdown to a single SG.

The LCO requires four channels of Steam Line Pressure - Low Function to be OPERABLE in MODEF 1, 2 and 3 (above P 11, when the RCS boron concentration is below that necessary to '

meet the SDM requirements at an RCS temperature ,

of 200'F), with any main steam isolation valve i open, when a secondary side break or stuck open ;

valve could result in the rapid depressurization i of the steam lines. Four channels are provided '

in each steam line to pemit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. This signal may be manually blocked by the operator below the P 11 setpoint. Below P-11, an inside containment SLB will be terminated by automatic at.tuation via Contairunent Pressure - High 2 and stuck open valve transients and outside containment steen (continued) h AP500 8 3.3 70 04/98 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2

, BASES APPLICABLE 6. Main Feedwater Control Valve Isolation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 on Tave low 1 coincident APPLICABILITY with Reactor Trip (P 4). Failure to close the main feedwater control valves following a SLB or FLB can lead to additional mass and energy being delivered to the steam generators, resulting in excessive cooldown and

411tional mass and release in containment.

Mamal main tote in.:tW h r+ aired to be in MODE 4 when the main feedsitEF " 1 valves are open. This Function is not applicable in for valve isolation if the main feedwater line is isolated.

Automatic actuation on a Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Level - High 2 is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 do'Y when the RCS is not being cooled by the RNS. In MODES 5 and 6, the energy in the RCS and the steam generators is y3 low and this function is not required to be OPERABLE.

k 7 6.a. Manual Main Fee &ater Isolation "Q M ,- Manual Main Feedwater Isolation can be accomplished from the main control room. There are two switches e

in the main control room and either switch can initiate action in both divisions to close all main feedwater control, isolation and crossover valves,

h. trip all main feedwater pumps, and trip the turbine.

6.b. Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Level - High 2 This signal provides protection against excessive feedwater flow by closing the main feedwater control, isolation and crossover valves, tripping of the Main Feedwater Pumps, and tripping the turbine.

Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. The transmitters (dh cells) are located inside containment. However, t1e events which this Function protect against cannot cause severe em'ironment in containment. Therefore, the Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties.

(continued) b AP600 B 3.3-75 04/98 Amen tent 0

ESFAS Instrumentation R B 3.3.2 i

BASES -

APPLICABLE 6.c. Safeguards Actuation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and This Function is also. initiated by all Functions APPLICABILITY that initiate the Safeguards Actuation signal.

(continued) The isolation requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for their Safeguards Actuation Function. Therefore, the recuirements are g not repeated in Table 3.3.21. Insteac Function 1 is referenad for all initiating Functions and O 3L y,p - requirgments. The Safeguards Actuation signal closes all main feedsater control, isolation and crossover valves, trips all main feedwater pumps, i (/ - and trips the turbine.

7 6.d. Town Low 1 Coincident with Reactor Trip (P 4)

This signal vides ection against excessive d g. feedsater fl by cloWng the main feedwater control

. 'I valves. This signal results from a coincidence of d)V l two of the four divisions of reactor loop average U V, temperature below the Low 1 setpoint coincident with V

the P 4 permissive. Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in tri) or bypass indefinite 1 and still ensure tut no single random

[k.7 failure wilf disable this tri) Function. This Function may be manually bloctad when the l

pressurizer pressure is below the P-11 setpoint.

The block is automatically removed when the i pressurizer pressure is above the P 11 setpoint.

7. Main Feedwater Pump Trip and Valve Isolation The primary function of the Main Feedwater Pump Trip and Isolation is to prevent damage to the turbine due to water in the steam lines and to stop the excessive flow of feedwater into the SGs. Valve isolation includes closing the main feedwater isolation and crossover valves. Isolation of main feedwater is necessary to prevent an increase in heat removal from the reactor coolant system in the event of a feedwater system malfunction. Addition of excessive feedwater causes an increase in core power by decreasing reactor coolant temperature. This Function is actuated by Steam Generator Water Level - High 2, by a Safeguards Actuation signal, or manually. The Reactor Trip Signal also initiates a turbine trip signal whenever a reactor trip (P-4) is generated.

(continued)

@ AP600 8 3.3 76 04/98 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, 7.c. Safeguards Actuation )

LCOs, and This Function is alse' initiated by all Functions APPLICABILITY that initiate the Safeguards Actuation signal. The (continued) isolation requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for their Safeguards a6 Actuation Function. Therefore, the recuirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Insteac Function I dy / is referenced for all initiating Functions and 7 D 1rements. The Safeguards Actuation signal b oses all main feedwater corrtrol, isolation and O

Jf3 'l crossover valves, trips all main feedwater ptmps, and trips the turbine.

7.d. Tm Low-2 Coincident with Reactor Trip (P-4)

This signal vides protection against excessive feedwater fl by closing the main feedwater

-6 g isolation and crossover leg valves, and tripping of the main feedwater pumps. This signal results from a coincidence of two out of four divisions of reactor loop average temperature below the Low 2 l setpoint coincident with the P.4 perleissive. Four '

channels are provided to reit one channel to be in tri or bypass indefinite y and still ensure that no si le random f611ure will disable this trip Function. This Function may be manually blocked .h when the pressurizer pressure is below the P 11 setpoint. The block is automatically removed when the pressurizer pressure is above the P 11 setpoint.

8. Startup Feedwater Isolation The primary Function of the Startup Feedwater Isolation is to stop the excessive flow of feedwater into the SGs. This Function is necessary in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to mitigate the effects of a large SLB or a large FLB. Failure to isolate the startup feedwater system following a SLB or FLB can lead to additional mass and energy being delivered to the steam generators, resulting in excessive cooldown and additional mass and energy release in containment.

(continued) b AP600 B 3.3-78 04/98 Amendment 0

u ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 p W,9 9/p'Y @

APPLICABLE 9. ADS Stages 1, 2, & 3 Actuation '

SAFETY S.

LCOs, and The Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) provides a APPLICABILITY n.c uv u. pressurization of the reactor coolant system (continued) to allow passive injection from the CMTs, acetaulators, and the in containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) to mitigate the effects of a LOCA. he depressurization is accomplished in four stages, with the first three stages discharging into the IRWST and the last stage discharging into containment. Each of the first three stages consists of two parallel paths with each path conta ning an isolation valve and a depressurization valve.

The first stage isolation valves open on any actuation of the first stage of the ADS. The first stage depressurization valves are opened following a preset time delay after the actuation of the isolation valves.

The second stap isolation valves are opened following a set time de ay after actuation of the first stage ressurization valves open. The second stage ressurization valves are opened following a preset time delay after the second stage isolation valves are actuated, similar to stage one. Similar to the second stage, the third stage isolation valves are opened following a preset time delay after the actuation of the t second stage depressurization valves. The third stage depressurization valves are opened following a preset g time delay after the third stage isolation valves are sj actuated.

[ d pa. Manual Initiation k ,J.

jY The first stage depressurization valves on h\. hh.) D gJ

' manua

2? W any actuation of st

==5.

actuates MbR and trips all reactor coolant ]

upwrai;or can ini6; % Ot;;;; ; vi uw ADS' from the main control room by simultaneously A Yv actuating two ADS actuation devices in the same

[' set. There are two sets of two switches each in the main control room. Simultaneously actuating the two devices in either set will actuate ADS.

This Fypetiaa fit M nornanir in unnrt 1. 2. 3.

j-: / s This Function must also be OPERABLE in >

.:.S 5 and 6 when the ADS valves are not open,

'u W;"[ f . ,$P t mi . .ii.. m. internais in p,...

/ p.

i M/ bi (continued) 4

@ AP600 8 3.3 80 04/98 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrtamentation i

B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 9.b. CNT Level - Low 1 Coincident with CNT Actuation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and This Function ensures continued passive injection APPLICABILITY or borated water to the RCS following a small break (continued) LOCA. Stage 1 ADS is actuated when the CNT Level reaches its Low 1 Setmint coincident with any CNT Actuation signal whic1 is addressed by Function 2.

Four channels are provided in each CNT to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function.

The ADS Function requirements are the same as the :

requirements discussed in Function 2 (CNT i Actuation). Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.21. Instead Function 2 is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements. This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. and in MODE 5. 1

10. ADS Stage 4 Actuation y & f /y 7*3/e i The ADS provides a sequenced depressurization of the reactor coolant system to allow passive injection from the CMTs,. accumulators, and the IRWST to

(- ..

mitigate the effects of a LOCA. The depressurization is accomplished in four stages, with the first three stages discharging into the IRWST and the fourth stage discharging into containment.

The fourth stage of the ADS consists of four parallel paths. Each of these paths consists of a normally open isolation valve and a depressurization valve. The four paths are divided into two groups with two paths in each

. group. Within each group, one path is designated to be substage A and the second path is designated to be substage B.

The substage A depressurization valves are opened following a preset time delay after the substage A isolation valve confinnatory open signal. The sequence is continued with substage B. A confirmatory open signal is provided to the s@ stage B isolation valves follour ng a preset time delay after the substage A depressurization valve has been opened. The signal to open the substage B (continued) h

@ APs00 B 3.3 81 04/96 Amendment 0

m % =

. .. ESFAS Instrtmentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 10. ADS Stage 4 Actuation (continued) t SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and depressurization valve is provided following a preset APPLICABILITY time delay after the substage B isolation valves confirmatory open signal.

10.a. Manual Initiation Co6th RCS Wide Range K1h Pressure - Low ot,43El5@ 9 )

J h0 a\h g

e k 7 .w Ine fourth stage depressurization valves open on manual actuation. The operator can initiate Stage 4 of ADS from the main control room. There dX 7 '

are two sets of two switches each in the main M control room. Actuating the two switches in either set will actuate all 4t1 stepe ADS valves. This manual actuation is interlocted to actuate with either the low RCS pressure signal used for

. Man 10.b or with the ADS Stages 1, 2, & 3 actuation (Fu N . " ;" nterlocks minimize the potential for inadvertent uation of this i Function. This interlock wit 9 allows manual actuation of this Function if tic or manual ADS Stages 1, 2, & 3 fail to deressurize

\ the RCS due to common mode failure. T11s )

consideration is important in PRA modeling to -

c[D improve the reliability of reducing the RCS j

/, .

. pressure following a small LOCA or transient event. i 6 This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3.

g/a and 4. This Function must also be OPERABLE in huut.S 5 ano o wnsi 6,65 vaives are not OisiD a in MODE 6 with the upper internals in place. , J 9 10.b. CNT ==1 - Low 2 Coincident withM 9

4

%[ x m ind RC5 Wide Range Pressure - Low s .

C- fourth stage depressurization valves open on CMT Level - Low 2 in two-out of-four channels in either CMT. Actuation of the fourth stage depressurization valves is interlocked with the third stage depressurization signal such that the fourth stage is not actuated unless the third stage has been previously actuated following a preset time delay. Actuation of the fourth stage ADS valves are further interlocked with a low RCS (continued)

.)

AP600 B 3.3 82 04/98 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrianentation B 3.3.2 BASES b APPLI" C C 10.b. CMT Level - Low 2 Coincident wit SAFET) A LYSES, 4F,conunuea>.T.

. r . - Low LCOs da ,a m,3 wioe nance Pres..

APPLICABILITY pressure signal such that the fourth staae ADS is not actuatec unless the RCS pressure is 6elow a h- predetermined setpoint. Four channels of CNT level

/ are provided to pemit one chennel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure wil disable this tri) Function.

This Function must be OPERABLE in M(DES 1, 2 3, and 4. This Function must also be OPERABLE in MODE 5 when the ADS valves are no and with

\ t pressurizer level > 20%. re g Y 10.c. Coincident RCS Loop 1 and 2 Hot Leg Level - Low e A signal to automatically op~ en the ADS Stage 4 is g\ D also generated when coincident loop 1 and 2 reactor coolant system hot leg level indication decreases 7> below an established setpoint for a duration g

S #c? exceeding an adjustable time delNa .

This Function p k4 6 0' is re 4 with the RCS cooled by the RNS. This Function is also bei)quiredtobeOPERABLEinMO req red to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 and in MODE 6.

j p

8

[ 11. Reactor Coolant Ptap Trip Reactor injection ofCoolant bora Phater w(RCP) int the Tri!

RCS. allows the !assive I jection provides RCS makeup water and boration during transients or accidents when the nomal makeup supply from the CVS is lost or insufficient. Two tanks rovide oassive injection of borated water by aravit when the reactor coolant pum>s are tripped. CMT in ion sitigates the effects of 11gh energy line breaks by adding primary side water to ensure maintenance or recovery of reactor vessel water level following a LOCA and by borating to ensure recovery or maintenance of SIUTD(nm MARGIN following a steam line break. RCP trio on high bearinc water temperature )rotects the RCP coast down. FCP trio is actuated by iigh RCP bearing water t Stages 1. 2, and 3 Actuation (

ratu

), a 35 E A actuation a , ;

[ M 11.a. ADS Actuation The RCPs are tri any time stage 1 ADS is M L.J 2 e

6A 4 [# actuated. The R. trip Function requirements for the stage 1 ADS are the same as the requirements for their ADS Function.

Therefore the re in Table 8.3.2-1.quirements IetT hare notyatedtisreferenced for all initiating fundions irements.

(continued) r i

lI ;L,3

[c,;f SI M

n

@ AP600 8 3.3 83 04/98 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 11.b. Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing Water Temperature - '

SAFETY ANALYSES, !t,1g LCOs, and '*

APPLICABILITY Each affected RCP will be tripped if two out-of-(continued) four sensors on the RCP indicate high bearing water tennerature. This Function is required to be OPEtABLE in MODES 1 and 2. Four channels are rovided to pemit one channel to be in trip or

>ypass indefinitely and .still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function.

11.c. CNT Actuation p' 1 RCP trip is also initiated b

[#j that initiate CNT actuation.

1 the Functions RCP trip Function requirements are the same as the requirements for N" the CMT actuation Functions. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1, and Function 2 is referenced for all initiating Fametions and requirements.

11.d. Pressurizer Water Level - Low 2 The RCPs are tripped when the pressurizer water level reaches its Low 2 setpoint. This signal results from the coincidence of pressurizer water -

level below the Low 2 setpoint in any two of four J divisions. This Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2. 3, and 4. This Function is 1 also required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 with l pressurizer level a 20%, when the RCS is not being l cooled by the RNS. This Function can be manually i blocked when the pressurizer water level is below l the P-12 setpoint. This Function is automatically unblocked when the pressurizer water level is above the P 12 setpoint. '

11.e. Safeguards Actuation This Function is also initiated by all Functions that initiated the Safeguards Actuation signal.

The requirements for the reactor trip Functions are the same as the requirements for the Safeguards 1 Actuation Function. Therefore. the requirements

/ re not repeated in Table 3.3.2.1. Instead, C h1 unctichs )and requirements.unctionJ is referenced for a

<_) -

(continued) h AP600 8 3.3 84 04/98 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrtmentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 12. Passive Containment Cooling Actuation SAFETY ANALYSES.

LCOs, and The Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) transfers l

APPLICABILITY heat from the reactor containment to the environment.

(continued) This Function is necessary to prevent the containment design pressure and teoperature from being exceeded following arty postulated DBA (such as LOCA or SLB). Heat removal is initiated automatically in response to a Containment Pressure - High 2 signal or manually.

) A Passivee m +=4 = ^ ranlino Ar+n=+4-4 5 71 initiates g ,,,,; , riow by aravity hv a-- = e' % hil g valvep water f ows onto t6e containment done.

^

- .;.mg the outer surface. The path g ]

circulation of air along the outside.for containment structure is always open.

natural walls of the e 1 Da The LCO ires this Function to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, o j 2, 3, and when the potential exists for a DBA that d could require the operation of the Passive Containment

/4' J Cooling System. In MODES 5 and 6 with decay heat more than 6.0 Wt, manual initiation of the PCS provides containment heat removal. Section B 3.6.7, Applicability, provides the basis for the decay heat limit.

12.a. Manual Initiation The operator can initiate Contairment Cooling' at any time from the main control room by actuating two containment cooling actuation switches in the same actuation set. There are two sets of two switches each in the main control room.

Simultaneously actuating the two switches in either set will actuate containment cooling in all divisions. Manual Initiation of containment cooling also actuates containment isolation.

12.b. Containment Pressure - High 2 This signal provides protection against a LOCA or SLB inside contairment. Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Funetton.

(continued) 4-h

_AP600 _ B 3.3 85 04/98 Amendment 0

- ~ - - - _. __ _

~

k[Q ESFAS Instrument on BASES [kfI . f w

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,

.d. ADS Stage 1 Actuation O LCOs. and PRlR is also actuated any time stage 1 ADS is APPLICABILITY actuated. The PRIE actuation Function (continued) requirements for the stage 1 ADS are the same as the requirements for the ADS Functions.

13.e. CMT Actuation I

is also actuatM Functions that actuate CMT injection. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead. <

Function 2 (CMT Actuation) is referenced for all gi II initiating functions and requirements.

Sb 13.f. Pressurizer Water Level - High 3 W

g) o g(1- PRfR is actuated when the pressurizer water level U r" reaches its High 3 setpoint. This signal provides t . ..k e '{ C], protection against a pressurizer overfill following a c4~ an inadvertent core makeup tank actuation with c & consequential loss of offsite power. This Function is automatically unblocked when RCS pressure is ADV above the P 19 set mint. This Function is required to be OPERABLE in 40 DES 1. 2. and 3. and in MODE 4 when the RCS is not being cooled by the RNS and above the P-19 (RCS pressure) interlock. This O l l

Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because it is not required to mitigate DBA in these MODES.

14. Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation The primary Function of the steam generator blowdown isolation is to ensure that sufficient water inventory is

) resent in the steam generators to remove the excess heat

eing generated until the decay heat has decreased to within the PRlR HX capability.

This Function closes the isolation valves of the Steam Generator Blowdown System in both steam generators when a signal is generated from the PRIR HX Actuation or Steam (continued)

@ AP600 8 3.3 80 04/98 Amendment 0

. . ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 15.a. Source Range Neutron Flux Multiplication SAFE 1Y ANALYSES, LCOs, and A signal to block boron dilution in MODE 2 below APPLICABILITY the P 6 interlock arid MODE 3, 4, or 5 is derived (continued) fron' source range neutron flow increasing at an excessive rate (source range flow multiplication).

This Function is not applicable in MODES 4 and 5 if the desireralized water makeup flowpath is isolated. The source range neutron detectors are used for this Fmetion. The LCO requires four divisions to be OPERABLE. There are four divisions and two out-of-four logic is used. On a coincidence of excessively increasing source range neutron flow in two of the four divisions.

@7q

/s domineralized water maketp is isolated to preclude dilution =* An MODE 6 this funct r w s no red because administrative controls are

'y ]* [ v. in place to block the RCS boron dilution paths.

p* 15.b. Rea or Trip

?

p . /*\ . Demineralized Water Makeup is also isolated by all C the Functions that initiate a Reactor Trip. The isolation requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for the Reactor Trip Function. Therefore, the requireesnts are not -

repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead Function 18.a.

(P-4 Reactor Trip Breakers), is referenced for all initiating Functions and requirements.

15.c. Battery Charger Input Yoltage - Low Block of boron dilution is also actuated from the loss of ac power. A short, preset time delay is provide to prevent actuation upon momentary power fluctuations; however, actuation occurs before ac power is restored by the onsite diesel generators.

The loss of all ac power is detected by undervoltage sensors that are connected to the input of each of the four Class 1E battery chargers. The loss of ac power signal is based on the detection of an undervoltage conditions by each of the two sensors connected to two of the four battery chargers. This Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. This Function is not applicable in MODES 4 and 5 if the (continued) b AP600 B 3.3 90 04/98 Amendment 0 AP01 N 16030302.tM a*=

. - _ _ . ~ _ _ . _

~~

ESFAS Instrumentatien B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 15.c. Battery Charger Input Voltage - Low (continued)

. SAFETY ANALYSES, !

LCO's, and asso & + M P C . i; & : d n MODE 6. this i APPLICABILITY :1on is not required because administrative rols are in place to block the RCS boron on paths.

16. Chemical Voltane and Control System Makeup Line Isolation

" C' The CVS makeup line is isolated following certain events 3 .q' 1 of the RCS. In addition this i6 to lineprevent overfilli1gh is isolated on H 2 contairunent radioactivity to provide containment isolation following an accident.

This line is not isolated on a contairunent isolation signal, to allow the CVS makeup pumps to perfors their defense in depth functions. However, if very high containment radioactivity exists (above the High 2 setpoint) this line is isolated.

A signal to isolate the CVS is derived from two out -

of-four high steam generator levels on either steam ponerator, two-out-of four channels of pressurizer evel indicating high or two out of four channels of containment radioactivity indicating high. Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or

( bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function.

16.a. Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Level - High 2 Four channels of steam generator level are provided for each steam generator. Two out-of four channels on either steam generator indicating level greater than the setpoint will close the isolation valves for the CVS. This Function prevents adding makeup water to the RCS during a SGTR. This Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 with the RCS not being cooled by the RNS. This Function is not ap)11 cable in MODES 3 and 4 if the CVS makeup flowpati is isolated. This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 ;

because the RCS pressure and rature are !

reduced and a steam generator t rupture event is i not credible.

L (continued) 4

@ AP600 8 3.3 91 04/98 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 I

BASES f ,

APPLICABLE 16.d. Containment Radioactivity - High 2 (continued) l SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3 if the APPLICABILITY q associated flowpath is isolated. This signal y/ results from the coincidence of containment te i, radioactivity above the High 2 Setpoint in any two of the fme divininna. "ha a E=at pA- [ because no DBA that wols , and 6 MODES l into the containment is considered credible in these MODES.

17. Nomal Residual Heat Removal System. Isolation y The RNS suction line is isolated by closing the dpu containment isolation valves on High 2 containment radioactivity to provide containment isolation following 1 a r an accident. This line is isolated on a containment isolation signal. However, the valves may be reset to

$< h.J pemit the RNS pumps to perform their defense in depth functions post-accident. Should a high containment

\ radiation signal (above the High 2 setpoint) develop following the containment isolation signal, the RNS valves would re close. A high contairunent radiation signal is indicative of a high RCS source ters and the

(' y## g va ves would re close to assure offsite doses do not exceed regulatory limits.

_ L (' T 17.a. Containment Radioactivity - High 2 1

A signal to isolate the normal residual heat hh U- removal system is mmrated from the coincidence of containment rad < osctivity above the High 2

% setpoint in two out of four channels. Four channels of Containment Radioactivity - High 2 are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when

53 0 si the potential exists for a LOCA, to ensure that f "\ the radioactivity inside containment is not (v' , [f q released to the atmos M . This Function is not required to be OPERAB.E in ME 3 if the RNS l

9 s, i suction line is isolated. These Functions are not l T required to be OPERABLE in M(EES 4, 5, and 6 because no DBA that could release radioactivity )

&y cp (continued)

)

8 3.3 93 04/98 Amendment 0

__ AP60 _0

ESFAS Instrtmentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 17.a. Containment Radioactivity - High 2 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs. and into the contai ^ 4 e c--9-F+1 -:- Shla in APPLICABILITY th=== WR 711s Function was previously 1 Mui as Function 16.d.

17.b. se .. L.- -

r s Function is also initiated b 1 Functions that initiated the Safeguards siguil .

The requirements to isolate the normal res' dual I

heat removal system are the same as the requirements for the Safeguards Actuation Function. Therefore, the requirements are not q repeated in Table 3.3.2.1. Instead Function 1 is C1 referenced for all initiating Functions and 1 J 8 requirements.

l L 18. ESFAS Interlocks To allow some flexibility in unit operations, several interlocks are included as part of the ESFAS. These interlocks permit the omrator to block some signals, I automatically enable otier signals, prsee.it some actions from occurring, and cause other actions to occur. The i interlock Functions backup manual actions to ensure bypassable Functions are in operation under the conditions asstmed in the safety analyses.

18.a. Reactor Trip. P 4 There are eight reactor trip breakers with two breakers in each division. The P-4 interlock is enabled when the breakers in two out-of-four divisions are open. The Functions of the P 4 interlock are:

. Trip the main turbine

. Permit the block of automatic Safeguards Actuation after a predetermined time interval following automatic Safeguards Actuation.

. Block boron dilution (continued)

O

- ,0-

@ AP60 8 3.3 94 04/98 Amendment 0

1 ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES

/ APPLICABLE 18.a. Reactor Trip, P 4 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and . Isolate main feedwater coincident with low APPLICABILITY reactor coolant temperature (This function is not assumed in safety analysis therefore, it is not included in the technical specifications.)

The reactor trip breaker position switches that provide input to the P 4 interlock only Function to energize or de-energize or open or close contacts. Therefore, this Function has no adjustable Trip Setpoint.

This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when the reactor may be critical or approaching criticality. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, 5, or 6 to trip the main turbine, because the main turbine is not in operation.

The P 4 Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 or 5 to block boron dilution, because Function 15.a. Source Range Neutron Flux

- Multiplication, provides the required block. In

( MODE 6. the P 4 interlock with the Boron Dilution Block Function is not required, since the unborated water source flow path isolation valves are locked closed in accordance with LCO 3.9.2.

18.b. Pressurizer Pressure. P-11 The P 11 interlock permits a normal unit cooldown and depressurization without Safeguards Actuation or main steam line and feedwater isolation. With pressurizer pressure channels less than the P 11 setpoint, the operator can manually block the Pressurizer pressure - Low, Steam Line Pressure -

Low, and Tesid - Low Safeguards Actuation sipiels and the Steam Line Pressure _ Low and Teold - Low

+r -- P -- Mit h . i v. .;.' - r.w uw 5i.ine u yleN MPressure - Low and manually blockeds main ste i visi.sv. . M ; r, 1 2 mir= rie aure Negative '

Rate - High 's enabled. This provides protection for an SLB by closure of the main steam isolation valves. Manual block of feedwater isolation on Two - Low 1. Low 2, and Teoid - Low is also (continued) 1

~

h _AP60,0 _'

-, B 3.3 95 04/98 Amentent 0 i

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 18.d. Pressurizer Level, P 12 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and IRWST actuation, reactor coolant ) ump trip, or APPLICABILITY purification line isolation. Witi pressurizer (continued) level channels less than the P-12 setpoint, the operator can manually block low pressurizer level signal used for these actuations. Concurrent with enabling the block of CMT actuation on low Dressurizer level, IRWST actuation on Low 2 RCS hot leg level is removed. When the pressurizer V level is above the.P 12 setpoint, the pressurizer 1evel signal is automatically enabled and a

{W confirmatory isolation valvanopen = si@1T is;;1d issued1;;

to the

) pd - k[*2 nd him 8 18.e. RCS Pressure. P 19 The P 19 interlock is provided to permit water o

l [5(M-( '

, J-solid conditions (i.e., when the pressurizer water level is [>92*]) in lower MODES without automatic isolation of the CVS mak s. With RCS F pressurebelowtheP-19gse i , the operator can j '(og p

,d manually block CVS isolation on High 2 pressurizer r) water level. When RCS pressure is above the P 19

/ setpoint, this Function is automatically

{ l L

I l unblocked. This Function is required to be 1

'3 i OPERABLE IN MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 with the RCS not being cooled by the RNS. When the RNS is cooled n tl b tne RNS, the RNS suction relief valve provides t required overpressure protection (L 3.4.15).

19. Containment Air Filtration System Isolation Some DBAs such as a LOCA may release radioactivity into the containment where the potential would exist for the radioactivity to be released to the atmosphere and exceed the acceptab'e site dose limits. Isolation of the Containment Air Filtration System provides protection to prevent radioactivity ir-A'O containment from being released to the atmosph:rc.

pe 19.a. Containment Radioactivity - High 1

<h Vh f Three channels Fig h required to of be Containment OPERABLE inRadioactivitk MODE 1. 2,

& f \i v,'and 4 w3h the RCS not being cooled by the RNS, T therttne potential exists for a LOCA, to protect against radioactivity inside containment

[ (continued)

(

b AP600 B 3.3 97 04/98 Amendment 0 APO1W16 i

ESFAS Instrumentation {

B 3.3.2 i BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs. and APPLICABILITY 19.a. Contairunent Radioactivity - High 1 (continued) being released to the atmos are not required to be

. These Functions in MODE 4 with the

')! i RCS being cooled by the RNS or MODES 5 and 6.

heram* any DBA release of radioactivity into the contairmient in these MODES would not require containment isolation.

19.b. Containment Isolation Contairusent Air Filtration System Isolation is ;

also initiated by all Functions that initiate !

Containeent Isolation. The Containment Air Filtration System Isolation requirements for these Functions are the same as the requirements for the Containment Isolation. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2 1. 1,,

Instead, Function 3. Containment Isolation. is referenced for initiating Functions and A requirements. //'/st 'y l

20. Main Control Room Isolation and Air Supply In on &

Isolation of the main control room and i 1ation of the air supply provides a protected envi t from which / \

\ [f \/T i

n. Js' 3,1 f 4 operators can control the plant foll ng an uncontrolled .

l release of radioactivity. This F ior A ,qM ta Y)1 74 I

ha M" OLE m EE3 . 2. 2. = ,,i' .-i during mover.nt of irradiated fuel because a' +8= aawin1 far a fission

[I ' p M relaaca f s17 ..Ts rue' h'andling acc1&in..

os i _ Ms r unction is required to be OPERABLE ng dbRE ALTERATIONS, to be consistent with Standard y Technical Specifications, IUtEG-1431, LCO 3.3.7, Control '

oJ

- Room Emerwncy filtration System Actuatio1

, A Instrumen;ation requirements.

,, iv.s. Cuncroi E-5 Air 9maly Maciai. Mid; E r, Two radiation monitors are provided on the main 3

I f@ ((5 }

control room air intake. If either monitor exceeds the High 2 setpoint, control room C isolation is actuated.

g 20.b. Battery Charger Iriput Voltage - Low

,/ !.ow input voltage to the 1E de batter k

i will actuate ma' n cigit.rol rus isn1=+,f.x chargers

w sir

--1y inii.iwin1s was previously described as unction 15.e.

(continued)

-h_AP600_ B 3.3 98 04/98 Amendment 0

9 -- . . . .. . . _ . . . ~ . _ _

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ,

APPLICABLE 21. Auxiliary Spray and Purification Line Isolation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs. and The CVS maintains the RCS fluid writy and activity level APPLICABILITY within acceptable limits. The CfS purification line (continued) receives flow from the discharge of the RCPs. The CVS also provides auxiliary spray to the pressurizer. To reserve the reactor coolant pressure in the event of a reak in the CVS loop piping, the purification line and the auxiliary spray line is isolated on a pressurizer water level Low 1 setpoint. This helps maintain reactor coolant system inventory.

21.a. Pressurizer Water Level - Low 1 p A signal to isolate the purification line and the

/ auxi iary spray line is generated upon the sh g%

coincidence of pressurizer level below the Low 1 setpoint in any two out of four divisions. This Qy Function can be manually blocked when the pressurizer water level is below the P 12 (p M setpoint. This Function is automatically unblocked when the pressurizer water level is above the P 12 set wint. This Function is f b/

106 6

required to be OPEtABLE in MODES 1 and 2 to help maintain RCS inventory. In MODES 3, 4, 5 and 6, this Function is not needed for accident detection C' #

and mitigation.

22. IRWST In.iection Line Valve Actuatian The PXS provides core cooling by gravity injection and recirculation for decay heat removal following an accident. The IgnET has two injection flow paths. Ed3 EIb"gs ngp _

2 g j normally open moCoperated isolation vafve and two h h:ludesi ily prallel lines, each isolated by one check valve and one

/\Pg k squib valve in series. Manual initiation or automatic

\ actuation on an ADS 4th stage actuation signal or a coincident RCS Loops 1 and 2 Hot Leg Level Low will f) generate a signal to open the IRWST injection line and actuate IRWST injection.

(continued) b AP600 B 3.3 99 04/98 Amendeont 0 A99tNgamenena -

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABILITY 22.a. Manual Initiation i SAFETY ANALYSES, I LCOs, and- The operator can open IRWST injection line APPLICABILITY valves at any time from the main control room by (continued) actuating two IRWST injection actuation switches in the same actuation set. There are two sets of two switches each in the main control room. This Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

22.b. ADS 4th Stage Actuation An open simal will be issued to the IRWST injection solation valves when an actuation signal is issued to the ADS 4th stage valves. The requirements for this function is the same as the requirements for the ADS 4th stage valves actuation Functions. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.21. Instead.

Function 10 is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements.

22.c. Coincident RCS Loops 1 and 2 Hot Leg Level - Low l i

A signal to automatically open the IRW5T injection -

line valves is also generated when coincident loops 1 and 2 reactor coolant system hot leg level indication decreases below an established setpoint for a duration exceeding an adjustable time delay.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 with the RCS being cooled by the RNS. This Function is also required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.

23. IRWST Contairment Recirculation Valve Actuation The PXS provides core cooling by gravity injection and

.# recirculation for decay heat removal following an

\ C. .t . PXS has two containment recirculation flow paths. Ea th contains two parallel flow paths, one d #v' l

path is iso by a motor operated valve in series with f a squib valve and one path is isolated by a check valve in series with a squib valve. Manual initiation or automatic actuation on a Safeguards Actuation signal (continued) h AP600 B 3.3 100 04/98 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrtmentation B 3.3.2 BASES

/

APPLICABILITY- 23. IRWST Contairment Recirculation Valve Actuation SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCOs, and APPLICABILITY coincident with a Low 3 level signal in the IRWST will l open these valves.

23.a. Manual Initiation i The operator can open the containment recirculation valves at any time from the main control room by actuating two containment recirculation actuation switches in the same !

actuation set. There are two sets of two switches l each in the main control room. This Function is

.y (, recuired to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. ,

.. . o. !

7b

( k 23.b. Safenuards Actuation Coincident with IRWST Leve' - Low 3

] ,1 f !

A low IRMST level coincident with a Safeguards Actuation signal will om the containment i recirculation valves. our channels are provided !

y 4 to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass l j /

(, c (A indefinitely and still ensure that no single random failure will disable this trip Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in l

J < MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. ;

24. Spent Fuel Pool Isolation 1 oU 3 The spent fuel pool lines from the refueling cavity /IRWST 9 f to the spent fuel system suction header and returning to

$ .# the refuelini; cavity /IRWST are isolated on a Low setpoint '

O to maintain the water inventory in the spent fuel pool (p '

due to line leakage.

24.a. Spent Fuel Pool Level - Low This Function actuates the ymnt fuel pool valves to isolate the spent fuel pool when the spent fuel pool level is below the Low setpoint in any two of (continued)

{

C

@ AP600 B 3.3 101 04/98 Ameruhent 0

B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 24.a. Spent Fuel Pool Level - Low (continued) I SAFE 1Y ANALYSES, LCOs. and three channels. This Function is required to be APPLICABILITY OPERABLE in MODE 6 to maintain water inventory in the spent fuel pool.

25. ESFEs Logic Tms Lc0 requires four sets of ESFEs, each set

'y with one battery backed actuation logic group

/Af f OPERABLE to automatic actuation. These logic groups are i emented as mic + scessor based actuation W subsystems. ESFEs provide the system level logic pp interfaces for the divisions.

25.a. Actuation Subsystems b If one battery backed actuation subsystem nr ESFE cabinet for all four divisions is OP3 TABLE.

an additional single failure will not prevent ESF actuations because three divisions will still be vailable to provide redundant actuation for all 5 PA F ions. If one ESF subsystem is failed in each the four

-%, divisions, an additional singig m ~* r : ;r.t MF ac+natiane m ause -

ADS can still operate if one division is 'j unavailable, an additional single failure will not cause loss of the ADS Function. This Function is u red to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, N 26. Protection Logic Cabinets pu i

,- n This LCO requires that for each of the PLCs, one battery I backed logic group be OPERABLE to support both automatic bcy6 and manual actuation. These logic groups are implemented gI6[7,o as microprocessor subsystems. The PLCs provide the logic and power interfaces for the actuated %,eiits.

26.a. Functional Logic Stbsystem If orm battery backed logic grou each PLC in all four divisions, pan is OPERABLE additional for l single failure will not prevent ESF actuations because PLCs in the other three divisions are still available to provide redundant actuation for (continued) i

@ AP600 B 3.3 102 04/98 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 26.a. Functional Logic Subsystem (continued)

SAFELY ANALYSES, LCOs. and ESF Functions. The remaining logic cabinets in {

APPLICABILITY the division with a failed PLC are still OPERABLE l and will provide their ESF F'.metions. If one PLC logic grou divisions,panis additional failed in cch d- PLC M in all four

'-""~ "" "

= n.C ES" ar+n=Hans. ause ADS can operate '

if one division is unc 11able, an additional 3 L failure will not cause loss of the ADS furw+1on.

Q a,oK, -- Inis MODES runction1,1s requirea 2, 3, 4, 5, andto6.se uruABLE in 4 6' hs The ESFAS instrtmentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the MtC Policy Statement.

27. Pressurizer Heater Trip Pressurizer heaters'are automatically tripped upon receipt of a core makeup tank operation signal or a Pressurizer Water Level - High 3 signal. 'his pressurizer heater block reduces the potential for steam generator overfill and automatic ADS actuation for a steam generator tube rupture event. Automatically tripping the pressurizer heaters reduces the pressurizer C- level swell for certain non LOCA events such as loss of normal feedwater inadvertent CMT operation, and CVS malfunction resulting in an increase in RCS inventory.

For small break LOCA analysis, tripping the pressurizer heaters supports ssurization of the RCS following actuation of the s.

27a. Core Makeup Tank Actuation A signal to trip the pressurizer heaters is generated on a core me tank actuation signal.

The requirements for thi function are the same as the requirements for the Core Makeup Tank Actuation Function. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2.1. Instead, itmetion 2 is referenced for initiating Functions and requirements and SR 3.3.2.9 also applies.

(continued)

@ B 3.3 103 04/98 Amendment 0

_ _AP600 ._ _

. is . __

ESFAS Instrissentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS A second Note' has been added to provide clarification that.

(continued) more than one Condition is listed for each of tim Functions in Table 3.3.21. If the Required Action and associated Coopletion Time of the first Condition listed in Table 3.3.21 is not met, the second Condition shall be entered.

In the event a channel's Nominal Trip Setpoint is not met, or the transmitter, or IPC, associated with a specific Function f a found inoperable, then all affected Functions >rovided by At channel must be declared inoperable and the .C0 Mdition(s) entered for the particular protection cunction(s) affected. hen the' Required Channels are s)ecified only on a per steam line, per loop, per SG basis, tien the Condition may be entered separately for each steam j line, loop, SG, etc., as appropriate. !

When the number of inoperable channels in a trip function exceed those s)ecified in one or other related Conditions associated wit 1 a tri the safety analysis. pTherefore function,LCD then the plant be is outside 3.0.3,should !

1meediateyenteredifapplicableinthecfrrentMODEof operation.

l j4 ; ,,,, y A.1 J L C O '9 0.% l g g 5+(,

Condition A is applicable to all ESFAS protection Functions. I Condition A addresses the situation where one or more channels / divisions for one or more functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.2-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection Functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions.

B.1 With one or two channels or divisions inoperable, the affected conditionchannel within 6(s) hours.orIfdivision (s) must one or two be placed th'c are bypassed, in a byonss logic becomes two out-of-three or one out of-two, ;

respectively, while still meeting single failure criterion (a failure in one of the three or one of the two remaining channels or divisions will not prevent the protective ,

Function. However, with two channels or divisions in bypass, a single failure ir. one of the two remaining channels or divisions could cause a spurious protective function. The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allmed to place the inoperable channel (s) or division (s) in tt.e bypass condition is justified in .

Reference 6. !

(continued).

(

@,_AP600 B 3.3-105 04/98 Amendment 0

PAM Instrumentation 8 3.3.3 BASES LCO 8. Containment Pressure (Extended Range)

(continued)

The extended range containment pressure transmitters are instrwents that operators use for monitoring the potential for breach of containment, a fission product barrier. The extended ra r containment !

r ..sure w... N - --- 0 to 180 psig]. three times j

] the design basis pres W F ;

i 'J 4 p 9. Containment Area Radiation (High Range)

C Containment Area Radiation is provided to monitor for the '

4 N) potential of significant radiation releases and to ;

'b provide release assessment for use by operators in determining the need to invoke site emergency plans. )

10. Hydrogen Monitors i Hydrogen Monitors are provided to detect high hydrogen ;

concentration conditions which represent a potential for i containment breach caused by a hydrogen explosion. This variable is also important in verifying the adequacy of mitigating actions.

11. Pressurizer Level and Associated Reference Leg

(~ Temperature Pressurizer level is provided to monitor the RCS coolant inventory. During an accident, operation of the l safeguards systems can be verified based on coolant inventory indicators.

The reference leg temperature is included in the Technical Specification since it is used to compensate the level signal.

12. In-Contairment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Water Level ,

The IRW5T provides a long tens heat sink for non LOCA events and is a source of in.iection flow for LOCA events.

Won the IRW5T is a heat sink, the level will change due to increased volme associated with the temperature increase. When saturation temperature is reached, the IRW5T will begin steaming and initially lose mass to the containment atmosphere until condensation occurs on the (continued)

(;.

,,,,_AP60,0 __

8 3.3-129 04/98 Amendment 0

!

ML20216C120

Contents

Text

SUBJECT:

Dear Mr. Liparulo:

Enclosures:

m % =

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