ML20196G243

Informs That USNRC Has Published in Fr Encl Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Re AP600 Design Certification Rule. Rulemaking Allows Applicants or Licensees to Construct AP600 Std Plant Design by Referencing Design Certification Rule

ML20196G243
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	05/21/1999
From:	Lohaus P NRC OFFICE OF STATE PROGRAMS (OSP)
To:	GENERAL
References
NUDOCS 9907010091
Download: ML20196G243 (51)

Text

3  : STATE LIAISON OFFICERS l

'PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS AP600 DESIGN CERTIFICATION RULE -

s

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has published in the Federal Reaister the L .

' enclosed notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR). If approved, this rulemaking will certify the l AP600 standard plant design,'which was submitted by Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, by adding a new Appendix C to.10 CFR Part 52.-

This rulemaking action is necessary so that applicants or licensees intending to construct and i operate an AP600 standard plant design may do so by referencing the'AP600 design certification rule (DCR). This proposed DCR is nearly identical to the two previously codified DCRs in Appendices A and B to 10 CFR Part 52. Also enclosed is a draft environmental assessment (EA) that has been prepared in support of the proposed rule. The conclusion 'of.

' the draft EA is the Commission's finding that no significant environmental impact will result from the proposed rule! ,

Please send your comments o ' n the proposed DCR, the draft EA, or the AP600 design control  ;

document (DCD) that is incorporated by reference into the DCR by August 3,1999. In addition,

. an interested State, county, municipality,"or agency thereof, may request an informal hearing  ;

pursuant te 10 CFR 50.51(b) on the matters pertaining to this proposed DCR. Such requests

. j must comply t.1iii iiis requirements for requesting a hearing as stated in the NPR under the j

'section entitled,." Comments and Hearings in the Design Certification Rulemaking." Even if an j

interested State, county, municipality, or agency does not request a formal hearing, the j Commission.will provide an opportunity for an interested State, county, municipality, or agency

- to participate in any informal or formal hearing that may be granted consistent with the provisions of 10.CFR 2.715(c). The Commission would appreciate an indication in writing if you

.y may be interested in participation consistent with 10 CFR 2.715(c), should an informal hearing be requested and granted.

Mail written comments and requests for an informal hearing to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear l l Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attention: Rulemakings and

' Adjudications Staff, Mail Stop O-16 C1. Comments may also be delivered to: One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays. Electronic comments may be provided via the NRC's interactive rulemaking website through the NRC home page <www.nrc. gov >. From the home page, select "Rulemaking" from ,

the tool bar at the bottom of the page. The interactive rulemaking website can then be j

. accessed by selecting "Rulemaking Forum." l H. ,

Paul H. Lobaus, Director Office of State Programs

Enclosures:

As stated . l

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS810N WASHINGTON, D.C. 30666-0001

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May 21, 1999

' STATE LIAISON OFFICERS

' PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS AP600 DESIGN CERTIFICATION RULE The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has published in the Federal Reaister the enclosed notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR). If approved, this rulemaking will certify the

' AP600 standard plant design, which was submitted by Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, by adding a new Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 52.

This rulemaking action is necessary so that applicants or licensees intending to construct and operate an AP600 standard plant design may do so by referencing the AP600 design certification rule (DCR). This proposed DCR is nearly identical to the two previously codified

- DCRs in Appendices A and B to 10 CFR Part 52. Also enclosed is a draft environmental assessment (EA) that has been prepared in support of the proposed rule. The conclusion of the draft EA is the Commission's finding that no significant environmental impact will result from the proposed rule.

Please send your commems on the proposed DCR,' the draft EA, or the AP600 design control document (DCD) that is incorporated by reference into the DCR by August 3,1999. In addition, an interested State, county, municipality, or agency thereof, may request an informal hearing pursuant to 10 CFR 50.51(b) on the matters pertaining to this proposed DCR. Such requests c..ust comply with the requirements for requesting a hearing as stated in the NPR under the section entitled, " Comments and Hearings in the Design Certification Rulemaking.' Even if an

' interested State, county, municipality, or agency does not request a formal hearing, the Commission will provide an opportunity for an interested State, county, municipality, or agency j to participate in any informal or formal hearing that may be granted consistent with the 1 provisions of 10 CFR 2.715(c). The Commission would appreciate an indication in writing if you may be interested in participation consistent with 10 CFR 2.715(c), should an informal hearing F be requested and granted.

Mail written comments and requests for an informal hearing to: Secmtary, U.S. Nuclear ,

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and l Adjudications Staff, Mail Stop O-16 C1. Comments may also be delivered to: One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays. Electronic comments may be provided via the NRC's interactive rulemaking website L1 -

through the NRC home page <www.nrc. gov >. From the home page, select "Rulemaking" from the tool bar at the bottom of the page. The interactive rulemaking website can then be accessed by selecting "Rulemaking Forum."

i ha H. ohau , D ector Office of State Programs  !

1

Enclosures:

As stated

_ J

Thursday May 20,1999 O

Part 11 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR Part 52 AP600 Design Certification; Proposed f Rule

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27626 Federal RegistIr/Vol. 64 No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules NUCLEAR REGULATORY website through the NRC home page B and Appendix 0 of 10 CFR Part 52.

COMMISSION /www.nrc. gov /. From the home page. The NRC formally accepted the select "Rulemaking" from the tool bar at application as a docketed application 10 CFR Part 52 the bottom of the page. The interactive for design certification (Docket No. 52-RIN 3150-AG23 rulemaking website can then be 003) on December 31.1992. Information accessed by selecting "Rulemaking submitted before that date can be found AP600 Design Certification Forum." This site provides the ability to under Project No. 676.

upload comments as files lany formatl, The NRC staff issued a final safety AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory if your web browser supports that evaluation report (FSER) related to Commission. function. Contact Ms. Carol Gallagher by certification of the AP600 standard ACTION: Proposed rule. telephone (301) 415-5905 or e- Pl ant design in September 1998 mail:cag@nrc. gov for information about (NUREG-1512). The FSER documents

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory the interactive rulemaking website. the results of the NRC staff's safety Commission (NRC or Commission) FOR FURTHER INFORMAT!ON CONTACT: Jerry review of the AP600 design against the proposes to amend its regulations to N. Wilson, Mall Stop O-12 G15. Office requirements of 10 CFR Part 52. Subpart certify the AP600 standard plant design of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. U.S. B, and delineates the scope of the under Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 52. This Nuclear Regulatory Commission. technical details considered in tction is necessary so that applicants or Washington, DC 20555-0001, or evaluating the design. The FSER licensees intending to construct and telephone (301) 415-3145, or e-mail: provides the bases for Commission operate an AP600 design may do so by jnw@nrc. gov. approval of the AP600 design through referencing the AP600 design design certification. A copy of the FSER SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

certification rule (DCR). This proposed may be obtained from the DCR set out as Appendix C,is nearly Table of Contents Superintendent of Documents, U. S.

identical to the two previously codified 1. Background. Government Printing Office P.O. Box DCRs in Appendices A and B of 10 CFR II. Comments and Hearings in the design 37082 Washington, DC 20402-9328 or l Part 52. The applicant for certification certification rulemaking. the National TechnicalInformation of the AP600 design is Westinghouse A. Opportunity to submit written and Service, Springfield, VA 22161-0002.

Electric Company LLC (hereinafter electronic comments. The final design approval for the AP600 referred to as Westinghouse). B. Opportunity to request hearing. design was issued on September 3.

The public is invited to submit C. Hearing process. 1998, and published in the Federal comments on this proposed DCR and E" I"'I " II'5"" f r the fin 81 Register on September 11,1998 (63 FR the AP600 design control document E. c st proprietary information in W2h (DCD) that is incorporated by reference rulemaking. Rulemahng Procedures into the DCR, In addition, interested F. Ex parte and separation of functions parties may request an informal hearing restrictions. Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 52 provides before an NRC Atomic Safety and III. Section-by-section discussion of design for Commission approval of standard Licensing Board, in accordance with 10 certification rule. designs for nuclear power facilities (e.g.,

CFR 52.51(b), on matters pertalning to A. Introduction (Section D. design certification) through this proposed DCR. The NRC also B. Ddinttions Nion 10. rulemaking. In accordance with the C. Scope and contents (Section III). Administrative Procedure Act (APA),

invites the public to submit comments D. Additional requirements and on the environmental assessment for the Part 52 provides the opportunity for the restrictions (Section IV). public to submit written comments on AP600 design. E. Applicable regulations (Section V),

the proposed design certification rule.

DATES: Submit comments by August 3, F. Issue resolution (Section VD.

However, Part 52 goes beyond the 1999. Comments received after this date sapp S " D' f; u 1on ,, o,f n d requirements of the APA by providing will be considered if it is practical t the public with an opportunity to consider them, but the Commission is (Section VIID.

I. Inspections, tests, analyses, and request a hearing before the Atomic only able to ensure consideration for acceptance criteria (Section IX). Safety and Licensing Board Panel in a comments received on or before this J. Records and Reporting (Section X). design certification rulemaking. While date. Requests for an informal hearing IV, Finding of no significant environmental Part 52 describes a general framework must be submitted by August 3.1999. Impact: availability for conducting a design certification ADDRESSES: Mail written comments and V. Paperwork Reduction Act statement.

rulemaking. S S2.51(a) states that more requests for an informal hearing to: y; fp$g" lory Fle(ib ilty Act certification,detailed procedures for the conduct of 8

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory VHI. Backfit analysis. each design certification will be Commission Washington, DC 20555- IX. Consensus standards. specified by the Commission.

0001, Attention: Rulemakings and To assist the Commission in Acijudications Staff Mall Stop O-10 Cl. 1. Background developing the detailed rulemaking Comments may also be delivered to: The NRC added 10 CFR Part 52 to its procedures, the NRC's C'ffice of the One White Flint North,11555 Rockville regulations to provide for the issuance General Counsel prepared a paper Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 of early site permits. standard design (SECY-92-381, "Rulemaking am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays. certifications, and combined licenses for Procedures for Design Certification." l Copies of comments received, the DCD, nuclear power reactors. Subpart B of 10 dated November 10.1992), that and the environmental assessment will CFR Part 52 established the process for recommended design certification be available for examination and obtaining design certifications. On June rulemaking procedures. This paper was copying at the NRC Public Document 26,1992, Westinghouse tendered its prepared after consideration of the Room at 2120 L Street NW. (Lower application for certification of the panel discussions at a public workshop Level), Washington. DC. AP600 standard plant design with the and the written comments received after Electronic comments may be provided NRC Westinghouse submitted this the workshop. On April 30,1993, the via the NRC's interactive rulemaking application in accordance with Subpart Commission issued a Memorandum to j

Federcl Register /Vol, 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27627

' the General Counsel that provided the fmm the publication of this notice, and where the action or event is to occur, in Commission's determinations with a copy of the request must be sent via which case the period runs until the respect to the procedural issues raised overnight mail to the design next day which is neither a Saturday, by the General Counsel's paper. Section certification applicant at the following Sunday, nor holiday.

11 describes the procedures to be utilized address: Mr. Brian A. McIntyre, in this design certification rulemaking. Manager, Advanced Plant Safety and 2. Content of Hearing Request II. Comments and Hearings in the Ucensing, Westinghouse Electric The Commission will grant a request Design Certificalon Rulemaking Company, P.O. Box 355, Pittsburgh. PA for an informal hearing only if the 15230-0355. The information which a hearing request satisfies each of the A. Opportunity To Submit Written and person requesting a hearing must following two requirements. First, the Electronic Comments provide in the hearing request, as well hearing request must include the Any person may submit written as the procedures and standards to be written presentations that the requestor comments on the proposed design used by the Commission in its wishes to be included in the record of certification rule to the Commission for determination of the request, are the hearing. The written presentations its consideration.8 Commenters have 75 discussed in Sections C.1 through C.4 must:

days from the publication of this notice be rson who needs to review (i) Identify the specific portion of the to file written comments on the Proposed design certification rule or proposed design certification rule. proprietary information submitted by the design certification applicant in supporting bases which are challenged, op eta or s fegua nf mation in rder to prepare a request for an (ii) Describe the reasons why the order to provide written comments must inf rm I hearing must follow the proposed rule or supporting bases are follow the procedures and filing pr cedures and filing schedule set forth incorrect or insufficient, and deadlines (including the date for filing in Section E. below. (iii) Identify the references or sources

• "IS "$ 8" wT ten comments) set forth in Section the person requesting the

, for n n b ate nty hPon Commenters are encouraged to a" Pal and o her local submit, in addition to the original paper G ve comments in the pubi!c comment copy, a copy of the comment letter in American tribal governments, to electronic format on a 3.5 inch " interested governments" period addressing these three factors for in any infcn mal hearings which the the specific issue for which the computer diskette. Text files should be provided in Wordperfect 8 format or Commission authorizes. similar to their requestor seeks a hearing, it will be

• "g g .. I ted sufficient for the requestor to identify unformatted ASCll code.The format the portions of the written comments and version should be identified on the g,vernment n Subpart G hearings diskette s externallabel. under 10 CFR 2.715. State, county, city / that the requestor intends to submit as municipal, local, and tribal a written presentation. Also, the hearinE B. Opportunity To Request Hearing Governments wishing to participate as request must demonstrate that tne Any person may request an informal an " interested government" in any requestor (or other persons identified in -

hearing on one cr more specific matters design certification rulemaking hearings tne hearing request who will represent, with respect to the proposed design must file their request to participate no assist, or speak on behalf of the certification rule.2 An informal hearing later than 75 days from the publication requestor at the hearing) has appropriate Provides the admittedParty with an of this notice. knowledge and qualifications to enable opportunity to provide written and oral the requestor to contribute significantly C. Hearing Process to the development of the hearing At afet and eeni g ard and 1. Filings and Computation of Times tters at issue.

gord on the specific to request that the licensing board All notices, papers, or other filings question the applicant on those matters. discussed in this section must be filed the requestor meet ajudicial " expert The conduct of an informal hearing is witness" standard in order to meet the by express mail.3 The time periods discussed in more detail in Section C. second criterion. Nonetheless, given the specified in this section have been below. Under certain circumstances, a substantial commitment of time and established based upon such a filing.

party in an informal hearing may resources associated with any hearing, The express mail filing requirement request that the Commission hold a the Commission believes it to be a shall be considered in establishing other formal hearing on specific and reasonable prerequisite that the filing deadlines.

substantial factual disputes necessary to - In computing any period of time, the requestor demonstrate that he/she (or

'esolve the matters for which the party day of the act, event, or default after his/her assistant) has:

was granted an informal hearing which the designated period of time (1) Substantial familiarity with the (Section C.ll below). begins to run is not included. The last Publicly available docketed information A person may request an informal day of the period so computed is relevant to the issue for which a hearing hearing even though that person has not included, unless it is a Saturday, is requested; submitted separate written comments' Sunday, or legal holiday at the place (ii) The requisite technical capability on the design certification rule (l.c., is to understand the factual matters and l not a commenter), Requests for an 3 Fihngs discussed in this section may also be develop a record on the issue for which informal hearing must be received by Served upon the Commission in electronic form in l" I '* P' ** ll H"*" P" *" "'

a hearing is requested, and the Commission no !ater tiian 75 days copics of their ritings on other parties by express (iii) An understanding of the NRC's mail unless the receiving party agrees to riling in i An opportunity for public comment is required electronic form. These filings must be transmitted hearing procedures in 10 CFR Part 2.4 by Section 553 of the Administrative Procedures no later than the last day of the time period Act and 10 CFR 52.51(b). specified for niing and must be in accordance with

• Requesters will satisfy this requirement by

• An opportunity for a hearing is provided by 10 the requirements specified under DATE and stating that they possess and have read a copy of CFR 52.51(b). ADDRESSES in this notice. 10 CFR Part 2. Subparts A. G. and L.

j

27628 Fedmt! Registtr/Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules

3. Request to Hold Hearing Outside of (1) The date by which any requests for hearing, based in part upon the Washington, DC discovery must be filed with the licensing board's review of the parties' Any hearing (s) which the Commission licensing board (normally 20 days after proposed oral questions to be asked of may authorize ordinarily will be the date of the Commission's decision), persons making oral presentations, conducted in the Washington, DC. and (vi) Request that the NRC staff:

metropolitan area. However, the (11) The date by which any objections (A) Answer licensing board questions Commission at its discretion may to discovery must be filed (see Section about the FSER or the proposed rule, schedule hearings outside the C.9. below) (B) Provide additional information or Washington, DC. metropolitan area in The Commission's decision will be documentation with respect to the response to requests submitted by a sent to each admitted party by overnight design certification, and mail. Separate hearings may be granted (C) Provide other assistance as the person requesting a hearing that all or part of the hearing be held elsewhere. for each controverted matter or set of licensing board may request. Licensing consolidated matters. Thus,if there are board requests for NRC staff assistance These requests must be submitted in three different controverted matters, the should be framed such that the NRC conjunction with the request for staff does not assume a role as an Commission may establish three hearing, and must specifically explain separate hearings. In this fashion, adversary party in the infurmal hearing the special circumstances for holding a (see Section C.8 below),

hearingoutside the Washington DC. closing of the hearing record on a controverted matter and its referral to (vil) Review all requests for additional metropolitan area. the Commission for resolution need not hearing procedures and refer all

4. Responses to Hearing Request await completion of the hearing on the appropriate requests to the Commission The applicant may file a response t other controverted matters. Finally, the with a decision explaining the licensing any hearing request within 15 days of Commission's decision will rule on any board's action, (vill) Certify the hearing record to the the date of the hearing request. The NRC Qu[s { a.C netro of tan area (see Commission, based upon the licensing staff will not provide a response to the board's determination that the hearing hearing request unless requested to do Section C.3 above)'

record contains sufficient information so by the Commission but may assist the 6. Authority of the Licensing Board for the Commission to make a reasoned Commission in its ruling on the request. If the Commission authorizes an determination on the controverted

5. Commission Determination of informal hearing on a controverted matter; and Hearing Request matter, the licensing board will function (ix) include with its certification any as a " limited magistrate" in that hearing c neerns identified by the licensing The Commission intends to rule on a hearing request within 20 days of the with the authority and responsibility for board in the course of the hearing assuring that a sufficient record is which, although neither raised by the close of the period for requesting a Parties nor r ecessary to resolution of the hearing. The Commission s developed on those controverted matters which the Commission has controverted hearing matters, are determination will be based upon the significant enough in the licensing determined are appropriate for materials accompanying the hearing board's view to warrant attention by the consideration in that hearing. The request and the applicant s response gand the NRC staffs response,if licensing board shall have @e following Commission, specific esponsibilities at.d authority: Licensing board determinadons with requested by the Commission). The respect to referral of requests to the (1) Schedule and expeditiously hearing request shall be granted if: conduct the informal hearing for each Commission, es well as licensing board (i) The request is accompanied by a admitted controverted matter, consistent determinations of parties' motions, are written presentation containing the with the rights of all the parties and not appealable to the Commission as an information required by Section C.2. with the Commission's Statement of interlocutory matter. Instead, any above; and disagreements with the licensing Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory (11) The requestor has the appropriate Proceedings 5. CLI-98-12,48 NRC 18 board's determinations and a specific knowledge and qualifications to enable (1998), (63 FR 41872 August 5,1998), discussion of how the hearing record is the requestor to contribute significantly (ii) Review all discovery requests deficient with respect to the contested to the development of the hearing against the criteria established by the issue must be set forth in the parties' record on the matters sought to be Commission, and refer all appropriate proposed findings of fact which are controverted- requests to the Commission with a submitted directly to the Commission The Commission may consult with decision explaining the licensing (see Section C.13 below).

the NRC staff before its determination of board's action. As suggested by item (ix) above, the a hearing request. A written decision (iii) P:eside over and resolve any licensing board shall not have any "sua either granting or denying the hearing issues regarding the scheduling and sponte" authority analogous to 10 CFR request will be published by the conduct of any discovery authorized by 2.760a. The Commission believes that in Commission. the Commission, the absence of a request for an informal If a hearing request is granted in (iv) Order such further consolidation hearing on a matter, the Commission whole or in part, the Commission's of parties and issues as the licensing should resolve issues with respect to the decision will delineate the controverted board determines is necessary or design certification rule in the same matter that will be the subject of the desirable, manner as other agency identified hearing and whether any issues and/or (v) Orally examine persons making rulemaking issues, viz.. through NRC parties are to be consolidated (see oral presentations in the informal staff consideration of the issue followed Section C.7. below). The Commission's by the Commission's review and its decision granting the hearing will 4trect 8 Ahhough the opponunity for an informal final resolution of the matter. However, the establishment of a licensing board to hearing provided tar in secuon 52.51(b) and this when it certifies the completed hearing nhnaung nouce is nm an adjudwawy heanng preside over the informal hearing. " record to the Commission (see Section Finally, the Commission's decision will 7p'difu $$o"n"0'cNr$'tuddo% C.12. below). the licensing board should specify: hearings are also applicable to intonnanmanno identify to the Commission any

Federal Register /Vol. 64 No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27629 concerns identified during the hearing simplify the overall conduct of informal shall be filed with the licensing board, that are significant enough to warrant hearings or materially reduce the time with copies of the request to be filed Commission consideration but that are or resources devoted to the hearings. In with the party against which discovery unnecessary or irrelevant to the these instances, the licensing board may is sought, and the NRC staff. The resolution of the controverted hearing direct such consolidation. The licensing requests must be received no later than matter, board shall set forth the issues and/or the deadline specified by the The licensing board shall close the parties to be consolidated and the Commission in its decision granting a hearing and certify the record to the reasons for such consolidation in a party's hearing request (see Section C.S.

Commission only after it determines written order, above). A party against whom discovery that the record on the controverted is sought may file a response objecting matter is sufficiently complete for the 8. Status of the Design Certification Applicant, the NRC staff, and to part or all of the request. Such a Commission to make a reasoned response must explain with determination with respect to that Requesting Party particularity why the discovery request matter. However, the licensing board The design certification applicant should not be granted.

shall not have any responsibility or shall be a party in the informal hearing. The licensing board shall review all authority to resolve and decide with the right to submit written and oral discovery requests and refer to the controverted matters in either an presentations, propose questions to be Commission those requests that it informal or a formal hearing. Rather, the asked by the licensing board of oral believes should be granted within 7 Commission retains its traditional presenters, and file and submit days after the date for receiving a party's authority in rulemaking proceedings to appropriate motions. objections to a discovery request. The evaluate and resolve all rulemaking The NRC staff shall not be a party in licensing board shall issue a written issues !dentified in public comments on the informal hearing but shall be decision explaining its basis for either a proposed rule. Therefore, the available in the informal hearing to referring the request to the Commission Commission will resolve any answer licensing board questions about or declining to refer it. The written controverted matters that are the subject the FSER or the proposed rule, provide decision shall accompany the discovery of a hearing in this design certification additional information or requests which are referred by the rulemaking, documentation with respect to the licensing board to the Commission.

design certification, and provide other The Commission will determine

7. Consolidation of Parties and Issues; assistance that the licensing board may whether to grant any discovery requests joint Hearings on Related Issues request without the NRC staff assuming forwarded to it based upon the licensing If two or more persons seek an the role of a party in the infonnal board's decision, together with the informal hearing on the same or similar hearing. request and the design certification matters, the Commission may, in its A party whose hearing requests have applicant's response (and any NRC staff discretion, grant an informal hearing been granted with respect to a particular response requested by the licensing and consolidate the matters into a single controverted matter shall not participate board). Discovery will be at the issue (as defined by the Commission). with respect to any controverted matter discretion of the Commission. In this The Commission may also, in its on which the party was not granted a regard, the Commission notes that there discretion, require that the parties be hearing. For example, if Person I has are two docket files in which the NRC consolidated analogous to the been authorized as a party on Issue A staff has placed information and consolidation permitted under 10 CFR and Person 2 has been authorized as a documents received from the applicant 2.715a. If the Commission consolidates party on issue B, then Person I may for the AP600 design certification two or more issues into a single part'icipate only in the informal hearing review. The application was docketed consolidated issue but does not on issue A, and may not participate in on December 31,1992 and assigned consolidate parties, each admitted the informal hearing on issue B. Docket No.52-003. Correspondence person will be deemed a separate party Conversely, Person 2 may participate relating to the application prior to this with an individual right to: only in the informal hearing on Issue B, date was addressed to Project No. 676.

,' (i) Submit separate written and may not participate in the informal This information includes the AP600 presentations, hearing on issue A. Design Control Document, Revision 2 (11) Submit separate sets of proposed (3/99) and the AP600 Standard Safety oral questions to be asked by the 9. Requests for Discovery Analysis Report, Revision 25.

licensing board (see Section C.10 Any party may request the Furthermore, the docket files contain below), opportunity to conduct discovery NRC staff communications and (ill) Make separate oral presentation, against another party before the oral documents, such as written questions and phase of the informal hearing. The and comments provided to the design (iv) Submit and separately respond to request for discovery must: certification applicant, and summaries motions. (1) Identify the type of discovery of meetings held between the NRC staff If the Commission also requires that permitted under 10 CFR 2.740,2.740a, and the design certification applicant.

parties be consolidated, the 2.740a(b),2.741, and 2.742 which the The NRC staff's bases for approving the consoh,'ated parties must participate party seeks to use; AP600 design are set forth in the FSER Jointly, including deciding upon written (11) Identify the subject matter or (NUREG-1512), dated September 1998, and oral presentations, submitting a nature of the information sought to be The Commission also notes that each single set of written questia 1s, obtained b discovery; and admitted pcrty has already disclosed a submitting motions supported by each till) Exp ain with particularity the substantial amount of information in its i of the consolidated parties, and relevance of the information sought to hearing request, relating both to bases responding to motions filed by other the controverted matter which is the for the party's position with respect to parties. subject of the hearing and why this the controverted matter as well as During the informal hearing, the information is indispensable to the information on the qualifications of the I licensing board may decide that further presentation of the party's position on party (or its representatives and consolidation of issues or parties would the controverted matter. The request witnesses in the hearing).

I 27630 Federal Register /Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20.1999/ Proposed Rules l

As discussed above, much of the overnight mail to all parties. The NRC provide a response unless specifically j information documenting the NRC staff shall file its written answers with requested to do so by the licensing staff's review and approval of the design the licensing board and the parties. board.

certification application has been Daring the oral phase of the hearing. The licensing board will review all routinely placed in the docket file. the licensing board shall receive into requests for additional hearing Furthermore., as discussed above in evidence the written presentations of procedures or a formal hearing and refer Section C.8, the NRC staff is not a party the parties and permit each party (or the those that it believes should be granted in an informal hearing. Therefore, the representatives identified in their to the Commission for its determination.

Commission has decided that in an hearing request) to make oral The licensing board shall issue a written informal hearing, the parties should not presentations addressing the decision explaining its determination be afforded discovery against the NRC controverted matter. Normally, the party whether to forward the request to the staf f. raising the controverted matter should Commission no later than 7 days after

10. Conduct of Informal Hearing make their presentations, followed by receipt of any applicant response to the the presentations of the design request. The decision will provide the if the Commission authorizes certification applicant. The licensing basis for either forwarding the request to discovery, the licensing board shall board may question the persons making the Commission or declining to forward establish a schedule for the conduct and oral presentations, using its own it,in the absence of any requests for completion of discovery. Normally, the questions as well as those submitted to hearing procedures or if the licensing licensing board should not permit more the licensing board by the other parties. board concludes that none of the than one round of discovery. The Based upon the parties' oral requests should be referred to the Commission will not entertain any presentations and/or responses to Commission, the licensing board should interlocutory appeals from licensing licensing board questions, the licensing declare that the hearing record is closed 3 board orders resolving any discovery board also may orally question the NRC (see Section C.12 below).

disputes or otherwise complaining of staff. The Commission will determine the scheduling of discovery. whether to gr ant any requests for Following the completion of 11. Additional Hearing Procedures and additional procedures or a formal discovery, the licensing board should Formal Hearings hearing that are forwarded by the issue an order setting forth the date of After the parties have made their oral licensing board. The Commission's commencement of the oral phase of presentations and the licensing board determination shall be based upon the each informal hearing, and the date (no has concluded its questioning of the licensing board's decision along with less than 30 days before the presenters (and, as applicable, the NRC the request and the design certification commencement of the oral phase of the staff), the licensing board should declare applicant's response. If the Commission hearing) by which parties must submit: that the oral phase of an informal directs that .a formal hearing be held on j (1) The identities and curriculum vitae hearing on a controverted matter (or a controverted factual matter, the NRC of those persons providing oral consolidated set of controverted staff shall be a party in the formal Presentations; matters) is complete. hearing. Any formal hearing authorized (ii) The outlines of the oral No later than 10 days after the by the Commission shall be conducted presentations; and licensing board has declared that the in accordance with the Commission's (iii) Any questions which a party oral phase of the informal hearing has Statement of Policy on Conduct of would like the licensing board to ask. been completed, parties may file with Adjudicatory Proceedings. As noted in The licensing board may schedule the the licensing board (with copies to the that Policy Statement, the Commission oral phases of two or more informal may, in individual cases, establish applicant and the NRC staff) a request hearings to be held during the same that some or all of the procedures specific milestone schedules for the session. The licensing board shall described in 10 CFR Part 2. Subpart G conduct of the formal hearing and publish a notice in the Federal Register (e.g., direct and cross-examination by require the presiding officer to explain announcing the commencement of the and mitigate any significant deviations the parties) be utilized. The request  ;

oral phase of the informal hearing (s). shall: from that milestone schedule. After The notice shall set forth the place and (i) Identify the specific hearing j

either the additional hearing procedures ,

time of the oral hearing session, the procedures which the pany seeks, or authorized by the Commission are i subject matter (s) of the informal state that a formal hearing is requested; completed or the formal hearing is I hearing (s), a brief description of the (ii) Identify the specific factual issues concluded on the factual dispute, the i informal hearing procedures, and a for which the additional procedures licensing board should declare the statement indicating that the public may would be utilized; hearing record closed (see Section C.12

)

l observe the informal hearing. (iii) Explain why resolution of these '

below).

Based upon the parties' outlines of the factual disputes are necessary to the oral presentations and proposed Commission's decision on the 12. Ucensing Board's Certification of questions, the licensing board should controverted issue: He ring Record to the Commission determine whether it has specific (iv) Explain, with specific citations to After the oral phase of a hearing is questions of the NRC staff with respect the hearing record, why the record is completed and either:  !

to the staff's review of the design insufficient on the controverted matter; (1) There are no requests for additional r certification application. These and hearing procedures or a formal hearing; l questions should be submitted in (v) Identify the nature of the evidence or writing to the NRC staff no less than 20 that would be developed utilizing the (ii) The Ikensing board concludes days before the commencement of the additional procedures requested. that none of the requests should be oral phase of the hearing and must The design certification applicant referred to the Commission, the the specify the date by which the NRC staff may file a response to these requests no licensing board should declare that the shall provide its written answers to the later than 7 days after the applicant's hearing record is closed. If the  ;

licensing board. The licensing board receipt of a request for additional Commission directs that additional j shall send copies of the request by procedures. The NRC staff will not hearing procedures should be utilized or i i

l

Fed:rel Rrgister/Vol. 64. No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27631 a formal hearing be held on specific file proposed findings of fact and proposed design certification rule meets factual disputes, the licensing board conciusions on issues which it was not the applicable standards and should declare the hearing record closed admitted). Any findings that a party requirements of the AEA. NEPA. and after completion of the additional wishes the Commission to consider the Commission's rules and regulations.

hearing procedures or the formal must be received by the Commission no The Commission's determination will hearing. Within 30 days of the closing later than 30 days after the licensing be based upon the rulemaking record as of the hearing record the licensing board board closes the hearing record on that described in Section D.1 above, with the should certify the hearing record to the issue. Although parties are not required addition of the hearing record for Commission on each controverted to file proposed findings and controverted matters. If the Commission matter (or consolidated set of conclusions, a party who does not file makes an affirmative finding. the controverted matters).6 a finding may not, upon appeal, claim Commission will issue a final design The licensing board's certification for or otherwise argue that the Commission certification ru!e as described in Section each controverted matter (or either misunderstood the party's D.I.

consolidated set of controverted position, or failed to address a specific matters) sha!! contain: piece of evidence or issue. E. Access to ProprietaryInformation in (i) The hearhg record, including a Rulemaking transcript er t ie oral phase of the D. Resolution oflssues for the Final Rulemaking 1. Access to Proprietary Information for hearing (M any pre-hearing the Preparation of Written Comments or conferences) and copies of all filings by 1. Absence of Qualifying Hearing Informal Hearing Requests the parties and the licensing board. Request (11) A list of all documentary evidence Persons who determine that they need if the Commission does not receive to review proprietary information admitted by the licensing board, any request for hearing within the 75-including the written presentations of submitted by the design certification day period for submitting a request, or applicant to the NRC in order to submit the parties.

does not grant any of the requests (see written comments on the proposed (iii) Copies of the documentary Section B. above), the Commission will evidence admitted by the licensing certification or to prepare an informal board, determine whether the proposed design hearing request. may request access to certification rule meets the applicable such information from the applicant.

(iv) A list of all witnesses wh standards and requirements of the The request shall state with provided oral testimony, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended particularity:

(v) The NRC staffs written answers t (AEA), the National Environmental licensing board requests, and (1) The nature of the proprietary Policy Act of 1969, as amended (NEPA), information sought, (vi) A licensing board statement that and the Commission's rules and (ii) The reason why the the hearing record contains sutTicient regulations. The Commission's information for the Commission to make determination will be based upon the nonproprietary information currently available to the public in the NRC's a reasoned determination on the rulemaking record, which includes: the Public Document Room is insufficient controverted ma:ter. application for design certification, Finally, as discussed in Section C.6 either to develop public comments or to including the AP600 Standard Safety prepare for the hearing.

above, the licensing board should Analysis Report (SSAR) and DCD, the (iii) The relevance of the requested identify any issues not raised by the applicant's responses to the NRC staffs parties or otherwise are not relevant to information either to the issue which requests for additional information; the the commenter wishes to comment on, the controverted matters in the hearing. NRC staffs FSER and any supplements and that the licensing board believes are thereto; the report on the application by (iv) A showing that the person significant enough to warrant attention the ACRS: the applicant's evaluation of requesting the information has the by the Commission. severe accident mitigation design capability to understand and utilize the

13. Parties' Proposed Findings of Fact alternatives for purposes of NEPA in requested information.

and Conclusions Appendix IB of the SSAR; the NRC Requests must be filed with the staffs draft EA and FONSl; the applicant such that they are received by The applicant must file directly with the Commission proposed findings of proposed rule, and the public comments the applicant no later than 45 days after received on the pronosed rule. If the the date that this notice of proposed fact and conclusions for each rulemaking is published in the Federal Commission makes'an affirmative controverted hearing matter (or Register.

finding. It will issue a standard design consolidated set of controverted certification in the form of a rule by Within ten (10) days of receiving the matters) within 30 days following the request, the applicant must send a adding a new appendix to 10 CFR Part close of the hearing record on that 52, and publish the design certification written response to the person seeking matter in the form of a proposed final access. The response must either rule and a statement of considerations rule and statement of considerations provide the documents requested (or in the Federal Register.

with respect to the controverted hearing state that the document will be provided issues. 2. Commission Resolution ofIssues no later than ten days after the date of Other parties are encouraged, but not Where a Hearing is Granted the response), or state that access has required, to file with the Commission All matters related to the proposed been denied. If access is denied, the proposed findings of fact and design certification rule, including those response shall state with particularity conclusions limited to those issues matters for which the Commission the reasons for its refusal. The which a party was afforded a hearing by authorizes a hearing (see Sections B. applicant's response must be provided the Commission (Le., a party may not and C. above), will be resolved by the via express mail.

Commission after the licensing board The person seeking access may then

• An informal hearing is deemed to be completed has closed the hearing record and request a Commission hearing for the h"e u25Nr t$n" pIs"and no cerufied it to the Commission. The purpose of obtaining a Commission request is received. Commission will determine whether the order directing the dasign certification

l 27632 Fed:rtl Register /Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules I applicant to disclose the requested requesting party setting forth with be memorial 2ed in a document which information. The person must include particularity the reasons for its refusal. will be placed in the PD.R and copies nf the original request (and any The party may then request the distributed to the licensing board and I subsequent clarifying information licensing board to order disclosure. The relevant parties.

provided by the person requesting party must include copies of the original access to the applicant) and the request (and any subsequent clarifying Ill. Secti n-By-Secti n Discussion of applican:'s response. The Commission information provided by the requesting Design Certification Rule will base its decision solely on the party to the applicant) and the The proposed design certification rule person's original request (including any applicant's response. The licensing (DCR) for the AP600 standard plant clarifying information provided to the board shall base its decision solely on design is nearly identical to the two design certification rules for the U.S.

applicant by the person requesting the party's original request (including I access), and the applicant's response. any clarifying information provided by ABWR and the System 80+ designs. l Accordingly, a person seeking access to the requesting party to the applicant), which the NRC previously adopted, proprietary information should ensure and the applicant's response. These DCRs are set forth in 10 CFR Part that the request sets forth in sufficient Accordingly, a party requesting 52, Appendix A (U.S. ABWR,62 FR detail and particularity the information proprietary information from the 25800, May 12,1997) and Appendix B required to be included in the request. applicant should ensure that its request (System 80+,62 FR 27840, May 21, Similarly, the applicant should ensure sets forth in sufficient detail and 1997). The AP600 DCR emulates the that its response to any request states particularity the information required to U.S. ABWR and System 80+ DCRs, with sufficient detail and particularity be included in the request. Similarly, inasmuch as the three designs were ,

the reasons for its refusal to provide the the applicant should ensure that its reviewed contemporaneously against requested informanon. response to any request states with the same technical requirements.

If the Commission orders access in sufficient detail and particularity the Furthermore, many of the procedural whole or part, the Commission will reasons for its refusal to provide the issues and their resolutions for the specify the date by which the requesting requested infor mation. The licensing ABWR and the System 80+ DCRs (e.g.,

party must file with the Commission board may order the applicant to the two-tier structure. Tier 2', the scope written comments and any request for provide access to some or all of the of issue resolution) were developed after an informal hearing before a licensing requested information, subject to an extensive discussions with nuclear board as discussed in Section V.C. appropriate non-disclosure agreement. Industry representatives, and above. A request for an informal hearing F. Ex Parte and Separation of functions estinghouse participated in those must meet the requirements set forth Restrictions cussi ns. It was b MC s inent above in Section V.C., in particular the (and likely Westinghouse's expectation) requirements governing the content of Unless the formal procedures of 10 that the resolutions for these issues in the hearing request, and shall be CFR Part 2 Subpart G are approved for the ABWR ana System 80+ rulemakings governed by the procedures and a formal hearing in the design would also be applied to the AP600 standards governing such requests set certification rulemaking proceeding, the rule. Accordingly, the NRC has modeled forth in Section V.C. NRC staff will not be a party in the the AP600 DCR on the existing DCRs for hearing and separation of functions the ABWR and System 80+, with certain

2. Access to Proprietary Information in limitations will not apply. The NRC departures. These departures are a Hearing staff may assist in the hearing by necessary to reflect that Westinghouse is Parties who are granted a hearing may answering questions about the FSER put the applicant for the AP600 DCR, and to request access to proprietary to it by the licensing board, or to account for differences in the AP600 information. Parties must first request provide additional information, design documentation, design features access to proprietary information documentation, or other assistance as (including the investment protection regarding the proposed design the licensing board may request. short-term availability controls), and certification from the applicant. The Furthermore, other than in a formal environmental assessment (including request shall state with particularity: hearing, the NRC staff shall not be severe accident mitigation design (1) The nature of the proprietary subject to discovery by any party. alternatives).

Information sou8ht, whether by way of interrogatory, The following discussion sets forth (ii) The reason why the deposition. or request for production of the purpose and key aspects of each ,

nonproprietary information currently documents, section and paragraph of the proposed f available to the public in the NRC's Second, the Commission has AP600 design certification rule. All Public Document Room is insufficient to determined that once a request for an section and paragraph references are to prepare for the hearing, informal or formal hearing is received, the provisions in the proposed (iii) The relevance of the requested certain elements of the ex parte Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 52.

information to the hearing issue (s) for restrictions in 10 CFR 2.780(a) will be 1 which the party has been admitted, and applicable with respect to the subject A. Introduction l (iv) A showing that the requesting matter of that hearing request. Under The purpose of Section I of Appendix l party has the capability to understand these restrictions, the Commission will C to 10 CFR Part 52 ("this appendix") I and utilize the requested information. communicate with interested persons / is to identify the standard plant design The request must be filed with the parties, the NRC staff, and the licensing that is approved by this design applicant no later than the date board with respect to the issues covered certification rule and the applicant for established by the Commission for filing by the hearing request only through certification of the standard design.

discovery requests with the licensing docketed, publicly-available written identification of the design certification i board. communications and public meetings. applicant is necessary to implement this if the applicant declines to provide Individual Commissioners may appendix, for two reasons. First, the the information sought, within 10 days communicate privately with interested implementation of 10 CFR 52.63(c) of receiving the request, the applicant persons and the NRC staff, however, the depends on whether an applicant for a must send a written response to the substance of the communication shall combined license (COI) contracts with i

i Federal Register /Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday. ' day 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27633 the design certification applicant to Section 14.3 of the FSER. Changes to or designation as Tier 2 information, to be provide the generic DCD and supporting departures from the Tier 1 information an approved (" sufficient") method for 3 design information. If the COL applicant must comply with Section Vill.A of this meeting Tier i requirements. However. I does not use the design certification appendix. there may be other acceptable ways of applicant to provide this information, The Tier i design descriptions serve complying with Tier 1. The appropriate then the COL applicant must meet the as design commitments for the lifetime criteria for departing from Tier 2 I requirements in 10 CFR 52.63(c). Also, of a facility referencing the design information are specified in Section '

X.A.1 of this appendix imposes a certification. The ITAAC verify that the Vill.B of this appendix. Departures from requirement on the design certification as-built facility conforms with the Tier 2 do not negate the requirement in l applicant to maintain the generic DCD approved design and applicable Section Ill.B to reference Tier 2.

throughout the time period in which regulations. In accordance with 10 CFR A definition of " combined license this appendix may be referenced. 52.103(g), the Commission must find (COL) action items" (combined license E M"# "8 that the acceptance criteria in the information), which is part of the Tier l ITAAC are met before operation. After 2 information, has been added to clarify 1 The terms Tier 1, Tier 2. Tier 2*, and the Commission has made the finding that COL applicants, who reference this l COL action items (license information) required by 10 CFR 52.103(g), the appendix, are required to address these are defined in this appendix because ITAAC do not constitute regulatory matters in their license application but these concepts were not envisioned requirements for licensees or for the COL action items are not the only when 10 CFR Part 52 was developed. renewal of the COL. However, acceptable set ofinformation. An The design certification applicants and subsequent modifications to the facility applicant may depart from or omit these l the NRC staff used these terms in must comply with the design items, provided that the departure or implementing the two-tiered rule descriptions in the plant-specific DCD omission is identified andjustified in structure that was proposed by unless changes are made in accordance the FSAR. After issuance of a representatives of the nuclear industry with the change process in Section Vill construction permit or combined after issuance of 10 CFR Part 52. During of this appendix. The Tier 1 interface license, these items are not consideration of the comments received requirements are the most significant of requirements for the licensee unless on Appendices A and B to Part 52, the the interface requirements for systems such items are restated in its FSAR.

Commission determined that it would that are wholly or partially outside the The investment protection short-term be useful to distinguish between the scope of the standard design, which availability controls, which are set forth

" plant-specific DCD" and the " generic were submitted in response to 10 CFR in Section 16.3 of the generic DCD, were DCD " the latter of which is 52.47(a)(1)(vil) and must be met by the added to the list of information that is incorporated by reference into this site-specific design features of a facility part of Tier 2. This set of requirements appendix and remains unaffected by that references this appendix. The Tier was added to Tier 2 to make it clear that plant specific departures. This I site parameters are the most the availability controls are not distinction is necessary in order to significant site parameters. which were operational requirements for the clarify the obligations of applicants and submitted in response to 10 CFR purposes of Vill.C of this appendix.

licensees that reference this appendix. 52.47(a)(1)(iii). An application that Rather, the availability controls are Also. the technical specifications that references this appendix must associated with specific design features, are located in Section 16.1 of the generic demonstrate that the site parameters and the availability controls may be DCD are designated as " generic (both Tier 1 and Tier 2) are met at the changed if the associated design feature technical specifications" in order to proposed site (refer to III.D of this SOC). is changed under Vill.B of this facilitate the special treatment of this Tier 2 is the portion of the design- appendix.

Information under this appendix. related information contained in the Certain Tier 2 information has been Therefore, appropriate definitions for DCD that is approved by this appendix designated in the generic DCD with these additional terms are included in but is not certified. Tier 2 information brackets and italicized text as " Tier 2*"

this appendix. is subject to the backfit provisions in information and, as discussed in greater The Tier i portion of the design- Vill.B of this appendix. Tier 2 includes detail in the section-by-section related information contained in the the information required by 10 CFR explanation for Section Vill.B. a plant-DCD is certified by this appendix and, 52.47 (with the exception of generic specific departure from Tier 2*

therefore, subject to the special backfit technical specifications, conceptual information requires prior NRC provislons in Vill.A of this appendix. design information, and the evaluation approval. However, the Tier 2*

An applicant who references this of severe accident mitigation design designation expires for some of this appendix is required to incorporate by alternatives) and the supporting information when the facility first reference and comply with Tier 1, under information on inspections, tests, and achieves full power after the finding Ill.B and IV.A.1 of this appendix. This analyses that will be performed to required by 10 CFR 52.103(g). The information consists of an introduction demonstrate that the acceptance criteria process for changing Tier 2*

to Tier 1, the system based and non- in the ITAAC have been met. As with information and the time at which its system based design descriptions and Tier 1,III.B and IV.A.1 of this appendix status as Tier 2* expires is set forth in corresponding inspections. tests, require an applicant who references this VIII.B.6 of this appendix. Some Tier 2*

analyses, and acceptance criteria appendix to incorporate Tier 2 by requirements. concerning special (ITAAC), significant interface reference and to comply with Tier 2. preoperational tests, are designated to requirements, and significant site except for the COL action items, be performed only for the first plant or parameters for the design. The design including the investment protection first three plants referencing the AP600 descriptions, interface requirements, short term availability controls in DCR. The Tier 2* designation for these and site parameters in Tier I were Section 16.3 of the generic DCD. The selected tests will expire after the first derived entirely from Tier 2, but may be definition of Tier 2 makes clear that Tier plant or first three plants complete the more general than the Tier 2 2 information has been determined by specified tests. However, a COL action information. The NRC staffs evaluation the Commission, by virtue of its item requires that subsequent plants of the Tier 1 information is provided in inclusion in this appendix and its shall also perform the tests orjustify

l 27634 Federal Regist:r/Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules that the results of the first-plant-only or and the plant specific technical availability controls is provided in first-three-plants-only tests are specifications. Chapter 22 of the FSER. 4 applicable to the subsequent plant. The The generic DCD (master copy) for l Commission is interested in comments Pe anKonmna this design certification will be archived I rddressing whether the first-plant-only The purpose of Section III of this at NRC's central file with a matching or first-three-plants-only limitations appendix is to describe and define the copy at OFR. Copies of the up-to-date should be part of the Tier 2* scope and contents of this design generic DCD will also be available at the information for these specified tests. certification and to set forth how NRC's Public Document Room. i During development of Appendices A documentation discrepancies or Questions concerning the accuracy of i and B to Part 52, the Commission inconsistencies are to be resolved. information in an application that  !

decided that there would be both Paragraph A is the required statement of references this appendix will be i generic (master) DCDs maintained by the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) resolved by checking the master copy of the NRC and the design certification for approval of the incorporation by the generic DCD in NRC's central file, if .

rpplicant, as well as individual plant- reference of Tier 1. Tier 2. and the a generic change (rulemaking) is made l specific DCDs. maintained by each generic technical specifications into this to the DCD pursuant to the change applicant and licensee who references appendix and paragraph B requires COL Process in Section VIII of this appendix, this appendix. The generic DCDs applicants and licensees to comply with then at the completion of the (identical to each other) would reflect the requirements of this appendix. The rulemaking the NRC will request generic changes to the version of the legal effect of incorporation by reference approval of the Director. OFR for the DCD approved in this design is that the material is treated as if it were changed incorporation by reference and certification rulemaking. The generic Published in the Federal Register. This change its copies of the generic DCD changes would occur as the result of material, like any other properly issued and notify the OFR and the design generic rulemaking by the Commission regulation, has the force and effect of rcrtification applicant to change their (subject to the change criteria in Section law. Tier I and Tier 2 information, as C Pi es. The Commission is requiring VIII of this appandix). In addition, the well as the generic technical that the design certification applicant i Commission understood that each specifications, have been combined into maintain an up-to-date copy under applicant and licensee referencing this a single document called the generic X.A.1 of this appendix because it is appendix would be required to submit design control document, in order to likely that most applicants intending to and maintain a plant-specific DCD. This effectively control this information and reference the standard design will plant specific DCD would contain (not facilitate its incorporation by reference btain the generic DCD from the design just incorporate by reference) the into the rule. The generic DCD was certification applicant. Plant specific information in the generic DCD. The prepared to meet the requirements of changes to and departures from the plant-specific DCD would be updated as the OFR for incorporation by reference n c C w ma al" d by t (1 CFR Part 51). One of the requirements fp ef en es ,

necessary to reflect the generic changes to the DCD that the Commission may of OFR for incorporation by reference le appendix in a plant-specific DCD. under that the design certification applicant X'A'2 of this a ndix adopt through rulemaking, any plant- In addition to equiring compliance specific departures from the generic must make the generic DCD available upon request after the final rule with this appendix, paragraph B DCD that the Commission imposed on clarifies that the conceptual design the licensee by order, and any plant. becomes effective. Therefore. III.A of information and Westinghouse's specific departures that the licensee this appendix identifies a representative evalustion of severe accident mitigation chose to make in accordance with the of Westinghouse who can be contacted design alternatives are not considered to relevant processes in Section VIII of this to obtain a copy of the generic DCD. be part of this appendix. The conceptual appendix. Thus, the plant-specific DCD Paragraphs A and B also identify the design information is for those portions would function akin to an updated Final investment protection short term of the plant that are outside the scope Safety Analysis Report, in the sense that availability controls in Section 16.3 of of the standard design and are it would provide the most complete and the generic DCD as part of the Tier 2 intermingled throughout Tier 2. As accurate information on a plant's information. During its review of the provided by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(ix).

licensing basis for that part of the plant AP600 design, the NRC determined that these conceptual designs are not part of within the scope of this appendix. residual uncertainties associated with this appendix and, therefore, are not Therefore. this appendix defines both a passive safety system performance applicable to an application that generic DCD and plant-specific DCD. increased the importance of non-safety- references this appendix. Therefore, the Also, the Commission decided to treat related active systems in providing applicant does not need to wnform with the technical specifications in Section - defense-in-depth functions that back-up the conceptual design information that 16.1 of the generic DCD as a special the passive systems. As a result. was provided by the design certification category of information and to designate Westinghouse developed some applicant. The conceptual design them as generic technical specifications. administrative controls to provide a information, which consists of site-A COL applicant must submit plant- high level of confidence that active specific design features, was required to specific technical specifications that systems having a significant safety role facilitate the design certification review.

consist of the generic technical are available when challenged. Conceptual design information is specifications. which may be modified Westinghouse named these additional neither Tier I nor Tier 2. Section 1.8 of under VIII.C of this appendix, and the controls " investment protection short- Tier 2 identifies the location of the remaining plant-specific information term availability controls." and the conceptual design information.

needed to complete the technical Commission included this statement in Westinghouse's evaluation of various specifications, including bracketed Section ill to ensure that these design alternatives to prevent and values. The Final Safety Analysis Report availability controls are binding on mitigate severe accidents does not (FSAR) that is required by 5 52.79(b) applicants and licensees that reference constitute design requirements. The will consist of the plant-specific DCD. this appendix and will be enforceable Commission's assessment of this the site-specific portion of the FSAR. by the NRC. The NRC's evaluation of the information is discussed in Section IV

Fed:ral Register /Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27635 of this SOC on environmental impacts. reference in the application should be falls within the site parameters for this The detailed methodology and clear and should specify the title, date, appendix and that the plant-specific quantitative portions of the design- edition, or version of a document, and design complies with the interface specific probabilistic risk assessment the page number (s) and table (s) requirements, as required by 10 CFR (PRA), as required by 10 CFR containing the relevant information to 52.47(a)(1)(v), were not included in the 52.79(b). If the proposed site has a be incorporated by reference.

generic DCD, as requested by NEl and characteristic that exceeds one or more Paragraph A.1 requires an applicant of the site parameters in the DCD, then the applicant for design certification. who references this appendix to The NRC agreed with the request to the proposed site is unacceptable for incorporate by reference this appendix delete this information because in its application. The legal effect of this design unless the applicant seeks an conforma 7ce with the deleted portions such incorporation by reference is that exemption under Section Vill of this of the PRA is not necessary, Also, the this appendix is legally binding on the appendix andJustifies why the certified NRC s position is predicated !n part applicant or licensee. Paragraph A.2.a is design should ! e found acceptable on upon NEl's acceptance, in conceptual intended to make clear that the initial the propo ,cd site. Paragraph A.2.e form, of a future generic rulemaking that application must include a plant- requires submission of information will require a COL applicant or licensee specific DCD. This assures, among other addressing COL Action items, which are to have a plant specific PRA that things, that the applicant commits to identified in the generic DCD as updates and supersedes the design- complying with the DCD. This Combined License Information, in the specific PRA supporting this rulemaking paragraph ah.o requires the plant. application. The Combined License and maintain it throughout the specific DCD to use the same format as Information identifies matters that need operational life of the facility. the generic DCD and to reflect the to be addressed by an applicant that Paragraphs C and D set forth the applicant's proposed departures and references this appendix. as required by manner in which potential conflicts are exemptions from the generic DCD as of Subpart C of 10 CFR Part 52. An to be resolved. Paragraph C establishes the time of submission of the applicant may depart from or omit tha,e the Tier i description in the DCD as application. The Commission expects items, provided that the departure t.,r controlling in the event of an that the plant-specific DCD will become omission is identified andjustified in its inconsistency between the Tier I and the plant's final safety analysis report application (FSAR). Paragraph A.2.f Tier 2 information in the DCD. (FSAR), by including within its pages, at requires that the application include the Paragraph D establishes the generic DCD the appropriate points, information such information required by 10 CFR 52.47(a) as the controlling document in the event as site-sperific information for the that is not within the scope of this rule, of an inconsistency between the DCD portions of the plant outside the scope such as generic issues that must be and either the application for of the referenced design, including certification of the AP600 design relv.ed ITAAC, and other matters addressed, in whole or in part, by an applicant that references this rule.

(AP600 Standard Safety Analysis rcquired to be included in an FSAR by Report) or the final safety evaluation Paragraph A.3 requires the applicant to 10 CFR 50.34 and 52.79. Integration of report for the certified standard design. physically include, not simply the plant-specific DCD and remaining Paragraph E makes it clear that design site-specific information into the plant,s reference, the proprietary and activities that are wholly outside the FSAR, will result in an application that safeguards information referenced in the scope of this design certification may be is easier to use and should minimize DCD' or its e9utvalent, to assure that the performed using site-specific design " duplicate documentation" and the applicant has actual notice of these parameters, provided the design attendant possibility for confusion. requirements.

activities do not affect Tier i or Tier 2. Paragraph A.2.a is also intended to Paragraph IV.B reserves to the or conflict with the interface make clear that the initial application Commission the right to determine in requirements in the DCD. This provision must include the reports on departures what manner this design certification applies to site-specific portions of the and exemptions as of the time of may be referenced by an applicant for a plant, such as the administration submission of the application. construction permit or operating license building. Because this statement is not Paragraph A.2.b requires that the under 10 CFR Part 50. This a definition, the Commission decided application include the reports required determination may occur in the context that the appropriate location is in by paragraph X.B of this appendix for of a subsequent rulemaking modifying Section Ill of this appendix. exemptions and departures proposed by 10 CFR Part 52 or this design the applicant as of the date of D. AdditionalRequirements and certification rule, or on a case-by-case Restrictions submission of it= application. Paragraph basis in the context of a specific A.2.c requires submission of plant'Section IV of this appendix sets forth - specific technical specifications for the application for a 10 CFR Part 50 additional requirements and restrictions plant that consists of the generic construction permit or operating imposed upon an applicant who technical specifications from Section license. This provision is necessary references this appendix. Paragraph 16.1 of the DCD, with any changes made because the previous design IV.A sets forth the information under Section Vill.C of this appendix, certifications were not implemented in requirements for these applicants. This and the technical specifications for the the manner that was originally appendix distinguishes between site specific portions of the plant that envisi ned at the time that 10 CFR Part information and/or documents which are either partially or wholly outside the 52 was created. The Commission,s must actually be included in the scope of this design certification. The concern is with the manner in which application or the DCD, versus those applicant must also provide the plant. ITAAC were developed and the lack of which may be incorporated by reference specific information designated in the experience with design certifications in (i.e., referenced in the application as if generic technical specifications, such as license proceedings. Therefore, it is the information or documents were bracketed values, appropriate to have some uncertainty actually included in the application), Paragraph A.2.d makes it clear that regarding the manner in which this thereby reducing the physical bulk of the applicant must provide information appendix could be referenced in a 10 the application. Any incorporation by demonstrating that the proposed site CFR Part 50 licensing proceeding.

27636 Fed:ril Righter /Vol. 64, No 97 / Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules E. Applicable Regulations purpose of the rule because 25 rem problems "under accident conditions The purpose of Section V of this TEDE is essentially the same level of resulting in a TID 14844 source term appendix is to specify the regulations risk. On this bcis, the Commission release." Similar wording appears in

-that will be applicable and in effect (if concludes that the AP600 design review requirements (vil), (viii), and (xxvi),

and) when this proposed design can be performed pursuant to the new Westinghouse has adopted the new certification is approved. These dose criterion (25 rem TEDEj and an source term technology summarized in j regulations will consist of the exemption from the requirements of 10 NUREG-1465, " Accident Source Terms '

technically relevant regulations CFR 50.34(a)(1) is authorized by law, for Light. Water Nucicar Power Plants "

identified in paragraph A, except for the will n t present an undue risk to public dated February 1995, not the old TID regulations in paragraph B that will not health and safety, and is consistent with 14844 source term cited in 10 CFR Part be applicable to this certified design- the common defense and securit . 50.34(0, The Commission has f (2) Paragraph (0(2)(iv) of 10 C R deterrnined that the special regulat ns in i F Pa 50,73, 50.34-Plant Safety Parameter Display circumstances described in 10 CFR l and 100 that are aI)plicable to the AP600 Console. 50.12(a)(ti) exist in that these design. The Commission,s 10 CFR 50.34(0(2)(iv) requires that an regulations need not be applied in this determination of the applicable application provide a plant safety particular circumstance to achieve the i regulations will be made as of the date parameter display console that will underlying purpose because l display to operators a minimum set of Westinghouse has adopted acceptable specified in paragraph V.A of this parameters defining the safety status of alternatives that accomplish the intent )

appendix, which will be the date that this appendix is approved by the the plant, be capable of displaying a full of the regulations that specify TID '

Commission and signed by the range of important plant parameters and 14844. On this basis, the Commission data trends on demand, and be capable concludes that a partial exemption from Secretary.

of indicating when process limits are the requirements of paragraphs In paragraph V.B of this appendix, the being approached or exceeded. (0(2)(vil), (viii), (xxvi), and (xxvill) of 10 Commission identified the regulations Westinghouse answered this that do not apply to the AP600 design. CFR 50.34 is authorized by law, will not 1 requirement, in Section 18.8.2 of the present an undue risk to public health The Commission has determined that DCD, with an integrated design rather the AP600 design should be exempt and safety, and is consistent with the from portions of 10 CFR 50.34, 50.62- than a stand-alone, add-on system, as is common defense and security.

used at most current operating plants. (4) Paragraph (c)(1) of 10 CFR 50.62-and Appendix A to Part 50, as described Specifically, Westinghouse integrated Auxiliary feedwater system.

In the FSER (NUREG-1512) and the SPDS requirements into the design The AP600 design relies on the summarized below: requirements for the alarm and display (1) Paragraph (a)(1) of 10 CFR 50.34- passive residual heat removal system systems. In NUREG-0800, the NRC staff (PRHR) in lieu of an auxiliary or whole body dose criterion.

indicated that, for applicants who are in emergency feedwater system as its This regulation sets forth dose criteria the early stages of the control room safety-related method of removing decay to be used in siting determinations. The design, the " function of a separate SPDS heat. Westinghouse requested an NRC staff performed its evaluation of may be integrated into the overall exemption from a portion of 10 CFR the radiological consequences of control room design" (p.18.0-1). 50.62(c)(1), which requires auxiliary or postulated design basis accidents for the Therefore, the Commission has emergency feedwater as an alternate  !

AP600 design against the dose criterion determined that the special system for decay heat removal during an  !

specified in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1)(li)(D) circumstances described in 10 CFR ATWS event. The NRC staff concluded because it was the Commission's intent 50.12(a)(2)(li) exist in that the that Westinghouse met the intent of the that the new dose criterion be used for requirernent for an SPDS console need rule by relying on the PRHR system to futum nuclear power plants. However. not be applied in this particular remove the decay heat and, thereby, met when the NRC codified the new reactor circumstance to achieve the underlying the underlying purpose of the rule.

site criteria for nuclear power plants (61 purpose because Westinghouse has Therefore, the Commission has FR 65157; December 11,1996), it made provided an acceptable alternative that determined that the special an error in the assignment of applicants accomplishes the intent of the circumstances described in 10 CFR that could use the new dose criterion regulation. On this basis, the 50.12(a)(2)(li) exist in that the

[25 rem TEDE), versus those that must Commission concludes that an requirement for an auxiliary or use the whole body criterion. The exemption from the requirements of 10 emergency feedwater system is not assignment of applicants in 10 CFR CFR 50.34(0(2)(iv) is authorized by law, necessary to achieve the underlying 50.34(a)(1), who must use the whole will not present an undue risk to public purpose of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(1), because body criterion, should not have health and safety, and is consistent with Westinghouse has adopted acceptable included applicants for a design the common defense and security. alternatives that accomplish the intent certification or combined license who (3) Paragraphs (0(2)(vil), (viii). (xxvi), of this regulation, and the enmption is applied prior to January 10,1997 (refer and (xxviii) of 10 CFR 50.34-Accident authorized by law, will not present an to 61 FR 65158), The Commission Source Terms in TID 14844. undue risk to public health and safety, adopted 25 rem TEDE as the new dose Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.47(a)(ii), an and is consistent with the common criterion for future plant evaluation applicant for design certification must defense and security.

purposes, because this value is demonstrate compliance with any (5) Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, essentially the same level of risk as the technically relevant TMI requirements GDC 17-Offsite Power Sources.

current criterion (61 FR 65160). In 10 CFR 50.34(0 The TMI Westinghouse requested a partial Therefore, the Commission has requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(0(2)(vil), exemption from the requirement in GDC determined that the special (viii), (xxvi), and (xxvill) refer to the 17 for a second offsite power supply circumstances described in 10 CFR accident source term in TID 14844. circuit.The APG00 plant design 50.12(a)(2)(ti) exist in that application of Specifically,10 CFR 50.34(0(2)(xxvill) supports an exemption to this i the 25 rem whole body criterion is not requires the evaluation of pathways that requirement by providing safety-related necessary to achieve the underlying may lead to control room habitability " passive" systems. These passive safety-

r Fed:ral Register /Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27637 related systems only require electric F. Issue Resolution assumed in Westinghouse's evaluation power for valves and the related of severe accident mitigation design The purpose of Section VI of this instrumentation. The onsite Class IE appendix is to identify the scope of alternatives (SAMDAs), all issues with batteries and associated dc and ac issues that are resolved by the mspect to SAMDAs arising under the distribution systems can provide the Conimission in this rulemaking and: National Environmental Policy Act of power for these valves and therefore, are " matters resolved" within 1969 associated with the information in instrumentation. In addition, if no the meaning and intent of 10 CFR the Environmental Assessment for this l offsite power is available, it is expected 52.63(a)(4). The section is divided into design and the information regarding

( that the non-safety-related onsite diesel five parts: (A) the Commission's safety SAMDAs in Appendix IB of the generic l generators would be available for findings in adopting this appendix, (B) DCD are also resolved within the l important plant functions; however, this the scope and nature of issues which are meaning and intent of S 52.63(a)(4). In non-safety-related ac power is not relied resolved by this rulemaking, (C) issues the event an exemption from a site on to maintain core cooling or which are not resolved by this Parameter is granted, the exemption containment integrity. Therefore, the rulemaking. (D) the backfit restrictions applicant has the initial burden of l Commission has determined that the applicable to the Commission with demonstrating that the original SAMDA special circumstances described in 10 respect to this appendix, and (E) the analysis still applies to the actual site CFR 50.12(a)(2)(li) exist in that the availability of secondary references. Parameters but, if the exemption is requirement need not be applied in this Paragraph A describes in general approved, requests for litigation at the particular circumstance to achieve the terms the nature of the Commission's COL stage must meet the requirements nnderlying purpose of having two findings, and makes the finding of S 2.714 and present sufficient offsite power sources because the AP600 required by 10 CFR 52.54 for the information to create a genuine design includes an acceptable Commission's approval of this design controversy in order to obtain a hearing alternative approach to accomplish certification rule. Furthermore, on the site parameter exemption.

safety functions that does not rely on paragraph A, explicitly states the Paragraph C reserves the right of the power from the offsite system and, Commission s determination that this Commission to impose operational therefore, accomplishes the intent of the design provides adequate protection of requirements on applicants that the public health and safety. reference this appendix. This provision o ar88 8 sc Pe of Mects de fad dat oma@nal 1 i n conc udes that a Partial issues which may not be challenged as requirements, including generic exemption from the requirements of a matter of right in subsequent technical specifications in Section 16.1 l GDC 17 is authorized by law, will not proceedings, The introductory phrase of of the DCD, were not completely or i present an undue risk to public health paragraph B clarifles that issue and safety, and is consistent with the comprehensively reviewed at the design l resolution as described in the remainder certification stage. Therefore, the special l common defense and security, of the paragraph extends to the backfit provisions of S 52.63 do not  ;

(6) Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50,

~

delineated NRC proceedings referencing apply to operational requirements.

GDC 19-whole body dose criterion. this appendix. The remainder of However, all design changes will be The NRC staff used a criterion of 5 Paragraph B describes the categories of controlled by the appropriate provision rem TEDE for evaluating the inf rmation for which there is issue in Section Vill of this appendix. ,

radiological consequences of design res luti n. S ecifically, P paragraph B.1 Although the information in the DCD '

basis accidents in the control room of Provides that all nuclear safety issues that is related to operational the AP600 design, under CDC 19 of adsing fmm the Aton* Energy Act of mquimnwnts was necessary to support 1954, as amended, that are associated the NRC staffs safety review of this Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.The NRC staff used the 5 rem TEDE criterion t with the ir. formation in the NRC staff's design, the review of this information FSER (NUREG-1512), the Tier i and was not sufficient to conclude that the be consistent with the new reactor site Tier 2 information (including the operational requirements are fully criteria in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) 161 FR availability controls in Section 16.3 of resolved and ready to be assigned 65157), although GDC 19 specifies ,

the generic DCD), and the rulemaking finality under 5 52.63. As a result, if the 5 rem whole body, or its equivalent t record for this appendix are resolved any part of the body, NRC wanted to change a temperature

.The within the meaning of 5 52.63(a)(4). limit and that operational change Commission adopted 25 rem TEDE as These issues include the information required a consequential change to a the new dose criterion for plant referenced in the DCD that are design feature, then the temperature evaluation purposes, because this value requirements (i e., " secondary limit backfit would be controlled by is essentially the same level of risk as references"), as well as all issues arising Section Vill (paragraph A or B) of this the current criteria (61 FR 65160). from proprietary and safeguards appendix. However, changes to other Therefore, the Commission has information which are intended to be operational issues, such as in-service determined that the special requirements. Paragraph B.2 provides- testing and in-service inspection circumstances described in 10 CFR for issue preclusion of proprietary and programs, post-fuel load verification 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist in that application of safeguards information. Paragraphs B.3, activities, and shutdown risk that do not the 5 rem whole body criterion is not B.4, B.S. and B.6 clarify that approved require a design change would not be necessary to achieve the underlying changes to and departures from the DCD restricted by 5 52.63 (see VIII.C of this purpose of the rule because 5 rem TEDE which are accomplished in compliance appendix). Paragraph C does allow the is essentially the same level of risk. On with the relevant procedures and NRC to impose future operational I this basis, the Commission concludes criteria in Section Vlil of this appendix requirements (distinct from design

! that a partial exemption from GDC 19 is continue to be matters iesolved in matters) on applicants who reference authorized by law, will not present an connection with this rulemaking. this design certification. Also, license undue risk to public health and safety, Paragraph B.7 provides that, for those conditions for portions of the plant and is consistent with the common plants located on sites whose site within the scope of this design defense and security, narameters do not exceed those certification, e g. start-up and power

p 27638 Federt1 R;gister/Vol. 64. No. 97/ Thursday. May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules ascension testing, are not restricted by certification during the 15-year period, that where the exemption involves an S 52.63. The requirement to perform then the design certification continues underlying substantive requirement i these testing programs is contained in in effect until the application is (applicable regulation), then the Tier 1 information. However,ITAAC withdrawn or the license issued on that applicant or licensee requesting the cannot be specified for these subjects application expires. Also, the design exemption must also show that an l because the matters to be addressed in certification continues in effect for the exemption from the underlying j these license conditions cannot be referencing license if the license is applicable requirement meets the verified prior to fuel load and operation, renewed. The Commission intends for criteria of 10 CFR 50.12.

when the ITAAC are satisfied. this appendix to remain valid for the life Therefore, another regulatory vehicle is of the plant that references the design Tier 1 Infonnation necessary to ensure that licensees certification to achieve the benefits of The change processes for Tier 1 comply with the matters contained in standardization and licensing stability, information are covered in paragraph the license conditions. License This means that changes to or plant. VIII.A. Generic changes to Tier 1 are conditions for these areas cannot be specific departures from information in accomplished by rulemaking that developed now because this requires the the plant-specific DCD must be made amends the generic DCD and are type of detailed design information that pursuant to the change processes in governed by the standards in 10 CFR will be developed after design Section VIII of this appendix for the life 52.63(a)(1). This provision provide inat certification. In the absence of detailed of the plant. the Commission may noi many, design information to evaluate the need change, rescind, or impose new for and develop speelfic post-fuel load II. Processes for Changes and requirements by rulemaking except verifications for these matters, the Departures where necessary either to bring the Commission is reserving the right to The purpose of Section Vill of this certification into compliance with the impose license conditions by rule for appendix is to set forth the processes for Commission's regulations applicable post-fuel load verification activities for generic changes to or plant-specific and in effect at the time of approval of portions of the plant within the scope of departures (including exemptions) from the design certification or to ensure this design certification. the DCD. The Commission adopted this adequate protection of the public health Paragraph D reiterates the restrictions restrictive change process in order to and safety or common defense and (contained in Section Vill of this achieve a more stable licensing process security. The rulemakings must include appendix) placed upon the Commission for applicants and licensees that an opportunity for hearing with respect when ordering generic or plant-specific reference this design certification rule. to the proposed change, as required by modifications, changes or additions to Section VIIIis divided into three 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1), and the Commission structures, systems or components, paragraphs, which correspond to Tier 1, expects such hearings to be conducted design features, design criteria, and Tier 2, and Operational requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, ITAAC (VI.D.3 addresses ITAAC) within The language of Section Vill Subpart H. Departures from Tier i may the scope of the certified design. distinguishes between generic changes occur in two ways: (1) the Commission Paragraph E provides the procedure to the DCD versus plant-specific may order a licensee to depart from Tier for an interested member of the public departures from the DCD. Generic 1, as provided in paragraph A.3; or (2) to obtain access to proprietary or changes must be accomplished by an applicant or licensee may request an safeguards information for the AP600 rulemaking because the intended exemption from Tier 1, as provided in design, in order to request and subject of the change is the design paragraph A.4. If the Commission seeks participate in proceedings identified in certification rule itself, as is to order a licensee to depart from Tier VI.B of this appendix, viz., proceedings contemplated by 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). 1, paragraph A.3 requires that the involving licenses and applications Consistent with 10 CFR 52.63(a)(2), any Commission find both that the which reference this appeadix. As set generic rulemaking changes are departure is necessary for adequate forth in paragraph E, access must first be applicable to all plants, absent protection or for comp!!ance, and that sought from the design certification circumstances which render the change special circumstances are present.

rpplicant. If Westinghouse refuses to (" modification" in the language of Paragraph A.4 provides that exemptions provide the information, the person S 52.63(a)(2)) " technically irrelevant." from Tier 1 requested by an applicant or seeking access shall request access from By contrast, plant-specific departures licensee are governed by the the Commission or the presiding officer, could be either a Commission-issued requirements of 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1) and as applicable. Access to the proprietary order to one or more applicants or 52.97(b), which provide an opportunity or safeguards information may be licensees; or an applicant or licensee- for a hearing. In addition the ordered by the Commission, but must be initiated departure applicable only to Commission will not grant requests for subject to an appropriate non-disclosure - that applicant's cr licensee's plant (s), exemptions that may result in a agreement. similar to a S 50.59 departure or an significant decrease in the level of safety exemption. Because these plant-specific otherwise provided by the design.

G. Duration of Tids Appendix departures will result in a DCD that is The purpose of Section VII of this unique for that plant,Section X of this Tier 2 Information appendix is in part to specify the time appendix requires an applicant or The change processes for the three period during which this design licensee to maintain a plant-specific different categories of Tier 2 certification may be referenced by an DCD. For purposes of brevity, this information, viz., Tier 2 Tier 2*, and applicant for a combined license, under discussion refers to both generic Tier 2* with a time of expiration, are set 10 CFR 52.55. This section also states changes and plant specific departures as forth in paragraph Vill.B. The change that the design certification remains " change processes." process for Tier 2 has the same elements valid for an applicant or licensee that Both Section Vill of this appendix and as the Tier I change process, but some references the design certification until this SOC refer to an " exemption" from of the standards for plant specific orders the application is withdrawn or the one or more requirements of this and exemptions are different. The Ilcense expires.Therefore,if an appendix and the criteria for granting an Commission adopted a "50.59-like" application references this design exemption. The Commission cautions change process for Tier 2 information.

Federtl Register /Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27639 in accordance with its SRMs on SECY- a departure from Tier 2* Information departures made prior to issuance of the 90-377 and SECY-92-287A. The under paragraph B.6. COL. After issuance of the COL, the Commission is currently considering Similar to Commission-ordered Tier 1 plant-specific technical specifications revisions to 10 CFR 50.59. After the departures and generic Tier 2 changes, are controlling under paragraph B.S.

Section 50.59 rulemaking is complete, Commission-ordered Tier 2 departures The bases for the plant-specific the Commission will determine whether cannot be imposed except where technical specifications will be l l any comparable revisions should be necessary either to bring the controlled by the bases control made to the "50.59.like" portion of the certification into compliance with the procedures for the plant specific Tier 2 change process (see Section Commission's regulations applicable technical specifications (analogous to I Vill.B.5 of this appendix). As stated at and in effect et the time of approval of the bases control provision in the the beginning of Section III, "Section. the design certification or to ensure improved Standard Technical by-section discussion cf design adequate protection of the public health Specifications). The definition of a USQ certification rule "11is the and safety or common defense and in paragraph B.S.b is similar to the Commission's intent that this appendix security, as set forth in paragraph B.3. definition in 10 CFR 50.59 and it emulate Appendices A and B to 10 CFR However, the special circumstances for applies to all information in Tier 2 1 Part 52, at this time. Therefore, the the Commission-ordered Tier 2 except for the information that resolves Commission will consider updating 10 departures do not have to outweigh any the severe accident issues. The process CFR Part 52, including the Appendices, decrease in safety that may result from for evaluating proposed tests or in an upcoming Part 52 rulemaking (see the reduction in standardization caused experiments not described in Tier 2 will SECY-98-282) and it will also consider by the plant-specific order, as required be incorporated into the change process any Section 50.59 revisions, as they may by 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3). The Commission for the portion of the design that is apply to the three design certification determined that it was not necessary to outside the scope of this design rules. However, any backfitting impose an additional limitation similar certification. Although paragraph B.5 ,

implications for Section Vill.B.5 of the to that imposed on Tier I departures by does not specifically state, the I design certification rules will be 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3) and (b)(1). This type Commission has determined that covered in the Section 50.59 of additionallimitation for departures must also comply with all rulemaking. standardization would unnecessarily applicable regulations unless an The process for generic Tier 2 changes restrict the flexibility of applicants and exemption or other relief is obtained.

(including changes to Tier 2' and Tier licensees with res9ect to Tier 2, which s tum is not as safety significant The Commission believes that it is 2* with a time of expiration) tracks the important to preserve and maintain the I e

process for generic Tier 1 changes. As ms lution of severe accident issuesjust set forth in paragraph B.1, generic Tier An applicant or licensee may request an exemption from Tier 2 information as like all other safety issues that were 2 changes are accomplished by set forth in paragraph B.4. The applicant res lved during the design certification rulemaking amending the generic DCD, review (refer to SRM on SECY-90-377).

er licensee must demonstrate that the and are governed by the standards in 10 H wever, because of the increased exemption complies with one of the CFR 52.63(a)(1). This provision provides special circumstances in 10 CFR uncertainty in severe accident issue that the Commission may not modify, 50.12(a). In addition, the Commission resolutions, the Commission has change. rescind or impose new adopted separate criteria in B.5.c for will not grant requests for exemptions requirements by rulemaking except that may result in a significant decrease determining whether a departure from where necessary either to bring the in the level of safety otherwise provided information that resolves severe certification into compliance with the by the design. However, the special accident issues constitutes a USQ. For Commission s regulations applicable circumstances for the exemption do not Purposes of applying the special criteria and in effect at the time of approval of have to outweigh any decrease in safety in B.5.c, severe accident resolutions are the design certification or to assure that may result from the reduction in limited to design features when the edequate protection of the public health standardization caused by the intended function of the design feature and safety or common defense and exemption. If the exemption is is relied upon to resolve postulated security, if a generic change is made to requested by an applicant for a license, accidents where the reactor core has Tier 2* information, then the category the exemption is subject to litigation in melted and exited the reactor vessel and and expiration, if necessary, of the new the same manner as other issues in the the containment is being challenged information would also be determined license hearing, consistent with 10 CFR (severe accidents). These design features in the rulemaking and the appropriate 52.63(b)(1). If the exemption is are identified in Section 1.9.5 of the change process for that new information requested by a licensee, then the DCD, with other issues, and are would apply- -exempdon is subject to litigation in the described in other sections of the DCD.

Departures from Tier 2 may occur in same manner as a license amendment. Therefore, the location of design five ways: (1) the Commission may Paragraph B.5 allows an applicant or information in the DCD is not important order a plant specific departure, as set licensee to depart from Tier 2 to the application of this special forth in paragraph B.3: (2) an applicant information, without prior NRC procedure for severe accident issues.

or licensee may request an exemption approval, if the proposed departure does However, the special procedure in b 5.c from a Tier 2 requirement as set forth in not involve a change to or departure does not apply to design features that paragraph B.4; (3) a licensee may make from Tier 1 or Tier 2* Information, resolve so-called beyond design basis a departure without prior NRC approval technical specifications. or involves an accidents or other low probability in accordance with paragraph B.5 [the unreviewed safety question (USQ) as events. The important aspect of this "50.59-like" process]; (4) the licensee defined in B.S.b and B.5.c of this special procedure is that it is limited may request NRC approval for proposed paragraph. The technical specifications solely to severe accident design features, departures which do not meet the referred to in B.5.a and B.5.b of this as defined above. Some design features requirements in paragraph B 5 as paragraph are the technical may have intended functions to rneet provided in paragraph B.S.d; and (5) the specifications in Section 16.1 of the " design basis" requirements and to licensee may request NRC approval for generic DCD, including bases, for resolve " severe accidents." If these

27640 Fed:ral Register /Vol. 64. No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules design features are reviewed under is desired, to develop an appropriate (100%) power, aRer the finding required l paragraph Vill.B.5, then the appropriate guidance document for processing by 10 CFR 52.103(g), while other Tier 2* I criteria from either B.S.b or B.S.c are proposed changes under VIII.B of this information must remain in effect selected depending upon the function appendix. throughout the life of the facility. The being changed. A party to an adjudicatory proceeding determining factors were the Tier 1 An applicant or licensee that plans to (e.g., for issuance of a combined license) information that would govern these ,

depart from Tier 2 information, under who believes that an applicant or areas after first full power and the NRC's l Vill.B.5, must prepare a safety licensee has not complied with Vl!I.B.5 judgement on whether prior approval evaluation which provides the bases for when departing from Tier 2 information, was required before implementation of the determination that the proposed may petition to admit such a contention the change due to the significance of the change does not involve an unreviewed into the proceeding under B.S.f. This information. Therefore, certain Tier 2

• safety question, a change to Tier 1 or provision was included because an information listed in paragraph B.6.c l

Tier 2* information, or a change to the incorrect departure from the ceases to retain its Tier 2* designation technical specifications, as explained requirements of this appendix after full power operation is first j above. In order to achieve the essentially places the departure outside achieved following the Commission Commission's goals for design of the scope of the Commission's safety finding in 10 CFR 52.103(gh Thereafter, certification, the evaluation needs to finding in the design certification that information is deemed to be Tier 2 consider all of the matters that were rulemaking. Therefore, it follows that information that is subject to the resolved in the DCD, such as generic properly-founded contentions alleging departure requirements in paragraph issue resolutions that are relevant to the such incorrectly. implemented B.S. By contrast, the Tier 2* information proposed departure. The benefits of the depanures cannot be considered identified in paragraph B.6.b retains its early resolution of safety issues would " resolved" by this rulemaking. As set Tier 2* designation throughout the l

be lost if departures from the DCD were forth in B.5.f. the petition must comply duration of f he license, including any made that violated these resolutiws with the requirements of S 2.714(b)(2) period of r, wal.

without appropriate review. The and show that the departure does not Certain pwoperational tests in evaluation of the relevant matters needs comply with paragraph B.S. Any other paragraph B.G.c are designated to be to consider the proposed departure over party may file a response to the petition. performed only for the first plant or first the full range of power operation from If on the basis of the petition and any three plants that reference this l startup to shutdown, as it relates to responses, the presiding officer in the appendix. Westinghouse's basis for anticipated operational occurrences, proceeding determines that the required performing these "first-plant only" and i transients, design basis accidents, and showing has been made, the matter shall "first-three-plants-only" preoperational severe accidents. The evaluation must be certified to the Commission for its tests is provided in Section 14.2.5 of the also include a review of all relevant final determination, in the absence of a DCD. The NRC staff found secondary references from the DCD proceeding, petitions alleging non. Westinghouse's basis for performing

, because Tier 2 information intended to conformance with paragraph B.5 these tests and itsjustification for only

! be treated as requirements is contained requirements applicable to Tier 2 performing the tests on the first-plant or I in the secondary references. The departures will be treated as petitions first-three-plants acceptable. The NRC l evaluation should consider Tables 14.3- for enforcement action under 10 CFR staff's decision was based on the need I through 14.3-8 and 19.59-29 of the 2.206 to verify that plant-specific generic DCD to ensure that the proposed Paragraph B.6 provides a process for manufacturing and/or construction change does not impact Tier 1. These departing from Tier 2* information. The variations do not adversely impact the tables contain various cross-references creation of and restrictions on changing predicted performance of certain l from the safety analyses and Tier 2* information resulted from the passive safety systems, while l probabilistic risk assessment in Tier 2 to development of the Tier 1 information recognizing that these special tests will l the important parameters that were for the ABWR design. During this result in significant thermal transients included in Tier 1. Although many development process, the applicants for being applied to critical plant issues and analyses could have been design certification requested that the components. The NRC staff believes that cross-referenced. the listings in these amount of information in Tier I be the range of manufacturing or tables were developed only for key minimized to provide additional construction variations that could analyses for the AP600 design. flexibility for an applicant or licensee adversely affect the relevant passive Westinghouse provided more detailed who references this appendix. Also, safety systems will be adequately l cross-references for important analysis many codes, standards, and design disclosed after performing the I assumptions that are included in Tier I processes, which were not specified in designated tests on the first plant, or the in its revised response to RAI 640.60 Tier 1, that are acceptable for meeting first three plants, as applicable. The (DCP/NRC 1440-September 15.1998). ITAAC were specified in Tier 2. The COL action item in Section 14.4.6 of the If a proposed departure from Tier 2 result of these actions is that certain DCD states that subsequent plants shall involves a change to or departure from significant information only exists in either perform these preoperational tests Tier 1 or Tier 2* information, technical Tier 2 and the Commission does not orjustify that the results of the first-specifications, or otherwise constitutes a want this significant information to be plant-only or first three-plant-only tests USQ, then the applicant or licensee changed without prior NRC approval. are applicable to the subsequent plant.

must obtain NRC approval through the This Tier 2* information is identified in The Tier 2* designation for these tests appropriate process set forth in this the generic DCD with italicized text and will expire after the first plant or first appendix before implementing the brackets. three plants complete these tests, as proposed departure. The NRC does not Although the Tier 2* designation was indicated in paragraph B.G.c.

endorse NSAC-125. " Guidelines for 10 originally Intended to last for the If Tier 2* Information is changed in a CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations," for lifetime of the facility, like Tier 1 generic rulemaking the designation of performing safety evaluations required information, the NRC determined that the new information (Tier 1. 2*, or 2) by Vill.B.5 of this appendix. However, some of the Tier 2* information could would also be determined in the the NRC will work with Mdustry, if it expire when the plant first achieves full rulemaking and the appropriate process o

Federal R gister/Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27641 for future changes would apply. If a safety conc usion in the FSER is being I. Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and plant specific departut e is made from modified or changed. If it cannot be Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)

Tier 2* in'ormation, then the new determined that the technical The purpose of Section IX of this designation would apply only to that specification or operational requirement appendix is to set forth how the ITAAC plant. If an applicant who references was comprehensively reviewed and this design certification makes a in Tier 1 of this design certification rule finalized in the design certification are to be treated in a license proceeding.

departure from Tier 2* Information, the rulemaking, then there is no backfit Paragraph A restates the responsibilities new information is subject to litigation restriction under 10 CFR 50.109 because of an applicant or licensee for in the same manner as other plant- no prior position was taken on this specific issues in the licensing hearing. performing and successfully completing safety matter. Some generic technical ITAAC, and notifying the NRC of such if a licensee makes a departure, it will specifications contain bracketed values, completion. Paragraph A.1 makes it which clearly indicate that the NRC clear that an applicant may proceed at n er 10 CFR 0 9 and t e f a ity is in accordance with paragraph VI.B.5 of staWs mview was not complete. Generic its own risk with design and this appendix. Any requests for changes made under Vill.C.1 are procurement activities subject to departures from Tier 2* Information that applicable to all applicants or licensees ITAAC, and that a licensee may proceed affect Tier i must also comply with the (refer to Vlli.C.2), unless the change is at its own risk with design,

\ requirements in Vill.A of this appendix. Irrelev nt because of a plant specific Procurement, construction, and departure. Preoperational testing activities subject Operational Requirements t an ITAAC, even though the NRC may Plant-specific departures may occur The change process for technical by either a Commission order under n t have found that any particular specifications and other operational VIII.C.3 or an applicant's exemption

"* " 5"#C*** Y requirements in the DCD is set forth in request under VIII.C.4. The basis for c mpleted. Paragraph A.2 requires the paragraph VIII.C. This change process determining if the techr ical "* " Y * "I *

• has elements similar to the Tier I and " " " "'"" *"" ***

Tier 2 change process in paragraphs specification or operational requirement in the ITAAC have been completed and was c mpletely reviewed and approved that the acceptance criteria have been Vill.A and Vill.B. but with significantly f r these processes is the same as for met.

different change standards. Because of the different finality status for technical VIII C.1 above. If the technical Paragraphs B.1 and B.2 essentially specifications and other operational Specification or operational requirement reiterate the NRC's responsibilities with requirements (refer to III.F of this SOC), was comprehensively reviewed and respect to ITAAC as set forth in 10 CFR the Commissim decided to designate a finalized in the design certification 52.99 and 52.103(g), Finally, paragraph special categoy of information, rulemaking, then the Commission must B.3 states that ITAAC do not, by virtue consisting of the technical specifications demonstrate that special circumstances of their inclusion in the DCD, constitute and other operational rcquirements, are present before ordering a plant- regulatory requirements after the with its own change process in 5Pecific departure. If not, there is no licensee has received authorization to paragraph VIII.C. The key to using the restriction on plant-specific changes to load fuel or for renewal of the license.

change process ( s in Section VIII is to the technical specifications or flowever, subsequent modifications determine if the proposed change or operational requirements, prior to must comply with the design departure requires a change to a design issuance of a license, provided a design descriptions in the DCD unless the feature described in the generic DCD. If change is not required. Although the applicable requirements in 10 CFR a design change is required, then the generic technical specifications were 52.97 and Section Vill of this appendix appropriate change process in paragraph reviewed by the NRC staff to facilitate have been complied with. As discussed Vill.A or Vill.B applies. However, if a the design certification review, the in III.D of this SOC, the Commission proposed change to the technical Commission intends to consider the will defer a determination of the specifications or other operational lessons learned from subsequent applicability of ITAAC and their effect requirements does not require a change operating experience during its in terms of issue resolution in 10 CFR to a design feature in the generic DCD, licensing review of the plant-specific Part 50 licensing proceedings to ,uch then paragraph Vill.C applies. The technical specifications. The process for time that a Part 50 applicant decides to language in paragraph VIII.C also petitioning to intervene on a technical reference this appendix.

distinguishes between generic (Section 16.1 of DCD) and plant-specific specification or operational requirement J. Records and Reporting is similar to other issues in a licensing technical specifications to account for hearing, except that the petitioner must The purpose of Section X of this the different treatment and finality also demonstrate why special appendix is to set forth the requirements accorded technical specifications before circumstances are present (VIII.C.5). f r maintaining records of changes to and after a license is issued. and departures from the generic DCD.

The process in C.1 for making generic Finally, the generic technical which are to be reflected in the plant-changes to the pneric technical specifications will have no further effect specific DCD.Section X also sets forth specifications in Section 16.1 of the on the plant specific technical the requirements for submitting reports DCD or other operational requirements specifications after the issuance of a (including updates to the plant. specific in the generic DCD is accomplished by license that references this appendix. DCD) to the NRC. This section of the rulemaking and governed by the backfit The bases for the generic technical appendix is similar to the requirements standards in 10 CFR 50.109. The specifications will be controlled by the for records and reports in 10 CFR Part determination of whether the generic change process in Section Vill.C of this 50, except for minor differences in technical specifications and other appendix. After a license is issued, the information collection and reporting operational requirements were bases will be controlled by the bases requirements, as discussed in V of this completely reviewed and approved in change provision set forth (n the SOC. Paragraph X.A.1 of this appendix the design certification rulemaking is administrative controls section of the requires that a generic DCD and the based upon the extent to which an NRC plant-specific technical specifications. proprietary and safeguards information

27642 Federal Regist:r/Vol. 64. No. 97/ Thursday, May 20.1999/ Proposed Rules referenced in the generic DCD be for a facility that references this rule. Section Vill of this appendix. The maintained by the applicant for this The phrase " site-specific portion of the ITAAC verify that the as-built facility rule. The generic DCD was developed. final safety analysis report" in conforms with the approved design and in part, to meet the requirements for paragraph X.B.3.d of this appendix emphasizes design reconciliation and incorporation by reference, including refers to the information that is design verification. Quarterly reporting availability requirements. Therefore, the contained in the final safety analysis of design changes is particularly proprietary and safeguards information report for a facility (required by 10 CFR important in times where the number of could not be included in the generic 52.79) but is not part of the plant- design changes could Le significant.

DCD because it is not publicly available. specific DCD (required by IV.A of this such as during the procurement of However, the proprietary and safeguards appendix). Therefore, this rule does not components and equipment, detailed information was reviewed by the NRC require that duplicate documentation be desio,n of the plant at the start of and, as stated in paragraph VI.B.2 of this maintained by an applicant or licensee construction, and during preoperational appendix, the Commission considers that references this rule, because the testing. The frequency of updates to the the information to be resolved within plant-specific DCD is part of the final plant-specific DCD is not increased the meaning of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4). safety analysis report for the facility. during facility construction. After the Because this information is not in the Paragraphs B.1 and B.2 establish facility begins operation, the frequency generic DCD, the proprietary and reporting requirements for applicants or of reporting reverts to the requirement safeguards information, or its licensees that reference this rule that are in X.B.3.d. which is consistent with the equivalent, is required to be provided by similar to the reporting requirements in requirement for plants licensed under an applicant for a license. Therefore, to 10 CFR Part 50. For currently operating 10 CFR Part 50.

ensure that this information will be plants, a licensee is required to maintain available, a requirement for the design records of the basis for any design IV. Finding of No Significant certification applicant to maintain the changes to the facility made under 10 EnvironmentalImpact: Availability proprietary and safeguards information CFR 50.59. Section 50.59(b)(2) requires The Commission has determined was added to paragraph X.A.1 of this a licensee to provide a summary report under the National Environmental appendi <. The acceptable version of the of these changes to the NRC annually, Policy Act of 1969, as amended (NEPA),

proprietary and safeguards information or along with updates to the facility and the Commission's regulations in 10 is identified (referenced) in the version final safety analysis report under 10 CFR Part St. Subpart A, that this of the DCD that is incorporated into this CFR 50.71(e). Section 50 71(e)(4) proposed design certification rule, if rule. The generic DCD and the requires that these updates be submitted adopted, would not be a major Federal acceptable version of the proprietary annually, or 6 months after each action significantly affecting the quality and safeguards information must be refueling outage if the interval between of the human environment and, maintained for the period of time that successive updates does not exceed 24 therefore, an environmental impact this appendix may be referenced. months. statement (EIS) is not required. The Paragraphs A.2 and A.3 place record- The reporting requirements in basis for this determination, as keeping requirements on the applicant paragraph B.3 vary according to four documented in the environmental or licensee that references this design different time periods during a facilities' assessment, is that this amendment to certification to maintain its plant. lifetime. Paragraph B.3.a requires that if 10 CFR Part 52 would not authorize the specific DCD to accurately reflect both an applicant that references this rule siting, construction, or operation of a generic changes to the generic DCD and decides to make departures from the facility using the AP600 design; it plant-specific departures made pursuant generic DCD, then the departures and would only codify the AP600 design in to Section Vill of this appendix. The any updates to the plant specific DCD a rule. The NRC will evaluate the term " plant-specific" was added to must be submitted with the initial environmental impacts and issue an EIS paragraph A.2 and other Sections of this application for a license. Under B.3.b. as appropriate in accordance with NEPA appendix to distinguish between the the applicant may submit any as part of the application (s) for the generic DCD that is incorporated by subsequent reports and updates along construction and operation of a facility.

reference into this appendix, and the with its amendments to the application in addition, as part of the plant-specific DCD that the applicant is provided that the subrnittals are made at environmental assessment for the required to submit under IV.A of this least once per year. Because AP600 design, the NRC reviewed appendix. The requirement to maintain amendments to an application are Westinghouse's evaluation of s arious the generic changes to the generic DCD typically made more frequently than design alternatives to prevent and is explicitly stated to ensure that these once a year, this should not be an mitigate severe accidents in Appendix changes are not only reflected in the excessive burden on the applicant. IB of the AP600 Standard Safety generic DCD, which will be maintained Paragraph B.3.c requires that summary Analysis Report (SSAR). The by the applicant for design certification, reports be submitted quarterly during Commission finds that Westinghouse's but that the changes are also reflected in the period of facility construction. This evaluation provides a reasonable the plant-specific DCD. Therefore, increase in frequen< . ' "mmary assurance that certifying the AP600 records of generic changes to the DCD reports of departum m We plant- design will not exclude severe accident will be required to be maintained by specific DCD is in mspcm "o the mitigation design alternatives for a both entities to ensure that both entities Commission's guk % v .eporting future facility that would prove cost have up-to-date DCDs. frequency in its SRm .!CY-90-377, beneficial had they been considered asSection X.A of this appendix does not dated February 15,1991. part of the original design certification place record-keeping requirements on Quarterly reporting of design changes application. These issues are considered site-specific information that is outside during the period of construction is resolved for the AP600 design.

the scope of this rule. As discussed in necessary to closely monitor the status The environmental assessment (EA),

Ill.D of this SOC, the final safety and progress of the construction of the upon which the Commission's finding analysis report required by 10 CFR plant. To make its finding under 10 CFR of no significant impact is based, and 52.79 will contain the plant-specific 52.99, the NRC must monitor the design AP600 SSAR are available for DCD and the site-specific information changes made in accordance with examination and copying at the NRC

r Feder:1 Regist:r/Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27643 Public Document Room 2120 L Street, and a person is not required to respond conser su:, standards bodies unless the NW. (Lower Level). Washington, DC. to, the information collection. use of such a standard is inconsistent Single copies of the EA are also with applicable law or otherwise cvailable from h:ry N. Wilson, Mailstop E bgulat ry Anahsis impractical. This proposed rule O-12 G15. Office of Nuclear Reactor The NRC has not prepared a provides for certification of a nuclear Regulation, UA. Nuclear Regulatory regulatory analysis for this proposed power plant design. Design Commission. Washington, DC 20555. rule. The NRC prepares regulatory certifications are not generic analyses for rulemakings that establish rulemakings in the sense that design V. Paperwork Reductbn Act Statement generic regulatory requirements certifications do not establish standards This proposed rule amends applicable to all licensees. Design or requirements with which all information collection requirements that certifications are not generic licensees must comply. Rather, design tre subject to the Paperwork Reduction rulemakings in the sense that design certifications are Commission approvals Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). certifications do not establish standards of specific nuclear power plant designs This rule has been submitted to the or requirements with which all by rulemaking. Furthermore, design Office of Management and Budget for licensees must comply. Rather, design certification rulemakings are initiated review and approval of the information certifications are Commission approvals by an applicant for a design collection requirements. of specific nuclear power plant designs certification, rather than the NRC. For The public reporting burden for this by rulemaking. Furthermore, design these reasons the Commission information collection is estimated to certification rulemakings are initiated concludes that the Act does not apply average 8 person-hours per response, by an applicant for a design to this proposed rule.

including the time for reviewing certification, rather than the NRC.

instructions, searching existing date List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 52 Preparation of a regulatory analysis in sources, gathering and maintaining the this circumstance would not be useful Administrative practice and data needed, and completing and because the design to be certified is Procedure. Antitrust, Backfitting, reviewing the information collection. proposed by the applicant rather than Combined license Early site permit, The NRC is seeking pubile comment on the NRC. For these reasons, the Emergency planning, Fees, the potential impact of the information Commission concludes that preparation incorporation by reference. Inspection, collections contained in the proposed of a regulatory analysis is neither Limited work authorization. Nuclear rule and on the following issues: required noi appropriate. power plants and reactors. Probabilistic

1. Is the proposed information risk assessment, Prototype. Reactor collection necessary for the proper VIL Regulatory Flexibility Act siting criteria. Redress of site, Reporting performance of the functions of the Certification and record keeping requirements, i NRC, including whether the information in accordance with the Regulatory Standard design. Standard design I will have practical utility? Flexibility Act of 1980. 5 U.S.C. 605(b), certification.

2. Is the estimate of burden accurate? the Commission certifies that this For the reasons set out in the f 1

preamble and under the authority of the

3. Is there a way to enhance the proposed rulemaking will not have a quality, utility, and clarity of the significant economic impact upon a Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; information to be collected? substantial number of small entitles. the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.

4. How can the burden of the This proposed rule provides for as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC information collection be minimized, certification of a nuclear power plant 15 pmPosing to adopt the following j including the use of automated design. Neither the design certification amendment to 10 CFR Part 52.

collection techniques? applicant, nor prospective nuclear Send comments on any aspect of this power plant licensees who reference PART S2-EARLY SITE PERMITS; proposed information collection,- this design certification rule, fall within STANDARD DESIGN including suggestions for reducing the CERTIFICATIONS; AND COMBINED the scope of the definition of "small l burden, to the Records Management entities" set forth in the Regulatory LICENSES FOR NUCLEAR POWER  !

Branch (T-6 E6), M.S. Nuclear Flexibility Act,15 U.S.C. 632. or the PLANTS Regulatory Cornmission. Washington. Small Business Size Standards set out in 1. The authority citation for 10 CFR DC 20555-0001, or by Internet regulations issued by the Small Part 52 continues to read as follows:

electronic mail at BJSl@NRC. GOV; and Business Administration in 13 CFR Part to the Desk Officer, Office of Authority: Secs. 103.104,161,182,183.

121. Thus, this rule does not fall within 186,189. 08 Stat. 936. 948, 953, 954. 955.

Information and Regulatory Affairs, the purview of the act. 956, as amended, sec. 234,83 Stat.1244, as NEOB-10202, (3150-0151). Office of amended (42 U.S.C. 2133. 2201. 2232. 2233, Management and Budget Washington. VIII.Backfit Analysis 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206. 88 DC 20503. The Commission has determined that Stat.1243.1244.1246.1246 as amended (42 Comments to OMB on the information the backfit rule,10 CFR 50.109. does not U.S.C. 5841, 5842. 5846).

collections or on the above issues apply to this proposed rule because this 2. In S 52.8. paragraph (b) is revised to should be submitted by June 21,1999. amendment does not impose new or read as follows:

Comments received after this date will changed requirements on existing 10 be considered if it is practical to do so. CFR Part 50 licensees. Therefore, a $ 52.8 information collection but assurance of consideration cannot backfit analysis was not prepared for requirements: OMB approval.

be given to comments received after this this rule.

date* (b) The approved information IX. Consensus Standards collection requirements contained in Public Protection Notincation The National Technology and this part appear in SS 52.15,52.17.

If a means used to impose an Transfer Act of 1995 (Act). Public Law 52.29,52.35,52.45,52.47,52.51,52.57, information collection does not display 104-113, requires that Federal agencies 52.63.52.75.52.77.52.78.52.79,52.89, a currently valid OMB control number, use technical standards that are 52.01,52.99, and appendices A. B, and the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, developed or adopted by voluntary C.

l l

27644 Federd Register /Vol. 64. No. 97/ Thursday, May 20.1999/ Proposed Rules l

3. A new Appendix C to 10 CFR Part identify certain mattcrs that shall be IV. Additional Requirements and 52 is added to read as follows: addressed in the site-specific portion of the Restrictions final safety analysis report (FSAR) by an A. An applicant for a license that wishes ppen lx C To Part 52-Design applicant who references this appendix-Certification Rule for the AP600 Design These items constitute infonnation to reference this appendix shall, in addition to complying with the requirements of 10 L Introduction requirements but are not the only acceptable CFR 52.77,52.78. and 52.79 comply with the Appendix C constitutes the standard set of information in the FSAR. An applicant following requirements' may depart from or omit these items-

1. Incorporate by reference, as part of its design certification for the APG00 5 design, in provided that the departure or omission is application. this appendix, accordance with 10 CFR Part 52. Subpart B. identified andjustified in the FSAR. After The applicant for certification of the AP600 2. Include, as part of its application:

issuance of a construction permit or COL. a. A plant-specific DCD containing the design is Westinghouse Electrk Company these items are not requirements for the LLC. same information and utilizing the same licensee unless such items are restated in the organization and numbering as the AP600 IL Definitions FSAR. DCD. as modified and supplemented by the

5. The investment protection short-term applicant's exemptions and departures; A en d n co 1d ent a ability controls in Section 16.3 of the n b. The reports on departures from and containing the Tier 1 and Tier 2 information UPdaws to the plant-specific DCD required by F. 'Ts.er 2. means the portion of the Tier 2 XB of this appendix; and generic technical specifications that is inf rmati n. designated as such in the c. Plant specific technical specifications.

incorporated by reference into this appendix.

B. Generic technical speclDcations means generic DCD. which is subject to the change consisting of the generic and site-specific pmcess in B 6 of this appendix.This technical specifications, that are required by the information. required by 10 CFR 50.36 and 50.3Ga. for the portion of the plant that designation expires for some Tier 2* 10 CFR 50 36 and 50.3Ga; is within the scope of this appendix. inf rmati n under Vill.B.G. d. Information demonstrating compliance C. Plant-specine DCD means the dccument. G. All other terms in this appendix have with the site parameters and interface maintained by an applicant or licensee who the meaning set out in 10 CFR 50.2.10 CFR requirements; references this appendix, consisting of the 52.3. or Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act e. Information that addresses the COL information in the generic DCD. as modified f 1954, as amended as applicable. action items; and and supplemented by the plant-specific " "" " "9" "

III. Scope and Contents departures and exemptions made under that is not within the scope of this appendix.

Section VIil of this appendix. A. Tier 1. Tier 2 (including the investment 3. Physically include, in the plant-specific D. Tier 1 means the portion of the design. Protection short-term availability controls in DCD the proprietary and safeguards related information contained in the generic Smi n 16.3). and the generic technical information referenced in the AP600 DCD.

DCD that is approved and certified by this specifications in the AP600 DCD. Revision 2 B. The Commission reserves the right to appendix (hereinafter Tier 1 information). (3/99), are approved for incorporation by determine in what manner this appendix The design descriptions, interface reference by the Director nf the Office of the may be referenced by an applicant for a requirements, and site parameters are derived Federal Register on linsert date of approvall construction permit or operating license from Tier 2 information. Tier 1 information in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and i CFR under Part 50 includes: Part 51. Copies of the generic DCD may be V. Applicable Regulations

. f ions and general provisions; fmm r Br nA cIn yr

{btain A. Except as indicated in paragraph B of i t 8" t P 3$ Insp ctions, t sts, analyses, and Lkensing. Westinghouse Electric Company.

P.O. Box 355. Pittsburgh, PA 15230-0355.A s6 b c] " 0 P 50 $

acceptance criteria (ITAAC); and 100, codified as oflinsert date final rule c Py is also available for examination and l

4. Significant sito parameters; and signedl, that are applicable and technically l S. Significant interface requirements. copying at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), relevant, as described in the FSER (NUREG-E. Tier 2 means the portion of the design. 1512) related information contained in the generic \Vashington. DC 20555-0001.

B. The AP600 design is exempt frora DCD that is. approved but not certified by this B. An applicant or licensee referencing this portions of the following regulations:

appendix (hereinafter Tier 2 information). appendix, in accordance with Section IV of

1. Paragraph (a)(1) of 10 CFR 50 34-whole Compliance with Tier 2 is required. but this appendix, shall incorporate by reference body dose criterion; i generic changes to and plant. specific and comply with the requirements of this 2. Paragraph (f)(2)(lv) of 10 CFR 50.34- I departures from Tier 2 are governed by appendix. including Tier 1. Tier 2 (inc!uding Plant Safety Parameter Display Console;Section VIII of this appendix. Compliance the investment protection short term 3. Paragraphs (f)(2)(vil). (villi. (xxvi), and with Tier 2 provides a sufficient, but not the availability controls in Section 16.3). and the (xxviii) of 10 CFR 50.34-Accident Source only acceptable, method for complying with generk technical specifications except as Term in TID 14844; Tier 1. Compliance methods differing from otherwise provided in this appendix. 4. Paragraph (c)(1) of 10 CFR 50.62- j Tier 2 must satisfy the change process in Conceptual design information in the generic Auxiliary (or emergency) feedwater system:  ;

Section VIII of this appendix. Regardless of DCD and the evaluation of severe accident 5. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. GDC these differences, an applicant or Itcensee mitigation design alternatives in Appendix 17-Offsite Power Sources: and must meet the requirement in Section III B to IB of the generic DCD are not part of this 6. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. GDC l reference Tier 2 when referencing Tier 1. Tier appendix. 19-whole body dose criterion.

2 information includes: C. If there is a conflict between Tier 1 and

1. Iniormation required by 10 CFR 52.47 Tier 2 of the DCD, then Tier I controls. VI. Issue Resolution with the exception of generic technical D. If there is a conflict between the generic A. The Commission has determined that specifications and conceptual design DCD and either the application for design the structures. systems, components, and information; certification of the AP600 design or NUREG- design features of the AP600 design comply

2. Information seguired for a final safety 1512. " Final Safety Evaluz tion Report with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act analysis report under 10 CFR 50.34; Related to Certification of the AP600 of 1954, as amended, and the applicable i

3. Supporting information on the Standard Design." (FSER), then the generic regulations identified in Section V of this i inspections, tests, and analyses that will be DCD controls. appendix; and therefore, provide adequate performed to demonstrate that the acceptance E Design activities for structures, systems, protection to the health and safety of the i criteria in the ITAAC have been met; and and components that are wholly outside the public. A conclusion that a matter is resolved

4. Combined license (COL) action items scope of this appendix may be performed includes the finding that additional or (combined license information), which using site-specific design parameters, alternative structures, systems, components, provided the design activities do not affect design features. design criteria, testing.

8 AP600 is a trademark of Westinghouse Eh ctric the DCD or conflict with the interface analyses, acceptance criteria, orjustifications Company 1.1.C requirements. are not necessary for the AP600 design.

l Federcl Register /Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27645 B. The Commission considers the DCD, in order to request or participate in the 4. Exemptions from Tier 1 information are following matters resolved within the hearing required by 10 CFR 52.85 or the governed by the requirements in 10 CFR meaning of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4) in subsequent hearing provided under 10 CFR 52.103, or to 52.63(b)(1) and 5 52.97(b). The Commission proceedings for issuance of a combined request or participate in any other hearing will deny a request for an exemption from license, amendrnent of a combined license, or relating to this appendix in which interested Tier 1, if it finds that the design change will renewal of a combined license, proceedings persons have adjudicatory hearing rights, result in a significant decrease in the level of held pursuant to 10 CFR 52.103, and shall first request access to such information safety otherwise provided by the design.

enforcement proceedings involving plants from Westinghouse. The request must state referencing this appendix: with particularsty: B. Tier 2Informadon

1. All nuclear safety issues, except for the a. The nature of the proprietary or other 1. Generic changes to Tier 2 information generic technical specifications and other information sought; are governed by the requirements in 10 CFR )

operational requirements, associated with the b. The reason why the information 52.63(a)(1). l information in the FSER. Tier 1. Tier 2 currently available to the public in the NRC's 2. Generic changes to Tier 2 information (including referenced information, which the pubile document room is insufficient; are applicable to all applicants or licensees context indicates is intended as c. The relevance of the requested who reference this appendix, except those for {

requirements, and the investment protection information to the hearing issue (s) which the which the change has been rendered I short term availability controls in Section person proposes to raise; and technically irrelevant by action taken under '

16.3). and the rulemaking record for d A showing that the requesting person paragraphs B.3. B.4, U.S. or B.6 of this certification of the AP600 design; has the capability to understand and utilize section.

2. All nuclear safety and safeguards issues the requested information. 3. The Commission may not require new associated with the information in 2. If a person claims that the information requirements on Tier 2 information by plant-proprietary and safeguards documents, is necessary to prepare a request for hearing, specific order while this appendix is in effect referenced and in context, are intended as the request must be filed no later than 15 under 55 52.55 or 52.61, unless:

requirements in the generic DCD for the days after publication in the Federal Register a. A modification is necessary to secure AP600 design: of the notice required either by 10 CFR 52.85 compliance with the Commission's

3. All generic changes to the DCD pursuant or 10 CFR 52.103. If Westinghouse declines regulations applicable and in effect at the to and in compliance with the change to provide the information sought, time this appendix was approved. as set forth processes in Sections Vill.A.I and VIII.B.1 of Westinghouse shall send a written response in Section V of this appendix, or to assure this appendix; within ten (10) days of receiving the request adequate protection of the public health and

4. All exemptions from the DCD pursuant to the requesting person setting forth with safety or the common defense and security; to and in compliance with the change particularity the reasons for its refusal. The and processes in Sections Vill.AA and VIII.B.4 of person may then request the Commission (or b. Special circumstances as defined in 10 this appendix, but only for that proceeding: presiding officer,if a proceeding has been CFR 50.12(a) are present.

5. All departures from the DCD that are established) to order disclosure. The person 4. An applicant or licensee who references approved by license amendment. but only for shall include copies of the original request this appendix may request an exemption that proceeding: (and any subsequent clarifying information from Tier 2 information. The Commission

6. Except as provided in Vill.B.S.f of this provided by the requesting party to the may grant such a request only ifit determines appendix, all departures from Tier 2 applicant) and the applicant's response. The that the exemption will comply with the pursuant to and in compliance with the Commission and presiding officer shall base requirements of 10 CFR 50.12(a). The change processes in Vill.B.5 of this appendix their decisions solely on the person's original Commission will deny a request for an that do not require prior NRC approval: request (including any clarifying information exemption from Tier 2, if it finds that the

7. All environmental issues concerning Provided by the requesting persnn to design change will result in a significant severe accident mitigation design alternatives Westinghouse), and Westinghouse *s decrease in the level of safety otherwise (SAMDAs) associated with the information in fesPonse. The Commission and presiding provided by the design. The grant of an j the NRC's environmental assessment for the officer may order Westinghouse to provide exemption to an applicant must be subject to l APG00 design and Appendix IB of the access to some or all of the requested litigation in the same manner as other issues 1 generic DCD, for plants referencing this information, subject to an appropriate non- material to the license hearing. The grant of appendix whose site parameters are within disclosure agreement. an exemption to a licensee must be subject those specifkxl in the SAMDA evaluation. VII. Duration of This Appendix to an opportunity for a hearing in the same C The Commission does not consider '**""****""**"

operational requirements for an applicant or This appendix may be referenced for a """.a".*An 5 applicant or licensee who licensee who references this appendix to be Period of 15 > ears from IInsert date 30 days ,

references this appendix may depart from 1 matters resolved within the meaning of 10 after publication of the final rule in the Tier 2 information, without prior NRC CFR 52.63(a)(4). The Commission reserves

' ceP as mvided for i" 8PProval unless the proposed departure the right to require operational requirements Cb 52 (b) d 52 PP" d involves a change to or departure from Tier for an applicant or licensee who references remains valid for an applicant or licensee 1 information. Tier 2* information, or the this appendix by rule. regulation. order, or who references this appendix until the technical specifications, or involves an license condition. application is withdrawn or the license unreviewad safety question as defined in D. Except in accordance with the change expires, including any period of extended paragraphs B.5.b and B.5.c of this section.

processes in Section VIII of this appendix, peration under a renewed license.

When evaluating the proposed departure, an the Commission may not require an applicant VIII. Prucesses for Changes and Departures applicant or licensee shall consider all or licensee who references this appendix to: matters described in the plant-specific DCD.

1. Modify structures, systems, components. A. Tier 1 Information b. A proposed departure from Tier 2, other or design features as described in the generic 1. Generic changes to Tier 1 information than one affecting resolution of a severe DCD; are governed by the requirements in 10 CFR accident issue identified in the plant-specific l 2. Provide additional or alternative 52.63(a)(1). DCD, involves an unreviewed safety question

! structures, systems, components, or design 2. Generic changes to Tier 1 information if-l features not discussed in the generic DCD; or are applicable to all applicants or licensees (1) The probability of occurrence or the

3. Provide additional or alternative design who reference this appendix except those for consequences of an accident or malfunction criteria. testing analyses, acceptance criteria, which the change has been rendered of equipment important to safety previously orjustification for structures, systems, technically irrelevant by action taken under evaluated in the plant-specific DCD may be components, or design features discussed in paragraphs A.3 or A.4 of this section. Incre m d; the generic DCD. 3. Departures from Tier I information that (2) A possibility for an accident or E.1 Persons who wish to review are required by the Commission through malfunction of a different type than any proprietary and safeguards information or plant-specific orders are governed by the evaluated previously in the plant specific j other secondarv references in the AP000 requirements in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3). DCD may be created or l

1

27646 Fedcr:1 Regist:r/Vol. 64 No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules (3) The margin of safety as defined in the 2' matters except in accordance with 5. A party to an adjudicatory proceeding basis for any technical specification is paragraph B.6.b of this section. After the for either the issuance, amendment. or reduced. plant first achieves full power, the following renewal of a license or for operation under

c. A proposed departure from Tier 2 Tier 2* matters revert to Tier 2 status and are 10 CFR 52.103(a). who believes that an affecting resolution of a severe accident issue thereafter subject to the departure provisions operational requirement approved in the identified in the plant specific DCD, involves in paragraph B.5 of this section. DCD or a technical specification derived from an unreviewed safety question if- (1) Nuclear Island structural dimensions. the generic technical specifications must be

[ (1) There is a substantial increase in the (2) ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, changed may petition to admit into the probability of a severe accident such that a Section III, and Code Case N-284. proceeding such a contention. Such petition particular severe accident previously (3) Design Summary of Critical Sections. must comply with the general requirements reviewed and determined to be not credible (4) ACI 318. ACI 349, and ANSI /AISC-690. of 10 CFR 2.714(b)(2) and must demonstrate

could become credible; or ($) Definition of critical locations ar'd why special circumstances as defined in 10 1

(2) There is a substantial increase in the thicknesses. CFR 2.758(b) are present, or for compliance consequences to the public of a particular (6) Seismic qualification methods and with the Commission's regulations in effect severe accident previously reviewed. standards. at the time this appendix was approved, as

d. If a departure involves an unreviewed (7) Nuclear design of fuel and reactivity set forth in Section V of this appendix. Any t safety question as defined in paragraph B.5 control system. except burn-up limit. other party may file a response thereto. If. on of this section. It is governed by 10 CFR (8) Motor-operated and power-operated the basis of the petition and any response.

50.90. valves. the presiding officer determines that a

c. A departure from Tier 2 information that (9) Instrumentation & control system sufficient showing has been made, the is made under paragraph B.5 of this section dest i processes, methods, and standards. presiding ofTicer shall certify the matter does not require an exemption from this (114 PRHR natural circulation test (first directly to the Commission for determination appendix. plant only)- of the admissibility of the contention. All

f. A party to an adjudicatory proceeding for (11) ADS and CMT vertfication tests (first other issues with respect to the plant-specific either the issuance, amendment, or renewal three plants only). technical specifications or other operational of a license or for operation under 10 CFR d. Departures from Tier 2' information that requirements are subject to a hearing as part 52.103(a), who believes that an applicant or are made under paragraph B 6 of this section of the license proceeding.

licensee who references this appendix has do not require an exemption from this 6. After issuance of a license the generic l not complied with Vill.B.5 of this appendix appendix- technical specifications have no further effect when departing from Tier 2 information, may on the plant-specific technical specifications petition to admit into the proceeding such a- C (2perationalrequirements i

and changes to the plant specific technical I contention. In addition to compliance with 1. Generic changes to generic technical specifications will be treated as license the general requirements of 10 CFR specifications and other operational amendments under 10 CFR 50.90.

2.714(b)(2), the petition must demonstrate requirements that were completely reviewed that the departure does not comply with and approved in the design certification IX. Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and VIII.B.5 of this appendix. Further, the rulemaking and do not require a change to a Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) petition must demonstrate that the change design feature in the generk 1CD are A.1 An applicant or licensee who bears on an asserted noncompliance with an governed by the requirements in 10 CFR references this appendix shall perform and ITAAC acceptance criterion in the case of a 50.109. Generic changes that do require a demonstrate conformance with the ITAAC 10 CFR 52.103 preoperational hearing. or that change to a design feature in the generic DCD before fuel load. With res;wt to activities the change bears directly on the amendment are governed by the requirements in subject to an ITAAC c , @ cant for a request in the case of a hearing on a license paragraphs A or B of this section. license may proceed - risk with amendment. Any other party may file a 2, Generic changes to getwric technical design and procuremen n f es. and a response. If on the basis of the petition and specifications and other oys.uional licensee may proceed at it < a risk with any response, the presiding officer requirements are appb a to all applicants design, procurenaent, construction, and determines that a sufficient showing has been or licensees who ref& u e this appendix, preoperational activities, even though the made, the presiding officer shall certify the except those for which t he change has been NRC may not have found that any particular matter directly to the Commission for rendered technically mdevant by action ITAAC has been satisfied.

determination of the admissibility of the taken under paragraph C 3 or C.4 of this 2. The !!censee who references this contention. The Commission may admit such section, appendix shall notify the NRC that the a contention if it determines the petition 3. The Commission may mquire plant- required inspections. tests. and analyses in raises a genuine issue of fact regarding specific departures on genene technical the ITAAC have been successfully completed compliance with VIII.B.5 of this appendix. specifications and other operational and that the corresponding acceptance 6 a. An applicant who references this requirements that were completely reviewed criteria have been met.

appendix may not depart from Tier 2* and approved, provided a change to a design 3. In the event that an activity is subject information, which is designated with feature in the generic DCD is not required to an ITAAC, and the applicant or licensee italicized text or brackets and an asterisk in and special circumstances as defined in 10 who references this appendix has not the generic DCD, without NRC approval. The CFR 2.758(b) are present. The Commission demonstrated that the ITAAC has been departure will not be considered a resolved may modify or supplement generic technical satisfied, the applicant or licensee may either issue, within the meaning of Section VI of specifications and other operational take corrective actions to successfully this appendix and 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4). requirements that were not complet-ly complete that ITAAC, request an exemption

b. A licensee who references this appendix reviewed and approved or require additional from the ITAAC in accordance with Section may not depart from the following Tier 2* technical specifications and other operational Vill of this appendix and 10 CFR 52.97(b). or matters without prior NRC approval. A requirements on a plant-specific basis, petition for rulemaking to amend this request for a departure will be treated as a provided a change to a design feature in the appendix by changing the requirements of request for a license amendment under 10 generic DCD is not required. the ITAAC, under 10 CFR 2.802 and 52.97(b).

CFR 50.90. 4. An applicant who references this Such rulemaking changes to the ITAAC must (1) Maximum fuel rod average burn.up. appendix may request an exemption from the meet the requirements of paragraph VIII.A.1 (2) Fuel principal design requirements. generic technical specifications or other of this appendix.

(3) Fuel criteria evaluation process. operational requirements. The Commission B.1 The NRC shall ensure that the required l (4) Fire areas. may grant such a request only ifit determines inspections. tests, and analyses in the ITAAC ,

l (5) Human factors engineering, that the exemption will comply with tk are performed. The NRC shall verify that the ,

. c. A licensee who references this appendix requirements of 10 CFR 50.12(a). The grant inspections. tests. and analyses referenced by 1 l may not, before the plant first achieves full of an exemption must be subject to litigation the licensee have been successfully {

power following the finding required by 10 in the same manner as other issues material completed and, based solely thereon, find the CFR 52.103(g), depart from the following Tier to the license hearing. prescribed acceptance criteria have been met.

l l l

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l Federd Regist:r/Vol. 64, No. 97/ Thursday, May 20,1999/ Proposed Rules 27647 l

At appropriate truervals during construction, 2. An applicant or licensee who references 3. The reports and updates required by I the NRC shall publish notices of the Ihis appendix shall maintain the plant- paragraphs B.1 and B.2 of this section must

! successful completion of ITAAC in the specific DCD to accurately reflect both be submitted as follows:

Federal Register. generic changes to the generic DCD and a. On the date that an application for a

2. In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99 and plant-specific departures made pursuant to license referencing this appendix is 52.103(g), the Commission shall find that the Section Vill of this appendix throughout the submitted. the application shall include the i acceptance criteria in the ITAAC for the period of application and for the term of the report and any updates to the plant. specific

! license are met before fuel load. license (including any period of renewal). DCD.

3. After the Commission has made the 3. An applicant or licensee who references b. During the interval from the date of finding required by 10 CFR 52.103(g). the this appendix shall prepare and maintain application to the date of issuance of a ITAAC do not, by virtue of their inclusion written safety evaluations which previde the license, the report and any updates to the within the DCD, constitute regulatory bases for the determinations required by plant-specific DCD must be submitted requirements either for licensees or for Section VIII of this appendix. These annually and may be submitted along with renewal of the license; except for specific evaluations must be retained throughout the amendments to the app 4kation.

ITAAC, which are the subject of a Section period of application and for the term of the c. During the interval from the date of 103(a) hearing. their expiration will occur license (including any perkx1 of renewal). issuance of a license to the date the upon final Commission action in such Commission makes its findings under 10 CFR Poning 52.103(g), the report must be submitted proceeding. However, subsequent modifications must comply with the Tier 1 1. An cpplicant or licensee who references quarterly. IIpdates to the plant-specific DCD this appendix shall submit a report to the must be sut. uitted annually.

and Tier 2 design descriptions in the plant-specific DCD.unless the licensee has NRC containing a brief description of any d. After th Commission has made its finding unde,10 CFR 52.103(g). reports and complied with the applicable requirements of departures from the plant specific DCD, 10 CFR 52.97 and Section VIII of this including a summary of the safety evaluation updates to the t lant-specific DCD may be f each. This report must be filed in submitted annually or along with updates to appendix. the site-specific portion of the final safety accordance with the filing requirements X, Re -;rds and Reporting applicable to reports in 10 CFR 50.4. an lysis rep rt for the facility at the intervals

2. An applicant or licensee who references required by 10 CFR 50.71(c), or at shorter this appendix shall submit uodates to its intervals as specifk d in the license.

1. The applicant for this appendix shall plant specific DCD. which reflect the generic Dated at Rockville. Maryland, this 13th day maintain a copy of the generic DCD that changes to the generic DCD and the plant- of May,1999.

includes all generic changes to Tier 1 and specific departures made pursuant to Section For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Tier 2. The applicant shall maintain the VIII of this appendix. These updates shall be Annette L Vietti-Cook' proprietary and safeguards information filed in accordance with the filing referenced in the generic DCD for the period requirements applicable to final safety Secretary of the Commission. ,

that this appendix may be referenced, as analysis report updates in 10 CFR 50.4 and (FR Doc. 99-12623 Filed 5-19-99; 8:45 aml j specified in Section VII of this appendix. 50.71(c). BILUNG CODE 76904M-P l

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BY U.S. THENUCLEAR OFFICE OF NUCLEAR RED. ,OTOR REGULATOlWm'"9SION b'.-c REGULATIO y( m@,5 %a,.n< A 1 RELATING TO '4E CERTIFICAW DP THE AP600 STANDARD PLANT DBEIRN d4 DOCKET NO. 62W3 VWM f?, l fYh m:w

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

1.0 I NTR O D U CTI O N . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.0 THE NEED FOR THE PROPOSED ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 3 3.0 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. . ,M. . . . . . . . . 4 8

3.1 Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives (SAMDAs))$$'. . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2 Potential SAMDAs identified by WestinghouseO 3.3 Staff 3.4 Risk Evaluation Reduction Potential . . .of. SAMDAs

. . . . . . .. ... .. .//.. ... .. .. .. ..M, . /M .Ot.. ... .. .. .M 3.4.1 Westinghouse Evaluation . . . . . '.M . . . . . /lN( W W ftW Y.10 3.4.2 Staff Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . .th.j .......%

3.5 Cost Impacts of Candidate SAMDAs . . . .iN M . 12 . . . . . . .

.$n.O)k.

3.5.1 Westinghouse Evaluation . . . . . . . Ei. Nk. . . . . . . . . . . .M. . . . 1 3.5.2 Staff Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . R 3.6 Cost-Benefit Comparison . 3. d. M. ,\...............

. . . . . . ....... . .k .12 14

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3.6.1 Westinghouse Evaluation . . n .w. . . . . .N.62). . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.6.2 Staff Evaluation . . . . . .

3.7 Further Considerations $ ,#. $. ..... . .g . .h. 4,. d!Ol'%.

............... 17 . . . . . MK 3.7.1 Exposures Uncertainties . . . .g%in Core

. . . . . Damag/efg%

f. . . . MM.M. . ......... . . . . . . .17..and Accide 3.7.2 Reassessment of Design Adrnative' Cost Benefit Relationships in Light of Uniiertainties 8. . . . . . ./d' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.7.3 Further Evaliad6n of D4eign Alternatives With Potentially Favorable Cost-Benslit FactorsEd . . . . g.

3.8 Conclusions ./hp . . . . . . %.............................24..DF.9.% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

f% )%% f Jy' 4.0 THE ENVIRONMENTAL SAPACT OF THE PROPOSED ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

%?A '% iZA 5.0 AGENCIES AW PERSONS CCNSU.LTED, AND SOURCES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 f on of Estimated%V Table 1 Comperle%h Beriefits from Averted Offsite Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 pfY TablegiKey Differen&WQ ces'8stween the Westinghouse Approach and NUREG/BR-0058 ... 16 ff WW TabEi 3 Key Parameters Used by FORECAST in Evaluating Maximum SAMDA Benefits . . 19 b$ N Tabli 4 SAMDA Benisfits Accounting for Uncertainties and External Events Effects E MN g (Benefits, 1996 $) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Tatsle'SiEstimated Maximum Benefit from Individual SAMDAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Q qu

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) has issued a design

- certification for the Advanced Passive 600 (AP600) design in response to an application submitted on June 16,1992, by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Westinghouse). A design certification is a rulemaking that amends Title 10, Part 52 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR Part 52).

w6fc he NRC This report has prepared presentswith in accordance the10environmental CFR Part 51 and the assessment requiremerWEdtb (EA) for this ruiemdhin Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended. TeileiEA addpesses the environmental impacts of issuing a design certification. In addition, thisiepo'rt addres$sasysics accident #

mitigation design attematives (SAMDAs), which the NR d final EA for the AP600 design. This report does ss the not ad$.0 fias decidositb ho gewironmer"itel&dpitatacl/

constructing and operating a facility which references th(APEQIdesign certifidhNosit/

particular site; such impacts will be evaluated as part of %Niiication(s) for sitinh;#

constructing, and operating such a facility. OC I

As detailed in Section 4.0 of this report, the NRC detefrnined .

.this design certification does not constitute a major Federal action si the quality of the human environment. This finding of no significed is based^ " "gnifica "1he fact that the design certification would not independently author %M tructiod$6r operation of an 1 AP600 reactor design. Rather, the certifiggifon wo .

fOle AP600 design in a rule that could be referenced in a constructippermit (OP), e brmit (ESP), combined operating license (COL), or operatin license (QQ'applica .*Further, because the certification is a rule, it does not i any resources thaOvould have alternative uses.

Therefore, the NRC has decided. o pre "an envi "mentalimpact statement (EIS)in connection with this action. t

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.A- 1; - a in additio gentuant to NRC al d Westinghouse's evaluation of SAMDAs that ge , spply t ,

design. CWthat basis, the NRC found that the evaluation provides a _ .

e F.ssu ertifying the AP600 design will not exclude SAMDAs for -

a future facil pro ,ficial had they been considered as part of the original design certifica ion._ ues are considered resolved for the AP600 design certificationgtfdf" N

2.0.THDIEED FOR T SED ACTION j Th,eSiRC has long sou , t e safety benefits of commercial nuclear power plant sigbardization,

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as weNflis the early resolution of design issues and the finality of these tions. The lans to achieve these benefits by certifying standard plant designs.

B to 10 Part 52 allows for certification in the form of rulemaking of an essentially ip nt design.

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.Th propo$ sed action would amend 10 CFR Part 52 to certify the AP600 design. The amendment would allow prospective licensee's to reference the certified AP600 design as part

- of an ESP or a COL application under 10 CFR Part 52 or for a CP application under 10 CFR Part 50. Those portions of the AP600 design included in the scope of the certification 3

l

rulemaking would not be subject to further regulatory review or approval. In addition, the  !

amendment would eliminate the need to consider SAMDAs for any future facilities that reference the certified AP600 design.

3.0 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED ACTION The NRC had two alternatives to certifying the AP600 design in an amendment to,10 CFR Part 52. Specifically, the NRC could (1) take no action to approve the design, or (2)' issue a ' l final design approval (FDA) without certifying the design. In and of thediselves[these alternatives would not have a significant impact on the quality of the Histiin'advironment because they would not authorize the siting, construction aieperati600f afacility.

W In the first case, the NRC would not approve the desigrdffhereforera,& ji% ~

the AP600 design would require licensing under 10 CFpfart 50,oi40 CFR Pert 52[Subliert C, as a custom plant application. Moreover, all design issedwouljf have to be c6nsklered a's part of each application to construct and operate an AP600 at a particular site.*Asiresult, this alternative would not achieve the benefits of standa " provide early resolution of design issues, or permit finality of design issue resolut f%sd Y VWk in the second case, the NRC would issue an FDA undgAppenkdkt0,CFR Part 52, but would not certify the design in a rulemaking. Thngiqllefelthough the NRC would have approved the design, the design could be moCNiled addelas would rppuire reevaluation as part  ;

of each application to construct and operage an AP6DO ^

ht aparticular site. This alternative would permit early resolutior) # issues,40t w " achieve the benefits of standardization or establish of desiggjesue respion.

The NRC sees no advantage in Itern e compared to the design certification rulemaking proposed for the APpgD' design $Althoughjdither the alternatives nor the proposed design certification rulema, ' uld significangyallect the quality of the human environment in l and of thesseetves, the r achieves standafdization, permits early resolution of design issues, ahd of reheludqm desigrElssti6s (including SAMDAs) that are within the ertific'atelt {Tlierefore, the NRC concludes that the alternatives to scope rulemaking of" w"[eull

. hieve ther es the Commission intended by certifying the AP600 design pursuar" 14CfS Party ' art B.

A$kh$& ~

Y 3.1 Severe'Accidenti _

Desian Alternatives (SAMDAs)

Cons nt with its obje tandardization and early resolution of design issues, the C^ ission decided to e SAMDAs as part of the design certification for the AP600

n. In a 1985 polic[e statement, the Commission defined the term " severe accident" as an sthati s "beyond the substantial coverage of design-basis events," including events in M"$'ere is subeimhtial damage to the reactor core (whether or not there are serious offsite iD6 sign-basis events are considered to be those analyzed in accordance with t dard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) and documented in Chapter 15 of the AP600 Deif C66 trol Document (DCD).

As part of its design certification application, Westinghouse performed a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for the AP600 desi0n to achieve the following objectives:

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.- Identify the dominant severe accident sequences and associated source terms for the design.

9 ' Modify the design,'on the bases of PRA insights, to prevent or mitigate severe accidents and reduce the risk of severe accidents.

i

,. Provide a basis for concluding that all reasonable steps have been taken educe the  !

. chances of occurrence, and to mitigate the consequences, of severe a ts. ;j Westinghouse's PRA analysis is presented in Chapter 19 of e' AP d Safety i Analysis Report (SSAR). i In addition to considering attematives to the rulemakin ess as on 3.$

applicants for reactor design certification or cps must con ~ lternat es I

~ for severe accidents consistent with the requirements art 50, as w . rt - I ruling related to NEPA. These requirements can be s as follows:

.. ' 10 CFR 50.34(f)(1)(i) requires the applicant to 3 ite-specific probabilistic risk assessment, the aim of which is to seek sf cl imp the reliability of core

- and containment heat removal systems as .. ' nifican al and do not impact excessively on the plant.

j -. _ . ,

. The U.S. Court of Appeals decisio, " Lime -

v. NBC,869 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir.1989), effectively requir 'the N oi Ideration of certain SAMDAs in the environmentalimpact r _. perf "ed und ion 102(2)(c) of NEPA as part of the OL application.

Although these two requiremen e not .

y re' they share a common purpose to consider alto atives to th d des' ' ' te potential alternatives improvements in  !

the plant ( which I. fety pe uring severe accidents, and to prevent viable om sed.I ' ould be noted that the Commission is not required altern design in this EA on the rulemaking; however, as a matter of di .Com etermined that considering SAMDAs is consistent with the intent o art 5 resolution of issues, finality of design issue

' resolution, ben standardization. -

In its ion'in Lime Action v.'NRC, the Court'of Appeals for the Third Circuit i

.e d its opinion th . id likely be difficult to evaluate SAMDAs for NEPA purposes on a ric basis. Howe , NRC has determined that generic evaluation of SAMDAs for the standard desi warranted for two significant reasons. First, the design and ion of all referencing the certified AP600 design will be governed by the rule a sin ign.1-L Second, the site parameters specified in the rule and the AP600 i consequences for a reasonable set of SAMDAs for the AP600 design. The of the AP600 and limited potential for further risk reductions provides high

' con at additional cost beneficial SAMDAs would not be found. Should the actual

. parameters for a particular site exceed those assumed in the rule and the SSAR, SAMDAs i would hava to be f eavaluated in the site-specific environmental report and the EIS.

5 3

1

o 1 l- .

{

l- 3.2 Potential SAMDAs identified by Westinahouse To identify candidate design alternatives, Westinghouse reviewed the design alternatives for other plants including Limerick, Comanche Peak, and the Combustion Engineering (CE)

System 80+ design. Westinghouse also reviewed _ the results of the AP600 PRA and o'esign alternatives suggested by AP600 design personnel.

Appendix 1B of the SSAR does nct explicitly state whether Westinghouse's e on included plant improvements considered as part of the NRC's Containment Pe mprovement

+ (CPI) program (NUREG/CR-5562, -5567, -5575, and -5630 Howe house statod that the types of design changes identified in the CPI pr ave n incorporated -

into the AP600 design or have been considered as de mativ vements J

identified in the CPI program were also evaluated in me Westinghouse, including the CE System 80+ design a ative ations. 4

Westinghouse eliminated certain SAMDAs from furthe tion on the basi ey are already incorporated in the AP600 design.f Such featur e following:

)

4

. ihydrogen ignition system. .. , ~

q

'. reactor ca N flooding system

. reactor coh.a pump seal cooling (AP ged mot )

.. reactor coolant system depressuriza

. . extemal reactor vessel cooling  ;

e nonsafety-grade containment s s On the basis of the screening, W ouse ined 1 ential SAMDAs for further consideration. These SAMDAs, i ction 1 the SSAR, are summarized below:

'(1). Up e the Che Volum tem (CVCS) for Small Loss-of-Coolant A LOC VCSis capable of maintaining the reactor cooling

)i OCAs ffective break sizes up to 0.97 cm (% in,) in

-di de would extend the capability of the CVCS so that it

~ cou RC uring small and intermediate LOCAs up to an l effectiv 15 .)in diameter. Implementation of this design alt re in tion of in-containment refueling water storage tank 3' T)/ 'rculation connections to the CVCS, as well as the addition of -

second line f S pumps to the RCS. Westinghouse estimated that mplementing thi attemative would reduce plant risk by at most 5.5E 04 person-rem /yr.

Filtered Con . ment Vent: This design alternative would involve the installation of a.

L ered ment vent, including all associated piping and penetrations. _This i would provide a means to vent the containment to prevent catastrophic l sure failures, as well as a filtering capability for source term release. The I

ed vent would reduce the risk associated with late containment failures that might L'

occur after failure of the passive containment cooling system (PCS). However, even if y the PCS fails, air cooling would be expected to limit the containment pressure to less 6

than the ultimate pressure. Westinghouse estimated that implementing this design alternative would reduce plant risk by at most 1.0E-03 person-rem / reactor-year.

(3) Self-Actuating Containment Isolation Valves: Self-actuating containment isolation valves could increase the likelihood of successful containment isolation during a severe accident. This design alternative would involve adding a self-actuating valve or enhancing the existing containment isolation valves on containment penetrations that are normally-open. (Specifically, penetrations that provide normally open idhways to the environment during power and normal shutdown conditions,.)Mhis;woUld permit automatic self-actuation in the event that containment conditions indicate a severe accident. Closed systems inside and outside containment, sdch as" residual heat removal system and component cooling, would be ex51uded from this design alternative?

Westinghouse estimated that implementing this deIsign alternative'would reduce plantF risk by at most 7.4E-04 person-rem /yr. $ V$,&MbpP' (4)

Ak/?[

Passive Containment Sprays: Installing a passive safety;related containment spray system (a)could resultproducts, Scrub fission in the following primarily forrisk cont benefits:)hinment Isolation failure.

(b) Provide an alternative means to flo6d the rea(tor vessel (in-vessel retention). j (c) Control containment pressure for cases in which the PCS has failed. I Westinghouse estimated that implementirig thisLdesign alte'rnative Would reduce plant risk by at most 6.9E-03 person-rem /yr[which would' represent' eliminating all release categories except containment bypass.

m I ~ 4 Rhf/

'",,;,9 (5) Active High-Pressure Safetyjnjec ion System: Adding'a safety-related, active high-pressure safety injection systerr! would enable the reactor to prevent a core melt in all f

events except excessive A'and a6ticipated tra6sient without scram. Note, however, that this design alternati n not corisistent wit 6the AP600 design objectives, in that it would change the AP606 rom a plant with onl[ passive systems to a plant with both passive and actly(syst' ems. Westinghbuse' estimated that implementing this design altamative;would' reduce' plant risk byat'rnost 6.1E-03 person-rem /yr.

%.$ %k A (6)  : Stearh Generator Shell-Side Heatflemoval System: This design alternative would 1 involve installin[a. passiv's safety-related heat removal system to the secondary side of l 4

This ephancement would provide closed loop secondary system the steain co6firig generators,hatural via th'e use of circulation and stored water cooling, th g^lois of the primhry Met sink given loss of startup feedwater and the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger. Westinghouse estimated that implernenting this design alternative would redLce plant risk by at most 5.3E-04 person-rem /yr.

f$ /

(7)M Direct Steam Ge/ and Relief Valve Flow to the IRWST: To prevent or nerator Safety 3 reduce fissi6n" product release from bypassing containment during an steam generator g Jtube rupturd (SGTR) event, flow from the steam generator safety and relief valves could RMbe directed to the IRWST. An alternative, lower cost approach to this design alternative NoUid be to redirect the flow only from the first stage safety valve to the IRWST.

Westinghouse estimated that implementing this design alternative would reduce plant risk by at most 4.2E-04 person-rem /yr.

7 I

1 1

4 l

(8) increased Steam Generator Pressure Capability: In lieu of design alternative (7) above, fission product release bypassing containment could be prevented or reduced by l

increasing the steam generator secondary side and safety valve set point to a level high enough so that an SGTR will not cause the secondary system safety valve to open.

l- Although detailed analyses have not been performed, it is estimated that the secondary L ' side design pressure would have to be increased by several hundred psi to make this

) alternative effective. Westinghouse estimated that implementing this design alternative j would reduce plant risk by at most 4.2E-04 person-rem /yr.

. (9) Secondary Containment Filtered Ventilation

This d ign alte uld involve  ;

installing a passive charcoal and high-efficiency p te a

~

m for the l middle and lower annulus region of the seconda . " crete c low // !

Elevation 135'-3"). Drawing a partial vacuum o " e middl '

uctor l motive power from compressed gas tanks wou ' [ erate ' filter sy n  !

alternative would reduce particulate fission pr I from any fa ment

. penetrations. Westinghouse estimated that im this design alteinstfn would reduce plant risk by at most 7.4E-04 person-re .

.(10) - Diverse IRWST Injection Valves: In the currert[t' design Ive in series with a check valve isolates each of the four IRWS ' ' tion pa ide diversity, the design could be modified so that a diffe 3rovide ives in two of the lines. This enhancement would red 4s comtion cause failures of the four IRWST injection paths. Wes ouse ' 'plementing this design ,

alternative would reduce plant rig y at m, 5. n-rem / reactor-year, which would represent eliminating ~ re da e seg resulting from a failure of IRWST injection (3BE seg s). ,

~

(11) Diverse Containment R lation .es: 1 ,

current design, a squib . valve isolates eac of the four nt recir . In two of the four paths, each of the sq es is i th a ch In the remaining two paths, each squib

'q peries - era alve (MOV). To provide diversity, the design co ied rent vendor provides the squib valves in two lines. This enh Idr lihood of common cause failures of the four contain lation estinghouse estimated that implementing this design alte. e pl sk by at rnost 1.5E-04 person-rem / reactor-year, which repres all core damage sequences resulting from a failure of tainment r 3BL sequences).

(1 Ex-Vessel Core t er: This design alternative would inhibit core-concrete interaction j (CCl), even in es where the debris bed dries out. The enhancement would involve

! designing ructure in the containment cavity or using a special concrete or coating.

yThe cu~' 600 design incorporates a wet cavity design in which ex vessel cooling is

[(4  ? ntain core debris within the vessel. In cases where reactor vessel flooding d, the PRA assumes that containment failure occurs from an ex-vessel steam

%? " -

l

• ibipiosion or CCl. Westinghouse estimated that implementing this design alternative

- would reduce plant risk by at most 6.1 E-03 person-rem / reactor-year.

8 o

l

'(13) High Pressure Containment Design: The proposed high-pressure containment design would have' a design pressure of approximately 300 psi, and would include a passive cooling feature similar to the existing containment design. This design would reduce the likelihood containment failures from severe accident phenomena such as steam explosions and hydrogen detonation. However, this alternative would not reduce the

. frequency or magnitude of releases from an unisolated containment. Westinghouse estimated that implementing this design alternative would reduce plant riskpy at most 6.1E-03 person-rem / reactor-year. 9 (14) increased Reliability of the Diverse Actuation SysternJDAS): essihn alternative would involve improving the reliability of the DAS. MpAS issionnisty system that can automatically trip the reactor and turbine and ate ce:talriengniered safety //

features (ESF) equipment if the protection and 'ty monitegny syWelid$4 enable toy perform these functions. In addition, the DAS ides divpse monilolsl@lW5 elected plant parameters to guide manual operation an actor trip an'd'EE!

actuations. Westinghouse estimated'that impi is design alternattvs[would reduce plant risk by at most 2.2E-04 person-re r.

3.3 Staff Evaluation The staff reviewed the set of potential SAMDAg by Westige and found it to be reasonably complete. The activity was accq - ,= ng design alternatives associated with the following plants: LimedW(NUR che Peak (NUREG-0775),

CE System 80+ (NUREG-1462), Watts On (NURi$04 h ABWR (NUREG-1503).

Also surveyed were accident manag " t strate $es (NU R-5474), and alternatives identified through the Containme rma " improve $bnt (CPI) Program (NUREG/CR-5567, -5575, -56 1556 The results the staff's a nt are Appendix A to the " Review of Severe Accident n Desj tives ( r the Westinghouse AP600 Design" (SEA 97-27 prepa . ce an ineering Associates Inc., and dated August 29, 1997. T .

rieff s each of the design alternatives identified in the foregoing re . lso in . e Westinghouse AP600 design alternatives, which are discussed i 1B of R; In all, the staff reviewed more than 120 possible design alt most i ovements identified as part of the NRC's CPI program.

Specific f6veme d applicable to the AP600 included a filtered containment vent and a ed rubble ention device, two improvements specifically mentioned in NU -0660 for eval 'part of Three Mile Island (TMI) Item II.B.8. The list of 120 also in d potential SAM $s oriented toward reducing the risk from major contributors to risk for

, including SG 4 vents.

the We '

house analysis did not consider several design alternatives, in most ed alternatives are either (1) already included in the AP600 design, or (2) s of risk reduction by one or more of the design alternatives that were included in t nghouse analysis. In other cases, the design alternatives were pertinent only to boiling water reactors. The staff's preliminary review did not reveal any additional design alternatives that obviously should have been considered by Westinghouse. Also, 9

l

)

1

' Westinghouse considered some potential design alternatives to be considerations for accident management strategies rather than design attematives.

The staff noted that the set of SAMDAs reviewed by Westinghouse is not allinclusive, in that additional (perhaps less-expensive) SAMDAs could be postulated. However, the benefits offered by any additional modifications would not likely exceed those for the modifications evaluated, and the costs of alternative improvements are not expected to be less than those of the least expensive improvements evaluated, when the subsidiary costs associaind*with maintenance, procedures, and training are considered.

f The discussions in Appendix 1B of the SSAR do not speci . basikohhEhrocess that Westinghouse used to screen the many possible design _ ritatives tdarrhe si ti le final list of 14 selected for further evaluation. Similarly, Westinghohte's respop516 thesteN's request; for additional information (RAls) provided few additiondihsights inWthe prom Noinethetsss, as noted above, the staff's review of the more than 1205sndidaie' designs did hotidentify'any new alternatives likely to be more cost-beneficial than theep uded in Westinghouse's .

evaluation of AP600 design alternatives. On this basis,'he~ t neludes that the set of potential SAMDAs identified by Westinghouse is acce 16 Q4 -

3.4 Risk Reduction Potential of SAMDAs [

3.4.1 Westinghouse Evaluation

]s.

f" In its evaluation, Westinghouse assumed that ea design abernative would work perfectly to completely eliminate the respective acdident se ~nces. assumption is conservative, as it maximizes the benefit of each desjgisiiliternati which i 'easured on the basis of risk reduction. (For example, the risife$ diction astigned to Mssive containment sprays assumes that all release categories excep"tcontainment bypassyre eliminated.) In each case, Westinghouse used anal els andres0ltscifmtained in the AP600 PRA to estimate the risk reductineRor each terms oflidialstiedy pe

~' -'" rnative.K ~ 'ouse then expressed the risk reduction in year rebbi d by the total population within a radius of 80.5 km (50[nti.)' AP e. Each of the 14 design alternatives was evaluated

}{p separately. N -

Table 1 of this:EA sWe house's risk reduction estimates by comparing the benefitsgs0erting oNeheengiosure using each potential design alternative. The bases for these,sstimates are prdildediniection 1.B.7 of the SSAR.

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' 3.4.2 Staff Evaluation The staff reviewed Westinghouse's bases for estimating the risk reduction associated with the various SAMDAs, and concluded that Westingnouse used a reasonable, and generally conservative, rationale and assumptions as the bases for the risk reduction estimates regarding

each design alternative. -

4 The level of risk reduction estimated for the various SAMDAs is driven two lying assumptions in the methodology. Specifically, Westinghouse's risk r timates reflect only the contribution from internal events initiated at power d the estimate (mean) values without consideration of uncertainties in core da quen offsite y consequences.' Althougti this is consistent with the a ' h taken

• n jf alternative evaluations, further consideration of these f rs coul . d to spt 1 risk reduction values, given the extremely small CDF k tes in th LA for internal events. *

. In assessing the risk reduction poteritial of S MDAs for design, the staff considered Westinghouse's risk reduction estimates for the variou conjunction with supplementary parametric analyses to evaluate the ntial i '

ernal events and uncertainties. These analyses are further discus ection .

3.5 Cost Imoacts of Candidate SAMDAs -

3.5.1 Westinghouse Evaluation J g 4

V j  ;

Sections 1 ,18.4.3, of the the capital cost estimates for the AP600 design a es eval esting Table 18.8-1 of the SSAR presents the i results val ifically, Jr e,ach design attemative, Table 18.8-1 lists the i potential , th it (assuming the design alternative was highly effective in reducing , ths '

, and the net capital benefit. Notably, Westinghouse' ations ccount for factors such as design engineering,

- testing, an lat th each design alternative. If included, these factors would i the and decrease the capital benefits of each attemative. Thus, 3 thisa ch is conse .

t Staff Evaluation : ,

i  ;

nableness of the cost estimates that Westinghouse presented in the SSAR, the capital costs for the AP600 design alternatives with those evaluated for the and CE System 80+ designs. However, there is not an exact match in the design 1 alternatives among the reactor designs, so only broad comparisons are possible.

c 1

1 i i

i For example, the AP600 active high-pressure safety injection system, which is estimated to cost $20 million, adds an active high-pressure safety injection pump and associated piping,

' valves, and supports, thus adding an entire new safety related system to the AP600 design.

" This attemative can be compared to the alternative high-pressure safety injection for the CE System 80+ decign, which is estimated to cost $2.2 million. However, the design alternative for  :

the CE System 80+ design simply adds parallel piping and valves to an existing system, which t would be expected to cost only a fraction of the total system price.

I Similarly~, the filtered containment vent for the AP600 desig n be j to systems with I L similar functions for the ABWR and the CE System 80+ .T .

. Ign included a filtered containment vent and all associated piping and tions. l. esign add l

an ex-containment filter system to an existing venting s' m. Th t ' n inc j a filtered containment vent similar to the multi-venturi q bbin . ems im e j European plants. _ The estimated costs for the three va s- $5 milli n, i and $10 million, respectively - reasonably agres with ( given the differe in the - j

. designs.

.The costs for the non safety-grade containment s RAP ich was evaluated in an earlier version of SSAR Section 1B befo orate AP600 design, can be compared to the reactor building spray 'gn an . alternative

~

! containment spray for CE System 80+ d . Thi ernative involves adding piping and spray headers inside contai t, an nn isting fire water system. j Similarly, for the ABWR, the existin ntain t fire s ,

stem would be modified to l provide sprays in areas vulnerabi lon uct role . The ABWR modification would j thus be limited to providing spr to s ted are containment. For the CE System l 80+ design, this altemative inv addin g ect to the existing in-containment spray syst ogether wit umps i ater. Estimated costs for these three l sprays re $4 the AP , $100,000 for the ABWR design, and

! $1.5 mi CE esign. ht of the scope differences among these design al ye est AP600 spray system appear to be reasonable, j i

! These com at t st estimates for'several of the AP600 design l

'altemati easonat ' h the costs for roughly similar design alternatives evaluated for '

l the A and the CE .

designs. ,

l-er assess the sonableness of the' AP600 design'altemative cost estimates, the staff l indepen cost estimates for one particular design alternative, the active, non )

ted ment spray system. (This analysis was performed before the l L ray system was incorporated into the AP600 design and deleted from SSAR e assessment assumed the addition of fire protection system grade spray he supply piping inside containment (carbon steel), and the addition of control valves

' and piping outside containment and connected to the existing fire water supply system. The resulting costs for the containment spray system ranged from about $300,000 to $350,000 l (1996 dollars), depending on the assumptions made regarding the required pipe size. These 13 I

' independent estimates did not include design engineering; first-of-a-kind costs; or allowances for associated personnel training, procedure development, or recurring operations and

' maintenance costs. This approach is similar to that used in Westinghouse's cost estimation.

" l Thus, the Westinghouse estimate of $415,000 for this design alternative reasonably agrees with the independent estimate, in addition, the staff developed an independent cost estimate for a containment spray system similar to that described above, but with increased pumping capacity. (The increased pumping capacity is needed because Westinghouse's letter of L

March 13,1997, indicated that the currently designed fire water supply gystem %able of delivering less than 1.89 kUmin (500 gpm) to the proposed containm r tem.) The system evaluated for this alternative would increase the fire ater p ~

ty so that each pump would be capable of delivering 11.36 kUmin (3000 to th nt sprays  !

against a containment pressure of 310.3 kPa (30 psig). piping fire water I the containment in the_ current design would be increa size t sist .

This modification to the AP600 design was estimated t st ab 70, As with the foregoing estimate, no allowance was made f training, pr i' development, or recurring operations and maintenanc On the basis of this audit, the' staff viewed We ting 's a st estimates as adequate, given the uncertainties surrounding th ying c , and the level of l precision necessary given the greater uncertai on the de, with which these l

costs were compared. v

)

. w l

'3.6 Cost-Benefit Comparison -

4~ i 3.6.1.We'stinghouse Evaluation a g After c Idhe ris wtentianm t impact of the various SAMDAs, Westingh ed c mparison to determine whether any of the potential i

- severe-acci ' n de would be justified. To do so Westinghouse )

assessed the j ch d native in terms of potential risk reduction, which was 1 defined as gl le-be person-rem per year received by the total population within a us 80.5 '

the AP600 plant site. Westinghouse then assigned a value

_ of $1, to each per verted offsite exposure, which was assumed to account for.

alth effects and roperty damage. This value was treated as the annual levelized b t for averted risk.  !

j mine t imum expenditure justified by a given reduction in risk (" maximum capital i I ouse divided the annual levelized benefit by the annual levelized fixed c e annual levelized fixed charge rate was determined to be 15.7 percent in curr . dollars on the basis of factors and methods provided in documents developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI P-6587-L) and the U.S. Department of Energy l (DOE /NE-0095). Westinghouse calculated the fixed charge rate using a component ' book life" of 30 years. The use of a high charge rate tends to minimize the capital benefit associated with 14 l

~

f L each design alternative. Nevertheless, the 30-year life used in the calculations makes little difference in the economic benefit compared to the more typical 60-year life, particularly when the high levelized annual fixed charge rate of 15.7 percent is used.

- The Westinghouse approach for calculating the benefits or reduced risk from each individual -

. design alternative also does not give credit for averted onsite property damage and replacement energy costs which are realized through a reduction in ace [ncy. The onsite property damage and replacement energy costs negt may have because the beer [jden estimated CDF is very low. However, as indicated below, these onsite

~

ations can substantially add to the benefits that may be achieved usi . " ign 50tegneSpes. .

/ f h Table 1 of this EA reports Westinghouse's cost-benefit timates foieach p . SAMDA i using a screening criterion of $1,000/ person-rem-avertIdii$hjdoritNy whether ai 9

' 6tf  ;

SAMDAs could be cost effective. As shown in Table 1,$

Westinghouse for any design attemative is about $50, wfjN@asjepital cost )f 1

- expensive design altemative is $33,000. On this basisfyF5 hen $segee concluded that no i' additional modifications to the AP600 design are warriimted. I 3.6.2 Staff Evaluation The NRC recently updated its recom ded apgueac the monetary conversion of radiation l exposures. Previous guidance s . that person-reprof exposure should be valued at

$1,000. This conversion factor f ite d was intended to account for both health effects  :

and offsite property damage, a xposur ' _urred future years were not to be discounted. i The recent ' ' dance give M NRC's r lysis guidelines (NUREG/BR-0058, l Revision mmen ,000 pQgspan' rem of exposure as the monetary i conver' ' In a sessingvases and impacts, future exposures are to be discountedttralgbat thelf rth. Offsite property damage from nuclear accidents is l to be separa ' nd a the $2,000 per person-rem value. l

.h

~$  ;

Evaluatigwps'recently

@A -

y Brookhaven National Laboratory for the NRC assessed total I costs associated with .

'ses, including both health effects and property damage / loss effeds'lNUREG/CR-6349).(C6sts were assessed for each of the five NUREG-1150 plants (G$sid Gulf, Peach Bo , Sequoyah, Surry and Zion). The results indicated that overall cM associated with , ite releases of radioactive materials, presented on a cost per pengpn-rem

, of exp to the public, ranged from about $2,000 to more than $5,000 por Mit' tfbrem, de g on factors such as the assumed interdiction criteria. A criterion of I

$ I rem averted was added to accountcost-benefit for offsite property damage and oth r severe accidents. Thus, the Westinghouse evaluation approach use 5 600 design alternatives is not consistent with the approach recommended in NUREG/BR-0058 Revision 2. The key differences are summarized in Table 2 of this EA, and the staff's independent evaluation is found below.

15

m Table 2 Key Differences Between the Westinghouse Approach and NUREG/BR-0058 I Westinghouse's SAMDA Approach - NUREG/BR-0058 Recommended Approach

$2,000 per person-rem averted to account for

$1,000 per person-rem averted (for valuing health effec,ts, plus $3,000 per ; on-rem risk reduction) ' averted to account forather effects and

? '

related costs Sh.

15.7% discount rate 7% dis t at'e @

j gy No accounting for benefits of averted onsite Consi en for benefits'okserted cleanup and decontaminadon costs onsite decontamination costs df .

No accounting for benefits of averted .

tion giv % benefits of averted {

replacement energy costs 1 ener sts hES%

y To arrive at a baseline potential be rom t eductionM offsite risk, the staff applied the recommended approach in NUR '00 vision 3% the design alternatives identified for  :

the AP600 design. This EA use ^

iscou of " ent and assumed a reactor life of I 60 years. ' averted risk: desig # Was taken from Table 1B.8-1 of the SSAR. In , the s mon ersion factors for radiation exposures. The i first is t rson- ende NUREG/BR-0058, Revision 2. The second,

- $5,000/pe .

nten t for offsite property damage and health effects. The results for ea ternat n in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1. For comparison purposes, West j stim e capital cost, averted risk, and capital benefit for each

' design alter s ente lumns 2,3, and 4 of Table 1). A 100% effective design alternativ id red and/or offsite releases to zero. Estimated benefits from a 100 % ive design a re also shown for each of the alternative cost bases (last row - )

of T 1).

T suits shown in le 1 indicate that the benefits calculated using a 7-percent discount 3 r -year pl , and a $2,000/ person-rem conversion factor is about a factor of four l' ulated by Westinghouse. The benefits calculated using

$ are about a factor of 10 higher than those estimated by Westinghouse. The

- hi benefit shown in Table 1 amounts to less than $500, while the capital cost for the least expensive design' alternative is $33,000. Thus, even with the highest benefit basis

($5,000/ person-rem,7-percent discount rate,60-year life), the calculated benefits are almost two orders of magnitude too small to justify the addition of any of the design alternatives listed. It should be noted, however, that this assessment neglected the benefits from averted onsite j 16 l l

l.

costs, which are relevant for design alternatives that reduce core damage frequency. Dollar

savings derived from averted onsite costs are treated as an offset or reduction in the capital cost of the design alternative in the staff's analysis.- Averted onsite costs are significant for certain design altematives and are further considered below.

3.7 Further Considerations The estimates of potential design alternative benefits listed in Table 1 of his EA Westinghouse's estimates of averted risk and neglect the benefits from site costs. As mentioned in Section 3.2 of this EA, Westinghouse's risk esti ates '

ntfor uncertainties eitner in the CDF or in the offsite radiation e es r a core damage event. The uncertainties in both of these key elements a ly larg safety

~ features of the AP600 design are unique, and their relia has b h-analysis and testing programs rather than operating ence. dition,'

CDF and offsite exposures do not account for the add xterna even' .

earthquakes.

To further explore these areas, the staff screened the As to determine whether any of the design alternatives could be cost-beneficial ent efit analysis incorporates uncertainties, added risk from extern . ~

ts,and te costs. The staff then performed a more detailed assessment for In alter aving potentially favorable cost-benefit factors under these m ratio , hese analyses are discussed in Sections 3.7.1 - 3.7.3 below. f f

3.7.1' Uncertainties in Core Damag 'uency Accidi lated Exposures

. Revision 8'to the PRA discussed certa . in the e ated CDF for the AP600 design.

Specifically, the CDF uncertainty ributio j" ' cha rized by an error factor (EF) of about 5.7. A. uming a l 71 . istrib

. s the ratio of the 95th percentile to the median, a _ the rat ' dian t could be: er than Numed . . percentile.

in the analysisThus, the CDF discussed for internal above. events

{six

- Additionalfac id su l ' crease the estimated CDF for the AP600 plant

.. include the cont I eve ccident sequences that have not yet been identified, as well as nce t have not yet been analyzed in the PRA. Examples of

~

the latter ~ e exte _

l ch as fires and earthquakes. Notably, the CDF base estim 1.7E-07/rea j es not include the contribution of external events. In the PR stinghouse indill at external events, in particular internal fires, are estimated to i e the CDF by a l a' factor of four. However, the PRA available for this study did not d the potential co utions from seismic events, which could readily increase the CDF by rof magnitud more. These external events can also degrade the containment e,so e releases from containment may also be higher than for accidents nal events.

The increases in CDF attributed to accident sequences that have not yet been identified is very difficult to estimate.' Presumably, the contributions from such sequences should be small if Westinghouse performs the PRA in a thorough and systematic manner. For the purposes of 17

p i

i

. the present analysis, the effects of these cequences are assumed to be captured by the potential increase in CDF attributed external events.

Section 1B.6 of the SSAR presented Westinghouse's estimates of offsite exposures for the

' major release categories (RCs) defined for the.AP600 design. On the basis of the CDF reference value of 1.7E-07/ reactor-year and the total risk of 7.3E-03 person-rem / reactor-year, Westinghouse estimated that the " average" offsite exposure is of the order of 50, ) person-rem per core damage event. However, Westinghouse's documentation did riot indi the

! uncertainty in the estimated releases.

The average offsite exposure of 50,000 person-rem per A re nt estimated by

,  ; Westinghouse is a factor of 2.7 lower'than the average exposur for the fiv current-generation nuclear plants' addressed in NUREG (after EG-1,

. plant releases to that of a 600-MWe plant)l The better orma f the A be attributed, in part, to methods and assumptions for defi terms, as we h

' likelihood of successful RCS depressurization and in-v n of damaged the AP600 design. )

l

~ Uncertainties in the offsite expbsure estimatein for the nificant. As described in Section 19.1.3.3.3 of NUREG-1512, t Fin luation Report

. (FSER), the AP600 risk profile is shaped by the ajor ass . s regarding containment failure modes and release char h a

conservative assumptions regar , early .ainj from ex-vessel phenomena

• - optimistic assumptions that e al rea vessel < Imhg will always prevent reactor pressure vessel (RPV) brea substantial credit for addit' aero movali TR events if early con ment failure ed (as deterministic calculations performed

.subseq PRA), .or pre breach instead results in a more benign release ainm the i diate time frame), overall risk for internal events 4 would be ut ~ . By contrast, if credit for external reactor vessel I cooling (ERV or e ntainment failure frequency would increase i proportionally, brea assumed to lead to early containment failure in the I baseline P limitt assumption that ERVC always fails and leads to early

. contain ilure, t nt failure frequency would approach the core melt frequency and ri ld increase of 20 (to about 0.16 person-rem /yr).'.Similarly, offsite risk can

, Lbe ' ntly impacted sign fails to realize the decontamination factor (DF) of 100 to aerosol relea r tions for SGTR events predicted by the modular accident analysis m (MAAP) to a t for fission product removal by impaction on steam generator tubes.

s credit for removal, the risk contribution from a containment bypass is minimal

.( of th . Without this credit, overall risk for internal events would increase by a f Id be dominated by containment bypass releases. Finally, the PRA did ct of the non safety-related containment spray system on fission product role niainment sprays could significantly reduce the estimated risk in the baseline PRA (by perhaps a factor of 2), since the sprays would be effective in reducing the source terms in the risk-dominant RCs such as early containment failure (CFE) and containment isolation failure (Cl).~ However,' sprays would not impact releases attributed to SGTR events.

18 7

)

m

w in summary, the actual offsite exposure could range from a factor of two lower to an order of

magnitude higher than the Westinghouse estimate, given the uncertainties in the underlying analyses of containment performance. This uncertainty range was factored into the staff's reassessment discussed below.

3.7.2 Reassessment of Design Alternative Cost-Benefit Relationships in Light of Uncertainties The staff-performed analyses reassess the benefits of potential AP600 design a tives taking into account the uncertainties in estimated CDF, offsite releases of radi '

erials given a

severe accident, and effects of external events. For these lyses, t timated the  !

maximum benefits that can be achieved with AP600 desig . nativd that a altemative can either completely eliminate all core dama nts or minate off releases of radioactive materials if a severe accident d ur, ti <

benefits, the staff used the_ FORECAST code (NUREG/ 5595, ision 1 Regulatory Effects Cost Analysis Software Manual, Ve l cience and Associates, Inc., July 199G). FORECAST allows the us ainty ranges for ey parameters and provides a means to combine uncertaint arameters.' It also provides a distribution for the bottom line costs or bene ' l sents a picture of the' _ ,

' uncertainty in the " bottom line" figures. Table 3 of this pre r parameters used in I

evaluating the maximum potential benefit.

4 p

Table 3 Key Parameters Used by FOR -(f .

,ng Ma m SAMDA Benefits Parameter [] IMk[ Value Reference'AP600 core damageMency[ 1.7EfrYactor-year (EF=5.7).

Average public radiation expgper . g 4p person-rem (rounded to 50,000)

accident: i F & garg + rumed error factor: 5)

Plant i '60 years

{

Disc yy 7% -

" ^

Conversi ,

$5000/ person-rem L Replace' $277,000/ day of downtime

r

~

'Av cleanup an ination costs 8 $1,690,000,000 / major accident

- drted replacementh%y costs8 $20,200,000,000/ major accident on NUREG/CR counts for both offsite health effects and offsite property damage effects a ~

guidance p in NUREG/BR 0184 (not adjusted for AP600-specific features)

'8 average ment energy costs for pressurized water reactors in the 500 - 1000 MWe range F_ of estimating the maximum' potential benefit from AP600 design alternatives,

~ the _

med that external events and accident sequences not yet accounted for in the PRA would increase the reference CDF by two orders of magnitude, (i.e., a factor of 100), with an EF of six used for this higher CDF. The staff then evaluated cases assuming the reference value of j 50,000 person-rem per accident. Table 4 of this EA presents the results of this analysis. i 19 )

l

Table 4 SAMDA Benefits Accounting for Uncertainties and External Events Effects (Benefits,1996$)

5% 95 %

Description Confidence Mean Confidence Level Level Base CDF (1.7E-07/yr) and reference offsite '

e release (50,000 person rem); design 3 .

alternatives which reduce the accident 3g. $26'600 l

.-2 ,

frequency to zero y l Base CDF increased by factor of 100 to i account for external events and other - ;,

2 accident sequences not yet accounted for; other factors same as Case 1; design y fw 3'

$647,000 $2,257,000 alternatives which reduce the accident 9M kL frequency to zero ff  % g'

• Base CDF increased by factor ofj f00 to account for external events; other"jactors -

'/ %y MSi 3 same as Case 1; design alt _ ives whilb $ $1,700 $49,000 $223,000 reduce the offsite releases ro, bdtlo not change the accident fre y (

~

4 x dst M (Vy8y' The entr. e 4 in sign aNematives which prevent accidents (reduce the accident zero) "

(nore cost-effective than design alternatives which reduce or eliminate ses b ffect on accident frequency. This is because of the fairly large ben,

~

ted onsite cleanup and decontamination costs, and avoided rep sts, er of which are assumed to be impacted by design alternati ch . accident frequency.

Cas the reference zing the base CDF and Westinghouse-estimated offsite ex res, in this case e timated benefits are considerably higher than those cited in

-T 1 of this EA, pri ly because they include averted onsite cleanup and decontamination s well as ave replacement energy costs.

the effects of the higher CDF associated with external events, but do not i . of possible higher releases from containment attributed to such events. (in oth these cases retain the base offsite exposure of 50,000 person tem / event.) These cases may be used as the basic benefits including external events and assuming that external events would not impact containment performance. Case 2 shows the potential benefit range for 20

a design attemative which could reduce the accident frequency to zero. Case 3 applies to a design alternative which would eliminate all offsite releases, but which would not impact the CDF.

Table 5 of this EA combines the information in Tables 1 and 4 to estimate the total benefit possible from specific design alternatives. The design alternatives are divided between those -

that impact the CDF and those that impact containment performance but not the F. Benefits l have been estimated by taking the fractional reduction in risk for each design alt ive (compared to the AP600 baseline risk as defined by Westinghouse) a hat fraction to

.. the mean benefits displayed in Table 4.-' Design alternatives at red F were applied to the Case 2 mean benefit, while those that only effect cont tp .

' were applied to the Case 3 mean benefit. ._

The values shown in Columns 4 through 7 of Table 5 r t bene Icula an values. By contrast values shown in Columns 8 throug -

Iculated usi 95*-percentile values. In other words, there is only a 5 ance that the ac enefits will be greater than the values shown in Columns 8-11.

The use of the maximum benefits typically improvos t st- y a factor of approximately five, but does not alter any of the ov nclusi sign alternatives that have acceptable cost-benefit ratios.

j .

3.7.3' Further Evaluation of Design Altern ' s With rable Cost-Benefit Factors Des;gn alternatives that are within a 'de of ing th enefit criteria of

$5,000/ person-rem were subjecte her abilistic . d deterministic considerations, including a qualitative assessme ' foil e g:

. the i et of additiop fits th ' e for the design alternative if it would be et reduc' V cert I events, as well as internal events

. th g(nprovi 'dy made at the plant

. . any ope . .

dvant lated with the potential design alternative W.~h 4.- '

. ' esign al

~

None of . ve a cost-benefit ratio of less than $5,000/ person-rem.

Howev. he only desig ' es that come within a decade of the $5,000/ person-rem stang are the diverse valves at $19,800/ person-rem and the self-actuating ment isolation va , s at $33,700/ person-rem, as described in the following sections,

m. e O

21

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• 1 234 ll

3.7.3.1 Diverse IRWST Injection Valves In the current AP600 design, a squib valve in series with a check valve isolates each of four IRWST injection paths. This design alternative would reduce the likelihood of commori cause failures of IRWST injection to the reactor by utilizing diverse valves in two of the four paths. If it functioned perfectly, this design alternative could potentially reduce the CDF by about 72-percent.

When taking into account external events, other accident sequences not yet includpd in the AP600 PRA, and other uncertainties, this design attemative is estimated to be highly cospsffective. In the absence of a comprehensive external events PRA for the AP600 plant,jthdifjio'utt to estimate the effectiveness of this design alternative in reducing the risk from such evedadHowever, it appears likely that failure to inject coolant to the reactor would remaidspromiAcaligodtabutor to the CDF from external events, in which case, diversity in the IRWS4J6ction valves should help to redud'e the risk from both external and internal events. 7 7 Alternative vendors are available for the check valves, hoggweQis questionable (whogier check valves from different vendors would be sufficiently differentjp.he ponsidered divers'etunless the type of check valve was changed from the current swing ' alve to another type. The swing disk type is preferred for this application, and oth ' y; sidered less reliable.

' Adding diversity to the injection line squib valves would ,

uire a some additional training for plant operations an ge staff, tudmspares ould not appear attothe add plant, and significantly to the operational aspects of the q a greikIr issus concerns the

r. Squib ve'ves are availability specialized valve and designscosts for whichofthere acquiring pre few ven diverse v%s ousefron[ dors claims that (

a vendor may not be willing to design, qualify, build aJessonable ' valve for this AP600 application considering that they would only s ov . per pladf The cost estimate for this design alternative assumes that a second b valv ndor exijts and that the vendor would provide only the two diverse IRWST s uik Ives. - cost t does not include the additional first-time engineejing and qualifi testing i incurred by the second vendor.

(Westinghoundestimated e costs heinore than a million dollars.) As a result, Westingh6geneancludedget~ sign ait live would not be practicable because of the uncertainty 1nmil@lityof a uib valve design / vendor and because of the uncertainty in reliabilityof ang ,of chei e staff considers the rationale set forth by Westinghouse he pot .

tions in reliability and high costs associated with obtaining divere,s . ,reaso . le. On the bases of these arguments, the staff concludes that this n altern ot be further pursued.

3.7.3 FSelf-Actuating C ~ent Isolation Valves .

.esign alternative uld reduce the likelihood of containment isolation failure by adding s ' uating valve nhancing the existing containment isolation valves for automatic closure tainmen , ditions indicate that a severe accident has occurred. Conceptually, the

, er an independent valve or an appendage to an existing fail-closed valve that w post-accident containment conditions within containment. For example, a fusible link it in response to elevated ambient temperatures, thereby providing the self-actuating function to vent the air operator pf a fail-closed valve. This design alternative is estimated to impact releases from containment by only 10-percent. It has a cost-benefit ratio of

$33,000/ person-rem, and achieves this ratio primarily because of its low capital costs.

23

This improvement to the containment isolation capability would appear to be effective in reducing offsite releases for accidents involving either external or internal events. Also, the effectiveness of this design alternative would not be affected by the design changes made as a result of the AP600 PRA.

The addition of this design alternative would impose minor operational disadvantages to the plant in that the operations and maintenance staff would require some additional training In addition, these automatic features would require periodic testing to ensure that they are functibning properly. /$

gh&g Perhaps the biggest question regarding this design alterna _^is whether R can be implemented for a cost of only $33,000. The cost estimate does not appeaf to include the first-time engineering and quaiification testing that would be required to demonstrate that )he valve;would perforrn_ its' I intended function in a timely and reliable manner. The costs associated with pedodic testing 'and l maintenance also do not appear to have been includedEThe staff believes that'the actualbosts of this design alternative would be substantially higher thakWestinghouse's estimate"(perhaps by a factor of 10) when all related costs are realistically considered.1 On the basis of the unfavorable cost-benefit ratio, and the expectation that actual costs,wo0ld tse Westinghouse, the staff concludes that this design attemative cost-beneficial is p_even and need not high be further evaluated. p $4 ' $

3.8 Conclusions

( k As discussed in Section 19.1 of AP600 FS'ER, West ghbuse extehdively used the PRA results to l arrive at a final AP600 design. As a resiJit, the estlihated CDF arh risk calculated for the I AP600 plant are very low both relatisto operatinh plants and in absolute terms. Moreover, the low CDF and risk for the AP600 design

• reflect Westingho6se's efforts to systematically minimize -

the effect of initiators / sequences that have b'een importsn't contributors to CDF in previous PWR  ;

PRAs. Westinghouse has achiehe'd this objectl0s laigel'y by incorporating a number of hardware '

improvemen's t in the AP600' design. These and othe'r AP600 design features which contribute to low CDF and ris6ffor the"AP000 design are ' disc 6ssed in Section 19.1 of the AP600 FSER.

%% s% f %

Because the AP,900 des!gn already contairjs numerous plant features oriented toward reducing CDF and risk, the benefits and risk toduction potential of additional plant improvements are significantly, reduced (This ,is true for both internally and externally initiated events. Moreover, with the features already incorporated in the AP600 design, the ability to estimate CDF and risk approaches the limitations of probabilistic techniques. Specifically, when CDFs of 1 in 100,000 or 1,000,000 years are estirpated th a PRA, it is the area of the PRA where modeling is least corp $lete, or supporting detais sparse or even nonexistent, that could actually be the more imporiant contributors tojisk. Areas not modeled or incompletely modeled include human reliability, sabotage,Jare initiating events, construction or design errors, and system interactions.

Although. improvements in the modeling of these areas may introduce additional contributors to CDF andilskyth'e, staff does not expect that additional contribution <, would change anything in absolute termsf wr 24

F The staff concurs with Westinghouse's conclusion that none of the potential design modifications evaluated are justified on the basis of cost-b-nefit considerations. The staff further concludes that it is unlikely that any other design changes would be justified on the basis of person-rem exposure considerations, because the estimated CDFs would remain very low on an absolute scale.

4.0 THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED ACTION A

Issuing an amendment to 10 CFR Part 52 certifying the AP600 design would not. con.s titute a significant environmentalimpact. The amendment would merely codifyMe resultiof the NRC's review and approval of the AP600 design as defined in the FSER, datesi Sipsr6ber 1998 (NUREG-1512). Further, because the amendment is a ru '9 ere ars rioteengces involved that 4MA

~

would have alternative uses.

e As described in Section 3 of this EA, the NRC reviewed ernativesi t the\%hdeSgn rulemaking and alternative design features related to prouenting;idd mitigating severe' accidents.

Consideration rule is the appropriate of alternatives course under of action, and (2) NEPA was to ensure'thatthshe, necessaE(1)lte'show sign codified in the tha, certification rule would not exclude any cost-beneficial deIWgh . related to the prevention and mitigation of severe accidents. The NRC concludss'that tt( [ 'ves to design certification rulemaking. did not provide for resolution h of /issues as clid the prop

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This design certification rulemaking is in keeping wit INoCommission's intent in the

" Standardization and Severe Accident Podriy StaterrlintsXsed 10,jCFR Part 52, to make fMure plants safer than the current generationhiants, to Ehleve M resolution of licensing issues, and to enhance the safety benefits of stasierdizatiod! ThroughTits own independent analysis, the NRC also concludes that Westinghouse'adeduatelyjionsideredin appropriate set of SAMDAs, and none were found to be cost-beneddal. Althod no design changes resulted from reviewing the SAMDAs, Westinghouse had'airssidy incor$oraiedcie' stain features in the AP600 design on the basis of the PRA,results.fSeed6k3.2 of thle EApresients examples of these features. These design featurgetslate to sovels accident prevention and mitigation, but were not considered in the SAMDA eyalundenbecause' ' legiealready part of the design. See FSER Section 19.1.6, "Use of PRA in the'Doelgn Process." A N jg y dg -

y .

Finally, the cM;sulegitsel would not authorize the siting, construction, or operation of an '

AP600 desfgn nuclear powerplegt. The issuance of a CP, ESP, COL, or OL for the AP600 design will require a prospectiv4lapNicant to address the environmental impacts of construction and operadlin at a specific site' pat that time, the NRC will evaluate the environmental impacts and issuisn EIS in accordarits with NEPA. The SAMDA analysis for the AP600, however, has been cosipieted as part of thii.EA and will not need to be reevaluated as part of an EIS related to siting, cdnekWction, or operalitin.

25 m

e 5.0 AGENCIES AND PERSONS CONSULTED, AND SOURCES USED i 1

The sources for this EA include Westinghouse's "AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report," as amended, August 19,1998; and the NRC's " Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the AP600 Standard Design" (NUREG-1512, Volumes 1,2 and 3),

September 1998.

The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), has determined under.tk National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the NRC's regulatio6s in 10;CFR Part 51, I Subpart A, that this rule is not a major Federal action significantly affecting ths duality of the I human environment, and therefore, an EIS not required. Thishasis f6r,the delarmination, as documented in this final EA, is that the amendment to 10,OPR Part 52 M not' authorize the8' siting, construction, or operation of a facility using the AFj400 design;fVvoUld$dodif AP600 design in a rule. Therefore, the NRC staff did not ksue thisfA Federal, for co'm State, and local agencies. However, the NRC's finding 'of Ao sigrifficant environ ~mentalipp'act was l the proposed AP800 design certification the environmental impactsrule and and issue an EIS as there appropriaiwere no comments recei the application (s) for the siting,pg construction,&% or operati6ri of a fac@{

The Director of NRR finds that Westinghouse's,etfeluelign provides seul56ent basis to conclude that there is reasonable assurance that an amjendmentto,10 CFR Pait 52 certifying the AP600 design will not exclude a severe accident deitgn alteiria#ve fofa facility referencing the certified design that would have been cost-beneficial had itMhn honsidered'as part of the original design certification application. The evaluation'of these,iesues under NEPA is considered resolved for i the AP600 design.

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