IR 05000247/1986013

Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept 50-247/86-13 on 860604.No Violations Noted.Major Areas inspected:full-participation Emergency Exercise

ML20207D240
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	07/09/1986
From:	Amato C, Lazarus W, Vito D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207D221	List: IR 05000247/1986013 ML20207D218
References
50-247-86-13, NUDOCS 8607220053
Download: ML20207D240 (7)

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U.S. NU. LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-247/86-13 Docket N License N DPR-26 Category C Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, In Broadway & Bleakly Avenues Buchanan, New York 10511 Facility Name: Indian Point Unit No. 2 Inspection At: Buchanan, New York Inspection Conducted: June 4, 1986 Inspectors: -

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fG D. NSentar/ Emergency Prepa#dness date~

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9 9 ffG C. G. Msto, Enfersency Preparepss da'te'

Specialist (Team Leader)

L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector, IP-2 E. Podolak, NRC, Hg J. Davis, PNL D. Fischer, PNL G. Weale, Sonalyst, Inc Approved by: oW 7 G W. L s, C , Emergency Preparedness date Areas Inspected: Routine, announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of a full participation emergency exercise at Indian Point Unit No.2 on June 4, 1986. The inspection was performed by a team of seven NRC Region I, NRC headquarters and NRC contractor personne Results: The licensee's response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public. No violations were identifie DR 860711 ADOCK 05000247 PDR

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting on June 5, 198 Consolidated Edison Company of New York, In Murray Selman, Vice-President Nuclear Power John Basile, General Manager, Nuclear Power Generation John Curry, Chief, Technical Engineer Nuclear Power Michael L. Miele, General Manager, Environmental Health and Safety Anthony Nespoli, Consultant to the Vice President, Nuclear Power Vincent L. Lander, Manager, Radiological Health Joseph J. Higgins, Manager, Chemistry Bowin Lindgren, Administrator,' Emergency Preparedness and Public Affairs Thomas Elsroth, Administrator Security Lawrence Kleinman, Director Public Information Robert Healy, Manager Energy Education Center Stephen W. Profeta, Supervisor Nuclear

.slan Homyk, Manager, Radiological Engineering George Liebler, Emergency Preparedness Section Anthony Ferraro, Emergency Planning Section Eric Bollin, Regulatory Affairs Technical Support Victor Meglovevich, Power Generation Support Astoria, Joseph Goebel, Technical Support Garry Hinrichs, Technical Support Richard Platt, Nuclear Power Group Joseph Barlok, Technical Support Michael Skotzko, Construction Assistant Ed Goetchius, Radiological Engineering Victor Nutter, Radiological Engineering David Smith, Radiological Engineering Thomas Rose, Quality Assurance and Reliability Janet M: Lay, Emergency Planning (Medical)

Stephen Sadlon, Administrative Services William Breckel, Administrative Services Richard Maier, Administrative Services A.N. Scnwayri, M.D., Medical Department Paul Marano, Emergency Prepardness Robert McKeon, Technical Support Others Peter W. Kelley, Resident Inspector USNRC, Region I Carl Patrick, New York Power Authority Charles Dimino, Nuclear Facility Safety Committee, Impell Cor Timothy Cotter, Nuclear Facility Safety Committee, Impell Corp.

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In addition, the inspectors observed the actions of numerous licensee personnel during the conduct of the exercis .0 Emergency Exercise The Indian Point Unit 2 announced exercise was conducted on June 4,1986 from 6:10 A.M. until 6:45 .1 Pre-Exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise NRC Region I representatives had telephone conversations with licensee representatives to review exercise objectives and the scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to certain scenario data by the license In addition, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on June 3, 198 The exercise scenario included the follow-ing events:

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Reactor coolant system leakage in excess of Technical Specifi-cation limits;

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A loss of offsite power;

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A fire damaging safety-related equipment (Motor Control Centers

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26 A & B);

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A small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) resulting in safety injection;

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A large break LOCA and subsequent core uncovery; and

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A release of radioactivity to the atmosphere through failed  :

purge valve These events resulted in the activation of all of the licensee's emergency response facilitie ;

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2.2 Exercise Observation  :

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The NRC observation team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and acti- ,

vation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) ware generally consistent with the Emergency Plan, Administrative Procedures and Implementation Procedures. The NRC team also noted the followirg ,

areas where the licensee's activities were thoroughly planned a '

efficiently implemented:

Use of procedures;

, Initial and continuing notification to off-site authcrities; l

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4 j Rapid staffing of Emergency Response Facilities;

Thorough and on going Health Physics support of Emergency Response Facilities including habitability checks;

The Control Room staff actions and communications were correct and timely, and carried out in a proficient manner; The Technical Support Center (TSC) was rapidly staffed and declared operational without delay; TSC staff assessed plant conditions and developed recommendations for corrective actions; The On-site Support Center (OSC) and five OSC teams were fully staffed and functional in a timely manner; Accountability of Indian Point Unit 2 personnel was completed in 32 minutes. Accountability of technical service personnel was maintained during the exercise; Maintenance and corrective operations were carried out by technical service personnel (OSC team members) as requeste Teams were briefed prior to departure. The Duty Roster Board was properly maintained showing assignments, work locations, names of team members and mission dose equivalents. Team members doses were estimated prior to dispatch to minimize exposure to team member *

The Emergency Director (ED) gave the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff thorough briefings and exhibited command and control throughout the exercise; The Emergency Director, Technical Advisor (TA) and Off-site Radiological Assessment Director (ORAD) formed an effective team. Plant status was identified and changes in emergency classification and indicated protective actions were anticipated in advance of scenario development;

Plant and radiological status information was kept current; Use was made of maps and overlays including Emergency Response Planning Area (ERPA) designators; Meteorological data posting was accurate and timely; Default time values for the duration of the release were used in the absence of estimated times for release duration;

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Pressurized Ion Chamber (PIC) data was requested and used;

IE IN 83-28 was applied to develop Protective Action Recommen-dations based on barrier breach analysis prior to the onset of radioactive material release; A very complete transition briefing was given to the Recovery Manager (RM) by the ED; Off-site field teams were briefed prior to dispatch and updated by radio as to changes in plant conditions. Observed team members were very well trained and knowledgeable. Survey data was taken while traveling between predesignated or assigned locations. Self-reading dosimeters were checked regularl Information was relayed between teams when direct communication with the EOF was not possible due to topographic factors; and The Recovery Planning meeting was excellent. There was a cur-rent status briefing and consideration given to about 22 items including continuing support to the State and Counties, con-tinued operation of the News Center, priority consideration of re-entry for evacuees, and restoration to normal functio Observation of actions relating to open items from the previous exercise demonstrated adequately that with two exceptions there was no repetitio The following open items are close (Closed) IFI (50-247/85-14-01) The Emergency Action Levels (EAL) in the Emergency Plan are not outlined in a usable format and resulted in confusion among key licensee participants when attempting to classify the emergency on two separate occasions. The EAL's should be revised and simplified so that the Shift Supervisor or Emergency Director is able to make a rapid and accurate emergency classifi-cation based on any abnormality associated with plant operatio The " Initiating Conditions / Emergency Action Levels for Declaration of Emergency" were revised on May 13, 1986. No apparent difficulty was observed in correctly classifying emergencie (Closed) IFI (50-247/85-14-02) Briefings were not provided to TSC personnel regarding updates in emergency classification and status of the activities taking place in other areas of the plan The TSC staff was briefed during the conduct of the exercis . .. .-. - _ - -_ - . - .._ . - -- -.

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(Closed) IFI (50-247/85-14-05) The size, space, and habitability i limitations of the E0F will inhibit an integrated and coordinated response by both augmented licensee staff and outside support per-  :

sonnel if a severe and prolonged emergency should occu ;

The EOF is a two level, dedicated facilit It is slated for en- I largement which will increase area by 50%. During the exercise 20 .

players and 16 non players occupied the EOF. Although crowded, this number of people did not appear to impede the proper function of the EO The following areas were identified which require licensee attentio Some of these findings were also identified by the licensee as part of their post exercise critiqu (0 pen) IFI (50-247/86-13-01) Failure to promptly recognize that fire damage to a safety system train or function constitutes a Site Area Emergency. The fire was announced at 9:30 A.M. and the SAE declared at 10:12 (0 pen) IFI (50-247/86-13-02) The E0F did not keep the Control Room and TSC informed of EOF action (0 pen) IFI (50-247/86-13-03) The site announcement of a Site Area Emergency declaration was delayed 12 minute (0 pen) IFI (50-247/86-13-04) The public address system was barely audible to inaudible in the TSC and OSC. This is a repeat item from the 1985 exercise (no. 50-247/85-14-03). This condition also pre-vailed in the tool room 15 foot elevatio (0 pen) IFI (50-247/86-13-05) The OSC was not updated as to plant conditions after 11:08 (0 pen) IFI (50-247/86-13-06) No apparent use was made of field monitoring team data to refine the source ter *(0 pen) IFI (50-247/86-13-07) There was no discussion ~ of shift change or demonstration of shift change capability by presentation of a second shift duty roste (0 pen) IFI (50-247/86-13-08) The observed field monitoring team did not monitor themselves, their equipment, vehicle or samples upon return to the site even though instructed to do so by the radio controlle , . - . - . . . - . . . ..,. .. . . . . ... .. - .- -

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Thi3 is a repeat item fr:m tne 1985 exercisa (no. 5C* 247/85-14-04).

Also, members of tb'a cbserved field monitorin9 team did not che their hands for contamination after collecting samples. Samples were left in the vehici *(0 pen) IFE (50-847/66-12-9) The obser.ed field mcnitoring team remained in a irigh radiation area awaiting directions fro.t the radio controlle .3 Licensee'_s Criticue The WRC tsain attend,d the licensee'; post-exercise critirpe on June 5,1986, durir g wt ch lead li' enseec ccatrollers discussed ab-servations 'of the exercise. The critique addressed inveral areas which require farther atteration. Wh11a adequate, the cr tique cceld i -

have been mere specific in nature to facilitate the tracking of problem area ,

3.0 Exit Meeting Following the licensee's self* critique, the NRC team me+ with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this repor The teaa le: der summarized the observations made during the exerg1se and discussed the

. findings of the inspection as noted in this repor The licensee was informed that although no violations .ere identified, there are areas which required additional licensee attentio The licensee demonstrated that they could implement their Emerger.cy Plan, Administrative Procedures and Impl6 mentation Procedures in a manner which I could adequately provide protect 1ve measures for the healtn and safety of ,

the public. At no tims during t'he inspection did the inspectors pYovide written information to the license .

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