ML20054L050
| ML20054L050 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1982 |
| From: | Baunack W, Koltay P, Rebelowski T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054L043 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-247-82-09, 50-247-82-9, NUDOCS 8207070112 | |
| Download: ML20054L050 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000247/1982009
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
DCS 50-247 820217
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
820224
820310
Region I
820308
820309
820221
Report No. 82-09
820320
Docket No. 50-247
820421
Category
C
License No. DPR-26
Priority
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Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place
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Facility Name:
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2
Inspection at: Buchanan, New York
Inspection conducted: May 1-31, 1982
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Inspectors:
tY
6f/d f'
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T. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector
date
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(;lfa/8 2-.
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P. Koltay, Resident Nspector
Approved by:
t/11,
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W. Baunack, Acting Chisf, Indian Point
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Resident Section, Division of Project
and Resident Programs
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 1-31, 1982 (Inspection Report 50-247/82-09)
Areas Inspected: Routine ons'ite, regular and backshift inspection including
licensee action on previously identified inspection findings; operational
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safety verification; plant tours; surveillance observations; operability of
engineered safeguard features; containment isolation lineup; sampling pro-
gram review; radioactive waste system controls; radiation protection con-
trols; independent limiting conditions for operation verification; physical
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security; safety system challenges; review of monthly and periodic, reports;
facility maintenance; licensee event reports followup; onsite licensee
event followup. The inspection involved 161 hours0.00186 days <br />0.0447 hours <br />2.662037e-4 weeks <br />6.12605e-5 months <br /> by the resident inspec-
tors.
Results: Of the 17 areas inspected, no violations were identified in 16
areas. One apparent violation was identified in one area. (Failure to
follow procedures, paragraph 3).
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8207070112 820616
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PDR ADDCK 05000247
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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D. Amy, Maintenance Engineer
J. Basile, General Manager Nuclear Power Generation
A. Brescia, I&C Supervisor
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K. Burke, Director Regulatory Affairs
W. Carson, Test Engineer
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J. Cullen, Radiation Protection Manager
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J. Curry, Chief Operations Engineer
W. Ferreira, Radiation Protection Administrator
J. Higgins, Chemistry Manager
W. Hornyk, Radiation Engineer
C. Jackson, Vice President Nuclear Power
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J. Mooney, Electrical Engineer
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A. Nespoli, Major Projects Manager
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R. Orzo, Senior Watch Supervisor
J. Quirk, Test and Perfomance Engineer
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D. Rosh, General Manager Technical Support
M. Skotzko, Security Adninistrator
M. Smith, Chief Technical Engineer
L. Volpe, Test Supervisor
T. Walsh, Instrument and Control Engineer
S. Wisla, General Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees including
members of the operations, health physics, technical support, main-
tenance, construction, corporate engineering staff, and security
personnel.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-247/81-22-01): Review of surveillance
test procedures for quality group A, B, and C pumps revealed that the
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procedures were not in compliance with ASME Section XI requirements.
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The inspectors verified that the licensee revised pump surveillance
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procedures to incorporate ASME XI requirements, and included reference
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values for each pump.
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(Closed) UnresolvedItem(50-247/81-19-04): A review of PTM-37, Rev. 1,
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Steam Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump surveillance test identified a cal-
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culation error in the test results. After correction of the error, the
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test results were within acceptable limits. The inspector reviewed re-
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sults of tests conducted in 1981 and 1982; no calculation errors were
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found.
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(Closed) NC4(50-247/81-15-01): The STA left the Unit 2 site without
notifying the control room watch. The inspector verified that the li-
censee revised Adninistrative Directive STAAD-1 to require the STA to
remain within the protected area unless relieved. The licensee also
reinstructed the STA's on their duties and responsibilities.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-247/81-11-01): Annunciators do not meet
dark board principle. The inspector verified that the licensee has
initiated a program to reduce the number of annunciators which are
continuously lit.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-247/81-19-06): Auxiliary Feed Pump Room
Remote Control Panel Pressure Gauges. The subject report describes
four improperly mounted steam generator ptessure gauges of various
ranges in the auxiliary feed pump building. The inspector
verified that the licensee pennanently mounted four 0-2000 psig
pressure gauges in the remote control panel.
3.
Operational Safety Verification
Using a unit specific daily and biweekly checklist, the inspector veri-
fied:
Proper control room manning and access control;
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Operators adhering to approved procedures for ongoing activities;
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Adherence to limiting conditions for operations observable from
the control room;
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No abnonnalities on instrumentation and recorder traces;
Operators understood the reasons for annunciators which were lit,
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and that timely corrective action was being taken;
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Nuclear instrumentation and other reactor protection systems are
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Control rod insertion limits arc in confonnance with technical
specification requirements;
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Containment temperature and pressure indications in confonngnce
with technical specification requirements;
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No abnomalities indicated on radiation monitor recorder traces;
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and,
Onsite and offsite emergency power sources available for auto-
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matic operation.
The inspector reviewed the control room log, shift supervisor's log,
tagout log, operating orders, significant occurrence reports, daily
leakrate calculations, shift turnover check sheet, and diesel opera-
bility log to obtain infomation concerning operating trends and
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activities, and to note any out-of-service safety systems.
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During routine entry and egress from the protected area (PA), the
inspector verified:
Access controls are in confomance with security plan require-
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ments for personnel, packages and vehicles;
The required number of guards are present and alert;
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Gates in the PA barriers are closed and locked if not attended;
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Isolation zones are free of visual obstructions and objects
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that could aid an intruder in penetrating the PA.
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Personnel radiation monitoring equipment is operable, and
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that equipment and materials are being monitored prior to
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release for unrestricted use.
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Findinas:
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During a tour of the control room, on May 20,.1982, the inspector
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noted that PORY block valves 535 and 536 were in the pull /close
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position. The reactor was in hot shutdown, 3400F at 1200 psig.
The senior reactor operator stated that the Overpressurization
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Protection System (OPS) amed and opened the block valves when
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the reactor was at 1900 psig and at 359 F.
The senior reactor
operator also stated that he expected the OPS to am but not
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open the block valves at 2900F, which is the OPS temperature
setting identified in heatup and cooldown procedures, POP 1.1
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and 3.3, checkoff list COL 48, and in the OPS actuation curves.
Discussions with the licensee identified that OPS temperature
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setting was modified. The modification was accomplished in
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accordance with WR 2N54090 dated March 11, 1981, requiring a
recalibration of OPS scaling amplifiers. The change constitutes
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a 55 F shift in aminb temperature and function generator out-
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put from 2900F to 345 F.
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Upon questioning several senior and
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reactor operators, the inspector verified that the operators were
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not aware of the modifications tosthe OPS setpoints
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The inspector noted that the licensee failed to revise procedures
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POP 1.1, POP 3.3, COL 48, and the OPS actuation curves; as ~ required
by Station Adninistrative Order 127, Revision 3, Modifications to
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Indian Point Facilities.
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The licensee's failure to follow the procedure which requires re-
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vision of operating procedures to reflect the implementation of a
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modification is considered a violation. (247/82-09-01)'
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The licensee took imediate acticn by issuing tanpora@ chinge pro ' m
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cedures (TPC's) to each affected procedure, and revised the OPS
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actuation curves. The licensee also instructed all control rooin
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personnel by placing-a letter, detailing the circumstances of the
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new OPS setting in the control room.
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4.
Plant Tours
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During the course of the inspection, the inspector made observations
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and conducted tours of the following areas during regular and back-
shifts:
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Turbine Building
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Control Room
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Diesel Generator Rooms
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Primary Auxiliary Building
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Security Control Building
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Auxiliary Feed Pump Buildin'g'
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Cable Spreading Room.
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Maintenance and (iperations Building
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Perimeter Fence
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Transformer Yard
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Intake Structure
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Spent Fuel Handling Building
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Containment Building
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The following itds were observed or verified:
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General plant / equipment conditions including operabiSity and veri-
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fication of standby equipment;
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Inspected plant areas for fire hazards, fire alanns,'extin'guishiig's
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equipment, actuating controls, fire fight,ing equipment, and emer-
gency equipment for operability;
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Ignition sources and flamable materials are being controlled;
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Combustible material and debris are promptly removed from the
facility;
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices are in confomance
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with approved programs;
Excess equipment and material is returned to storage areas;
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Critical clean areas are controlled in accordance with pro-
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cedures, when required;
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Activities in progress are being conducted in accordance with
adninistrative controls and approved procedures. Verified
these activities do not interfere or have the potential to
interfere with the safe operation of the facility; and,
Reviewed a sample of equipment tagouts to verify compliance
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with Technical Specifications limiting conditions for opera-
tion regarding removal of equipment from service.
Findings:
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On May 27, 1982, the licensee reported a fire in the laundry room,
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53' elevation of the nuclear service building. The fire originated
in one of the three respiratordryers. The fire was extinguished by
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the plant fire brigade. No radioactive materials were involved.
The inspector verified that the licensee discontinued the use of
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the dryers, which were manufactured onsite, and ordered new dryers.
In addition, the licensee replaced the roughing filters in the
primary auxiliary building ventilation systems.
No violations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observations
A.
The licensee's surveillance equipment and program provides assurance
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that required pumps, fans, valves, and other instrumentation will
perform their required functions.
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The inspector's verification of the licensee's surveillance
program includes:
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Review of surveillance procedure for confomance to tech-
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nical specification requirements, and verify proper licensee
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review / approval;
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Verification of test instrumentation calibration;
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Observations of portions of system removal from service.
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Confirmation that LCO's are met when operational mode re-
quirements are specified;
Observation of portions of the conducted surveillance test;
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Observation of portions of the system's restoration to
service;
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Review test data for accuracy and completeness.
Independent-
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ly calculated selected test results to verify accuracy;
Confirmction that surveillance test documentation is reviewed
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and test discrepancies are rectified;
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Verification that test results meet technical specification
requirements;
Verification that testing was done by qualified personnel;
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and,
Verification that surveillance schedule for this test was met.
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The following surveillance test was witnessed:
PT-M37, Revision 1 Steam Driven Auxiliary Boiler Feed
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Pump #22 Functional Test. This test was conducted on
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May 11, 1982, to verify that the requirements of the
Technical Specification Section 4.8 are met.
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B.
Additional Surveillance Test Verification
Portions of the following surveillance tests were witnessed, by
the inspector. The tests were:
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Scheduled in accordance with the TS, where applicable;
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Procedures were being followed;
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Testing was performed by qualified personnel;
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LCO's were met, when applicable; and.
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Restoration of systems was correctly accomplished.
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The tests witnessed were:
PT-SA-2, Revision 8. Rydrogen Recombiner Control System Test,
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conducted on May 12, 13, 1982;
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PT-M19. Revision 11, Containment Spray Pumps Functional Test,
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conducted on May 27, 1982; and,
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PT-TMI, Revision 6, Kydrogen Recombiner Blower Functional
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Test, conducted on May 12, 1982.
Findinas:
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PT-SA-2. Revision 8. Hvdroaen Recornhiner Control System Test.
The technicians conducting the test lacked familiarity with
the H2 recombiners. Test Procedure PT-SA-2, Revision 8 proved
to be inadequate to allow the technicians to successfully com-
plete the tests.
In order to verify system operability, a station technical
advisor tested the H2 recombiners using SAO 10.9.1, and
proved both units to be operable. The licensee revised
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PT-SA-2, and successfully retested both m combiners on
May 13, 1982.
PT-M19. Revision 11. Containment SDrav Pumps Functional Test
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Paragraph 2.4 of the test procedure requires that the con-
tainment isolation valve associated with the pump under test,
either 869A or 869B, must be opened within two minutes upon
phase B isolation.
The resident inspector observed that the
operation of valve 869B took approximately 3-4 minutes due
to difficult access. The valve must be operated at the ceil-
ing level of elevation 51 ft., since the remote operator
mechanism has been removed. Valve 869A was opened within
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the required time period, however, it required a wrench and
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two technicians to turn the valve.
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This item has been brought to the licensee's attention', and
it is considered unresolved pending NRC review of the licen-
see's corrective actions. (247/82-09-02)
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PT-TM1, Revision 6, Hydrogen Recombiner Blower Functional Test.
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This test was performed May 12, 1982.
No violations were identified.
6.
Operability of Engineered Safeguard Features
A.
The inspector verified through direct observation, and procedural
review, the operability of a selected ESF system.
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The inspection criteria included:
A walkdown of the accessible portions of selected system;
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System lineups checked against plant drawings;
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Verified hangers and supports were operable;
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Cleanliness of breakers, instrumentation cabinets;
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Instrumentation is properly valved and calibrated;
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Valves in proper position, power available, locked and
sealed, as required by checkoff lists; and,
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Local and remote control positions correctly established.
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The accessible valve lineups and flow paths for the weld
channel and containment pressurization system with its associated
checkoff list COL 15 was inspected.
Findings:
The inspectors noted the pressure control valve PCV 1140, which
controls backup air supply from the station air systems to the
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air receiver tanks, was open indicating that instrument air
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pressure was at 90 psig or less. Nomal instrument air pressure
at the air receivers is 100 psig. Discussion with the licensee
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indicates that the numerous modifications to plant equipment,
pushed the demand for instrument air beyond that system's capacity,
thus, backup air supply from the station air system is necessary
to meet demand. The licensee is evaluating methods by which the
instrument air supply could be increased. This item remains un-
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resolved pending NRC review of the licensee's corrective action.
(247/82-09-03)
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B.
Additional ESF system operability was determined by observation
of:
Valves in the system flow paths in the correct position;
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Power supplies and breakers are aligned for components
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that must activate upon initiation signals;
Major component leakage, lubrication, cooling water
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supply, and general conditions which might prevent ful-
fillment of their functional requirements; and,
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Instrumentation essential to system activation or per-
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formance operable.
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ESF systems inspected included portions of:
Radiation Monitoring and Protection Systems; and,
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Diesel Generators.
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No violations were identified.
7.
Containment Isolation Lineup
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To ensure licensee's ability to maintain and exercise containment
isolation, the inspector verified by observation:
That manual valves required to be shut, capped and/or locked
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met operating mode;
That motor or air-operated valves were not mechanically blocked
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and power was available, where required.
The inspector conducted:
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Visual inspection of piping between containment and isolation
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valves for leakage; and,
Inspection of selected electrical penetrations.
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The following valves and penetrations were included in this inspection:
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Valve No. 71-4-B
Service Water System
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Valve No. 71-3-B
Service Water System
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Valve No. 71-1-B
Service Water System
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Valve No. 71-2-B
Service Water System
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Valve No. 71-5-B
Service Water System
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Also, electrical penetrations 27, 28, 39, 40, 41, 52, 53 and 54
were inspected in the electrical penetrations area. All pene-
trations were verified to be pressurized to at least 60 psig.
(Minimum requirement is 47 psig.)
No violations were identified.
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8.
Sampling Program Review
The inspector reviewed sampling results for the following tests to
verify ionfonnance with regulatory requirements:
Accumulators, boron concentration for test performed on
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May 13, 1982;
Spent Fuel Pool, boron concentration for four tests
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performed during the month of May; and,
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Reactor Coolant, boron concentration for tests per-
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fonned weekly during the month of May.
No violations were identified.
10. Radioactive Waste System Controls
The inspector verified through observation and calculations, the
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liquid and gaseous release programs at the site.
The inspection parameter for liquid and gaseous releases included:
Releases were in accordance with approved procedures;
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Release approvals were documented;
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Samples were taken and analyzed; and,
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Release control instrumentation was operable during release.
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The inspector reviewed the liquid radioactive waste releases
associated with the following permits:
Permit No. 2256 released on May 12, 1982;
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Permit No. 2259 released on May 19, 1982; and,
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Pennit No. 2262 released on May 27, 1982.
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The inspector also reviewed the following permits associated
with containment pressure reliefs
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Pennit No.1680 for release on May 18, 1982;
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Pemit No.1681 for release on May 19, 1982; and,
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Permit No. 1683 for release on May 21, 1982.
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No violations were identified.
11. Radiation Protection Controls
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During routine facility tours, the inspectors ve.lfied radiation
protection controls were properly established by:
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Observing that licensee's HP policies / procedures are being
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followed;
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Observing portions of area surveys perfonned by licensee's
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personnel, and confiming licensee's survey results by
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independent measurement;
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Verifying by observation and review that the requirements of
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current RWP's are appropriate, and are being followed;
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Observing proper completion and use of selected RWP's;
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Observing proper use of protective clothing and respirators;
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Observing proper personnel monitoring practices; and,
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Examining randomly selected radiation protection instruments
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that were in use to verify operability and adherence to
calibration frequency.
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No violations were identified.
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Radiation Emergency Drill
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On May 27, 1982, a Radiation Emergency Medical Drill was observed
by the resident inspector. The drill scenario consisted of a
dropped primary coolant sampling bottle which msulted in a con-
taminated area, and an injured and contaminated chemist at the
Primary Auxiliary Building at the 80' elevation of Unit 2.
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The inspector's observations at the scene of the simulated accident,
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the sampling station in the Primary Auxiliary Building, are as
follows:
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The timing of the drill should not overlap the licensee's
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personnel lunch hour; more participants could be used to
make a meaningful exercise;
When the victim was discovered, the imediate and onsite
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first aid and emergency medical team responded in a satis-
factory manner. The victim was checked for bleeding, blood
pressure, pulse, br: L_n bones, etc;
Health Physics requirements were not imediately enforced
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to prevent spread of contamination by the use of area mstric-
tions.
In addition, the preparation of a stretcher for a
contaminated victim's removal should include plastic covering
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readily available in the area of stretcher storage; and,
The air monitors were not observed for an increase in airborne
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by the personnel at the scene.
The above observations were discussed with the licensee, and will be
a subject of review by the licensee for inclusion in critique review
and corrective actions exhibited in the form of additional training.
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No violations were identified.
12. Independent Limiting Condition for Operation Verification
The inspector independently verified equipment status to determine
that Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation re-
quirements were being met for the following:
Fire Protection System. Minimum available water volume of
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300,000 gallons contained in the fire water tank;
Diesel Fuel 011. A minimum of 41,000 gallons of diesel fuel
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maintained in the fuel storage tanks;
Diesel Generator Day Tank Levels were found acceptable and
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diesel gererator jacket cooling water was at proper level; and,
Fire barrier penetration between the electrical cable tunnel
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and the primary auxiliary building.
Findings:
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The fire barrier penetrations between the cable tunnel and the primary
auxiliary building show signs of deterioration due to cracking. This
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item was brought to the attention of the licensee.
No violations were identified.
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13. Physical Security
During the course of the inspection, the inspectors observed the
implementation of the security plan by noting:
The security organization is properly manned and that security
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personnel are capable of performing their assigned functions;
Persons and packages are checked prior to allowing entry into
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the protected area;
Selected vital area barriers are not degraded;
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Vehicles are properly authorized, searched, and escorted or
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controlled within the protected area;
Persons within the protected area display photo identification
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badges, persons in vital areas are properly authorized, and
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persons requiring escort are properly escorted;
Comunications checks are conducted and proper comunication
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devices are available;
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Compensatory measures are employed when required by security
equipment failure or impaiment; and,
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Response to threats or alarms or discovery of a condition that
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appears to require additional security precaution is consistent
with procedures and the security plan.
Findings:
On May 21,1982 at 4:25 p.m., during a severe electrical rain stom,
various safeguard systems required compensatory measures to be in-
stituted to all vital areas. The inspector observed CAS operations,
and the response by the Instrument and Control Department to restore
security systems to the fully automatic mode.
No violations were identified.
14. Safety System Challenges / Unit Trips
On May 17,1982 at 5:40 a.m., the unit tripped from 100% power due
to low level in steam generator No. 23. The inspector verified that
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all systems operated satisfactorily. No safeguards systems werd
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activated. The cause of the low water level in the steam generator
was due to momentary closure of all four feedwater regulator valves
resulting from an inadvertently deenergized solenoid valve. Unit
restart was delayed due to mechanical failures in No. 23 and No. 22
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auxiliary feed pumps. The licensee issued MWR's 2567 and 2603 to
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facilitate repairs.
(See Section No. 16)
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During startup on May 24, 1982, following the repair of the auxiliary
feed pumps, the unit tripped due to a high level in No. 22 steam
generator, caused by a swell when the moisture separator reheat
valves were opened. All systems functioned normally. The unit was
returned to power on the same day.
On May 30,1982 at 7:40 a.m., the unit tripped from 100% power due
to low level in steam generator No. 23. No safeguards systems were
activated. The cause of the low steam generator level was the loss
of No. 22 main boiler feed pump. The licensee's investigation could
not determine the exact cause of the feed pump trip. The licensee
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stated that pump vibration readings were being taken at about the time
of the trip on No. 22 feed pump in the proximity of the manual trip
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lever.
Subsequent to each unit trip, the licensee established appropriate
communications by notifying resident inspectors and HQ duty officers.
In each case the licensee investigated the cause of the trip and
took appropriate corrective action before returning to power.
No violations were identified.
15. Review of Monthly and Periodic Reports
Monthly Operating Reports
The Monthly Operating Report for April,1982 was reviewed. The
review included an examination of selected Maintenance Work Re-
quests, and an examination of significant occurrence reports to
ascertain that the summary of operating experience was properly
documented.
Findings:
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The inspector verified through record reviews and observr.tions of
!
maintenance in progress that:
The corrective action was adequate for resolution of the
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ider.tified items;
The information in the reports was identified as licensee
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event reports, where required, per TS 6.9.1.7; and,
The Operating Report included the requirements of TS 6.9.1.6.
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No violations were identified.
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16. Facility Maintenance
The inspector reviewed portions of safety-related corrective and pre-
ventive maintenance, and detemined through observations and reviews
of records that:
The maintenance activity did not violate limiting conditions
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for operation;
Redundant components are operable, if required;
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.
Required administrative approvals, and tagouts were obtained
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prior to initiating the work, if required;
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Approved procedures were being used, where required;
The procedures used were adequate to control the activity;
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The activities were being accomplished by qualified personnel;
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Replacement parts and materials being used are properly
certified;
Preventive Maintenance Program is functioning in accordance
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with approved procedures;
Radiological controls are proper, and that they are being
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properly implemented;
Ignition / fire prevention controls were appropriate, and were
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implemented, where required;
QC hold points were observed, and provided independent verifi-
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cation of specific points, if required; and,
Equipment was properly tested prior to return to service.
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Findings:
During the inspection, two of the three auxiliary feed pumps failed.
Extensive maintenance and retests were performed to meet ASME Section
XI criteria.
.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were reviewed:
Auxiliary Feed Pump No. 23
On May 4-6, based on an oil test sample, indicating metal
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particle contamination, the rotating element and bearings
were replaced. Maintenance Work Request (MWR) No. 02381,
describes procedure, material, and retest actions.
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An additional MWR No. 02444 required the elongation of base
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bolts of motor base to realign coupling due to an extended
drive shaft.
On May 17, the pep tripped after approximately one hour on
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line. MWR No. 02567 required a new rotating element and
thrust and line bearings. During disassembly, a keyway of
stationary feed stage was found in pump casing.
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Observations of No. 23 ABFP . retest was observed, and no
violations were identified.
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The inspector's review of test data for Section XI testing of
ptsnps noted that the test on May 6, indicated higher tempera-
ture than previously experienced at the bearing points.
Discussion with the licensee of results, indicated that the
licensee recognized the increased temperature, but believed
that newly installed feed rotor with changes in clearances
was the cause. Additional review of previous versus present
data will be performed by the licensee in test review.
Auxiliary Feed Pump No. 22
Subsequent to the reactor trip of May 17, the licensee lost the
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steam driven auxiliary feed pump. This failure of a redundant
component required the licensee to cool down the reactor coolant
system below 3500F. The licensee's MWR 2603 addressed repairs
that were perfonned. Portions of the maintenance activity,
including overspeed trip tests were observed by the inspector.
Main Boiler Feed Pump No. 22
The Main Boiler Feed Pump No. 22 was repaired on May 20-23.
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(MWR2446). Observations were made of maintenance department
perfonnance.
No violations were identified for each of the above.
17.
Licensee Event Reports Followup
'
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
that reportability requirements were fulfilled, imediate corrective
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent rec'urrence
had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
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i
l
18
LER 82-007/03L-0
Battery Cell Failure
LER 82-008/03L-0
Isolation of Weld Channel Penetrations
LER 82-010/01T
Requirements for Safeguard Equipment Activation
LER 82-011/03L-0
Boric Acid Concentration Exceeding TS Limits
LER 82-012/03L-0
Level Indication Failure of BIT Level Channel 944E
LER 82-013/03L-0
High Vibration No. 23 Service Water Planp
LER 82-014/03L-0
Diaphragm Failure Valve 267A
LER 82-015/03L-0
Inoperable Heat Tracing Circuits
Findings:
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'
LER 82-015, submittal date exceeded the thirty day report requirement by
one day. Discussions were held with the licensee on this item, and
corrective measures have been taken to ensure that licensee event reports
are submitted within the allotted time frame.
No violations were identified.
18.
Onsite Licensee Event Followup
The following LER's were selected for onsite followup. This review
was conducted to verify that the reporting requirements of Technical
Specifications and Station Adninistrative Orders had been met, that
appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the events were
reviewed as required, and that continued operation of the facility
conformed to Technical Specification limits.
,
Infonnation concerning the selected LER's and records reviewed by
the inspector with cournents are described below:
LER 82-008/03L-0, Isolation of Weld Channel Penetration
l
This item was identified by the resident inspectors and reported
in NRC inspection report No. 247/82-03. The unpressurized units were
verified twice since originally reported and found satisfactory.
l
LER 82-010/01T-0, Requirements for Safeguard Equipment Activation
The licensee identified the requirement for safeguarding equipment operabil-
i
ity prior to increasing reactor coolant system above 3500F. The present
'
,
Technical Specifications do not address these changes in safeguard equip-
.
ment requirements. The licensee has written a procedure COL-46B,~ Plant
l
Heatup, that lists 70 different requirements which are not add'ressed in Tech-
nical Specifications. Pending NRC License Project Manager's review of nec-
essary changes to Technical Specifications with the licensee, this item
remains unresolved.
(247/82-09-04)
No violations were identified.
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19. Un' resolved Items
An item about which more infomation is required to detemine
whether it is acceptable, or an item of noncompliance is con-
sidered unresolved. Paragraphs 3, 58, 6A, and 18 contain un-
resolved items.
20.
Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings
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t
were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection
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scope and findings.
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