ML20054L050

IE Insp Rept 50-247/82-09 on 820501-31.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Revise Procedures to Include Mod to Operational Protection Sys Setpoints Completed in Mar 1981

ML20054L050
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	06/15/1982
From:	Baunack W, Koltay P, Rebelowski T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054L043	List: ML20054L042 ML20054L045 ML20054L050
References
50-247-82-09, 50-247-82-9, NUDOCS 8207070112
Download: ML20054L050 (19)

See also: IR 05000247/1982009

Text

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS 50-247 820217

0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 820224

820310

Region I 820308

820309

Report No. 82-09 820221

820320

Docket No. 50-247 820421

License No. DPR-26 Priority --

Category C

Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.

4 Irving Place

-

New York, New York 10003

1

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

'

Facility Name:

Inspection at: Buchanan, New York

Inspection conducted: May 1-31, 1982

,

Inspectors:

tY

T. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector

6f/d'

date

f' l

^

A

_

(;lfa/8 2-.

P. Koltay, Resident Nspector '

'date

Approved by: ,

t/11,

W. Baunack, Acting Chisf, Indian Point '

date

Resident Section, Division of Project

and Resident Programs

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on May 1-31, 1982 (Inspection Report 50-247/82-09)

Areas Inspected: Routine ons'ite, regular and backshift inspection including

licensee action on previously identified inspection findings; operational

l safety verification; plant tours; surveillance observations; operability of

engineered safeguard features; containment isolation lineup; sampling pro-

gram review; radioactive waste system controls; radiation protection con-

trols; independent limiting conditions for operation verification; physical

l security; safety system challenges; review of monthly and periodic, reports;

facility maintenance; licensee event reports followup; onsite licensee

event followup. The inspection involved 161 hours0.00186 days <br />0.0447 hours <br />2.662037e-4 weeks <br />6.12605e-5 months <br /> by the resident inspec-

tors.

Results: Of the 17 areas inspected, no violations were identified in 16

areas. One apparent violation was identified in one area. (Failure to

follow procedures, paragraph 3).

l

8207070112 820616 I

'

PDR ADDCK 05000247 .

O PDR .

__ _ _ _

. i

.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted  ;

! D. Amy, Maintenance Engineer

J. Basile, General Manager Nuclear Power Generation

i A. Brescia, I&C Supervisor

K. Burke, Director Regulatory Affairs

W. Carson, Test Engineer >

. J. Cullen, Radiation Protection Manager

J. Curry, Chief Operations Engineer

W. Ferreira, Radiation Protection Administrator  ;

J. Higgins, Chemistry Manager  :

W. Hornyk, Radiation Engineer

C. Jackson, Vice President Nuclear Power

l J. Mooney, Electrical Engineer

A. Nespoli, Major Projects Manager i

l R. Orzo, Senior Watch Supervisor

'

J. Quirk, Test and Perfomance Engineer '

D. Rosh, General Manager Technical Support

M. Skotzko, Security Adninistrator

M. Smith, Chief Technical Engineer

L. Volpe, Test Supervisor

T. Walsh, Instrument and Control Engineer

S. Wisla, General Manager, Environmental Health and Safety

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees including

members of the operations, health physics, technical support, main-

tenance, construction, corporate engineering staff, and security

personnel.  ;

2. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-247/81-22-01): Review of surveillance

test procedures for quality group A, B, and C pumps revealed that the i

procedures were not in compliance with ASME Section XI requirements. t

The inspectors verified that the licensee revised pump surveillance ,

procedures to incorporate ASME XI requirements, and included reference i

values for each pump. l

,

(Closed) UnresolvedItem(50-247/81-19-04): A review of PTM-37, Rev. 1, _

Steam Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump surveillance test identified a cal-  !

culation error in the test results. After correction of the error, the i

test results were within acceptable limits. The inspector reviewed re- i

l

sults of tests conducted in 1981 and 1982; no calculation errors were

'

found. I

!

.

!

_. _ _. . _ _ -

3

(Closed) NC4(50-247/81-15-01): The STA left the Unit 2 site without

notifying the control room watch. The inspector verified that the li-

censee revised Adninistrative Directive STAAD-1 to require the STA to

remain within the protected area unless relieved. The licensee also

reinstructed the STA's on their duties and responsibilities.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-247/81-11-01): Annunciators do not meet

dark board principle. The inspector verified that the licensee has

initiated a program to reduce the number of annunciators which are

-

continuously lit.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-247/81-19-06): Auxiliary Feed Pump Room

Remote Control Panel Pressure Gauges. The subject report describes

four improperly mounted steam generator ptessure gauges of various

ranges in the auxiliary feed pump building. The inspector

verified that the licensee pennanently mounted four 0-2000 psig

pressure gauges in the remote control panel.

3. Operational Safety Verification

Using a unit specific daily and biweekly checklist, the inspector veri-

fied:

-

Proper control room manning and access control;

-

Operators adhering to approved procedures for ongoing activities;

-

Adherence to limiting conditions for operations observable from

the control room;

-

No abnonnalities on instrumentation and recorder traces;

-

Operators understood the reasons for annunciators which were lit,

and that timely corrective action was being taken;

-

Nuclear instrumentation and other reactor protection systems are

operable;

-

Control rod insertion limits arc in confonnance with technical

specification requirements;

-

Containment temperature and pressure indications in confonngnce

with technical specification requirements; -

t

I

-- _- -- -

4 i

- No abnomalities indicated on radiation monitor recorder traces;

and,

-

Onsite and offsite emergency power sources available for auto-

matic operation.

The inspector reviewed the control room log, shift supervisor's log,

tagout log, operating orders, significant occurrence reports, daily

leakrate calculations, shift turnover check sheet, and diesel opera-

. bility log to obtain infomation concerning operating trends and

activities, and to note any out-of-service safety systems. ,

During routine entry and egress from the protected area (PA), the

inspector verified:

-

Access controls are in confomance with security plan require-

ments for personnel, packages and vehicles;

l

-

The required number of guards are present and alert; f

- Gates in the PA barriers are closed and locked if not attended; f

-

Isolation zones are free of visual obstructions and objects

j that could aid an intruder in penetrating the PA. l

-

Personnel radiation monitoring equipment is operable, and i

that equipment and materials are being monitored prior to "

release for unrestricted use. j

Findinas: l

,

During a tour of the control room, on May 20,.1982, the inspector [

noted that PORY block valves 535 and 536 were in the pull /close i

position. The reactor was in hot shutdown, 3400F at 1200 psig.

The senior reactor operator stated that the Overpressurization

,

'

Protection System (OPS) amed and opened the block valves when  ;

the reactor was at 1900 psig and at 3590F. The senior reactor

operator also stated that he expected the OPS to am but not

I open the block valves at 2900F, which is the OPS temperature

setting identified in heatup and cooldown procedures, POP 1.1 -

and 3.3, checkoff list COL 48, and in the OPS actuation curves.

Discussions with the licensee identified that OPS temperature ,

setting was modified. The modification was accomplished in -

accordance with WR 2N54090 dated March 11, 1981, requiring a

recalibration

0

of OPS scaling amplifiers. The change constitutes

a 55 F shift in aminb temperature and function generator out-

put from 2900F to 345 F.

1

'

l Upon questioning several senior and

l

!

i

,

9

. ,._ - --- --. . _ . - - . _ . _ _ - .

-

5 _ . --

, -

,

reactor operators, the inspector verified that the operators were -

not aware of the modifications tosthe OPS setpoints n -

'

The inspector noted that the licensee failed to revise procedures

POP 1.1, POP 3.3, COL 48, and the OPS actuation curves; as ~ required

by Station Adninistrative Order 127, Revision 3, Modifications to s

Indian Point Facilities. -

_

. ~

The licensee's failure to follow the procedure which requires re- X

,

vision of operating procedures to reflect the implementation of a s'N s

modification is considered a violation. (247/82-09-01)'

s

s .

,

,

The licensee took imediate acticn by issuing tanpora@ chinge pro ' m -

~ '

'

cedures (TPC's) to each affected procedure, and revised the OPS f

actuation curves. The licensee also instructed all control rooin ~

'

l personnel by placing-a letter, detailing the circumstances of the -

new OPS setting in the control room. ,

,

'

Plant Tours

'

4. ,

~ .

f

'

During the course of the inspection, the inspector made observations

and conducted tours of the following areas during regular and back-

'

shifts: s

'

'

- Turbine Building ^ -

_

-

Control Room -

_ .

?

-

Diesel Generator Rooms

- Primary Auxiliary Building .

' ~

.

-

Security Control Building -

- Auxiliary Feed Pump Buildin'g' -

.~ ,

-

Cable Spreading Room. - -

.

- Maintenance and (iperations Building  :' s

-

Perimeter Fence ,

.

'

- ~

x

-

Transformer Yard

-

Intake Structure s

-

Spent Fuel Handling Building

- Containment Building

'

The following itds were observed or verified: s

- General plant / equipment conditions including operabiSity and veri-

fication of standby equipment;

'

- Inspected plant areas for fire hazards, fire alanns,'extin'guishiig's .

equipment, actuating controls, fire fight,ing equipment, and emer-

~'-

gency equipment for operability;

- -

N , , , -

.. .

e

.a

r

I

.

6

- Ignition sources and flamable materials are being controlled;

-

Combustible material and debris are promptly removed from the

facility;

'

-

Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices are in confomance

with approved programs;

-

Excess equipment and material is returned to storage areas;

"

- Critical clean areas are controlled in accordance with pro-

cedures, when required;

-

Activities in progress are being conducted in accordance with

adninistrative controls and approved procedures. Verified

these activities do not interfere or have the potential to

interfere with the safe operation of the facility; and,

-

Reviewed a sample of equipment tagouts to verify compliance

with Technical Specifications limiting conditions for opera-

tion regarding removal of equipment from service.

Findings:

l On May 27, 1982, the licensee reported a fire in the laundry room,

53' elevation of the nuclear service building. The fire originated

in one of the three respiratordryers. The fire was extinguished by

'

l the plant fire brigade. No radioactive materials were involved.

The inspector verified that the licensee discontinued the use of

- the dryers, which were manufactured onsite, and ordered new dryers.

In addition, the licensee replaced the roughing filters in the

primary auxiliary building ventilation systems.

No violations were identified.

5. Surveillance Observations

A. The licensee's surveillance equipment and program provides assurance

that required pumps, fans, valves, and other instrumentation will

,

!

perform their required functions.

s

The inspector's verification of the licensee's surveillance

program includes: .

'

- Review of surveillance procedure for confomance to tech-

.

nical specification requirements, and verify proper licensee

! review / approval;

,

,n. - - , , - - - . . , _._.n._ _ . _ . . , . - . _ . - _ _ - . _

7

.

- Verification of test instrumentation calibration;

- Observations of portions of system removal from service.

Confirmation that LCO's are met when operational mode re-

quirements are specified;

- Observation of portions of the conducted surveillance test;

- Observation of portions of the system's restoration to

service;

.

- Review test data for accuracy and completeness. Independent-

ly calculated selected test results to verify accuracy;

-

Confirmction that surveillance test documentation is reviewed

and test discrepancies are rectified;

i

- Verification that test results meet technical specification

requirements;

- Verification that testing was done by qualified personnel;

and,

-

Verification that surveillance schedule for this test was met.

The following surveillance test was witnessed:

- PT-M37, Revision 1 Steam Driven Auxiliary Boiler Feed

i Pump #22 Functional Test. This test was conducted on

l May 11, 1982, to verify that the requirements of the

Technical Specification Section 4.8 are met.

l

B. Additional Surveillance Test Verification

Portions of the following surveillance tests were witnessed, by

the inspector. The tests were:

.?

- Scheduled in accordance with the TS, where applicable;

-

Procedures were being followed;

- Testing was performed by qualified personnel;

l

'

I

l

1

8

- LCO's were met, when applicable; and.

- Restoration of systems was correctly accomplished.

The tests witnessed were:

- PT-SA-2, Revision 8. Rydrogen Recombiner Control System Test,

conducted on May 12, 13, 1982;

I

- PT-M19. Revision 11, Containment Spray Pumps Functional Test,

-

conducted on May 27, 1982; and,

1

- PT-TMI, Revision 6, Kydrogen Recombiner Blower Functional

Test, conducted on May 12, 1982.

'

Findinas: ,

,

- PT-SA-2. Revision 8. Hvdroaen Recornhiner Control System Test.

The technicians conducting the test lacked familiarity with

the H2 recombiners. Test Procedure PT-SA-2, Revision 8 proved

to be inadequate to allow the technicians to successfully com-

plete the tests.

In order to verify system operability, a station technical

advisor tested the H2 recombiners using SAO 10.9.1, and

proved both units to be operable. The licensee revised  !

PT-SA-2, and successfully retested both m combiners on

May 13, 1982.

- PT-M19. Revision 11. Containment SDrav Pumps Functional Test i

Paragraph 2.4 of the test procedure requires that the con-

tainment isolation valve associated with the pump under test,

either 869A or 869B, must be opened within two minutes upon

phase B isolation. The resident inspector observed that the

operation of valve 869B took approximately 3-4 minutes due

to difficult access. The valve must be operated at the ceil-

ing level of elevation 51 ft., since the remote operator  ;

'

mechanism has been removed. Valve 869A was opened within

the required time period, however, it required a wrench and ,

two technicians to turn the valve. l

This item has been brought to the licensee's attention', and

it is considered unresolved pending NRC review of the licen-

, see's corrective actions. (247/82-09-02)

,

e

. _ . m _ _ _ _ ,

. . . _ _ -

9

- PT-TM1, Revision 6, Hydrogen Recombiner Blower Functional Test.

This test was performed May 12, 1982.

No violations were identified.

6. Operability of Engineered Safeguard Features

A. The inspector verified through direct observation, and procedural

,

review, the operability of a selected ESF system.

The inspection criteria included:

- A walkdown of the accessible portions of selected system;

-

System lineups checked against plant drawings;

l

-

Verified hangers and supports were operable;

- Cleanliness of breakers, instrumentation cabinets;

-

Instrumentation is properly valved and calibrated;

l -

Valves in proper position, power available, locked and

!

sealed, as required by checkoff lists; and,

-

Local and remote control positions correctly established.

The accessible valve lineups and flow paths for the weld

channel and containment pressurization system with its associated

checkoff list COL 15 was inspected.

Findings:

The inspectors noted the pressure control valve PCV 1140, which  :

controls backup air supply from the station air systems to the '

air receiver tanks, was open indicating that instrument air

l pressure was at 90 psig or less. Nomal instrument air pressure

l at the air receivers is 100 psig. Discussion with the licensee

indicates that the numerous modifications to plant equipment,

pushed the demand for instrument air beyond that system's capacity,

thus, backup air supply from the station air system is necessary

to meet demand. The licensee is evaluating methods by which the

i

instrument air supply could be increased. This item remains un-

resolved pending NRC review of the licensee's corrective action.

(247/82-09-03)

<

10

B. Additional ESF system operability was determined by observation

of:

-

Valves in the system flow paths in the correct position;

-

Power supplies and breakers are aligned for components

that must activate upon initiation signals;

- Major component leakage, lubrication, cooling water

supply, and general conditions which might prevent ful-

fillment of their functional requirements; and,

l - Instrumentation essential to system activation or per-

formance operable.

I ESF systems inspected included portions of:

l

-

Radiation Monitoring and Protection Systems; and,

1 -

Diesel Generators.

No violations were identified.

i 7. Containment Isolation Lineup

l

To ensure licensee's ability to maintain and exercise containment

isolation, the inspector verified by observation:

-

That manual valves required to be shut, capped and/or locked

met operating mode;

- That motor or air-operated valves were not mechanically blocked

and power was available, where required.

The inspector conducted:

,

l

- Visual inspection of piping between containment and isolation

l valves for leakage; and,

-

Inspection of selected electrical penetrations.

l The following valves and penetrations were included in this inspection:

'

l -

Valve No. 71-4-B Service Water System

! - Valve No. 71-3-B Service Water System

-

Valve No. 71-1-B Service Water System

-

Valve No. 71-2-B Service Water System

-

Valve No. 71-5-B Service Water System

l

i

I

.

- - - - - . -- . - - , - - . - - - , _

e . . _ -

11

Also, electrical penetrations 27, 28, 39, 40, 41, 52, 53 and 54

were inspected in the electrical penetrations area. All pene-

trations were verified to be pressurized to at least 60 psig.

(Minimum requirement is 47 psig.)

No violations were identified.

,

8. Sampling Program Review

The inspector reviewed sampling results for the following tests to

verify ionfonnance with regulatory requirements:

-

Accumulators, boron concentration for test performed on

May 13, 1982;

,

-

Spent Fuel Pool, boron concentration for four tests

performed during the month of May; and,

'

-

Reactor Coolant, boron concentration for tests per-

fonned weekly during the month of May.

No violations were identified.

10. Radioactive Waste System Controls

The inspector verified through observation and calculations, the

! liquid and gaseous release programs at the site.

The inspection parameter for liquid and gaseous releases included:

-

Releases were in accordance with approved procedures;

j -

Release approvals were documented;

-

Samples were taken and analyzed; and,

-

Release control instrumentation was operable during release.

The inspector reviewed the liquid radioactive waste releases

associated with the following permits:

-

Permit No. 2256 released on May 12, 1982; ,

-

Permit No. 2259 released on May 19, 1982; and, ,

'

- Pennit No. 2262 released on May 27, 1982.

-

-.

.___ _. ___ _ __

!

12 l

The inspector also reviewed the following permits associated

with containment pressure reliefs

i i

- Pennit No.1680 for release on May 18, 1982;  !

- Pemit No.1681 for release on May 19, 1982; and, t

- Permit No. 1683 for release on May 21, 1982. ,

No violations were identified.

11. Radiation Protection Controls

.

During routine facility tours, the inspectors ve.lfied radiation f

l

protection controls were properly established by:

- Observing that licensee's HP policies / procedures are being

followed; ,

l

-

Observing portions of area surveys perfonned by licensee's ,

l personnel, and confiming licensee's survey results by [

independent measurement;

I

-

Verifying by observation and review that the requirements of l

current RWP's are appropriate, and are being followed;  ;

I

- Observing proper completion and use of selected RWP's;

- Observing proper use of protective clothing and respirators;

- Observing proper personnel monitoring practices; and, l

- Examining randomly selected radiation protection instruments

that were in use to verify operability and adherence to

'

calibration frequency.

i

No violations were identified. ,

Radiation Emergency Drill

,

On May 27, 1982, a Radiation Emergency Medical Drill was observed

by the resident inspector. The drill scenario consisted of a

dropped primary coolant sampling bottle which msulted in a con-

taminated area, and an injured and contaminated chemist at the  ;

Primary Auxiliary Building at the 80' elevation of Unit 2. ,

,

t

'

The inspector's observations at the scene of the simulated accident, .

the sampling station in the Primary Auxiliary Building, are as

follows:  !

!

l

,

l

I

!

- _ _ _ - . _ _ . . ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . . _ _ -... .. __ __

_ _ - -

_

13

- The timing of the drill should not overlap the licensee's

personnel lunch hour; more participants could be used to

make a meaningful exercise;

- When the victim was discovered, the imediate and onsite

first aid and emergency medical team responded in a satis-

factory manner. The victim was checked for bleeding, blood

pressure, pulse, br: L_n bones, etc;

-

Health Physics requirements were not imediately enforced

to prevent spread of contamination by the use of area mstric-

tions. In addition, the preparation of a stretcher for a

contaminated victim's removal should include plastic covering

l readily available in the area of stretcher storage; and,

-

The air monitors were not observed for an increase in airborne

by the personnel at the scene.

The above observations were discussed with the licensee, and will be

a subject of review by the licensee for inclusion in critique review

and corrective actions exhibited in the form of additional training.

No violations were identified.

l

12. Independent Limiting Condition for Operation Verification

The inspector independently verified equipment status to determine

that Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation re-

quirements were being met for the following:

-

Fire Protection System. Minimum available water volume of

300,000 gallons contained in the fire water tank;

-

Diesel Fuel 011. A minimum of 41,000 gallons of diesel fuel

maintained in the fuel storage tanks;

- Diesel Generator Day Tank Levels were found acceptable and

diesel gererator jacket cooling water was at proper level; and,

-

Fire barrier penetration between the electrical cable tunnel

and the primary auxiliary building.

Findings: ,

.

The fire barrier penetrations between the cable tunnel and the primary

auxiliary building show signs of deterioration due to cracking. This ,

item was brought to the attention of the licensee.

No violations were identified.

l

B

- - - - -- - - -

14

13. Physical Security

During the course of the inspection, the inspectors observed the

implementation of the security plan by noting:

-

The security organization is properly manned and that security

personnel are capable of performing their assigned functions;

-

Persons and packages are checked prior to allowing entry into

the protected area;

,

-

Selected vital area barriers are not degraded;

-

Vehicles are properly authorized, searched, and escorted or

controlled within the protected area;

-

Persons within the protected area display photo identification

badges, persons in vital areas are properly authorized, and

persons requiring escort are properly escorted;

l

-

Comunications checks are conducted and proper comunication

devices are available;

-

Compensatory measures are employed when required by security

equipment failure or impaiment; and,

l

- Response to threats or alarms or discovery of a condition that

'

appears to require additional security precaution is consistent

with procedures and the security plan.

Findings:

On May 21,1982 at 4:25 p.m., during a severe electrical rain stom,

various safeguard systems required compensatory measures to be in-

stituted to all vital areas. The inspector observed CAS operations,

and the response by the Instrument and Control Department to restore

security systems to the fully automatic mode.

No violations were identified.

14. Safety System Challenges / Unit Trips

On May 17,1982 at 5:40 a.m., the unit tripped from 100% power due

to low level in steam generator No. 23. The inspector verified that

all systems operated satisfactorily. No safeguards systems werd

activated. The cause of the low water level in the steam generator

.

(

was due to momentary closure of all four feedwater regulator valves

resulting from an inadvertently deenergized solenoid valve. Unit

restart was delayed due to mechanical failures in No. 23 and No. 22

l

auxiliary feed pumps. The licensee issued MWR's 2567 and 2603 to

l facilitate repairs. (See Section No. 16)

l

l

.

. - - - - , . - - - - - - - - - -_ - . _ . - ., - . . . . . . - -

- - . - , - - , - - . . , - - - - - - - - ,---

-

.

.

15

During startup on May 24, 1982, following the repair of the auxiliary

feed pumps, the unit tripped due to a high level in No. 22 steam

generator, caused by a swell when the moisture separator reheat

valves were opened. All systems functioned normally. The unit was

returned to power on the same day.

On May 30,1982 at 7:40 a.m., the unit tripped from 100% power due

to low level in steam generator No. 23. No safeguards systems were

activated. The cause of the low steam generator level was the loss

of No. 22 main boiler feed pump. The licensee's investigation could

. not determine the exact cause of the feed pump trip. The licensee

j stated that pump vibration readings were being taken at about the time

, of the trip on No. 22 feed pump in the proximity of the manual trip

lever.

Subsequent to each unit trip, the licensee established appropriate

communications by notifying resident inspectors and HQ duty officers.

In each case the licensee investigated the cause of the trip and

took appropriate corrective action before returning to power.

No violations were identified.

15. Review of Monthly and Periodic Reports

Monthly Operating Reports

The Monthly Operating Report for April,1982 was reviewed. The

review included an examination of selected Maintenance Work Re-

quests, and an examination of significant occurrence reports to

ascertain that the summary of operating experience was properly

documented.

Findings:

l The inspector verified through record reviews and observr.tions of

! maintenance in progress that:

- The corrective action was adequate for resolution of the

i ider.tified items;

- The information in the reports was identified as licensee

event reports, where required, per TS 6.9.1.7; and,

- The Operating Report included the requirements of TS 6.9.1.6.

No violations were identified.

,

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _____,_._-----.-_,..---..._.-_,..s . . _ - , _ . _ . -- -. - _ _ _ _ _ _ , , _ - _, - - _ _ , _ _ _ _ ,

16

16. Facility Maintenance

The inspector reviewed portions of safety-related corrective and pre-

ventive maintenance, and detemined through observations and reviews

of records that:

- The maintenance activity did not violate limiting conditions

for operation;

-

Redundant components are operable, if required;

.

- Required administrative approvals, and tagouts were obtained

prior to initiating the work, if required;

-

Approved procedures were being used, where required;

-

The procedures used were adequate to control the activity;

-

The activities were being accomplished by qualified personnel;

-

Replacement parts and materials being used are properly

certified;

- Preventive Maintenance Program is functioning in accordance

with approved procedures;

- Radiological controls are proper, and that they are being

properly implemented;

-

Ignition / fire prevention controls were appropriate, and were

implemented, where required;

-

QC hold points were observed, and provided independent verifi-

cation of specific points, if required; and,

-

Equipment was properly tested prior to return to service.

Findings:

During the inspection, two of the three auxiliary feed pumps failed.

Extensive maintenance and retests were performed to meet ASME Section

XI criteria.

.

Portions of the following maintenance activities were reviewed:

Auxiliary Feed Pump No. 23

-

On May 4-6, based on an oil test sample, indicating metal

particle contamination, the rotating element and bearings

were replaced. Maintenance Work Request (MWR) No. 02381,

describes procedure, material, and retest actions.

,

_ - - - - - .- _ _ _ ,_ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _

1

.

17

.

- An additional MWR No. 02444 required the elongation of base

bolts of motor base to realign coupling due to an extended

drive shaft.

- On May 17, the pep tripped after approximately one hour on

line. MWR No. 02567 required a new rotating element and

thrust and line bearings. During disassembly, a keyway of

stationary feed stage was found in pump casing.

- Observations of No. 23 ABFP . retest was observed, and no

-

violations were identified.

i

The inspector's review of test data for Section XI testing of

ptsnps noted that the test on May 6, indicated higher tempera-

ture than previously experienced at the bearing points.

Discussion with the licensee of results, indicated that the

licensee recognized the increased temperature, but believed

that newly installed feed rotor with changes in clearances

was the cause. Additional review of previous versus present

data will be performed by the licensee in test review.

Auxiliary Feed Pump No. 22

- Subsequent to the reactor trip of May 17, the licensee lost the

steam driven auxiliary feed pump. This failure of a redundant

component required the licensee to cool down the reactor coolant

system below 3500F. The licensee's MWR 2603 addressed repairs

that were perfonned. Portions of the maintenance activity,

including overspeed trip tests were observed by the inspector.

Main Boiler Feed Pump No. 22

- The Main Boiler Feed Pump No. 22 was repaired on May 20-23.

(MWR2446). Observations were made of maintenance department

perfonnance.

No violations were identified for each of the above.

17. Licensee Event Reports Followup

'

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and

review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine :

that reportability requirements were fulfilled, imediate corrective

action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent rec'urrence

had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

i

i

l

18

LER 82-007/03L-0 Battery Cell Failure

LER 82-008/03L-0 Isolation of Weld Channel Penetrations

LER 82-010/01T Requirements for Safeguard Equipment Activation

LER 82-011/03L-0 Boric Acid Concentration Exceeding TS Limits

LER 82-012/03L-0 Level Indication Failure of BIT Level Channel 944E

LER 82-013/03L-0 High Vibration No. 23 Service Water Planp

LER 82-014/03L-0 Diaphragm Failure Valve 267A

LER 82-015/03L-0 Inoperable Heat Tracing Circuits

-

Findings:

'

LER 82-015, submittal date exceeded the thirty day report requirement by

one day. Discussions were held with the licensee on this item, and

corrective measures have been taken to ensure that licensee event reports

are submitted within the allotted time frame.

No violations were identified.

18. Onsite Licensee Event Followup

The following LER's were selected for onsite followup. This review

was conducted to verify that the reporting requirements of Technical

Specifications and Station Adninistrative Orders had been met, that

appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the events were

reviewed as required, and that continued operation of the facility

conformed to Technical Specification limits.

,

Infonnation concerning the selected LER's and records reviewed by

the inspector with cournents are described below:

LER 82-008/03L-0, Isolation of Weld Channel Penetration

l This item was identified by the resident inspectors and reported

in NRC inspection report No. 247/82-03. The unpressurized units were

verified twice since originally reported and found satisfactory.

l LER 82-010/01T-0, Requirements for Safeguard Equipment Activation

i

The licensee identified the requirement for safeguarding equipment operabil-

'

ity prior to increasing reactor coolant system above 3500F. The present ,

Technical Specifications do not address these changes in safeguard equip-

.

ment requirements. The licensee has written a procedure COL-46B,~ Plant

l

Heatup, that lists 70 different requirements which are not add'ressed in Tech-

nical Specifications. Pending NRC License Project Manager's review of nec-

essary changes to Technical Specifications with the licensee, this item

remains unresolved. (247/82-09-04)

No violations were identified.

,

-- - - - - . - - - _ _ _ - - _ - r -- -- - --

- - - - - - - - - - - ,

.

. .

i

19

,,

-

,

19. Un' resolved Items

An item about which more infomation is required to detemine

whether it is acceptable, or an item of noncompliance is con-

sidered unresolved. Paragraphs 3, 58, 6A, and 18 contain un-

resolved items.

20. Exit Interview

-

At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings t

were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection  !

scope and findings.

i

9

,

P

l

'

.

)

- - - - .