IR 05000247/1987002
| ML20207S349 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1987 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Finkel A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207S329 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-247-87-02, 50-247-87-2, NUDOCS 8703190299 | |
| Download: ML20207S349 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-247/87-02 Docket No.
50-247 License No.
DPR-26 Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Broadway and Bleakley Avenue Buchanan, New York 10511 i
Facility Name:
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2
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Inspection At: Buchanan, New York Inspection Conducted: January 27-29, 1987 Inspectors:
9//O A. Finkel, Ldad Reactor Engineer date
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Approved by:
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N. Blumberg, A(ting Chief f
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Operational Programs Section Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Summary:
Inspection on January 27-29, 1987(Report No. 50-247/87-02)
Areas Inspected:
Unannounced inspection of the surveillance testing and calibration control program, licensee action on previous inspection findings and licensee event reports.
Results: One violation was identified:
failure to include acceptance limits for battery electrolyte temperature and failure to ensure that the battery room temperature was kept within normal bounds, paragraphs 3.4 and 6.1.
6703190299 870311 PDR ADOCK 05000247
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Details 1.0 Persons Contacted Consolidated Edison Company Personnel
- D. Bishop, Test and Performance Engineer
- H. Morrison, Operations Manager
- J. Quirk, Manager Test and Performance
- M. Selman, Vice President, Nuclear Power United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector
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- P. Kelley, Resident Inspector The inspector also held discussions with other licensee employees during the inspection including operation, technical support and administrative personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on January 29, 1987
2.0 Follow-up of Previous Inspection Findings and Licensee Event Reports (0 pen) Unresolved Item 247/83-03-04 -The isolation valve seal water system (IVSWS), TS paragraph 3.3.C.1.6, was not included in the regularly scheduled calibration program although the gauges had been calibrated.
The licensee has written preventive maintenance procedures 1049 and 1466 for the level and pressure gauges, respectively. The licensee established a task force in June, 1983 to identify and ensure that all TS related gauges not currently calibrated be identified and given priority in the licensee's calibration program.
The task force completed its task in November, 1983 with a listing of I&C PM's that were recommended to be converted into surveillance procedures and be controlled under the present surveillance program system.
There are approximately saven I&C PM's identified by the licensee's task force which have not been converted into surveillance procedures. This item remains open pending the preparation of surveillance procedures for the listed items in the task force report.
(0 pen) Licensee Event Report 86-033 i
The 480 volt Emergency Diesel Generator output breakers, 52EG2A and 52EG2B failed to close during a surveillance check. The licensee identified the cause of these malfunctions to be the misalignment of the slide-type con-nectors in the control circuit of the breakers from making full contact during the racking of the breakers into the cabinets.
To correct the problem on a temporary basis the licensee has replaced the control block housing, lubricated the trip mechanism and reset the alarm switch.
The permanent design change is to reduce the number of slide type connections
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needed for the 08-75 type of breaker and paralleling the remaining slide type connectors to improve breaker operations and system reliability. The licensee has completed their re-design of the breaker contact connectors and has contacted the breaker manufacturer.
Modification of these breakers is scheduled for the next outage, late in 1987.
This item remains open pending NRC review and verification of the breaker reliability.
(0 pen) Licensee Event Report 86-037 While at 97% power reactor trip breaker B opened during the performance of monthly surveillance test of the analog bistables. The opening of trip breaker B was caused by a failure in one or more of three Westinghouse BF66 relays (455 A-X, 456 A-X, and 474 A-X) in the reactor protection logic. Relays 455 A-X, 456 A-X and 474 A-X were replaced with tested new units prior to restart.
The removed relays were sent to the Franklin Research facility in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for analysis. The results of the Franklin Research facility report have not been received by the licensee as of the end of this inspection period.
This item remains open pending review of the results and the licensee proposed corrective action.
3.0 Surveillance and Calibration Program 3.1 Objective The inspection objective was to ascertain whether the licensee has developed programs for the control and evaluation of surveillance testing, calibration and inspection required by Section 4 of the Technical Specifications, and for the Calibration of safety related instrumentation not specifically controlled by the Technical Specification.
3.2 Scope The station battery System, selected safety related valves and the calibration program and equipment were selected for review based on the testing being performed during this inspection period The following specific components were reviewed by the inspector:
1.
Station Battery System
--Batteries Nos. 21, 22, 23 and 24.
--Battery Chargers Nos. 21, 22, 23 and 24
--Battery Breakers Nos. 19A, 228, 38 and 98.
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Safety Related Valves
--E-2 Post Accident Venting Exhaust Air Operated
--E-5 Post Accident Venting Exhaust Air Operated
--FCV-24.10 Fan Cooler Unit Normal Outlet Valve
--1310A MS-SM to Aux. Feed Pump Turbine
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Test Equipment
--Stopwatch, Electrical
--Thermometers
--Voltmeter, digital
--Voltmeter, analog 3.3 Conduct of Inspection The master schedule for surveillance testing and calibration inspection and testing required by the Technical Specifications was evaluated to determine if the required safety related equipment was tested properly within the required time allocations. The inspector also included in his verification inspection that the licensee's program has:
--Established the responsibility for maintaining a master surveillance test, calibration and inspection schedule,
--A system program to update the master surveillance schedule to reflect Technical Specifications or license revisions,
--Procedures established for conducting surveillance tests, calibrations and inspections,
--Responsibility established for the signing, review and evaluation of test data with follow-up corrective actions as required, and
--Established a system for ensuring that required schedules for surveillance and calibration tests are satisfied.
3.3.1 As Built Configuration A walk-down inspection and a P&ID review was conducted to evaluate and verify the "As Built" and "As Found" condition of the battery system for equipment accessibility, operability and cleanliness control.
3.3.2 Battery System Inspection The availability and operability of the battery equipment was evaluated based on the plant surveillance programs and their implementation.
The inspection focused on the activities and initiatives associated with the surveillance testing and corrective action system to support equipment failures, deficiencies and inoperable conditions.
Monthly and Quarterly surveillance procedures and records were reviewed to assure that recurring failures or generic problems were identified and resolved in a
timely manner.
Specific features of the surveillance inspection included:
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--Surveilance procedure adequacy including environmental parameters, and
--Test personnel understanding of the test.
3.4 Findings The inspection findings demonstrated that the electrical surveillance procedures dealing with the safety related battery system were missing acceptance limits for environmental data that are necessary for determining whether the batteries are in an operable condition.
On the other hand, the technicians were knowledgeable of their issued surveillance procedures and equipment and performed their task within the procedure guidelines.
The inspection observations which follow describe the condition of the safety-related battery system January 28, 1987.
During a quarterly surveillance test of the station battery system, the inspector questioned the temperature of the batteries in battery rooms No. 21 and 22, and the cable spreading room area in general.
The louvers in the cable spreading room, elevation 33 where the battery rooms are located, were opened to the point where the cold outside air penetrated this room. The results of the low temperature caused the battery electrolyte in battery No. 21 to reach a tempera-ture of 54 F and in battery No. 22 to reach 56 F as measured by the licensee using a calibrated thermometer.
During the battery voltage check the voltages for these two batteries were reading approximately 4 volts above mid point and were adjusted down by the technician.
These readings were taken at approximately 10:00 a.m.
on January 28, 1987 and recorded onto the quarterly surveillance procedure data sheets in PT-Q1, Revision 16.
PT-Q1 requires the control cells'
electrolyte temperature and specific gravity of each battery to be recorded.
A review of the monthly battery surveillance procedure PT-M22 did not address the action to be taken on low battery temperature similar to be problem discussed above in PT-Q1.
Using a table within the surveillance procedure, the technicians would adjust the float charge as required based on the results of these readings.
The inspector was concerned with the low battery temperature of the control cells and performed a calculatior, using the Exide Stationary Lead-Acid Battery Systems manual, section 50.00, figure 16 and the associated licensee data sheets.
Figure 16 plots battery temperature in F on the X axis and % of Rated Amperes at 77 F on the Y Axis.
The figure indicated that an electrolyte temperature reading of 54 F rated the battery at less than 90% rated amperes (for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> time period).
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The inspector concerns regarding the battery electrolyte temperature and the less-than-90% capacity of the battery system were discussed with the licensee and an evaluation of operability was requested by the inspector. On January 29, 1987, at approximately 10;00 a.m., the
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inspector requested that additional measurements be taken on the batteries.
The licensee had closed the louvers in the room, had the wall heaters on and began discharging the batteries to heat up the electrolyte.
At approximately 7:00 p.m.,
readings were taken of the battery electrolyte with temperatures of battery No. 22 0 60 F and battery No. 21 @ 59 F.
At 4:00 p.m. on January 29, 1987, the licensee stated that battery No. 22 was operational, but that battery No. 21 was not, and could not meet its Technical Specification requirement of page 3.7-2 paragraph 8.4. which states:
"One battery may be inoperable for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> provided the other battery and two battery chargers remain operable with one battery charger carrying the DC load of the failed battery's supply system."
I At approximately 4:30 p.m. on January 29, 1987, the licensee notified the NRC that the plant was being taken to a not shutdown condition due to battery No.
not being capable of meeting its load requirements.
The failure to prescribe and implement specific acceptance limits in the surveillance procedures requiring the area temperature to be recorded for determining the effect on safety-related equipment is considered a violation (50-247/87-02-01).
4.0 Valve and Valve Operators The inspector selected the below listed valves for verification of position and opening and closing times as defined in licensee's surveillance procedure PTQ-13.
Valve No.
Description E-2 Post Accident Venting Exhaust Air Operator E-5 Post Accident Venting Exhaust Air Operator FCV-24.10 Fan Cooler Unit Normal Outlet Valve 1310A MS-MS to Aux. Feed Pump Turbine 4.1 Findings During witnessing of the valve test, the inspector verified that the time to open and close the valve was within the time requirements listed in the surveillance data sheet and in surveillance procedure PTQ-13. Specific notes were made by the technicians that metal name plate tags were not on the equipment and one valve gave a pop during its travel position and was not a smooth movement.
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During the review of the test data by the responsible licensee's supervisor, the inspector noted that the supervisor took action to have a replacement tag made for the missing one and to investigate the poping condition of the valve as identified in the test data report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.0 Calibration and Control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE)
5.1 Administrative Controls The inspector reviewed and evaluated the licensee's calibration and test equipment program to assess whether the administrative controls established were consistent with the plant Technical Specification (TS), Regulatory Guide 1.33, ANSI N18.7 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B.
5.2 Summary of Findings The licensee has a master schedule which defines when equipment is required to be calibrated and the method to be used. The Calibration and Control of Measuring and Test Equipment procedure TAD 6, Revision 9, identifies the following:
--Calibration frequency for each component
--Plant group responsible for preparing the calibration
--Calibration-Status, and
--Responsibility for maintaining the calibration schedule.
During the verification testing of the valves in paragraph 4.0 of this report, the inspector verified that the test equipment used during the surveillance was within the calibration dates and had the
required accuracy for the test being performed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.0 Procedure Review The inspector reviewed selected surveillance procedures to determine the technical adequacy of the procedures and whether or not they addressed the present design of the plant.
(See the Attachment to this report)
6.1 Findings The inspector identified that the Freeze Protection Procedure, Operations Administrative Directive 22, Revision 0 does not cover the
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battery room area level 33, Control Building, in its winterization program.
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This item is considered to be a example of inadequate monitoring to assure that all required safety-related equipment has been considered in the protection program and is considered another example of violation 50-247/87-02-01.
7.0 Quality Assurance The inspector selected the latest audit report performed on the Surveillance, Calibration and Test Program for compliance with the licensee's audit program schedule, and evaluated the technical adequacy of the audit.
7.1 Findings Audit No. 86-02-H was conducted during the last refueling outage in accordance with procedure QA-400-5 The refueling calibration and test procedures, listed in Appendix A of the licensee's Audit Report No.
86-02-H were reviewed by the inspector on a sampling basis to determine if the test data recorded was in compliance with the procedure requirements.
(Selected procedures listed from the Audit Report No. 86-02-H are listed the Attachment to this report).
The inspector verified tht t some test data recorded were outside of the surveillance procedure tolerances, but that they were returned to within specti"; cation tolerance by adjustment as described in the surveillance procedure.
A Test and Performance memorandum of November 26, 1986, stated that evaluation of the data indicated that the readings were outside of their conservative set point values in their procedures but still within their operability criteria.
The licensee also stated in their memorandum of November 26, 1986, that to reduce the surveillance procedures requirements would require and error analysis of the loop to be performed.
The licensee does not plan to perform an error analysis at this time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.0 Plant Transformer Inspection The inspector reviewed the licensee's inspection program for their large transformers to determine if they have a program of inspection and maintenance for those large transformers whose failure could cause challenges to, or interaction with, safety systems.
8.1 Findings The inspector selected the Station Auxiliary Transformers to perform his inspection on tM methods and programs used by the licensee to determine the overall operational characteristics of these units.
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The licensee has two Station Auxiliary Transformers manufactured by the Westinghouse Corporation in 1968.
Their capacities are listed below.
Capacity / Rating 43000 KVA @55 c rise 48160 KVA @65*c rise
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138,000/6900 volts The transformers are maintained by a corporate group who, upon installation, perform an analysis of the oil system for establishing a base line reference point.
The transformer group on a yearly bases performs the following test and inspections on their transformers:
--011 sample
--Gas sample
--Pumps Inspected
--Fans Inspected
--Coolers Cleaned & Inspected
--Relays Tested for Operation
--Tap Changer (at I and 10 years or every 20,000 operations)
During the yearly inspection of transformers by the transformer group, if a problem may be developing within the transformer they will increase the inspection frequency of the suspect condition.
This inspection frequency is based on data the transformer group has been trending over the years.
The site watch personnel perform a transformer surveillance every four hours. The transformer data is recorded on the Unit Two Conventional Power Log Sheet, DSR-9, Revision 11.
The listing below is the type of data that is required to be taken during this surveillance:
Units Normal Min /Ma Liquid Temperature
- c 25-80 0/90 Winding Temperature
- c 25-70 0/100 Liquid Level Tap CHR Gear Comt.
Lo-Hi Lo-Hi Tap CHR Tran Comt.
Lo-Hi Lo-Hi Main Compt.
Lo-Hi Lo-Hi Nitrogen Pressure PSIG 1-2.5 0.5/3 In addition to the above requirements being recorded, the site watch personnel are required to verify that the transformer fans are running and note other conditions such as peeling paint, broken or damaged equipment and general area conditions around the transformer.
If the watch personnel identify a condition that requires investiga-tion other than minor repairs, this work is handled by the corporate transformer group.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, or violations.
An unresolved item is discussed in paragraphs 2.
10.0 Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee and contractor representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on January 29, 1987.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as described in this report.
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.
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ATTACHMENT TO REPORT 50-247/87-02 Surveillance Procedures (SP)
PT-M22 - Monthly Battery Procedure PT-Q1 - Quarterly Battery Procedure Operations Administrative Directives (0 AD's)
OAD 22, Revision 0, Freeze Protection
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Quality Assurance Procedures Audit Report No. 86-02-H - Surveillance Test of Calibrations and Tests during Refueling Outages Procedures / Documents Audited PC-R3, Revision 6 - Pressurizer Level PC-R4, Revision 6 - Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter 6.9Kv Undervoltage Relay Calibration And Response Time Test PC-R16A, Revision 2 -Boric Acid Flow Transmitter Calibration PC-R27, Revision 1 - Acoustic Monitor Calibration PT-R13A, Revision 3 - Recirculation - Switches PT-R61, Revision 2 - 480 Voltage Breaker Undervoltage Relay PT-V248, Revision 0 - Emergency Boration - Check Valves Battery Procedures Exide Stationery Lead Acid Battery Systems Manual, Section 50.00 IEEE STD 485 1978 - Recommended Practice For Sizing Large Storage Batteries For Generating Stations And Substations.
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