IR 05000247/1985014

Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept 50-247/85-14 on 850604-06. No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Observation of Licensee Annual Emergency Exercise Performed on 850605

ML20127P161
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	06/21/1985
From:	Craig Gordon, Harpster T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127P124	List: IR 05000247/1985014 ML20127P121
References
50-247-85-14, NUDOCS 8507020323
Download: ML20127P161 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /85-14 Docket N License No. DPR-26 Priority --

Category C Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, In Irving Place New York, New York 10003 Facility Name: Indian Point - 2 Inspection At: Buchanan, New York Inspection Conducted: Jure 4-6, 1985 Insptetors: fe AO-15-C. Z@ordon, DRSS, EP&RP8, EPS date P. Koltay, Resident Inspector, IP-3 J. Pappin, Battelle, PNL L. Rossbach, Resident Inspector, IP-2 L. Smith, Battelle, PNL R. .imith, RI Approved by: W T. p. HarpsTer, Chief (slLiffT

' da'te Emergency P l eparedness Section, DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on June 4-6,1985 (Report No. 50-247/85-14)

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Areas Inspected: Routine, announced emergency preparedness inspection and

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observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on June 5, i 1985. The inspection involved 120 inspector-hours by a team of six NRC Region I l and NRC contractor personne .Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's response actions for l this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and

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safety of the public.

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OETAILS Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on June 6, 1985:

M. Blatt, Of rector, Regulatory Affairs M. B. Byster, Senior Radiological Engineer T. A. Cotter, Supervisor, Emergency Planning J. Curry, Chief Technical Engineer M. DiGenova, Senior Radiological Engineer T. S. Elsroth, Security 11. C. Irwin, Financial Analyst -

C. W. Jackson, Technical Consultant W. R. Kraemer, Maintenance Supervisor V. R. Lander, Radiological Health Manager G. H. Liebler, Senior Radiological Specialist B. M. Lindgren, Manager, Nuclear Infornation J. M. Makepeace, Consultant to Vice President M. L. Miele, General Manager, EH&S A. A. Nespoli, Consultant to Vice President R. Platt, Instrument and Controls Staff C. R. Powell, Operations Analyst B. A. Raskovic, Engineer, Regulatory Affairs J. T. Rose, Senior QA&R Engineer M. Sanchez, Security Supervisor D. J. Sarc, Maintenance Staff E. A. Schlechting, S. M. Selman, Vice President, Nuclear Power D. L. Smith, Radiological Engineer H. Somers, Field Engineer R. E. Weber, Consultant, Impe11 The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response personnel, controllers, and observers as the/ performed their assigned functions during the exercis . Eme rgency_._ Exe rc i se The Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Station partial exercise was conducted on June 5, 1985 from 8:30 a.m. until 12:30 Pre-Exercise Activities The exercise objectives, submitted to NRC Region I on March 25, 1985, were reviewed and determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On April 22, 1985, the licensee submitted the com-plete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation. The scenario was found to be Ilmited in scope and deficient in essential program

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area Employment of this initial scenario would not have allowed response personnel to demonstrate their abilities in the areas of operational assessment, technical support to operations, radiation

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surveillance, general health physics practices, repair and corrective

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actions, and decision-making. The licensee subsequently upgraded the j scenario by providing additional abnormal occurrences in the i scenario, thereby allowing adequate testing of the major portions of j the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP).

The upgraded scenario also provided the opportunity for licensee

personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC i as in need of corrective actio .

i NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on June 6, 1985, and '

participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected

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during the various phases of the scenario. the licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that '

, controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent

scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant operation ,

The exercise scenario included the following events:

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Dropping of a spent fual cask into the spent fuel storage pool

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causing breakage of stored fuel elements;

• Shutdown of spent fuel cooling pump;

Failure of the reactor vessel cavity seal causing loss of refueling

, water level with a fuel assembly in the control rod change fixture;

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• Release of radioactivity to the atmosphere; and r

Declaration of unusual event, alert, and site area emergency classifications.

i j The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite

emergency response facilitie ;

i i i b. Activities Observed '

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During the conduct of the Itcensee's exercise, six NRC team members i l made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the  !

emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities,

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and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of i the emergency response facilities. The following activities were j observed: , ,

i * Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events; l

• Direction and coordination of the emergency response;

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Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent plant status information;

Communications /information flow, and record keeping;

Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions;

Provisions for in plant radiation protection;

Performance of offsite and in plant radiological surveys;

Maintenance of site security and access control;

Performance of technical support; and a Performance of repair and corrective action Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedure The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

• Direction and control provided by managers of each emergency response facility was effectiv *

Emergency response personnel were knowledgeable in the use of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures and carried out duties and responsiblitties efficientl *

Offsite field teams conducted a thorough checkout of field kits, survey instruments, and communications equipment prior to departur *

Documentation and recordkeeping was observed to be adequately maintained in each of the emergency response facilities, d. Open Items The NRC team identified the following areas which need to be evalu-ated by the licensee for possible corrective action (the licensee conducted an adequate self-critique of the exercise which also iden-tified some of these areas):

• (0 pen) 50-247/85-14-01: The Emergency Action Levels (EAL) in the Emergency Plan are not outlined in a usable format and resulted in confusion among key licensee participants when

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attemptingtoclassifyI,heemergencyontwoseparateoccasion The EAL's should be revised and simplified so that the Shift Supervisor or Emergency Of rector is able to make a rapid and accurate emergency classification based on any abnormality associated with plant operatio *

(0 pen) 50-247/85-14-02: Briefings were not provided to TSC personnel regarding updates in emergency classification and status of,the activities taking place in other areas of the plan * (0 pen) 50-247/85-14-03: Emergency instructions and other announcements provided over the plant page system were not easily understood in the immediate areas of the TSC and OS *

(0 pen) 50-247/85-14-04: Offsite monitoring teams did not perform contamination surveys of vehicles upon return to the EO *

(0 pen) 50-247/85-14-05: The size, space, and habitability limitations of the EOF will inhibit an integrated and coordi-nated response by both augmented licensee staff and outside support personnel if a severe and prolonged emergency should occu Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The licensee provided adequate demonstrations of deficient areas which were identified by NRC during the previous emergency exercise and no items were found to recu ' Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on June 6, 1985, during which key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The critique appeared adequate in that 11censee participants highlighted both areas for improvement (which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken)

and areas in which improvements have been mad Specific improvement areas which were identified related' to delays in initial Control Room notifications to offsite authorities, uncertainty in authorizing OSC evacuation, difficulty in using area maps provided to of f site field teams, and security obstacles encountered by key personnel during critical response time .

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3. Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team ret with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercis The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for possible corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the sces,ario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken regarding the icentified open item At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.

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