IR 05000286/1989003

Enforcement Conference Rept 50-286/89-03 on 890428 in King of Prussia,Pa Re Findings of Insp Repts 50-286/89-03 & 50-286/88-22.Violations Noted.Areas Discussed:Security Program During Current Outage

ML20245F224
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	06/13/1989
From:	Olsen W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19064A007	List: IR 05000286/1989003
References
50-286-89-03-EC, 50-286-89-3-EC, NUDOCS 8906280065
Download: ML20245F224 (5)

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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ REGION 1-L

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Report No. 50-286/89-03 Docket No. 50-286 License No. DPR-64

Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York P. O. Box 215 Buchanan, New York 10511 Facility Name: Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Type of Meeting: Enforcement Conference Enforcement' Action No: 89-25 Meeting Date: April 28, 1989 Prepared by: D _

W. T. Olsen,~ Reactof Engineer / Physical Security 6 - fit - 8 9 date Approved by: h.- 1

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R. R. Keimig, Chiff, Safeguards Section 6_ # g . 8 f>

date Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch Meeting Summary: An Enforcement Conference was held at NRC Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, on April 28, 1989, to discuss the findings of NRC/RI Inspection Report No. 50-286/89-03 and NRC resident Inspection Report N /88-22 and other matters as outlined in an April 14, 1989 letter to the licensee. The inspections covered various aspects of the security program during the current outage. Violations of NRC requirements were identified, as follows:

failure to conduct adequate searches of personnel, packages and vehicles entering the protected area; failure to provide adequate illumination within the protected area at night; failure to provide adequate assessment capabilities on the protected area perimeter; fa'. lure to maintain the protected area perimeter adequately; and, failure te report a security event to the NRC within I hour as required in 10 CFR 73.71. Another violation consisting of a failure to properly control access into the protected area was also identified. The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee management and lasted about 415 hours0.0048 days <br />0.115 hours <br />6.861772e-4 weeks <br />1.579075e-4 months <br />, during which the circumstances surrounding the violations and the licensee's corrective actions were discusse ^'

8906280065 890619 PDR ADOCK 05000286 O PDC

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DETAILS Meeting Attendees t i Power Authority of the State of New York i W. Jostger, Resident Manager W. Harrington, Corporate Director of Security J. Hahn, Manager of Security E. Sackman, Manager of Security Compliance M. Peckham, Assistant to Resident Manager Nuclear Regulatory Commission M. Knapp, Director, Division of Radiation Safety cnd Safeguards E. Wenzinger, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2 P. Koltay, SRI, Indian Point ')

R. Barkley, Reactor Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects R. Christofer, Enforcement Specialist E. Sylvester, Senior Reactor Engineer - Physical Security R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section R. Bellamy, Chief, Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch W. Olsen, Reactor Engineer - Physical Security T. Dexter; Physical Security Inspector

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W. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector D. Langford, NRR-PDI-1, Acting PM Summary of Discussion Mr. Knapp opened the meeting and the attendees were introduced. Mr. Knapp described the purposa of the enforcement conference and summarized the findings of the routine physical security inspection conducted on February 27 - March 3, 1989, and a esident inspection conducted in December, 198 Mr. Knapp expressed Region I's concerns regarding the apparent violations and noted the following: Failure to lock, for approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />, an alarmed gate that provides access to the protected area, and to implement proper compensatory measures when the gate was discovered unlocked; Failure to provide adequate assessment capabilities for portions of protected area barriers and associated isolation zones; l Inadequate lighting in portions of the protected area; I

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w 3 Numerous examples nf inadequate searches of personnel and hand-carried items prior to entry into the protected area; Two examples of inadequate searches'of vehicles.' prior to entering the protected area; Unauthorized entry of a terminated contractor employee into the protected area (three days after the employee was terminated)

l by using another employee's badge; and, 1 Failure to notify the NRC of this incident (item 2.f. above)

i within one hour of discover Several other concerns were brought up during the enforcement conference, l

which included: security force staffing levels during the current outage; excessive use of overtime during the cutage; and, indications of poor security force morale.

i Mr. Josiger made.an opening remark and then introduced Mr. Harrington. who discussed the plant ..yout and security systems. Mr. Harrington used slides and overheads to show the Indian Point 3 protected area barrier, assessment and detection aids, the proximity of the plant to Indian Point 2, and the exterior plant security systems. He then introduced Mr. Hahn who discussed the security staffing situation in relation to the current outage and the personnel issues involved. Mr. Hahn stated that the proprietary security force had requested that no additional security personnel, i.e., temporary contractor personnel, be brought in for the outage and that this was taken by management to mean that the proprietary force members wanted to work the overtire. He stated that only in a few instances were Security Officers required to work a 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> day. This overtime issue was a concern mentioned by several of the security force personnel who were interviewed during the inspection conducted February 27-March 3, 198 Mr. Hahn also discussed several of tne appr. rent violations at length and answered questions e-ked by the NRC attendee In commenting on the unlocked protectrd area gate (Item 2.a. above),

Mr. Hahn stated that he could not determine why the gate was unlocked and why it was not discovered sooner by the security force. With regard to the inadequate assessment capabilities (Item 2.b. above), Mr. Hahn stated that Indian Point 3 management felt that the present assessment capabilities were adequate. Mr. Hahn also stated that he considered the protected area lighting problems that were discovered during the inspection, to be minor in nature. The numerous examples of inadequate searches of personnel, packages and vehicles were being addressed by Indian Point 3 management by instituting additional security force training and better oversight of the security force by supervision. The failure of the Indian Point 3 management to notify the NRC within one hour of a security reportable event, according to Mr. Hahn, was due to the licensee's inability to quickly assess whether a security event required a prompt repor _ - _ - _ _

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Mr. Hahn then turned the presentation over to Mr. Sackman who discussed the corrective actions already taken and those being planned. Mr. Sackman stated that the security supervisors will receive specific training to improve their sensitivity in the problem areas that were identified as well as other supervisory training. He closed with the statement that, in his opinion, the Indian Point 3 security program was basically sound and'

that recent events are not indicative of serious security problems at the l' plan Mr. Josiger then closed by reiterating that the security organization and program were sound, but needed attention in some areas that apparently had been overlooked because of the previous Category 1 SALP ratings that the program had receive Conclusion of Meeting Mr. Keimig commented on several of the positions expressed by the licensee's representatives and emphasized the importance of implementing an effective security progra Mr. Knapp concluded the meeting by stating that the Region I staff would evaluate the information presented by the licensee during the enforcement conference, and that'a decision regarding the appropriate enforcement action would be forthcoming. Mr. Knapp also emphasized that the licensee should review the entire security program rather than just correct the problems identified during the recent inspections since the NRC perceived that a management effectiveness problem may still exist at the plant.

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ATTACHMENT A INDIAN POINT 3 SECURITY ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE April 28, 1989 AGENDA A. INTRODUCTION By: William A. Josiger-Resident Manager Indian Point 3'

B. IP#3 SECURITY SYSTEM HARDWARE By: . William Harrington Director - Security STAFF By: John Hahn Site Security Manager C. CORRECTIVE ACTION By: Eugene Sackman Manager - Security Compliance D. PAST PERFORMANCE By: William A. Josiger E. SUMMARY By: William A. Josiger

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