IR 05000247/1987014

Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept 50-247/87-14 on 870512-14. No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Annual Emergency Exercise Performed on 870513

ML20215E049
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	06/08/1987
From:	Lazarus W, Schumacher J, Tuccinardi T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215E014	List: IR 05000247/1987014 ML20215E011
References
50-247-87-14, NUDOCS 8706190238
Download: ML20215E049 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-14 Docket N License No. DPR-26 Priority --

Category C Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, In Broadway and Bleakley Avenues Buchanan, New York 10511 Facility Name: Indian Point Station Inspection At: Buchanan, New York Inspection Conducted: May 12-14, 1987 Inspectors t ec T. Tuccinardi, T a

>ader, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS

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niyrEPSpecialist,EPS, / 'date C. Conklin, EP Specialist, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS S. Merwin, Battelle .

L. Rossbach, SRI :l P. Kelly, SRI '

R. Meck, NRR  :

Approved by: - M/ maw-

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W.gf/ Lazps, Chief, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS 6[/2 #7 date Inspection Summary: Inspection on May 12-14, 1987 (Report No. 50-247/87-14) I Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on May 13, 1987. The inspection was performed by a team of seven NRC Region I, headquarters, and contractor personne Results: No violations were identifie Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi However, observations made by the NRC team revealed a deficiency in one area which concerns a previously identified weakness concerning the ability to promptly and accurately classify accident condition hf G

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Persons Contacted i

The following. licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on '

May 14, 198 i N.(SelmannVice. President i J.111 war.gdr,. Senior Engineer i F. Meile, General Manager, Environmental Health and Safety

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J. Del Percio, Manager, Regulatory Affairs >

f? 3" $ B. Marguglio, Manager - NPQA

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8. Lindgren, Manager, Emergency Planning

- T. Ferraro, Senior EP Engineer '

G. Liebler, Senior EP Specialist

- J. Quirk, Test and_ Performance Manager J. Goebel, Test Engineer:

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C. Limoges, Senior Engineer C. Giocomazzo, Project Manager, Tenera

S. Profeta, Nuclear Supervisor The t am chserved'and interviewed seveia) licensee emergency response personnel, con' trollers and observers as they performed their assigned functions dbing the exercis , Emergency Egircise The . Indian Point Station Partial participation exercise was conducted on May 13,.1987 from 8:00 a.m. to.4:00 .1 Pre-exer:ise Activities Prio'r to the' emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held

,,,; meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee . representatives to ditcuss objectives, scope and content of the exercise scenari [.1'H 'M As a result, changes were made in order to clarify certain objec-tives, revise certain portions of the scenario and ensure that the s

scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate

. . ~those. areas.previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective

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a- 1 NRC coservers' attended a licensee briefing on May 12, 1987, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions g expectedfduring the various phases of the scenario. The licensee h stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to

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preytr.ty scenario deviation or disruption of normal plant operation .

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. 3 The exercise scenario included the following events;

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Loss of offsite power;

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Main Coolant specific activity greater than Technical Specification limits;

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Steam generator tube rupture, with associated steam atmospheric dump valve failure;

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Release of activity through the steam dump valve;

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Loss of all core cooling capability with subsequent' severe fuel damage;

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Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency Classifications;

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Calculation of offsite dose consequences; and

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Recommendation of protective actions to state official .2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, seven NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed: Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events; Direction and coordination of the emergency response; Augmentation of the emergency organization and emergency response facility activation; Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies of pertinent plant status information; l Communications /information flow, and recordkeeping; Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; provisions for in-plant radiation protection; Performance of offsite and in plant radiological surveys; Maintenance of site security and access control;

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'1 Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 11. Assembly and accountability of personnel; and 12. Management of recovery operation .0 Exercise Observations The NRC. team noted that the licensee's activatica and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of.the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedure The team also.noted the following-actions that were indicative of their ability to cope wit abnormal plant conditions:

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The Technical Support Center (TSC) was well organized and manage Discussions of plant conditions were excellent and demonstrated a good working knowledge of the plant. Briefings for entry teams were thorough and complete. Quality assurance personnel were present to log all changes to the plant which repair teams were making. The TSC demonstrated good use of status boards, and good interface with .

the Control Room and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F). 1

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Control Room supervision demonstrated good technical understanding of the accident and continually planned ahead to mitigate further plant degradation and expedite recover The EOF was staffed and activated within 26 minutes of declaration of Site Area Emergency. The EOF communicator provided the Emergency Director (ED) with data from the TSC and Control Room efficientl The county, state and local agencies were adequately briefed by the

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EOF Communicato The ED maintained command and control of the EOF during the exercise and periodically briefed the EOF staff on the progress of plant conditions and recover .1 Areas Requiring Followup The NRC team identified the following area which could have degraded the response and need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action. These items are tracked as Inspector Followup Items (IFI).

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Habitability surveys in and around the TSC and OSC were simulated,.but were not listed in the scenario as being simulated. The simulated habVtability-information was not made available to the TSC Manager, and thus he did not have an awareness of facility habitability. Additionally, the OSC health physics station was unmanned periodically throughout the exercise and may be indicative of a shortage of health physics personnel (50-247/87-14-01).

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-The noble gas release rate was erroneously calculated by Control Room personnel. The reason for the error was that an out-of-date form was used which contained an incorrect calibration factor, The subsequent offsite dose projections, based upon the incorrect release rate, were a factor of four too high and would have resulted in premature protective action recommendations had the controller not intervened. Use'of the

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proper form for steamline releases (IP-1007, Rev. 2) would have L-prevented the error. A form with the correct calibratio factor had been developed, approved and issue Control Room personnel-used a copy of the-form from a previous revision of the procedure. Once given the correct form, Control Room personnel performed the calculation correctly, and obtained the correct release rate. The licensee stated all outdated forms would' be removed from the Control Room and the monthly check of procedure inventory would be revised to include spare calculation forms (50-247/87-14-02).

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The Control Room and EOF used different steam release rates to calculate the radiological release. The Control Room used the default value in IP-1007, as they discredited the supplied measured value based upon their knowledge of the plan However, the EOF used the measured value. The differences should be resolved and the same value used by both facilities to avoid future discrepancies in offsite dose projections (50-247/87-14-03).

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Dosimetry is not issued to response personnel unless emergency response facility (ERF) whole body dose rates are greater than five mrem /hr. Teams receive dosimetry at the access control poin Under changing accident conditions, this is not satisfactory for those personnel who are in transit between, or from the response facilities and/or the access control point (50-247/87-14-04).

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After plant evacuation, repair teams and other inplant personnel outside the ERF's, need to be informed of changing classifications and plant condition Neither the plant paging system, nor the portable radio's were utilized for this purpose (50-247/87-14-05).

4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following items were identified during previous inspections (Inspection Report Nos. 50-247/86-12 and 50-247/86-13). Based upon observations made by the NRC team during the exercise the following Open Items were not repeated and are closed:

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(CLOSED) 50-247/86-12-02 (IFI): Investigate why 14 sirens did not wor The cause of the siren failure and subsequent corrective measures were examined and discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-27/87-1 This report modified the above item to require verification of the operability of the sirens. Operability of the sirens is demonstrated on a quarterly basis and was verified by the Senior Resident Inspecto (CLOSED) :50-247/86-13-02 (IFI): The EOF did not keep the Control :

Room informed of EOF action (CLOSED) 50-247/86-13-03(IFI): The site announcement of a Site Area Emergency declaration was delayed 12 minute (CLOSED) 50-247/86-13-04 (IFI): The public address system was barely audible to inaudible in the TSC and OS (CLOSED) 50-247/86-13-05(IFI): The OSC was not updated as to plant conditions after 11:08 (CLOSED) 50-247/86-13-06 (IFI): No apparent use was made of field monitoring team data to refine the source ter The following items were identified during the previous exercis (Inspection Report No. 50-247/86-13). Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during-the exercise, these items are modified pending further licensee actio Clarification of these findings is as follows:

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(UNRESOLVED). 50-247/86-13-01: . Failure to recognize fire damage to a safety system train, or safety function, constitutes a Site Area Emergenc The Emergency Director (ED) in the Control Room failed to classify both the Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) and the Aler Neither the licensee's Abnormal Operating Instructions, nor the Emergency Operating Procedures refer the ED to consider Emergency Action Levels (EAL's) at specific events in the course of an acci-dent. References to EAL's, if available, would have alerted the ED to the fact that emergency classification was necessary. Addition-ally, several EAL's appear to be confusing and others require work sheets to be completed to determine if an EAL has been reache .

Training appears to not be effective in the use of the EAL table j

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Specifically,-IP-1007, Determination of the Magnitude c' Release and Exposure Rates, must be used for radiological releases. Et.L's or training do' not trigger the E0 to this procedure or to the varicus j inputs needed to effectively utilize the procedure. Further, the NUE loss of.offsite power EAL and the General Emergency fuel danage EAL are ambiguously writte :1

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(OPEN) 50-247/86-13-07 (IFI): There.was no discussion of shift change or demonstration of shift change. capability by presentation of a second shift duty roster. in the TSC or OS The EOF demonstrated the ability to adequately provide for relief shift coverage. However, the TSC and OSC shift change capability j was not demonstrate .0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the' licensee's post-exercise critique on May 14, 1987, during which the. key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The critique clearly highlighted all of the areas noted by the inspection team as requiring corrective action. The licensee indicated these areas would be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions take .0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique The NRC. team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercis The licensee was informed that most previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there-were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they would implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken regarding the identified open item At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the license j