IR 05000286/1986006

Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept 50-286/86-06 on 860311-13. No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Observation of Annual Emergency Exercise on 860312

ML20203F383
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	04/15/1986
From:	Harpster T, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203F360	List: IR 05000286/1986006 ML20203F354
References
50-286-86-06, 50-286-86-6, NUDOCS 8604250137
Download: ML20203F383 (6)

Text

m-

. . .

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-06 Docket No. 50-286 License N DPR-64 Priority -

Category C Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York P.O. Box 215 Buchanan, New York 10511 Facility Name: Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Buchanan, New York Inspection Conducted: March 11-13, 1986 Inspectors: 7 W.'J A~ aru da't'e

"

S rgenc reparedness Specialist C. Gordon, NRC P. Koltay, NRC f

/

L Approved by: T. L. Harpsth, C

~

hief dat I

/

SG Emergency Prepare dness Section, DRSS, EPRPB Inspection Summary: Inspecti on March 11-13, 1986, Report No. 50-286/86-06 Areas Inspected: Special announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on March 12, 198 Results: The. licensee's emergency response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public. No violations were identifie ,

G

e

. . br

.

DETAILS

- 1. Person Contacted

• D. Bell, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Engineer, NYPA

• J. Brons, Resident Manager, IP3, NYPA

• Hamlin, Assistant to Resident Manager

• J. Kelly,. Manager, Rad. Health and Chemistry, NYPA

• S. Munoz, Technical Services Superintendent, NYPA

• M. Peckham, Emergency Planning Coordinator, NYPA J. Perrotta, Radiol. and Environ. Services Superintendent, NYPA

• A. Picciano, QA Engineer, NYPA The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response personnel, controllers, and evaluators as they performed their assigned functions during the exercis * Indicates those present at the exit interview on March 13, 198 . Emergency Exercise The Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant's partial participation exercise was conducted un March 12, 1986, from 6:15 a.m. until 1:00 Pre-Exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to discuss objectives, scope, and content of the exercise scenari As a result, minor revisions were made in order to clarify certain objectives and ensure that the scenario provided the opportunity for-the licensee to' demonstrate those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective actio NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on March 11, 1986, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviation or disruption of normal plant operation The exercise scenario included the following events:

• Complete loss of offsite power resulting in declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT;

!

• Low pressure turbine blade failure with rupture of the low pressure turbine casing resulting in declaration of an ALERT; l

l

!

_ _ _ _ _ _

.. - - .

.

.

• RCS leak rate increased beyond the capacity of two charging pumps resulting in declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY;

• Large break loss of coolant accident resulting in declaration of a GENERAL EHERGENC The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite emergency response facilitie Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:

• Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events;

• Direction and coordination of the emergency response;

• Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent plant status information;

• Communications /information flow, and record keeping;

• Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions;

• Provisions for in plant radiation protection;

• Performance of off-site and in plant radiological surveys;

• Maintenance of site security and access control;

• Performance of technical support;

• Performance of repair and corrective actions;

• Performance of Search and Rescue;

• Assembly and accountability of personnel; and

• Management of accident recovery operations.

!

i

-

.,-

.

c. Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

• Activities performed by the emergency response organization were indicative of an active and effective emergency preparedness training program;

• Communications equipment was efficiently utilized and a continuous flow of information was observed within and between all emergency response facilities;

• Response personnel appeared familiar with their duties, responsi-bilities, and use of emergency procedures;

• Personnel briefings regarding plant status were conducted on a timely basis in the TSC, OSC, AND EOF;

• Habitability in each response facility was promptly established and routinely maintained throughout the exercise; and,

• Direction and control was clear and adequately provided by individuals in command of each response facility, d. Open Items The NRC team identified the following areas which need to be evaluated by the licensee for possible corrective action (the licensee conducted an adequate self-critique of the exercise which also identified some of these areas):

• (0 pen) 50-286/86-06-01; The control room communicator is assigned other routine tasks which could detract from the 10 CFR 50.72 requirement to maintain a continuous channel of communication with the HQ Operations Officer (if requested).

!- * (0 pen) 50-285/86-06-02; The control room communicator was not prepared to provide all the information which the HQ Operations Officer requires concerning plant / system status during ENS notification. The licensee is comparing the notification checklist with the HQ Operation Officer notification checklist to assure that the communicator will be prepared to provide the necessary information, i

.____ _____ _ _ __ _____ -

- _ . -

.

.

= (0 pen) 50-286/86-06-03: The OSC and TSC activation procedures do not detail the location of equipment when activating the facilities (for equipment not already in place). This resulted in some minor confusion in OSC as to where the OSC Team Status Board should be locate * (0 pen) 50-286/86-06-04: The Search and Rescue Team did not have the dosimetry specified in procedure IP-1054. At the time, there were no abnormal radiological conditions. Radiological Exposure Authorization requirements were met. The conflicting requirement is being evaluated by the license . (0 pen) 50-286/86-06-05: A public relations representative was allowed direct access to control room operators during the initial part of the exercise and to the Emergency Director in the EOF later to gather information that was readily available from other sources. The inspector expressed a concern that these people could be distracted from their primary duties to respond to various queries. The licensee is reviewing whether

, the interface with public relations personnel is being made at

'

the appropriate leve e. Licensee Actions on Previous Irspection Finaings (Closed) 50-286/85-07-01: EOF does not have adequate spac The licensee is presently satisfied that the size of the EOF is adequat This item will be reviewed during the upcoming Emergency Response Facility Appraisa (Closed) 50-286/85-07-02: Offsite field team members did not exhibit safe driving practices when using monitoring equipment. No unsafe driving practices were identifie (Closed) 50-286/85-07-03: Telecopy transmission was lost between TSC/ EOF and TSC/ Recovery Center for brief periods. Telecopy transmission was found to be adequat (Closed) 50-286/85-07-04: Protective Action Recommendation (PAR)

status board was not updated at designated time intervals or when changes were made. Updates to the PAR status board were noted to be timely during this exercis f. Licensee Critique l

The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on April 11, 1985, during which key Itcensee controllers discussed observa-tions of the exercise. The critique was adequate in that licensee

-

o participants highlighted both areas for improvement (which the l licensee indicated would be evaluated and ppropriate action taken)

l and areas in which improvements have been made.

!

!

,

+-s

_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ - -

.. .. .

. .

.

.

3. Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following 'the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives. listed in Section The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercis The licensee was informed that recurring items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for improvement, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the license \

. .

-

...- ..

. . - .-