ML20236M601
| ML20236M601 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236M585 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-247-97-15, 50-247-98-02, 50-247-98-2, EA-97-576, EA-98-028, EA-98-056, EA-98-192, EA-98-28, EA-98-56, NUDOCS 9807140152 | |
| Download: ML20236M601 (6) | |
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ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. Docket No. 50-247 Indian Point 2 Nuclear Generating Station License No. DPR 26 EA Nos.97-576;98-028;98-056;98 192 During NRC inspections conducted between October 27,1997 and March 23,1998, for which exit meetings were held on November 14,1997, and January 23, January 30, and April 23, 1998, and during an investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations (01) from September 25,1997, unt!! January 22,1998, violations of NRC requirements were identified.
In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act),42 U.S.C.
2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:
- 1. VIOLATIONS RELATED TO INACCURATE INFORMATION 10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information required by the Commission's regulations to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.
Technical Specification Section 6.8.1 requires written procedures be implemented covering activities referenced in Regulatory (Safety) Guide 1.33, November 1972.
Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, recommends, in part, written procedures for performance of surveillance tests and for record retention.
Station Administrative Order (SAO) 521, " Records Management Program," provides instructions for the identification and storage of completed records. Section 4.1 of SAO-521, requires,in part, that quality assurance records be maintained in accordance with ANSI N45.2.9-1994, " Requirements for Collection, Storage, and Maintenance of Quality Assurance Records for Nuclear Power Plants." Appendix A, Section A.6.1 of this document, specifies retention of records dealing with periodic checks, inspections, and calibrations performed to verify surveillance requirements are being met.
A. Consolidated Edison surveillance test PT-M498, " Appendix R Emergency Lighting (Nuclear),"provides instructions for monthly checks of the emergency battery lighting required by the NRC-approved fire protection program required by License Condition 2.K. PT-M49B provides instructions for inspections of 33 emergency battery lights in the primary auxiliary building (PAB) and requires signatures for completion / performance of all procedure steps.
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Enclosure 2 Contrary to the above, on August 8,1997, the emergency battery lights in the PAB were not tested in accordance with PT-M498, yet records were created that indicated that the lights had been tested. Specifically, a Nuclear Production Technician (NPT) signed that he had completed all of the checks required by PT-M498. However, on August 8,1997, the NPT was only in the PAB for a period of 15 minutes and the other NPT assigned to assist with the checks was only in the PAB for a period of 17 minutes; it is not possible to complete all the checks of the 33 emergency battery lights in a period of 32 minutes. These records were material because they indicate whether certain required safety activities had been completed. (01013)
D. Consolidated Edison surveillance test PT-W1, " Emergency Diesel Generator,"
- establishes a weekly surveillance test of the emergency diesel generator auxiliaries. Steps 3.4.1 and 3.5.2 of PT-W1 require double verification that the steps have been performed and require that the double verification be documented.
Contrary to the above, on August 8,1997, the double verifications of steps 3.4.1. and 3.5.2 of PT-W1, which involved checks of the diesel generator
. compressor, were not performed, yet records were created that indicated that the second verifications had been performed. An NPT signed the data sheet indicating that he had performed the second verification of the steps; however, the NPT did not enter the emergency diesel generator building on August 8, 1997. Therefore, he could not have performed the second verifications. These records were material because they indicate certain required safety activities had been completed when in fact they had not been completed. (01023)
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These violations represent a Severity Level 111 problem. (Supplement Vil).
Civil Penalty - $55,000.
II. VIOLATION RELATED TO DB50 BREAKERS 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as
, failures, deficiencies, and deviations, defective material and equipment are promptly
' identified and corrected. . In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
Contrary to the above, between August 1993 and October 14,1997, the licensee failed to determine the cause and take corrective action to preclude repetition of a significant condition cdverse to quality involving failures of safety-related electrical
! breakers. Specifically, a root cause analysis performed in June 1997 to address multiple recurring failures of Westinghouse DB-50 breakers (that occurred between
' August 1993 arid May 1997) was inadequate in that the analysis did not address all credible failure modes that could have prevented the breakers from closing. For example, the analysis did not address inadequate weight on the trip bar as a credible failure mode. In addition, the identified causes (malfunctioning amptectors and binding
4 Enclosure 3 of the operating mechanisms due to accumulated dust, dirt, and lubricant).were not supported bythe facts (e.g., there was little evidence of dust and hardened lubricant),
and it was later determined that these f actors were not significant contributors to the failures, As a result, corrective actions taken in July 1997 failed to preclude repetition of failures of DB-50 circuit breakers on August 13 and October 14,1997. The f ailure )
of these breakers is considered a significant condition adverse to quality because it .
could prevent safety-related equipment from starting during an accident. (02013)
This violation is classified at Severity Level lli (Supplement 1). !
! LCivil Penalty - $55,000.
I Ill. VIOLATION RELATED TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE TESTING L 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, " Test Control," requires, in part, that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that systems and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents.
Contrary'to the above, prior to January 1998, the Technical Specification (TS) surveillance test program did not assure that all testing required to demonstrate that systems and components will perform satisf actorily in service as specified in the plant technical specifications was incorporated into test procedures. Examples of
. deficiencies in the si.rveillance test program included:
- 1) No surveillance test existed to assure that the requirements of TS 4.4.D.2.b, goveming service water in-leakage into containment in the event of a loss of fan cooler unit integrity, were met;
- 2) No surveillance test existed to verify that the steam generator blowdown valves ;
isolate during an automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater as required by TS ,
Table 4.1-1, item 30; l
- 3) No procedural requirements existed to calibrate the service water inlet i
temperature monitoring system prior to service water temperature exceeding 80 degrees F, as required by TS Table 4.1-1, item 45; and
- 4) Surveillance procedure PT-V16 only required a differential pressure of greater than 100 psid while performing leak tr. sting across certain reactor coolant system pressure isolation valves, although TS 4.16.A.5, requires that a minimum differential pressure of 150 psid across the valves bf. .J tested.
(03013) l This violation is classified at Severity Level lli (Supplement 1).
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Enclosure 4 IV. . VIOLATIONS RELATED TO CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL A. 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, in part, requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment are promptly identified and corrected. l 1.- Contrary to the above, as of December 31,1997, measures were not established to assure that conditions adverse to quality identified in work orders on the Post Accident Containment Venting System (PACVS) were promptly corrected. Specifically, on October 19,1993, work order 93-67432 identified that a flow meter (FM-1249) indicated incorrectly, and on February 1,1995, work order 95-75719 identified that flow integrator (FZ-1249) was not responding to input signals. This equipment is needed to permit the proper operation of the system as directed in its associated system operating procedure (SOP). However, these deficiencies were not corrected as of December 31, 1997.
(04014)
This violation is classified at Severity Level IV. (Supplement I)
- 2. Contrary to the above, as of December 31,1997, measures were not established to assure that conditions adverse to quality idsntified in work j orders on the hydrogen recombiners were evaluated and either promptly {
corrected or adequately compensated for until corrective actions could !
be effected. Specifically, !
I a) On October. 22,1994, work order 94-74545 identified that repair / replacement of the 21 hydrogen recombiner RC-1 A ratio control was needed.
b) On October 23,1996, work order 96-86886 identified that the 22 hydrogen recombiner hydrogen pressure gauge (PI)-5B was !
pegged high.
c) On April 8,1997, work order 97-90343 identified that the 22 hydrogen recombiner low pressure alarm was not working as a result of its associated pressure switch being broken.
These deficiencies could have impacted the operability of safety-related equipment required to be operable in accordance with Technical
. Specifications. However, these deficiencies were not corrected as of December 31,1997.' (05014)
This violation is classified at Severity Level IV (Supplement 1),
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Enclosure 5 B. TS 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established covering activities referenced in Regulatory (Safety) Guide 1.33, November 1972. Appendix A of Regulatory (Safety) Guide 1.33 recommends written procedures that govern operation of safety-related systems including containment cleanup systems. An example of a procedure to operate a containment cleanup system is System Operating Procedure (SOP) 10.9.2, " Post Accident Vent System Operation."
Contrary to the above, until corrected by revision on October 20,1997, SOP 10.9.2 was inadequate because it did not reflect the proper containment pressure for system operation. The technical specification basis for the post-accident containment vent system (PACVS) states that a minimum internal containment pressure of 2.14 psig is required for the system to operate 4 properly. The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, section 6.8.2.2,' states that the PACVS requires a differential pressure between the containment and the outside atmosphere in order to permit venting and that this is based on a pressure of 2.14 psig in the containment. However, step 2.6 of SOP 10.9.2 stated that the minimum containment p. essure for proper operation of the PACVS was 0.5 psig. ~ Also, steps 4.1.9, 4.2.1, and 4.2.2, referenced the incoriect pressure value of 0.5 psig. (06014) .
This violation is classified Severity Level IV (Supplement 1).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Cons.olidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
(Licensee)'is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the receipt of this Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be cleaily marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why,-(3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the tirae specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked er why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given 13 extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of tae Act,42 U.S.C. 2232,
- this response shall be submittid under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Ucensee may pay the ::ivil penalties by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement,
- U.S. Nuclear Regulato"y Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Trear urer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalties proposed j above, or may protect imposition of the civil penalties, in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Should the Lice;tsee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil ;
i penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate ' extenuating circumstances, (3) show error ;n this
4 Enclosure 6 Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or j mitigation of the penalties.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of 1 the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR
. 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference
- (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee
- is directed to the other provisions of >10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due that subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR '2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney
~ General, and the penaltyt unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2282c.
The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Mark Satorius, Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738,with a copy to the Regiona! Administrator, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Senior Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent
- possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or
, proyide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential or financisti information). If safeguards informat!on is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
l In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice withir two working days. ,
Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 6th day of July 1998