ML20135C813
| ML20135C813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1997 |
| From: | Mcintyre B WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | Quay T NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NSD-NRC-97-4947, NUDOCS 9703040309 | |
| Download: ML20135C813 (59) | |
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e Westinghouse Energy Systems Bcx 355 I Pmsburgh PemsyNania 15230 0355 Electric Corporation NSD-NRC-97-4947 !
DCP/NRC0709 1
Docket No.: STN-52-003 j February 26,1997 Document Control Desk 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: T.R. QUAY
SUBJECT:
REFERENCES AND CIIANGES FOR SSAR CliAPTER 7
Dear Mr. Quay:
Hulbert Li (NRC) has contacted Westinghouse regarding seme documents which do not appear in the AP600 SSAR Chapter 7, but which he plans to reference in his input to the AP600 Final Safety Evaluation Report. Each of these 5 references is addressed by this letter.
- 1. WCAP-14080 is the AP600 Instrumentation and Control Software Architecture and Operation Description. Because it is a valid reference for the AP600, Westinghouse is revising Section 7.1 and Table 1.6-1 of the SSAR to include a reference to WCAP-14080, as marked on the attached. This markup will be incorporated into Revision 11 of the AP600 SSAR.
- 2. WCAP-ll341, from November 1986, is a Noise, Fault, Surge, and Frequency Interference test report for the Westinghouse Eagle-21 systems. This report is not applicable to the AP600 I&C design and thus is not an appropriate reference for the AP600 design certification.
- 3. WCAP-13633 is the AP600 Instrumentation and Control Defense in Depth Diversity Report.
While this report is applicable to AP600, the SSAR references only those documents which are used as input to the various SSAR sections. Since WCAP-13633 was not used as a source document for SSAR Chapter 7, it should not be referenced therein. For your information, l i
WCAP-13633 was transmitted to the NRC by letter ET-NRC-93-0264 and is the WCAP referred to as an ongoing defense in depth analysis of the protection and safety monitoring system in the f responses to RAls 420.5 and 420.7. i
)
4 WCAP-13559 is the Operational Assessment which, while a valid reference for SSAR Section 7 20.7, was not used as input to SSAR Chapter 7 and should not be referenced therein. hl,f WCAP-13559 Revision was transmitted to the NRC by letter NSD-NRC-96-4818 in September, T 19%.
- 5. WCAP-14605 is the Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems - AP600 from May 1996. By error of omission, SSAR Revision 10 did not include the SSAR markup which was agreed upon in early December 1996. That SSAR markup, also attached, will be included g#00S5 n iRevisi n Mf the SSAR.
9703040309 970226 f gDR ADOCK 05200003 E PDR %,E%$$EE l
NSD-NRC-97-4947 DCP/NRC0709 February 26,1997 Chanter 7 Changes for SSAR Revision 11 Given the oversight described above, SSAR Chapter 7 has been reviewed to confirm the changes which were supposed to be incorporated into Revision 10 were incorporated. The changes being made to SSAR Chapter 7 in Revision 11, which were previously approved by the NRC for SSAR Revision 10, are:
- Section 7.7.1.11 regarding qualification of DAS equipment, including actuated devices.
- Changes reflecting COL applicant responsibility for a setpoint study per WCAP-14605.
- Revised figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-12 (changes were made only to the text in Revision 10).
In addition to those changes previously approved by the NRC, Westinghouse will be making the following changes to SSAR Chapter 7 in Revision 11:
- Changes to reflect resolution of NRC PAM/ ERG comments (Tables 7.5-5, 7.5-7, 7.5-9).
- Changes to 7.3.1.2 reflect isolation of auxiliary spray and CVS letdown.
- Changes to 7.4.3 resulting from resolution of NRC comments on minimum inventory (SSAR Chapter 18) to reflect the remote shutdown workstation.
- Changes to reflect the Westinghouse design changes resulting from NRC's new post-72 hour position.
Most of the attached changes were faxed to Tom Kenyon/Hulbert Li on 02/18/97 with some minor changes made since then. The attached markups are considered Enclosure 1 of this letter. Other than changes which may result from the AP600 Shutdown Evaluation, which would be communicated as a package separate from this letter, no more changes to SSAR Chapter 7 are anticipated.
Status of DSER Open Items is a DSER open item tracking system (OITS) report for all of the DSER Chapter 7 items which are not statused as " resolved" by the NRC. With the changes to be incorporated into SSAR Revision i1 and excluding the ITAAC items, Westinghouse has no outstanding actions for DSER Chapter 7.
Items 1052 and 1053 are considered to be NRC action to document concurrence or disagreement with the Westinghouse position regarding interlocks for the accumulator isolation valve and IRWST discharge valve. When these valves and their interlocks were changed from safety-related to nonsafety-related, these interlocks were removed from SSAR Chapter 7. While Westinghouse considers this an acceptable approach based on the following, it has not been accepted by the NRC.
htinghcuse Position for DSER Open Items 1052 and 1053 The accumulator isolation valve and IRWST discharge valve interlocks were changed from safety-related to nonsafety-related based on their never having been required to change position to mitigate an accident. However, since the SSAR Chapter 15 safety analyses assume that both accumulators and both IRWST injection lines are always available, valve mispositioning (prior to an m.
- i Mn' i l l NSD-NRC-97-4947 DCP/NRC0709 February 26,1997 accident) or spurious closure (during an accident) are not allowed and are therefore prevented by the following, as described in SSAR Section 6.3: l l
- 1. Power is locked out at the motor control center when RCS pressure is greater than 1000 psig.
- 2. With power locked out, redundant (nonsafety-related) valve position indication is provided on the main control board. Alanns (nonsafety-related) are activated in case the valves are closed with RCS pressure greater than 1000 psig. These position indications and alarms are powered by ;
different nonsafety-related power supplies. !
l
- 3. The following surveillances are required by the AP600 Technical Specifications
- a. Verify MOVs open every 24 hr
- b. Verify power is removed every 31 (ays in addition, the valves have a confirmatory open signal during an accident (Si or ADS stage 4 signal) l and an automatic open signal when the close prr.ussic clears during plant startup.
):
Summarv l Enclosure I will be included in SSAR Revision 11. NRC is re.luested to review Enclosure 2 and ;
provide Westinghouse with an NRC status for each iterr, including 1052 and 1053 for the interlocks. l I
Please contact Robin K. Nydes at (412) 374-4125 if you h.ve any questions regarding this letter or i AP600 SSAR Chapter 7. l
& S' Brian A. McIntyre, Manager Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing jml Attachment cc: Tom Kenyon, NRC - (IL, IEl,1E2) liulbert Li, NRC - (ll, IEl, IE2) l l
1 3053s
I Changes Previously Approved by NRC
- to be Incorporated in SSAR Revision 11 1
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A O Y
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- 7. Instrumentation'and Controls n om.
Operability, Availability, and Testing
, 'Ihe diverse actuation system is designed to provide protection under all plant operating conditions in which the reactor vessel head is in place. The automatic actuation processors, I in each of the two r*Anadant automatic subsystems of the diverse actuation system, are I provided with the capability for channel calibration and testing while the plant is operating.
l To prevent inadvertent DAS actuations during online calibration, testing activities or I, inaintenance, the normal activation function is bypassed. Testing of the diverse actuation
, system is performed on a periodic basis.
- Equipment Quah6 cation and Quality Standards The diverse actuation system is capable of functioning during and after normal and abnormal events and conditions tint include
- Excessive temp.iore i
- Ambient vibration
- Radio frequency and electrnmagnatic interference 4
,ievJodig otetooMd hviCPsv The diverse actuation system equipmentAis designed and qualified in accordance with
_ industry standards listed in subsection 7.l A.I.8. The adequacy of the hardware and so are i
is demonstrated through the verification and validation prograhdi _caA in
(' subsection 7.I.2.15. 'Ihis program provides for commMal dedication of commeirial off-the-shelf hardware and software. As the diverse amation system performs many of the protection functions associated within the ATWS systems used in existing plants, the diverse actuation system is designed to meet the quality guidelines established by Generic I.etter 85-06,
" Quality Assurance Guidelines for ATWS Equipment that is not Safety-Related."
7.7.1.12 Signal Selector The plant control system for the AP600 derives some of its control inputs from signals that are also used in the protection and safety monitoring system. The advantages of this design are:
= 1he nonsafety-related plant systems are contmiled from the same measurements which provide protection. This permits the control system to function in a manner which maintains margin between operating conditions and safety limits, and reduces the likelihood of spurious trips.
- Reducing the number of redundant measurements for any single process variable reduces the overall plant complexity at critical pressure boundary penetrations. This leads to a reduction in sepamtion requirements within the containment, as well as to a decrease in plant con and maintenance requirements.
To obtain these advantages, measures are taken to provide the independence of the pmtection
. and control systems. The criteria for these measures are contamed in the Standard IEEE l
Revision: 10 W Westkghouse 7.7-19 December 20,1996 a
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Operation procedures prohibit testing two divisions at the same time. There are no built-in interlocks to prevent simultaneous testing of two integrated protection cabinets. However, the l use of bypasses by the tester provides that the protection and safety monitoring system cannot i be placed in an unsafe condition if the procedure prohibiting simultaneous testing is violated. I For example, testing two divisions results in two bypasses, which causes the voting logic to '
I revert to a one-out-of-two coincidence for the remaining two unbypassed divisions, j Attempting to test three or four divisions at the same time causes a plant trip. The operational procedure restricting simultaneous testing of two or more divisions is for operability reasons 4 to avoid unnecessary trips. L 1
l In addition to periodic tests, the system performs error detection and data link testing as part of its normal operation. Where practical, the on-line error detecting features are designed to q automatically place the channel in which the error was detected into a trip or bypass state (either by direct bypass or reconfiguration). When a channel is automatically placed into a
- trip state, the operator has the option to subsequently place that channel in a bypass state. If the automatic configuration of the channel is not practical, the on-line error detecting feature l causes alarm annunciation to the operator.
1 l
- 7.1.2.13 Safety Related Display Instrumentation Safety related display instrumentation provides the operator with information to determme the i
effect of automatic and manual actions taken following reactor trip due to a Condition II, III, i or IV event as defined in Chapter 15. This instrumentation also provides for operator display of the information necessary to meet Regulatory Guide 1.97. A description of the equipment used to provide this function is provided in subsection 7.1.2.6. A description of the data
- provided to the operator by this instrumentation is provided in Section 7.5.
1 7.1.2.14 A=Illary Supporting Systems
'lhe safety-related systens equipment is supported by the supply of uninterruptable electrical j
~
energy. This electrical power is supplied by the Class IE de and UPS system discussed in l Chapter 8.
e 7.1.2.15 Verification and Validation Adequacy of the hardware and software is demonstrated for the protection and safety l monitoring system through a verification and validation (V&V) program. Details on the
{ verification and validation program are provided in WCAP-13383 (Reference 4). The software development process which is documented in this document is consistent with the following standards:
- ANSI /IEEE ANS-7-4.3.2 (1993); " Application Cnteria for "roa re.re.ebic Digital Computer Systems in Safety Systems for Pros i r.eble Digital Computer Systems in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations" O
Revision: 5 February 29,1996 7.1-26 T Westkighouse c I
- 7. Instrume1tation and Controls l
- i IEC 880-1986; " Software for Computers in the Safety Systems for Nuclear Power
- Generating Stations" {'
i IEEE 828-1983;"IEEE Standard for Software Configuration Management Plans"
, IEEE 829-1983; "IEEE Standard for Software Test Documentation" IEEE 830-1984; "IEEE Standard for Software Requirements Specifications" IEEE 1012-198 "IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation Planry iEGG loin-190 7 *, "le66 6uide fe, Sdtuom GYSyfDb f/D00pd- [AMD ,
WCAP-13383 also provides for the use of commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software through a commercial grade dedication process.
7.1.3 Plant Control System
" 1he plant control system is a nonsafety-related system that provides control and coordination of the plant during startup, ascent to power, power operation, and shutdown conditions. The plant control system integrates the automatic and manual control of the reactor, reactor coolant, and various reactor support processes for required normal and off-normal conditions.
'Ihe plant control system also provides control of the nonsafety-related decay heat removal systems during shutdown. The plant control system accomplishes these functions through use
!(
4 of the following:
- Rod control -
- Pressurizer pressure and level control 4
- Steam generator water level control Steam dump (turbine bypass) control
- Rapid power reduction 8
'Ihe plant control system provides automatic regulation of reactor and other key system pwei in response to changes in operating limits (load changes). 'Ihe plant control system acts to maximize irwgins to plant safety limits and maximize the plant transient performance. The plant control system also provides the capability for manual control of plant systems and equipment. Redundant control logic is used in some applications to 1 merease single-failure tolerance.
l The plant control system includes the equipment from the process sensor input circuitry '
through to the modulating and nonmodulating control outputs as well as the digital signals to other plant systems. Modulating control devices include valve positioners, pump speed l controllers, and the control rod equipment. Nonmodulating devices include motor starters for rnator operated valves and pumps, breakers for beaters, and solenoids for actuation of air-operated valves. The control cabmets contain the process sensor inputs and the rnodulating med nonmodulatmg outputs. *Ihe plant control system also includes equipment to monitor and control the control rods.
Revision: 5 !
T WOStkigh0088 7.1-27 February 29,1996 l
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- 7. Instrumentados and Contrds C
7.1.4.2.22 Confonnance to the Requirements for Identification of Redundant Safety System Equipment (Paragraph 4.22 of IEEE 2791971)
Distinctive markings are applied to redundant divisions of:he protection and safety monitoring system.
The color coded nameplates described below provide identification of equipment, associated with protective functions and their divisions associations.
Division Color Codine Division A BROWN with WHITE lettering j Division B GREEN with BLACK lettering Division C DLUE with WHITE lettering Division D YELLOW with BLACK lettering i
Non. cabinet mounted protective equipment and components have an identification tag or nameplate. Small electrical components such as relays, have nameplates on the enclosure that {;
houses them. '
7.1.5 AP600 Protective Functions Protective functions are those necessary to achieve the system responses assumed in the safety analyses, and those needed to shut down the plant safely. 'Ihe protective functions are (
grouped into two classes, reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation.
Reactor trip is discussed in Section 7.2. Engird safety features actuation is discussed in Section 7.3.
7.1.6 Combined License Information % .
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Revision: 5 Fetmaary 29,1996 7.1-48 T Westkighouse c
' ' 7. Instrumentation cre! Controis i1 '
7.I.7 References I
- 1. IEEE 603-1991, "IEEE Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generator Stations."
- 2. IEEE 796-1983, "IEEE Microcomputer System Bus." '
- 3. WCAP-13382 (P), WCAP-13391 (NP), "AP600 Instrumentation and Control Hardware I
- Description."
- 4. WCAP-13383 (P), WCAP-13392 (NP), "AP600 Instrumentation and Control Hardware and Software Design, Verification, and Validation Process Report."
- 5. IEEE 279-1971, "IEEE Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
- 6. IETE 384-1981, "IEEE Criteria for Independence or Class IE Equipment and Circuits."
- 7. WCAP-8897 (P), WCAP-8898 (NP), " Bypass Logic for the Westinghouse Integrated Protection System."
- 8. WCAE-1%05(P)/14 CAP-l%0(s(NP')/ Sush avse jrp
[tdodoloy & Prokdim Systms, Ar600. "
q' sp-14680(P),wcAP-Ho81(NP3,." N O#
ag (pdrol ,$4fure Mfodort and OmM l
g.sai pM , hvison O .
L Revision: 5 T Westingh0088 7.1-49 February 29,1996 0
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- 1. Introdecdos and General n--Myden of Plant j m-
! Table 1.8-2 (Sheet 3 of 4) i .
SUMMARY
OF AP600 STANDARD Pl. ANT COMBINED LICENSE
. INFORMATION ITEMS Item No. Subject Sam i 6.4-2 Imcal Toxic Gas Services and Monitoring 6.4.7 1 6.43 Procedures for Training for Control Room Habitability 6.4.7 6.6-1 tar _taa Programs 6.6.9.1 g Nt Wms & PrcMd 9M .'h, 8.21 Off e Elecincal Power 8.2.4 8.3 1 Onsite Elecincal Power 833 9.1 1 Fuel Storage and Handling 9.1.6 9.5 1 Offsite Comrnunications Interfaces 9.5.2.5.1 9.5-2 E.cs ;y Response Facility Communications 9.5.2.5.2 9.5-3 Security Communications 9.5.2.53 9.5 4 Cathodic and Environmental Protecnon for Fuel Oil Tanks 9.5.4.7 10.1-1 Erosion-Corrosion Monitoring 10.13 ;
10.2-1 Turbine Maie=== and Inspection 10.2.6 -
10.4 1 Circulating Water Supply 10A.12.1 10.4-2 c-Wia* Feedweser and Anviliary Sesam System N- =t ry Connel 10A.12.2 10.4-3 Posable Water 10A.123 l 11.2-1 IJquid Radwaste Processing by Mobile Equipment 11.2A.1 11.2-2 Cost Benefit Analysis of Population Doses from Liquid Effluents 11.2.4.2 11.2 3 IdentiAcation of Ion Exchange and Adsorbent Media for Uquid Radwasee '41.2A3 l 11.2 4 Dilution and Control of Boric Acid Discharge 11.2A.4 11.5-1 Cost Benent Analysis of Population Doses from Gaseous Effluents 113A.1 11.3-2 Limanification of Adsorbent Media e for -i. Radwasse 11.3A.2 i i 11A-1 Solid Waste M-- 7--- - System Process Cosmol Program 11 A.6 11.5-1 Plant Offsite Dose rahi1=*iaa Manual (ODCM) 11.5.7 12.1 1 ALARA and Operational Pobcies 12.13 12.2 1 Addaia=al raatai-I Radiation Sources 12.23 l 12.3-1 Ad=l=Wve Connois, Criteria and Methods for Radiological Proesedan 123.5 l O! l Revision: 9 August 9,19M 1.8 12 3 WSEtkIgh0080 c
- 7. Instrumentation and controts core cooling monitor. The incore instrument assemblies house both fixed incore detectors and .
l core exit thermocouples. The incore instrumentation system is described in subsection 4.4.6.1.
7.1.2 General Protection Subsystem Configuration The protection and safety monitoring system is illustrated in Figure 7.1-2. The functions of the protection and safety monitoring system have been decomposed into physically and electrically separate microprocessor based subsystem::. Each subsystem is located on an independent computer bus to prevent propagation of failures and to enhance availability. In most cases, each subsystem is implemented in a separate card chassis. Subsystem "
independence. is maintained through the use of the following: '
Separate de power sources with output protection to prevent interaction between subsystems upon failure of a subrystem. ,
I Separate input or output circuitry to maintain independence at the subsystem interfaces.
Deadman signals: A device, circuit, or function that forces a predefined operating j condition upon the cessation of a normally dynamic input parameter to improve the ;
reliability of hard-wired data that crosses the subsystem interface.
Optical coupling or resistor buffering between two subsystems or between a subsystem ;
and an input / output (1/0) module. ~
UKAP-19080 WCAP-13382 (Reference 3) provides a description of the hIware elements which comprise '
I the protection and safety nitoring system configuration.
dBuiph'an cP-ko ct@ %dPS4 7.1.2.1 artWtec:kure clnd opdan.
Functional Cosaponents I
The type and number of boards used to implement the functions of a microprocessor based '
subsystem are purposely limited to aid serviceability and to restrict the number of spares. In t addition, the basic function of a particular board remains fixed among subsystems to facilitate i
the development and maintenance of the subsystem software. IEEE 796 (Reference 2) bus cards are typically used to provide functions as listed below. g 3
Functional Processor .
'Ihe functional processor performs the major computations required to achieve the specific function of the misorucessor based subsystem. Tasks performed by the functional processor S g
include movement of data between subsystem memories or I/O registers for the purpose of input or output, on-line compensation of the analog inputs, conversion of input data to '
engineering units, and magnasue testing. A functional processor is included in each subsystem.
P Revision: 5 -
February 29,1996 7.1-6 T Wesunghouse o ,
I
~h L Introduction and General Description of Plant 4
Table 1.6-1 (Sheet 11 of 15)
MATERIAL k. 3RENCED SSAR t
Section W#=f:x: Topical Number Repost Number Tkle l 6.2 WCAP-14382
_ EGOTHIC Code Description and Validation 4
l WCAP-8077 (P) Ice Condenser Containment Pressure Transient Analysis l WCAP-8078 Methods l WCAP-8264-P-A (P) Westinghouse Mass and Energy Relears Data for I WCAP-8312-A Containment Design
. l WCAP-10325 (P) Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Model i for Containment Design - March 1979 Version i l WCAP-8822 (P) Mass and Energy Releases Following A Sicam Line l WCAP-8860 Rupture l WCAP-7907 P-A (P) LOITRAN Code Description l WCAP-7907-A
! l WCAP-12945-P (P) Code Qualification Document for Best Estunate Analysis 4
l WCAP 14407 (P) EGOTHIC Appbcation to AP600 ,
i ! WCAP-14408 . t
] l 6.3 WCAP-8966 Evaluation of Mispositioned ECCS Valves l 7.1 WCAP-13382 (P) AP600 Instrumentation and Control Hardware
, l WCAP-13391 Description l l WCAP-13383 (P) AP600 Instrumentation and Control Hardware and I WCAP-13392 Software Design, Wri&W, and Validation l Process Repon, I
l WCAP-8897 (P) Bypass ! ogic lor the Westinghouse lategrated Protection l WCAP-8898 Spe s I l .2 WCAP-13594 (P) lidEA of Advanced Passive Plant Protecnon Sysaem I I WCAP 13662 l 8.3 WCAP 13856 AP600 Implementation of the Regulatory Treat-r of I Nonsafety-Related Systems Process
- I 10.2 WCAP-11525 Probabihstic Evaluauon of Reda
- tion in Turbine Valve l Test TTwi loCAP-I%05 (b (Ac h gcrm h Scipavd M hoclolog h (MAP -M@b 055) PretcMc% ghu,- A%oo i (P) _ ist.,._,
O Revision: 7 Apru 30,1996 1.6-12 T Westkighouse
In!: hm I!!
L Introduction and General Description of Plant A m,h Table 1.6-1 (Sheet 11 of 15)
MATERIAL REFERENCED SSAR a
Section Westingbosse Topical Neanber Report Number Title 1 6.2 WCAP-14382 EGOTHIC Code Description and Validation l WCAP-8077 (P) Ice Condenser Containment Pr ssure Transient Analysis I WCAP-8078 Methods q l WCAP-8264-P-A (P) Westingbouse Mass and Energy Release Data for I WCAP-8312-A Containment Design
, l WCAP-10325 (P) Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Model l
for Containment Design - March 1979 Version l WCAP-8822 (P) Mass and Energy Releases Followhg A Steam Line I WCAP-8860 Rupture l WCAP-7907 P-A (P) LOPTRAN Code Description I WCAP-7907-A l WCAP-12945-P (P) Code Quahfication Document for Best Estimase Analysis l l WCAP-14407 (P) WGODIIC Application to AP600 I WCAP-14408 (
l 6.3 WCAP-8966 Evaluation of Mispositioned ECCS Valves l 7.1 WCAP-13382 (P) AP600 Instrumentation and Control Hardware I WCAP-13391 Description l WCAP-13383 (P) AP600 Instrumentation and Control Hantware and l WCAP-13392 Software Design, Venficanon, and Valhion I Process Report
.. 9 4 l WCAP-8897 (P) Bypass Logic for the Westmgbouse Integrased Protection l WCAP-8898 System l 7.2 WCAP-13594 (P) PM.JA of Advanced Passive Plant Protection System ,
i I l WCAP-13662 1
l 8.3 WCAP-13856 AP600 I=.htation of the Regulatory Treatment of l l Nonsafety-Related Systems Process l
- I 10.2 WCAP-il525 Probabilssuc Evaluation of Reduction in Turbine Valve ,
l Test Tr+wi i
@f-F4bSO(P) APW lnWodh ord(OM bOMT 4
v # -Hosi AreaeCiwed Oprah besmph
- l (P) Denoies Document is Propnetary
{
Revision: 7 i April 30,1996 1.6-12 3 WBElktgfl0088
, G
j Changes Reflecting Resolution of NRC PAM/ ERG Comments 4
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j b
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1 4
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1 j , 7. Inserrmatation and Camerais n ,1 l - - - -
i l
. Table 7J-5 h===ry of Type B Variables l Function Varlalde Type /Caergery i Monitored j Reactivity Control Neumon fluz B1
{ Consol rod position 33
- Boric acid concentranon B3 1
l Reactor Coolant System lategrity R G pressure B1 l
- RCS wide range Th at BI l l RCS wide range Tcold 51 i i ra==i====* waner level 31 i e - == = pressuse 31 .
i i l Reactor Coolant Inventory Connel Pressuriser level 31-l Pressunaar referemos leg earnparasure 31 i Pressunser pressuse 31 j Rancear vessel - bot leg woner level 33 4
i j Reactor Core Cooling Core exit osaperanse 31 i
- RCS possuse 32 l Tm vessel - bot leg wseer level B2 i Heat Sink M==- RWST woner level 31 1 i PRHR flow B1 l
} PRHR outlet essaperamme 31 PCS sesrage insk waner level al Passive h cooling waner flow B1 j RW5T to RNS section valve smans ,
31 Containment Environment Comisiassent presume Bl Remoesty operased ennemi=mam isolanos valve 31
- S N 5 ,
I Revision: 8 Y ,O *
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- 7. Imatrunneration and Centrols 4
)
Table 7.5-7 (Sheet i of 4)
- Sumunary of Type D Variables i
1 -
Systema Variable TypeQaegory
{ Reactivity Control System Reactor trip breaker stans D2 l
Control rod possoon D3 l
i P:sssunser level and Presswe Control Pressunser safety valve status D2 Pressunaar level D2 j RCS pressum D2
- emssunser- D2 l
Refernace leg aanperasure D2 i
RCS Loops RCS wide range That D2 RCS wide range Tcond D2 RCP breaker means D2 tarandary Pressure and 14 vel Cosmol Steam gaaeraant PORV sessus D2 Sesem pseerssor PORY block valve seems D2 Steam 3seeraser safety valve status D2 Mais feedwansiisolanos valve sessus D2 Seeam generaser level (wide range) D2 Sesam generaser level (narrow rames) D2 i Steen goesneer blowdown isolanos valve D2 senes RcP 4eann3 inder bperdum b2 Revhlos: 8 gg 7.5-31 June 19,1996
- 7. Instrunnestados and Centrols a
i i
I Table 7.5-7 (Sheet 2 of 4) i Sa==ary of Type D Variables syseem vartaue l Typocesesorr
! Secondary Pressee and Level Connel Sesam line presswe 1
D2 (continued) l Main feedwater panp stems D2 l d'
] Main feedweser consol valve stans D2 j Main sasam lies isolanon valve stanas D2 l
Main sesam line isolanon bypass valve stams D2
! Startup Feedwater Startup feedwaner flow i D2
- Startup feedweser consol valve seems D2 l Startup feedwater isolanos valve sessus D2
} Main to stanup feedwater crossover valve D2 j seams 4
Signi h i pressee D2 l
l A-.im level D2 4
- Core snakeup tank level D2 i
1 RWSTE}sne :- -__ - aolahsan . valve seems (MOV) D3 in j RWSTh f
. ,)ecl~s en" valve
/20lad:een saanes D2
- Sguik i ADS Arm sage, second sage and tied sage D2 j valve stems l ADS fourt slags valve stums (MOV) D2 j
ADS founk sage valve mams (non MOV) D2 PIUOL best enchanger inist isolados valve D3 staeus m ,,,,, g _.gonbal. j D2
- I valve senses Reesear vessel head voet valve seams D2 l d-CW$b .u ckarse. valve sumsIsolabon D2 Cwr a isoise.a vaive s sas D2 I A-- _ _ r
- p/solofton* valve saanes D3
&2 ,12 . - _L 11- 1 l nn a . --
y--
Revision: 8 !
June 19,19N g 7.5-32 T@
- 7. Instr ====tation and Controis i
l Table 7.5 7 (Sheet 4 of 4) i Sumissary of Type D Variables Syssene Varlsble TyparCategory i
Containment Coohng Containawat teenperatwe D2 i water serte4110labtm J PC44torage tanh, x r-- talve status D2
! (MOV)ta ler iso -leibson
- PC3gstorage *-',b - valve status D2 l (.ma-MOV) l Passive containement cooling water flow D2 i
- PCS storage tank water level D2
! HVAC System Stams MCR reenra air isolation damper stanas D2 4
! MCR toilet exhaust isolanos damper stesus D2 l MCR supply air isolasma damper staans D2
- MCR air delivery ih valve stamos D2
- MCR air storage bottle pressure D2 ;
MCR supply air radianos level D2 l j Main Steam Turbine stop valve staens D2 1
)
1 Twinas consol valve position D2 '
Condenser sneens dump valve stanas D2 e
1 l
Revision: 8 '
June 19,1996 0 7.5-34 T Westkgl10000
- 7. lastronnestation and Controis l
Table 7.5-9 (Sheet 2 of 4)
. Su==ary of Type F Variables j
Variable Type / Caw Startup feedwater control valve stems p3
]
Main feedwater flow F3 Steam generator level (WR) F3
- Steam flow F3 Main steam line isolation valve staans F3 Main feedwaaer pump stams F3 Startup feedwater pump stams F3 Condenser steam dump valve stams F3 Condensees suorage tank level F3
)
Fressuriser sprayCcosa 4 to F- Mi>alve stans F3 i Auuhary spray line isolance valve stanas F3 Makeup flow P3 Makeup pump stams F3 tendown flow F3 Cmula/3 u x l u p u m L ,e d e r s / , 6 s F3 Codenser- Seakpreswrc.
)=3 Ac.eumulat%r ved valve shelus P3 l
l l
Revision: 8 !
$ WestkWh0 MIS v ,,
7.5-37 June 19.1996 l l
l ,.
i j Table 7.5-9 (Sheet 3 of 4) i l Sumanary of Type F Variables I
j j Variable Type / Category I serie acid inak level p3 l Mdb n i
h'^ -- g, b!ettd '- ' valve staans s
, __ __ F3 l Makeup flow consol valve status F3 1
i RNS flow F3 f l
j N RWST to RNS sucnos valve status F3 A
j RNS discharge to RWST valve stanas F3 i CCS surge tank level F3 i CCS flow F3 1
4 CCS punap staats F3 l CCS flow to RNS valve sessus F3 I CCS flow to RCFs valve stanas F3 l CCS heet exchanger inist teenparamare F3 1
j CCS heat exchanger outlet teenperanse F3 l Desel p3 l 4 "aanar
=genermer
=ame fan cooler staans meus
- p3 I
(%Itad weser pump sesess F3 Chilled wasar valve sessus F3
)
Mamaan temperanse F3 f
Main o.a s.,,iy air - da.,e, s.a n
- Mais osasol room rease air isolanos damper sensus F3
) ,
Mais consol room supply air radiation F3 i Service waner flow F3 biesel genercMr- fooct F3
Yob ey br diesel-dotekeck buses F3
) Pm st>pply % eliesel.fea.ked huseg p3 f
i - RN5 pump xbba F.3 Revisies: 8 0
]
June 19,1996 7.5-38 e T6
- 7. Instrassentation and Controis Table 7.5 9 (Sheet 4 of 4)
Summary of Type F Variables Variable Typ/ Caw Service water pump status p3 Service water pump discharge valve status F3 Service water pump discharge :;+a. p3 Instrument air header pressure F3 Spent fuel pool pump flow F3 Spent fuel pool semperature F3 Spent fuel pool water level F3 I e '
Main to startup feedwater cw<er valve status F3 '
,r . --- -_;. m 73 f IewsT c3ey;,. {3pou tsojo6en voIvc sMus 1
Revision: 8 T WestkIghouse 7.5-39 June 19,1996 C ,
Aalelsbenof Mktmobon. Os best. pe> cess Artebb.!
d .^. i: .,M ..' J y.=___ - - ::. is included as part of the description of each process system provided in other chapters. The process variables measured by the potection and safety monitoring system are listed in Sections 7.2,7.3, and 7.5.
7.1.2.3.2 Nuclear Instrumentation Detectors Three types of neutron detectors are used to monitor the leakage neutron flux from a completely shutdown condition to 120 percent of full powe- The power range channels are capable of measuring overpower excursions up to 200 pera. of full power.
'Ihe lowest range (source range) covers six decades of leakage neutron flux. The lowest observed count rate P= on the strength of the neutron sources in the core and the core multiplicanon associated with the shutdown reactivity. '!his generally is greater than two counts per second. The next range (intermediate range) covers eight decades. D-:- z-e and instrumentation are chosen to provide overlap between the higher pornon of the source r.;nge 4
and the lower portion of the intermediase range. 'Ibe highest range of instrumentation (power range) covers - , - =i-- "4y two decades of the total instr ==antahan range. This is a knear range that overlaps the higher pornon of the intermediate range. 'Ibe neumon detectors are metallad in tubes located around the reactor vessel in the prunary slueld. Detector types for these three ranges are:
. Source range - propornonal counter l . Intermediate range - pulse fission chamber
. Power range - uncompensated iomzation chamhar 7.1.2.3.3 Ecydysment Status Inputs Some inputs to the praescsion system are not measurements of process or nuclear variables, but are discrete indemeiana of the status of certam equipment. Examples include snanual switch positions, contact status inputs, and indienaaan provided by valve limit switches.
7.1.2.9 Intercnidmet ('h Integrated Protecties Cabinet to Integrated Protecties Cabinet Isolased fiber-optic data links are used for these ra===ni. arians links. The global trip subsystem in each ineegrated praesetion cabmet contmis this camemnicarian link. These att standard one-way (simplex) ca====emaana used to traname bistable trip status between insegrased prosecnon cabinets for use in two eut-of-four reactor trip logic.
Integrated Protecties Cabinet to Engineered Sofety Features Actuaties Cabinet Isolated fiber-optic data links in each integrated pmesetion cabinet transmit bistable trip outputs to the engmeered safety feanues acmanon cabest for use in engineered safety features actuation logic. These data links are one-way links that only tran==nr data to the eng -
s4 safety femmres actuanon cabmets.
Revision: 10 g@ 7.1-21 Dar*=her 20,1996
j Changes for Auxiliary Spray and CVS Letdown 4
4 4 *+
l
' Condition 2 consists of the manual actuation of either of two momentary contmis in the main {
control room. Either contml actuates all divisions and closes the nonessential fluid system ;
paths from the containment.
Manual reset is provided to block the automatic actuation signal for containment isolation. !
l Separate momentary controls are provided for resetting each division. l i No other interlocks or permissive signals apply directly to the containment isolation function.
Automatic actuation originates from a safeguards actuation (S) signal that does contain interlock and permissive inputs.
' j l
'Ihe functional logic that actuates containment isolation is illustrated in Figure 7.2-1, sheets 11 and 13.
l 4
7.3.1.2.2 In-Coutainment Refueling Water Storage Tank Injection ;
Signals to align the in-containment refueling water storage tank for injection are generated ;
). from the following conditions: '
- 1. Actuation of the fourth stage of the automatic depressurization system (subsection 7.3.1.2.4) .
' low - 2. i 2.
Cnincidence loop I and loop 2 hot leg levels belowAsetpoint for a duration exceeding an i adjustable time delay
- 3. Manual initiation Each of the above conditions opens the in-containment refueling water storage tank injection valves, thereby providing a flow path to the reactor coolant system.
Condition 3 consists of two sets of two momentary controls. Manual actuation of both controls of either of the two control sets generates signals that open the in containment I refueling water storage tank injection valves. A twwontml simultaneous actuation prever.*a i inadvertent actuation.
i No interlocks or permissive signals apply directly to the injection valves of the in-containment i refueling water storage tank.
~
- 'Ihe functional logic relating to in-containment refueling water storage tank injection is illustrated in Figure 7.21, sheet 16.
1 i
i i Revision: 7 April 30,1996 7.3-4 T Westinghouse
j ,. .-
i i Condition I results from a coincidence of two of the four divisions of reactor loop average i
temperature (T,.,) below the Low-2 setpoint coincident with the P-4 permissive (reactor trip).
- '!his blocks the openmg of the steam dump valves. This signal also becomes an input to the l l steam dump interlock selector switch for unblocking the steam dump valves used for plant '
i 3
cooldown. This function may be manually blocked when.the pressurizer pressure is below the P-Il setpoint. The block is automaucally removed whers the pressurizer pressure is above the P-11 setpoint.
l Condition 2 consists of two controls. Either one of these controls can be used to manually l initiate a steam dump block.
i l The functional logic relating to the steam dump block is illustrated in Figure 7.2-1, sheet 10.
7J.1.2.17 Control Room Isolation and Air Sapply Initiation l
) Signals to minare isolation of the finain control room and to mitiate the air supply are generated from either of the followmg conditions:
3
- 1. High control room air supply radioactivity level .
i j 2. Loss of ac power sources -
l J
! Naian 1 is the occurrence one of two consol recen air supply radioactivity momtors l
- desecans a radioactivity level above the High-2 setpoint. 1
- n l Condition 2 results from the loss of all ac power sources. A presst time delay is provided to )
permit the restoranon of ac power from the offsiae sources or from the onsies diesel generators
- l befose mitaanon. "Ihe loss of all ac power is detected by undervoltage sensors that are '
) conneesed to the input of each of the four Class IE banery chargers. Two senaars are ca=== e-a to each of the four bemery charger inputs. The loss of ac power signal is based on i
- the detecnon of an = '-E'T condinon by each of the two sensors eaaaarend to two of the
! four banery chargers. The two out-of-four logic is based on an-A-#7 to the banery
{ chargers for divisions A or C concident with an : ET to the banery chargers for i divisions B or D.
1 4
Tbs fsactional logic mieting to consol roona isolation and air supply initianon is illustrated I in Pigme 7.2-1 sheet 13.
i Aox,i; rat:3 dpmy emd.
l 7.3.1.2.13h!AldWWE Purglegllgg [ Jag Imelmelam i ,
auxilieu3 spr cud canel' i A signal to isolase thejleadown pun,ficanon linjas generseed upon the concidence of 1 I pressunaar level below the Inw-1 setpoint in any two of four (visions. This helps to j rrimarain reactor coolant system inventory. This function can be inanually blocked when the j pressunser waeer level is below the F 12 setpost. This funcnon is r+-"y unblocked
! when the pressunser waaer level is above the P-12 setpoint. The funceianal logic relanng to j this is illustrated in Figue 7.2-1, sheet 12.
1 i
l Revisies: It J
- 7. W and centreis 7.3.1.2.19 ennema====* Air Futration Systens Isolation l l
l A signal to isolate the containment air filtranon system is .e-4 upon the coincidence of l l
l contamment radioactivity above the High-1 setpost in any two of four divisions. This limits ,
i activity release to the envuonment. The functional logic relating to this is illustrated in '
i Figure 7.2-1, sheet 13. l i
! 7 3.1.2.20 14eresal Residual Heat Removal System Isolation I i
I l~
A signal for isolating the normal residual heat removal system lines is generated upon the l coincidence of containment r=<liaartivity above the High-2 setpoint in any two of tbur i divisions. This signal also isolates the chemical and volume control system as discussed in I subsection 7.3.1.2.15. This lismts activity release to the envuonment. The funcuanal logic relatmg to this is illustrated in Figure,7.2-1, sheet 13.
7.3.1.2.21 Spent Fuel Peel Isolation .
A signal for isolating the spent fuel pool lines is generated upon the coincidence of spent fuel pool level below the Low setpost in any one of two divisions. This helps to anniaania the water inventory in the spent fuel pool due to line leakage. The functional logic relating to this ,
is illustrated in Figure 7.2-1, sheet 13.
. CAbo .wsEAT Z 3. I. 2 22 7.3.1.3 Blocks, Paradssives, and Interlocks for Eaglasered Safety Features Actuation The interlocks used for engineered safety festmes actuation are designated as "P-xx" pernussives and are listed in Table 7.3-2.
7.3.1.4 Bypasses of Enghneered Safety Features Actuations
'!he channels used in engineered safety feannes arenatiasi that can be :=manally bypassed are indicated in Table 7.3-1. A desenption of this bypass capability is provided in subsection 7.1.2.10. The arenarian logic is not bypassed for test. Durmg tests, the arenariaa logic is fully tested by blocking the acniarian logic output before it results in component actuations.
7.3.1.5 Design Basis for Eaglasered Safety Features Actuaties The following subsections provide the design bases informanon for engmeered safety features marian includag the information required by Secnon 3 of IEEE 2791971. Engineered safety feannes are initiated by the penaar'eian and safety monitormg system. '! hose design bases relating to the equipment that initiates and w.@ engmeered safety features are given in subsection 7.1.4.1. The design bases presented here concern the variables monitored for engineered safety features acenation and the minirraim performance requirements in genereng the actuanon signals.
Revisios: 7 g@ O 7.3-17 Apru 30,1996
[ INSERT 7.3.1.1.22]
7.3.1.2.22 Chemical and Volume Control System Ietdown Isolation A signal to isolate the letdown valves of the chemical and volume contml system is generated upon the occurrence of a low-1 hot leg level in either of the two hot leg loops. 'Ihis helps to maintain reactor system inventory. The functional logic relating to this is illustrated in Figure 7.2-1, sheet 16.
'Ihese letdown valves are also closed by the containment isolation function as described in subsection 7.3.1.2.1.
I o
- u. .
i
- 7. Imatrunestados and Controls l
l 1
l Table 7.31 (Sheet 7 of 8) i ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SIGNALS l
$ %d
{ Chamaels/ Ammelaa j Acmados Signal Switches Logic Permissives and laterlocks j 16. Main Control Room Isolation and Air Sapply laitiation (Figure 7.2-1. Sheet 13) i
- a. High-2 control room 2 1/2 None j supply air radianon
- b. Undervoltage to Class IE 2/ charger 2/2 per charger None l
banery chargers and 2/4 Auxils cur- $ p rcx3 o n el **
Isolados (Figure 7.21. Sheet 12) 17] PtsrtScation I a. Low-l pressurizer level 4 2/4-BYP'* Manual black permitted below P-12.
Automancelly unblocked above P-12.
- 18. Cemenlaaneet Air Fleraties System I=almel== (Figue 7.21. Sheet 13)
- a. High-l containment 4 2/4-BYP' None radioactivity
- 19. Noreaal Resideal Heat Removal System Instaden (Figue 7.21. Shast 13)
- a. High 2 contanament 4 2/4 BYP' None radioactivity
- 20. Spent Feet Peet Isoleden (Figue 7.21. Shoot 13)
- a. Law spent fuel pool level 2 1/2 None
- 21. Open In C=h Rasselleg Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Ishceles use Valves (Figwe 7.2-1. Sheet 16)
- a. /.momanc reactor coolset (See items 3d and 3e) system f , - = '
(fourth sings) l
- b. r=* loop 1 and I pa-loop 2/2 None l loop 2 leslevel (aner delay) %.3 8
- c. Manoelimidados 4 swides 2/4 switches Noas ;
- 22. Open IRWST Ceassiement Rariscalasten Vahes la Series wish Check Vahes '
(Figwe 7.21. Sheet 15) a ten.e. e 2, cit.rge, i,2 ,e, charge, o Class IE banery chargers and 2/4 chargers i Revision: 10 3 Da===hae 20,1996 TW 7.3-29
1 i
- Table 7.3-1 (Sheet 8 of 8) i ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SIGNALS
- %d ts.--aar Actuation j Actuation Signal Switches Logic Periplm!ves and Interlocks i
- 23. Open AH 1RWST Containment Recirc=l=*ian Valves (Figure 7.2-1, Sheet 16)
I b. Safeguards actuation signa: (See items la through le)
- (automatic or manual) l coincident with 1
14w IRWST level 4 2/4 BYP' None j (Iow-3 seapoint)
- c. Manuallaitiation 4 switches 2/4 switches None jf9hE:
- 1. 2/4-BYP IMices automatic bypass logic. The logic is 2 out of 4 with no bypasses 2 out of 3 with one bypass:
1 out of 2 with two bypasses; and, autornatically actuated with three or four bypasses.
4
- 2. Any two chanwie from either tank not in same division.
j 3. Two switchew must be acaimd simul'anaa=ely.
- 4. Also, closes power-operated relief block valve of respective steam generator.
I J
l 5. The two out.of-four logic is based on undervoltage to the battery chargers for divisions A or C coincident with
! I an undervoltage to the battery chargers for divisions B or D.
- 6. Any two chan=le from either loop not in same division.
1
- 7. Any two channele from either line not in same division.
I. .
84 ck-a 1 wvol .,. coa.1 s31,% Last.4,1,q,, (p,3,,*M-l, i
% Lw-l La ; f" f* P l e. g g V2. Mone.
i f
i Revisiosi: 7 April 30,1996 7.3-30 y Westkg
- 7. Instrunsentation and Controls
, Table 7.3-2 (Sheet 3 of 3) i INTERLOCKS FOR ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM Designation Derivation Fumetion P-12 Pressurizer level below setpoint (a) Permits manual block of core makeup 3
tank actuanon on low pressurizer level to allow mid-loop operation 4
(b) Pernuts manual block of reactor coolant pump trip on low pressuruer level to allow 4 mid-loop operanon ,
L 1 cWnllary.5prayON j (c) Permits manual block oh&mian line isolation on low pressurizer level to allow j mid-loop operanon l
P-12 :h rizr.i level above setpoint (a) Prevents manual block of core maken.,e tank actuanon on low pressurizer leve!
- I
- (b) Prevents manual block of reactor coolant pump trip on low pressuruer level l G0XIflat j
' (c) Prevents manual block oppunfication e j l isolanon on low pressunzer Idvel (d) Provides confirmatory open signal to the core makeup tank cold leg balance lines l
l l
I l
l Revision: 7 l 7.3 33 APru 30,1996 T WDEhgh0088 C
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i i
]
1 C
,. o-l 7. Instrumentation and Control
- 4 s-MONITOR BUS JL Il a) _ a)
DATALee(8:
DAT W :
PnoupcDev. A =$ OUuED OUu ED N Pnou ec osv. A
} .- Pnou rc oev.s ;$ DATA DATA Cc Pnou rc ory.s FRou rC Dev. C O$ PROCESSOR PROCESSOR DC Pnou ec Div.C Faou PC Div. D O$ g g Cc Pnou ec orv.O p-hELET6 ,
! ouumD ,i aidi di a f- oUumo '
i DISPLAY DISPLAY {
J Q-DELETE
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f DISPLAY DISPLAY
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j ouumD ouwmD -
DATA DATA l PRoceSu e process a ;
i m m cAmwer cA met l
I i
h JL l
- Se= SORS Sensors 1
l s
- teae,e o moLAnDu l Fig w e 7.1-8 N dN4D&& 3 SSAA MARuuP#
f*A4s 3 or (o @mHM ha Prwaar l
( -
T Wealnghouse Revision 5 February 29, im 7.1-59 C
! 1 l Condition 3 results from a coincidence of two of the four divisions of narrow range steam j generstar water level above the High-2 setpoint for either stearn generator.
4 ,
j De functional logic relating to the tripping of the turbine is illustrated in Figure 7.2-1, )
- . sheet 14.
~
7.3.1.2.9 En-C=*5-==* Refueling Water Storage Tank ca.ean e Rectrentation i
l Signals to align the in-containment refueling waar.r storage tsak cansainment recirculation isolation valves are generated from the following conditions: l
} 1. Automatic or manual safeguards armiariaa (==haaeeiaa 7.3.1.1) in coincidence with low i
! in containment refueling water storage tank water level i
, 2. Manualinitiation . !
! i
- 3. Extended loss of ac power sources l l
t
~
! ~ Dere are four parallel containment recuculation paths provided to permit the recirenimeiaa of l the water provided by the in-containment isfueling water storage tank. Two of these paths j are provided with two isolanon valm in senes while the romanung two paths are provided
! with a single inal=*iaa valve in senes with a check valve. .
s !
! l l Conditions 1 and 2 result in the opening of all isoletion valves in all four parallel paths.
l Condition 3 resuhs in the opening of the two isolation valves that are in series with the check i i valves.
1
- raaditian I results from the caineidaar* of two of the four divisions of ineaasainment i
! refueling water s6orage tank water level below the Low-3 seapoint, coincident with an l automanc or manual safeguards armatiaa 4 ;
Condinon 2 consists of two sets of two saamantary contmis. Manual acmation of both concels of either of the two consol sets ininetes recirculation in all four parallel paths. A tw iamhnamaan actuation prevents inadvertent meniasiaa raadeiaa 3 resuks fm n the loss of all ac power for a period of time that appmaches the 24-hour Class IE de battery capaldlity to activate the iaeanemiamant refueling water storage tank emmainment recirculation isolation valves. De timed ausput holds on restoration of ac power and is manually reset aAer the bemories are recharged. De loss of all ac power is I detected by undervoltage sensors that am connected so the input of each of the four Class IE banery chargers. Two sensors are connected en each of the four bemory charger inputs. De
( I ions of ac poww sismat is based on ihn detection of an ; condison by ekharof the I two sensors connected so two of the four bemery chargers. l C /A> s E A T 7.3. /. ,9 ~
No innriochs or pennesive asnais APPl y diactly to acti of the inconminnent mfueiing waar morage tank -ain--e meirculanon isolation vaim. Howevw. - a- eie
,_. Revisies: 7 y@ 7.311 April 30,1996
i 3
i i
~
- [ INSERT 73.1.2.9]
1 De safeguards actuation signal, which is part of condition I, is latched-in upon its occurrence. A deliberate operator action is required to reset this latch. his featwe is provided so that the actuation signal to the recirculation isolation valves is not cleared by the reset of the safeguards actuation signal as discussed in subsection 7.3.1.1.
i g
a e
i b
i .*
- 7. Instrumentation and Centrees i
l Condition I results from a coincidence of two of the four divisions of reactor loop average l temperamre (T,,,) below the Low 2 setpoint coincident with the P.4 permissive (reactor trip).
This blocks the opening of the steam dump valves. This signal also becomes an input to the i
steam dump interlock selector switch for unblocking the steam dump valves used for plant l cooldown. This function may be manually blocked when.the pressurtzer pressure is below l the P II- setpoint. The bic,ek is automancally removed wheti the pressurizer pressure is above j the P-11 setpoint.
1 l Condinon 2 consists of two courols. Either one of these controls can be used to manually j initials a steam dump block.
i 1he Amenonal logic relasmg so the steam denp block is i!!ustrated in Figure 7.2-1, sheet 10.
- 7.3.1.2.17 Control Rooms Isolados and Air Supply Imanimatum i
Signals to intiane isolanon of the main consol room and to imnase the air supply are ,
generated from either of the foDowing condmons:
- 1. High consol room air supply radioactivity level
- 2. Loss of ac 1 Manuca, power sourcest instiaticm l
q r=iaia= 1 is the occunenes ces of two consol room air supply radioactivity monitors desecung a radioactivity level above the High-2 setpoint.
r-iaia= 2 russies froen the loss of aD ac power sources. A pnpet time delay is provided to
- pernut the restoranon of ac power from the offsite sources or frorn the casies diesel generators
) before inmanos. The loss of au ac power is deescend by '-_#?7 sensors that aus j connoceed to the input of each of the four Class IE banery chargers. Two sensors are consacred to each of the four bemory charger inputs. The loss of ac power signal is based on the desscnon of an ==='=ity condmos by each of the two sensors connected to two of the four banery chargers. The two eut of-four logic is based on an undervoltags to the basesry chargers for divisions A or C coincidset with an - '- s4 to the banery chargers for divisions B or D. --r CIA >5ERT 7 3, J. 2,17 j The femenonal logic telsting to coneet room isolation and air supply initiation is illustrated in Figuse 7.2-1, sheet 13.
7.3.1.2.18 1Aedows ParMisados IJss th A signal to isolaan the needown puri5canos line is generssed upon the concidenes of
( l pressuriser level below ths ime-1 asspoun in any two of four divisions. This helps to maintain reactor coolant syssues invemeary. This fhaction can be manuaDy blocked when the pressunaar wasar level is below the F 12 asspoint. This function is r-M="y unblocked whom the passeriser weer level is above the F 12 seapoest. The fhacnonal logic relating to this is iDuserssed in Figum 7.2-1, shast 12.
L -
R.,ws.: a December 30,1996 C 7.3 16 TW
Q. *
[ INSERT 7.3.1.2.17]
Condition 3 consists of two momentary controls. Manual actuation of either of the two controls wj!! i result in control room i:miation and air supply initiation. .
I l
I i
l
)
l l
l O
l l
1 i
k C
- 7. tastrusnestation and Controis
!j i
i Table 7.31 (Sheet 7 of 8)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SIGNALS No. or l Cha==alat Actuatios Actuation Signal Switches Logic Perunhelves and Interlocks
- 16. Male. Control Room Isolation and Air Supply Initiation (Figure 7.21. Sheet 13) i a. High.2 control room 2 1/2 None j supply air radiation
! b. Undervohage to Class IE 2/ charger 2/2 per charger None j battery chargers and 2/4 i
17.c. Mas & onihabian Partncaties IJae2Isolation swkkes (Figure s* 7.21. Sheet h)ag12)ff;;&
! I a. Low-l pressuriser level 4 2/4-BYP'. Manual block permined below P 12.
Automancally unblocked above P 12.
- 18. Ca=*ah Air Filtration Systems Isolaties (Figure 7.21. Sheet 13)
{
- a. High-1 containment 4 2/4-BYP' None radioactivity ,
l 19. Norunal Reeldeal Hest Romeoval Systema Isolation (Figues 7.21. Sheet 13)
- a. High-2 contaimah 4 2/4-BYP' None l radioactivity
- 20. Spent Feel Fool 1 a.eaa= (Figure 7.21. Sheet 13) )
a.1.ow spent fuel pool level 2 1/2 None l 21. Open In Centainement Reheeling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Injection IJae Valves (Figure 7.21. Sheet 16)
- a. Autornanc reactor coolant (See items 3d and 3e) i systeen depressuritanon j (fourth stage)
- b. Coincident loop 1 and I per loop 2/2 Noas
, loop 2 low het les level
- (after delay)
- c. Mammalinisiesion 4 switches 2/4 switches' None
- 22. Open IRWST c==e.a=====e Recirculaties Valves la Seetes wish Check Valves
(
j (Figure 7.21. Sheet 15)
- a. Extended undervoltage to 2/ charger, 1/2 per charger Noes l Class IE banery chargers and 2/4 l
(
Revision: 10 l g@ 7.3-29 Deessaber 20,1996
i ,. .- l
% Instrumentation and Centrois 4
i l
)
4 Table 7.3 3 SYSTEM-LEVEL MANUAL INPUT *It) THE l t ENGINRFRFn SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM i i )
- To Figure 7.21 Mammal Centrol Divisloes Sheet I h ..
- Manual safeguards actuanos el ABCD 2 & 11 Manual safeguents h #2 ABCD 2 & 11 l Manual passive rosklual heat removal actuation #1 AB 8 l Manual passive residual heat removal actuation #2 AB 8 Manual steam line isolation #1 B D 9 Manuel sones line isolation #2 B D 9
- Sesam/fsedwater isolation and safeguards block control #1 B 9 j Steam /feedwater isolation and safeguards block comerol #2 D 9 l Manual feedwater isolation #1
- B D 10 l Manual feedwater isolation #2 B D 10 j Manual seems dump interlock selector #1 B 10 l Manuel seemm dump inearlock selector #2 D 10 Ptosauriser pressure safeguents block control #1 A 11 i Pressunser pressure safeguanis block commet #2 B 11 Pressuriser pressure safeguanis block consol #3 C 11 Pressunser pressure safeguanis block control M D 11 Manual core makeup tank actuation #1 ABCD 12 l Manual core makeup tank actuanon #2 ABCD 12 l Core makeup tank actuation block consol #1 A 12 j Core makeup tank actuation block consol #2 B 12 j Core makeup tank actuation block control #3 C 12 l Cat makeup tank actuation block coatml N D 12 Manual ==e=1====# cooling actuation #1 & #2 AB 13 Manual consninment cooling actuation #3 & N AB 13 Manual =ne=i====# isolanon actuation #1 ABCD 13 l Manual radainment isolation actuanon #2 ABCD 13 l Manua" ' , _ _ - === system stages 1.1 and 3 actuadom #1 & #2 ABCD 15
? Manual c:epressunasmon system stages 1,2 and 3 acemanon #3 & N ABCD 15 Manual ' ,
' =-
system stage 4 actuadon #1 & #2 ABCD 15 l l Manual ' , _
- system stage 4 actuadon #3 & N ABCD 15 i Manual RWST acemenom #1 & #2 ABCD 16
! Manual RWST acemanon #3 & N ABCD 16 .
l Manual came=i====# recirculanon acemation #1 & #2 ABCD 16 l j Manual ca========e recirculados acenados #3 & N ABCD 16
) )
p l3 l Manoel controlroom15elaban ord airspfy,Mu / 48 O l j ( Mango l cedr.1 rw.m is.lalm ciad.o'ir sQ in,WQ ABQ 33
. 1 i
l 1
4 l 1 l Revision: 7
- April 30,1996 ,
7.3 34 y@
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45P b 15M h previded. . The remote shutdown wortstanon contains eb One reh shutdown workstation is controlvfor the safety-related equipr ent required to establish and maintain safe shutdown.
h Additionally, control of nonsafety- god components is available, allowing operation and control when ac power is available.j ) ,,=^-- ' ' ~' "w. . -'-fx i -
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- The remote shutdown workstation is provided for use only following an evacuatio'n of the dildsfif[ #lf/yh '
main control room. No actions are anticipated from the remote shutdown workstation during normal, routine shutdown, refueling, or mantenance operations.
l'l Die 184,1~l The remote shutdown workstanon has sufficient communication circuits to allow the operator d(t.febchd/t ' "'IY "'" "* **#* d**" A' *d I" " ' ' '
communication is available between the following =====:
I 1
reert $t
- Main control room (esste h Sk fje w
- Remote shutdown workstation
- Onsite techancal support center ufed(s}d5K ,
- Diesel generator local control station Sussa.he/.f 18,I2.3 /
gy Operator control capability at the remote shutdown workstation is normally disabled, and
),h g,g ,g f MU operator control funcuans are normally performed from workemiaan located inside the main control room; however, operator control capability can be transfoned from the main control room workstations to the remote workstation if the canaal room requires evacuation. This O s (epHett operator contml transfer capability can not be disabled by any smgle active failure coincident with the loss of offssee power.
pdgg ,
grp@/s.bt The control transfer fuocoon is i - '--- ^ ' by multiple transfer switches. Each individual
.i ,
transfer switch is associated with only a single safety-relsend or smgle nonsafety-related division. These switches are locaed behind an aahw+=8 access panel. Entry into this access 85h. h A'AMy panel will resuk in alarms at the snain control room and renaces shadown workstation. The h ceg kyy h , access panel is locsand within a fhe mone which is separase from the main control room. ;
Actuanon of these transfer swisches resuks in additional alanns at the main canaal room and remote shutdown workeneiaa the activation of opermor conaal capabihty from the remote workmarian and tg deactivation of openger connol p from the main cannot room workeh The__' , -
f 1 ' -- ' 7 ' ^ p W W in die e consol room and on the remote shutdown workstanon are noe affected by this consol transfer funcuan.
7.4.3.1.2 Centrols at Other Locations In addmon to the controls and inchcators provided at the remote shutdown workstation, the following controls are provided outside the main control room:
- Reactor trip capabdity at the reactor trip switchgear
- - Turbine trip capability at the turtune
~
Revision: 5 February 29,1996 C 7.4-12 T Westkghpunt
- 7. Instrunneltation and Controls v.- -
- i. .
- Stan/stop controls for the diesel generators, located at each diesel generator local control panel l 7.4.3.1.3 Design Bases Information .
l According to GDC 19, the capability of establishing a shutdown condition and maintaining l
the station in a safe status in that mode is an essential function. The controls and indications necessary for this function are identified in subsection 7.4.2. To provide the availability of the remote shutdown workstation after contml room evacuation, the following design features are provided:
- The remote shutdown workstation conforms with the guidelines provided by ANSI 58.6 1983 (Reference 1).
^-
.... r mown - m --m...::i ' - 1. ij . J z woo m. .J ...l_9 ^#
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i
- ~ , ,j, 7; T.. mr .,, - _-[,Q- ,,,__f_____-
e 'Ihe remote shutdown workstadon achieves and maintains safe shutdown conditions from full power conditions and maintains safe shutdown conditions thereafter.
m
. The remote shutdown workstation achieves safe shutdown when offsite power is available~ and when offsite power is not available.
- The remote shutdown workstation operates safety-related synems, i%t from the main control room.
- 'Ihe remote shutdown workstation is designed for a single failure. When a random event, such as a fire, or an allowable techmcal specification maintenance results in one safety-related division being unavailable, a single failure in a redundant division is not postulated. When a random event other than fire causes a main control room evacuation, I a coincident single failure in the systems controlled from the remote shutdown panel is considered. -
- Access to the remote shutdown workstation is under administrative contml.
I
- 7.4.3.2 Analysis The analysis of the systems required for safe shutdown is provided in subsection 7.4.1. *Ihe following discussion is limited to the remote shutdown workstation.
Conformance to NRC General Design Cdteda General Design Criterien M - The remote shutdown workstation provides @- controls and indications located outside the main control room to establish and maintain the reactor Revision: 5 7.4-13 February 29,1996 T Westkghouse ,
u
- 7. lasp6mentath Controls '
i
- and the reactor coolant system in a safe shutdown condition in the event that the main control ,
i l room must be eve _'=4 4
- Conformance to NRC Regulatory Guides l
4 l Regulatory Guide 1.22 - The remote shutdown workstation is tested periodically during l sution operation.
4
! Retsistory Gaide 1.29 -The remote shutdowirworkstation is designed 2 1 - - ! 2._ 2 1
.- , _ , . . _ , . _ _ .__ __, n
._.__w_..
4 __ .2_.2___
.cismic Category II to prevent compromi ing the
! function of safety-related devices during or after a safe shutdown earh-b Conformance to EEE 279-1971
- M V4fOf i "Ihe remote shutdown workstation and the design features which preside for the transfer of il hsMff fdQ j workstation conforrns control capability from the main control room to the remote shutdopd - - ;
j to applicable portions of IEEE 279-1971. The asemePcircuits-- ::
i worksesseen are designed so that a single fai does not prevent maintaining safe shutdown.
1 This is accomplished by redundant W the systerns requued for safe shutdown, using
!='= - : '==t safety-related power divisionh. ;
j (tearMt'aff m] ,
i To prevent interacuan between the redundant systems, the redundant control channels are I wired !='=r- =_+-tly and are separated from each other. Nonsafety-related circuits available :
for (but not requued for) safe shutdown are elocuically isolated from safety-related circuits. l I
! 7.4.4 Comtdned th Infonmaties j This section has no requirement for information to be provided in support of the Combined i
License applicanon.
j 7.4.5 References i
- 1. ANSI 58.61983, " Criteria for Remote Shutdown for Light Water Reactos."
J j
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i Revision: 5 February 29,1996 7.4-14 y WagtkIgh0058
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- 7. Instrumentation and Centrols i
- e The protection and safety momtoring system provides signal conditioning, communications,
! and display functions for Category I variables and for Category 2 vanables that are energimd i from the Class 1E de uninterruptible power supply system. 'Ihe plant control system and the data display and processing system provides signal conditioning, communications and display functions for Category 3 variables and for Category 2 variables that are c gged from the J
non-Class 1E de uninterruptible power system.1he data display and processing system also provides an altemale display of the variables which are displayed by the protection and safety monitoring system. Electrical separation of the data display and processing system and the i protection and ss'ety monitoring system is maintained through the use ofisolation devices in i
the data links connecting the two systems, as discussed in subsection 7.1.2.11.1he portion
, of the protection and safety monitoring system which is dedicated to providing the safety-l related display function is referred to as the quahfied data processing cabinets. These cabinets are discussed in subsection 7.1.2.6 and are illustrated in Figum 7.1-8.
The qualified data processing cabinets are divided into two separate electrical divisions. Each
- of the two electrical divisions is connected to a Class IE de uninterruptible power system with
, sufficient battery capacity to provide - y electncal power for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. If all i
ac power sources ars lost for a period of time that exceeds 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the power supply system
- will be energized frongac power sources which are brought to the site fmm other locations.
See Section 8.3. L g g,./ f.,] y 43 r [%
Instrumentation associated with primary variables that are energued from the Class 1E de unintenuptible power supply system are powered from one of the two electrical divisions with 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> herrny capacity. Instrumentatior. asM H with other variables that are energized frorn the Class IE de unintenuptible power supply system are powered frorn one of four electncal divisions with 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> battery capacity. If a variable exists only to provide a backup to a pnmary variable, it may be powered by an electrical division with a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> battery capacity. In such cases, provisions are provided to enable this variable to be powered by an alternate source if it is needed to resolve a discrepancy beres two primary variables !
in the event that all ac power sources are lost for a period in excess of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
I Class IE position indication signals for valves and electrical breakers may be ge 4 by an
? electrical division with 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> battery capacity. This is --ary to make full use of all four !
l Class IE electncal divisions to enhance fire separation criteria. 'Ibe power associated with I the actuation signal for each of these valves or electrical breakers is provided by an electrical )
I division with 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> battery capacity, so there is no need to provide position indication !
I beyond this period. The w4ui will verify that the valves or electrical breakers have I achieved the proper position for long-term stable plant operation before position indication is
]
I lost. Once the position indication is lost, there is no need for further monitoring since the l I operator does not have any remote capability for changing the position of these components. j Electrically operated valves, which have the electrical power removed to meet the single ;
failure criterion, are provided with redundant valve position sensors. Each of the two position sensors is powered from a different non-Class 1E power source.
\
Revision: 8 Jane 19,1996 7.5-12 T Wesikighouse
i ,. .-
4 j 7.3.1119 ('ame.a mama Air F9tration Systems Isehdien j A signal to isolate the caneminmane air filtranon system is generated upon the coincidence of i -
containmant radianceivity above the High-1 setpost in any two of four divisions. 'Ihis limits l activity release to the environment. 'Ihe functional logic relating to this is illustrated in j Figure 7.2-1, sheet 13.
l 7.3.1120 Normal Rashimal Rama Raunovel System Isolaties i
l A signal for isolanng the normal rendual heat removal system lines is generated upon the
! coincidence of caatmininent r=dianerivity above the High-2 setpoint in any two of four
- I divisions. 'Ihis signal also isolates the chemical and volume control system as discussed in
! I subsection 7.3.1.2.15. This limits activity release to the environment. 'Ibe functional logic
! relating to this is illustrated in Figure,7.2-1, sheet 13.
7.3.1121 Spent Fuel PeelIsoletten dwo M.e.
A signal for isolating the spent fuel pr lines is upon the coinculence of spent fuel l pool level below the Low setpoint in ampmene of divisions.1his helps to snaintain the l water inventory in the spent fuel pool due to line leakage. 'Ihe funerianal logic relating to this l
i is illustrated in Figure 7.2-1 sheet 13.
. 7.3.13 Blocks, Persaissives, and Interlocks for Engineered Safety Features Actuaties .
l The interlocks used for engineered safety featums actuation are designated as "P-xx"
} permissives and are listed in Table 7.3-2.
i
! 7.3.1.4 Bypasses of Engineered Safety Festuses Actuations
'Ihg channale used in r-;- -
-_i safety feannes actuation that can be nimannity bypassed are i indicated in Table 7.3-1. A description of this bypass capability is provuled in l subsection 7.1.2.10. 'Ibe actuation logic is not bypassed for test. During tests, the actuation i logic is fully tesend by blocking the actuation logic output before it results in component l aceinmeinne i
l 7.3.1.5 Design Basis for Engineered Safety Features Actuation l 'Ihe following =ih=areia== provide the design bases information for - --- ed safety features i mee==eian including the information requimd by Section 3 of isa: 279-1971. Engineered j . safety features are initiated by the protection and safety unaninaring system. 'Ihose design j bases relating to the equipment that initisses and Ee- ,"- engmeered safety feneses are
- given in anh=aceian 7.1.4.1. The design bases pasented here concern the variables monitored
.! for ===ia=='ad safety features actuarian and the minimum mi. -- = requirements in j generatmg the actuation signals.
i l
i Revision: 7 y Weglbghgugg C 7.3-17 April 30,1996
j ,
f
- 7. Instrumasatasies and Contrees
{ Table 7.3-1 (Sheet 7 of 8)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SIGNAIE j %d 2
Chamaele/ Acamaeles l Actuosion Signal Switches 14 sic Peneissives and Interlocks l 16. Main Comerel Reean Issiseles and Air Supply Isaan as ,(Figme 7.21. Sheet 13) l a. High-2 control room 2 1/2 None j supply air radiacon j l b. Undervoltage to Class IE 2/ charger 2/2 per charger None I
banery chargers and 2/4 l charga 8
- 17. Purificaelen IJae Isoleelen (Figue 7.2-1. Sheet 12) l ,
I l a. Low-l presswiser level 4 2/4-BYP' Manuel block pernused below P 12.
{ Automancelly unblocked above F-12.
i
- 15. ca a a=====* Air FBersaise Systems Isolastem (Figure 7.21 Sheet 13)
- a. High 1 cone =*===e 4 2/4 BYP' None -
radioactivity l l
- 19. Normaal Residual Best Ramnovel System Isaiselen (Figue 7.2-1 Sheet 13) J l
j a. High 2 cone =====e 4 2/4-BYP' Noes
! radioactivity I 28. Spent Feet Post saan=a6== (Figue 7.21, Shast 13) f a. Iow spent fuel pool level # -WD- 2h Noas 3
i 21. Open sa a.a====* RammeMag Water Seerage Tank (IRWST) Indoseles 1 Ass Valves j (Figue 7.21, Sheet 16)
- a. Ausemenc reactor coolant (See itses 3d and 3s) l system ' ,
1 (fourth stage) i
- b. Coincidset loop 1 and I per loop 2/2 Nome
- loop 2 low het les level
! (aher delay)
- c. Mammallaislados 4 switches 2/4 swiaches' Noes
- 22. Open IRWST r==ama====* Rosinmissism Valves In Series with Chedt Valves 1 (Figwe 7.21. Sheet 15) ,
.' a. Extended undervohage to 2/ charger 1/2 per charger Noas i Class IE banery chargers ani 2/4
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k Itevisies: 10 Decemeber 20,1996 36 7.3-29
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- 7. Instrunnestation and Controis I l
j Tame 7.5-1 (Sheet 7 of 12)
Post-Accident Monitoring System !
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vesset estre Ossed i/v.sve N.tE m sesmas CMT imht beiseies Open/ D2 Hanh Yes IAmive IE Yes l vehe semas Gemed Odeen 7)
CMT ieves e seos D2. F2 Hamb Ya 1/mmt 1E Yes EtWST es senseur open/ D2 Hasah Name 1/ valve Neo 1E Ne eusset selve seems Cnemed .
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senseur esammt Ossed value samens (MOV)
ADS: seat. Opa./ D2 Hank Yes t/sofie l escend and Ossed EE Yu Piess 7) thod sage vesse sames Revision: 8 June 19,1996 7.5-20 W WestkWhouse
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- i. Vehhts new Seas w
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! 3. Matts gus: W 7m 305 rummhm:
Wgn a, )
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1 4. The mesher ofinsummes seguised seur ashis plant sendamus is ess A tikd shmanal is suuRahls tsunds sumpsesy enemmelems as susehe j indommmen muhemisy N sumsmmy Gas subsamen 7J4
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l 7. This imussammt is est sagsbad star 34 humm.
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.A Revisies: 8
- $ Weggghoung 7.5-25 June 19,19M 4
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DSER Open Item Tracking System Report for Chapter 7 Items not Statused " Resolved" by NRC l
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AP600 Open Iteen Tracking Systems Database: Executive Samanary Date: 2n8/97 setection: Inre a codelo' Resolved' And [D3ER Section] like '7 Sorled by Item #
~}
hem DSER Sechonf Tidesemiphon Resp 00 NRC
- No. Branch Queshon Type Detail Staus Engineer Senue Suhm LeserNo. / Ih 1038 NRRADCB 7.1.4-I DSER-OI ITAAC/Deutsch, K. Action N Acsion N NSD NRC-96-4737
T- . _ _ should provide a detailed descritphon of the digital system design process in the SSAR and CDM whh a conesponding ITAAC.
Action W - WCAP-13383, witich describes the digital system design process is being updmeed. De certufled design mecenal and ITAACs will be noodified. The SSAR has been modified to rethrence the design process and to indicate the software design semidenh the design process conforms to. This infonnation is provided in Revision 3 of the SSAR, Subsection 7.1.2.15. The WCAP and ITAAC revisions nnet be compleesd before this inern can be closed out. NRC has ret ==ead a - -_ when allelements are -- , 1 WCAP-I3383 rev due 5/3056 ska 5/7/96 WCAP-13383 in repro &l4 for 6/17 release. ska 6/1456
() Closed - Response provided by NSD-NRC-96-4737, t
Per mi 11/21 W/NRC telecon, the NRC thinks the IAC ITAAC is deficient and requested that we "fix" the ITAAC orMyl , ._ deviehens froen the SRP I4.3.5 to NRC satisfaction. NRC to proviQ specific conunents on die ITAAC. rka 12/2 l 1039 NRRADCB 7.1.7-1 DSER G ITAAC/Deutsch Action N Action N NSD-NRC-96-4737 Westinghouse should describe a conunercial grade itre dedication program for digital systents. I Wesanghouse has not addressed the comunercial grade leem dedication program that is necessary to ensure sufficient quaiky in the design of safety.
related and nonsafety-related l&C systems using comum.scial of-the-shelf _ The design, . ;" - -
and validation process for COTS sonware and hardware should be clearly documented for design cernfication.
Action W - WCAP-13383 is being updated to include a commercial grade leem dedication process. The SSAR has been modified to reference this process. This infonnation is provided in Revision 3 of the SSAR, Subsection 7.l.2.15. The WCAP revision noust be completed before this leem )
can be closed out.
WCAP in repro 6/14 for 6/17 issuance rkn 6/14 Closed Response provided by NSD-NRC-96-4737.
Some as leem 1038. rkn 12/2 1041 NRR/IllCB 7.2.61 DSEROI ITAAC/Deutsdi, K. Action N Action N 1he samff has not yet completed its evahsetion of the software archteecture design. !
.-.because WCAP I4030 was subented in July 1994, the staffhas not completed its review of the document and is continemg its evahsation of the I notwee architecame based on both the proposed design and the associssed design process. The resides Soni this evahsstson will be presented in the final SER Ibr AP600. j Closed - Westinghouse has counpleted necessary subenistals to support samff review.
t Per 11/21 W/NRC telecon, when the NRC agrees with the design process through their review of the ITAACs, this item will be closed. rkn 12/2 1943 NRRADCB 7.2.5-1 DSER-OI ITAAC/Deutsch Action N Action N NTD-NRC-95-4464 o Westinghouse should provide a discussion concerning the qualificanon of digital egepment to the - _ _ . ; environment. i
^
Westinghouse has not addressed the issue of-_'_-_ __ .-
environmental qualificerion and has not couailmed to the appsopnose standants. j Closed - List of standards reviewed by NRC during nieeting on May 15-16. Standards incorporused into Revision 3 of the SSAR, Subsection 7.1.4.1.6. ;
Per an 11/21 W/NRC telecon, the sedusical issues are resolved. When NRC agrees with shsign process thru ITAAC review, this item will be closed.
i Page: I Total Records: 14
AP600 Open Items Tracking Systems Database: Executive Seamanary Date: 2/18/97 **
Selseties: [nre c code}o* Resolves And [DSER Section] liks'7*' Sorted by item 8 Item DSER Sectionf Tide / Description Resp (W) NRC
- No. Branch Question Type Detail Status Enginsee Stans Stans imiserNo. I Dame 1044 NRR411CB 7.2.8-2 DSER-OI ITAAC W K. Closed Action W NTDNRC-95-4464 Westinghouse should provide indbnnation concenung environmental quanfication of FMS components addressing local tenquereture rises above ,
the room unblent experienced by the components during opension. i It is desiraide to have additional neergin built into the design. The components should, therefore, be qualified by testing to higher temperatures than specified in the SSAR Ibr a given room environment. Westinghouse should address dois concern in the SSAR. Westinghouse should also provide mild environment equipment gushfication in the CDM wilh the corresponding ITAAC.
Closed -Technical indbnnation agreeded to by NRC during anecting on May 15-16. Additional technical infbnnation reganNng the equipment design margin to loss of HVAC has been
- _y. " into Revision 3 of the SSAR, Subsection 7.1.4.1.8. rkn 12/2 Westinghouse needs to decide approach to close this item. sta 12/6 Action N -NRC stNI has the action to evalunge the Westinghouse proposal on procedural fbt ofinsensment overheating aAer 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. (6/21 i meeting with W/SPLBSDCB). Based on 11/21 W/NRC telecon, this approach is reasonable; see quaHfication program in SSAR Section 3.11.
Action W -NRC requested W provide proposed COL lene for qualification niergin and instrument secreet data or document in the CDM and
. ~ , , , " . ITAAC (W is considering options; did not conunit to eMuer approach). ska 12/2 weednghouse does not consider there to be an applicable Cot action to identify. Technical infonnanon retened to design magin againt a nces of HVAC was provided in SSAR 7.1.4.1.6 and is considered ,echnically resolved, as waws previously agreed to by NRC. This item is considered closed since tiere is no Westinghouse action regul-J at this time to address this leem (since the NRC relates this comment to the PMS ITAAC, the
, n engineer is changed to '%w. ftn 1/14/97.
Action W -(9ese NRC on 1/23//) Submit revised CMD & ITAAC to include COL action to inchede additional design margin to accomodese a ions of the nonnel HVAC Trovide an alenn ifingenial cabmet temperatures reach an excessive vahse.jwwI/28 This was previously closed and is still considered closed, meaning there is no W- . z action identified or required o close this item; all necessary submittels have been niede. For background, SSAR Section 7.1.4.1.6 was revised in Feb 1996 to address this. Specifically, there is a sentence which reads,"The cabinets containing the digital equipment see provided with temperature sensors which provide si alarm ifintemal cabinet traiperahmes reach an excessive value." This is closed. ska 1/30/97.
Per telecen with Hulbert LI today, the action is (br Westeghouse to include this slann in the ITAAC. ska 2/18/97.
1949 NRR/IECB 7.5.8-1 DSER-OI ITAAC/Limigren/Deues Action N Action N
-Westinghouse should describe the design features of the incere insenenentation system.
In hs response to Q492.5 dated July 25,1994, Westinghouse senses that infonnatior, on the employment of fixed incore detectors in conjunction with an online power distribution anonitoring system will be provided to the NRC to support the final SER.
Closed - The technical infonnation was accepted by the IAC Branch of NRC daring the meeting on May 15-16. This techmcal infonnstron has been incorponned into Revision 3 of the SSAR, Subsection 4.4.6.1.
Open Ibr ITAAC based on fax Born NRC l/21!97. rkn For Chapter 7 diis leem is resolved (NRC/RSB to conimunecame any conczrns with qualification of thennoccupies and instrument coolent capability outside the scope of Chapter 7). stn 12/2 Page: 2 Total Records: 14
AP600 Open Items Tracking Systesis Databege Executive Seamusary page: 2n8/97 '*
Seleetten: {me a code}o' Resolved And [DSER Section]like '7* Soned by Item #
lam DSER Sec6on/ Tidenscripuen Resp NRC *
(W)
No. Branch Queshen Type Detail Samus Engineer Same Sasus Imer No. I Date 1052 NRR/HICB 7.6.2-1 DSER-Of Schulz,T. Closed Action N Wesonghouse should provide adetional design details of sie accumudmor bolation valve interiocks kuponnut to safety to connnn sist the design meets the relevant realmirements of die SRP,incheding IEEE 279.
Closed - Adetional techucal infonnation has been incorpormeed into Revision 3 of the SSAR, Subsection 7.611. Figure 7.2-1 was aho noodined to include additirwiel technical detail.
Action NRC - Per I 1/21 telecon, NRC to review technical information aheady provided since this opersoor is nonsafety, not important to safhty, has separuse power, positive 3 posinon * ~ _. and power seniowed at-power (consiseent with Tech Specs) and finuit switch shres. rkn 1212 Technical infonnation provided. NRC to advise to resolution stamas, ska 1/1487 Per fax, NRC conseders this open for inseriocks concern (FSER open item 7.6.2-1). ein 1/2187 l0h3 NRR/fDCB 7.6.3-1 DSER-OI Schulz,T. Closed Action N W- J should provide adetional design detnNs of the IRWST discharge valve interlocks important to safety to confirm that die design meets the relevant : _ of the SRP,includeg IEEE 279.
Closed - Adessonal tedmical intornietion has been incorporated into Revision 3 of the SSAR, Subsection 7.6.2.2. Figure 7.2-1 was also nicefied te include adetional technecol detail.
Action NRC-See 1952. sin 12/2 Technical bdbnnation his been provided. NRC to advise regarding resolution samus. ska 1/14/97.
Per fax, NRC considers this open Ihr interlocks concern (FSER open item 7.6.2-1). rka 1/2167 1055 NRMDCB 7.7.2-1 DSER OI ITAAC/Delose, Frank Action N Action N NTD-NRC-95-4464 l Westinghouse should provide addioonal nedbnnation concensing the design of the DAS.
l Closed - Technical infonnation eccepted by NRC during meeting on May 15-16. This adetional technical deemil has been incorporated into Revision 3 of the SSAR, Subsection 7.7.1.11.
NRC action to review ITAAC. Per 11/21 telecca, this item is now seidect to DAS ITAAC comment resolution / , _ _ rka 12/2 2023 NRMDCB 7. DSER-OISO ITAAC/Deutsch Action N Action N NSD-NRC-4875
- 27. No Conunisment to Imheery Standernis for Digital Systems Winie the SSAR references IEEE standards 279,3H,603 and 796 lbr the design of AF600 IAC systems, the sta8 tis concerned that there is no reference to digital microprocessor-related standards. SpeciAcally they are concerned about the lack of standards reissed to mulhplexer arduteceare, consnunicanons prosocols, and hardwarehoftware design. The surf wants W.c Ja to inske an explicit comumement to indesey hardware and softwee related standards. No deemiled documentation of the process and no phased ITAAC for verification of the design.
Actied W -Item 1037 closes all but final sentence ofitem. Remanag action to einhess "No detailed documentahan of the process and no phased ITAAC for verincation of the design'.
SSAR Ch 7.1 comumes to a VAV prognen, meeting Standanis, etc., such the NRC expectations are met. When the ITAAC lbr PMS is complete, ihis leem will be closed. rka 5/756 4
Closed -ITAAC subenised by NSD-NRC-96-4875 of 11/7/96.
Per 11/21 telecon Ihr DSER Ch 7. NRC wants to discuss ITAAC approach with Westinghouse Page: 3 Total Records: 14
.. . _> .. _. . _ _ _ . . - . _ _ _ _ . _ ~ _. _ _ _ ~ _ _ . - . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ __ . _ _ -_
AF600 Open Items Tracking Systeen Database: Executive Seammary sessesion: [nre c code}oltesolved' And [DSER Section] like '7 Sorted by item #
Date: 2/18/F7
'( '
Imm DSER Sectionf ThielDescripetost Resp (W) NRC No. Branch Questum Type Detail Sesses Engineer Status Susua lateerNo. / Date i 2025 NRR/}DCB 7. DSER4)l50 SSARREV/ Miner Condhn-W Action N
^
- 29. Environmental Qualification of DAS " , _- and Sensors
- The DSER indicanes that the DAS equipment ausst be designed and qualified to die envisosunent in which k needs to perfarna. The Westinghouse position is that the DAS equipsment will be designed to ihnction the environment in which k needs to perfomi. However, the DAS equipenent will not be subjected to a lhll-blown 10 CFR 50.49 / IEEE 323 quaHSemien program. ;
Closed - SSAR Chapter 7 section 7.7.1.11 revised to address.
Per mi 11/21 telecen, NRC thinks the DAS sensors and =,m.nad devices (e.g., PRHR solenohl valve) should be qualified to a higher (PMS) standard but W- f _: does not eyee.
By 12/6 fax, W proposed SSAR change to clarify gusHfication;NRC to seriew approach. ska 12/6 (l Completed in SSAR Rev 10. rka 1/14/97 Whoopst I checked and it didnt get into SSAR Rev 10. It WILL get into Rev i1. See NSD-NRC-97-4947. ska 1/30/97 2272 NRR/SRXB 7.6.2 MTG4M Deutsch Closed Action N APRIL 19,1995 (HSII) DISCUSSION ITEMS *
- 15. Availabihty of Safeguards -Interlocks (SSAR Section 7.6.2):
Section 7.6.2 of the SSAR a>=r==== the inserlock systems to verify the availabihty of safeguard Ihnetions,i.e., to ensure opemag of the isolation vehes of the ---- lRWST, and PRHRHXs. These vehes se neotoreperated, nannaNy open valves, and are comroNed Dom the main centrol roosn and remote shutdown work meaam
- a. SSAR Section 7.6.2 senses that, as a result of the __~_. _ _, safeguard open sipiel (which will ' 97 open the isolation vehes,
/ "" , bypass features to aHow die isolation valves to be closed), isolation of an accumulsor wide die RCS at pressee (or isolation of the !
IRWST gravky injection line when the tank is required to be operable, or isolation of the PRHRHX inlet line when the PRHRHX is seguimd to be operable)is _. _ _ , _ What are die design seliablHay of these interlocks to ensure diese isolation valves will be open upon the -- -- ,
safeguard open signals 7 Is this practice mer=panhar Ibr current opersang reactor to allow accuneulator isolmed at peessure?
I Closed - At he Reactor System Branch Meeting on 4/25/95, Westinghouse reserved to die use of identical interlocks on the accumulators and ,
IRWST as diese currently used on the accumulators at cuneet plants (power lockedeut). CMTs and PRHR interlocks are not power locked out but instead sedundant consollers are provided for each valve along with three-way reaundant vehe positions. W- f sho seferred to the Revision 2 SSAR 6.3 for the design details. Revuton 3 of the SSAR, Section 7.6 includes the interlock information.
Based on 11/21 telecon, NRC doesni shink the SSAR Section 7.6 h sufficient and has been asked to pr3 vide specific comments ekn 12/6 Closed since there is no W _ J _ _ action at this time. NRC to advise vegenhng status. rka 1/14/97.
2273 NRR/SRXB 7.6.2 MTG4M TECHSPEC/ Schule Closed Action N ,
APIUL 19,1995 (HSil) DISCUSSION ITEMS 5
- 15. Availabilky of Safeguards -Interlocks (SSAR Section 7.6.2):
- b. SSAR Section 7.6.2 also semes diet else maximune pennissible time dent i en accumulator valve (or IRWST dhcharge vehe, or PRHRHX inlet ;
vehe, respecthety) is closed when the reactor is at pressure as specified in the TS. Where me Gwy specified? !
Action W - Section 3.5.1 of the Tech Specs specifies die niemimuni permisable vehe times. llie sevised Tech Specs will be sulnnined June 1996, at which time tids leem can tr closed. .
I Closed - With inseance c i die Tech Specs in SSAR Rev. 9.
Action NRC- Per 11/21 telecon, NRC to seriew Tech Specs to ensure dois is resobed/ closed ,tn 12/4
"!- J u action is complete for this leem. NRC to advise on status. ska 1/14/97.
i Page: 4 Total Records- 14
_ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ __ _____ __ __ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ __ __O
AP608 Open Iteam Tracidag System Database: Executive Semunary Date: 248/F7 **
Seleetles: [nic c code}<>1tesolved' And [DSER Sechon) like P Sorted by item #
Item DSER Sectionf Tide /Descnytson Resp (W) NRC No. Branch Question Type Detail Samens Engineer Sm Santus h No. I Dune 4257 NRR/HICB 7 MiGCOM SSARREV/Deutsch, Ke Contm-W Condhn-W l Add WCAP-14000 as reemence Ibr SSAR Sectiert 7.1 l Wesanghouse has connnned this is an approprinse :Serence and truuntlIIed due SSAR markups to NRC. This item is opened to ensure the marked tiuunges are included in die next SSAR sev. sta 1/15/97.
Reiter to NSD-NRC 97-4947 br changes to be inchsded in SSAR Rev i1. ska 1/31/97 O
Page: $ Total Records- 14
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