NSD-NRC-98-5749, Forwards Rev 13 to AP600 PRA for Simplified Passive Advanced LWR Plant Program. Rev Represents Final Version of AP600 Pra.All NRC Comments Related to Rev 12 of AP600 PRA Have Been Resolved

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Forwards Rev 13 to AP600 PRA for Simplified Passive Advanced LWR Plant Program. Rev Represents Final Version of AP600 Pra.All NRC Comments Related to Rev 12 of AP600 PRA Have Been Resolved
ML20237B081
Person / Time
Site: 05200003
Issue date: 08/13/1998
From: Mcintyre B
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To: Quay T
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20237B082 List:
References
NSD-NRC-98-5749, NUDOCS 9808180036
Download: ML20237B081 (3)


Text

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Westinghouse Energy Systems Box 355 Pinsbu@ Pennsylvania 15230 0355 Electric Corporation DCP/NRCl406 NSD-NRC-98-5749 i Docket No.: 52-003 August 13,1998 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: T. R. QUAY

SUBJECT:

AP600 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT, REV1510N 13 l

Dear Mr. Quay:

Enclosed is Revision 13 of the AP600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Report. This revision represents the final version of the AP600 PRA. All NRC comments related to Revision 12 of the AP600 PRA have been resolved.  !

l The enclosure is in the form of replacement pages to be a<ided to the existing PRA report. In addition, to reduce the amount of material per PRA volume, we are pro.iding two additional binders for the AP600 PRA document. Included with each AP600 PRA set is the change page instructions including a suggestion of how the chapters should be divided among the six PRA volumes.

Twenty-five sets of Revision 13 to the PRA have been sent to Mr. Joe Sebrosky for distribution within NRC, to NRC subcontractors, and to the ACRS. He enclosure contains no Westinghouse proprietary information.

1 Pursuant to 10CFR50.30(b), this revision is submitted under the enclosed oath or affirmation.

Please contact Cynthia L. Haag on (412) 374-4277 if you have questions concerning this transmittal.

A 8 Brian A. McIntyre, Manager ,

Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing b&

jml Enclosures .O r

- cc: J. M. Sebrosky, NRC (25 copies Enclosure) Q6 u /,)J I

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J. E. Lyons NRC (w/o Enclosure) '

11. A. Sepp, Westinghouse (w/o Enclosure) 9808190036 0e0813 [M- } ')

PDR ADOCK 05200003 A A PDR.,

.m. ,1 I U i

e o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the Matter of: )

)

Westinghouse Electric Company, )

)

A Division of CBS Corporation )

)

AP600 Standard Plant Design ) Docket No.52-003

)

Final Design Approval and Design )

)

Certification application )

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF "AP600 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT" FOR FINAL DESIGN APPROVAL AND DESIGN CERTIFICATION Charles W. Pryor, Jr. being duly sworn, states that he is President and Chief Executive Officer of Westinghouse Electric Company, a Division of CBS Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this document; that all statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his kncwledge, information and belief.

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, A DIVISION O BS CORPORATION By: 4Wh Charles W. Pryor, Jr.

President and Chief Executive Officer Westingiiouse Electric Company,

, A Division of CBS Corporation i

Subscaibed and sworn to before me this 120 day of duW p 1998.

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Notary Public

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Letter DCP/NRC1406 i

i August 13, 1.998 I

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AP600 PRA Revision 13 n) f

,, ,. Page Change Instructions (Sheet 1 of 1)

Below are the page change instructions for incorporating Revision 13 of the AP600 PRA into the existing AP600 PRA report. Two additional binders, which represent PRA Volumes 5 and 6, are also provided. It is recommended that the volumes contain the following:

Volume 1 AP600 Document Cover Sheet, List of Effective Pages, Table of Contents, List of Tables, List of Figures, Chapters 1 through 18 Volume 2 Table of Contents, List of Tables, List of Figures, Chapters 19 through 33 Volume 3 Table of Contents, List of Tables, List of Figures, Chapters 34 through 41 Volutr.c 4 Table of Contents, List of Tables, List of Figures, Chapters 42 through 53 Volume 5 Table of Contents, List of Tables, List of Figures, Chapters 54 and 55 Volume 6 Table of Contents, List of Tables, List of Figures, Chapters 56 through 59, Appendices A through D Non Proprietary I p Chapter Remove Previous Revisions PRA Pages: Replace with Rev.13 PRA Page:

VOLUME 1 AP600 Document Remove from front of Volume 1 Place new cover sheet in front of Cover Sheet Volume 1 of AP600 PRA l List of Effective Remove pages 11 through 16 Replace with pages 11 through 16 l Pages VOLUME 3 34 Remove pages 34-15 & 34-16 Replace with pages 34-15 & 34-16 l

r VOLUME 4 45 Remove pages 45-9 & 45-10 Replace with pages 45-9 & 45-10 50 Remove pages 50-17 & 50-18 Replace with pages 50-17 & 50-18 i

Note: The Table of Contents List of Tables, and List of Figures for Volumes 5 and 6 were placed within those binders prior to shipment.

O V

. List cf Effective P;ges l

i AP600 PRA List of Effective Pages Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision 29-15 7 30A-11 2 31-14 7 32 18 7 29-16 7 30A-12 2 31-15 7 32-19 7 29-17 7 30A-13 2 31-16 7 32-20 10 29-18 7 30A-14 2 31-17 7 32-21 7 29-19 7 30A-15 2 32-22 7 29-20 7 30A 16 2 32-1 7 32-23 7 29-21 7 30A-17 2 32-2 7 32-24 7 29-22 7 30A-18 2 32-3 7 32-25 7 29-23 7 32-4 7 32-26 7 31-1 7 32-5 7 32-27 7 30-1 7 31-2 7 32-6 7 32-28 7 through 30-115 31-3 7 32-7 7 32-29 7 30A-1 2 31-4 7 32-8 7 32-30 7 30A-2 2 31-5 7 32-9 7 32-31 7 10A-3 2 31-6 7 32-10 7 32-32 7 30A-4 2 31-7 7 32-11 7 32-33 7 30A-5 2 31-8 7 32-12 7 32 34 7 30A-6 2 31-9 7 32-13 10 32-35 7  !

30A-7 2 31-10 7 32-14 7 32-36 7 30A-8 2 31-11 7 32-15 7 32-37 7 30A 9 2 31-12 7 32-16 7 32-38 7 30A-10 2 31-13 7 32-17 7 32-39 7 l

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e l AP600 PRA List of Effective Pages Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision 32-40 7 35-1 8 35-20 8 36-1 8 32-41 7 35-2 8 35-21 8 36-2 8 32-42 7 35-3 8 35-22 8 36-3 8 32-43 7 35-4 8 35-23 8 36-4 8 32-44 7 35-5 8 35-24 8 36-5 8 32-45 7 35-6 8 35-25 8 36-6 9 32-46 7 35-7 8 35-26 8 36-7 10 32-47 7 35-8 8 35-27 8 36-8 8 35-9 8 35-28 8 36-9 8 33-1 7 35-10 8 35-29 10 36-10 8 through 33-17 33-18 8 35-11 8 35-30 8 33-19 7 35-12 8 through 33-66 35-13 8 34-1 8 35-14 10 through 34-14 1 34-15 13 35-15 8 34-16 8 35-16 8 through 34-487 35-17 8 35-18 8 35-19 8 O

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39-11 8 40-4 11 42-6 8 I 38-1 8 39-12 8 40-5 8 42-7 8 38-2 8 39-13 8 42-8 8 38-3 8 39-14 11 41-1 8 42-9 8 38-4 10 39-15 8 41-2 8 42-10 8 38 5 10 39-16 8 41-3 8 42-11 8 V 38-6 10 39-17 8 41-4 8 42-12 8 38 7 10 39-18 8 41 5 10 42-13 8 39-19 8 41-6 8 42-14 8 ,

through I 41-123 l 39-1 8 39-20 8 39-2 8 39-21 8 41A-1 8 43-1 8 through through 41A-375 43-162 39-3 11 39-22 8 41B-1 8 through 41B-120 39-4 8 39-23 8 39-5 10 39-24 8

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O AP600 PRA List of Effective Pages Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision I 44-1 8 45-10 13 49-14 8 i I 44-2 8 45-11 8 49-15 8 I through I 45-136 44-3 8 49-16 8 44-4 8 46-1 8 49-17 8 44-5 8 40-18 8 44-6 8 47-1 8 49-19 9 44-7 8 49-20 8 through 49-47 44-8 8 48-1 8 49-48 11 44-9 8 44-10 8 49-1 8 44-11 8 49-2 8 44-12 9 49-3 8 49-4 8 45-1 8 49-5 8 45-2 8 49-6 8 45-3 8 49-7 8 45-4 8 49-8 9 45-5 8 49-9 8 45-6 8 49-10 8 45-7 9 49-11 8 45-8 8 49-12 8 I 45-9 8 49-13 8 Revision: 13 9

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9, AP600 PRA List of Effective Pages Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision 50-1 8 54-10 8 54C-1 11 56-1 8 through through and through 50-16 54-32 54C-4 56-11 1 50-17 13 54-33 9 50-18 8 through 50-76 50A-1 11 54-34 8 55-1 9 56-12 5 through through through through 50A-3 54-39 55-6 56-111 54-40 9 55-7 10 51-1 8 54-41 8 55-8 9 through through through 51-21 54-97 55-72

,A 54-98 9 55-73 10 52-1 8 54-99 9 55-74 9 57-1 9 through through through 52-30 55-75 57-156 52-31 9 54-100 8 55-76 10 through 54-319 52-32 8 54A-1 9 55-77 9 57A-1 9 through through through through 52-156 54A-5 55-140 57A-4 l

54A-6 11 53-1 8 54A-7 9 55A-1 9 57B-1 11 I through through through 54 A-154 55A-31 57B-18 1 54-1 8 54B-1 11 55B-1 9 i

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List of Effective Pages Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision 59-1 8 59-104 8 D-1 11 through through through 59-7 59-203 D-107 59-8 12 59-9 8 through 59-36 59-37 9 59-204 11 D-108 12 59 38 9 59-205 8 59 39 8 59-206 8 59-40 8 59-207 11 through 59-236

$9-41 9 59-42 8 A-1 2 through through 59-68 A 296 59-69 11 59-70 8 through 59-74 59-75 11 B-1 11 through through 59-82 B-5 59-83 8 B-6 12 through 59-86 59-87 9 B-7 11 through B-36 59-88 8 C-1 9 through through 59-100 C-10 59-101 9 C-Il 11 59-102 9 l 59-103 12 Revision: 12 July 1998 W W85tingh0USB o:Mp0lWVev.12Wloc.wpf.lb ]6 l ..

. 34. Severe Accident Phenomens Treitment ml

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+ 0/2 IRWST recirculation lines

  • 1/2 cavity flooding lines l
  • Containment failure in CMT room due to hydrogen detonation (at time just after core relocation)
  • Failure area = 0.1 m2
  • Hydrogen igniters not operating The main events of the case are shown in Table 34-14, while relevant plots are presented in Figures34-131 through 34-150.

34.4.2.5 3BE Overpressure Containment Failure due to Passive Containment Cooling Failure (3BE-10)

The purpose of this case is to determine the thermal-hydraulic results and source term release fractions for an assumed overpressure containment failure due to failure of the passive containment cooling. No water or air cooling of the containment shellis credited. The timing of the containment failure is conservatively based on a containment failure pressure of 90 psig (see Chapter 42), with the pressurization rate calculated via an adiabatic heatup with MAAP4.

As described in subsection 34.4.1, the limiting scenario for 3BE is an intermediate LOCA with minimal systems available. The relevant assumptions from this case include:

I

  • 6-inch hot-leg break 7
  • 0/2 ADS stage 1

= 0/2 ADS stage 2

  • 0/2 ADS stage 3
  • 4/4 ADS stage 4 - automatic

= 0/2 IRWST injection lines

= 0/2 IRWST recirculation lines I

  • 1/2 cavity flooding lines
  • Passive containment cooling fails
  • Containment failure in valve vault at P = 90 psig
  • Failure area = 0.1 m*

The main events of the case are shown in Table 34-15, while relevant plots are presented in Figures34-151 through 34-170.

34.4.3 Accident Class 3BL - Intact Containment As noted in Table 34-2, accident class 3BL sequences are fully depressurized sequences with successful gravity injection. In these cases, failure of recirculation causes core damage.

l These sequences contribute over 25 percent to the core damage frequency. 3BL sequences in the top 25 dominant core damage sequences include intermediate LOCA (#2 and #21),

medium LOCA (#8), small LOCA (#12), CMT line break (#13), large LOCA (#16 and #17) m (O)

NEL Revision: 13

[ W85tingh0tlS8 E,mi.th August 1998 34-15 orawvi3wcuugibm8m

34. Severt Accidst Phenom na Tre:tme t E' .

I medium LOCA (#8), small LOCA (#12), CMT line break (#13), large LOCA (#16 and #17)

I and RCS leakage (#20).

I To analyze 3BL sequences, the first step is an analysis of the dominant 3BL sequence. A i subsequent sensitivity is performed with respect to system assumptions to maximize source I term results. However, further sensitivities on break size are deemed unnecessary since the I success of ADS stage 4 will dominate break size effects. His is observed for the 3BE break I size sensitivities where the release fractions are essentially the rame. All cases described I within this section are intact containment analyses. These cases are discussed below.

I 34.4.3.1 3BL Dominant Sequence (3BL-1)

I nis case determines the thermal hydraulic response and examines the fission-product releases I for the accident class 3BL dominant sequence. This sequence corresponds to core damage I sequence #2 from the level I results.

l The sequence description and assumptions are listed below:

I = 6-inch hot-leg break i = Failure of PRHR I

  • 2/2 CMTs (both inject to RCS)

!

  • 2/2 ADS stage 3 - automatic I
  • 4/4 ADS stage 4 - automatic l = 2/2 IRWST gravity injection lines I

=

I Cavity flooding unnecessary since IRWST gravity injection successful I No containment failure is considered, thus the release category is IC (Intact Containment);

I however, normal leakage from the contamment is assumed. Reflooding the core via the l 1 hot leg break is not credited. His case is terminated at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following core damage.

I he main events of the case are shown in Table 34-16, while relevant plots are presented in I Figures34-171 through 34-188.

I 34.4.3.2 3BL Dominant Sequence Sensitivity on System Availability Assumptions (3BL-2) l his case compares the results of changes to system assumptions to the dominant sequence I discussed above. He results of this comparison are used to define the system assumptions I for subsequent 3BL containment failure analyses. ,

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45. Fission-Product Source Terms ,

l Table 45-3 RELEASE CATEGORY IC CASES FOR COMPARISON Accident CET Report Class Case Sequence Description Path Section I 3BE 3BE- 4 6-inch Hot Leg Break I 34.4.1.4 4/4 ADS Stage 4 0/2 IRWST Injection 1/2 Cavity Flooding 3BL 3BL-1 6-inch Hot Leg Break 9 34.4.3.1 4/4 ADS Stage 4 f

2/2 IRWST Injection 0/2 IRWST Recirculation l

1/2 Cavity Flooding 3BR 3BR-1 10-inch Hot Leg Break 1 34.4.5.1 0/2 Accumulators 4/4 ADS Stage 4 1/2 IRWST Injection / Recirculation 1/2 Cavity Flooding 3C 3C-1 0.1 m2Vessel Rupture 1 34.4.7.1 4/4 ADS Stage 4 2/2 IRWST Injection / Recirculation 1/2 Cavity Flooding 3D 3D-1 DVI Line Break 9 34.4.9.1 0/4 ADS Stage 4 1/2 IRWST Injection / Recirculation 1/2 Cavity Flooding ,

Revision: 13 August,1998 di W WeStingh0USB >

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50. Importance end S:nsitivity An-lysis I

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assumed to result in a relocation of the core out of the vessel, then containment failure would always result for the 3C accident class. The results of this sensitivity show the resulting large release frequency would be 2.7E-08 events per year, and the containment effectiveness would bc 84 percent. This is not a significant impact on the large rebase frequency.

PC Node The PC node models the success or failure of the passive containment cooling system (PCS).

If the air flow in the containment anwlar spaces is blocked, preventing the passive l containment cooling system from cooling the containment shell, the containment will eventually fail from overpressurization. Assuming the containment always fails makes the large release frequency the same as the core damage frequency,1.7E-07 events per year.

IG Node The IG aode models the reliability of the hydrogen control (hydrogen igniters). If the hydrogen igniters are assumed to fail, the potential for a hydrogen combustion event that could fail the containment is increased. (Hydrogen detonation events are assumed to fail the containment.) The result shows the large release frequency becomes 4.3E-08 events per year, and the containment effectiveness is 74 percent. This shows that the operation of the i hydrogen igniters is important to maintaining a low release frequency. An investigation of

( ) other (non-zero) values of the reliability of the hydrogen control system is discussed later.

v DF Node This sensitivity assumes that containment failure results whenever a diffusion flame occurs.

Accident classes 3D and 1 AP (successful recovery of RCS depressuri2.ation at node DP) can produce diffusion flames, and this node is set to 1.0 for these two accident classes. As discussed in Chapter 38,44 percent of the sequences for accident class 3BE release hydrogen I through the valve vault and can produce a diffusion flame. Design features of the phmt I prevent this flame from threatening containment .ntegrity. Therefore the 3BE diffusion flame I is not considered in this analysis. The results show a release frequency of 2.6E-08 events per l year, and a containment effectiveness of 84.5 percent.

DTE Node The DTE node models the failure of the containment from an early hydrogen detonation event. If the occurrence of an early hydrogen detonation event is assumed to fail the containment, the large release frequency is 1.9E-08 events per year and the containment effectiveness is 89 percent. Tliis is essentially the same as the baseline case because the j patential for early hydrogen detonation events is very low in the AP600 containment with the laydrogen igniters functioning.

O Revision: 13 f 3 Westingh00S8 6 August 1998 50-17 uwawvi3wcsoampr.ib-osio98 l

l

50. Importance and Sensi2vity Analysis

'. a l DFG Node i The DFG node models the potential for containment failure due to a hydrogen dedagration i event. This sensitivity assumes that all hydrogen deflagration events result in an intermediate I containment failure, and the resulting large release frequency is 1.9E-08 events per year, with I a containment effectiveness of 89 percent. His is essentially the same as the base case I because the potential for hydrogen deflagration events or the progression of a liydrogen I deflagration event into a hydrogen detonation event is very low in the AP600 containment I with the hydrogen igniters functioning.

I DTI Node l The DTI node models the potential for containment failure due to an hydrogen deflagration-to-I detonation event. 'Ihis sensitivity assumes that all hydrogen bums transition from i deflagration-to-detonation and result in an intermediate containment failure. The resulting i large release frequency is 1.9E-08 events per year, with a containment effectiveness of 89 I percent. His is essentially the same as the base case, because the potential for hydrogen I deflagration events or the progression of a hydrogen deflagration event into a hydrogen i detonation event is very low in the AP600 containment with the hydrogen igniters functioning.

I 50.6.1.2 Initiating Event Importances for Large Release Frequency i ne contribution of at-power initiating events to the large release frequency is shown in i Table 50-17. Table 5018 shows the containment effectiveness (C,,) and the containment I failure probability (CCFP) for the dominant initiating events.

l The C,, for a loss-of-coolant-accident is over 90 percent. This reflects the ability of the I containment to mitigate the effects of a serious accident. A loss-of-coolant-accident is a rare i event with serious potential consequences. In fact, the core damage frequency is dominated i by loss-of-coolant-accident sequences. In the unlikely event that a loss-of-coolant-accident l i results in core damage, the containment is designed to prevent a large release.

I For transients, the C , is relatively low, The core damage frequency from transients is small.

I But, if a transient does result in core damage, it is most likely as a result of a common cause I failure of the instrument and control systems. His is also a rare event. Conservatively, no I recovery action is modeled in the PRA for such failures. Rese recovery actions, such as I finding alternative ways to actuate the automatic depressurization system would certainly be I undertaken by the operr.; ors. Also, if a transient does result in core damage, it sometimes I results in a high-pressure event. These events are assumed to lead to a failure of the reactor I coolant system pressure boundary, which is assumed to fail the containment. These are i conservative assumptions in the PRA models for transients.

p i r 30,1996 mwsoosprawv.swc50umf:Ib 50-18 h_ 3 Westiflgh0Use

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