ML20100A022

Forwards Supplemental Info to 850301 Preliminary Evaluation of Plant Distribution Igniter Sys,Per SER License Condition 5 on Hydrogen Control.Encl Provides Info on Preoperational Testing & Equipment Survivability

ML20100A022
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	03/21/1985
From:	Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
To:	Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8503250283
Download: ML20100A022 (31)

Text

__ _ ________________ ___________ - __

r o fuc! c n 4

O _ ;_ v L L / t .  ;, , ., e f7,[ti P.O. DOX 5000 - CLEVELAND, OHlo 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - ILLUMINATING BLOG - 55 PUBLICSOUARE Serving The Best Location in the Nation MURRAY R. EDELMAN VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR March 21, 1985 PY-CEI/NRR-0220 L Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Branch No. I Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 SER License Condition (5)

Hydrogen Control

Dear Mr. Youngblood:

This letter and its attachments are provided in order to supplement the information provided in our March 1, 1985 submittal (PY-CEI/NRR-0199L) of our preliminary evaluation of the PNPP distributed igniter system. The attachments provide additional information on preoperational testing, equipment survivability and the containment response analysis.

If there are further questions, please feel free to call.

Very truly yours,

% ER,T M Murray R. Edelman Vice President Nuclear Group MRE:njc Attachments cc: Jay Silberg, Esq.

John Stefano (2)

J. Grobe 8503250283 850321 PDR ADOCK 05000440 E PDR I

List of Changes March 21, 1985 Page Section Directions

1. 10 2.6-1 Replace page 10 with revised l page 10  ;

2. Table 2.4-1 Table 2.4-1 Replace third page of Table 2.4-1 with revised page

3. Table 2.6.1-1 Table 2.6.1-1 Add Table 2.6.1-1

4. 13 3.1 Replace page 13 with revised page 13

5. 16 3.2 Replace page 16 with revised page 16

6. 21 4.3 Replace page 21 with revised page 21

7. 21a through Section 4.4 Add new section 4.4 including 21d pages 21a thorugh 21d

8. Table 4.4.2-1 Table 4.4.2-1 Add new Table 4.4.2-1

9. Figure 4.4.2-1 Figure 4.4.2-1 Add new Figure 4.4.2-1

10. Page 27 5-4.3 Replace page 27 with revised page 27

11. Page 27a 5-4.3 Add page 27a

12. Figures Figures Add new Figure 5.4.3-1 5.4.3-1 5.4.3-1 through 3 through 3 through 3

13. Table 5.6-1 & Table 5.6-1 & Add revised Tables 5.6-1 &

5.6-2 5.6-2 5.6-2

14. Appendix A, Table 8 Add page 15, Table 8 Page 15

15. Appendix A, Figure 18 Replace Figure 18 Figure 18

2. The 480-208/120 volt transformers (M56-S201 and S202) are capable of providing satisfactory sec-  ;

ondary voltages of 120112 VAC and of meeting the

-minimum load requirement of 15 KVA.

3. All hydrogen igniter transformers are capable of i providing satisfactory hydrogen igniter voltages of 12.011.2 VAC.

The preoperational test abstract for the hydrogen control system is provided on Table 2.6.1-1.

2.6.2 Surveillance The HCS surveillance requirements will be included in the PNPP Technical Specifications.

2.6.3 Qualification The qualification of the hydrogen igniter assembly is in accor-dance with the PNPP equipment qualification program described in FSAR sections 3.10 and 3.11. The hydrogen igniter qualifi-cation program meets the requirements of the following docu-ments:

o IEEE Std. 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (including the November 21, 1975 Supplement) and USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.89.

o IEEE Std. 344-1975, "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" and USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.100.

o IEEE Std. 381-1977, "IEEE Standard for Type Tests of Class lE Modules Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations".

o IEEE Std. 627-1980, "IEEE Standard for Design Qualification of Safety Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations".

o USNRC NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electric Equipment".

o 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants".

)

l l

i TABLE 2.4-1 (Continued) l HYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS ESF DIMENSION TO POWER CENTERLINE IGNITER # DIVISIONELEVATION AZIMUTH OF CONTAINMENT IM56-088 2 745'-6" 3240 48'-0" '

IM56-089 2 737 oa ao ti.o*

IM56-090 2 757'-0" 1800 l'-0" IM56-091 2 645'7" 1680 60'0" IM56-092 1 645'-0" 1720 IM56-093 58'-0" 1 613'-4" 70 44'-0" IM56-094 2 612'5" 12030' 42'8"  !

IM56-095 1 612'6" 343c-30' 42'6" t IM.56-096 2 612'3" 3500-30' '

43'6" IM56-097 2 638'8" 2890 49'6" IM56-098 1 658'6" 3420 IM56-099 53'-0" 2 685'-6" 170 50'6" IM56-100 2 686'-0" 750 i

IM56-101 25'-0" 1 686'-0" 1050 25'-0" IM56-102 1 670'-0" 3500 13'0"

!M56-103 2 670'-0" 40 13'0" NOTE: 1 M56-007 not used. .

I I

2 I

I l

Table 2.6.1-1 Hydrogen Control System Test Abstract

a. Test Objective To demonstrate the operability of the hydrogen igniter system.

b. Prerequisites

1. Electrical power is available.

2. Communications have been established between testing areas.

, c. Test Procedures

1. Measure primary and secondary voltages of the 480/120 and 120/12 volt transformers with the hydrogen igniters energized.

2. Perform a load test of the 480 to 120 volt transformers.

3. Measure hydrogen igniter glow plug temperatures.

d. Acceptance Criteria

1. The 480 volt transformers are capable of supplying satisfactory secondary voltages.

2. The 120 volt transformers are capable of supplying satisfactory secondary voltcges.

3. The 480/120 volt transformers are capable of meeting minimum load requirements.

4. Temperature requirements for the hydrogen igniter glow plugs are met.

3/21/85 i

3.0 CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ULTIMATE CAPACITIES 3.1 CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY The ultimate structural capacity analysis of positive internal  !

pressure for the PNPP Mark III containment has been evaluated.

The results were transmitted to the NRC in letters dated January 25, 1982 (D.R. Davidson to R.L. Tedesco) and February 11, 1985 (M.R. Edelman to B.J. Youngblood). Local regions of the containment vessel, equipment hatch, personnel air locks, and the main steam penetrations were evaluated for static 1 loads. The actual material strengths of ASME-SA-516, Grade 70 l steel were used in the analysis to determine the mean, lower I bound and upper bound values of the material yield strength and ultimate strength. Based on these material properties, the ca-pacity of the general shell to resist statically applied pres-sure was determined to be 78 psig lower bound strength and 94 psig mean value strength. The limiting region of the contain-ment shell for the analysis was found to be the dome knuckle.

The maximum allowable pressure to meet the ASME Service Level C limits was determined to be 50 psig for the most limiting con-tainment penetration. However, use of ASME Service Level D limits (defined in the ASME Code as " limits which are permitted for combinations of conditions associated with extremely low i probability postulated events") is a more realistic evaluation of the containment pressure capability, considering the nature and probability of the hydrogen generation event. Utilizing Service Level D stress limits, the maximum allowable pressure for the most limiting containment penetration was determined to be 57 psig.

PNPP Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement 1, (NUREG-0887) Sec-tion 3.8.2 discussed the results of the containment ultimate capacity analysis. The SER noted that the dome knuckle area contois the ultimate capacity at the containment vessel which starts to yield at 68 psig. Containment shell pressure capaci-ty can be increased to 78 psig, the pressure at which hoop buckling occurs in the knuckle region, since yielding occurs at one point along the meridian at 68 psig. However, as previous-ly discussed, the most limiting penetration establishes the ul-timate capacity value for the containment.

Previous analyses performed by the Hydrogen Control Owners Group (HCOG) Mark III member utilities have demonstrated that significant margins exist between the containment ultimate pos-itive and negative pressure capacity and the positive and nega-tive pressures postulated as a result of hydrogen combustion.

At the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS), the ultimate capacity versus design levels are 56 psig versus 15 psig for containment additional No. 11 vertical rebars are provided.  !

The upper drywell wall is integrally connected to the 4'-0" thick drywell top slab.

3. A flat, horizontal, circular, reinforced con-crete drywell top slab. The top slab contains a  !

central circular opening of 31'-11.5" diameter which is closed by the drywell head.

4. The 14'-9.25" deep, steel ellipsoidal drywell head, which forms part of the drywell pressure retention boundary. The drywell head is 1-1/2" thick, type 516 grade 70 carbon steel with 10%

v _ thickness of SA-240, type 304 stainless steel cladding.

The general arrangement and design details of the PNPP drywell structure are consistent with those previously evaluated for the GGNS. The primary drywell structure of the GGNS drywell consists of four major components:

1. A flat, circular reinforced concrete foundation.

-2. A right, vertical cylinder. The cylinder wall .

is 75'-0" outside diameter, 91'-6" high, and

. 5'-0" thick. The lower 24'-10" portion of the wall, i.e., the vent region, is of heavily rein-forced, concrete composite construction. This Fe lower region has two stiffened steel, concen-tric, cylindrical surface plates. The annulus ac, ,

between the surface plates is stiffened by ver-

'"- tical, radial plates and is filled with con-

^

crete. The upper wall is designed as a rein-forced concrete cylinder which is supported by the steel, lower wall section and internal con-crete. The lower steel section is connected in-tegrally with the upper wall vertical and diago-nal reinforcement.

c. A flat, horizontal, circular, reinforced con-crete drywell roof slab, containing a central T circular opening of about 32 feet. This opening is closed by the drywell head.

d. A steel ellipsoidal drywell head, approximately 4

15'-6" deep, which forms part of the drywell f

pressure retention boundary. The drywell head

' is 1-1/2" thick, SA-240, type 304 stainless steel.

The. structural design aspects of the GGNS and PNPP drywells are functionally similar. The strength of the PNPP drywell head material is equal to or greater than the GGNS drywell head. Ad-ditionally, the drywell positive and negative design pressures for PNPP and GGNS are consistent in all material respects. See Section 5.4 of this report for a comparison of these values.

l 4.4 Equipment Survivability I 4.4.1 Equipment Required to Survive a Hydrogen Burn A preliminary identification and evaluation has been per-formed of equipment required to survive a hydrogen burn. The l

l criteria for selecting equipment for the preliminary evaluation '

are consistent with the criteria submitted by Mississippi Power

& Light Company (MP&L) in support of the operating license for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS). This information was sub-mitted by MP&L letter AECM - 82/26 dated January 19, 1982. The identification of the PNPP equipment requirpd to survive the hydrogen burn environment was based on its functions during and efter postulated degraded core accidents. The criteria for se-lection of equipment included:

1) Systems mitigating the consequence of the accident

2) Systems needed for maintaining the integrity of the containment pressure boundary

3) Systems needed for monitoring the core in a safe condition

4) Systems needed for monitoring the course of the accident Using these criteria, equipment in the containment and drywell which must function during and after a hydrogen burn were identified and are part of the following list of general systems and components:

1) Containment structure, penetrations, locks &

hatches

2) Hydrogen Control System

3) Combustible Gas Control System

4) Emergency Core Cooling Systems (HPCS, LPCS, LPCI, ADS)

5) RHR Containment Spray

6) Containment and Reactor monitoring instrumentation

7) Associated instruments, controls and cable The specific list of PNPP equipment which must survive a hydrogen burn is provided in Tables 5.6-1 and 5.6-2.

4.4.2 Equipment Temterature Survivability A preliminary evaluation of the PNPP equipment required to curvive a hydrogen burn was conducted based upon a comparison of the pressure and temperature profiles of the GGNS & PNPP CLASIX-3 containment response analyses which is discussed in detail in section 5.5.

I I

The GGNS & PNPP temperature profiles are comparable, with the exception of several minor differences which are explained i in section 5.5. The temperature profile of concern is the GGNS '

l l -21A-

i base case SORV (sal) which was used for evaluation of the GGNS

.squipment. The peak temperature of the initial burn without sprays is slightly higher for PNPP (by approximately 170*F),  ;

however most of the burn peak temperatures later in the analy-sis are approximately the same (700-800*F) for the two plants.

Use of the SORV case for equipment survivability evalua-tions in the PNPP preliminary evaluation is appropriate because of risk studies which show that transient initiated events (such as SORV) have higher core melt frequency than the LOCA (DWB) event. Although the DWB case has a peak temperature which occurs during the extended portion of the transient, es-contially the same as the peak for the SORV transient there are esveral reasons why it is expected that the SORV temperature profile is more limiting for equipment temperature response.

The large peak burn at the end of the DWB case was " forced" at 0.065 v/o since it did not reach the 8.0 v/o ignition criteria.

Therefore, this burn is somewhat artificial. In addition the spacing between burns during the DWB extended period is sub-stantial such that the burns should provide little contribution to the peak equipment temperature. It should be noted that the time scales on the Figures for the two cases are different, with the DWB presented on a more compressed time scale. During the initial part of the transient, the DWB case has fewer burns (30) over the same time period as the SORV case (32), and has fewer above average burns (2) than the SORV case (5). There-fore, for the above reasons, the SORV wetwell temeprature pro-file should be more conservative for equipment temperature re-sponse.

!~

There are two significant differences between the PNPP and GGNS SORV temperature profiles which require assessment of the

, effect on equipment temperature response. The first is that PNPP has burns late in the transient with higher peak tempera-tures than GGNS due to coincident wetwell and containment burns, and burning at higher concentrations due to insufficient oxygen concentration when hydrogen concentration reached the 8 v/o setpoint. The other principal difference is that there are fewer burns and more time between burns for PNPP due to the larger wetwell volume.

These differences when evaluating equipment response should have little overall effect. The burns with the higher psak temperature are only three burns out of the total 32 burns for PNPP. Therefore the incremental temperature increase for equipment would be small.

The most dominant effect should be the decreased number of burns and increased time between burns for PNPP. This allows more time for the containment heat removal mechanisms to remove energy and maintain lower average temperatures. It also allows time for the equipment to transfer heat back to the containment l

-21B-

ctmosphere and cool down to average containment temperature be-tween burns.

The overall effect of these differences should be lower equipment temperatures for PNPP than for comparable GGNS equipment using the same methodology as that described in MP&L's letter, AECM-82/26.

An analysis was conducted to verify that the PNPP CLASIX-3 temperature profile will result in lower equipment temperatures than the GGNS temperature profile. The temperature response of the igniter assembly, which is identical for PNPP and GGNS, was calculated using the PNPP CLASIX-3 temperature profile and com-pared to the GGNS response. The igniter assembly heat transfer model and assumptions described in MP&L's letter, AECM-82/26, were used for the analysis. The HEATING heat transfer computer code was used for the comparison, however a later revision, HEATING-6, was used for PNPP instead of the HEATING-3 version used for GGNS. The heat transfer methodology and equations are essentially the same in the two versions. The major difference is some changes in HEATING-6 which improves the efficiency of the code.

A comparison of the igniter assembly temperature response to the PNPP and GGNS CLASIX-3 temperature profiles is shown in Figure 4.4.2-1. The response is based upon the GGNS and PNPP SORV base case wetwell temperature profiles which are shown in Figure 5.5-2 (also Figure 2 of MP&L letter AECM-82/26) and Fig-ure 4 of Appendix A for GGNS and PNPP respectively.

The igniter assembly response is as expected. During the initial part of the transient the PNPP temperature response is higher due to the higher initial peak burn temperature and the greater number of burns for about the first 700 seconds of burn time. However, later in the transient, the GGNS temperature response is higher due to substantially more burns with less time between burns. This effect is dominant and much more sig-nificant than the higher PNPP peak burn temperatures at the end of the transient tainment burning.which result from coincident wetwell and con-MP&L, as described in AECM-82/26, evaluated the critical components with two-dimensional heat transfer computer models using the HEATING heat transfer computer code, and the SORV base case (SAI) wetwell temperature profile. As shown in sec-tion 5.6, the GGNS and PNPP equipment survivability lists contain components which are the same or very similiar. Table 4.4.2-1 compares the PNPF equipment qualification temperatures to the calculated temperature response and equipment qualifica-tion temperatures for the similar GGNS components.

In summary, using an analysis comparable to that used at GGNS, it is concluded that the PNPP required equipment would survive hydrogen deflagration burning. This conclusion is based upon:

-21C-i

l i

1) The similarity between the GGNS & PNPP temperature profiles

2) The heat transfer analysis which shows lower equip-ment temperatures for PNPP due to the minor differ-ences which exist betwen the GGNS & PNPP temperature profiles

3) The similarity and in many cases identical components between PNPP and GGNS required to survive

4) The significant margins between the calculated re-sponse for GGNS equipment and the GGNS & PNPP quali-fication temperatures 4.4.3 Equipment Pressure Survivability A preliminary evaluation of equipment pressure survivability has been conducted. Tables 5.5-1 and 5.6-2 pro-vide the qualification or design pressure for PNPP components required to survive a hydrogen burn. The peak pressure for the PNPP CLASIX-3 containment analysis shown in Appendix A is 21.2 psig. The peak drywell to containment differential pressure for PNPP ranges from approximately +7 psid to -11 psid. As discussed in section 3.1, containment negative differential pressure following hydrogen combustion should not exceed the design pressure of -0.8 psid. The qualification or design pressures bound the calculated peak pressures from hydrogen combustion in all cases except:

1) The containment vacuum breaker, IM17F0010.

2) The hydrogen mixing compressors, 1M51C001A&B and discharge check values 1M51F0501A&B In the case of the containment vacuum breaker and hydrogen aixing compressor discharge check valves, only the external pack design preesure which is provided and exceeded by the hy-drcgen burn peak pressure. Since these are check valves, and the active components are not exposed to the peak external pressures it is anticipated'that this equipment will function during hydrogen burning. In the case of the hydrogen mixing compressors, ident: cal compressors at GGNS were evaluated and ware shown to survive for pressures of 24 psig in AECM 82/265, dated June 11, 1982. This bounds the PNPP peak calculated con-tainment pressure of 21.2 psig.

In summary, based upon the preliminary evaluation de-l ceribed above, it can be concluded that the PNPP equipment re-L quired will survive the peak pressure during hydrogen combus-tion.

-21D-l I

? s'

Table 4.4.2-1 Comparision of PNPP Qualification Temperatures To Calculated Temperatures For Comparable GGNS Equipment GGNS GGNS Maximum Qualification Equipment - GGNS Maximum Calculated or Tested PNPP Limiting Calculated (1)

Component Interior (l) Survival Qualification Surface Temperature Temperature Temperature (1) Temperature (2)

1. Containment Locks & 216 F --

250 F l Hatches - seals (3)

2. Instrument Cables 300 F 275 F l

320 F 385 F

3. Electrical Penetra- 300 F 275 F 320 F 340 F tions - cables

4. Igniter Assembly - 246 F 251 F transformer 400 F (3)

5. Pressure Transmitter 235 F ---

303 F 318 F

6. Purge Compressor 184 F 178,F

- motor 200 F 192 F

7. Hydrogen Recom- 300 F 275 F 330 F biners - cable 346 F

8. Motor Actuators - 184 P 178 F 200 F 340 F motor

9. Safety Relief 184 F 349 F valves - housing 355 F l

10. Containment Sprays - 208 F 158 F 200 F 340 F motor actuator 3/21/85

Notes:

(1) See Table 1 of MP&L letter AEC?l-82/26, dated January 19, 1982.

(2) See Table 5.6-1 and 5.6-2.

(3) Qualification of PNPP component in progress. '

S 3/21/85

Figure 4.4.2-1 Comparison of Igniter Assembly Temperature Response to PNPP & CGNS CLASIX-3 Temperature Profiles i, T .

i i ; ' t g .. .

- - -- a t: i

.! z.,

} .

g

.f a. . . 'y. . ... . .

4>* -- ~ .

l x.

.u ._

. -. ... y .

.y.

j f;?ff. s

(. . ,i . .. . . . .:- -

. g. ( igg - . f...

,'~~ ..,.

. . ..t.... ..- -

i / ,i g

. 3:

_1

. - -p g , ,. .. ,

=

_ ! 1 , s i i

.v.. . . . " . . t .

i g-.. . . {. .i g ,

-k f -c. .. . -- ..

.3 ,  ? , # ~ ~

ej .\, -y/a

._ i

~"

l. ._.l'  ;

...:! . ..i _

e h

R! \;

I

!b. i r

p f,/\_ . *l \.; i N k' ~T

~l s

pH,4y'T ~T'* *T[

i  !  !

r uf / /

N I  ;

i, i ._ or-j- ~

g r..

8

-/ M /

\ m I '

s

\ K ~ *:^

~~

%  %% A ./

' )

N 4

4 j, f N ,.  ;

, f - 4-. . . . , . . . .. . . . . .. ,I

,. y l s -

.g...,,,,-... _J....> t

@. i . ' d

,(

. ,s- '

I

_ M ...

! I j q 4.... .

f

^ -

2 y -

u m i I

. M.

, ..J ,

/ lg- l i

[ ,, y. --- r

_.7.~ L. _.. y

.q .

/ff5L --

+ . . - -. ,

7 .

.. ,. . l -

. . . .... . L. .. . . . . -

.. . . , . . . ... y.. ..

,....} _

_ p.. l L. .. . .!

. . . . -. . .. g... .,i. -.._

_ 4, ...

. . ...i. ... .

}

q p

i.. -

.7 ... .. -

j J 7 ..

} '> . g. . .

f { i 'f

/D /' AI /l #5 / T"

.4' ' . i r' .r]- - --- - -- ,

/$ l -/k iP l /P J>

i._. ..

I l

' TAaf/

--l- -

--- - -- - - JP

- -- - -l Jg ,Jj Af Jf J$ - Jf 4 .

-'-- 'J AWi"?

I fg l

-- '@tefr- - --a i g

i

-WS 7 CMS ZGwYCK M *TW6e Rfstoxsc CWyES i ! 9 l ~l,  ; l,,j  ! -

3 I

W -

(~ s rh ha esfo, ,e e t.e < r load )t 'fg h/fjg'

a. PNPP compressors, although made by the same man-ufacturer and the same model number as GGNS, are rated at 546 scfm versus the 500 scfm (minimum) at GGNS (1000 scfn per GGNS Technical Specifica-tion 3/4.6.7.3).

b. The PNPP drywell purge system is manua.lly oper-ated, while the GGNS system is initiated either manually or automatically (LOCA signal and drywell pressure within 1.0 psid of ccntainment pressure) due to the additional function of post-LOCA drywell vacuum relief.

c. The PNPP drywell purge discharge is 4 inches and penetrates the drywell through the drywell vacu-um breaker 10 inch penetrations. The,GGNS de-sign has a separate penetration for the post-LOCA vacuum breaker lines and the drywell purge discharge line is 10 inches.

d. The GGNS drywell purge discharge lines include vaccum breakers for additional vacuum relief once the system is initiated. The PNPP design does not include this feature.

e. The PNPP drywell purge conpressor and vacuum breaker discharge lines penetrate the drywell from the side of the drywell at the top of the cylinder instead of through the flat, horizontal drywell top slab as in GGNS. Figures 5.4.3-1 and 2 and Figure 5.4.3-3 show typical drywell purge and vacuum breaker inlet line arrangements for PNPP and GGNS respectively. ,

None of the differences identified above would have a signifi-cant effect on the analysis of the HCS. Plant specific differ-ences in system design values were included in the containment analysis as discussed in sections 4.0 and 5.5.

Both GGNS and PNPP include two 100%-capacity hy~drogen recombiners inside the containment. The hydrogen recombiners are thermai recombiners manufactured by Westinghouse, each f having a capacity of 100 scfm and a power rating of 75KW. The hydrogen recombiner subsystem designs for both PNPP and GGNS are similar.

5.4.4 Suppression Pool Makeup System The designs of the Suppression Pool Makeup System (SPMS) are essentially the same at GGNS and PNPP. The SPMS provides water from the upper containment pool to the suppression pool by gravity flow'following a design basis accident (LOCA). The piping system consists of two lines, with two normally closed

-y-

motor operated valves in series in each line. The piping dia-gram for each system is shown in PNPP FSAR Figure 6.2-67 and GGNS FSAR Figure 6.2-82.

Both GGNS and PNPP systems are initiated either manually or au-tomatically following LOCA signals and low-low suppression pool water level or 30 minutes, whichever occurs first. The quanti-ty of water added to the suppression pool is approximately 36,400 and 32,800 cubic feet for GGNS and PNPP, respectively.

O

-27A-

so.*a ewe es.nas-l -,

i

... II ~ ,

,s#"

. 'L.

~~

..l

% g

.' .I x

. . . , 2), , x 7.

y* , ,x

/ / . . -

' .L n_. .

_ _._' h 'A, ' 'h:, -~-

,f , .S l f4._ . _ "'_, 4 _Iad la - ! " -",Ig.,,_,_ ,f

~ ....~

,_// , ~

L I H l

I t 9 _.5i gr# m<

d, P:

}

-Y , . . .. ! , N \(!

/3m d f' 7 7 ' N N l "N YT  : I ,.s ...-*;.NYbE*iG

Imus h .

:n 41 '--

/ s. s.u::; /. I@; i,* ,..

L mt I.,4%7 4

.enr... ,. 4A 7(c. ~ ~:~~ J

' t,'*%,1 '9. ..:. ,l '+$r'.3,

/ ._ ). _m D u' ..!.k'.l dth -Ni . ; .- -+.- ri*um

s. - ..

f_ - s -m  :: , ,!.

.,p t r.e

.' iu, it ..

. er. < ..

1. '\

/ ' r 1

/

'~

c '*4y

~

hFa f,'ra',..' e,, -

LW.'b y'

.=,,,_,,-

T.liFM.8

. 2 s:

I

.- . ] -

gI,... s*-*O AJr'[d'e, i

! ', . 6 gr

f. : ,

.m

• 1 r------- y

, y, .-

n n1

- e-- ~\  : .s,..a>*.

, , , .. , -, . .. -3 p.__u _.y e _ ...,p ____' g. s_p. _,_ ___

-t

. . o .- - . -

r%.

=n -_ a .

6g- .

... _ \\ .lf

_,_,,. : y ~ .~.* s.~~y\ r l1 lLTr_ , . . t

_ ' L. L._

~~

7--_._ -

i:p* . , ,

j r w ... v > y

..u . w__

I

. msJ,.LT7 -

.g 0

I I1:,.s mig 3 M st_ .t '

• • "*I$ *Au v . ./

,, Y /f

.u. ) '*.e.~'

~

M1G.MCV. FolC 6 LI ,,,o*g ggg .. E'a *" ' ,. , /, Y l

,f s) e --

• a

• w .

'<y*yr,i ('~.~

$t .,j

'o* - 2 -- -

q'

~

c)[- ~ 4'u 2 .v; :,.

i h- ' , .r y ss.os: ,&g_,,} pq{,_,,

yI c.u y%( .'" %~

'o #'

wis.wotos .1,.

yy[// :::::n

.h.! b'M\

' i. .

s' 4-N g (j s.w. coww.

cast Cow)

(. /

mig.FS038 SECTION 1515 SCAtt : {e 1*-O* 4* t 2 i I r-]

' uis.u ev.c oica j 4.w cogg, - ,.,. -mig . F otGA f

y - - lO'LI 2 e go 3 e O

• E.R.EL&. , ] Et..G,5G' og i$o '

i l.L d 16.LTMir .F070A ~

i *1

.s g,

,, i>

g Mif. FSOSA

,l'5. W. CON 4.

(TEST CONN.

._ 3 SECTION 16-16 stAa.t : {* i'.o*

Figure 5.4.3-1 PffP UNIT l REACTOR DUILDING DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER &

COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL PIPING 3/21/85

g

- - ~

. g4 ~ . . , m.~. . . p.- .

1. w

\

.. ._.,,r ,,

.m I-'--~--- ~n-u,ew.) f '****.6 .= G 3 i 2 ,% . ,. , , ,

a - ge m. m. ._ iq.$

-).gy

- yf = ~ .e.

l t

_sa u_ m i W n, .s. w ~

m:s 8= A. -',

.. ~.. - .

• .s,; e- -# -  %.w 6 6., - ._

m. .-- .-.

==

, . 3 .i. .

8 yth: 4 l h '* 9 1 e l wh' .

b m c<u w- -

1m ,.g,, c

. _ , 9 c' --s,:: . - . - .

h4 m4m e / t.4lp 'g +

.su__ . . e. _ c<

r~

. .t---+

l{

e .-

w

<. . -a a ]N _% e,_,

p p- _:..

.s .

1. m . ,..

a g

w_ . - . ,

y l7 4

]a .! F, " "" p === rg g . - -,g y ,

1 l6 m -s _ ~_

.. %Q$ w l4LC ii n Te.~;. - - - - - - ==J a sp ,c,

=

u g ~t .y

' .c..-. 5* "

e M I 'e s . . . ~ . -

H g '.

rm, M ***

)r.. =.

I . gt o--,--,  ;

6 1Wh.. m

'. ' "

• 4;' r. '%fA u~y

. . . . . . ,1

-"'. t C ;W. I

. .,. ota j EE c;;r. /4 .t ,._

.1~

j ( e - -. ~_ g ps,.;.,.

sij p. 9

)(j, aqq

=

• ~~-l .

m.< _ - .. 3 e e ,.y- s e _

y.~ . a y: - , ^^"

=

! ' **"*- ':a M E. l n'M TO a "~~l r.

,  !. , +

-_ 4 W EW'* A w

/  %.$,

j .e , 79 . ..,,.#T .. . , .

m / '

'! g ,

c Jr nq'% s :ij l ,_ ) _r 7 - .

~

- =

w y>

u i  %

a p

Q1m- na!;b.*'lr{gQ:, -te dlia4 i j-"

EGY, p. 3----- ,

.. n. _,.. , m.'r

= L p

m l

e.. , . f _ _ _ _ ,

',y d,. ..._ W .n a

- ~

u =il g ,, d - -f f --'t~ m. t" m

~  :

l i a -

wl . ,7..

s s @' '", 7".".u m s , 4 .. . . ,

. --__ __ t ,

. .. _- - 1---- u . g ,l[=!!!suunnus!p l , ,,,,,,,,,, ,

g.g ,

-D'".D*j,.(t }i. fD.. .r,f g  ;

j _

@?

" i ,

=

! 8 '. c.

(. 3 s~ 1et; og, r -+T4 a$. J.,

iusa .

C 7/j (e 'y' 9 L~=:.-

qgE.. g:h-<lpym j. v . = l T ,: = '

_ml_

e,  ;-

"<~

4

,.w. .j M ; .-2-9..

- ig, g - . .

.

_s.s. ua=

j g g_c r

g y..o->

i m . J. ...\,,,,,],;,n - , .

m, - ,

b

-.... .+~

s .....

\ .-

3 _ .. , ,e 1,I . . _ -. l b .> Au, ti G =n ~ .

7. a l we m_  : .I e! -

~

.l 1 l ,>

I f

$@= 1 =

i i ., ..- s..

J- , .

, - q ,

n._. .a ,

.m... . ,. e

, - --.c /_ L,

. e.~t,,,,,, 3

i. ,,

.i

( _ . =.- ,_

/ -. * .,. y- s .

s vs e

. \.. .s_ o

%h - . . - , ,

%) "_ 7l,i4r 1. f> Y,

_-h..,,, t'[q /s. ..%.. < . ..7*

.s 1,/ ...._

• =. .

s - -- ~ _ .s.

' gy

' is ~ a s

w. =

l, g.g. ..-.- -.... .

. g , ,;.;, _. . _ _ . s i ru-- \ - - - . t. . . . . .

.o j j_**.,.,,

J - *a ac.- jj ____  ;

~"**

• • • ?'.;':* ." . . . ;. I

(

cIn  ; l .

h ** y . v. . ..

! /h .

_ w . i,. .

([_$_

1 f.r :~v .- :. _.up ;

.! is l- - - - .

.}

?

[.,,,,,., ._._- - -

J . .{. . . . .

L _-.-

(...

n..

I'igure 5.4.3-2 PNI'P O!!YWELL PURGE / VACUUM BREAKER INLET LINES L

1~~ ""

M i $ i h % b..sa.m@.aj E " W,. M@, B.. h' Mea.aa

.wm..J i C hW:.-e.4 . 5 mr.:.- $,h T.sm M mS _m ' "l' x .&

A . M ll

-h M . < .. .. .. v.f.F. ,

,,, ','Ip s' " " -% .r[-""4W $ . 3 n =" i e.;:

• • %{*g'" ,'

@b 1,ve ,4 n er* -

=*

. . .,;,.. 'w

m. -

m gf l s . .N..

, .r - - m *' (

R' *"

'N

,g ,

v..  %

F

- : "" N'F ! 0,g M ii7 4

'i e., ,,

!{'**{ .. l a  : 1 -*=a _ _

kk\\\\ h '

. .._.Jii o.. _m k\ k k' N= h w) ,.xm'*Nw \.

'N' j>___N

-~  :

p } i i ch 1l 1

'.. t J+ , o -

J -

,4

• L d'.. (.: :.  :  :

ds k. .*. - , . . --,y

. n, e- ,. @':.*4. Ro

' j l /

f s s

I.

s Y ** , g% f.f-

{. '

4 ,-

s

,. ,/ -

dN_ Y ' '

S +

a,m _ pc. O '}

y .. h l

i

=4 j

.<w-A '[g I I as., , --< _

G L . .-.~/ ; cd ,

y_ ,

rt q._ f ,

0

\ . -

=l; mac

~~~

x

3-N.

ii i d, l

! t  %/* = p --- . . < , _

.=.

.pg ej -- i q=E-. g- g. g 1 /- ~ ~

-~

g T's c,h, s. ...

t e. L pi l a;. j

]

Dy3',;p. .

u i

- - Ewt m

v'7: 1 s

h

\-! ~

~

^ $_ ,,, / ._ l e -. J r-aim r;-- 4ewit.rM. 'T=- Ms %-9_

., nm e,,;s m n- >-[;r _, hm_ _.,/,...,, ,,,,

.< -s E

W um t

.u%eigy""4 r?

'r v k, t*)

l- ,

i ".

3-d

'===

n 9 . FQ'f' i A

it 3 Lp u m'uus.

.g/ ,g g 'g 4,\\} <-

[. -

--m -g' ,y. )q bDY

i-

~

2_

{f'  ::100;" h

..v

, , - s g

p s 4

s i '* * * *lR hiar .

hmy

• M i * = I j

l

,7 7 m

?

NEh2%Wd*

fl A7.' '.tP"

, me m,

i(dd k t

s y n h-d 1__ J d 5_ <= p.g 1

[""~h3#  ; <

i('sy"'"_,, _! La-- ..

l $

{

be2 s _s. ._

=

. .x w

( .,

- a s

2:

. , _L --1 ^

((L __ __ _a., 1l .

1.} -~ ***'lh; esp g <

u .l ~. *'

- -s--z - s--

'l A

t L /i s#

- . ./ -3

$ @ G. .l . .- 4 ,5 'j JL  ; r - .',f*

2:

MEy ;

a,e.3 .,,. ,,,, ,,5-r-

M m

):

• '*'[--~im

.u. . - i:k - .2^ )y s

t'~

s]

wi,R'.7

'"'" J g _

$g M _Q 3.)""**{l J\ t

\l

{ s 3 j t -

g -; M cf5.- s'ac.?v x

'b. M'l l' . . _

__..___.h$iA5%MmNNNNNUM ._. . _ A N *'

g I4%'sl Sieg Figure 5.4.3-3 I

CGNS'DRYWELLPIIRGEINLEh11NES I

• I

DRYWELL EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY LISTb) 6 i

TABLE 5.6-1

' EQUIPMENT Rx CEN-IDENTIFICATION EQUIPNENT AZI- TERLINE QUALIFICATION NUMBER DESCRIPTION FUNCTION ELEVATION QUALIFICATION MUTH DISTANCE TEMP (F) DURATION MANUF. MODEL PRESSURE (PSIs IB21F0041A Automatic Depressuri- RPV Fressure 636' 5" 51 20' 355 3 hrs sation System Valvett)

Dikkers G471- 60 Relief / ADS 6/125.04 1821F0041B * *

• 636' !* 277 26' " * * *

• IB21F0041E * * * *

• 636' 5" 31 * * *

• 21' IB21F0041F " * *

• 636' 5" 289 26' " * * *

• IB21F0047D * * * *

• 636' 5" 308 20 " " "

• IB21F0047H * *

• 636' 5" 322 21' " " " = "

IB21F0051C * * * * "

• 636' 5" 88 25' " " " "

1821F0051G * *

• 636' 5" 71 26' " * * * "

l IB21F0410A Automatic Depressuri- *

• Location Same as Valves QUALIFICATION sation System Valve Qualification Seitz 6A33 in Progress IN PROGRESS i Solenoid "

(2)

I 1821F0410B = = = = = = = = = = "

1521F0411A * * * * = = = = = = = "

1821F0411B * * * * = = = = = =

• IB21F0414A * * * = * = = = = = =

• IB21F04143 * * = = = = = = = = =

• IB21F0415A * * * = * = = = = = = "

1821F0415B * * * * * = "

= = =

1821F0422A * * * = = = "

= = =

1821F0422B " * * * *

~

= = = = = = "

1321F0425A " * * * * = "

= = =

1BS1F04258 " * * * = = "

= = =

1821F0442A * * = = = = = = "

=

1B21F0442B * * * * * = = "

= =

1B21F0444A * * * * = = = = = = = "

IB21F0444B * * * * * * = = = = = "

1D23N0100A Drywell RTD Drywell Temp. 642' 315 485 Weed 70 17' 3 hrs 611 Monitoring 1D23N01008 * * *

• 642' 135 16' * * * *

• IP23N0110A * *

• 620' 6" 308 36' 6" " * * * "

1D23N0110B * *

• 620' 6" 145 36' 6" " * * *

• ID23N0120A * * *

• 599' 9" 308 36' 6" " " " " "

ID23N0120B * *

• 599' 9" 150 36' 6" * * * * *

, 3/21/85

Page 2 DRYWELL EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY LIST TABLE 5.6-1 (Cont.)

EQUIPMENT Rx CEN-IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENT ASI- TERLINE QUALIFICATION QUALIFICATIC NUMBEM DESCRIPTION FUNCTION ELEVATION MUTH DISTANCE TEMP (F) DURATION MANUF. MODEL PRESSURE IM56S008 Bydrogen Ignition Hydrogen 629' l-1/2= 12 36' 6" 345 3 hrs Power 6043 IN PROGRES:

l System 01 Ignition Systems

• IM565009 637' 0" 41 36' 6"

• IM56S010 636' 3-1/2" 90 36' 6"

• IM56Soll 636' 7" 137 36' 6" =

IM565012 632' 3" 180 36' 6* *

= " " * * *

• IM56S013 631' 5" 221 36' 6"

• IM56S014 636' 10" 273 36' 6" " "

IM56S015 * *

• 630' 9-1/2" 322 36' 6" " * * * ",

IM56S016 660' 0* O 31' 6" ,

IM56S017 659' 8" 57 29' 6* ,

IM565018

• 659' 8" 114 30' 0"

• IM56S019 * *

• 659' 8" 172 30' 0* " " = "

IM56S020 * *

• 659' 8" 225 28' 0" " * * *

• 660' 0* 280 30' 0" * * *

• IM56S021 * * " " " "

IM56SO22

• 660' 0" 317 31' 0" ,

IM56S102 670' 0" 350 13' 0" ,

• *

• 4 " * *

• IM56S103 670' 0" 13' 0" Control Cable and Drywell 346 Rockbestos Firewall 113 Small Power Cable (Various Locations) III Instrument Cable 385 Brand-Rex 16 & 20 113 AWG Drywell Personnel 603' 1* 105 36' 6" In W. J. Wooley IN PROGRESS Airlock Seal Progress "

Drywell Equipment 605' 227 36' 6" Batch Seal NOTES: (1) All components oathis list will be qualified or justification for interim operation provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49.

This justification will address appropriate considerations for the equipment required to survive hydrogen combustion.

, 3/21/85

4 i

L i

i I .

4

) NOTES (cont'd): (2) Demonstration of equipment survivability for these components

! will be applicable to all safety releif valves.

(3) PNPP Igniter qualification in progress. Identical igniter assembly qualified (GGNS) to 70 psig for 10 minutes and 330 P.

I 1

i I

s 1/21/RS

l CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY LISTU g TABLE 5.6-2 EQUIPMENT Rx CEN-IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENT AEI- TERLINE QUALIFICATION NUMBER DESCRIPTION FUNCTION QUALIFICATION ELEVATION MUTH DISTANCE TEMP (F) DURATION MANUF. MODEL PRESSURE (psig) 1D23NO130A Containment RTD Containment 689' 0" 272 60' 485

• Weed 611 70 Temperature Monitoring ID23NO1308

• 720' 0* 95 60' " * * *

• 1D23NO140A * * "

• 664' 0" 45 60' " " "

ID23NO1408 *

$64' 0" 210 60' " * * * "

1D23NO150A

• 642' 0" 55 60' " " " " "

1D23NO1508 * *

• 642' 0" 250 60' " " "

• ID23NOl60A

• 599' 9" 67 60' " " " *

• ID23NOl608 *

• 599' 9" 250 60' " " * *

• IE12F0028A Containment Spray Containment Spray 643' 6" 37 48' 6" 340

• Limitorque SMB 105 Valve (MO) "

1E12F00285 "

643' 9" 335 42' 9" " " " " "

1E12F0042A RRR LPCI Inboard Low Pressure 624' 0" 41 44' 0" * *

• SMB "

Isolation valve (MO) Coolant Injection "

1E12F0042B 620' 0" 315 55' 0" * * " *

• 1E12F0537A Containment Spray containment Spray 689' 0" 40 58' 0" " * " " "

Isolation Valve (MO)

• 1E12F05378 689' 0" 320 58' 0" " " " " "

1M16F0010A Drywell vacuum Drywell Isolation 652' 325 36' 6" 250

• Benry Pratt NRS "

Relief System Butterfly Valve 1M16F0010B * * *

• 652' 222 36' 6" 250 " * * "

IM16F0020A Drywell Isolation 652' 324 36' 6" 250

• GPE Controls LD240- 21psid/25psih.

Check Valve 339 1M16F0020B " "

652' 225 36' 6" 250 * * *

• IM17F0010 Containment Vacuum Containment vacuum 664' 58 60' 250 *

• LD240-337 0.8psid/15ph Relief System Releif Check Valve IM17F0020 " * * "

664' 150 60' 250 * * *

• IM17F0030 " * *

• 664' 302 60' 250 " " " "

1M17F0040 * * * * "

664' 315 60' 250 " " "

e 3/21/85

Page 2 CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY LIST TABLE 5.6-2 (Cont'd) 4 EQUIPMENT '

Rx CEN-e IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENT AZI- TERLINE l NUMBER DESCRIPTION QUALIFICATION QUALIFICATIOt FUNCTION ELEVATION MUTfi DISTANCE TEMP (F) DURATION MANUF. MODEL PRESSURE (PSIC IM51C0001A Hydrogen Mixing Rydrogen Mixing 664' 300 Compressor and 24' 192 2 days Turbonetics SC-6 24 Motor ( 3 ) Compressor Reliance Type P IM51C00015 " * *

• Motor . .

664' 245 25' 192 * *

• IM51D0001A Nydrogen Recombiner Removal of Hydro 304 664 37' 1700-1750 21 days Westingl.ouse Model A 45.3 gen by Hydrogen (Heater and Oxygen Element)

Recombination 1M51D001B

• 664' 236 37' " " " *

• IM51F0010A Hydrogen Mixing Isolation Valve 670' 309 25' 340 3 hrs Limitorque Compressor Iso- for Drywell SMB-00-5 105 lation valve (MO) Purge Compressor IM51F0010B *

• 670' 245 20' 340 " * *

. IM51F0501A Eydrogen Mixing Check Valve for 664' 305 Compressor for Drywell Purge 25' 350 "

TRW Mission K15ACEFv73 15.3(2 Check valve Compressor IM51F0501B " * .

250 21' 350 * * * *

. IM569001 Hydrogen Igniter Hydrogen Ignition 613' 4" 355 49' 0" 345 System (4) 3 hrs Power Sys. 6043 IN PROGREE IM56S002 * * * *

• Division

• 613' 4" 5 51' 0" * * *

• 1M56S003 * *

• 619' 6" 63 * " "

1M56S004 * * *

• 51' 8" " "

• 619' 6" 89 52' 0" * * * *

• 1M56S005 * *

• 664' 0" 34 * " " "

57' 0" "

1M565006 * * *

• 689' 0" 34 * * "

1M56S023 * * *

• 52' 0" *

• 619' 6" 54 52' 0" " " " " "

1M56S024 " * *

• 619' 6" 118 51' * * " " "

' 8" 1M56S025 * *

• 619' 6" 152 * " ** *

• 51' 0"

• 1M56SO26 * * " "

1M56S027 * * *

• 619' 6" 186 52' 0" " " "

• 619' 6" "

1M56S028 " " " "

221 51' 8" " " " "

• 619' 6" 255 51' 4" " * * *

• 1M56S029 *

• 619' 6" 289 * * * "

52' 0" *

, su in e

g Page 3 CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY LIST TABLE 5.6-2 (Cont'd) l EQUIPMENT Rx CEN-4 -

IDENTIFICATION EQUIP;2NT QUALIFICATION NUMBER DESCRIPTION AZI- TERLT'id QUALIFICATION FUNCTION ELEVATION MUTH gf" ANCE TEMP (F) DURATION MANUF, MODEL PRESSURE (PS IM56.030 Bydrogen Igniter Hydrogen Ignition 619' 6" 327 51' 11" 345 3 hrs Power Systems 6043 INPROGRbbb

. System (9 1M56S031 * * *

• Division 638' 0" 358 41' 6" * * * * ,

IM565032 * * * "

640' 0" 155 46' 0" " * * * ,

1M56S033 * *

• 640' 0' 186 46' 0" * * * * ,

IM56SO34 * * *

• 640' '.P 324 53' 6" " " " " ,

IM565035 * * *

• 640' 4-3/4" 61 51' 6" * * * * ,

IM56SO36 * *

• 640' 5-1/2" 118 51' 6" " " * * ,

IM56S037 * *

• 640' 5" 227 46' 0" " * * * ,

1 IM56S038 * * *

• 639' 4" 260 54' 0" " * * * ,

1M56S039 * * * *

• 651' 1" 236 41' E'* * " " " ,,

i IM56SO40 * *

• 647' 4" 2 41' 6" * * * * ,

IM565041 ** * *

• 650' 6-3/4" 41 50' 6" * * * * ,

IM56SO42 * * *

• 650' 6" 87 49' 0" " " " " ,

1 IM565043 * * *

• 651' 0" 101 49' 0" " " * * ,

IM56SO44 * * * *

• 660' 0" 86 44' 6" " " " " ,

IM56SO45 * *

• 660' 6" 95 48" 6" * * * * ,

IM56SO46 * * *

• 664' 0" 54 51' G" * * * " ,

IM56SO47 * * * *

• 665' 0" 114 52' 0" * * * " ,

IM56SO48 * *

• 662' 6" 147 53' 0" " * *

• IM56SO49 * * * * ,

662' 7-3/4" 218 51' 0" " * *

• IM56S050 * * *

• 664' 7" 251 49' 6" " " " "

IM56S051 * * * * ,

• 661' 6" 289 50' 0" " " " "

IM56S052 * *

• 661' 6" 324 49' 6" * * *

• 1M56S053 * *

• 669' 6" 0 54' 6" * " " "

IM565054 " = *

• 684' 9" 355 52' 6" " " " "

IM56S055 = *

• 686' 0" 75 48' 0" * * " "

IM56S056 * * *

• 686' 0" 85 47' 0" " * *

• IM56S057 = = " =

686' 0" 95 47' 0" " " *

• IM56S 058 * * * * ,

686' 0" 105 48' 0" " " *

• IM565059 * * * "

G36' 0" 75 35' 0" ~ " * '

IM56S060 * *

• 686' 0" 105 35' 0" " " " "

IM56S061 * * * * ,

689' 6" 45 48' 0" " " * *

• 3/21/85

I i

Page 4 CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY LIST TABLE 5.6-2 (Cont'd) 6 EQUIPMENT . Rx CEN-IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENT AZI- TERLINE QUALIFICATION QUALIFICATION NUMBER DESCRIPTION FUNCTION ELEVATION MUTH DISTANCE TEMP (F) DURATION MANUP. MODEL PRESSURE (PSIG l

IN PROGRESS (4, l IM56 062 Hydrogen Igniter Hydrogen Ignition 689' 6" 130 41' 0" 345 3 hrs Power Systems 6043

Systead) Division l 1M56s 063 689' 6" 229 48' 0" .

IM56s064

• 689' 6" 252 43' 6" 1M565065 689' 6" 289 43' 0" .

1M565066 689' 6" 310 48' 6" .

IM56S067 715' 6" 359 58' 9" .

IM56S068 715' 6" 27 58' 9" .

IM56S069 715' 6" 62 58' 9" .

1M56S070 715' 6" 87 58' 9" .

IM56S 071 715' 6" 119 58' 9" .

IM565072 715' 6" 151 58' 9" .

1M56S073 715' 6" 178 58' 9" .

1M56S074 715' 6" 209 58' 9" .

1M563075 715' 6" 241 58' 9" .

IM56S076 715' 6" 273 58' 9" 1M56S077 715' 6" 300 58' 9" .

IM5GS078 715' 6" 331 58' 9" IM56S079 745' 6" 359 48' 0" 1M56S080 745' 6" 34 48' 0" IM565081 745' 6" 72 48' 0" i 1M56S082 745' 6" 102 48' 0" l IM565083 745' 6" 143 48' 0" 1 IM565084 745' 6" 180 48' 0" IM565 085 745' 6" 216 48' 0" .

' 1M5GS086 745' 6" 252 48' 0" .

1M56S087 745' 6" 287 48' 0" IM565088 745' 6" 324 48' 0" IM56S089 757' 0* O l' 0" IM565090 757' 0" 180 l' 0" IM56S O91 645' 7" 168 60' 0" .

IM56SO92 645' 0" 172 58' 0" 1M56S093 613' 4" 7 44' 0" .

s 3/21/85

~ '

___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ - . .~

t Page 5 CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY LIST TABLE 5.6-2 (Cont'd)

EOUI N M Rx CEN-IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENT AgI. TERLINE QUALIFICATION NUMBER DESCRIPTION QUALIFICATION FUNCTION ELEVATION MUTH DISTANCE TEMP (P) DURATION MANUF. MODEL PRESSURE (PSIC) 1M56-094 (4 Rydrogen Igniter Rydrogen 612' 5" 13 42' 8" 345 IN PROGRESS System 3 hrs Power Systems 6043 Ignition Division IM568095 * * "

612' 6" 344 42' 6" * * * *

• 1M56SO96

• 612' 3" 351 43' 6" * * * *

• 1M565097 * * *

• 638' 8" 289 49' 6" * * *

• IM565098 " *

• 685' 6" 342 53' 0" * * * * "

1M56S099

• 685' 6* 17 50' 6" * * * *

• IM56S100 " * *

• 686' 0" 75 25' 0" * * *

• IM56S101

• 686' 0" 105 25' 0" * * * *

• 1R7250001 Electrical Penetrations containment 659' 0" 221 60' 340 3 hrs Westinghouse WX33328 108 Boundary IR7280002 * *

• 659' 0* 228 * * *

• WX33328 1R72S0003 * * * * "

656' 3" 221 * =

• 1R7250004 " * " "

• WX33329 ,

657' 1-1/2' 248 *

• IR7250005 * * *

• WX33329 ,

656' 3" 228 * *

• WX33330 IR7250006 * *

• 657' 1-1/2" 242 " " *

• WX33331 1R7250007 *

• 651' 6" 221 * * *

• 1R72S0008 * * *

• WX33332 ,

649' 9" 221 * *

• WX33333 1R72S0009 *

• 651' 6" 248 * * *

• 1R7250010 * * *

• WX33332 ,

649' 9" 248 * *

• WX33333 1R72S0011 *

• 657' 1-1/2" 235 * * * * "

1R72S0012 * * * *

• WX33334 651' 6" 228 "

• WX33335 IR72S0013 * *

• 649' 9" 228 * * *

• WX33333 1R72S0014 *

• 651' 6" 242 * * " "

7 IR7250015 * * *

• WX33335 ,

649' 9" 242 " *

• WX33333 IR72S0016 * * "

643' 3" 221 * * *

• WX33336 IR72S0017 " *

• 641' 6" 221 * * *

• WX33337 IR72S0018 * *

• 643' 3" 228 * * *

• WX33338 1R72S0019 * * * * * ,

641' 6" 228 .

WX33339 IR7250020 " *

• 643' 3" 248 * * *

• WX33336 1R72S0021 *

• 641' 6" 241 = " " "

WX33363 1R7250022 * * * = ,

643' 3" 242 * *

• WX33340 IR72S0023 *

• 641' 6" 248 " " " "

WX33341

, 3/21/85

T

{ Page 6 CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY LIST TABLE 5.6-2 (Cont'd)

EQUIP M Rx CW QUALIFICATIC

. IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENT AZI- TERLINE OUALIFICATION t NUMBER DESCRIPTION FUNCTION ELEVATION MUTH DISTANCE TEMP (F) DURATION MANUF. MODEL PRESSURE (PSIC 1R7250024 Electrical Penetrations Containment 643' 3" 235 60' 340 3 hrs Westinghouse WX33342 108 Boundary *

IR7250025 651' 6" 235 WX33337 *

' 1R72S0026 638' 4" 221 WX33343

• 1R7250027 638' 4" 228 WX33344 "

1R7250028 641' 6" 223 WX33345 "

1R72S0029 * *

• 656' 3* 223 W-34147

• 1R7250030 * *

• 643' 3* 223 W34488

• 1R72S0031 649' 9" 223 w-34489 "

1R7250033 " *

• 649' 9" 235 W-34490 *

• * * * *

• W-34491 1R7250035

• 641' 6" 242

• 1R7250036

• 649' 9" 241 W-34492

• 1R7250038

• 651' 6" 241 W-34493 Upper Personal Airlock

• 692' 10" 225 60' Qualification J. Wooley IN PROGRE:

l I

Seals *

• In Progress Lower Personal Airlock 603' 1" 241 Seals " *

• Equipment Hatch Seals 629' 6" 133 Terminal and Fuse Containment 346 3 hrs Buchanan NBQ, NQO, 113 Block Assemblies (Various Locations) NQO-361 control cable and

= 346 Rockbestos Firewall 113 111 Small Power Cable Instrument cable "

385 Brand-Rex 16 and 20 113 AWG 318 Rosemont 1153 73 Pressure / Level /DP Transmitters NOTES: (1) All components on this list will be qualified or justification for interim operation provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49.

~

l s 3/21/85

i Page 6 NOTES (cont'd): This justification will address appropriate considerations for the equipment required to survive hydrogen combustion.

(2) Design values j (3) Demonstrated qualification to 14.9 for PNPP. Capability demonstrated to 24 psig at GGNS for identical compressor. GGNS compressor demonstrated qualification to 15.3 psig.

(4) Demonstration of equipment survivability for these components will be applicable to all safety relief valves.

t I

i h

8 3/21/85 ,

BRIA 8 PerTy QASIX-3 Input Suppression Pool Parameters Fool surface area in dryw11 (ftI) 482 Pool surface area in wetwell (ft2 ) 5900 Weir height above wtar level (ft) 5.667 l

l pool hter Density (1hq/ft3) 62.11 Mass (lien) 7.349 x 10, l L. p ature (OF) 90 1 Heat Tdty (stu/lb- F) 10 J l

l saw 1 acw 2 mow 3 I Ezeer of vents 40 40 40 Flow aree per vent (ft ) 4 125 4.125 4.125 Vent length (ft) 7.458 7.458 7.458 Depth of vent bottan (ft) 8.646 13.146 17.646 Additional vent length (ft)* 2.87 2.87 2.87 Trning icos coefficient 2.3 3.9 9.6 Gas loss coefficient 2.5 2.5 2.5 Drywell Ibid @ W1ums (ft3 ). 2 40,564 Ikysell Hold @ surface Area (ft ) 2617 l

1

• hts ibr acceleration of fluid.

• • ust fue volume in drywell, inside and belod the top of the wir wall.

3/21/85

I lI ll 0.09. .

4 t

0.07 f z

! 1 -

$ 0

$ 0.05 p

/ / '

I

\

/

t -

h 0.03 l / }

f 0.01 '

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 TIME (SECONDS) X 1000 CLEVELAND ELECTRIC IllijHINATING PERRY NUCLEAR STATION SORV CONTAINMENT H2 CAS CONCENTRATION FIGURE 18

. _ __ .____ -_ 3/21_/85

- _