ML20078A662

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Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept 29 Re Inadequate Clearance Between Process Piping Sys & box-type Pipe Support/Restraints Installed by Tompkins-Beckwith,Inc. Documentation Reviewed & Accepted as of 830620
ML20078A662
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/02/1983
From: Drummond F
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Jay Collins
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 29, W3I83-0295, W3I83-295, NUDOCS 8309230364
Download: ML20078A662 (5)


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l_OUISIANA 442 onAnoNoe srecer POWER & LIGHT P O BOX 6008

  • NEW ORLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174 a (504) 366-2345

$ pus $ E sY $

September 2, 1983 W3I83-0295 Q-3-A35.07.29 Mr. John T. Collins m'&@WKvxtiw_

s Regional Administrator, Region IV ]l i

i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission b j, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  ; ._

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j Arlington, Texas 76012

SUBJECT:

Wateriird SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 29

" Inadequate Clearance Between Process Piping Systems and Box-Type Pipe Supports / Restraints" Final Report

REFERENCE:

LP&L Letter W3I83-0232 dated July 7, 1983

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 29,

" Inadequate Clearance Between Process Piping Systems and Box-Type Pipe Supports / Restraints."

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly ours, M

F. J. Drummond Manager, Engineering & Technical Services cc: 1) Director 3) Mr. E. L. Blake Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (with 15 copies of report)

2) Director 4) Mr. W. M. Stevenson Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (With I copy of report) 8309230364 830902 PDRADOCK05000g B

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FINAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 29 INADEQUATE CLEARANCE BETWEEN PROCESS PIPING CfSTEMS AND BOX-TYPE PIPE SUPPORTS / RESTRAINTS INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a deficiency relative to clearance between process piping systems and box-type supports restraints.

L To the best of our knowledge, this deficiency has not been reported to the USNRC pursuant to 10CFR21.

t DESCRIPTION l l

On April 23, 1981, it was established that a problem existed with the box-type I restraints for process piping being installed by Tompkins-Beckwith, Inc.  !

The elements of the problem were:

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Inconsistent support / restraint design drawing gap criteria

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c) provided by Bergen-Patterson l b) Tompkins-Beckwith's Contract conflicted with the design drawings as to required and allowable gaps between the pipe and restraint structure. The criteria entered in Tompkins-Beckwith, Inc.'s contract was interpreted as 1/16" maximum and 0" minimum allowable gap.

.The significant problem which resulted from the above defined problem elements was that the as-built installation had insufficient clearance to allow pipe thermal movement as required.

This problem existed in the following piping systems: Fuel Pool, Containment Spray . Component Cooling Water, Safety Injection, Boron Management, Waste Management, Turbine Cooling Water, Nitrogen Gas, Chemical Volume Control, Blowdown, Emergency Generator, Extraction Steam, Condensate, Reactor Cooling, Main Steam,- Heater Drain, Air Evacuation and Auxiliary Steam. The total number'of restraints affected was estimated at 1,900. Of this number, 241 supports required some form of modification (shim, trim lugs or increase gap) to make them acceptable.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS l L .If these deficiencies were left uncorrected, possible degradation of safety

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systems could occur.' -Such degradation could occur by exceeding the ASME Code  !

allowable stresses, creating the possibility that systems would be overstressed in some way not analyzed in the FSAR. Additionally, these deficiencies presented the potential for common mode failures within/between systems. Such failures are not analyzed in the FSAR.

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P CORRECTIVE ACTION l

l The corrective action plan to correct the deficiencies is delineated below:

A. Evaluation

1. Ebasco Site Support Engineering (ESSE) Hanger Group measured all as-built gaps.
2. . Analysis of as-built gaps versus calculated thermal movements and I maximum expected radial expansion of pipe was conducted by Ebasco to I determine accepttbility of the as-built installation.

B. Corrective Action Implementation -l

1. Restraints which required modifications were remeasured by l Tompkins-Beckwith, Inc. after the modifications were completed. l l
2. Nonconformance Report W3-2644 was used by Tompkins-Beckwith, Inc. to <

l implement corrective action (modifications) and to document rework l on gaps of restraints which were modified. l l

For those restraints not installed to date, the gap criteria has been redefined and distributed.through issue of Field Sketches, Series'M694 via FCR-MP-1553. These requirements have been incorporated into the respective

, Tompkins-Beckwith program procedures.

As of June 20, 1983 all corrective action was completed and all applicable l documentation has been reviewed and accepted.

i This report is submitted as the Final Report.

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FINAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 29 INADEQiTATE CLEARANCE BETWEEN PROCESS PIPING SYSTEMS AND BOX-TYPE PIPE SUPPORTS / RESTRAINTS INTRODUCTION

. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a deficiency relative to clearance.between process piping systems and box-type supports restraints.

To the best of our knowledge, this deficiency has not been reported to the USNRC pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION On April 23, 1981, it was established that a problem existed with the box-type restraints for process piping being installed by Tompkins-Beckwith, Inc.

The elements of the problem were:

a) Inconsistent support / restraint design drawing gap criteria provided by Bergen-Patterson b) Tompkins-Beckwith's Contract conflicted with the design drawings as to required and allowable gaps between the pipe and restraint structure. The criteria entered in Tompkins-Beckwith, Inc.'s contract was interpreted as 1/16" maximum and 0" minimum allowable gap.

The significant problem which resulted from the above defined problem elements was that the as-built installation had insufficient clearance to allow pipe '

thermal movement as required.

This problem existed in the following piping systems: Fuel Pool, Containment Spray, Component Cooling Water, Safety Injection, Boron Management, Waste Management, Turbine Cooling Water, Nitrogen Gas', Chemical Volume Control, Blowdown, Emergency Generator, Extraction Steam, Condensate, Reactor Cooling, '

Main Steam, Heater Drain, Air Evacuation and Auxiliary Steam. The total number of restraints affected was estimated at 1,900. Of this numb ~er, 241 supports required some form of modification (shim, trim lugs or increase gap) to make them acceptable.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS If these deficiencies were left uncorrected, possible degradation of safety systems could occur. Such degradation could occur by exceeding the ASME Code allowable stresses, creating the possibility that systems would be overstressed in soms way not analyzed in the FSAR. Additionally, these deficiencies presented the potential for common mode failures within/between

, systems. Such failures are not analyzed in the FSAR.

i i

u

CORRECTIVE ACTION The corrective action plan to correct the deficiencies is delineated below:

A. Evaluation

1. Ebasco Site Support Engineering (ESSE) Hanger Group measured all as-built gaps.

l 2. Analysis of as-built gaps versus calculated thermal movements and maximum e::pected radial expansion of pipe was conducted by Ebasco to determine acceptability of the as-built installation.

B. Corrective Action Implementation

1. Restraints which required modifications were remeasured by Tompkins-Beckwith, Inc. after the modifications were completed.
2. Nonconformance Report W3-2644 was used by Tompkins-Beckwith, Inc. to implement corrective action (modifications) and to document rework on gaps of restraints which were codified.

For those restraints not installed to date, the gap criteria has been redefined and distributed through issue of Field Sketches, Series M694 via FCR-MP-1553. These requirements have been incorporated into the respective Tompkins-Beckwith program procedures.

As of June 20, 1983 all corrective action was completed and all applicable documentation has been reviewed and accepted.

This report is submitted as the Final Report.

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