ML20041F145

Interim Status Rept of Significant Const Deficiency 39 Re Fire Damage in Rcb to Main Steam Line & safety-related Cables.All Wood Used Throughout Plant Replaced W/Fire Retardant Matl.Final Rept by 820416

ML20041F145
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	03/02/1982
From:	Gutierrez J, Hart J, Mclendon G, Milhiser R, Wills J, Yaeger W LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3K-82-0125, W3K-82-125, NUDOCS 8203160231
Download: ML20041F145 (9)

Text

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l OUISIANA f 242 oEunoNoE s1nar POWE R & LIG H T/ p o Box boos . NEW onLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174 . (504) 366 2345

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0 s"ysSIr5 March 2, 1982 G. D. McLENDON Senior Vice President W3K-82-0125 Q-3-A35.07.39 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S . Nuclear Regula tory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit 3 Docket No. 50-382 Interim Status Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 39

" Fire Damage in RCB to Main Steam Line and Safety Relatea Cables"

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Status Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 39, " Fire Damage in RCB to Main Steam Line and Safety Related Cables."

If you have any questions, please advise.

Ver: trily yours,

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. X, CDMcL/LLB/grf Attachment Q/(t ,, f u

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cc: 1) Director l Office of Inspection & Enforcement  ! %D j @

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 ' 8 (with 15 copies of report) J

2) Director Sil qf office of Management ,. 72 '

Information and Program Control 2,- < S U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission f'p OO Washington, D. C. 20555 g'i , . -

(with I copy of report) -i, NM .,4 6 #

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8203160231 820302 PDR ADOCK 05000382 S PDR J

LOUISIA"A POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT No. 3 Interira Status Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 39

" Fire Damage in RCB to Main Steam Line and Safety Related Cables" Reviewed by [!>

R. J. ".ilhis6r 7- Site Manager 8 (, f,2 Date Reviewed by Ed/[7 -

'Date

/. L. U - Project Superintendent Reviewed by -

J." fart -TrWject Licensing Engineer Ab)IL Date Reviewed by ,

N WYieder' - Sf. Resident Engineer Date Reviewed by { b 2f,!3 7._

J. Gttfierrez - Q. A. Site Supervisor Date February 24, 1982 l

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INTERIM STATUS REPORT SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 39 FIRE DAMAGE IN RCB TO MAIN STEAM LINE AND SAFETY RELATED CABLES INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a fire which occurred in Louisiana Power & Light Company's Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Reactor Containment Building (RCB) in the main steam line penetration area on elevation

+46.00'. The fire affected electrical cables, main steam line, and associated pipe supports and restraints which were exposed to flames of an undetermined temperature for a period of approximately one hour and ten minutes. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). This problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION On October 11, 1981, at 5:23 a.m., a fire was discovered in the RCB, elevation

+46.00', in the main steam line penetration area. Investigations to determine the cause of the fire have not positively established the cause. The items found to be on fire were twenty-two (22) 6" x 8" x 3' oak timbers which were being used as dunnage for the main steam line. The local fire department was called at 5:25 a.m. and arrived on site at 5:50 a.m. In the meantime, site personnel at-tempted to extinguish the flames with the use of available extinguishers and by removing the burning timbers from the immediate area of the main steam line. The items sustaining obvious damage include some safety- and non-safety-related elec-trical cables. Ebasco has coordinated tests to determine whether or not metal-lurgical damage occurred to the main steam line and its associated supports, re-str..ats, and accessories.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS The following is a safety evaluation for the electrical cable:

If the cable insulation has teen degraded, there is the possibility that during an accident, the cables will fail to carry signals for safety grade instrumenta-tion and/or control. Thus, several safety systems could become degraded and not be able to carry out their safety function. Therefore, if these cables were not replaced, the safety of the plant would be affected.

The following is the safety evaluation of the line:

Based on the report of Ebasco's Materials Applications Group, the line and associ-ated components are essentially undamaged (outside of the excerior coatings), and the safety of the plant would not be affected. However, some of the components require coatings for corrosion protection; thus, subsequent corrosion could weaken these items and prevent them from carrying out their safety function. Therefore, if the components are left uncorrected (i.e., recoated), the safety of the plant could be affected.

/

CORRECTIVE ACTION Immediately following the fire, the above mentioned area was secured and placed off limits to all personnel with the exception of Security and Safety personnel pending an investigation. On October 16, 1981, Ebasco Quality Assurance person-nel were permitted to enter the area. On that date, Nonconformance Report No.

W3-3093 was initiated.

a) In order to prevent recurrence of similar incidents to the extent feasible, all wood being used throughout the plant island bc.s been replaced with ap-proved fire retardant material.

b) Mechanical: Ebasco Materials Applications personnel have evaluated the in-formation provided by Ebasco Site Engineering and Quality Assurance, and the conclusions drawn are that:

1) The heat produced by the subject fire did not produce any detrimental effects on the mechanical properties of the portions of the Nuclear Safety Class 2 Main Steam Piping Spools, ?ipe Hanger Assembly MSRR-18, or Pipe Restraint FR1 exposed to the fire.

2) The hardness test data obtained from the components evaluated did not indicate the presence of any unacceptable hard areas which would be as-sociated with the presence of a martensitic structure caused by heating to temperatures above the transformation temperature and rapid cooling.

3) The components exposed to the subject fire will be acceptable for their intended service following cleaning to remove soot deposits, scale, and blistered paint and restoration of the surfaces in accordance with the respective design specification requirements.

c) Civil: Ebasco Civil Construction has directed the painting contractor to per-form the following work as related to the damaged items or areas:

1) Restraint P4L-El-W1: The restaint will require only removal of surface discoloration and reapplication of Ameron-Amercoat 90 except for an area approximately from El. +46 to El. +49 on northwestern, vertical member of restraint. The large area of exposed metal and the several isolated spots of exposed metal will require surface preparation by sandblasting and reapplication of Ameron-Dimetcote EZ primer with Ameron-Amercoat 90 top coat. Structural steel shall be treated in one of the above methods depending on extent of damage.

2) Support MSRR-18: Remove strut and clamp portions of support to Sline (painting contractor) blast yard for sand blast surface preparation and reapplication of Ameron-Dimetcoat EZ primer.

3) Main Steam Line: Prepare entire surface where there is damage to coating by sand blasting and reapply Ameron-Dimetcote EZ primer.

This work will be completed by March 31, 1982.

_3 d) Electrical: As noted on the Nonconformance Report, Ebasco Engineering has investigated, evaluated, and dispositioned all electrical components in-volved. Pullout and repull documents have been issued as applicable for cables and tests. A partial disposition identified and designated the areas of assignment. Ebasco Engineering defined the cable trays, cables, and conduit involved. All documents such as related pullslips, meggaring, and inspection have been completed. Repair work necessary to restore electrical integrity has been completed.

As previously mentioned, the civil portion of the corrective action should be completed by March 31, 1982, with a Final Report to the USNRC to follow by April 16, 1982.

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l LOUISIA 'A POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT No. 3 Interim Status Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 39

" Fire Damage in RCB to Main Steam Line and Safety Related Cables" Reviewed by [!W R. J. ".ilhis6r 7- Site Manager 47 6//1 bate Reviewed by 2,d81-

f. L. U1'~ - Prc[- Superintendent ' 'Date Reviewed by J." fart'- 7tWject Licensing Engineer Ah)IL Date Reviewed by, M ?A C lieser'- 5(. Resident Engineer Date Reviewed by lle!T L J. Gttfierrez - Q. A. Site Supervisor Date February 24, 1982

~

INTERIM STATUS REPORT SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY No. 39 FIRE DAMAGE IN RCB To MAIN STEAM LINE AND SAFETY RELATED CABLES INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a fire which occurred in Louisiana Power & Light Company's Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Reactor Containment Building (RCB) in the main steam line penetration area on elevation

+46.00'. The fire affected electrical cables, main steam line, and associated pipe supports and restraints which were exposed to flames of an undetermined temperature for a period of approximately one hour and ten minutes. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). This problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION On October 11, 1981, at 5:23 a.m., a fire was discovered in the RCB, elevation

+46.00', in the main steam line penetration area. Investigations to determine the cause of the fire have not positively established the cause. The items found to be on fire were twenty-two (22) 6" x 8" x 3' oak timbers which were being used as dunnage for the main steam line. The local fire department was called at 5:25 a.m. and arrived on site at 5:50 a.m. In the meantime, site personnel at-tempted to extinguish the flames with the use of available extinguishers and by removing the burning timbers 2 rom the immediate area of the main steam line. The items sustaining obvious damage include some safety- and non-safety-related elec-

, trical cables. Ebasco has coordinated tests to determine whether or not metal-lurgical damage occurred to the main steam line and its associated supports, re-straints, and accessories.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS The following is a safety evaluation for the electrical cable:

If the cable insulation has been degraded, there is the possibility that during an accident, the cables will fail to carry signals for safety grade instrumenta-tion and/or control. Thus, several safety systems could become degraded and not be able to carry out their safety function. Therefore, if these cables were not replaced, the safety of the plant would be affected.

The following is the safety evaluation of the line:

Based on the report of Ebasco's Materials Applications Group, the line and associ-a..ad components are essentially undamaged (outside of the exterior coatings), and t.te safety of the plant would not be affected. However, some of the components require coatings for corrosion protection; thus, subsequent corrosion could weaken these items and prevent them from carrying out their safety function. Therefore, if the components are lef t uncorrected (i.e. , recoated), the safety of the plant could be affected.

4

CORRECTIVE ACTION Immediately following the fire, the above mentioned area was secured and placed off limits to all personnel with the exception of Security and Safety personnel pending an investigation. On October 16, 1981 Ebasco Quality Assurance person-nel were permitted to enter the area. On that date, Nonconformance Report No.

W3-3093 was initiated.

a) In order to prevent recurrence of similar incidents to the extent feasible, all wood being used throughout the plant island bcs been replaced with ap-proved fire retardant material.

b) Mechanical: Ebasco Materials Applications personnel have evaluated the in-formation provided by Ebasco Site Engineering and Quality Assurance, and the conclusions drawn are that:

1) The heat produced by the subject fire did not produce any detrimental effects on the mechanical properties of the portions of the Nuclear Safety Class 2 Main Steam Piping Spools, Pipe Hanger Assembly MSRR-18, or Pipe Restraint FR1 exposed to the fire.

2) The hardness test data obtained from the components evaluated did not indicate the presence of any unacceptable hard areas which would be as-sociated with the presence of a martensitic structure caused by heating to temperatures above the transformation temperature and rapid cooling.

3) The components exposed to the subject fire will be acceptable for their intended service following cleaning to remove soot deposits, scale, and b71stered paint and restoration of the surfaces in accordance with the respective design specification requirements.

c) Civil: Ebasco Civil Construction has directed the painting contractor to per-form the following work as related to the damaged items or areas:

1) Restraint P4L-El-W1: The restaint will require only removal of surface discoloration and reapplication of Ameron-Amercoat 90 except for an area approximately from El. +46 to El. +49 on northwestern, vertical member of restraint. The large area of exposed metal and the several isolated spots of exposed metal will require surface preparation by sandblasting l and reapplication of Ameron-Dimetcote EZ primer with Ameron-Amercoat 90 l

top coat. Structural steel shall be treated in one of the above methods l depending on extent of damage.

2) Support MSRR-18: Remove strut and clamp portions of support to Sline (painting contractor) blast yard for sand blast surface preparation and reapplication of Ameron-Dimeccoat EZ primer.

3) Main Steam Line: Prepare entire surface where there l's damage to coating by sand blasting and reapply Ameron-Dimetcote EZ primer.

This work will be completed by March 31, 1982.

_3_

d) Electrical: As noted on the Nonconformance Report. Ebasco Engineering has investigated, evaluated, and dispositioned all electrical components in-volved. Pullout and repull documents have been issued as applicable for cables and tests. A partial disposition identified and designated the

areas of assignment. Ebasco Engineering defined the cable trays, cables, and conduit involved. All documents such as related pullslips, meggaring, and inspection have been completed. Repair work necessary to restore electrical integrity has been completed.

As previously mentioned, the civil portion of the corrective action should be completed by March 31, 1982, with a Final Report to the USNRC to follow by April 16, 1982.

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