ML19351E575

Forwards LER 80-024/03L-0

ML19351E575
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	12/05/1980
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML16148A395	List: ML16148A394 ML19351E575
References
NUDOCS 8012100466
Download: ML19351E575 (3)

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A DIJKE POWER . COMPANY Powra Dust.n

NO 422 Soctri Cattacu Srazer. CuAnt.orTE. N. C. ana4a WIL6] AM O. #4 R M E R, g R,

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r 3. .c s 3 December 5, 1980 Mr. James P. O'Reill.y, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II.

101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportabla Occurrence Report R0-270/80-24 This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded. mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly.yours,

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William O. Par:*er, Jr.

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4 Attachment ec: Director Mr. Bill Lavallee

,, Office of Management & Progran Analysis Nuclear Safety Analysis Center

-- Ar'USNRC m, P. O. Box 10412 4 3. Washington, D..C. 20555 Palo Alto, California 94303

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OUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 Recorr Number: R0-270/80-24 Report Date: December 5, 1980 Occurrence Date: November 5,1980 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: 23 RPI Pump Declared Inoperable Due to High Upper Motor Bearing Temperature Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 2 - 100% FP Description of Occurrence:

At 2334 on November 5,1980, the 2B High Pressure Injection (RPI) Pump g was declared inoperable due to a high upper bearing temperature of 268 F.

This constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.3.1.c.2(b) and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Unit 2 was operating with the 2B HPI pump supplying seal injection to the RCP and RCS makeup. The Emergency Supply of LPSW was determined to be lined up, and the normal supply was isolated at approximately 2230.

At 2238, a cceputer alarm of 201 F on the 23 HPI pump appeared on the alan. iideo. This alarm went unnoticed. At 2306, a printout was made as a part of monitoring the HPI pumps, but the high camperature on the upper motor bearing was not noticed. At 2334, the alarm was noticed and verified. At this time, the 2A RPI pump was placed in service and the 2B RPI pump was declared inoperable. Soon after placing the 1A HPI pump in service, the bearing temperature on that pump began increasing. The normal cooling water was removed from isolation at this time. The bypass valva was also opened to allow more flow to the pump bearing. The temperature of the bearing stabilized at approximately 175 F.

Apparent Cause or Occurrence:

The apparent cause for the high temperature was the isolation of the normal cooling water supply to the Unit 2 HPI pumps. This incident was the result of personnel error, equipment malfunction, and design deficiency. The personnel error resulted from the alarm going unnoticed for 47 miautes.

The equipment malfunction resulted from something obstructing the flew of the emergency cooling water supply. This obstruction was the result of a stuck check valve and a partially closed filter. The design deficiency resulted from the inability of the bearing cooling system to supply more than minimum cooling water to the bearing. This appears to be related to pipe size and materials used.

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Anclysis of Occurrence: .

uith the unit at full power, Technical Specification 3.3 requires all three HPI pumps to be operable in the event that emergency core cooling is needed. If one HPI pump is inoperable, the pump must be restored to operability within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or the unit must be reduced to below 60~ FP.

During the period of the inoperability of the 2B HPI pump, both the 2A and 2C HPI pumps were opersble, as well as all other ECC systems. In addition, the HPS'd was available to supply the coolers if required to do so. Unit 2 was shut down for a planned maintenance outage at 1636 on November 7, 1980, which was well within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period allowed. Thus, this incident i was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

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Corrective Action:

9 The personnel involved have been counseled on shift coverage and monitoring procedures. Appropriate disciplinary actions have been taken, and an effective Control Roon Monitoring Program was established. A work order wa, issued to investigate the flow degradation in the emergency cooling line. The cooling water system for the HPI pump motor bearing cooling jackets will be upgraded to provide additional flow. Operations will consider revising the weekly HPI cooler flow check to verify that both normal and emergency flow paths are operable.

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